Slovakia
Peter Spáč
Published in Havlík, Vlastimil; Pinková, A. et al. (2012): Populis Political Parties in EastCentral
Europe. Brno: Munipress, pp. 227-258.
1. The Politics of populism in Slovakia
Populism as an ideology has emerged in many regions in the world, including Europe.
This raises the question of whether certain features or conditions in regions or particular
countries help this phenomenon to appear (and sustain itself), or whether its existence is
independent of the context. If the former is true, then the region of Central and Eastern
Europe has provided a solid basis for such political movements and parties (Stanley 2011:
258). Slovakia is no exception, and we can trace at least three factors supporting this insight.
First, after the fall of communism in 1989 Slovakia (until 1992 as part of
Czechoslovakia) experienced major economic consequences. This was best seen when
comparing Slovakia to its Czech counterpart over several indicators, particularly the level of
unemployment (Holman 2000; Hilde 1999: 648). Slovaks were more sceptical than Czechs of
radical economic liberalisation. These trends were later magnified by the privatisation of state
property, a process beset by corruption (Jurzyca, Jakoby, Pažitný 1999: 405-408).
Secondly, Slovaks usually hold a rather negative opinion of domestic politics and its
actors. Although this does not apply to the entire period of the last two decades, the trends
here are quite obvious and are regularly supported by public opinion surveys (Bútorová,
Gyárfášová, Velšic 1999: 244; Gyárfášová, Velšic 2002: 303). The third and final factor is the
polarisation of the party system, which has led to the division of parties into two blocks. As
for the distrust by Slovaks toward their politics, this feature has had a changing significance
as well, reaching its peak in the late 90s during the last government of Vladimír Mečiar.
Separately or in combination, these three factors have created favourable conditions
for the emergence of populism in Slovakia. As this chapter shows, the opportunity has been
repeatedly exploited, and led to the creation of a number of political parties. For these parties,
populism became a primary or a secondary weapon in their struggle to gain public support,
though with varying degrees of success.
2. The evolution of the party system
Since 1989 the party system of Slovakia has gone through many interesting
developments. The preceding era of communist rule had a strong impact, as connections to
earlier political movements and parties were effectively lost. As in other post-communist
countries, the previous cleavages in society were blurred. The party system as such was thus
re-constituted on new basis, mostly without significant historical connections to previous
political actors.1
Added to the existing distrust by the society towards political parties based on the
negative experience of communist one-party rule, this meant there were less than optimum
conditions for a stable party system. Subsequent developments bore this out. Of all the parties
that competed in the first free elections in 1990 only one, the Christian Democratic Movement
(KDH), is still represented in the current parliament, whereas all other actors from this period
lost their relevance or are balancing on the edge. This chapter introduces the evolution of the
party system, and stresses its main features.
A usual feature of the collapsing communist countries was the emergence of a broad
dissident movement. Slovakia was no exception, and during the revolutionary days of
November 1989 the Public Against Violence (VPN) was created. This party had a very weak
structure; it was composed of representatives of variety of ideologies. Although it clearly won
the first elections in 1990 and entered both the national and federal governments, centrifugal
trends were gaining strength, and in 1991 they finally led to the disintegration of the VPN.2
Its
main successor with the strongest influence on later Slovak politics was the Movement for
Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) led by Vladimír Mečiar.
Other elements of the party system were developing in the early 1990s as well. The
former ruling communists transformed themselves into a moderate Party of the Democratic
Left (SDĽ); their orthodox branch renewed its existence as a communist party but remained
1
One case was the Slovak National Party (SNS), which emerged in 1990 but claimed to be the direct successor
of the eponymous party created in 1871. Despite the SNS’s claim that it was the “oldest Slovak party” this
alleged connection was more than doubtful for many reasons. (Kopeček 2007: 413-414)
2
In its program the VPN proclaimed the goal aim of national independence. This goal became complicated with
the start of discussions about the future configuration of Czechoslovakia. Ultimately the VPN was split over this
issue. (Kopeček 2007: 139-140)
weak. Other parties were newly created, most importantly the Christian Democrats (KDH)
and Nationalists (SNS). As about one tenth of the Slovak society is ethnic Hungarian, parties
representing their interests emerged and began to cooperate.
A key feature with a strong impact was the last government led by Mečiar in 1994-
1998, which led to a sharp polarization of the system. Against the parties comprising the
government stood an ideologically heterogeneous opposition including the Hungarian parties.
This tension reached its peak in the 1998 elections which ended Mečiar’s rule and prevented
the country from continuing down the road to illiberal democracy.
The easing of the polarization, accompanied by continuously falling public support for
the HZDS, allowed the party system to become standardized in the ideological sense. The
party Direction (Smer), established by former vice-chairman of the SDĽ Robert Fico, saw a
rapid rise in support, and swallowed up the smaller leftist parties. Attempts on the right were
also made, but with only limited success.3
As a result the left part of the spectrum was clearly
dominated by Smer, while the right remained fragmented and represented by numerous
parties. This configuration continues to the present, and the last elections in 2012 confirmed it
strongly.4
The Slovak party system has thus been stable in respect to the number of relevant
parties, which has ranged from 5 to 7, but not with respect to its composition.5
The system is
still undergoing development, and even though most of the parties can be included in
traditional party families their stability is an open question. The current shape of the party
system resembles some of its past features, since Smer is a clearly dominant party which has
assumed the role earlier held by the HZDS. The same applies to the polarization of the
system. Although it had its peak during Mečiar’s governments and decreased afterward, the
rising strength of Smer re-polarized the scene. Before the elections 2010 all of the centre-right
3
This was the initial aim of the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKÚ) led by Mikuláš Dzurinda
which envisioned itself as a centre-right union inspired by the German CDU-CSU.
4
In the last elections in 2012 Smer won a majority in parliament. The parties which composed the previous
centre-right government led by Iveta Radičová lost their public support, and most of them are now hovering
around the threshold needed to enter parliament.
5
During the last two decades many new parties were created and tried to find their place in the system. Such
were the cases of the Party of Civic Understanding (SOP) and the Alliance of the New Citizen (ANO) which
survived only for a single term although they both managed to enter the government. More successful stories
were the SDKÚ and Smer, whose chairmen both became prime ministers. The dynamics of the emergence of
new actors has still not ended, as three of the current parliamentary parties, namely the right-wing liberal
Freedom and Solidarity (SaS), the Slovak-Hungarian project Bridge (Most), and Ordinary People and
Independent Personalities (OĽaNO) were created in 2009 and 2011 respectively. On the other hand many of the
parties which entered parliament were not able to hold their popular support and became marginalized. This
counted for the above mentioned SOP or ANO but also for original actors like HZDS which in the 1990s clearly
dominated the system.
parties openly pledged not to enter a government with Robert Fico and his party. Though
there has been some movement in these relations and the parties are no longer divided into
two strict blocks, the above-mentioned tension still exists and plays its role in Slovak politics.
