Political Culture versus Rational Choice: Explaining Responses to Transition in the Czech
Republic and Slovakia
Author(s): Stephen Whitefield and Geoffrey Evans
Source: British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Jan., 1999), pp. 129-154
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/194299
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B. J. Pol. S. 29, 129-155 Copyright ? 1999 Cambridge University Press
Printed in Great Britain
Political Culture Versus Rational Choice:
Explaining Responses to Transition in the
Czech Republic and Slovakia
STEPHEN WHITEFIELD AND GEOFFREY EVANS*
There has been considerable disagreement among political scientists over t
political culture versus rational choice explanations of democratic and
commitments. However, empirical tests of their relative explanatory pow
evidence have been in short supply. This article employs national probabil
conducted in 1994 to assess differences between Czechs and Slovaks in
democratic norms and liberal attitudes with respect to economic, politi
issues. The applicability of an explanation focusing on long-standing cultura
the two countries is compared with a rational choice explanation based on
in their recent experiences of political and economic transition. It is shown
the expression of support for marketization and democracy in the two countr
relatively parsimoniously in rational choice terms. The explanatory con
culture appears to relate only to a narrow range of attitudes and values.
The debate between 'political cultural' and 'rationalist' exp
Eckstein among others has argued, is central to contemporary
and to an understanding of political phenomena.l However
fundamental and competing perspectives are not easy to f
literature.2 The aim of this article is to take up the emp
evaluating the value of political cultural versus rationalis
context which arguably affords a good test of the exten
usefulness - the case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia
which theory offers the most appropriate and efficient expl
on citizens' orientations towards liberalization.
The term 'political culture' is famously (or notoriously) problematic even
within the camp of scholars who find the term useful. There is little agreement
among its practitioners on its scope and meaning, on how it may be measured,
* Pembroke College, Oxford; and Nuffield College, Oxford, respectively. Responsibility for this
article is held equally by the two authors. The research reported here was commissioned as part of
the Economic and Social Research Council's East-West Programme, phase II, Grant
no. Y309253025 'Emerging Forms of Political Representation and Participation in Eastern Europe'.
The authors would like to thank Karen Henderson, Kieran Williams, Albert Weale and the Journal's
three reviewers for comments on earlier drafts of this article.
Harry Eckstein, 'A Culturalist Theory of Political Change', American Political Science Review,
82 (1988), 789-804.
2 An exception is Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth, 'Political Culture and Regime Type:
Evidence from Nicaragua and Costa Rica', Journal of Politics, 55 (1993), 777-92.
B. J. Pol. S. 29, 129-155 Copyright ? 1999 Cambridge University Press
Printed in Great Britain
Political Culture Versus Rational Choice:
Explaining Responses to Transition in the
Czech Republic and Slovakia
STEPHEN WHITEFIELD AND GEOFFREY EVANS*
There has been considerable disagreement among political scientists over t
political culture versus rational choice explanations of democratic and
commitments. However, empirical tests of their relative explanatory pow
evidence have been in short supply. This article employs national probabil
conducted in 1994 to assess differences between Czechs and Slovaks in
democratic norms and liberal attitudes with respect to economic, politi
issues. The applicability of an explanation focusing on long-standing cultura
the two countries is compared with a rational choice explanation based on
in their recent experiences of political and economic transition. It is shown
the expression of support for marketization and democracy in the two countr
relatively parsimoniously in rational choice terms. The explanatory con
culture appears to relate only to a narrow range of attitudes and values.
The debate between 'political cultural' and 'rationalist' exp
Eckstein among others has argued, is central to contemporary
and to an understanding of political phenomena.l However
fundamental and competing perspectives are not easy to f
literature.2 The aim of this article is to take up the emp
evaluating the value of political cultural versus rationalis
context which arguably affords a good test of the exten
usefulness - the case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia
which theory offers the most appropriate and efficient expl
on citizens' orientations towards liberalization.
The term 'political culture' is famously (or notoriously) problematic even
within the camp of scholars who find the term useful. There is little agreement
among its practitioners on its scope and meaning, on how it may be measured,
* Pembroke College, Oxford; and Nuffield College, Oxford, respectively. Responsibility for this
article is held equally by the two authors. The research reported here was commissioned as part of
the Economic and Social Research Council's East-West Programme, phase II, Grant
no. Y309253025 'Emerging Forms of Political Representation and Participation in Eastern Europe'.
The authors would like to thank Karen Henderson, Kieran Williams, Albert Weale and the Journal's
three reviewers for comments on earlier drafts of this article.
Harry Eckstein, 'A Culturalist Theory of Political Change', American Political Science Review,
82 (1988), 789-804.
2 An exception is Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth, 'Political Culture and Regime Type:
Evidence from Nicaragua and Costa Rica', Journal of Politics, 55 (1993), 777-92.
This content downloaded from 147.251.110.15 on Mon, 20 Feb 2017 13:01:57 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
130 WHITEFIELD AND EVANS130 WHITEFIELD AND EVANS
or on its impact on political behaviour or political development.3 In th
we do not propose a new definition or attempt to resolve the disputes
various adherents of different conceptions of political culture ex
rather, we seek to investigate the applicability of the 'subjectivist
political culture - arguably the most influential one in recent res
subjective approach to political culture theory was developed most
Almond and Verba and more recently by Harry Eckstein.4 From this
to explain an individual's actions or political responses in terms of cult
assume that his/her preferences derive from normative orientatio
mainly, but not exclusively, in childhood from the family and other
of socialization and which are subject to relative continuity over time.
is placed on shared values, beliefs and preferences in the political
have been shaped by common historical understandings. The term
culture' in this article, therefore, is taken to refer, as Archie Brown
to 'the subjective perception of history and politics, the fundamental
values, the foci of identification and loyalty, and the political kno
expectations which are the product of the specific historical exp
nations and groups'.5
An important characteristic of a political culture, at least in this su
form, is that it is shared by large categories of people. William Re
example, has argued that 'to the extent that the object of study is som
culture, it must refer to an entire social grouping'.6 Or, as Elkins and
put it, 'political culture is the property of a collectivity - nation, regi
ethnic community' .7 Normally, the unit of political culture is the nati
national political culture, in turn, is held in some contexts to constrain the
choices taken in mass level politics and, thus, to account for national differences
in certain political phenomena. Where differences are observable between
nations with respect to a dimension of attitudes, such as willingness to tolerate
non-conformist life-styles or to allow freedom of political protest, they would
be explained by a culturalist in terms of long-standing societal norms
transmitted through socialization especially during individuals' formative
3 For a recent critique, see William M. Reisinger, 'The Renaissance of a Rubric: Political Culture
as Concept and Theory', International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 7 (1995), 328-52. See
also John Street, 'Political Culture - From Civic Culture to Mass Culture', British Journal of Political
Science, 24 (1994), 95-104; Archie Brown, 'Political Culture', in A. Kuper and J. Kuper, eds, The
Social Science Encyclopaedia, 2nd edn (London and New York: Routledge, 1996); and Stephen
Welch, The Concept of Political Culture (London: Macmillan, 1993).
4 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and
Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton, NJ Princeton University Press, 1963); Eckstein, 'A
Culturalist Theory of Political Change'.
5 Archie Brown, 'Introduction' in A. H. Brown and J. Gray, eds, Political Culture and Political
Change in Communist States (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 1.
6 Reisinger, 'The Renaissance of a Rubric: Political Culture as Concept and Theory', p. 337
(emphasis added).
7 David J. Elkins and Richard E. B. Simeon, 'A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does
Political Culture Explain?' Comparative Politics, 11 (1979), 127-45, p. 129.
or on its impact on political behaviour or political development.3 In this article
we do not propose a new definition or attempt to resolve the disputes among the
various adherents of different conceptions of political culture explanations;
rather, we seek to investigate the applicability of the 'subjectivist' variant of
political culture - arguably the most influential one in recent research. The
subjective approach to political culture theory was developed most notably by
Almond and Verba and more recently by Harry Eckstein.4 From this perspective,
to explain an individual's actions or political responses in terms of culture is to
assume that his/her preferences derive from normative orientations learned
mainly, but not exclusively, in childhood from the family and other institutions
of socialization and which are subject to relative continuity over time. Emphasis
is placed on shared values, beliefs and preferences in the political sphere that
have been shaped by common historical understandings. The term 'political
culture' in this article, therefore, is taken to refer, as Archie Brown has put it,
to 'the subjective perception of history and politics, the fundamental beliefs and
values, the foci of identification and loyalty, and the political knowledge and
expectations which are the product of the specific historical experience of
nations and groups'.5
An important characteristic of a political culture, at least in this subjectivist
form, is that it is shared by large categories of people. William Reisinger, for
example, has argued that 'to the extent that the object of study is some form of
culture, it must refer to an entire social grouping'.6 Or, as Elkins and Simeon
put it, 'political culture is the property of a collectivity - nation, region, class,
ethnic community' .7 Normally, the unit of political culture is the nation, and this
national political culture, in turn, is held in some contexts to constrain the
choices taken in mass level politics and, thus, to account for national differences
in certain political phenomena. Where differences are observable between
nations with respect to a dimension of attitudes, such as willingness to tolerate
non-conformist life-styles or to allow freedom of political protest, they would
be explained by a culturalist in terms of long-standing societal norms
transmitted through socialization especially during individuals' formative
3 For a recent critique, see William M. Reisinger, 'The Renaissance of a Rubric: Political Culture
as Concept and Theory', International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 7 (1995), 328-52. See
also John Street, 'Political Culture - From Civic Culture to Mass Culture', British Journal of Political
Science, 24 (1994), 95-104; Archie Brown, 'Political Culture', in A. Kuper and J. Kuper, eds, The
Social Science Encyclopaedia, 2nd edn (London and New York: Routledge, 1996); and Stephen
Welch, The Concept of Political Culture (London: Macmillan, 1993).
4 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and
Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton, NJ Princeton University Press, 1963); Eckstein, 'A
Culturalist Theory of Political Change'.
5 Archie Brown, 'Introduction' in A. H. Brown and J. Gray, eds, Political Culture and Political
Change in Communist States (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 1.
6 Reisinger, 'The Renaissance of a Rubric: Political Culture as Concept and Theory', p. 337
(emphasis added).
7 David J. Elkins and Richard E. B. Simeon, 'A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does
Political Culture Explain?' Comparative Politics, 11 (1979), 127-45, p. 129.
This content downloaded from 147.251.110.15 on Mon, 20 Feb 2017 13:01:57 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Political Culture Versus Rational ChoicePolitical Culture Versus Rational Choice
years. Thus, a political culture explanation posits a long and complex chain of
causal explanation, involving historic experiences and foci of groups, which are
transmitted to individuals in a shared manner especially via childhood and
official socialization leading to a particular response to a current set of political
circumstances.
This form of explanation can usefully be counterposed with a rational choic
one which emphasizes situational characteristics, including the social character
istics of the agent, political opportunities and recent experience as fact
shaping an individual's attitudes and behaviour. In this view, individuals
construct and reconstruct their political responses and behaviour on the b
of the combination of available information, resources and constraints. Such a
approach is labelled 'rationalist' by Eckstein although, again, the extent a
meaning of rationality is highly contested.8 Nevertheless, rather than expecti
shared political values among national cultures resulting from the normat
convergence of citizens via the socialization process on common nationa
symbols, myths and foci of loyalty and identification, emphasis on the ration
choice account is given to the importance of contemporary state contex
individual endowments and opportunities for political voice. Thus, as in t
example given above, where differences among nations on a dimension
political attitudes are observed, this account would focus on the immedia
political context and the recent political, economic and social experiences
citizens. The aim of such an approach is to account for differences in national
responses by reference to such proximal factors rather than historicall
entrenched cultural differences. By comparison with the political cultu
approach, therefore, rational choice explanation is rather direct and immediat
in terms of the causal chain of processes required to produce a given attitudin
response;9 individuals assess a given political issue in terms of their rec
experience and calculated future opportunities
The reader might at this point object to our characterization of the subjectivi
variant of political culture theory. Certainly, in recent work Almond has argu
against the sort of dichotomy we have just presented and in favour of
approach to political culture that takes account of institutional factors as well
8 Kirsten Renwick Monroe, 'The Theory of Rational Action', in K. R. Monroe, ed., The Econom
Approach to Politics (New York: Harper Collins, 1991).
9 Critics of rational choice approaches may argue that the apparent relative simplicity of t
causal relationship between experience or opportunity and attitudes disappears when the high c
of the subject's making the calculation are taken into account. By comparison, oriented action is
to reduce transaction costs significantly and thus simplify the decision choice for agents. This v
may be true if agents are being asked to optimize, though this is not an assumption of the notion o
rational choice developed here. However, the supposed simplicity of oriented action from the po
of view of transaction costs is not entirely clear; agents are still required to perform the complex t
of deciding by some criterion under which of a number of possible orientations a particular cur
or prospective phenomenon should be subsumed. It is not at all clear that such a mental enterpr
is less costly than calculations based on referral to recent experience.
years. Thus, a political culture explanation posits a long and complex chain
causal explanation, involving historic experiences and foci of groups, which ar
transmitted to individuals in a shared manner especially via childhood a
official socialization leading to a particular response to a current set of politic
circumstances.
This form of explanation can usefully be counterposed with a rational choic
one which emphasizes situational characteristics, including the social character
istics of the agent, political opportunities and recent experience as fact
shaping an individual's attitudes and behaviour. In this view, individuals
construct and reconstruct their political responses and behaviour on the b
of the combination of available information, resources and constraints. Such a
approach is labelled 'rationalist' by Eckstein although, again, the extent a
meaning of rationality is highly contested.8 Nevertheless, rather than expecti
shared political values among national cultures resulting from the normat
convergence of citizens via the socialization process on common nationa
symbols, myths and foci of loyalty and identification, emphasis on the ration
choice account is given to the importance of contemporary state contex
individual endowments and opportunities for political voice. Thus, as in t
example given above, where differences among nations on a dimension
political attitudes are observed, this account would focus on the immedia
political context and the recent political, economic and social experiences
citizens. The aim of such an approach is to account for differences in national
responses by reference to such proximal factors rather than historicall
entrenched cultural differences. By comparison with the political cultu
approach, therefore, rational choice explanation is rather direct and immediat
in terms of the causal chain of processes required to produce a given attitudin
response;9 individuals assess a given political issue in terms of their rec
experience and calculated future opportunities
The reader might at this point object to our characterization of the subjectivi
variant of political culture theory. Certainly, in recent work Almond has argu
against the sort of dichotomy we have just presented and in favour of
approach to political culture that takes account of institutional factors as well
8 Kirsten Renwick Monroe, 'The Theory of Rational Action', in K. R. Monroe, ed., The Econom
Approach to Politics (New York: Harper Collins, 1991).
