BSS 186/486
NATO & European Security
Professor Schuyler Foerster
Fulbright Distinguished Chair in Social Studies
Department of Political Science
Masaryk University
Thursday 09:45 - 11:15 am + 11:30 am – 1:00 pm
2 March – 13 April

Course Objectives
üHistorical challenge of finding peace &security in Europe üNATO’s creation; US unique peacetime
security guarantee üNATO in the Cold War … strategic debates, bipolar world üNATO after the Cold
War: enlargement in Europe, new missions in the Balkans & Afghanistan üNATO’s future: prospects for
sustained adaptability in a changing world
ü

Course Requirements
üWritten essays (75%)
ü5 x 15 points ~ 500 words … listed in the syllabus
üCrisis simulation team strategy paper (10%)
ü1-page joint point (bullet) paper – 10 points for each member
üSeminar preparation, engagement, participation (15%)
üPrepare
üEngage
üParticipate
A – 90-100%
B – 80-89%
C – 70-79%
D – 60-69%
E– 50-59%
F – 0-49%

Main Textbooks
üGülur AYBET & Rebecca MOORE (eds).  NATO: In Search of a Vision (Washington: Georgetown University
Press, 2010) üBrian J. COLLINS.  NATO: A Guide to the Issues (New York: Praeger, 2011) üStan
SLOAN.  Permanent Alliance?  NATO and the Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to Obama (Continuum
International Publishing Group, Inc, 2010) üDavid YOST.  NATO’s Balancing Act (Washington: US
Institute of Peace, 2014)
üOther readings distributed electronically through IS
ü

Structure of Each Session
üEach week – 2 x 90-minute sessions
ü0945-1115 – PC-25 – classroom lecture
ü1130-1300 – U-34 – seminar discussion [see syllabus for ?]
üEssays due in class each week (except 1st and last classes)
üFinal week (13 April) – Crisis Simulation
üClass will divide into teams, with individual roles
üContext will be hypothetical future crisis
üSimulate NATO decision-making

Course Overview
ü2.3: The Genesis of NATO
²9.3: NATO in the Cold War
²16.3: NATO After the Cold War: Dilemmas of Enlargement
²23.3: NATO & Post-Cold War Conflicts: The Balkans
²30.3: NATO & Post-9.11 Conflicts: Afghan, Iraq, Libya, Syria
²6.4: NATO, Russia, & Ukraine
ü13.4: NATO’s Future: How Will it Respond? [crisis simulation]
²Note: 5 essays at beginning of class [see syllabus]

The Genesis of NATO
Session I
2 March 2017

Backdrop to NATO
üPost World War II attempts at reconciliation w/USSR
ü1947-48 turning points
üTruman Doctrine
üMarshall Plan
üFall of Prague
üBerlin Airlift
üKennan – “containment” doctrine (1947)
üVandenberg (R-MI) Resolution in US Senate (1948)
üPrinciple of “self-help and mutual aid”

Formation of NATO
üTruman & UK Prime Minister Ernst Bevin
üDunkirk & Brussels Pact ~ “self-help & mutual aid”
üNo anticipation of enduring US military commitment
üPolitical statement was sufficient
üPrecedent – “constitutional processes” … Art IV vs Art V
ü1949 – another turning point (USSR; PRC)
ü1950 – NSC ’68 & Korean War
üAcheson to NATO Ministerial: armed FRG in NATO (1955)
üPleven Plan … Euro Defense Community … then FRG
ü

Look-ahead to 9 March
üNATO in the Cold War
üEssay #1 DUE IN CLASS:
üTo what extent is NATO a unique security alliance, and was it the “right answer” for post-World
War II security in Europe?
üSelect NATO Country Team
üUS, UK, FR, GE, CZ, PL, HU, EE, LT, TU
üReading Assignment:
üCollins, Chapters 4 & 5 [in FSS library]
üSloan, Chapters 3 & 4 [in FSS library]

Seminar Discussion
üWas NATO the “right answer” for post-World War II security in Europe?