3. Case selection
An overview of the existing literature on our topic brings the expected results:
Slovakia provides an excellent ground for research as a post-communist country which has
faced severe problems with the sustainability of quality of its democracy. As such its political
development since 1989 has been thoroughly mapped (see Kopeček 2006; Kopeček 2007). On
the other hand there is no vast amount of work specifically concentrating on populism in
Slovakia, as this is a much narrower focus, and research on populism itself is still evolving. In
this chapter some of the papers that have focused on this theme are presented. After that we
select the cases which will be analyzed in the further text.
We start with the work of Deegan-Krause and Haughton (2009), which can be
presented as an overall study of populism in Slovakia, and so far the only one of its kind. The
authors concentrated on the presence of populism in Slovak party system since 1990 and they
mapped the usage of these appeals by all relevant parties. Their insight is both interesting and
original, as they use the term “populism” as a scale and not as a strict binary choice (2009:
838).
A greater volume of work so far has been done on case studies focusing either on
single parties or on smaller party groups. An important contributor to this kind of research has
been Peter Učeň, who studied the then-new parties Smer and ANO labelled them as parties of
“centrist populism” (2003). According to Učeň, these parties were reluctant or even refused to
discuss their ideological affiliation, preferring criticize the elites, and call for easy and fast
solutions based on common sense. Another case study was elaborated by Just (2007), who
thoroughly described the creation and rise of SOP led by Rudolf Schuster, who later became
President of Slovakia.
A wider study but one still dealing with a particular issue was a report on national
populism edited by Petőcz (2009). The above-mentioned Učeň and another important Slovak
scholar Grigorij Mesežnikov contributed to this book, the former providing a chapter on the
concept of national populism, and the latter identifying the parties in Slovakia that fit into this
category. According to Mesežnikov these parties include the HZDS, SNS, and Smer, which
share several common topics which they use to mobilize society.6
A somewhat different study was made by Stanley (2011) concerning Slovak
parliamentary elections in 2010. The study focused not on parties as other authors have, but
on ordinary citizens instead. Stanley discusses whether the usage of (national) populism
among Slovak parties is equally reflected by the sentiment within Slovak society. In other
words, whether Slovaks are attentive to such messages, and whether these affect their
sympathies towards the various parties. As Stanley found out, populist appeals have only a
limited influence on Slovak citizens, as socio-economic and national questions simply matter
more.
Now we can move on to select cases for our analysis. Based on our overview of the
literature, there are several Slovak parties which might be rounded up as the “usual suspects”
when dealing with populism. Most notably this group includes parties which emerged shortly
after 1989 such as the HZDS and SNS, as well as parties that were created in later years, e.g.
Smer, SOP, and ANO. Our selection of cases mostly copies these findings, but not for all
situations and time periods, as the text below discusses. This book distinguishes between
indentitarian and partially populist parties, which we do not need to explain further as this was
done in the first chapter. In this chapter we present those Slovak parties which we understand
to have been populist at least for some periods of their existence, regardless of whether they
fit into the former or latter subgroup.
What can be said is that we have not tracked any party that could be labelled as having
been populist for the whole time of its existence.7
As Deegan-Krause and Haughton (2009:
832-836) correctly conclude, the populist appeals of the respected parties diminish after these
parties enter parliament and most notably the government. This conclusion has a logical
background: because we understand populism as primarily evoking antagonism between the
people and elites, it becomes harder and harder for such parties to use this language after they
become part of the establishment. The Slovak parties which can be classified as populist thus
continued to meet the definition of populist mostly until their first or second elections; later
they drew back on their populism and tried to form closer ties with other ideologies. This
strategy proved common to all of the parties, though with a sharply different rate of success.
6
Mesežnikov implies that these topics include the definition of society, relations towards ethnic minorities, the
interpretation of problematic issues of Slovak history, and the goal of awakening national consciousness.
(Mesežnikov 2009)
7
The only exemption here is OĽaNO, but this may be due to the very short existence of this party.
After these remarks we may proceed to the selection of our cases. As populist parties
used in this chapter we will be working with six parties, namely the HZDS, ZRS, Smer, SOP,
ANO and OĽaNO.8
In accordance with the above discussion, in all cases we regard these
parties to have been populist only for a limited time, which mostly ended shortly after their
entry into parliament or government. All these parties shared a common topic, which initially
was the division between the people and the elites; they stressed antagonism between these
two groups, where the former represented the good guys and the latter the bad guys. The
following chapters will elaborate these statements further.
For many authors this list may seem incomplete, as they would without a doubt add
the SNS. On the contrary, this chapter will not classify the SNS as a populist party, but this
requires an explanation. When dealing with national populism the SNS was clearly a party
fitting this profile (Mesežnikov 2009: 41-42). The same counts for the analysis of DeeganKrause
and Haughton (2009), which identified a sharp rise in populist appeals by this party
after the 1998 elections.9
Why do the conclusions in this chapter differ from those of the other
scholars?
The main reason lies in usage of the term populism. If we understand populism mainly
as an appeal distinguishing between two antagonistic groups, the people and the elite, the SNS
just barely fits this profile. Though this party often speaks in the name of all Slovaks and
understands Slovakia in ethnic terms, we identify this as a sign of its xenophobic character.
Appeals pointing to ethnic Slovaks are thus the point that makes the SNS a radical
nationalistic party and not a populist party. We are aware that this might in the strictest terms
a disagreement with the other authors, but our point here is that the populism should be
defined more narrowly, because otherwise nearly every party could be labelled as populist. In
this respect, if praising ordinary Slovaks qualifies SNS as a populist party, than the same
could be said of the Hungarian parties in Slovakia, as they appeal with a comparable message
to their “target group”, and we could continue on this way ad absurdum.10
Our remark here is that if populism is primarily seen as an ideology which sets groups
of people and the elite against one another, then the term it should be used carefully;
otherwise we may end up with the classical situation in which our only tool is a hammer, and
8
This book works with a time frame ending in 2011, which would exclude OĽaNO. After consultations with the
editors the party was included, and the chapter about Slovakia got a little exemption.
9
For the electoral term 2002-2006 Deegan-Krause and Haughton even rank the SNS as the party with the
highest ratio of populist appeals among all others. (Deegan-Krause, Haughton 2009: 832)
10
Taken to the logical extreme, most parties have some groups in society which they aim at and shape their
messages for. The parties of the right stress the importance of employers and entrepreneurs; Christian democrats
do the same toward religious voters, etc. But based on these actions these parties are not labeled as populist,
which is correct. The question is why nationalists should be regarded otherwise.
we see all problems as nails. This fully accounts for the supposed rise in the SNS’s populism
after 1998 when the SNS left the government due to internal problems which led to a
temporary internal split, and its failure to get into parliament in 2002. The party reacted by
becoming more radicalized, mostly towards Hungarians, Roma, and later the European
Union.11
One may see this change as a trend toward populism, but in fact these changes only
strengthened the xenophobic and nationalistic features of the party. We thus consider the SNS
to be a classical radical rightist formation, and do not include it on our list of populist
parties.12
4. Analysis of selected cases
4.1. Histories of the populist parties
The political parties included in our analysis were formed at various times over the
period after 1989. The first chronologically was the HZDS, which formed when it split away
from the dissident forum Public Against Violence. The reason for the split was tension
between the VPN leadership and Vladimir Mečiar, who became Slovak premier after the 1990
elections. The internal conflict came to a head with Mečiar’s removal from executive office.
