
Party system in the Czech Republic II. Voters and transformation of party politics


Electoral results (1996-2006)



Stable cleavage structure


	ČSSD			KSČM									
	1996	1998	2002	2006	2010	2013		1996	1998	2002	2006	2010	2013
pensioners	0.08	0.1	0.18	0.16	0.26	0.25	pensioners	0.19	0.16	0.19	0.14	0.11	0.11
high education	-0.11	-0.17	0.07	0.03	0.02	0.05	high education	-0.21	-0.23	-0.32	-0.23	-0.19	-0.22
industry	0.08	0.05	-0.01	0.03	0.02	0.03	industry	-0.03	-0.04	-0.05	-0.04	-0.02	-0.03
unemployment	0.33	0.24	-0.07	0.07	0.06	-0.05	unemploymen t	-0.03	0.01	0.08	0	0.01	0.04
bussinesmen	-0.33	-0.33	-0.29	-0.43	-0.28	-0.27	bussinesmen	-0.18	-0.19	-0.19	-0.16	-0.07	-0.12
catholics	0	0	0.04	0.06	0.03	0.04	catholics	-0.04	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	0	-0.01
R^2	0.44	0.44	0.16	0.38	0.43	0.4	R^2	0.25	0.31	0.43	0.38	0.37	0.45
C		ODS	DS			KDU-ČSL							
	1996	1998	2002	2006	2010	2013		1996	1998	2002	2006	2010	2013
pensioners	0.1	0	0.02	-0.03	-0.02	0.01	pensioners	0.01	0.04	0.04	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02
high education	0.33	0.36	0.16	0.26	0.2	0.09	high education	-0.09	-0.11	0.15	-0.01	0.05	0.09
industry	0.02	-0.01	0	-0.02	0.06	-0.01	industry	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0	0.03	0.03
unemployment	-0.3	-0.38	-0.28	-0.41	-0.31	-0.18	unemploymen t	-0.21	-0.22	-0.21	-0.13	-0.02	-0.07
bussinesmen	0.44	0.53	0.4	0.7	0.4	0.15	bussinesmen	0	-0.01	0.15	0.02	-0.01	0
catholics	-0.05	-0.09	-0.07	-0.1	-0.04	-0.02	catholics	0.26	0.24	0.18	0.2	0.14	0.16
R^2	0.56	0.76	0.69	0.77	0.67	0.63	R^2	0.7	0.72	0.62	0.72	0.65	0.68

Electoral results (1996-2013)



Volatility and the success of new political parties

Figure 1: Evolution of volatility and gains of new political parties in the Czech Republic (1992–2010)



Source: Birch (2003), Sikk (2005), Author's calculation

Public Affairs (VV)



Action of Dissatisfied Citizens 2011 (ANO 2011)



Tomio Okamura`s Dawn od Direct Democracy



Who are they?

- Strong populist appeal
- Lack of a clear host ideology
- Solutions: direct democracy (VV, Dawn), managerial way of running the state (ANO 2011)
- New/centrist populist parties (Pop Eleches 2010, Učeň 2008)

Political crisis and the rise of populist parties

- Similar political context preceding both the 2010 and 2013 elections
- Crises and eventually falls of weak(ened) Topolánek and Necas cabinet
- Formation of "non-political" (and popular) caretaker cabinets
- 2009 cancelled early election
- 2013 corruption affair of Prime Minister and head of his Office
- Trust to the parliament and satisfaction with political situation falling off

Affiliation of voters

	Time of electoral decision				Close to a p	arty		
	2006	2010	2013		2002	2006	2010	2013
Always + long time	57.7	45.6	43.2	Yes	56	42.2	38.3	31.2
Last year - months	18	21.7	16.5	No	34.7	53.4	58	65.8
Weeks - election day	23.2	32.3	40.5	DK	9.3	4.4	3.7	3

Political cynicism

	Voting can c	hange some	ething
	2006	2010	2013
Yes	62.3	58.2	53.1
No	15.6	19.6	20.3

Why should one vote for new parties?

H1: The effect of **cleavage voting** will be lower in explanation of voting for new centrist populist parties in comparison to voting for the established political parties.

H2: Voters who perceive **corruption** as a salient issue are more likely to vote for centrist populist parties.

H3: Voters who evaluate the **state of economy** negatively are more likely to vote for centrist populist parties.

H4: Voters who evaluate the **future of economy** negatively are more likely to vote for centrist populist parties.

H5: Voters with low **satisfaction with democracy** are more likely to vote for centrist populist parties.

H6: Voters who do not trust politicians are more likely to vote for centrist populist parties.

H7: Voters who **position themselves** in the centre of political space are more likely to vote for centrist populist parties.

H8: Voters who perceive centrist populist parties **more competent** to solve the most salient political issues are more likely to vote for them in comparison to other political parties.

Results I.

- Cartograms and correlations:
 - TOP 09: concentrated electoral support similar to ODS and SZ
 - VV: dispersed, weak positive correlation with ODS
 - ANO: dispersed, medium positive correlation with ODS, TOP 09 and VV
 - The Dawn: dispersed, very limited similarity to the established parties


Pearson	ČSSD 2006 I	(DU-ČSL 2006	5 KSČM 2006	ODS 2006	SZ 2006	
TOP 09 2010	-0,2	0	-0,33	0,6	0,3	
VV 2010	0	-0,01	-0,19	0,21	0,15	
	ČSSD 2010	ODS 2010	TOP 09 2010	KSČM 2010	KDU-ČSL 2010	VV 2010
ANO 2013	-0,12	0,32	0,32	-0,19	-0,14	0,27
The Dawn 2013	0	-0,03	-0,03	-0,05	0,07	0,18

Results I.


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Pearson	ČSSD 2006 I	KDU-ČSL 2006	6 KSČM 2006	ODS 2006	SZ 2006	
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The Dawn 2013	0	-0,03	-0,03	-0,05	0,07	0,18


Regression results (R²)



Regression results (R²)



Regression results (R²)



Results – model fit

	2006	2010	2013	evolution
class	0.41	0.34	0.36	\downarrow
values	0.56	0.47	0.43	\downarrow
position	0.14	0.11	0.15	
satisfaction	0.44	0.35		\downarrow
cynism		0.18	0.09	
issue and valence	0.12	0.19	0.32	\uparrow
economic voting	0.16		0.10	\downarrow

H1: The effect of **cleavage voting** will be lower in explanation of voting for new centrist populist parties in comparison to voting for the established political parties.

V

H6: Voters who do not **trust politicians** are more likely to vote for centrist populist parties.

+

H7: Voters who **position themselves** in the centre of political space are more likely to vote for centrist populist parties.



H8: Voters who perceive centrist populist parties **more competent** to solve the most salient political issues are more likely to vote for them in comparison to other political parties.



H2: Voters who perceive **corruption** as a salient issue are more likely to vote for centrist populist parties.

X

H3: Voters who evaluate the **state of economy** negatively are more likely to vote for centrist populist parties.

X

H4: Voters who evaluate the **future of economy** negatively are more likely to vote for centrist populist parties.

X

H5: Voters with low satisfaction with democracy are more likely to vote for centrist populist parties.

X

Conclusion

- General patterns of voting have changed
- Differences between the established and the new populist parties in several ways:
- Socio-structural and value based model X new populists
- Political cynicism/dissatisfaction Dawn
- Valence voting
- Prospective economic voting
- Generally weakening of voters affiliation + cleavage voting