9 Critics of rational choice approaches may argue that the apparent relative simplicity of t
causal relationship between experience or opportunity and attitudes disappears when the high c
of the subject's making the calculation are taken into account. By comparison, oriented action is
to reduce transaction costs significantly and thus simplify the decision choice for agents. This v
may be true if agents are being asked to optimize, though this is not an assumption of the notion o
rational choice developed here. However, the supposed simplicity of oriented action from the po
of view of transaction costs is not entirely clear; agents are still required to perform the complex t
of deciding by some criterion under which of a number of possible orientations a particular cur
or prospective phenomenon should be subsumed. It is not at all clear that such a mental enterpr
is less costly than calculations based on referral to recent experience.
131131
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All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
132 WHITEFIELD AND EVANS132 WHITEFIELD AND EVANS
as recent experience. 1 As he puts it, even 'the early advocates of p
explanation recognised that causality worked both ways: attitu
structure and behaviour, and structure and performance in t
attitudes. There was essentially a straw man polemic.' Almond
to cite numerous studies12 undertaken since his pioneering work w
Verba which show that political culture has been subject to c
considerable 'plasticity'.13 And he offers a definition of political c
includes not only the factors present in our characterization above b
such as 'adult experience with governmental, social and econom
ance', concluding that the 'causal arrows between culture and s
performance go both ways'.14
Our view is that under such a definition, the term 'politica
essentially meaningless. This is not to say that reciprocal causa
are unknown to science - though Almond makes no effort to
conditions of reciprocal influence in advance of research, as
approach would dictate. More importantly, if political cultur
subjective socialized orientations and adult experience and eva
performance, the term has become so broad that it is of little the
There is the suspicion that in face of evidence of the failure o
perfectly scientific - specification of the term, defenders of politic
as Almond have so diluted the concept as to make it impossible
or to refute. Rather than attacking a 'straw man' in our characteri
subjectivist variant of political culture, therefore, we would argue
seeking to test a theoretical construct that may turn out to be we
against another approach which is, in advance of the test, equally
possibility of failure; after all, if political culture theory is right,
evident that recent experience is very likely to explain away diffe
groups with distinctive long-standing historical foci of
identification. At the very least, even on Almond's revised definit
expect there to be a large residual of variance between societ
unexplained by recent experience - if there were not, then th
revised definition is even harder to see.
10 Gabriel A. Almond, 'The Study of Political Culture', in Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Ralf
Rytlewski, eds, Political Culture in Germany (London: Macmillan, 1993).
11 Almond, 'The Study of Political Culture' p. 16.
12 For example: S. M. Lipset, and W. Schneider, The Confidence Gap (New York: Free
Press/Macmillan, 1983); D. Kavanagh, 'Political Culture in Britain: The Decline of the Civic
Culture', in G. Almond and S. Verba, eds, The Civic Culture Revisited (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown,
1980); K. Baker, R. Dalton and K. Hildebrandt, Germany Transformed: Political Culture and the
New Politics (Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press, 1981); S. H. Barnes and
M. Kaase et al., Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies (Beverly Hills,
Calif.: Sage, 1979); and R. Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles
Among Western Publics (Princeton, N. J: Princeton University Press, 1977).
13 Almond, 'The Study of Political Culture', p. 18.
14 Almond, 'The Study of Political Culture', p. 15.
as recent experience. 1 As he puts it, even 'the early advocates of political culture
explanation recognised that causality worked both ways: attitudes influence
structure and behaviour, and structure and performance in turn influence
attitudes. There was essentially a straw man polemic.' Almond then goes on
to cite numerous studies12 undertaken since his pioneering work with Sydney
Verba which show that political culture has been subject to change and
considerable 'plasticity'.13 And he offers a definition of political culture which
includes not only the factors present in our characterization above but also others
such as 'adult experience with governmental, social and economic performance',
concluding that the 'causal arrows between culture and structure and
performance go both ways'.14
Our view is that under such a definition, the term 'political culture' is
essentially meaningless. This is not to say that reciprocal causal relationships
are unknown to science - though Almond makes no effort to stipulate the
conditions of reciprocal influence in advance of research, as a scientific
approach would dictate. More importantly, if political culture means both
subjective socialized orientations and adult experience and evaluations of
performance, the term has become so broad that it is of little theoretical value.
There is the suspicion that in face of evidence of the failure of the initial perfectly
scientific - specification of the term, defenders of political culture such
as Almond have so diluted the concept as to make it impossible either to test
or to refute. Rather than attacking a 'straw man' in our characterization of the
subjectivist variant of political culture, therefore, we would argue that we are
seeking to test a theoretical construct that may turn out to be weak or wrong
against another approach which is, in advance of the test, equally subject to the
possibility of failure; after all, if political culture theory is right, it is not at all
evident that recent experience is very likely to explain away differences between
groups with distinctive long-standing historical foci of loyalty and
identification. At the very least, even on Almond's revised definition, we would
expect there to be a large residual of variance between societies to remain
unexplained by recent experience - if there were not, then the value of the
revised definition is even harder to see.
10 Gabriel A. Almond, 'The Study of Political Culture', in Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Ralf
Rytlewski, eds, Political Culture in Germany (London: Macmillan, 1993).
11 Almond, 'The Study of Political Culture' p. 16.
12 For example: S. M. Lipset, and W. Schneider, The Confidence Gap (New York: Free
Press/Macmillan, 1983); D. Kavanagh, 'Political Culture in Britain: The Decline of the Civic
Culture', in G. Almond and S. Verba, eds, The Civic Culture Revisited (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown,
1980); K. Baker, R. Dalton and K. Hildebrandt, Germany Transformed: Political Culture and the
New Politics (Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press, 1981); S. H. Barnes and
M. Kaase et al., Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies (Beverly Hills,
Calif.: Sage, 1979); and R. Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles
Among Western Publics (Princeton, N. J: Princeton University Press, 1977).
13 Almond, 'The Study of Political Culture', p. 18.
14 Almond, 'The Study of Political Culture', p. 15.
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Political Culture Versus Rational ChoicePolitical Culture Versus Rational Choice
In this sense, our explanatory strategy privileges political culture explanation;
whatever is not accounted for by experience may be interpreted as evidence for
the value of political culture. However, it is worth noting that the differences
in the character of the two frameworks ought to incline us to prefer a rational
choice account even if the two theories were equally valid in face of the
evidence. If we were to apply a principle common to adjudicating between
competing theories, Occam's razor, whereby simpler explanations of phenomena
are preferred over more complex ones on grounds of parsimony and a desire
to avoid multiplication of unnecessary causal factors, especially when the
simpler ones are efficient, the advantages of the rational choice perspective are
clear; as pointed out above, it requires much less complexity with respect to the
causal relationship between the subject and the political object. As John Street
has argued, to justify itself empirically political culture theory would have to
demonstrate that it is an indispensable and decisive factor in an explanation over
and above rational considerations.15 Thus, where experience and assessments
of future prospects are able to account for differences between groups, we feel
justified in asserting that the rational choice perspective is preferable to a
political culture one.
Fortunately, for a number of reasons, a case study of the Czech Republic and
Slovakia is particularly appropriate to the evaluation of the relative merits of the
two approaches. Indeed, many modem political culture studies were stimulated
by questions arising from the impact of communism on societies such as
Czechoslovakia.'6 The Czechoslovak case allows for clear hypotheses to be
framed concerning cultural differences and their sources which enable the
complexities of historically transmitted culture versus rational choice responses
to be disentangled.
First, the two countries had distinctive political histories and national
traditions before 1918, and some commentators have argued that these traditions
reasserted themselves since 1989. As a result of their distinctive histories,
important divergences in political orientations are evident among the peoples
of the two nations. As Miroslav Kusy has observed, a stereotype of argument
about Czechoslovakia was that 'Slovaks were too different from Czechs, and
so their state was only an artificially and forcibly maintained entity'.7 Five areas
of difference have been especially emphasized by a number of authors: Slovaks
are more nationalistic, more separatist (on ethnic questions), more Christianconservative
(on individual rights and tolerance), more left-wing (on the
economy), and more 'eastward-looking'.18
15 Street, 'Political Culture - From Civic Culture to Mass Culture', pp. 96-7.
16 Brown and Gray, eds, Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States.
17 Miroslav Kusy, 'Slovak Exceptionalism', in J. Musil, ed., The End of Czechoslovakia
(Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995), p. 139.
18 See Kusy, 'Slovak Exceptionalism'; John Morison, 'The Road to Separation: Nationalism in
Czechoslovakia', in Paul Latawski, ed., Contemporary Nationalism in East Central Europe (London:
Macmillan, 1995), pp. 67-86; and Archie Brown and Gordon Wightman, 'Czechoslovakia: Revival
In this sense, our explanatory strategy privileges political culture explanation;
whatever is not accounted for by experience may be interpreted as evidence for
the value of political culture. However, it is worth noting that the differences
in the character of the two frameworks ought to incline us to prefer a rational
choice account even if the two theories were equally valid in face of the
evidence. If we were to apply a principle common to adjudicating between
competing theories, Occam's razor, whereby simpler explanations of phenomena
are preferred over more complex ones on grounds of parsimony and a desire
to avoid multiplication of unnecessary causal factors, especially when the
simpler ones are efficient, the advantages of the rational choice perspective are
clear; as pointed out above, it requires much less complexity with respect to the
causal relationship between the subject and the political object. As John Street
has argued, to justify itself empirically political culture theory would have to
demonstrate that it is an indispensable and decisive factor in an explanation over
and above rational considerations.15 Thus, where experience and assessments
of future prospects are able to account for differences between groups, we feel
justified in asserting that the rational choice perspective is preferable to a
political culture one.
Fortunately, for a number of reasons, a case study of the Czech Republic and
Slovakia is particularly appropriate to the evaluation of the relative merits of the
two approaches. Indeed, many modem political culture studies were stimulated
by questions arising from the impact of communism on societies such as
Czechoslovakia.'6 The Czechoslovak case allows for clear hypotheses to be
framed concerning cultural differences and their sources which enable the
complexities of historically transmitted culture versus rational choice responses
to be disentangled.
First, the two countries had distinctive political histories and national
traditions before 1918, and some commentators have argued that these traditions
reasserted themselves since 1989. As a result of their distinctive histories,
important divergences in political orientations are evident among the peoples
of the two nations. As Miroslav Kusy has observed, a stereotype of argument
about Czechoslovakia was that 'Slovaks were too different from Czechs, and
so their state was only an artificially and forcibly maintained entity'.7 Five areas
of difference have been especially emphasized by a number of authors: Slovaks
are more nationalistic, more separatist (on ethnic questions), more Christianconservative
(on individual rights and tolerance), more left-wing (on the
economy), and more 'eastward-looking'.18
15 Street, 'Political Culture - From Civic Culture to Mass Culture', pp. 96-7.
16 Brown and Gray, eds, Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States.
17 Miroslav Kusy, 'Slovak Exceptionalism', in J. Musil, ed., The End of Czechoslovakia
(Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995), p. 139.
18 See Kusy, 'Slovak Exceptionalism'; John Morison, 'The Road to Separation: Nationalism in
Czechoslovakia', in Paul Latawski, ed., Contemporary Nationalism in East Central Europe (London:
Macmillan, 1995), pp. 67-86; and Archie Brown and Gordon Wightman, 'Czechoslovakia: Revival
133133
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134 WHITEFIELD AND EVANS134 WHITEFIELD AND EVANS
Secondly, and in clear contrast to this view of historically-based
ness, the creation of a unified Czechoslovakia in 1918 may h
departure from cultural diversity. Twenty years of inter-war dem
and political unity were followed by more than forty years
attempts by the communist authorities to introduce new soci
similar patterns of social structure across the Czech and Slovak la
there is considerable evidence of success in this latter regard,
respect to equalization in many aspects of economic, ed
demographic indicators.19 The salient political culture in the p
period, therefore, might be that related to the historical ex
transformations brought about during the political unity of t
rather than the residue of historical events before that time. Accor
of distinctive political orientations, a relative similarity in the po
of Czechs and Slovaks might have emerged.
Thirdly, however, contemporary evidence for similarity or dive
structure of attitudes among Czechs and Slovaks need not support
political culture explanations. Diversity need not be the result of
political traditions - nor need similarity be accounted for by
communist socialization. The alternative, rational choice, acco
to explain differences in terms of variation in the recent experie
and environment of the two peoples. One expectation of a suc
culture explanation would be that it should demonstrate t
differences referred to by Reisinger and Elkins and Simeon are e
or notwithstanding differences among group members in ter
situation or experience. Where group differences can be accounted
of current situation or experience, however, evidence for the
political culture would be absent and the rational choice explan
supported.
The strategy of the rest of the article is to assess and comp
Slovak political cultures in the light of these competing appr
differences in 'political culture' - the responses of Czechs an
variety of important dimensions of political issues - are obser
will be made to account for them, where possible, by reference t
(F'note continued)
or Retreat', in Brown and Gray, eds., Political Culture and Political Change in C
pp. 159-96. These authors recognize that shared political history since 1918, with
has resulted in convergence between the two cultures on some dimensions; none th
evidence which suggests important differences in the historical identities of th
have important political implications for their future orientations to democra
remembered that the Czechs too have had an ambiguous attitude towards the W
Germany.
19 Milan Kucera and Zdenik Pavlik, 'Czech and Slovak Demography'; Vaclav Prucha, 'Economic
Developments and Relations, 1918-89'; and Jiri Musil, 'Czech and Slovak Society', all in Musil,
ed., The End of Czechoslovakia, pp. 15-39, 40-76, and 77-96, respectively.
Secondly, and in clear contrast to this view of historically-based distinctiveness,
the creation of a unified Czechoslovakia in 1918 may have signalled a
departure from cultural diversity. Twenty years of inter-war democratic consent
and political unity were followed by more than forty years of aggressive
attempts by the communist authorities to introduce new societal norms and
similar patterns of social structure across the Czech and Slovak lands. Moreover,
there is considerable evidence of success in this latter regard, especially with
respect to equalization in many aspects of economic, educational and
demographic indicators.19 The salient political culture in the post-communist
period, therefore, might be that related to the historical experience and
transformations brought about during the political unity of the two peoples,
rather than the residue of historical events before that time. Accordingly, instead
of distinctive political orientations, a relative similarity in the political cultures
of Czechs and Slovaks might have emerged.