The almost immediate reaction was the departure of his faction from the party, and the
founding of the HZDS (Kopeček 2007: 132-135).
In the following years Mečiar’s party became the dominant party in Slovakia by far,
supported by more than a third of the electorate. However, the party was unable to maintain
these levels in the long run, no doubt partly because of its problematic manner of governance,
which went outside the bounds of liberal democracy in 1994-1998. In the latter half of the
1990s the party’s public support steadily dwindled, and it went into the opposition in 1998.
The Movement managed to get back into government in 2006, but only as a small coalition
11
There were many visible signs of radicalization within the SNS. One of the most famous was an episode when
the leader of SNS Jan Slot urged a tank attack on Budapest, or when he vulgarly offended the Hungarian
minister of foreign affairs. The party’s program for 2006 elections was called “We are Slovaks. A Slovak
government for Slovaks” which was aimed against the presence of the Hungarian party in the Dzurinda
government.
12
For the same reason the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS) is not considered a populist party. Although it
directs strong criticism toward the political establishment, this is because it is a dogmatic communist party and
thus an anti-systemic element that aims to overthrow the current democratic regime. In this sense all antisystemic
parties would have to be regarded as populist, which would only further blur the concept of populism.
partner of Smer. The decline of HZDS became definitive in 2010 with its failure to get into
parliament, and subsequent marginalization.13
The ZRS was born in a similar manner. Its main figure, Ján Ľupták, began in 1990 as
an MP from the SDĽ, and represented a certain alternative to its main intellectual current. In
1992 Ľupták founded the civic organization ZRS14
, which functioned independently from the
SDĽ. After the SDĽ joined the coalition Moravčík government with some right-wing parties,
the civic organization became a political party. The ZRS got into parliament after the 1994
elections and joined the government led by Mečiar. As it turned out, this move eventually led
to the Ľupták party’s downfall, as the actions of the government and in particular its
privatization policy was in direct conflict with the party’s election campaign goals. ZRS
voters, who tended to come from the low-income social groups, left the party in droves. After
the 1998 elections the ZRS suffered a sharp drop in support, and failed to win any seats in
parliament. Ľupták tried to reverse this trend in subsequent years, but the party remained
marginalized.
Three other parties, namely SOP, Smer, and ANO, were formed under qualitatively
different circumstances. The problematic actions of the Mečiar government led to serious
polarization on the political scene in the 1990s. As Kopeček tells us (2007: 143), the position
of the HZDS was so predominant that the positions of all the other parties in the system were
defined by their relationship to the Movement, or rather its chairman. Ideological
considerations were secondary. It was this tension that produced dissatisfaction and then
frustration among large segments of the public. This created room for the formation of new
parties, the pioneer in this regard being the SOP (Učeň, Gyárfášová, Krivý 2005: 5-8).
The SOP was founded at the beginning of 1998 on the initiative of the popular mayor
of Košice and one-time prominent communist functionary R. Schuster. This party was very
critical of the existing political polarization, and set as its goal the achievement of civic unity,
the idea of which was contained in its very name (Just 2007: 181-182). It managed to hang on
to this ambition for a short time only, as the political situation forced it to choose between the
two blocs. Months before the elections the SOP publicly declared itself part of the opposition,
and in doing so gave up its position as a potential alternative for all. It thus lost its drawing
power for a portion of its membership, and election results fell far short of expectations
(Kopeček 2007: 273). Another problem for the SOP was the election of Rudolf Schuster as
13
In the election year 2012 the HZDS received less than one percent of the vote, which led to discussion of
possibly dissolving the party.
14
The name of the civic organization was the same as that of the later political party ZRS.
President of Slovakia, which deprived the party of its most prominent figure. As a part of the
first Dzurinda government the party tried to redefine itself ideologically, but its proclaimed
refocus on social and liberal values failed to halt its decline. After the 2002 elections it went
into a tailspin15
and ceased to be a relevant party.
Two parties with populist leanings were formed during the term of the first Dzurinda
government in 1998-2002. The first was Smer, founded in 1999 by former
SDĽ vice-chairman R. Fico.16
Smer was sharply critical of the established parties, and based
its main strategy on this negative stance. The second party was ANO, formed by media
magnate Pavol Rusko, which like Smer was critical of the existing establishment, but
somewhat less intensely so (Učeň 2003: 54-56). The two new parties were in a better position
than the SOP had been. The climate after the fall of the Mečiar government continued to be
very polarized, but there was no longer such massive pressure on new parties to commit
themselves to one bloc or the other.
In the 2002 elections Smer and ANO succeeded in getting into parliament, and the
latter party even joined the second Dzurinda government. Here, however, the trajectories of
the two parties begin to diverge. While ANO lost voter support because of financial scandals
involving its chairman, Smer was steadily building its position. The 2006 elections confirmed
this trend. While ANO lost its seats in parliament and faded away, Smer came to dominate the
center-left, and became the most powerful party in Slovakia. It remains so today; in the 2012
elections Smer won an absolute majority of seats in parliament, and formed a one-party
government.
The final party we will introduce is OĽaNO. The party as such was founded in 2011,
although its members ran for parliament as independents on the SaS ballot in the 2010
election.17
After elections it became part of the Radičová government, even though they were
not represent an independent member party, but operated under the SaS label, which produced
a number of practical problems.18
After the Radičová government lost its vote of confidence
and was forced into early elections in June 2012, “Ordinary People” founded their own party
15
The SOP did not run by itself in the elections; its candidates ran on the SDĽ ballot. The result of this project,
however, was just over one percent of the vote. (Bureau of Statistics SR)
16
The founding of Smer to a certain degree recalls that of the ZRS: both parties grew out of the SDĽ.
17
Specifically these were four candidates who were given the last four places on the ballot (numbers 147-150).
They got into parliament due to preference votes, thanks to the strong media ties of their main figure Igor
Matovič, who owns a network of regional periodicals. (Spáč 2010: 69) In those elections they ran under the
heading of civic association Obyčajní ľudia [Ordinary People] (OĽ), and this became part of the name of the
new political party.
18
In practice the leading figure of the “Ordinary People” Igor Matovič spoke mainly for himself, which finally
led to his expulsion from the SaS parliamentary club. This happened during the debate over the law on state
citizenship, when Matovič refused to vote according to the governing coalition’s line.
OĽaNO.19
As its name implies, its declared goal is to create a platform for non-partisans, as
the Slovak electoral system does not allow them to run independently. With a relatively
diverse list of candidates OĽaNO took part in the early elections and succeeded, becoming the
second-strongest part after Smer. Since Smer has formed a single-party government, OĽaNO
is an opposition party at the moment.