NATO in the Cold War
Session II
9 March 2017

EDC “non” – FRG “ja”
ü1950 – Acheson: rearm FRG as NATO member
üPleven Plan … European Defense Community
üUltimately rejected by France in 1954 … concerns:
üResurgent Germany might pose a threat
üSuccessful EDC might encourage US to leave Europe
üUS might actually provoke a way & drag Europeans in
üUS focused on nuclear deterrent ... Others viewed as unreliable
üRussian proposals for “European Defense Conference” (no US)
ü1955 – rearmed, sovereign FRG joins NATO
ü

Debating European Defense
ü1952 Lisbon Force Goals
ü90 divisions for defense of Europe
üNever did happen … never could happen
üUS: 100,000 in 1950 … peak of 400,000 by 1954
üBurden sharing debate
üEuropeans could never make up the difference
üUS highest per capita expense
üConventional defense of Europe – Desirable?  Affordable?

US Forces in Europe
New
Look
End of
Cold War

Types of Deterrence
üHOW do we deter?
üDeterrence by denial
ü“I can defend … and you will not win”
üDeterrence by punishment
ü“I cannot defend … but you will pay an unacceptable price”
üON BEHALF OF WHOM do we deter?
üBasic (or “passive”) deterrence – deter attack on oneself
üExtended deterrence – deter attack on someone else
üDeterrence vs. Reassurance (Sir Michael Howard, 1982)

Deterrence vs Defense in NATO
ü1952:  Lisbon Force Goals – defend NATO with troops
ü1953:  Eisenhower/Dulles – US “New Look”
üConventional defense unaffordable to US AND Allies
üAdvent of both “fusion” and “tactical” nuclear weapons
ü1955 “Carte Blanche” NATO exercise in FRG (simulated)
ü2 days – 300 “tactical” bombs – estimated 4.5 million casualties
ü1958: Berlin Crisis
üIs “defense” possible?  Is “deterrence” credible?
ü

“Flexible Response”
üKennedy/Johnson Administration (1961-1969)
üAdvent of the Missile Age (“Sputnik” 1957)
ü“New Look” too risky for the US
üUS & USSR only at risk if escalate to strategic nuclear weapons
üUS needs “options” – in Europe and in rest-of-world (Vietnam)
üEuropeans unwilling to risk “defense”
üBut need to keep US presence in Europe “sustainable”
üFrench – de Gaulle out of integrated military structure [‘66]

1967 “compromise”
üMC 14/3 NATO Strategy of Flexible Response
üAccepted by Defense Planning Committee (no French veto)
ü“as late as possible but as early as necessary”
üHarmel Report
ü“Military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary.”
üRecognition of irreconcilable contradictions
üNo “light switches” … must be “both/and” & controlled
üHope that political solution removes security contradictions

But it didn’t quite work out
üDétente enabled German Ostpolitik but still divided Europe
üArms Control provided inherently limited foundation
üStrategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I & SALT II)
üCSCE/Helsinki Final Act important to Germany, not US
üMutual & Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) not serious
üBy 1979, détente was “dead”
üSoviet invasion of Afghanistan
üSALT II signed by not ratified in US – viewed as destabilizing
üSoviet deployment of SS-20’s led to missile crisis

The Euromissile Debate
üIntermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) changed the strategic landscape
üUSSR could hold all of Europe “at risk” without using strategic systems limited under START
üUS could not hold USSR at risk unless US strategic systems
üPlausible scenario: Soviet conventional attack + ability to deter NATO’s use of nuclear weapons =
incentive to attack
üNATO’s 1979 “Double Zero” decision … 0 INF or deploy
ü1983 deployment of Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) & Pershing II capable of striking USSR