Thirdly, however, contemporary evidence for similarity or diversity in the
structure of attitudes among Czechs and Slovaks need not support either of these
political culture explanations. Diversity need not be the result of continuity in
political traditions - nor need similarity be accounted for by the success of
communist socialization. The alternative, rational choice, account would seek
to explain differences in terms of variation in the recent experiences, prospects
and environment of the two peoples. One expectation of a successful political
culture explanation would be that it should demonstrate that the group
differences referred to by Reisinger and Elkins and Simeon are evident, despite
or notwithstanding differences among group members in terms of current
situation or experience. Where group differences can be accounted for in terms
of current situation or experience, however, evidence for the importance of
political culture would be absent and the rational choice explanation would be
supported.
The strategy of the rest of the article is to assess and compare Czech and
Slovak political cultures in the light of these competing approaches. Where
differences in 'political culture' - the responses of Czechs and Slovaks to a
variety of important dimensions of political issues - are observed, an attempt
will be made to account for them, where possible, by reference to differences
(F'note continued)
or Retreat', in Brown and Gray, eds., Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States,
pp. 159-96. These authors recognize that shared political history since 1918, with a brief interlude,
has resulted in convergence between the two cultures on some dimensions; none the less, they provide
evidence which suggests important differences in the historical identities of the two peoples which
have important political implications for their future orientations to democracy. It must also be
remembered that the Czechs too have had an ambiguous attitude towards the West, particularly to
Germany.
19 Milan Kucera and Zdenik Pavlik, 'Czech and Slovak Demography'; Vaclav Prucha, 'Economic
Developments and Relations, 1918-89'; and Jiri Musil, 'Czech and Slovak Society', all in Musil,
ed., The End of Czechoslovakia, pp. 15-39, 40-76, and 77-96, respectively.
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Political Culture Versus Rational ChoicePolitical Culture Versus Rational Choice
in the recent experiences of individuals in the two countries. If it is possible to
explain national variation in this way, we would feel justified in, if not rejecting
culturalist explanations outright, then at least in claiming, by Occam's razor, that
they are not necessary to explain observed national differences in a context in
which these sorts of theories have traditionally been prevalent and that,
therefore, the concept of political culture is scientifically superfluous.
The article is structured as follows: Section I uses batteries of questions in
national surveys to operationalize certain key dimensions of subjective political
culture and provides evidence on differences between Czechs and Slovaks on
these dimensions. Important differences do emerge and these are generally with
one important exception - consistent with the expectations of those,
generally political culture, theorists, who have commented on differences
between Czechs and Slovaks. Section II considers evidence on recent economic
and political experiences of individuals in each country. Measures of these
experiences are then used as independent variables in a number of regression
models which attempt to explain statistically national differences on the
dimensions of political culture presented in Section I. The results of these
analyses tend to support rational choice explanations, in that differences in
democratic and market commitment are explained by experience - although the
admittedly somewhat less pronounced disparities with respect to social and
political liberalism do seem to result from long-standing differences in the
countries' religious traditions and thus offer support to a political culture
explanation in at least this area. Section III addresses the question of the notable
exception to expected differences in attitudes: contrary to expectations (and
contemporary political practice): Slovaks do not appear to be less liberal than
Czechs with respect to ethnic rights. The explanation for these findings, however
- explored in Section III - appears to lie in the different meanings assigned to
the questions in each country which result from the very different ethnic and
state-building contexts faced by the two peoples.
I. ONE POLITICAL CULTURE OR TWO (OR THREE)?
Judging only on the basis of the nature of issues most salient to elite po
and from the distinctive nature of the ruling parties in the two states sin
there is a strong primafacie case for the existence of distinctive political c
in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. These divergences, at least in eli
competition, have become even more evident in the period since sepa
Consistent with many expectations of differences in political culture, th
20 Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield, 'The Parting of the Ways? Explaining I
Cleavage Formation in the Czech and Slovak Republics', Political Studies, 46 (1998
Sharon Fisher, 'Slovakia: Turning Back', Transition, 1994 in Review, Part I (Prague: O
Research Institute, 1995); Sharon Fisher, 'Prime Minister and President Grapple for
Transition, 11 (1995), 38-3; and Jiri Pehe, 'Czech Republic: A Leader in Political Stab
Economic Growth', Transition, 1994 in Review, Part I (Prague: Open Media Research
1995).
in the recent experiences of individuals in the two countries. If it is possible to
explain national variation in this way, we would feel justified in, if not rejecting
culturalist explanations outright, then at least in claiming, by Occam's razor, that
they are not necessary to explain observed national differences in a context in
which these sorts of theories have traditionally been prevalent and that,
therefore, the concept of political culture is scientifically superfluous.
The article is structured as follows: Section I uses batteries of questions in
national surveys to operationalize certain key dimensions of subjective political
culture and provides evidence on differences between Czechs and Slovaks on
these dimensions. Important differences do emerge and these are generally with
one important exception - consistent with the expectations of those,
generally political culture, theorists, who have commented on differences
between Czechs and Slovaks. Section II considers evidence on recent economic
and political experiences of individuals in each country. Measures of these
experiences are then used as independent variables in a number of regression
models which attempt to explain statistically national differences on the
dimensions of political culture presented in Section I. The results of these
analyses tend to support rational choice explanations, in that differences in
democratic and market commitment are explained by experience - although the
admittedly somewhat less pronounced disparities with respect to social and
political liberalism do seem to result from long-standing differences in the
countries' religious traditions and thus offer support to a political culture
explanation in at least this area. Section III addresses the question of the notable
exception to expected differences in attitudes: contrary to expectations (and
contemporary political practice): Slovaks do not appear to be less liberal than
Czechs with respect to ethnic rights. The explanation for these findings, however
- explored in Section III - appears to lie in the different meanings assigned to
the questions in each country which result from the very different ethnic and
state-building contexts faced by the two peoples.
I. ONE POLITICAL CULTURE OR TWO (OR THREE)?
Judging only on the basis of the nature of issues most salient to elite po
and from the distinctive nature of the ruling parties in the two states sin
there is a strong primafacie case for the existence of distinctive political c
in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. These divergences, at least in eli
competition, have become even more evident in the period since sepa
Consistent with many expectations of differences in political culture, th
20 Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield, 'The Parting of the Ways? Explaining I
Cleavage Formation in the Czech and Slovak Republics', Political Studies, 46 (1998
Sharon Fisher, 'Slovakia: Turning Back', Transition, 1994 in Review, Part I (Prague: O
Research Institute, 1995); Sharon Fisher, 'Prime Minister and President Grapple for
Transition, 11 (1995), 38-3; and Jiri Pehe, 'Czech Republic: A Leader in Political Stab
Economic Growth', Transition, 1994 in Review, Part I (Prague: Open Media Research
1995).
135135
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136 WHITEFIELD AND EVANS136 WHITEFIELD AND EVANS
successful parties in the Czech Republic have chosen to compet
economic questions and the ruling Civic Democratic Party has
support and broad popularity by standing with a pro-market
pro-European stance. Although other parties have appealed to voter
points on each of these dimensions - the Communist Party on the
with greater misgivings about the West, the Christian an
Union/Czechoslovak People's party on more traditional Catholi
and the Republican Party on nationalist and ethnic issues,
anti-German sentiments21 - elite level conflict over the terms and
of democracy itself has been notably absent.
In Slovakia, by contrast, parties have presented a much more com
issues to the electorate. The national question was first put on
Slovak parties such as the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia
extreme Slovak National Party. Moreover, the latter party also def
antagonism to the interests of neighbouring Hungary and to t
residing in Slovakia who constitute slightly more than 10 pe
population.22 This, in turn, cemented the position of the vari
Hungarian parties which operated electorally under a coalition.2
however, did not push economic or social questions wholly ou
discussion: the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia was distinc
its economic appeal, while the economic left was more co
represented by the communist-successor Party of the Democratic
the Christian Democratic Movement, though non-denominati
an amalgam of economically right, nationalist and socially
positions.24
From this brief description a picture emerges of the relative pr
in the Czech Republic of support for the market, democratic norm
political liberalism and ethnic rights when compared with Slovakia
extent is such a picture from the elite level justified at the ma
on citizens' beliefs? We address this issue by using data drawn from a
questionnaire designed by the authors and administered to national probability
21 Gordon Wightman, 'The Czech and Slovak Republics', in Stephen White, Judy Batt and Paul
Lewis, eds, Developments in East European Politics (London: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 51-65; Jan
Obrman, 'The Czechoslovak Elections: A Guide to the Parties', RFE/RL Research Report, No. 22
(1992), 1-16; David Olson, 'Dissolution of the State: Political Parties and the 1992 Election in
Czechoslovakia', Communists and Post-Communist Studies, 26 (1993), 301-14.
22 Statisticka rocenka Ceske a Slovenske Federativni Republiky 1990 (Prague: 1990), p. 100, cited
in Karen Henderson, 'Czechoslovakia: The Failure of Consensus Politics' (University of Leicester
Discussion Paper in Politics, 1993). The largest ethnic minority in the Czech Republic are Slovaks,
who have generally been well assimilated; see Jiri Pehe, 'Slovaks in the Czech Republic: A New
Minority', RFE/RL Research Report, No. 23 (1993), 59-62.
23 Alfred A. Reisch, 'Hungarian Ethnic Parties Prepare for Czechoslovak Elections', RFE/RL
Research Report, No. 18 (1992), 26-32.
24 Zora Butorova and Martin Butora, 'Political Parties, Value Orientations and Slovakia's Road
to Independence', in Gordon Wightman, ed., Party Formation in East-Central Europe (London:
Edward Elgar, 1995), pp. 107-33.
successful parties in the Czech Republic have chosen to compete over mainly
economic questions and the ruling Civic Democratic Party has won electoral
support and broad popularity by standing with a pro-market secular and
pro-European stance. Although other parties have appealed to voters at different
points on each of these dimensions - the Communist Party on the economic left
with greater misgivings about the West, the Christian and Democratic
Union/Czechoslovak People's party on more traditional Catholic social issues,
and the Republican Party on nationalist and ethnic issues, especially
anti-German sentiments21 - elite level conflict over the terms and institutions
of democracy itself has been notably absent.
In Slovakia, by contrast, parties have presented a much more complex set of
issues to the electorate. The national question was first put on the agenda by
Slovak parties such as the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and the more
extreme Slovak National Party. Moreover, the latter party also defined itself in
antagonism to the interests of neighbouring Hungary and to the Hungarians
residing in Slovakia who constitute slightly more than 10 per cent of the
population.22 This, in turn, cemented the position of the various ethnically
Hungarian parties which operated electorally under a coalition.23 These issues,
however, did not push economic or social questions wholly out of political
discussion: the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia was distinctly populist in
its economic appeal, while the economic left was more conventionally
represented by the communist-successor Party of the Democratic Left. Finally,
the Christian Democratic Movement, though non-denominational, stood on
an amalgam of economically right, nationalist and socially conservative
positions.24
From this brief description a picture emerges of the relative preponderance
in the Czech Republic of support for the market, democratic norms, social and
political liberalism and ethnic rights when compared with Slovakia. But to what
extent is such a picture from the elite level justified at the mass level by data
on citizens' beliefs? We address this issue by using data drawn from a
questionnaire designed by the authors and administered to national probability
21 Gordon Wightman, 'The Czech and Slovak Republics', in Stephen White, Judy Batt and Paul
Lewis, eds, Developments in East European Politics (London: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 51-65; Jan
Obrman, 'The Czechoslovak Elections: A Guide to the Parties', RFE/RL Research Report, No. 22
(1992), 1-16; David Olson, 'Dissolution of the State: Political Parties and the 1992 Election in
Czechoslovakia', Communists and Post-Communist Studies, 26 (1993), 301-14.
22 Statisticka rocenka Ceske a Slovenske Federativni Republiky 1990 (Prague: 1990), p. 100, cited
in Karen Henderson, 'Czechoslovakia: The Failure of Consensus Politics' (University of Leicester
Discussion Paper in Politics, 1993). The largest ethnic minority in the Czech Republic are Slovaks,
who have generally been well assimilated; see Jiri Pehe, 'Slovaks in the Czech Republic: A New
Minority', RFE/RL Research Report, No. 23 (1993), 59-62.
23 Alfred A. Reisch, 'Hungarian Ethnic Parties Prepare for Czechoslovak Elections', RFE/RL
Research Report, No. 18 (1992), 26-32.
24 Zora Butorova and Martin Butora, 'Political Parties, Value Orientations and Slovakia's Road
to Independence', in Gordon Wightman, ed., Party Formation in East-Central Europe (London:
Edward Elgar, 1995), pp. 107-33.
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Political Culture Versus Rational ChoicePolitical Culture Versus Rational Choice
samples of the adult populations of both states in the spring of 1994.25 Each
survey contains batteries of questions indexing the core dimensions of political
culture where, on the basis of expectations of mass level differences and the elite
ideologies described above, citizens of the two states are expected to differ: on
the extent of democratic commitment, market support, social liberalism and
tolerance for diversity of opinion and life-style, and willingness to support the
rights of ethnic minorities. All of these attitudes are measured using statements
with five-point agree/disagree response formats, or variants thereof. In a few
examples (see Table 2 below) respondents are presented with two contrasting
policies and asked to say with which they agree most. Question wording was
identical in the two countries except, of course, where the name of the country
was referred to explicitly.
As well as comparing Czech and Slovak responses to these questions we also
distinguish between ethnic Slovaks and ethnic Hungarians. In Slovakia the
interests of the Hungarian minority have been pressed not only by Hungarian
parties, but by the keen interest of the Hungarian government between 1990 and
1994, for whom the issue of protection of the rights of Hungarians abroad
constituted one of the central political issues.26 The extent to which Hungarians
and Slovaks differ from or resemble one another on the various dimensions of
attitudes is thus of evident relevance to any assessment of a 'Slovak' political
culture.
Attitudes Towards Democracy
The first dimension on which differences between Czechs, Slovaks and Slovak
Hungarians have been anticipated relates to the level of commitment to
democracy among the three groups. Slovaks in particular, as a result of the
relative weakness of their democratic traditions, would be expected by many
commentators to exhibit weaker levels of support for democratic norms.