4.2. Organizational structure and leadership style
One of the features of populism involves praising of the people. Knowing this it can be
expected that parties that use populist messages will at least for the first years of their
existence concentrate more on the communication with the electorate at the expense of
building a strong organizational structure. In the case of the Slovak parties we are studying
here, this presumption is for the most part confirmed. They may not precisely fit this identical
organizational model, but a number of similar elements can be observed.
One of these is the party’s approach to building internal structures. After their
founding not one of them began immediately to build a broader party organization. The
HZDS is a prime example: in the first years of its existence it had no codified principles of
decision making or distribution of powers; its grass-roots organizations grew up
spontaneously, and there was no formalized membership (Rybář 2011: 70). On the other hand
Mečiar’s party began to pick up a large number of members and its membership base
continued to grow, until it was the largest party in Slovakia.20
The ZRS started out on similar
foundations. Its internal organization and operation were marked by inexperience and
amateurism, but this was compensated for by strong growth in membership. Their base began
to grow even before the founding of the ZRS as a party, while it was still a civic organization,
and it continued to increase even after transforming into a political party. The ZRS reached its
numerical zenith in 1995.21
Populist parties that were formed in earlier eras did not fully share these patterns.
Although they did not actually avoid recruiting members, or deliberately restrict their
numbers, this aspect of their organization was on a much lower level than with the HZDS or
19
There was an agreement between OĽ and SaS that the “Ordinaries” would not found their own party until the
end of 2010.
20
In 1993 the HZDS already listed 30 thousand members (Minarovič 2004: 54).
21
When the civic association changed into a political party in March 1994 the ZRS had more than 13 000
members. By 1995 membership had risen to around 20 thousand (Kopeček 2007: 223-224).
ZRS.22
As for their organizational structure itself, the SOP gradually created a structural
model for the whole party (Ondruchová 2000: 29). In contrast, Smer and ANO emphasized a
rather different set of priorities. These two entities concentrated on forming narrow,
professionally-operated structures that proved efficient and successful in running election
campaigns. In effect Smer and ANO based their organization on managerial principles.23
This
model was taken furthest by Smer, which unlike SOP and ANO almost completely bypassed
the building of regional structures at the beginning. In 2001 this party, almost two years after
its founding, replaced its regional management offices with traditional regional organizations,
and began to establish networks in the districts (Kopeček 2007: 286). But not until recent
years has Smer become more generally institutionalized.
A key point that all Slovak populist parties have in common was a major degree of
centralization, low levels of internal party democracy, and a prominent role for party
leaders.24
The strong positions of the chairman derived from the fact that they were all among
the groups’ founders. The cases of Smer and ANO were prime examples, says Učeň (2003:
55), according to whom these parties were basically an act of will by their chairmen. This was
surely true for the HZDS, ZRS, and SOP as well. Perhaps the most visible example in this
sense was Pavol Rusko who headed ANO: as the owner of various media outlets was not only
the party’s founder, but its nearly exclusive funder as well. He was almost literally the owner
of the party.
Another strength of the chairmen of these populist parties is their longevity (tab. 1).
ZRS and Smer both long had or still have had only one chairman, and the HZDS was even
more extreme in this regard. Vladimír Mečiar announced he would step down after the 2012
elections, but this only happened after the party’s definitive marginalization. During the era
that the movement was a relevant force, and for many years after, Mečiar’s position was
22
The SOP and ANO reached their peak numbers at around 6 thousand. At present the voter base of Smer is one
of Slovakia’s largest at over 15 thousand members. These numbers were built up over a longer the course of
time: contributing factors included the gradual strengthening of the party’s position, and the attrition process
among the smaller center-left parties. Smer’s original reluctance to take on a larger number of members was
shown by the fact that in 2000 it had only around 3 thousand members (Mesežnikov 2003: 82; Kopeček 2007:
286; „Kongres SOP...“, Sme, 28.6.1999).
23
In the context of the financial background that ANO’s chairman provided it, the party from an organizational
standpoint was in effect something between a political party and a private firm (Rybář 2011: 18).
24
In Slovak politics centralization is not limited to the populist parties. One strong factor determining this was
the introduction of a single country-wide electoral district in 1998, which impacted the other parties as well. One
example was the SDKÚ and its choice of candidates, which was officially strongly inclusive, but the deciding
role in the process was kept by the party leadership (Spáč 2012).
unchallenged.25
There was a change in the chairmanship of the SOP, when in 1999 Rudolf
Schuster was replaced by Pavol Hamžík, but this change was necessitated by Schuster’s
election as President of Slovakia, an office which is traditionally non-partisan. Likewise, in
2007 Pavol Rusko was replaced at the head of ANO by Robert Nemcics, but again this was at
a time when the party had declined into irrelevancy. In the practice of the individual parties,
the institution of electing a chairman was a non-conflict confirmation of the chairman in his
position.26
Table 1. Party chairmen
Political party Name Term in office
HZDS Vladimír Mečiar 1991 – 2012
ZRS Ján Ľupták 1994 – 2012
SOP
Rudolf Schuster 1998 – 1999
Pavol Hamžík 1999 – 2003
Smer Robert Fico 1999 – 2012
ANO
Pavol Rusko 2001 – 2007
Robert Nemcics 2007 – 2011
OĽaNO Igor Matovič 2009 – 2012
The Slovak populist parties took differing approaches to organizational matters. From
the beginning the HZDS and ZRS concentrated more on growing their member base, leaving
their structures less organized, while SOP, Smer, and ANO on the other hand made relatively
little effort to increase membership. While the SOP maintained an almost traditional
organization, Smer and ANO were aiming, at least at first, to construct a narrow but effective
framework for winning elections. For objective reasons the process of institutionalization
advanced furthest with HZDS and Smer, while the other parties lost motivation after losing
elections. With the HZDS there was a marked tendency towards the formation of clientelist
networks outside the formal party structure, but when the partly went into opposition in 1998
this trend was halted and eventually negated.27
25
Among the democratic countries Vladimír Mečiar may have been the party chairman with the longest
uninterrupted term as party head. This is not fully verifiable, however, given the limited information coming out
of some of the Asian or African countries.
26
Elections for party chairmen often featured a lack of opposing candidates, which was typical for the HZDS for
example. Likewise election procedures could be designed to help the favored candidate, as with ANO which
used public voting (Kopeček 2007: 404-405).
27
In the 1990s the HZDS as the ruling party created a sort of political support network, made up of associated
organizations for young people or women. The party also initiated special-interest groups that worked in its
favor, such as business, journalistic, or community associations (Kopeček 2007: 161-162; Rybář 2011: 70-71).
In this chapter we have not yet mentioned OĽaNO. This party is a special case that
differs from any of the other parties in the chapter, or any other political party for that matter.
In reality OĽaNO lacks any organizational structure, and since it was founded it has shown no
ambition to become a classic party. This entity continues to present itself almost as a civic
association, making it more attractive for independent candidates to run on its ballot. The only
fixed point of party leader Igor Matovič, whose dominant position is comparable to that of the
other populist parties’ leaders. It is impossible to say whether OĽaNO will finally begin
building a broader internal structure, or will remain in its current amorphous shape. At the
moment the latter seems more likely, but if the party ever becomes part of a coalition
government it may be tempted to modify that.