The Cold War thaws …
ü1983 INF missile deployments while Geneva arms control talks go nowhere – no one in Moscow to say
“Da”
üAfter 1986 … Gorbachev “perestroika” / “glasnost”
üBegin withdrawal from Afghanistan
üAccepts on-site-inspection in Stockholm (CDE Agreement)
üReykjavik Summit “failure” leads to INF Treaty in 1987
üSignal willingness to consider real reductions in conventional forces in Europe … leads to CFE in
1990
üSTART I (1991) & START II (1993) – real reductions

NATO: “now what”
ü1990-1992 – NATO’s world had fundamentally changed:
üReunified Germany in NATO (4+2 Agreement)
üWarsaw Pact dissolved … Soviet forces out of Europe
üSoviet Union dissolved (December 1991)
üUS draws down NATO troop levels after Desert Storm
üUS pulls out almost all nuclear weapons from Europe
üNATO’s chronic, insoluble strategic dilemma ended [??]
üNo more dominant conventional threat on its borders
üNo more need for reassurance of Allies on US deterrent

Look-ahead to 16 March
üNATO After the Cold War: The Dilemmas of Enlargement
üEssay #2 DUE IN CLASS:
üExplain why NATO strategy throughout the Cold War remained ambiguous about the role of nuclear
weapons.
üReading Assignment:
üSloan, Chapters 5, 6, & 10 [in FSS library]
üYost, Chapter 8 [in FSS library]
üAybet & Moore, Chapter 7 (Kanet) [in FSS library]
üNATO’s Strategic Concepts – 1991 & 1999 [NATO website]

Seminar Discussion
üWhat issues plagued NATO strategy during the Cold War, and how were they resolved?


NATO After the Cold War:
Dilemmas of Enlargement
Session III
16 March 2017

Looking back …
üThe problem with “lines” …
üTo include a broader membership in this new alliance “... would amount to a final militarization
of the present line through Europe ... [and] create a situation in which no alteration or
obliteration of that line could take place without having an accentuated military significance.”
üGeorge Kennan memorandum to US Secretary of State George Marshall & Deputy Secretary of State Bob
Lovett, 1948
üSo what to do when the “line” finally disappears?

1991 Strategic Concept
üHistoric changes ~ fulfillment of Harmel Report
ü“Monolithic, massive & potentially immediate threat … has disappeared.”
ü“Great deal of uncertainty and risks to security remain.”
üAdverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social, and
political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes … may lead to crises
inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts.”
üSeek broader patterns of bilateral & multilateral cooperation

1999 Strategic Concept
ü“Broad approach to security” ~ pol / econ / soc / environ
üNew “EuroAtlantic security structure in which NATO plays a central part” (OSCE, EU, WEU, UN)
ü“Essential new activities in interest of wider stability”
üDepth of commitment ~ end suffering & conflict in Balkans
üConflict prevention … crisis management … crisis response
üEmphasis on cooperation with EU
üEuropean Security and Defense Identity
üCombined Joint Task Force

Tasks of the Alliance
ü1991
üProvide indispensable stable security foundation through democratic institutions and peaceful
resolution of disputes
üServe as forum for Allied consultations (Article 4)
üDeter & defend (Articles 5 & 6)
ü“Preserve the strategic balance in Europe”
ü1999
üProvide indispensable stable security foundation through democratic institutions and peaceful
resolution of disputes
üServe as forum for Allied consultations (Article 4)
üDeter & defend (Articles 5 & 6)
üContribute to effective conflict prevention, crisis response ops
üPartnership beyond membership

Partnership for Peace (1994)
üAll former Soviet, Warsaw Pact, neutrals in Europe
üOther “global partners” since 2011
ü“build individual relationship” with NATO
üEuroAtlantic Partnership Council [today]
ü28 Members
ü22 Partners
ü7 from Mediterranean Dialogue
ü4 from Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
ü8 “global partners”
ü
ü