25 Respondents were sampled from the lists of voters in the 1992 elections (access to current lists
was not allowed under Czech and Slovak law), with minor augmentation using random route
procedures and a small top-up sample for urban areas where the rate of non-contact due to movement
was especially high. The Czech sample involved selection of 182 sampling points from which 2,104
addresses were chosen (names issued: 2,104; non-contact: 404; refusal 291; plus quota: 111; final
achieved sample: 1,520; the response rate was 67 per cent of the initial sample and 83 per cent of
those contacted). The Slovak sample involved selection of 215 sampling points from which 2,014
addresses were chosen; (names issued: 2,014; non-contact: 338; refusal 233; plus quota: 68; final
achieved sample: 1,509; the response rate was 75 per cent of the initial sample and 86 per cent of
those contacted). The surveys were directed by Lubos Rezler and Jan Hartl of the Stredisko
empirickych vyzkumu (STEM), from its offices in Prague and Bratislava.
26 Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield, 'Social and Ideological Cleavage Formation in
Post-Communist Hungary', Europe-Asia Studies, 47 (1995), 1177-204; Alfred A. Reisch,
'Hungarian-Slovak Relations: A Difficult First Year', RFE/RL Research Report, No. 50 (1993),
16-23.
samples of the adult populations of both states in the spring of 1994.25 Each
survey contains batteries of questions indexing the core dimensions of political
culture where, on the basis of expectations of mass level differences and the elite
ideologies described above, citizens of the two states are expected to differ: on
the extent of democratic commitment, market support, social liberalism and
tolerance for diversity of opinion and life-style, and willingness to support the
rights of ethnic minorities. All of these attitudes are measured using statements
with five-point agree/disagree response formats, or variants thereof. In a few
examples (see Table 2 below) respondents are presented with two contrasting
policies and asked to say with which they agree most. Question wording was
identical in the two countries except, of course, where the name of the country
was referred to explicitly.
As well as comparing Czech and Slovak responses to these questions we also
distinguish between ethnic Slovaks and ethnic Hungarians. In Slovakia the
interests of the Hungarian minority have been pressed not only by Hungarian
parties, but by the keen interest of the Hungarian government between 1990 and
1994, for whom the issue of protection of the rights of Hungarians abroad
constituted one of the central political issues.26 The extent to which Hungarians
and Slovaks differ from or resemble one another on the various dimensions of
attitudes is thus of evident relevance to any assessment of a 'Slovak' political
culture.
Attitudes Towards Democracy
The first dimension on which differences between Czechs, Slovaks and Slovak
Hungarians have been anticipated relates to the level of commitment to
democracy among the three groups. Slovaks in particular, as a result of the
relative weakness of their democratic traditions, would be expected by many
commentators to exhibit weaker levels of support for democratic norms.
25 Respondents were sampled from the lists of voters in the 1992 elections (access to current lists
was not allowed under Czech and Slovak law), with minor augmentation using random route
procedures and a small top-up sample for urban areas where the rate of non-contact due to movement
was especially high. The Czech sample involved selection of 182 sampling points from which 2,104
addresses were chosen (names issued: 2,104; non-contact: 404; refusal 291; plus quota: 111; final
achieved sample: 1,520; the response rate was 67 per cent of the initial sample and 83 per cent of
those contacted). The Slovak sample involved selection of 215 sampling points from which 2,014
addresses were chosen; (names issued: 2,014; non-contact: 338; refusal 233; plus quota: 68; final
achieved sample: 1,509; the response rate was 75 per cent of the initial sample and 86 per cent of
those contacted). The surveys were directed by Lubos Rezler and Jan Hartl of the Stredisko
empirickych vyzkumu (STEM), from its offices in Prague and Bratislava.
26 Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield, 'Social and Ideological Cleavage Formation in
Post-Communist Hungary', Europe-Asia Studies, 47 (1995), 1177-204; Alfred A. Reisch,
'Hungarian-Slovak Relations: A Difficult First Year', RFE/RL Research Report, No. 50 (1993),
16-23.
137137
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138 WHITEFIELD AND EVANS138 WHITEFIELD AND EVANS
TABLE 1 Attitudes Towards Democracy by Ethnic Group
Slovak
Czechs Slovaks Hungarians
Do you agree with the aim of Agree 73% 59% 63%
introducing democracy in the Disagree 26% 36% 33%
country, in which political
parties compete for power
Democracy gives ordinary Agree 48% 42% 38%
people more say in how the Disagree 29% 37% 40%
country is run
Democracy is a good means Agree 43% 39% 46%
of solving social conflicts Disagree 21% 32% 28%
Democracy is better for the Agree 45% 57% 62%
rich in society than the poor Disagree 34% 25% 18%
TABLE 1 Attitudes Towards Democracy by Ethnic Group
Slovak
Czechs Slovaks Hungarians
Do you agree with the aim of Agree 73% 59% 63%
introducing democracy in the Disagree 26% 36% 33%
country, in which political
parties compete for power
Democracy gives ordinary Agree 48% 42% 38%
people more say in how the Disagree 29% 37% 40%
country is run
Democracy is a good means Agree 43% 39% 46%
of solving social conflicts Disagree 21% 32% 28%
Democracy is better for the Agree 45% 57% 62%
rich in society than the poor Disagree 34% 25% 18%
Table 1 presents the distribution of responses to a battery of questions
three groups.27
The evidence in Table 1 indicates that there are significant diff
between the populations of the two states. These differences are cleare
first item, in which respondents are asked to express the strength
agreement with the aim of introducing democracy in their country. Thi
thus taps into the normative foundations of democratic support: C
clearly more supportive than Slovaks, with Hungarian responses lying
the two main ethnic groups. Slovaks are also less willing to accept d
as a good means of solving social conflicts than Czechs, although in
Hungarians are not significantly different from Czechs. As we have di
elsewhere in Eastern Europe where minorities face difficulties in integra
the democratic process - in Estonia, for example - a sense of having
in the democratic process has been associated with a greater desire
democracy as a means of resolving social conflicts.28
On the remaining two items, however, ethnic Slovaks are again
than Czechs to believe that democracy gives ordinary people more say;
surprisingly given their minority status and the rhetoric of many lead
politicians, Slovak Hungarians are even less likely to agree with this sta
27 The number of respondents to the questions presented in this table and those whic
within the following ranges: Czechs: n = 1,456-1,461; Slovaks: n = 1,285-1,291; Slov
ians: n = 172-173.
28 Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield, 'The Politics and Economics of Democra
Commitment', British Journal of Political Science, 25 (1995), 485-514.
Table 1 presents the distribution of responses to a battery of questions by the
three groups.27
The evidence in Table 1 indicates that there are significant difference
between the populations of the two states. These differences are clearest on th
first item, in which respondents are asked to express the strength of the
agreement with the aim of introducing democracy in their country. This questio
thus taps into the normative foundations of democratic support: Czechs a
clearly more supportive than Slovaks, with Hungarian responses lying between
the two main ethnic groups. Slovaks are also less willing to accept democra
as a good means of solving social conflicts than Czechs, although in this ca
Hungarians are not significantly different from Czechs. As we have discovered
elsewhere in Eastern Europe where minorities face difficulties in integrating int
the democratic process - in Estonia, for example - a sense of having little s
in the democratic process has been associated with a greater desire to endo
democracy as a means of resolving social conflicts.28
On the remaining two items, however, ethnic Slovaks are again less like
than Czechs to believe that democracy gives ordinary people more say; but, no
surprisingly given their minority status and the rhetoric of many leading Slo
politicians, Slovak Hungarians are even less likely to agree with this statement
27 The number of respondents to the questions presented in this table and those which follow
within the following ranges: Czechs: n = 1,456-1,461; Slovaks: n = 1,285-1,291; Slovak Hung
ians: n = 172-173.
28 Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield, 'The Politics and Economics of Democra
Commitment', British Journal of Political Science, 25 (1995), 485-514.
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Political Culture Versus Rational ChoicePolitical Culture Versus Rational Choice
The responses of the groups to the question of whether democracy is better for
the rich in society than the poor show a similar pattern: with Czechs again more
committed to democracy than are either of the two Slovak groups.
Attitudes Towards the Market
Evidence on differences between the states in normative support for the m
and redistributive intervention in the economy also offers support fo
culturalist account. Czechs appear significantly more supportive of ma
principles than either Slovaks or Slovak Hungarians. But, again, the fac
Hungarians are similar to their Slovak compatriots on these items might al
taken as testimony to the importance of countrywide economic circumstan
in determining the level of market support.
The variations which appeared in the relative levels of support for democ
especially in the responses of Slovaks are, however, largely absent w
considering the other items presented in Table 2 - relative levels of suppor
the market are remarkably similar across a whole range of measures
Czechs are clearly more likely than ethnic Slovaks - and in most case
Hungarians - to agree that governments should not intervene to secur
provision, income equality, state ownership and control over wages, prices
profits. They are also much more likely to believe that private enterprise i
best way to solve the country's problems, and that large differences in inc
are important for the country's prosperity. This is not to say that Czechs
regarded as markedly laissez-faire on the economy: for example, the
overwhelming majority believe that governments should ensure guaranteed
basic incomes, and a majority also believe that governments should ensure jobs
for all and a decent standard of living. It is even the case that a majority of Czechs
support maintaining major public services in state ownership. However, Czechs
do emerge as significantly more supportive of the free market than Slovaks.
Social Liberalism
Some political culturalists have emphasized the importance of long-s
differences between the two populations with respect to issues of
liberalism: Slovaks with their 'Eastward-looking', more orthodox and
outlook have been regarded as having a less tolerant set of orientat
Certainly, the Slovaks in our sample were far more likely to have a r
denomination (73 per cent were Catholics) and to attend church regu
per cent reported attending once a week or more often) than were th
(34 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively).29
Table 3 provides data on a range of questions which tap into the
liberalism dimension of political culture, covering issues such as the e
The responses of the groups to the question of whether democracy is bet
the rich in society than the poor show a similar pattern: with Czechs aga
committed to democracy than are either of the two Slovak groups.
Attitudes Towards the Market
Evidence on differences between the states in normative support for the m
and redistributive intervention in the economy also offers support fo
culturalist account. Czechs appear significantly more supportive of ma
principles than either Slovaks or Slovak Hungarians. But, again, the fac
Hungarians are similar to their Slovak compatriots on these items might al
taken as testimony to the importance of countrywide economic circumstan
in determining the level of market support.
The variations which appeared in the relative levels of support for democ
especially in the responses of Slovaks are, however, largely absent w
considering the other items presented in Table 2 - relative levels of suppor
the market are remarkably similar across a whole range of measures
Czechs are clearly more likely than ethnic Slovaks - and in most case
Hungarians - to agree that governments should not intervene to secur
provision, income equality, state ownership and control over wages, prices
profits. They are also much more likely to believe that private enterprise i
best way to solve the country's problems, and that large differences in inc
are important for the country's prosperity. This is not to say that Czechs
regarded as markedly laissez-faire on the economy: for example, the
overwhelming majority believe that governments should ensure guaranteed
basic incomes, and a majority also believe that governments should ensure jobs
for all and a decent standard of living. It is even the case that a majority of Czechs
support maintaining major public services in state ownership. However, Czechs
do emerge as significantly more supportive of the free market than Slovaks.
Social Liberalism
Some political culturalists have emphasized the importance of long-s
differences between the two populations with respect to issues of
liberalism: Slovaks with their 'Eastward-looking', more orthodox and
outlook have been regarded as having a less tolerant set of orientat
Certainly, the Slovaks in our sample were far more likely to have a r
denomination (73 per cent were Catholics) and to attend church regu
per cent reported attending once a week or more often) than were th
(34 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively).29
Table 3 provides data on a range of questions which tap into the
liberalism dimension of political culture, covering issues such as the e
29 Further information on the demographic characteristics of the samples can be obtai
the authors.
29 Further information on the demographic characteristics of the samples can be obtained from
the authors.
139139
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140 WHITEFIELD AND EVANS140 WHITEFIELD AND EVANS
TABLE 2 Attitudes Towards Markets and Government Involvem
Ethnic Group
TABLE 2 Attitudes Towards Markets and Government Involvem
Ethnic Group
Czechs SlovaksCzechs Slovaks
The government should ensure
that every person has a job and a
good standard of living
or
The government should just let
each person get ahead on their
own
The government should not
concern itself with inequality
or
The government should try to
minimize income differences
The government should take all
major industries into state
ownership
or
The government should place all
major industries in private
ownership
Individual companies should decide
wages, prices and profits
or
The government should control
wages, prices and profits
Private enterprise is best
Major public services ought to be
in state ownership
Large differences in income are
necessary for prosperity
Profits are the best way to improve
everyone's standard of living
Government should reduce the
difference between high
and low incomes
Government should provide
a guaranteed basic income
The government should ensure
that every person has a job and a
good standard of living
or
The government should just let
each person get ahead on their
own
The government should not
concern itself with inequality
or
The government should try to
minimize income differences
The government should take all
major industries into state
ownership
or
The government should place all
major industries in private
ownership
Individual companies should decide
wages, prices and profits
or
The government should control
wages, prices and profits
Private enterprise is best
Major public services ought to be
in state ownership
Large differences in income are
necessary for prosperity
Profits are the best way to improve
everyone's standard of living
Government should reduce the
difference between high
and low incomes
Government should provide
a guaranteed basic income
Agree 66% 80%Agree 66% 80%
Slovak
Hungarians
78%
Slovak
Hungarians
78%
Agree 11% 5% 9%
Agree 29% 40% 41%
Agree 45% 39% 38%
Agree 47% 59% 49%
Agree 21% 14% 15%
Agree 29% 40% 41%
Agree 49% 42% 39%
Agree 50% 34% 28%
Disagree 18% 30% 32%
Agree 57% 62% 62%
Disagree 23% 17% 14%
Agree 24% 14% 20%
Disagree 42% 57% 52%
Agree 49% 42% 38%
Disagree 25% 32% 28%
Agree 37% 46% 56%
Disagree 37% 30% 19%
Agree 83% 88% 80%
Disagree 9% 6% 6%
Agree 11% 5% 9%
Agree 29% 40% 41%
Agree 45% 39% 38%
Agree 47% 59% 49%
Agree 21% 14% 15%
Agree 29% 40% 41%
Agree 49% 42% 39%
Agree 50% 34% 28%
Disagree 18% 30% 32%
Agree 57% 62% 62%
Disagree 23% 17% 14%
Agree 24% 14% 20%
Disagree 42% 57% 52%
Agree 49% 42% 38%
Disagree 25% 32% 28%
Agree 37% 46% 56%
Disagree 37% 30% 19%
Agree 83% 88% 80%
Disagree 9% 6% 6%
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Political Culture Versus Rational ChoicePolitical Culture Versus Rational Choice
TABLE 3 Attitudes Towards Social Liberalism by Ethnic Group
Slovak
Czechs Slovaks Hungarians
People should be allowed to Agree 86% 90% 91%
worship in their own way Disagree 5% 4% 2%
Young people don't respect Agree 13% 16% 16%
traditional values Disagree 64% 60% 58%
Censorship of films and Agree 48% 43% 50%
magazines is necessary to Disagree 30% 34% 32%
uphold moral standards
People should be allowed Agree 57% 49% 59%
to organize public protest Disagree 17% 22% 15%
against government
Homosexual relationships Agree 22% 14% 16%
are always wrong Disagree 44% 52% 45%
People should be more tolerant of Agree 44% 43% 39%
unconventional lifestyles Disagree 22% 21% 21%
This country needs Agree 31% 27% 25%
government with a strong hand Disagree 47% 52% 56%
People should be Agree 72% 65% 64%
free to emigrate even if Disagree 11% 18% 17%
their skills are needed
TABLE 3 Attitudes Towards Social Liberalism by Ethnic Group
Slovak
Czechs Slovaks Hungarians
People should be allowed to Agree 86% 90% 91%
worship in their own way Disagree 5% 4% 2%
Young people don't respect Agree 13% 16% 16%
traditional values Disagree 64% 60% 58%
Censorship of films and Agree 48% 43% 50%
magazines is necessary to Disagree 30% 34% 32%
uphold moral standards
People should be allowed Agree 57% 49% 59%
to organize public protest Disagree 17% 22% 15%
against government
Homosexual relationships Agree 22% 14% 16%
are always wrong Disagree 44% 52% 45%
People should be more tolerant of Agree 44% 43% 39%
unconventional lifestyles Disagree 22% 21% 21%
This country needs Agree 31% 27% 25%
government with a strong hand Disagree 47% 52% 56%
People should be Agree 72% 65% 64%
free to emigrate even if Disagree 11% 18% 17%
their skills are needed
which individuals accept diversity in beliefs and lifestyles and political
practices, or express conservative social values and endorse strong (i.e.