4.3. Ideology
This publication distinguishes between two types of populist parties. The first are
identitarian populist parties, parties for which ideas are only the backdrop, and populist
messages predominate. The second type is the partially populist party, a party that can still be
placed into a specific party family, and for which populism is an accessory. Therefore, in
defining whether a party is populist or not, we must take ideology into account. The Slovak
case gives us a number of interesting examples.
Of the parties we are analyzing, the HZDS was the first to be founded. Mečiar’s party
was formed in 1991, and from the beginning it relied on strongly populist rhetoric. Their
perspective was critical of existing elites who had failed to comprehend the needs of
“ordinary” Slovaks. The HZDS drove home this point especially in the context of an
economic transformation undertaken by the establishment without proper attention to the
needs of the public. These arguments were accompanied to a great degree by nationalistic and
socially-laden rhetoric (Kopeček 2007: 158).
In the case of the HZDS the exploitation and exacerbation of antagonisms between the
people and the elites took on a rather unusual form. The reason was simple: the HZDS itself
was part of the elite. Even before the party was founded, many of its officials were part of the
political leadership in the regions, and Mečiar himself was Premier until the spring of 1991.
Even so, the HZDS the HZDS used its populist message effectively during its time in the
opposition in the early 1990s.28
Paradoxically, it was able to do so not only during the initial
period from its founding up until the 1992 elections, but even afterward during the time of the
Moravčík government in 1994. By then HZDS had experienced a convincing electoral
victory, a dominating two-year stint in the government, and was totally identified with what
was happening at the time29
, even so it continued to successfully present itself as an outsider
party (Deegan-Krause, Haughton 2009: 830). Its next term in government in 1994-1998
finally exhausted this vein and the HZDS ceased to fall under our definition of populism as it
was now clearly perceived as an "insider" of the system.
What type of populist party was the HZDS at that time? Mečiar’s party originally
refused to categorize itself ideologically, which was a reflection of its internal heterogeneity.30
The program orientation of the party was vague and ambivalent, which meant in practice that
the HZDS played on various themes, but carefully and without being too contentious or
defining itself too much.31
In 2000 the Movement proclaimed itself to be center-right, but in
reality there was no change (Kopeček 2007: 178-179). About the HZDS in the period 1991-
1994 we can safely say that it was ideologically unclassifiable, which places it close to the
group of identitarian populist parties. On the other hand, the HZDS’s populist issues went
alongside a number of various other ideological elements. The HZDS was thus closer in its
early days to identitarian populism, but this conclusion remains somewhat qualified.32
The ZRS on the other hand is a relatively simple case. This party, continuing from its
previous activities as a civic association, defined itself as a far-left party appealing to the
socially disadvantaged and threatened groups.33
Its central themes were economic, such as the
transition to the market economy or the privatization of state property. Into this message the
ZRS succeeded in introducing clearly populist themes. It defined itself as a politically and
morally clean party with the goal of unifying the broader segments of society. The existing
28
A typical example was the failure of talks between Czech and Slovak officials over the shape of the
Czechoslovak federation during the first half of 1992. In this situation the HZDS became the party of the
“deceived people” and leveled its criticism at the entire existing establishment (Leško 1996: 75).
29
After the breakup of the federation the HZDS began to tout itself as the founding party of the state and the
standard-bearer of the era. Mečiar himself was presented as the “Father of his Country”.
30
This heterogeneity was the logical outcome of the way the HZDS was founded, in that it did not split off from
the VPN primarily on the basis of ideas ideology. Contrast this with Václav Klaus’s Civic Democratic Party
(ODS), which as the main successor of the dissident movement Civic Forum (OF) was founded as a clearly
right-wing party.
31
The ambiguous character of the HZDS manifested itself in a number of ways. For example the movement
styled itself as having helped bring down the communist regime, but at the same time it was opposed to
lustration laws. Likewise Mečiar’s party proclaimed Christian values, but never slipped towards hard
conservative Catholic positions (Kopeček 2007: 159-160).
32
To a certain degree the HZDS might be classified as a partially populist party during these years, but it is
impossible to determine what “traditional” ideology it actually had.
33
It was the ZRS’s own self-presentation as the party farthest left on the political spectrum except for the Slovak
communists.
establishment was accused by the party of being egoistic and placing its own goals above the
general national and civic interest (ZRS Election Program 1994).
From the beginning Ľupták’s party poised itself to exploit the tension between society
and the elites, with society being seen as morally good, the elites as a stratum that had
betrayed its trust. The ZRS emphasized the point by identifying itself with the general protest
against the developments taking place at the time.34
As in the case of the HZDS, their
participation in the coalition government in 1994-1998 was a fundamental turning point.
When the ZRS became part of the establishment, it lost this issue for the future. Although
they did not abandon the theme entirely (Kopeček 2007: 232), it was no longer able to keep
from becoming marginalized. In the end Ľupták’s party, including its previous activities as a
civic organization, at least at the beginning fit the definition of a partially populist entity with
a primarily far-left orientation.
Political conditions in Slovakia resulting from developments in the 1990s were also
strongly reflected in the appearance and activities of populist parties that were formed later.
The polarization of the party spectrum between two blocks (pro-Mečiar and anti-Mečiar) also
impacted the mood of society at the time. The level of tension was so high that a large part of
the public viewed it as a negative factor, and were willing to consider various alternatives.
This freed up a large segment of the voting population, to whom the emerging new populist
parties purposefully reached out (Učeň et al. 2005: 17).
The first of these new parties was SOP. At the beginning this party founded by Rudolf
Schuster lacked a clear ideological profile. Instead it put all its energy into criticizing the
existing conditions: the polarization of society, ever-present social hatred, and the inability of
the two blocs to come to agreement.35
The SOP saw these two factors as a negative influence
on society, which instead stood in need of unity and reconciliation. In this way the SOP
justified the reasons for its founding as a reaction to society’s need to end this state of affairs,
and this was emphasized in the party’s choice of name (Mesežnikov 1999: 92-93).36
The
SOP’s populism lasted only a short time, however. Circumstances forced the party into the
opposition bloc, which rendered the fundamental attributes that distinguished it from the other
parties less pronounced. Its participation in the coalition government and the departure of
34
The ZRS specifically called in its election program for voters to choose it as an expression of protest against
the economic, political, and moral changes than taking place (Volebný program ZRS 1994)
35
Slovakia’s effort to elect a president was reflective of the period. Originally the Slovak head of state was
elected by parliament; a constitutional three-fifths majority was necessary. But in 1997-1998 none of the party
blocs possessed this kind of majority, which led to a stalemate. As a result, after the end of M. Kovač’s term in
office Slovakia went almost a year without a president..
36
The SOP described the tension within the party system as “senseless” and “artificial” (Volebný program SOP
1998).