Who’s Who … & When?
1.Belgium
2.Canada
3.Denmark
4.France
5.Italy
6.Luxembourg
7.Netherlands
8.Iceland
9.Norway
10.Portugal
11.UK
12.USA
13.Greece (‘52)
14.Turkey (’52)
15.Germany (‘55)
1.Armenia
2.Azerbaijan
3.Belarus
4.Georgia
5.Kazakhstan
6.Kirgizstan
7.Moldova
8.Russia
9.Tajikistan
10.Turkmenistan
11.Ukraine
12.Uzbekistan
13.Bosnia-Herzegovina
14.FYROM/Macedonia
15.Serbia
ü
16.Spain (‘82)
17.Czech (‘99)
18.Hungary (‘99)
19.Poland (‘99)
20.Estonia (‘04)
21.Latvia (‘04)
22.Lithuania (‘04)
23.Bulgaria (‘04)
24.Romania (‘04)
25.Slovakia (’04)
26.Slovenia (‘04)
27.Albania (‘09)
28.Croatia (‘09)
•invited
29.Montenegro (?)
30.
30.
ü
16.Austria
17.Finland
18.Ireland
19.Malta
20.Sweden
21.Switzerland
•PARTNERS
•
•MEMBERS
•

The Enlargement Debate
üApril 1993: Clinton w/Vaclav Havel & Lech Walesa
üClinton foreign policy theme: promote democracy
üTony Lake (NSC): “The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement …of
the world’s free community of market democracies.” [1993]
üBureaucratic pushback:
üDefense: Partnership for Peace more practical
üState: Enlargement would antagonize Russia

The Enlargement Decision
üDecisive arguments:
üDemocracy in Central Europe fragile; need assurance
üRussia had cooperated on 4+2 … why not this?
üNeed to coordinate “enlargement track” and new initiatives regarding Russia & Ukraine
üGradual ... not “fast track” time line: 1994-1997
üPracticalities: 1,200 NATO Standardization Agreements
üMay 1997 – signing of NATO-Russia Founding Act
üJuly 1997 – invitation to PO, HU, CZ

Consultation Commitments
üArticle 4, Washington Treaty (1949)
ü“The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial
integrity, political independence, or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”
üParagraph 8, Partnership for Peace Framework Document (1994)
ü“NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a
direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.”
ü

NATO-Russia Founding Act
[May 1997]
ü“NATO and Russia will promptly consult within the Permanent Joint Council in case one of the
Council members perceives a threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or
security.
ü“… to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate, ... joint decisions and joint action ….
ü“... do not provide NATO or Russia, in any way, with a right of veto over the actions of the
other, nor do they infringe upon or restrict the rights of NATO or Russia to independent
decision-making and action.”
üRecite international obligations … aspirational cooperation
ü

Unilateral NATO Assurances
ü“… in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will [ensure] the necessary
interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent
stationing of substantial combat forces.
üRussia will exercise similar restraint in its force deployments …
ü“… no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members,
… and do not foresee any future need to do so.
ü“… no intention, no plan, and no reason to establish nuclear weapon storage sites on the territory
of those members

NATO Ukraine Charter
July 1997
ü“Distinctive partnership” between NATO and Ukraine
ü“Allies ... support Ukrainian sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity, democratic
development, economic prosperity and its status as a non-nuclear weapon state, and the principle of
inviolability of frontiers ....”
ü~ December 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances
ü“NATO and Ukraine will develop a crisis consultative mechanism to consult together whenever
Ukraine perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or
security.”
üAnticipated closer, substantive cooperation
ü

Reaffirming the “Open Door”?
ü2008 Bucharest Summit:  “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for
membership in NATO.  We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO …
üMembership Action Plan …
ü2016 Warsaw Summit … “recognized progress”
üFYROM … as soon as agreement on “name”
üMontenegro … Bosnia-Herzegovina … Serbia
üDifferent levels of cooperation and planning (in that order)

Look-ahead to 23 March
üNATO & Post-Cold War Conflicts: The Balkans
üEssay #3 DUE IN CLASS:
üHas NATO enlargement increased European security?
üWhy or Why not?  Address counter-arguments
üReading Assignment:
üSloan, Chapter 8 [in FSS library]
üWebber, “The Kosovo War” [posted in IS]
üAybet & Moore, Chapter 8 [in FSS library]

Seminar Discussion
üAre there limits to NATO enlargement?  What & why?


