Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fjls20
Download by: [Masarykova Univerzita v Brne] Date: 07 March 2016, At: 05:15
The Journal of Legislative Studies
ISSN: 1357-2334 (Print) 1743-9337 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjls20
Two Decades of Divergent Post-Communist
Parliamentary Development
David M. Olson & Gabriella Ilonszki
To cite this article: David M. Olson & Gabriella Ilonszki (2011) Two Decades of Divergent PostCommunist
Parliamentary Development, The Journal of Legislative Studies, 17:2, 234-255, DOI:
10.1080/13572334.2011.574028
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2011.574028
Published online: 23 May 2011.
Submit your article to this journal
Article views: 295
View related articles
Citing articles: 1 View citing articles
IV. CONCLUSION
Two Decades of Divergent Post-Communist
Parliamentary Development
DAVID M. OLSON∗
and GABRIELLA ILONSZKI
Post-communist parliaments have become increasingly different from one another over
their first two decades. This two decade review considers seven parliaments: four in
Central Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) and three in the
former USSR (Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine). They have evolved over four dimensions
of change: context of constitution and party system, rules and organisation, members,
and civil society. At the end of the second decade, parliaments may be placed on two
dimensions, of autonomy from the executive, and of party polarisation. Three background
factors of transitions, legacies of communist era legislatures, and of international contacts
are identified as sources of their divergent trends.
Keywords: post-communist legislatures; parliamentary contexts; legacies of communist
legislatures; parliament–executive relations; parliamentary structure and rules.
Over the initial two decades of post-communist states, there has been a considerable
differentiation among their parliaments. At the end of the first decade, the
two main types of parliaments were the stable democratic parliaments and the
conflicted parliaments. This differentiation coincided with their regional
locations in Central Europe and the former Soviet Union (Olson and Norton
2008). This two decade review considers seven parliaments: four in Central
Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) and three in the
former USSR (Moldova, Russia, Ukraine).
Post-communist parliaments have evolved through four dimensions of
change, constituting a complex set of interactions over two decades: context,
rules and organisation, members, and civil society. Though we discuss each in
turn, they together constitute an interactive whole, which keeps changing. The
rate of interactive changes has been especially high in the initial decade, but
has continued into the second as well. Parliaments, at the end of the second
decade, are placed on two dimensions of autonomy from the executive and of
party polarisation. Three background factors can be identified as leading to the
divergent trends among them.
The Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol.17, No.2, June 2011, pp.234–255
ISSN 1357-2334 print/1743-9337 online
DOI: 10.1080/13572334.2011.574028 # 2011 Taylor & Francis
Downloadedby[MasarykovaUniverzitavBrne]at05:1507March2016
Shaping the Contexts: The Intersection of Executive–Parliament
Relationships and Party Systems
The political systems of post-communist countries began with communist constitutions
and party systems at the time of communist system collapse. The one
feature of all communist constitutions which could easily be changed was elimination
of the ‘leading role’ of the Communist Party clause. Also easily removed
were restrictions on candidacy nominations and on party formation in both the
electorate and in parliament itself. Beyond these two elemental preliminary
steps to open political space for electoral competition, nothing was settled
about either the basic relationships between parliament and executive or the
party system.
The initial elections were to undefined offices by undefined participants. For
newly elected MPs, one of their responsibilities was to define their own office and
the relationship between parliament and executive, and in so doing, to begin also
to create their party system (Elster 1993). For countries emerging from collapsed
federations, their additional task was to define their sovereign status in the
international community.
Legislative–Executive Relationships
While the constitutions define the legislative–executive relationship in mixtures
of presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary forms, their practices evolve
through interaction with the emerging party system. The experience of postcommunist
parliaments is especially relevant to the argument that a semipresidentialist
constitution threatens democratic stability in new democracies
(Garlicki 1997, Stepan and Skach 1993, Fisher 1996, Linz and Stepan 1996,
pp. 176–183, Elgie 2004, 2008). The very different outcomes at the end of the
second decade suggest that constitutional forms in many variations do not, by
themselves, lead to either democratic or non-democratic practices.
The working relationships between parliament and the executive have several
dimensions, in part depending upon the structure of the executive as parliament
based or external as president, but in either case it also includes interactions with
ministers, ministries, and a panoply of administrative offices. This review concentrates
on parliaments in government formation and on legislation.