Rudolf Schuster as party head led the party to move towards more social and liberal values,
but without a more precise ideological grounding (Kopeček 2007: 278).
The party ANO was a different case: from the beginning it defined itself as a centerright
liberal party. This was the primary basis for its program oriented towards economic
issues, which called for a diminished role for the state in society. Even so, ANO resorted to
clearly populist messages. The party accused the existing establishment of corruption and
strong ties to the business sector. Moreover, according to ANO there was an ever-widening
gap between the elites and people, overseen by politicians who were incapable of or
uninterested in allowing people to live their own lives as they see fit (Učeň 2003: 54-55).
Thus ANO’s populism was not actually very radical, and when the party entered Dzurinda’s
second government these arguments were muffled. Instead, the party decided to focus more
on its liberal identity, even on questions civilizational issues, which brought it into frequent
conflict with its coalition partners the KDH.37
The last of the three populist parties created in 1998-2002 was Smer. When it was
founded this party rejected any classification on the left-right scale, and defined itself as nonideological
(Mesežnikov 2000: 119). Instead, Smer was strongly critical of both party blocs,
and the entire establishment. It did not view the prevailing polarization through the same lens
as SOP, but it did blame both sides in the conflict, accusing them of failure and of having lost
the right to lead the country and society in the future. Smer’s antagonism towards the
mainstream was perhaps best illustrated by the slogan “as they stole under Mečiar, so they
steal under Dzurinda” (Wienk, Majchrák 2003: 168). This bon mot should be seen not in the
personal context but in the broader sense. Here Vladimír Mečiar and Mikuláš Dzurinda do not
appear as individual persons, but as symbols of the era “before Smer”, which R. Fica’s party
criticized as a whole. The gap between the people and the elites was so large, according to
Smer, that it could only be resolved by replacing the entire current generation of politicians.
Smer’s populism differed in intensity and range from that of SOP and ANO. As Učeň
(2003: 56) observes, ANO made relatively selective use of these appeals, but with Smer the
populism was applied across the board. After the 2002 elections, however, there were changes
even changes in the case of Smer. Shortly prior to elections the party talked about following
the so-called “Third Way”, but this failed to have the desired effect. Its poorer-than-expected
election showing led the party to abandon its non-ideological stance and openly espouse the
37
Between ANO and KDH there were sharp conflicts over the nature and character of the state. In these conflicts
ANO represented the secular view. Typical arguments were over the issue of abortion, or the so-called Vatican
accord.
principles of social democracy. Smer continued to further solidify this ideological stance,
which placed it in a better position to criticize the right-wing economic reforms of the second
Dzurinda government (Kopeček 2007: 298-300). At the same time it toned down its populist
rhetoric, and finally entered the government in 2006.38
From the above information we can rank SOP and Smer among the identitarian
populist parties, while ANO with its liberalism belongs among the partially populist parties.
With all three of these parties the populism lasted for a limited time only. The populism of
SOP and ANO pretty much ended with the first parliamentary elections; the SOP’s populist
appeal weakened even before the elections, under the necessity of lining up with the aniMečiar
bloc. Smer, on the other hand, had the “advantage” of not getting into the government
after the first elections, but remaining in the opposition, which allowed it to maintain its
populism for a longer time.39
But this, too, was ended when it entered the government as the
winner of the next elections.
The last case we will analyze is OĽaNO. In this case any clear ideological definition is
by nature problematic, as the party seeks to serve as a platform for non-partisans of various
ideological backgrounds. The party’s program for the 2012 elections does not provide us any
more precise guidance, as there is no visible tilt in one direction or the other (see OĽaNO
Electoral Program 2012). Although OĽaNO does not reject the right-left categorization as
vehemently as some of the above parties, it remains for the time being an ideologicallyamorphous
entity.40
However, the populist element in the OĽaNO has been important from the beginning.
In accordance with its name the party assumed the role of representative and defender of
ordinary people, and took a strongly critical attitude towards the political establishment. The
party drew on the frustration of people who have long felt themselves robbed by politicians
and the elites, those symbols of corruption and clientelism (Election Program OĽaNO 2012).
This aspect was displayed during the 2012 election campaign, when the OĽaNO pointed to
media reports of clientelistic ties of political elites to certain financial groups, and placed this
38
The classification of Smer as a social democratic party is not without reservation. The party has long projected
nationalist messages as well, and this was clearly reflected in the way they governed during 2006-201.
Moreover, this helped Smer to gradually absorb a big share of former SNS voters.
39
In the period after the 2002 elections until the elections in 2006 Smer can be seen as gradually moving towards
becoming a partially populist party, mainly by presenting itself as a social democratic party.
40
One possibility might be to note the candidacies of the leading OĽaNO representatives on the ballots of the
liberal SaS in 2010. However, they are not as ideologically close as they may seem given the campaign program
of the “ordinaries” along with the statement by chairman Matovič who denied being a liberal.
in the context of its call for a new generation of politicians.41
Overall OĽaNO can be safely
classified as an identitarian populist party, while the future remains quite open in this regard.
From the standpoint of ideology, we can point out a number of interesting features
among the Slovak populist parties. Most of these parties are, or have been, identitarian
populist parties and not the partial type. The point they shared in common, with the logical
exception of OĽaNO, is the transitory nature of these parties’ populism, which usually
(though not always) ended with the party’s first elections. Last but not least, because of the
closeness of these parties’ ideologies, we can speak of at least two waves of Slovak populism.
The first is represented by ZRS and HZDS; their messages were aimed at citizens who lost
out in the post-1989 economic transformation. The second wave, started by SOP and
continued by Smer and ANO, drew on the exhaustion and frustration among parts of society
with developments in the post-communist era, which the existing polarization of the party
spectrum only exacerbated. In this context it is a question whether OĽaNO falls under the
second wave, or forms the foundation for a new trend, or whether it represents something of a
divergent case.
4.4. Electoral support and the social base
This chapter will provide basic information on the election results of the Slovak
populist parties, and the character of their supporters. Two observations at the outset: because
the individual parties maintained the populist profile for a limited time, key for us is the
information that corresponds to the particular era. The second point is of an entirely practical
nature and concerns OĽaNO. This party was formed only recently, and took part in its first
parliamentary elections in March 2012. These circumstances of time limit the amount of
available information about OĽaNO and its voters.42
41
Specifically the so-called Gorilla affair, involving the publication of conversations indicating widespread
corruption and influence by financial interests on domestic politics.
42
The individual parliamentary elections in Slovakia are regularly mapped in detail and published by the
Institute for Public Affairs. This text was written only a few months after the 2012 election; therefore the 2012
data is lacking. For information on OĽaNO and its voter support we will be able to consult this publication after
it comes out..