NATO & Post-Cold War Conflicts: The Balkans
Session IV
23 March 2017

Yugoslav Civil War
ü1980: death of Tito … power-sharing arrangements
ü1989: Milosevic at 600th anniversary of Battle of Kosovo
ü1991: Slovenia & Croatia declare independence
ü1992: Bosnia declares independence … Sarajevo shelling ü1993: UN 6 x “Safe Areas” … [Srebrenica
massacre 1995]
ü1994: NATO first air combat sorties
ü1995: Dayton Peace Accords re Bosnia
ü1995: NATO IFOR (32 states; 52,000 troops); SFOR til 2004
ü

Spillover to Kosovo
üAlbanian/Muslim enclave in Serbia (Serb enclave within)
üAutonomous region status revoked 1989 by Milosevic
üKosovo Liberation Army formed 1991 … attacks 1995
üSpiral of violence & atrocities
üSep 1998 – UNSC Resolution ~ 250,000 refugees
üNext day … NATO “activation warning”
ü30 January 1999 … NAC gave “preauthorization” of bombing
ü23 March-3 June – bombing campaign

Lessons Learned?
üThere is a difference between “legal” and “legitimate”
üThe sometimes inadequacy of law and diplomacy
üForce in the pursuit of peace is justified
üBut it still may not succeed
üMilitary force can change the “situation on the ground”
üBut it may not always “compel” a political solution
üIf force is used, then be clear about the objectives
ü… which must be political, not military
üDiplomacy is necessary before using military force …
ü… and just as necessary afterwards to avoid renewed conflict

Look-ahead to 30 March
üNATO & Post-9.11 Conflicts: Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria
üEssay #4 DUE IN CLASS:
üHow can NATO ensure peace in the Balkans?
üReading Assignment:
üSloan, Chapters 9 & 11 [in FSS library]
üYost, Chapters 4 & 5 [in FSS library]

Seminar Discussion
üHow should we assess NATO’s actions in the Balkans?


NATO & Post 9.11 Conflicts: Afghan, Iraq, Libya, Syria
Session V
30 March 2017

Look-ahead to 6 April
üNATO, Russia, & Ukraine
üEssay #5 DUE IN CLASS:
üCHANGE: 1 page … What should be NATO’s future priorities?
üReading Assignment:
üSloan, Chapter 7 [in FSS library]
üAybet & Moore, Chapter 5 (Smith) [in FSS library]
üFoerster, “NATO’s Return” [posted in IS]
üCecire, “Russia’s Art of War” [posted in IS]
üNATO-Russia-Ukraine documents [NATO website]

Post 9.11 Conflicts
Global NATO?
üAfghanistan ~ response to invocation of Article 5
üIraq ~ thanks but no thanks, US
üLibya ~ France & Italy force NATO’s hand
üSyria ~ paralysis
ü
üIs there a pattern?
üIs NATO “stretching its legs” or “finding its limits”?
ü

Afghanistan
üInitially U.S. reluctant to engage NATO in Afghanistan
ü“The coalition must not be permitted to determine the mission.”  (SecDef Rumsfeld, September 2001)
üBy December 2001 … Bonn Agreement
üInternational Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
üUK command … then Turkey … then Germany/Netherlands
üAugust 2003 – NATO officially takes command of ISAF
ü6,500 to 10,000 troops in 2003 … over 60,000 by 2009
üOperation Enduring Freedom … additional 38,500 U.S. troops

Afghanistan -- An Assessment
üThe Good News:
üNATO comprehensive support in spite of Iraq War
üAlliance consensus over a decade in global mission despite challenges in Afghanistan and domestic
support at home
üSome effective reconstruction efforts