'authoritarian') government. Although the results once again offer support to
those who expect differences between the two societies, the extent of divergence
is relatively weak.
Czechs are more socially liberal overall, but not by a great margin. Moreover,
it is also evident from responses to particular items that the picture of Czech
tolerance is by no means uniform. Slovaks, for example, appear more committed
to freedom of religion than Czechs, though it is worth noting that in both
countries support for this is overwhelming. Interesting as this result is, however,
closer inspection indicates that it needs to be treated cautiously as an indicator
of a more general tolerance. As we have seen, Slovaks as a group are
considerably more religious than are Czechs. However, the background against
which questions of religious toleration must be set is that of communist
anti-religious ideology and activity. Support for religious freedom, therefore, is
more likely to be an expression of the desire of the religious - emerging, as they
are, from many years of communist repression - to obtain tolerance for their own
which individuals accept diversity in beliefs and lifestyles and political
practices, or express conservative social values and endorse strong (i.e.
'authoritarian') government. Although the results once again offer support to
those who expect differences between the two societies, the extent of divergence
is relatively weak.
Czechs are more socially liberal overall, but not by a great margin. Moreover,
it is also evident from responses to particular items that the picture of Czech
tolerance is by no means uniform. Slovaks, for example, appear more committed
to freedom of religion than Czechs, though it is worth noting that in both
countries support for this is overwhelming. Interesting as this result is, however,
closer inspection indicates that it needs to be treated cautiously as an indicator
of a more general tolerance. As we have seen, Slovaks as a group are
considerably more religious than are Czechs. However, the background against
which questions of religious toleration must be set is that of communist
anti-religious ideology and activity. Support for religious freedom, therefore, is
more likely to be an expression of the desire of the religious - emerging, as they
are, from many years of communist repression - to obtain tolerance for their own
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142 WHITEFIELD AND EVANS142 WHITEFIELD AND EVANS
activities, than it is to reflect the broader principle of tolerance. F
we do not interpret the finding as support for a counter-intuitive
Slovak tolerance (nor, for obvious reasons, do we include it in the
by combining the other items in the table for later analysis).
None the less, even when this item is set to one side no simple pic
Slovaks of both ethnicities again appear slightly more likely to agr
people have no respect for traditional values; and they are less
that people should be allowed to organize protest meetings against the
government. But, surprisingly for a more fervently Catholic population, ethnic
Slovaks are no more inclined than Czechs to be intolerant of unconventional
life-styles and to favour censorship of films and magazines, and they are
likely to agree that homosexuality is always wrong.
Ethnic Liberalism
The final dimension of political culture to be examined concerns responden
willingness to include and accept the rights of ethnic minorities. Again, one se
of expectations, supported by both some historical interpretations a
contemporary evidence at the level of elite action, is that ethnic Slovaks are les
ethnically liberal than Czechs. It is perhaps most surprising of all, therefore, t
see from Table 4 how weak the grounds for this claim are.
activities, than it is to reflect the broader principle of tolerance. For this reaso
we do not interpret the finding as support for a counter-intuitive hypothesis
Slovak tolerance (nor, for obvious reasons, do we include it in the scale formed
by combining the other items in the table for later analysis).
None the less, even when this item is set to one side no simple picture emerge
Slovaks of both ethnicities again appear slightly more likely to agree that youn
people have no respect for traditional values; and they are less likely to acc
that people should be allowed to organize protest meetings against the
government. But, surprisingly for a more fervently Catholic population, ethnic
Slovaks are no more inclined than Czechs to be intolerant of unconventional
life-styles and to favour censorship of films and magazines, and they are
likely to agree that homosexuality is always wrong.
Ethnic Liberalism
The final dimension of political culture to be examined concerns responden
willingness to include and accept the rights of ethnic minorities. Again, one se
of expectations, supported by both some historical interpretations a
contemporary evidence at the level of elite action, is that ethnic Slovaks are les
ethnically liberal than Czechs. It is perhaps most surprising of all, therefore, t
see from Table 4 how weak the grounds for this claim are.
TABLE 4 Attitudes Towards Ethnic Rights by Ethnic Group
Slovak
Czechs Slovaks Hungarians
Minority groups should Agree 8% 6% 72%
have far more rights than Disagree 63% 72% 9%
they do now
Everyone should have the Agree 43% 76% 79%
right to become a citizen Disagree 36% 11% 9%
regardless of their ethnic
origins
The ethnic group a person Agree 63% 82% 91%
belongs to should not Disagree 18% 7% 2%
influence the benefits they
can get from the state
All minority groups Agree 76% 90% 28%
should have to be taught Disagree 11% 4% 60%
in (country's language)
TABLE 4 Attitudes Towards Ethnic Rights by Ethnic Group
Slovak
Czechs Slovaks Hungarians
Minority groups should Agree 8% 6% 72%
have far more rights than Disagree 63% 72% 9%
they do now
Everyone should have the Agree 43% 76% 79%
right to become a citizen Disagree 36% 11% 9%
regardless of their ethnic
origins
The ethnic group a person Agree 63% 82% 91%
belongs to should not Disagree 18% 7% 2%
influence the benefits they
can get from the state
All minority groups Agree 76% 90% 28%
should have to be taught Disagree 11% 4% 60%
in (country's language)
Not unexpectedly, Hungarians are vastly different in their a
issues than either majority ethnic group, whereas on ave
Not unexpectedly, Hungarians are vastly different in their a
issues than either majority ethnic group, whereas on ave
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Political Culture Versus Rational ChoicePolitical Culture Versus Rational Choice
between Czechs and ethnic Slovaks are only marginal - if anything, Slovaks are
slightly more liberal than Czechs. On closer inspection, the distribution in the
responses to specific items suggests a complex picture. Czechs and Slovaks are
rather similar in the minimal support they give to the notion that ethnic
minorities should have more rights - compare this with the massive level of
support among Hungarians for the same proposition. Strikingly, however,
Czechs are clearly less likely than ethnic Slovaks to support granting citizenship
regardless of ethnic origins, or to allow people to receive state benefits without
regard for their ethnic origins. Only on the question of the use of the Slovak
language for teaching in schools do Slovaks exhibit clearly more illiberal
responses than Czechs. The explanation of these ambiguous findings will be
given further attention below.
So far, we have provided evidence that there are differences as expected on
all four dimensions between the two countries and between the three ethnic
groups: democratic commitment and market support display relatively clear-cu
differences, while social liberalism and ethnic rights have a more mixed patter
Particularly with respect to democratic and market support, these differences ar
firmly in the expected direction: Czechs are more liberal than Slovaks. However
on each of these dimensions Slovak Hungarians also appear to be much like thei
ethnically Slovak compatriots, suggesting the possibility that it is less culture
than common national experience which may account for these difference
Moreover, on the question of ethnic liberalism, Hungarians are predictably quit
different from either group, but the direction of support for ethnic rights betwe
Czechs and ethnic Slovaks is, if anything, somewhat contrary to expectations.
We now turn to evidence on why these differences might have occurred.
II. EVALUATING CZECH-SLOVAK DIFFERENCES IN POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC EXPERIENCE
As the introduction explained in detail, one explanatio
Czechs and Slovaks (and Hungarians) in their positions on the various
dimensions of attitudes characterized above is that they result from longstanding
national and ethnic traditions which transmit political orientations to
respondents. An alternative explanation would instead emphasize variation in
the current circumstances facing these groups, expressed via distinctive political
and economic experiences or by the impact of differing contexts on the meaning
of responses to attitude questions. The evidence above suggests support for each
of these accounts: on the one hand, differences in responses are generally along
the lines predicted by political culturalists; on the other, the same patterns of
response could be taken to indicate the importance of current experiences and
circumstances.
To evaluate empirically which of these is the case, this section looks in detai
at the political and economic transition experiences of our respondents in
two countries. These experiences include: their evaluation of the recent
performance of their country's political institutions, as well as their family's,
between Czechs and ethnic Slovaks are only marginal - if anything, Slovaks are
slightly more liberal than Czechs. On closer inspection, the distribution in the
responses to specific items suggests a complex picture. Czechs and Slovaks are
rather similar in the minimal support they give to the notion that ethnic
minorities should have more rights - compare this with the massive level of
support among Hungarians for the same proposition. Strikingly, however,
Czechs are clearly less likely than ethnic Slovaks to support granting citizenship
regardless of ethnic origins, or to allow people to receive state benefits without
regard for their ethnic origins. Only on the question of the use of the Slovak
language for teaching in schools do Slovaks exhibit clearly more illiberal
responses than Czechs. The explanation of these ambiguous findings will be
given further attention below.
So far, we have provided evidence that there are differences as expected on
all four dimensions between the two countries and between the three ethnic
groups: democratic commitment and market support display relatively clear-cu
differences, while social liberalism and ethnic rights have a more mixed patter
Particularly with respect to democratic and market support, these differences ar
firmly in the expected direction: Czechs are more liberal than Slovaks. However
on each of these dimensions Slovak Hungarians also appear to be much like thei
ethnically Slovak compatriots, suggesting the possibility that it is less culture
than common national experience which may account for these difference
Moreover, on the question of ethnic liberalism, Hungarians are predictably quit
different from either group, but the direction of support for ethnic rights betwe
Czechs and ethnic Slovaks is, if anything, somewhat contrary to expectations.
We now turn to evidence on why these differences might have occurred.
II. EVALUATING CZECH-SLOVAK DIFFERENCES IN POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC EXPERIENCE
As the introduction explained in detail, one explanatio
Czechs and Slovaks (and Hungarians) in their positions on the various
dimensions of attitudes characterized above is that they result from longstanding
national and ethnic traditions which transmit political orientations to
respondents. An alternative explanation would instead emphasize variation in
the current circumstances facing these groups, expressed via distinctive political
and economic experiences or by the impact of differing contexts on the meaning
of responses to attitude questions. The evidence above suggests support for each
of these accounts: on the one hand, differences in responses are generally along
the lines predicted by political culturalists; on the other, the same patterns of
response could be taken to indicate the importance of current experiences and
circumstances.
To evaluate empirically which of these is the case, this section looks in detai
at the political and economic transition experiences of our respondents in
two countries. These experiences include: their evaluation of the recent
performance of their country's political institutions, as well as their family's,
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144 WHITEFIELD AND EVANS144 WHITEFIELD AND EVANS
TABLE 5 Political Experience and Involvement Among Czechs, Slovaks
and Slovak Hungarians
Slovak
Czechs Slovaks Hungarians
TABLE 5 Political Experience and Involvement Among Czechs, Slovaks
and Slovak Hungarians
Slovak
Czechs Slovaks Hungarians
People like me have
no say in what the
government does
Elected officials don't
care much what people
like me think
Government reflects the
wishes of ordinary people
No point in voting because
government makes no difference
The government acts for
the benefit of the majority
Everyone has an
influence on the election
of the government
How would you evaluate
the practice of
democracy here?
Do you think of yourself
as a supporter of any
particular party?
People like me have
no say in what the
government does
Elected officials don't
care much what people
like me think
Government reflects the
wishes of ordinary people
No point in voting because
government makes no difference
The government acts for
the benefit of the majority
Everyone has an
influence on the election
of the government
How would you evaluate
the practice of
democracy here?
Do you think of yourself
as a supporter of any
particular party?
Agree 71% 77%
Disagree 14% 11%
Agree 67% 79%
Disagree 9% 7%
Agree 71% 77%
Disagree 14% 11%
Agree 67% 79%
Disagree 9% 7%
Agree
Disagree
Agree
Disagree
Agree
Disagree
Agree
Disagree
Agree
Disagree
Agree
Disagree
Agree
Disagree
Agree
Disagree
26%
40%
10%
71%
52%
44%
52%
46%
26%
40%
10%
71%
52%
44%
52%
46%
13%
63%
15%
61%
31%
65%
45%
53%
13%
63%
15%
61%
31%
65%
45%
53%
Positive 40% 20%
Negative 28% 43%
Yes 27% 26%
Positive 40% 20%
Negative 28% 43%
Yes 27% 26%
and the country's, economic experien
assessment of the effectiveness of th
Examination of responses to these
basis for determining whether pol
account for differences on at least some of the dimensions of attitudes outlined
above.
It is evident from the responses to items in Table 5 that pronounced
differences exist in the political experiences and evaluations of Czechs an
Slovaks. Our evidence is in this respect consistent with other studies sin
1989.30 Moreover, the evidence lends credibility to the account of some nation
differences at the normative level being the result of variation in politica
and the country's, economic experience and prospects and their current
assessment of the effectiveness of the functioning of the market econom
Examination of responses to these items will provide a more systema
basis for determining whether political and economic experience may
account for differences on at least some of the dimensions of attitudes outlined
above.