Table 2. Election results for the analyzed parties
Political
party
1992 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2012
% seats % seats % seats % seats % seats % seats % seats
HZDS 37,26 74 34,96 61 27 43 19,5 36 8,79 15 4,32 - 0,93 ZRS
- - 7,34 13 1,3 - 0,54 - 0,29 - 0,24 - 0,72 SOP
- - - - 8,01 13 1,36 - - - - - - Smer
- - - - - - 13,46 25 29,14 50 34,79 62 44,41 83
ANO - - - - - - 8,01 15 1,42 - - - - OĽaNO
- - - - - - - - - - - - 8,55 16
Note: In 2002 the SOP did not campaign independently, but its candidates ran on the SDĽ ballot. The same was
done by ZRS in 2012 when it ran on the KSS ballot.
Source: Slovak Bureau of Statistics.
The above information (tab. 2) shows the results our parties achieved in the individual
elections. From this data it is possible to observe the paths of the populist parties through
parliament. While the HZDS was a clear victor after its first elections, the others were not
quite so successful. Besides Smer, which achieved a decent result, though below expectations,
the other parties became minor actors with returns up to ten percent. But their position was
very fragile, as their subsequent election losses proved.
Another important point is a closer analysis of the individual parties’ support. The two
parties established at the beginning of the 1990s, the HZDS and the ZRS, aimed their
messages primarily at the social groups that suffered most during the transformation process
after 1989. This was exhibited especially by the ZRS. Its electorate was made up mostly of
working people and the unemployed, while students and businessmen were represented to a
lesser degree. This corresponded to the educational profile of ZRS supporters, with trade
school education predominating, and minimal support from university graduates. The
peripheral profile of the party43
was also illustrated from a geographic standpoint; predictably,
party support grew the greater the distance east of Bratislava (Kopeček 2007: 225).
In the case of the HZDS the situation was different; at first its voters matched
remarkably well the average vital statistics of Slovak society. This can be explained by the
HZDS’s heterogeneous character, which differed greatly from the relatively narrowly-focused
ZRS. The early support for Mečiar’s party was centered in the villages and smaller towns, in
areas with higher proportions of Catholics, and likewise people with less education. Soon,
however, this broad profile narrowed significantly: these changes were quite apparent in the
data from the 1998 elections. The HZDS as a party began to take on a markedly rural
43
The ZRS was the only one of the relevant parties not to make its headquarters in Bratislava, but in central
Slovakia in the town of Banská Bystrica.
character, with strong support among older voters and people with less education (Krivý
1999). Geographically the party’s support was stable over time, concentrated in the northern
and northwest parts of Slovakia, and came to gradually include some eastern regions as well.
A few changes took place in later years, but these were part of the HZDS’s decline (Madleňák
2012: 74-78).
The trio of parties SOP, Smer, and ANO were formed at a different time and aimed at
other groups of voters. The focus of their interest was not the “losers” of the transformation,
but social segments dissatisfied with the long-term direction of the country and political
polarization (Učeň, Gyárfášová, Krivý 2005: 18). The result was that although their voter’s
demography was not completely amorphous, still in many respects they diverged little from
the statistical norms, and did not range towards the extreme values. A shared trait among
these parties was their ability to appeal to younger categories of voters and first-time voters.
This was true for the SOP in 1998, and for Smer and ANO in 2002. Their support did not
have any significant religious component, although in the case of SOP and ANO there was a
minor tendency to lose Catholic voters. At the same time all three parties gained greater
support in larger cities (Krivý 1999: 53-55; Krivý 2003: 89-90; Gyárfášová 2011: 76-78, 86-
88; Madleňák 2012: 62-63).
On the other hand, in terms of geographical support the political groups differ. The
chairman of the SOP was from eastern Slovakia, where the party drew its earliest; like the
ZRS, it was somewhat a party of the periphery.44
ANO was also rooted geographically in
central and eastern Slovakia, but its support was not as concentrated as the SOP’s. Smer’s
support in its first elections came mostly from the western and central parts of the country
(Slovak Bureau of Statistics).
In their first elections the voter bases of SOP, Smer, and ANO shared a number of
attributes in common despite their differing geographical distribution. With all of the above
parties, it was the shallow loyalty of their supporters, especially in the case of the SOP, which
was behind disappointing election results and declining support in the polls. The parties did
manage to get into parliament, but their position was uncertain; the SOP and ANO would
suffer the consequences from this in subsequent elections. On the other hand Smer as an
opposition party aimed for the center-left, and took a strongly critical stance towards the
second Dzurinda government; which brought it greater support in the polls. This led to a
major shift in the nature of the party’s support; this was partly a result of voters leaving the
44
In the Košice districts, which make up nearly seven percent of Slovakia’s population, the SOP gained nearly
20 percent of the vote (Slovak Bureau of Statistics).
declining HZDS as well. While Smer went explicitly after first-time voters from the big cities
in 2002, they changed their focus soon afterward. With the influx of former HZDS voters
Smer’s electoral base became older, and became well-established in smaller communities
(Gyárfášová 2011: 91). Unlike the HZDS, however, Smer continued to enjoy significant
support from the other voter segments as well.45
As for OĽaNO, at present we can only make a few general observations. The
geographic distribution of their support during the 2012 elections showed nothing specific; on
the contrary, its electoral support was quite evenly distributed (Štatistický úrad SR). The one
exception in this regard were areas with a larger share of the Hungarian minority, but this has
been true of all the “non-Hungarian” populist parties. From the [social standpoint], there are
several indicators that OĽaNO has especially taken center-right voters away from the
established parties.46
This might make it more attractive to younger people with middle and
high levels of education and from bigger towns. This theory requires some more examination,
however, and the question remains open for the time being.
Election results show that the individual Slovak populist parties enjoyed varying
degrees of success in this regard. The fact that they appeared on the scene in two separate
waves is reflected in the social background of their electorates. While in their first elections
the ZRS and HZDS were supported by the economically weaker strata, the supporters of the
second wave displayed different characteristics. Especially with the parties we have classified
as identitarian populist, at the beginning their voters did not diverge significantly from the
social averages. During in a later period the HZDS electorate became more narrowly
concentrated, while Smer’s voting base changed from its original characteristics altogether;
but this is no longer relevant for our purposes, as these aspects go beyond the bounds of our
topic, which concerns the two parties populist stages.
4.5. Position in the political system
The last set of topics to be discussed is the position of the populist parties within the
framework of the political system. As indicated by the election results shown above, these
parties were able to win relevant political support which allowed them to get into parliament.
The question is how they dealt with their newfound status.
45
Smer’s overwhelming victory in the 2012 elections has led it to re-focus on the less-contentious elements
among its voter base.
46
According to polls taken in February 2012 shortly before the elections, 20 percent of former SaS voters, and
almost 15 % of SDKÚ voters, were willing to vote for OĽaNO. (Prieskum agentúry Polis 2012)
Probably the most important indicator of the success of a political party in general is
its ability to gain and hold on to power. Under parliamentary democracies this means
becoming part of the executive. The political trajectory of the Slovak populist parties has been
impressive in this regard. Of the six formations analyzed here, four got into the government
after their first elections: the HZDS, ZRS, SOP, and ANO. Mečiar’s party is something of a
special case, as its top officials including their chairmen had held the highest offices
previously. Smer won a place in the government after its second elections in 2006. The only
one of these parties that has not served in government is OĽaNO (tab. 3).