Afghanistan -- An Assessment
üThe Good News:
üNATO comprehensive support in spite of Iraq War
üAlliance consensus over a decade in global mission despite challenges in Afghanistan and domestic
support at home
üSome effective reconstruction efforts
üThe Bad News:
üAs a counterinsurgency effort, it has not been a success
üNo consensus on priorities:
üCounterterrorism vs Counterinsurgency vs Reconstruction

Iraq 2003
ü2002 UN Security Council debate
üU.S. & UK vs. France & Germany
üNo “trigger”
üNo credible connection between Saddam & 9.11
ü“coalition of the willing: U.S., UK, Poland, Spain [why?]
üMarch 2003-June 2004 … war & U.S. occupation
üNATO officially on the sidelines
üOthers (e.g. Germany) joined post-war training effort, once Iraqi sovereignty restored … but
impact?

Libya 2011
üFebruary 2011 – Libyan “Arab Spring” uprisings
üUNSC – sanctions, froze bank assets, arms embargo, war crimes to ICC
üArab League suspended Qaddafi, asked for no-fly zone
üUNSCR 1973 authorized states, “regional organizations”
ü“… all necessary means to protect civilians …” [meaning Qaddafi]
ü“… excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory
üFirst invocation of “Responsibility to Protect”
ü
ü

Syria
üLimits to coalition
üNo UNSC Resolution
üNo Alliance consensus
üInevitable conflict with Russia
üComplications with Turkey
üNATO SecGen: “use of force would complicate matters …”
ü
ü

Global NATO?
üClear competence when:
üBacking by UN Security Council resolution
üEuropean allies not otherwise directly involved
üDefined political objectives
üConfined role of military force
üNot a diversion from more “core” missions
ü
üAre Afghanistan and Libya exceptions or harbingers?

Lessons Learned?
Would you change any of these from Balkans?
üThere is a difference between “legal” and “legitimate”
üThe sometimes inadequacy of law and diplomacy
üForce in the pursuit of peace is justified
üBut it still may not succeed
üMilitary force can change the “situation on the ground”
üBut it may not always “compel” a political solution
üIf force is used, then be clear about the objectives
ü… which must be political, not military
üDiplomacy is necessary before using military force …
ü… and just as necessary afterwards to avoid renewed conflict

Look-ahead to 6 April
üNATO, Russia, & Ukraine
üEssay #5 DUE IN CLASS:
üCHANGE: 1 page … What should be NATO’s future priorities?
üReading Assignment:
üSloan, Chapter 7 [in FSS library]
üAybet & Moore, Chapter 5 (Smith) [in FSS library]
üFoerster, “NATO’s Return” [posted in IS]
üCecire, “Russia’s Art of War” [posted in IS]
üNATO-Russia-Ukraine documents [NATO website]

Seminar Discussion
üHow should NATO address conflict in the Middle East?


NATO, Russia, & Ukraine
Session VI
6 April 2017

NATO 2010 Strategic Concept
Active Engagement – Modern Defense
ü“fundamental & enduring purpose … safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by
political and military means.”
üCollective Defense ~ Article 5 … deter & defend
üCrisis Management ~ “political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the
potential to affect Alliance security”
üCooperative Security ~ “engage actively to enhance int’l security”
ücontribute actively to arms control, non-proliferation, & disarmament …
ükeep the door to membership … open to all European democracies that meet NATO’s standards.
ü“Today, the EuroAtlantic area is at peace … the threat of conventional attack is low” …  “historic
success”

Wales Summit Declaration
 September 2014
ü“Russia’s aggressive actions against Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe
whole, free, and at peace.”
üGrowing instability from Middle East to North Africa … transnational threats
üNATO Readiness Action Plan + Spearhead Force (5,000)
üSupport reinforcement capacity – 8 C2 centers
ü2 combat brigades of prepositioned equipment
üNATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF)
ü“aim to move towards the 2% guideline within a decade”
ü