Governments in the four Central European parliaments have been formed in
parliament, reflecting party strengths in elections. In each, governments of one
party, or coalition of parties, have been replaced by other parties or coalitions,
often in successive elections. Each parliament has experienced minority as
well as majority government, while the Czechs have had a caretaker government
lasting a year (Zubek, this issue, Table 1). Their duration has been subject to
splits, both within government coalitions and within government parties.
Government formation in the post-Soviet states, by contrast, has been subject
to the vicissitudes of protracted conflict over constitutional authority and political
power in both government and parliament. While presidential authority over
CONCLUSION: DIVERGENT DEVELOPMENT 235
Downloadedby[MasarykovaUniverzitavBrne]at05:1507March2016
government cabinets in Russia has been stable in the second decade, government
status has varied considerably in both Ukraine and Moldova. Towards the end
of the first decade, for example, President Kuchma’s decree subordinated the
government to the president, and, under the ‘Law on State Power’ adopted by
the Rada, the president could appoint the prime minister and Cabinet without
legislative consent (Crowther, this issue).
Over a two-term period, roughly 1998–2004, each of the four democratic
parliaments considered roughly 2000 bills, of which approximately 1200 were
enacted (Table 1). Governments introduced from 55 per cent (Hungary) to 86
per cent (Slovenia) of all bills, while government bills constituted from 76 per
cent (Poland) to a high of 97 per cent (Slovenia) of all adopted bills.
A minimum of 80 per cent of government bills were adopted (Czech Republic),
while in Slovenia, 95 per cent of government bills were adopted.
The rates of government bill introductions and enactments increased rapidly
through the early terms. The parliaments vary consistently, however, in the sheer
number of bills introduced and passed over the two decades (Olson and Norton
2008, p. 170). Government bills are a higher proportion of all bills introduced
than in four western European parliaments, while government bill success rates
are more variable in the western parliaments than in the Central European parliaments
(Bra¨uninger and Debus 2009, pp. 819–820) and in parliamentary systems
in the post-War period (Cheibub et al. 2004). The increase in government bill
introduction and enactment rates in Central European parliaments follow the
same pattern in Spain and Portugal through their second decade as well
(Leston-Bandeira 2004).
These bill numbers show not only busy parliaments, but also busy governments.
A constant complaint by members is that government bills are poorly prepared
and are often late. Governments themselves, not only parliaments, have had
to develop internal procedures and working structures to prepare draft legislation
Table 1: Government Bills Introduced and Passed: Four Post-Communist Parliaments,
Two Terms 1998–2008
Total Number Bills Government Bills
Government
Success Rate
Introduced Passed Introduced Passed
Government
Bills Passed
Parliament N N % N
% of
all N
% of
all %
Czech Republic 1775 1215 68.45 1260 70.99 1022 84.12 81.11
Hungary 1759 995 56.57 962 54.69 867 87.14 90.12
Poland 2180 1546 70.92 1360 62.39 1179 76.26 86.69
Slovenia 1457 1238 84.97 1253 86.00 1196 96.61 95.45
Source: Zubek (this issue, Figure 1).
236 THE JOURNAL OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES
Downloadedby[MasarykovaUniverzitavBrne]at05:1507March2016
(Kopecky´ 2007, pp. 154–155). A recent theme emphasises the importance of the
‘core executive’ to exercise central control within government as a means of
obtaining parliamentary approval, without delay, of government legislation
(Goetz and Wollmann 2001).
The rules of parliament have also been shaped to enable the government
parties not only to favour government bills but also to discourage opposition
bills. Zubek (this issue) shows the resulting increasing success of governments
in gaining parliamentary approval of their legislative proposals.
How to prepare and adopt legislation to meet EU schedules and standards
(Mansfeldova, this issue, Fink-Hafner, this issue), has been a constant challenge
for the four post-communist parliaments as both applicant, and then as new
member, states of the EU.
The parliament’s legislative function for the new EU member states has been
transformed in two ways. First, selected national policies have been shifted to the
EU, thus removing the exclusive national jurisdiction of both governments and
parliaments from those topics. Second, parliaments act more in an oversight
capacity than in a legislative capacity in reviewing and advising on government
negotiating positions in EU decisions. In response, both governments and parliaments
have adapted new structures and procedures (Mansfeldova, this issue).
Governments have developed internal legislative review councils, and parliaments
have formed new European Union Affairs Committees, and Poland’s
bicameral parliament experimented with a joint EU review committee, but
only for one term.