It is evident from the responses to items in Table 5 that pronounced
differences exist in the political experiences and evaluations of Czechs an
Slovaks. Our evidence is in this respect consistent with other studies sin
1989.30 Moreover, the evidence lends credibility to the account of some nation
differences at the normative level being the result of variation in politica
30 Sharon Wolchik, 'The Politics of Transition and the Break-up of Czechoslovakia', in J. Mus
ed., The End of Czechoslovakia, pp. 225-44.
30 Sharon Wolchik, 'The Politics of Transition and the Break-up of Czechoslovakia', in J. Mus
ed., The End of Czechoslovakia, pp. 225-44.
71%
13%
73%
7%
9%
69%
14%
61%
26%
69%
41%
53%
9%
64%
30%
71%
13%
73%
7%
9%
69%
14%
61%
26%
69%
41%
53%
9%
64%
30%
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Political Culture Versus Rational ChoicePolitical Culture Versus Rational Choice
experience. Czechs are consistently more positive in their estimation of their
input into the process of government than ethnic Slovaks and, on most items,
than Slovak Hungarians, though it is also apparent that on many issues the
absolute level of support for the operation of the political systems among all
groups is rather low.
Clearest differences emerge in response to a question that asks respondents
to evaluate the 'actual practice of democracy' in the respondent's country so far,
i.e. since 1989. Here, the greater incidence of elite level conflict in Slovakia is
mirrored by a far greater likelihood among Slovak citizens, and not surprisingly
most of all among Hungarians, to have negative views on democratic practice.
Forty per cent of Czechs hold positive views about democracy in their country,
compared with 20 per cent of ethnic Slovaks and only 9 per cent of Hungarians.
A similar degree of difference can be seen in responses to the question of
whether the government acts for the benefit of the majority in society: 52 per
cent of Czechs agree with this statement compared to only 31 per cent of ethnic
Slovaks and 26 per cent of Hungarians.
This picture of difference is matched, although sometimes to a lesser extent,
across virtually all of the items in the table. Ethnic Slovaks are less likely to
believe they have a say in what government does; they are much more likely
than Czechs to believe that elected officials do not care much about what they
think; they are more likely to think that there is no point in voting because the
government cannot make any difference; and less likely to believe that they can
have an influence on government. We can see, therefore, that evaluation of the
political systems varies significantly between the two states in ways which may
account for at least some of the national differences outlined in the previous
section.
A similar likelihood emerges from examination of data on the economic
experiences and expectations of citizens of the two states. Table 6 presents
responses to questions asking people to evaluate the direction taken in their own
family's and the country's living standards over the past five years and their
estimation of how family and country living standards will develop in the five
years to come. On each of these items, Slovaks as a whole are more negative
than Czechs, and Hungarians most negative of all. Thus, 64 per cent and 72 per
cent of ethnic Slovaks and Hungarians respectively believe that their family
living standards have fallen over the last five years compared to only 42 per cent
of Czechs. Whereas 39 per cent of Czechs expect family living standards to rise
in future, only 28 per cent of ethnic Slovaks and 23 per cent of Hungarians agree.
Most dramatic, however, are differences in the evaluations of national economic
performance. Compared to 32 per cent of Czechs who believe that the country
has improved its living standards over the past five years, only 5 per cent of
ethnic Slovaks and 2 per cent of Hungarians believe that this has happened.
Similarly, while a majority of Czechs - 55 per cent - look forward to rising
standards in the country as a whole, only 30 per cent of ethnic Slovaks and 22
per cent of Hungarians share this optimism. The same picture emerges when
asking people to evaluate in the most general terms the performance of the
experience. Czechs are consistently more positive in their estimation of their
input into the process of government than ethnic Slovaks and, on most items,
than Slovak Hungarians, though it is also apparent that on many issues the
absolute level of support for the operation of the political systems among all
groups is rather low.
Clearest differences emerge in response to a question that asks respondents
to evaluate the 'actual practice of democracy' in the respondent's country so far,
i.e. since 1989. Here, the greater incidence of elite level conflict in Slovakia is
mirrored by a far greater likelihood among Slovak citizens, and not surprisingly
most of all among Hungarians, to have negative views on democratic practice.
Forty per cent of Czechs hold positive views about democracy in their country,
compared with 20 per cent of ethnic Slovaks and only 9 per cent of Hungarians.
A similar degree of difference can be seen in responses to the question of
whether the government acts for the benefit of the majority in society: 52 per
cent of Czechs agree with this statement compared to only 31 per cent of ethnic
Slovaks and 26 per cent of Hungarians.
This picture of difference is matched, although sometimes to a lesser extent,
across virtually all of the items in the table. Ethnic Slovaks are less likely to
believe they have a say in what government does; they are much more likely
than Czechs to believe that elected officials do not care much about what they
think; they are more likely to think that there is no point in voting because the
government cannot make any difference; and less likely to believe that they can
have an influence on government. We can see, therefore, that evaluation of the
political systems varies significantly between the two states in ways which may
account for at least some of the national differences outlined in the previous
section.
A similar likelihood emerges from examination of data on the economic
experiences and expectations of citizens of the two states. Table 6 presents
responses to questions asking people to evaluate the direction taken in their own
family's and the country's living standards over the past five years and their
estimation of how family and country living standards will develop in the five
years to come. On each of these items, Slovaks as a whole are more negative
than Czechs, and Hungarians most negative of all. Thus, 64 per cent and 72 per
cent of ethnic Slovaks and Hungarians respectively believe that their family
living standards have fallen over the last five years compared to only 42 per cent
of Czechs. Whereas 39 per cent of Czechs expect family living standards to rise
in future, only 28 per cent of ethnic Slovaks and 23 per cent of Hungarians agree.
Most dramatic, however, are differences in the evaluations of national economic
performance. Compared to 32 per cent of Czechs who believe that the country
has improved its living standards over the past five years, only 5 per cent of
ethnic Slovaks and 2 per cent of Hungarians believe that this has happened.
Similarly, while a majority of Czechs - 55 per cent - look forward to rising
standards in the country as a whole, only 30 per cent of ethnic Slovaks and 22
per cent of Hungarians share this optimism. The same picture emerges when
asking people to evaluate in the most general terms the performance of the
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146 WHITEFIELD AND EVANS146 WHITEFIELD AND EVANS
TABLE 6 Economic Experience and Expectations Among Czechs,
Slovaks and Slovak Hungarians
Slovak
Czechs Slovaks Hungarians
Living standards of Risen 27% 13% 8%
family over past five years Fallen 42% 64% 72%
Living standards of Will rise 39% 28% 23%
family over next five years Will fall 20% 33% 35%
Living standards of Risen 32% 5% 2%
country over past five years Fallen 47% 87% 92%
Living standards of Will rise 55% 30% 22%
country over next five years Will fall 13% 33% 47%
How would you evaluate Positive 38% 16% 13%
the market economy so far? Negative 29% 52% 62%
TABLE 6 Economic Experience and Expectations Among Czechs,
Slovaks and Slovak Hungarians
Slovak
Czechs Slovaks Hungarians
Living standards of Risen 27% 13% 8%
family over past five years Fallen 42% 64% 72%
Living standards of Will rise 39% 28% 23%
family over next five years Will fall 20% 33% 35%
Living standards of Risen 32% 5% 2%
country over past five years Fallen 47% 87% 92%
Living standards of Will rise 55% 30% 22%
country over next five years Will fall 13% 33% 47%
How would you evaluate Positive 38% 16% 13%
the market economy so far? Negative 29% 52% 62%
market economy so far: 38 per cent of Czechs are positive, compa
16 per cent and 13 per cent of ethnic Slovaks and Hungarians.
The evidence about economic experience adds to that concernin
evaluations: while we cannot yet rule out the culturalist explana
differences in orientations towards the normative items described in Section I,
there is at least a strong primafacie case for the importance of recent experience
in explaining differences. The next section seeks to provide a stricter test of the
explanatory power of each of these types of account.
III. EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES IN ATTITUDES BETWEEN CZECHS,
SLOVAKS AND SLOVAK HUNGARIANS
In this section we attempt to decide between political cu
sorts of explanations of the country and group d
Section I. Our strategy is to regress measures of dem
economic and social liberalism on the measures of politic
experience and evaluation. The aim is to try and acc
observed differences between Czechs and Slovaks in levels of commitment to
democracy, the market and social liberalism. We do this by first entering
variables which represent the effect of being in a particular country or ethnic
group (so-called 'dummy' variables), into a regression model and then adding
potential explanatory variables. If these explanatory variables account for the
observed national differences, then their addition to the regression models
should reduce the coefficients for country differences to statistically insignificant
levels.
market economy so far: 38 per cent of Czechs are positive, compared to only
16 per cent and 13 per cent of ethnic Slovaks and Hungarians.
The evidence about economic experience adds to that concerning political
evaluations: while we cannot yet rule out the culturalist explanation of
differences in orientations towards the normative items described in Section I,
there is at least a strong primafacie case for the importance of recent experience
in explaining differences. The next section seeks to provide a stricter test of the
explanatory power of each of these types of account.
III. EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES IN ATTITUDES BETWEEN CZECHS,
SLOVAKS AND SLOVAK HUNGARIANS
In this section we attempt to decide between political cu
sorts of explanations of the country and group d
Section I. Our strategy is to regress measures of dem
economic and social liberalism on the measures of politic
experience and evaluation. The aim is to try and acc
observed differences between Czechs and Slovaks in levels of commitment to
democracy, the market and social liberalism. We do this by first entering
variables which represent the effect of being in a particular country or ethnic
group (so-called 'dummy' variables), into a regression model and then adding
potential explanatory variables. If these explanatory variables account for the
observed national differences, then their addition to the regression models
should reduce the coefficients for country differences to statistically insignificant
levels.
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Political Culture Versus Rational ChoicePolitical Culture Versus Rational Choice
For example, we shall assess the extent to which individual differences in
levels of democratic commitment between groups are removed by controllin
for individual differences in the independent variables - the indicators of
political and economic experience - and the relationship between these and
nationality.31 Where we succeed in removing group differences by this method,
it provides evidence that recent experience and evaluations of the workings of
the political and economic system can explain variations in commitment, rather
than long-standing national traditions as expressed through common normative
orientations. However, where country differences are not removed in this way,
or are removed only by reference to variables that can be taken to represen
long-standing national traditions, we find evidence consistent with cultura
forms of explanation.32
The dependent variables used in these analyses are constructed from
responses to groups of questions which have been combined to form summated
rating ('Likert') scales. In a Likert scale, responses to the constituent items are
given scores (ranging, for example, from 1 through to 5). These scores are then
simply added together. It is assumed that each item is a parallel measure of the
same underlying concept (although each may tap slightly different aspects o
it). Because each item may contain considerable measurement error and/o
specificity, a strength of Likert scaling is that it does not give too great a
importance to any particular item. The internal consistency of the scales wa
assessed using Cronbach's alpha, which is an estimate of reliability related to
the average inter-item correlation. Selection of scale items was done partly on
a priori grounds, but items that were found to reduce internal consistency (as
measured by alpha) were removed. This was not done, however, with some
items that helped preserve the balance of the scales with regard to direction of
question wording. These were retained even when their presence reduced the
internal consistency of the scales (particularly the social liberalism scale),
because balanced scales are less prone to the biases associated with
acquiescence effects.33
31 For an elaboration of this approach to cross-national analysis, the aim of which is to replace
country names with theoretically relevant variables, see Adam Przeworski and H. Teune, The Logic
of Comparative Social Enquiry (New York: Wiley, 1970) An illustration of this approach, also using
individual level data, can be found in Evans and Whitefield, 'The Politics and Economics of
Democratic Commitment'.
32 We also conducted analyses which included relatively stable national attributes such as the
distribution of respondents across different social classes, educational levels and urban-rural
residence. However, these social structural characteristics failed to make any contribution to
explaining country differences (details available on request).
33 For similar treatments of acquiescence effects in comparable data to that presented here, see
Anthony Heath, Geoffrey Evans and J. Martin, 'The Measurement of Core Beliefs and Values: The
Development of Balanced Socialist/Laissez-Faire and Libertarian/Authoritarian Scales', British
Journal of Political Science, 24 (1994), 115-32. For an assessment of the consequences of the
presence, or otherwise, of balanced question wording in scales, see Geoffrey Evans and Anthony
Heath, 'The Measurement of Left-Right and Libertarian-Authoritarian Values: Comparing
Balanced and Unbalanced Scales', Quality and Quantity, 29 (1995), 191-206.
For example, we shall assess the extent to which individual differences in
levels of democratic commitment between groups are removed by controlling
for individual differences in the independent variables - the indicators of
political and economic experience - and the relationship between these and
nationality.31 Where we succeed in removing group differences by this method,
it provides evidence that recent experience and evaluations of the workings of
the political and economic system can explain variations in commitment, rather
than long-standing national traditions as expressed through common normative
orientations. However, where country differences are not removed in this way,
or are removed only by reference to variables that can be taken to represent
long-standing national traditions, we find evidence consistent with cultural
forms of explanation.32
The dependent variables used in these analyses are constructed from
responses to groups of questions which have been combined to form summated
rating ('Likert') scales. In a Likert scale, responses to the constituent items are
given scores (ranging, for example, from 1 through to 5). These scores are then
simply added together. It is assumed that each item is a parallel measure of the
same underlying concept (although each may tap slightly different aspects of
it). Because each item may contain considerable measurement error and/or
specificity, a strength of Likert scaling is that it does not give too great an
importance to any particular item. The internal consistency of the scales was
assessed using Cronbach's alpha, which is an estimate of reliability related to
the average inter-item correlation. Selection of scale items was done partly on
a priori grounds, but items that were found to reduce internal consistency (as
measured by alpha) were removed. This was not done, however, with some
items that helped preserve the balance of the scales with regard to direction of
question wording. These were retained even when their presence reduced the
internal consistency of the scales (particularly the social liberalism scale),
because balanced scales are less prone to the biases associated with
acquiescence effects.33
31 For an elaboration of this approach to cross-national analysis, the aim of which is to replace
country names with theoretically relevant variables, see Adam Przeworski and H. Teune, The Logic
of Comparative Social Enquiry (New York: Wiley, 1970) An illustration of this approach, also using
individual level data, can be found in Evans and Whitefield, 'The Politics and Economics of
Democratic Commitment'.