ü“We condemn in the strongest terms Russia’s escalating and illegal intervention in Ukraine …
ü“… violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty & territorial integrity …
ü“... do not and will not recognize illegal and illegitimate ‘annexation’ of Crimea”
ü“We support sanctions imposed by the EU and others …”
ü“Suspend all practical civilian & military cooperation between NATO & Russia … political channels
… remain open” [Amb]
ü“commend people of Ukraine … encourage Ukraine to further promote an inclusive political process …
show restraint”
Wales Summit Declaration
 NATO – Russia – Ukraine

Warsaw Summit Communique
 July 2016
ü“There is an arc of insecurity and instability along NATO’s periphery and beyond … a range of
security challenges and threats that originate both from the east and from the south.”
ü“Enhanced forward presence”
üBeginning 2017 [January 2017 exercise in Poland: 1,500 troops]
üMultinational forces … voluntary, sustainable, rotational basis”
ü4 battalions (CA, GE, UK, US) in Estonia Latvia, Lithuania, Poland
ü4,000 U.S. troops (combat brigade) + 2,000 prepositioned equipment
üRomania ~ multinational “framework brigade” for training for operations in SE Europe, Black Sea

Range of Security Threats
üMilitary intimidation ~ force presence, incursions in air, sea and land operations … intent to
use?
ü“Hybrid” or “non-linear” warfare
üGoals political ~ means are disruptive, cheap, risk-averse
üShaping the narrative – defining alternative realities
ü“Reflexive Control” to shape opponents’ responses
ü“Four D’s” of disinformation
üDismiss – Distort – Distract – Dismay
üHow to assess – defeat – deny – coordinate NATO response
ü
ü

Strategic Questions
A guide for crisis decision-making
üWhat “end states” does NATO want to achieve?
üWhat “end states” can NATO accept?  At what cost?
üWhat are Russia’s strategic goals?  Others’?
üHow does NATO address those goals to avoid conflict yet maintain the integrity of the Alliance?
üWhat are NATO’s “redlines”?
üDoes NATO have a comprehensive set of political and military tools with which to respond?
üMeans must be commensurate with ends
ü

Look-ahead to 13 April
üNATO’s Future: How will it respond to the next crisis?
üSee ADVANCE BACKGROUND PACKAGE
üCrisis Simulation TEAM Point Paper DUE IN CLASS:
üReading Assignment:
üAybet & Moore, Chapter 1 (Shea) [in FSS library]
üNATO Strategic Concept (2010) [NATO website]
üCome prepared to:
üThink hard! … Work creatively in a team! … Have fun!

Crisis Simulation – 13 April
be “in role” – bring name tags
üCOUNTRY
üCroatia
üCzech Republic
üEstonia
üFrance
üGermany
üGreece
üNorway
üPoland
üSlovakia
üSpain
üTurkey
üUnited Kingdom
üUnited States
üNATO [Sec Gen & CMC]
ü
üFOREIGN MINISTER
üSušovská
üDoskočil
üMartináková
üBichon
üWiehe
üKozová
üPitrunová
üBátria
üHavierniková
üRodriguez
üPavelová
üŽilinčik
üChustinová
üKling
•DEFENSE MINISTER
•Vinkler
•Dvořáček
•Saarnio
•Jakubec
•Hošek
•Škripová
•Zita
•Brezden
•Rekšáková
•[vacant]
•Bajerová
•Janičatová
•Vorda
•Běláč

Seminar Discussion
üHow does NATO ensure a future peace in Europe?