Both government and parliament are developing new ways of interacting
with each other in preparation for EU meetings. Parliaments can both help
form government negotiating positions in advance of EU decisions, and
review those decisions and government actions in the EU decision-making
process. Often their interactions are both ad hoc and informal, especially
in last-minute preparations for EU meetings on or immediately following
weekends.
The constraints upon post-Soviet parliaments’ actions on legislation, by contrast,
stem from conflicts over power and constitution. As Putin gained power in
both constitution and party majority, his administration could informally discuss
pending legislation with parliamentary deputies, thereby gaining approval in
advance of formal proceedings (Remington 2008).
Clear ascendancy by Putin enabled the Duma to enact more legislation than
previously, while continued conflict, both inter-branch and intra-party, in Ukraine
brought legislative work to a halt (Crowther, this issue). The institutional fate
of the parliament–executive relationship was more critical than the fate of
legislation.
Neither budgetary review nor oversight of government administration has
been emphasised in post-communist parliaments. Review of budgets has been
perfunctory, though committees do examine budget requests (Mansfeldova and
Rakusˇanova 2008), while only the Polish Sejm has developed specialised
CONCLUSION: DIVERGENT DEVELOPMENT 237
Downloadedby[MasarykovaUniverzitavBrne]at05:1507March2016
means of reviewing the administration of government policy (Olson 2008,
Remington 2008).
Elections, Parties and Party Systems: From Votes to Power
How the formal apparatus of power in constitutional text functions in practice
varies with the party system (Linz 1997, A´ gh 1998, pp. 139–170). The formal
parliamentary system text of the Moldovan constitution, for example, is in practice
a presidentially led system exercised through presidential leadership of the
dominant political party (Roper 2008, Crowther, this issue).
Elections have a direct impact on the organisation and functioning of
parliament through a multi-stage process. Each election system concentrates
votes for many parties in elections into seats for a few parties in parliament
(Loewenberg and Patterson 1979, pp. 97–105, Olson 1994, pp. 94–108). The
vote concentration process only begins with elections; it continues beyond the
election into parliament in the conversion of shares of votes into shares of power.
Electoral system rules and parliamentary rules taken together constitute a
multi-stage single process to form a majority in parliament as an essential prerequisite
to make decisions, either about government formation or policy questions.
We measure the impact of these two sets of rules upon the emergence and development
in the varied and variable systems of political parties over two decades.
Party systems are more concentrated at the end of two decades than in the
beginning. The number of parties has declined steadily from the early to the
later elections. At the end of the second decade, post-communist party systems
range from the dispersed (Slovenia) to the concentrated (Hungary and Russia).
These patterns, already developed by the end of the first decade, have, with
variations, continued through the second.
Neither the number nor the concentration of parties alone, however, reflects
polarisation or distance among the parties (Sartori 1976). From a political and
parliamentary perspective, the level of polarisation indicates how they can
cooperate either in legislation or in government formation. For example, the
concentrated party system in Hungary is highly polarised which makes cooperation
difficult and coalition formation uni-dimensional, while in Slovenia a dispersed
but non-polarised party system (Enyedi and Casal Bertoa 2010) provides
opportunities for coalition variance.
In Hungary, for example, 11 parties gained over 1.5 per cent of the vote in the
first election in 1990, while only five did so in the 2006 election (Table 2). The
effective number of electoral parties in the first election of 6.7 had declined steadily
to 2.7 in the 2006 election. In Poland, the effective number of electoral
parties declined from 13.8 in the 1991 Sejm election to 3.3 in the 2007 election.1
Slovenia, and Poland until the 2007 election, have consistently had the
highest effective number of parties in both elections and in parliament
(Szczerbiak 2008). Russia, by contrast, has had the most dramatic decline: The
effective number of electoral and parliamentary parties in the 1995 election, of
10.57 and 5.6, had declined in the 2007 election to 2.22 and 1.92, respectively.