32 We also conducted analyses which included relatively stable national attributes such as the
distribution of respondents across different social classes, educational levels and urban-rural
residence. However, these social structural characteristics failed to make any contribution to
explaining country differences (details available on request).
33 For similar treatments of acquiescence effects in comparable data to that presented here, see
Anthony Heath, Geoffrey Evans and J. Martin, 'The Measurement of Core Beliefs and Values: The
Development of Balanced Socialist/Laissez-Faire and Libertarian/Authoritarian Scales', British
Journal of Political Science, 24 (1994), 115-32. For an assessment of the consequences of the
presence, or otherwise, of balanced question wording in scales, see Geoffrey Evans and Anthony
Heath, 'The Measurement of Left-Right and Libertarian-Authoritarian Values: Comparing
Balanced and Unbalanced Scales', Quality and Quantity, 29 (1995), 191-206.
147147
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148 WHITEFIELD AND EVANS148 WHITEFIELD AND EVANS
Democratic commitment is measured using the four items
Cronbach's alpha is 0.64 in the Czech Republic and 0.63 in Slov
liberalism is measured using the ten items presented in Table
alpha is 0.77 in the Czech Republic and 0.71 in Slovakia. Social
includes seven of the items in Table 3. Cronbach's alpha is 0.46
Republic and 0.42 in Slovakia. The political experience scale cont
six items shown in Table 6. Cronbach's alpha was 0.67 in the C
and 0.58 in Slovakia. All of the items used in the analyses are coded
scores indicate liberal positions or positive evaluations of political and
economic practice. Scores on items which are inconsistent with this direction
have been reversed. 'Don't know' responses are recoded to the mid-point of the
scale.34
In Table 7 we model differences between Czechs, ethnic Slovaks and
Hungarians with respect to the democratic commitment scale. The first model,
which includes only the dummy variables for country and ethnic group, restates
the differences in mean scores shown in Table 1; both ethnic Slovaks and
Hungarians are significantly different from the somewhat more liberal Czechs.
Models 2 and 3 seek to remove these differences by introducing the political
experience scale and measures of economic experience examined in the
previous section.
TABLE 7 Democratic Commitment Regressed on Country, Political and
Economic Experience t
Model 1: Model 2: Model 3:
Ethnic and Political Economic
country dummies experience experience
Czech Republic
Slovaks - 0.18** -0.04** 0.00
Hungarians - 0.07** 0.02 0.04
Political experience 0.43**
Democracy evaluation 0.22**
Family past 0.15**
Family future 0.04
Country past 0.02
Country future 0.17**
Market evaluation 0.27**
Adjusted r2 0.03 0.32 0.22
**Significant of p < 0.01.
tThe values shown are standardized beta coef
34 If 'Don't knows' are treated as missing it re
on the substantive findings. Details available
Democratic commitment is measu
Cronbach's alpha is 0.64 in the Czec
liberalism is measured using the te
alpha is 0.77 in the Czech Republic
includes seven of the items in Tabl
Republic and 0.42 in Slovakia. The p
six items shown in Table 6. Cronba
and 0.58 in Slovakia. All of the items
scores indicate liberal positions or positive evaluations of political and
economic practice. Scores on items which are inconsistent with this direction
have been reversed. 'Don't know' responses are recoded to the mid-point of the
scale.34
In Table 7 we model differences between Czechs, ethnic Slovaks and
Hungarians with respect to the democratic commitment scale. The first model,
which includes only the dummy variables for country and ethnic group, restates
the differences in mean scores shown in Table 1; both ethnic Slovaks and
Hungarians are significantly different from the somewhat more liberal Czechs.
Models 2 and 3 seek to remove these differences by introducing the political
experience scale and measures of economic experience examined in the
previous section.
TABLE 7 Democratic Commitment Regressed on Country, Political and
Economic Experience t
Model 1: Model 2: Model 3:
Ethnic and Political Economic
country dummies experience experience
Czech Republic
Slovaks - 0.18** -0.04** 0.00
Hungarians - 0.07** 0.02 0.04
Political experience 0.43**
Democracy evaluation 0.22**
Family past 0.15**
Family future 0.04
Country past 0.02
Country future 0.17**
Market evaluation 0.27**
Adjusted r2 0.03 0.32 0.22
**Significant of p < 0.01.
tThe values shown are standardized beta coef
34 If 'Don't knows' are treated as missing it re
on the substantive findings. Details available
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Political Culture Versus Rational ChoicePolitical Culture Versus Rational Choice
In Model 2, the political experience scale and the single item on how
respondents evaluate the actual practice of democracy in their country so far are
introduced as independent variables. As can be seen, both of these have a
significant and substantial impact on levels of democratic commitment, with
standardized beta coefficients of 0.43 and 0.22. The effect of the introduction
of these variables is virtually to remove most of the differences between ethnic
Slovaks and Czechs with respect to democratic commitment - though still
statistically significant, the beta coefficient for Slovaks falls from -0.18 to
- 0.04. Differences between Hungarians and Czechs are removed completely.
The r2 for Model 2 is also increased over that of Model 1 from 0.03 to a
substantial 0.32.
Model 3 introduces the economic experience variables. Once again, a numb
of these variables are highly significant statistically - family living standards
over the past five years, country living standards over the next five an
evaluation of the market in practice are strongly associated with democrat
commitment - and differences in the country or group variables are removed
entirely. The effects of economic experience are even more effective than thos
of political experience at accounting for country differences, primarily becaus
differences in economic experience between the two countries are considerably
more marked than those in political experience.35
We can thus account for higher levels of commitment to democracy among
Czechs by comparison with Slovaks without recourse to notions of long-standin
political culture. Higher levels of support for democracy in the Czech Republic
appear to reflect that country' s greater success in making the economic transitio
resulting in materially less harsh market experiences, and its relatively
straightforward democratic transition. These have resulted in less elite conflict
and a greater willingness to allow citizens say in political development than has
occurred in the more highly fractious political disputes found in Slovakia.
Culturalists might still want to argue that the political experience items are
themselves conditioned by culture rather than experience. Indeed, Almond and
Verba and others have used similar items as part of their 'civic cultur
measures. There are, however, several replies to this point: first, at face value
these items clearly ask about the workings of the political system as experience
by respondents; we therefore see no good reason to treat these responses
reflections of cultural differences. The patterns of Czech, Slovak and Hungarian
responses make good sense as reflections of differences in the party systems in
35 The importance of economic experiences in accounting for differences in democratic attitud
between Czechs and Slovaks is slightly at odds with our analysis of other countries in the regio
where political experience was of clearly greater importance in explaining national variation
support for democracy than was economic experience. The reasons for this divergence probably l
in the particularly positive experience of the market reported by Czechs compared with all oth
countries we have surveyed in Eastern Europe, and the fact that until 1993 the political system
experienced by Czechs and Slovaks were the same, thus reducing the extent of experience
differences in political experience and evaluation. See Evans and Whitefield, 'The Politics an
Economics of Democratic Commitment'.
In Model 2, the political experience scale and the single item on how
respondents evaluate the actual practice of democracy in their country so far are
introduced as independent variables. As can be seen, both of these have a
significant and substantial impact on levels of democratic commitment, with
standardized beta coefficients of 0.43 and 0.22. The effect of the introduction
of these variables is virtually to remove most of the differences between ethnic
Slovaks and Czechs with respect to democratic commitment - though still
statistically significant, the beta coefficient for Slovaks falls from -0.18 to
- 0.04. Differences between Hungarians and Czechs are removed completely.
The r2 for Model 2 is also increased over that of Model 1 from 0.03 to a
substantial 0.32.
Model 3 introduces the economic experience variables. Once again, a numb
of these variables are highly significant statistically - family living standards
over the past five years, country living standards over the next five an
evaluation of the market in practice are strongly associated with democrat
commitment - and differences in the country or group variables are removed
entirely. The effects of economic experience are even more effective than thos
of political experience at accounting for country differences, primarily becaus
differences in economic experience between the two countries are considerably
more marked than those in political experience.35
We can thus account for higher levels of commitment to democracy among
Czechs by comparison with Slovaks without recourse to notions of long-standin
political culture. Higher levels of support for democracy in the Czech Republic
appear to reflect that country' s greater success in making the economic transitio
resulting in materially less harsh market experiences, and its relatively
straightforward democratic transition. These have resulted in less elite conflict
and a greater willingness to allow citizens say in political development than has
occurred in the more highly fractious political disputes found in Slovakia.
Culturalists might still want to argue that the political experience items are
themselves conditioned by culture rather than experience. Indeed, Almond and
Verba and others have used similar items as part of their 'civic cultur
measures. There are, however, several replies to this point: first, at face value
these items clearly ask about the workings of the political system as experience
by respondents; we therefore see no good reason to treat these responses
reflections of cultural differences. The patterns of Czech, Slovak and Hungarian
responses make good sense as reflections of differences in the party systems in
35 The importance of economic experiences in accounting for differences in democratic attitud
between Czechs and Slovaks is slightly at odds with our analysis of other countries in the regio
where political experience was of clearly greater importance in explaining national variation
support for democracy than was economic experience. The reasons for this divergence probably l
in the particularly positive experience of the market reported by Czechs compared with all oth
countries we have surveyed in Eastern Europe, and the fact that until 1993 the political system
experienced by Czechs and Slovaks were the same, thus reducing the extent of experience
differences in political experience and evaluation. See Evans and Whitefield, 'The Politics an
Economics of Democratic Commitment'.
149149
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150 WHITEFIELD AND EVANS150 WHITEFIELD AND EVANS
the two countries and the representation available to the various et
If political culturalists want to assume these responses reflect cultur
then they need to make a good case for that assumption. Secondly,
in democratic commitment between Czechs and Slovaks can be acco
economic experience without including measures of political exp
regression model (this is because economic and political ex
themselves strongly correlated). Thirdly, if we do treat the indica
experience as dependent rather than independent variables in our a
as a cultural phenomenon to be explained rather than as an explana
responses - we find that differences in responses between Czechs a
wholly explained by economic experience (details available).
It is not surprising, therefore, that a similar analytic strategy is
in removing differences in the levels of market commitment amo
groups which emerged from Table 2. Again, Model 1 in Table 8
that ethnic Slovaks and Hungarians are both significantly les
committed to the market than are Czechs. However, when the item
Table 6 are introduced into the second model as independent v
prove to have substantial effects. The economic experience of t
the past five years and a general evaluation of the market in pract
being particularly important in reducing differences between
country dummy variables, the beta coefficients for which fall fro
ethnic Slovaks to - 0.04 (barely significant) and from - 0.11 to
case of Hungarians. Again, this is consistent with the proposition t
in levels of normative commitment to liberalization - in this case
to the economy - among the three groups is not the result o
long-standing traditions and orientations but the consequence of t
the two states to manage the market transition successfully.
TABLE 8 Economic Liberalism Regressed on Country and Economic
Experience (OLS Regressions) t
Model 1: Model 2:
Ethnic and country dumm
Czech Republic
Slovaks -0.21** -0.02
Hungarians -0.11** 0.00
Family past - 0.19**
Family future - 0.08**
Country past - 0.13**
Country future - 0.10**
Market evaluation - 0.16**
Adjusted r2 0.04 0.22
*Significant at p <0.05. **Significant
coefficients.
the two countries and the representation available to the various ethnic groups.
If political culturalists want to assume these responses reflect cultural dispositions
then they need to make a good case for that assumption. Secondly, differences
in democratic commitment between Czechs and Slovaks can be accounted for by
economic experience without including measures of political experience in the
regression model (this is because economic and political experience are
themselves strongly correlated). Thirdly, if we do treat the indicators of political
experience as dependent rather than independent variables in our analysis - i.e.
as a cultural phenomenon to be explained rather than as an explanation of such
responses - we find that differences in responses between Czechs and Slovaks are
wholly explained by economic experience (details available).
It is not surprising, therefore, that a similar analytic strategy is also effective
in removing differences in the levels of market commitment among the three
groups which emerged from Table 2. Again, Model 1 in Table 8 demonstrates
that ethnic Slovaks and Hungarians are both significantly less normatively
committed to the market than are Czechs. However, when the items detailed in
Table 6 are introduced into the second model as independent variables, they
prove to have substantial effects. The economic experience of the family over
the past five years and a general evaluation of the market in practice emerge as
being particularly important in reducing differences between the group and
country dummy variables, the beta coefficients for which fall from - 0.21 for
ethnic Slovaks to - 0.04 (barely significant) and from - 0.11 to - 0.01 in the
case of Hungarians. Again, this is consistent with the proposition that variations
in levels of normative commitment to liberalization - in this case with respect
to the economy - among the three groups is not the result of different
long-standing traditions and orientations but the consequence of the capacity of
the two states to manage the market transition successfully.
TABLE 8 Economic Liberalism Regressed on Country and Economic
Experience (OLS Regressions) t
Model 1: Model 2:
Ethnic and country dumm
Czech Republic
Slovaks -0.21** -0.02
Hungarians -0.11** 0.00
Family past - 0.19**
Family future - 0.08**
Country past - 0.13**
Country future - 0.10**
Market evaluation - 0.16**
Adjusted r2 0.04 0.22
*Significant at p <0.05. **Significant
coefficients.
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Political Culture Versus Rational ChoicePolitical Culture Versus Rational Choice
The same argument does not, however, explain the (admittedly smaller)
differences among the groups on questions of social liberalism (shown in Table
3). The introduction of political and economic experience and evaluation as
independent variables in regression analyses (details available on request)
makes no dent in removing differences in the country or group dummies - in
this case, in removing the relative social illiberalism of ethnic Slovaks. Ther
is little reason for believing, therefore, that differences in levels of social
liberalism result from recent experience, individual resource endowments, or
evaluation of performance and prospects. Rather, as Table 9 shows, these
differences between the country or groups are only removed when variation in
levels of church attendance is controlled for. As we have seen, Slovaks are
clearly more religious than are Czechs. This fact, which derives from
long-standing differences in the two countries' historical traditions, appears best
to explain the lower levels of commitment to social liberalism among Slovaks.
In this case, we conclude that differences in the two political cultures - reflecting
the different historical role of Catholicism in the two countries - is the more
likely explanation for small differences which emerge in responses to ou
questions about individual liberties, the right to protest, and tolerance of
differences in lifestyles.
TABLE 9 Social Liberalism Regressed on Country, Religious
Denomination and Levels of Church Attendance
(OLS Regressions) t
Model 1: Model 2:
Ethnic and country dummi
Czech Republic
Slovaks - 0.12** - 0.03
Hungarians - 0.04* 0.01
No religion 0.03
Church attendance - 0.18**
Adjusted r2 0.01 0.04
*Significant at p <0.05. **Significa
standardized beta coefficients.