NATO’s Future: How Will it Respond to the Next Crisis?
Session VII
13 April 2017

NATO Crisis Simulation
üTEAM Point Papers
üBackground Package
üEvening Update
üMorning Press Update
üPress Injects – Breaking News

Morning Press Updates 1/4
üEstonia PostTimes.  This morning, in Tartu, Estonia, a group called the "Estonian Russian
Alliance" claims that they have occupied Tartu City Hall and called upon Russia to support their
cause in restoring the Baltic borders of the Soviet Union.  There are no known records of the
existence of this group.  Crowds of ethnic Russians surrounded the building and kept Estonian
Homeland security forces at bay. üThis follows anti-Russian protests last night in Tartu, after
which some of Tartu’s 15% ethnic Russian population launched a counter-demonstration, claiming
persecution. üA Kremlin press spokesman repeated Russia’s determination to protect the rights of
Russian minorities living in neighboring countries.
ü

Morning Press Updates 2/4
üMoscow Times.  An explosion in the Moscow subway early this morning—before rush hour—created
extensive damage but few casualties and no fatalities. üA Russian Interior Ministry spokesman said
that the explosives were detonated by a suicide bomber, tentatively identified by forensic evidence
as a Chechen radical.  No groups have claimed credit. üA Kremlin spokesman spoke of the need for
Russia and the West to focus together on a clear common enemy in radicalism and terrorism, instead
of the ‘artificial issues’ currently dividing them.

Morning Press Updates 3/4
üKiev Times.  The Ukrainian Interior Ministry announced today that they had captured four Russian
Spetsnaz soldiers 100 km southwest of Mariupol.  üUnless Russia admitted to its aggression eastern
Ukraine, the Ministry said they would be tried as criminals instead of being treated as prisoners
of war.  üThe Kremlin responded that this would be viewed as a “severe provocation” in what was
already a volatile relationship.
ü

Morning Press Updates 4/4
üAl Jazeera.  Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS, announced through a video that he is still
in Raqqa, in charge of the Caliphate, and that the families of “all our martyrs” are prepared to
die in defense of the city. üBased on reports from Kurdish and Syrian rebel fighters, the Pentagon
said it expected the battle for Raqqa to be bloody and protracted. üWashington Post.  As the battle
for Raqqa nears, Americans are getting increasingly concerned that the U.S. will will lose many
lives in trying to take Raqqa, but to what end?  As Congressman Rand Paul (R-KY) said, “This is not
America’s war.  This is Europe’s war – they’re getting all the refugees.  Where is NATO in this
fight?

Breaking News …
üCNN.  NATO sources report indications of movement of units of a Russian motorized rifle brigade
toward the Estonian border.  Russian Defense Ministry spokesmen indicated that these were only
routine maneuvers.
üThe Warsaw Voice. Poland’s Defense Ministry announced that Polish Air Force F-16’s intercepted a
Russian fighter in Polish airspace and escorted it back to Russian airspace in Kaliningrad without
incident.  The Russian Ministry of Defense had no comment.
üOslo News.  Norway’s Ministry of the Interior reports that the wreckage of a small Russian
intelligence surveillance submarine has washed up on the Norwegian coastline just outside the
Arctic Circle.
ü
ü

Breaking News …
üEl Pais.  This morning there was an explosion in a marketplace in Gibraltar.  There were 15
fatalities—including the suicide bomber who committed the attack—and over 100 seriously wounded.
“Al Qaeda in the Maghreb” has claimed responsibility for the attack.  The Spanish government has
expressed concern that the independent status of Gibraltar makes it difficult for them to control
their border.

North Atlantic Council Agenda
1.Terrorism
üHow to respond to Russian bombing – common enemy of terrorism?
üTerrorist attack in Gibraltar – how to respond?  Similar?
2.Baltic States
üCrisis in Estonia – How to deal with Situation in Tartu?
3.Ukraine
üRussian infantry on Ukrainian land
üMinsk negotiations – Russian-Ukrainian relation – NATO position?
4.Situation in Syria – severe situation in Raqqa - Collective Approach
5.Russian claims of Arctic Circle – how to react?

Military Committee Agenda
1.Terrorism – Moscow & Gibraltar
2.
2.Estonia & Russian troops
3.
3.Ukraine & Russian landbridge
4.
4.Syria/ISIS & battle for Raqqa
5.
5.Arctic & Russian naval escorts