Our effort to reveal and distinguish among the patterns of behavior by the Slovak
populist parties both in and out of government is problematic for two reasons. The first is that
these parties soon abandoned their populist stances, and turned to other messages to
accomplish their goals. Typically there was an effort to either strengthen or re-define their
ideological profile, as in the case of ANO or SOP. The second reason is the very short
lifespan of these parties, half of which were unable to maintain relevance for more than one
term. After joining coalition governments the parties we have analyzed toned down their
populist rhetoric, which means that their later activities (in or out of parliament) fall outside
their populist stages.
Table 3. Populist parties and their participation in coalition governments
Political party Year of founding
Entered
government
Number of
elections before
first joining
government
HZDS 1991 1992 1
ZRS 1994 1994 1
SOP 1998 1998 1
Smer 1999 2006 2
ANO 2001 2002 1
OĽaNO 2011 - Note:
The last column indicates the number of parliamentary elections the party ran in before joining a
government.
The rapid rise of the Slovak populist parties indicates that these entities enjoyed high
coalition potential, and often found themselves in the position of the kingmakers. Both the
ZRS and ANO became necessary links in the formation of a minimal winning coalition after
the 1994 and 2002 elections.47
The case of the SOP was a bit different: while the first
Dzurinda government would have been viable without it, the promised constitutional changes
required a minimum of 90 coalition MP’s to pass, making it necessary to include Schuster’s
party. The presence of ANO was one reason Smer did not join the government after its first
election. Robert Fico had made clear his ambition to do so during the election campaign
(Mesežnikov 2002: 86-87), but with the chance to form a homogeneous center-right
government his party became superfluous to building the coalition.
Meanwhile, the Slovak populist parties were not only the object of interest coalitionbuilding
interest; they also undertook their own initiative in this regard. We could say that
despite the varying degrees of antagonism harbored towards the existing establishment when
the parties were first starting out, they all proved willing to adapt to the new situation that
typically occurred after their first election success. The SOP took this step already during the
election campaign of 1998, when circumstances forced it into the opposition camp. As Učeň
observes (2003: 55), the weaker anti-elitist element in ANO compared to that of Smer before
the 2002 elections helped Rusko’s party get into the government. Probably the most
spectacular display of adaptability to changing conditions was the ZRS, which originally
planned to remain in the opposition and had been strong critic of the government (Kopeček
2007: 226). Instead the ZRS joined Mečiar’s government, and apart from a few occasions
became a loyal partner of the HZDS.
Relations with other political parties are an important factor of a party’s position in the
political system. In this sense the Slovak populist parties differed little from the established
actors, and after making it into parliament and the government they fell in line with the
existing mechanism. As the political spectrum became increasingly polarized, the ZRS clearly
attached itself to the pro-Mečiar bloc. Later on the SOP and ANO did something similar, but
with diametrically opposite results. On the other hand Smer resisted this logic at first, and its
ideology and bitter criticism of the second Dzurinda government led to mostly negative
relations with the center-right parties. Working from the same principle at present is OĽaNO,
which came out against Fico’s cabinet, but is keeping its distance from the parliamentary
opposition.
In other words, the Slovak populist parties made it into the political system, but found
it difficult to stay there. ZRS, SOP, and ANO failed to win re-election to parliament, and this
47
An absolute majority in the Slovak parliament is 76 (out of 150 seats). In 1994-98 Mečiar’s government had
83 seats, of which the ZRS contributed 13. Similarly the second Dzurinda government (2002-2006) as a
minimum victorious coalition had 78 seats to start with, of which 15 belonged to ANO.
presaged their downfall. It is symptomatic that in every case these were parties that entered
the government after their very first elections (Deegan-Krause, Haughton 2009: 837-838).48
Smer was different, remaining in the opposition until 2006, which allowed them to better-time
their ideological shift. These observations should indicate the options open to the youngest
and currently only populist party, OĽaNO. This party, like the previous three, entered
parliament as a minor player, but like Smer it has remained in the opposition. Even if we
overlook its special status as a platform for independent figures, it is possible that future
survival will depend on its ability to move toward a firmer set of values, and gain loyalty from
a specific segment of the voters.
5. Conclusion
Political developments in Slovakia after 1989 created a favorable setting for the
emergence of populist parties. A marked degree of mistrust by the public toward the political
elites, aggravated by a problematic transformation process and ever-increasing polarization of
the party spectrum, have proven to be the factors that together formed fertile conditions for
the appearance of populism. These favorable conditions were noticed and taken advantage of,
with varying degrees of success.
In the case of Slovakia we can distinguish two waves of populist parties. The first
consisted of HZDS and ZRS, which were formed in the early 1990s during the political and
economic transformation, and focused their attention on segments of society seen as having
lost out in these processes. The second wave came during a period of high polarization in
politics and among the public. During this stage SOP, Smer, and ANO gradually formed, and
benefited from the existing conflict between two party blocs. The question remains whether
OĽaNO can be classified together with these other parties, because it was founded quite a bit
later than the others, and under somewhat different qualitative conditions.
These two waves, however, did not form two homogeneous categories that would
differ significantly from one another. The parties do not fall into the same defined categories
of populist parties that we are working with. While HZDS, SOP, and Smer (and OĽaNO) can
be classified during their various periods as identitarian populist types of party, the ZRS and
ANO represent partial populist types of parties. Although differences are observable between
48
This may be contradicted by the very presence of HZDS, which entered the executive at the same time. The
basic difference between it and the trio of other parties was that the starting position of Mečiar’s party was
different, and from the standpoint of strength incomparable.
the parties of the two waves in various aspects such as internal organization or patterns of
voter support, we can otherwise draw no strict lines between the parties of the two waves.
Populism in the Slovak context represented and continues to represent a means by
which new party-type entities can achieve relevance, and seats in parliament. Our analysis of
the cases, however, shows that this type of vehicle is fragile and unstable. For this type of
party, participation in a coalition government means not only access to power; but a
significant challenge, as it involves becoming “contaminated” with policies which they
themselves had formerly opposed. As the cases of ZRS, SOP, and ANO show, when a party
gets into executive power too soon, it can turn out to destroy the party. It seems to be more
advantageous to serve first in the opposition, then later to hone one’s ideological message and
move away from populism; although the model of Smer is not of sufficient scope to allow us
definite conclusions in this regard. It will be interesting to see how OĽaNO deals with the
same challenge.
List of abbreviations
ANO Alliance of the New Citizen
HZDS Movement for a Democratic Slovakia
KDH Christian Democratic Movement
KSS Communist party of Slovakia
Most Bridge
ODS Civic Democratic Party
OF Civic Forum
OĽ Ordinary people
OĽaNO Ordinary People and Independent Personalities
SaS Freedom and Solidarity
SDKÚ Slovak Democratic and Christian Union
SDĽ Party of the Democratic Left
Smer Direction
SNS Slovak National Party
SOP Party of civic understanding
VPN Public Against Violence
ZRS Association of Slovak Workers
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