To summarize: Czech-Slovak differences with respect to the major issues of
economic and political liberalization appear to be the result of recent experience,
resources, evaluations and circumstances rather than deeper normative
orientations. However, attitudes towards various social issues involving
questions of liberal rights and tolerance of disagreement and diversity do not
seem to relate to economic or political experience, but rather to long-standing
traditions and identities of the two states as reflected in participation in the
country's religious institutions.
The same argument does not, however, explain the (admittedly smaller)
differences among the groups on questions of social liberalism (shown in Table
3). The introduction of political and economic experience and evaluation as
independent variables in regression analyses (details available on request)
makes no dent in removing differences in the country or group dummies - in
this case, in removing the relative social illiberalism of ethnic Slovaks. There
is little reason for believing, therefore, that differences in levels of social
liberalism result from recent experience, individual resource endowments, or
evaluation of performance and prospects. Rather, as Table 9 shows, these
differences between the country or groups are only removed when variation in
levels of church attendance is controlled for. As we have seen, Slovaks are
clearly more religious than are Czechs. This fact, which derives from
long-standing differences in the two countries' historical traditions, appears best
to explain the lower levels of commitment to social liberalism among Slovaks.
In this case, we conclude that differences in the two political cultures - reflecting
the different historical role of Catholicism in the two countries - is the more
likely explanation for small differences which emerge in responses to ou
questions about individual liberties, the right to protest, and tolerance of
differences in lifestyles.
TABLE 9 Social Liberalism Regressed on Country, Religious
Denomination and Levels of Church Attendance
(OLS Regressions) t
Model 1: Model 2:
Ethnic and country dummi
Czech Republic
Slovaks - 0.12** - 0.03
Hungarians - 0.04* 0.01
No religion 0.03
Church attendance - 0.18**
Adjusted r2 0.01 0.04
*Significant at p <0.05. **Significa
standardized beta coefficients.
To summarize: Czech-Slovak differences with respect to the major issues of
economic and political liberalization appear to be the result of recent experience,
resources, evaluations and circumstances rather than deeper normative
orientations. However, attitudes towards various social issues involving
questions of liberal rights and tolerance of disagreement and diversity do not
seem to relate to economic or political experience, but rather to long-standing
traditions and identities of the two states as reflected in participation in the
country's religious institutions.
151151
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152 WHITEFIELD AND EVANS152 WHITEFIELD AND EVANS
IV. THE MEANING OF ETHNIC LIBERALISM
It remains only to return to an account of the unexp
Czechs and Slovaks on questions of ethnic liberalis
attitudes towards ethnic rights are more complex.
items (ethnic rights and language in schools), Slov
slightly - with the latter tending to be the slightly m
while Hungarians are clearly far more pro-minorit
items, however, it is Czechs who appear to be marked
while Hungarians lose much of their liberal distin
focus on the rights to citizenship and state benefits o
At first glance this inconsistent pattern may seem
removed by a regression analysis similar to the o
available on request). It seems likely, however, that ex
of responses results from differences in the meaning
the ethnic rights questions for Czechs and Slovaks
ethnic rights elicit considerations about Hungarian
have no such similarly large and distinctive group wi
connect more distinctly to the gypsy question, and p
the case of citizenship) to the rights of ethnic German
of Bohemia and Moravia after the end of the Second World War. These
considerations make salient questions about the rights of gypsies (and possi
Germans) to be citizens of the Czech Republic. These differences of interpret
may therefore explain the substantial proportion of Czechs who react some
negatively to these issues. For Slovaks, in contrast, the rights of Hungarian
be citizens and to have rights to state benefits are not such sensitive topics
These considerations seem to be borne out by differences in the patterns
association between attitudes towards ethnic issues in the two countries. In
addition to the four questions shown in Table 4, respondents were also asked
about their beliefs concerning the presence of 'too many' gypsies in their
countries.36 For Czechs, attitudes towards gypsies predict attitudes towards
citizenship rights (r = 0.20, significant at p < 0.01), but for Slovaks they do not
(r = - 0.02), ns. Similarly for Czechs, but not for Slovaks, beliefs about ethnic
rights in general are moderately strongly associated with attitudes towards
citizenship rights (r = 0.27, p < 0.01) - for Slovaks there is only a very weak
association (R = 0.11, p < 0.01), whereas the link between ethnic rights in
general and attitudes towards the use of the majority language for teaching in
schools is very strong in Slovakia (0.54, p <0.01) but not (0.20, p < 0.01)
among Czechs. Finally, there is evidence that attitudes towards the use of the
majority language for teaching are more closely linked with attitudes towards
national independence37 among Slovaks (0.25, p < 0.01) than they are among
36 'There are too many gypsies in the Czech Republic/Slovakia.' Both ethnic Slovaks and
Hungarians were more likely than Czechs to agree with this statement - perhaps because there ar
more gypsies in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic.
37 'The Czech Republic/Slovakia should co-operate with other countries even if it means giving
up some independence.'
IV. THE MEANING OF ETHNIC LIBERALISM
It remains only to return to an account of the unexp
Czechs and Slovaks on questions of ethnic liberalis
attitudes towards ethnic rights are more complex.
items (ethnic rights and language in schools), Slov
slightly - with the latter tending to be the slightly m
while Hungarians are clearly far more pro-minorit
items, however, it is Czechs who appear to be marked
while Hungarians lose much of their liberal distin
focus on the rights to citizenship and state benefits o
At first glance this inconsistent pattern may seem
removed by a regression analysis similar to the o
available on request). It seems likely, however, that ex
of responses results from differences in the meaning
the ethnic rights questions for Czechs and Slovaks
ethnic rights elicit considerations about Hungarian
have no such similarly large and distinctive group wi
connect more distinctly to the gypsy question, and p
the case of citizenship) to the rights of ethnic German
of Bohemia and Moravia after the end of the Second World War. These
considerations make salient questions about the rights of gypsies (and possi
Germans) to be citizens of the Czech Republic. These differences of interpret
may therefore explain the substantial proportion of Czechs who react some
negatively to these issues. For Slovaks, in contrast, the rights of Hungarian
be citizens and to have rights to state benefits are not such sensitive topics
These considerations seem to be borne out by differences in the patterns
association between attitudes towards ethnic issues in the two countries. In
addition to the four questions shown in Table 4, respondents were also asked
about their beliefs concerning the presence of 'too many' gypsies in their
countries.36 For Czechs, attitudes towards gypsies predict attitudes towards
citizenship rights (r = 0.20, significant at p < 0.01), but for Slovaks they do not
(r = - 0.02), ns. Similarly for Czechs, but not for Slovaks, beliefs about ethnic
rights in general are moderately strongly associated with attitudes towards
citizenship rights (r = 0.27, p < 0.01) - for Slovaks there is only a very weak
association (R = 0.11, p < 0.01), whereas the link between ethnic rights in
general and attitudes towards the use of the majority language for teaching in
schools is very strong in Slovakia (0.54, p <0.01) but not (0.20, p < 0.01)
among Czechs. Finally, there is evidence that attitudes towards the use of the
majority language for teaching are more closely linked with attitudes towards
national independence37 among Slovaks (0.25, p < 0.01) than they are among
36 'There are too many gypsies in the Czech Republic/Slovakia.' Both ethnic Slovaks and
Hungarians were more likely than Czechs to agree with this statement - perhaps because there ar
more gypsies in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic.
37 'The Czech Republic/Slovakia should co-operate with other countries even if it means giving
up some independence.'
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Political Culture Versus Rational ChoicePolitical Culture Versus Rational Choice
Czechs (0.04, ns); a similar tendency can be observed with respect to ethnic
rights in general among Slovaks (0.32 and 0.17, respectively (both p < 0.01)).
The issues made salient with respect to the ethnic rights question do appear
to differ in the two countries, just as the groups under consideration appear to
differ. Among Czechs the link is between ethnic rights, gypsies and citizenship.
Among Slovaks, beliefs about ethnic rights do not link even moderately strongly
with views on citizenship - probably because this is not a right from which
ethnically illiberal Slovaks want to exclude the Hungarian minority (if anything,
this would facilitate the possibility of secession). Similarly, because gypsies are
not the group brought most obviously to mind by the question of ethnic minority
rights, there is no link among Slovaks between attitudes towards citizenship
rights and beliefs about the presence of undesirably large numbers of gypsies;
while there are stronger links between ethnic rights and both attitudes towards
national independence and the issue of language in schools among Slovaks than
among Czechs.
By illustrating the different connotations of ethnic rights questions in the two
countries this evidence suggests, once again, that differences in political culture
conceived as general normative orientations to minority rights are not the key
to understanding differences in Czech-Slovak political attitudes. What matters
are differences in the circumstances faced by these two populations resulting
from the presence or otherwise of challenges to the nation state and the character
of the ethnic groups to be incorporated in them. These factors shift the meaning
of questions about minority rights in ways which make comprehensible
otherwise surprising results.
V. CONCLUSION
Our strategy in this article has been to test for the relati
cultural versus rational choice explanations of national
attitudes. We cannot claim to have tested the relative m
conclusively - and in any case, only one way of conceiv
explanation has been dealt with. None the less, much
suggests that political culture is of less importance tha
expectations and the country's ethnic, political and eco
conditioning Czech-Slovak differences in political attit
Inevitably, when comparing answers to attitude ques
contexts there has to be considerable sensitivity to p
measurement and meaning - indeed, such a difference
ethnic liberalism has been identified and elucidated a
however, the case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia
appeared to offer particularly fruitful ground for compari
the fact that the surveys were conducted by the same
contaminating effects resulting from differing 'hou
linguistic comparability, and many shared nuances
frequencies more directly comparable than is often the
Czechs (0.04, ns); a similar tendency can be observed w
rights in general among Slovaks (0.32 and 0.17, respect
The issues made salient with respect to the ethnic rights
to differ in the two countries, just as the groups under c
differ. Among Czechs the link is between ethnic rights, g
Among Slovaks, beliefs about ethnic rights do not link ev
with views on citizenship - probably because this is no
ethnically illiberal Slovaks want to exclude the Hungarian
this would facilitate the possibility of secession). Similarly
not the group brought most obviously to mind by the ques
rights, there is no link among Slovaks between attitud
rights and beliefs about the presence of undesirably large
while there are stronger links between ethnic rights and
national independence and the issue of language in schools
among Czechs.
By illustrating the different connotations of ethnic right
countries this evidence suggests, once again, that differen
conceived as general normative orientations to minority r
to understanding differences in Czech-Slovak political atti
are differences in the circumstances faced by these tw
from the presence or otherwise of challenges to the nation
of the ethnic groups to be incorporated in them. These fact
of questions about minority rights in ways which m
otherwise surprising results.
V. CONCLUSION
Our strategy in this article has been to test for the relati
cultural versus rational choice explanations of national
attitudes. We cannot claim to have tested the relative m
conclusively - and in any case, only one way of conceiv
explanation has been dealt with. None the less, much
suggests that political culture is of less importance tha
expectations and the country's ethnic, political and eco
conditioning Czech-Slovak differences in political attit
Inevitably, when comparing answers to attitude ques
contexts there has to be considerable sensitivity to p
measurement and meaning - indeed, such a difference
ethnic liberalism has been identified and elucidated a
however, the case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia
appeared to offer particularly fruitful ground for compari
the fact that the surveys were conducted by the same
contaminating effects resulting from differing 'hou
linguistic comparability, and many shared nuances
frequencies more directly comparable than is often the
153153
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154 WHITEFIELD AND EVANS154 WHITEFIELD AND EVANS
comparisons. We can have some confidence, therefore, that the d
observed between political attitudes in the two countries are substant
than artefactual.
Given this, we consider it is reasonable to conclude that on a number of
dimensions of attitudes where differences between Czechs and Slovaks - and
Hungarians - were found, and which could have been explained in terms o
enduring systems of belief, they could be shown empirically to be associated
with differences in transition experiences. If parsimony and testability are to be
given weight when comparing explanatory accounts, there seems little reason
in these cases to have recourse to the complexities of political culture.
True, rational choice does not account for all of the observed differences
between Czechs and Slovaks. Those concerning social liberalism appear to
relate only to frequency of church attendance - and the place of this institution,
and the attachment of Slovaks to it, is best understood as part of the
long-standing traditions and identities of Slovak culture. In this sense, political
culture explanation has a role; indeed, it is precisely the role that Almond, in
his retrospective appraisal of the value of political culture theory, is most secure
in ascribing to it. As he puts it, 'most resistant to change are attitudes, identities
and value commitments associated with ethnicity, nationality and religion'.38
Our evidence supports this. None the less, even this attitudinal difference was
muted and not consistent across issues. Indeed, of most interest with respect to
issues of social liberalism is how little difference there is between two
communities with such marked differences in religiosity and relations w
Catholic Church. Thus even this finding might be taken as evidence of h
this most enduring of cultural differences between Czechs and Slovaks is
explanation of their current political beliefs.
comparisons. We can have some confidence, therefore, that the diff
observed between political attitudes in the two countries are substantive
than artefactual.
Given this, we consider it is reasonable to conclude that on a number of
dimensions of attitudes where differences between Czechs and Slovaks - and
Hungarians - were found, and which could have been explained in terms o
enduring systems of belief, they could be shown empirically to be associated
with differences in transition experiences. If parsimony and testability are to be
given weight when comparing explanatory accounts, there seems little reason
in these cases to have recourse to the complexities of political culture.
True, rational choice does not account for all of the observed differences
between Czechs and Slovaks. Those concerning social liberalism appear to
relate only to frequency of church attendance - and the place of this institution,
and the attachment of Slovaks to it, is best understood as part of the
long-standing traditions and identities of Slovak culture. In this sense, political
culture explanation has a role; indeed, it is precisely the role that Almond, in
his retrospective appraisal of the value of political culture theory, is most secure
in ascribing to it. As he puts it, 'most resistant to change are attitudes, identities
and value commitments associated with ethnicity, nationality and religion'.38
Our evidence supports this. None the less, even this attitudinal difference was
muted and not consistent across issues. Indeed, of most interest with respect to
issues of social liberalism is how little difference there is between two
communities with such marked differences in religiosity and relations w
Catholic Church. Thus even this finding might be taken as evidence of h
this most enduring of cultural differences between Czechs and Slovaks is
explanation of their current political beliefs.
38 Almond, 'The Study of Political Culture', p. 22.38 Almond, 'The Study of Political Culture', p. 22.
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