238 THE JOURNAL OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES
Downloadedby[MasarykovaUniverzitavBrne]at05:1507March2016
Table 2: Electoral Filters: Number of Parties by Votes and Seats in Seven Post-Communist Parliaments, 1989–2010 by Term
Terms
Parliament Pre 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Central Europe:
Czech Republic 1990 1992 1996 1998 2002 2006 2010
N Parties over 1.5% of Vote 8 15 9 8 6 6 9
N Parties over Threshold 4 8 6 5 4 5 5
Eff. N elec. Parties 3.5 7.3 5.3 4.7 4.8 3.9 6.59
N PPGs 4 8 6 5 5 5 5
Eff. N PPGs 2.2 4.8 4.15 3.71 3.81 3.17 4.51
Hungary 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010
N Parties over 1.5% of Vote 11 10 8 6 5 5
N Parties over Threshold 6 6 6 3 4 4
Eff. N elec. Parties 6.7 5.5 4.5 2.8 2.7 2.86
N PPGs 6 6 6 4 5 5
Eff. N PPGs 3.78 2.88 3.45 2.5 2.61 2.55
Poland 1989 1991 1993 1997 2001 2005 2007
N Parties over 1.5% of Vote – 13 15 9 8 9 5
N Parties over Threshold – 9 6 5 6 6 4
Eff. N elec. Parties – 13.8 9.8 3.5 4.5 5.9 3.3
N PPGs 5 20 7 5 8 6 4
Eff. N PPGs 3.38 10.96 3.88 2.95 4.14 4.34 2.9
Slovenia 1990 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008
N Parties over 1.5% of Vote – 12 9 8 10 9
N Parties over Threshold – 8 7 8 7 7
Eff. N elec. Parties – 8.4 6.2 5.2 5.9 4.9
N PPGs 11 9 8 9 8 8
Eff. N PPGs 9.70 6.59 5.52 4.85 4.89 4.42
(Continued)
CONCLUSION:DIVERGENTDEVELOPMENT239
Downloadedby[MasarykovaUniverzitavBrne]at05:1507March2016
Table 2: Continued
Terms
Parliament Pre 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Post-Soviet:
Moldova 1990 1994 1998 2001 2003 2005 2009a 2009b 2010
N Parties over 1.5% of Vote – 8 10 10 6 7 8 7 7
N Parties over Threshold – 4 4 3 4 3 4 5 4
Eff. N elec. Parties – 3.9 5.7 3.5 2.01 3.27 3.43 3.7 3.74
N PPGs 6 4 4 3 4 3 4 5 4
Eff. N PPGs 3.37 2.62 3.43 1.85 2.01 2.31 2.45 3.32 3.23
Russia 1993 1995 1999 2003 2007
N Parties over 1.5% of Vote 10 15 9 9 6
N Parties over Threshold 8 4 6 4 4
Eff. N elec. Parties 8.1 10.57 6.48 4.7 2.22
N PPGs 11 7 9 4 4
Eff. N PPG 9.2 5.6 8.1 2.01 1.92
Ukraine 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2007
N Parties over 1.5% of Vote – – 14 9 6 6
N Parties over Threshold – – 8 6 5 5
Eff. N elec. Parties – – 9.78 7.31 5.55 4.2
N PPGs – 9 8 6 5 5
Eff. N PPGs – 8.11 6.3 3.91 3.41 3.31
Notes: Corrections from Olson and Norton 2008, Table 1 for: Czech Republic, N of parties over 1.5% and Effective N PPG term 3; Russia, N parties over 1.5% 1999,
2003. EN electoral parties 1993, 1995, 1999, 2003, EN PPG 1993, 1999; Hungary, N parties over threshold 1998, N PPGs 1990, 1994, 1996. ‘Pre’ is last election
under old rules leading to system change.
Sources: University of North Carolina, Greensboro, Center for Legislative Studies, ‘The Initial Decade: Elections and Parliamentary Parties’ (http://libres.uncg.edu/
ir/listing.aspx?id=332), updated from each country’s electoral commission and parliamentary website.
240THEJOURNALOFLEGISLATIVESTUDIES
Downloadedby[MasarykovaUniverzitavBrne]at05:1507March2016
There has also been a progressive reduction in the number of political parties
through five successive stages in any one election from votes to seats, also shown
in Table 2. In each of the several elections over two decades, the number of
parties usually declines from the election to party group formation in parliament.
In the Czech Republic, for example, 15 parties and electoral slates obtained a
minimum of 1.5 per cent in the 1992 election, while only eight parliamentary
party groups were formed; the effective number of electoral parties was 7.3,
while the effective number of parliamentary party groups was 4.8. The postcommunist
parliamentary elections show a greater decline in the number of
parties through successive stages of any one election than is found at comparable
times in western Europe (Birch 2001, p. 361, 2007).
The progressive concentration of the party system over two decades has
occurred in spite of variations among countries and in spite of many changes
in election system rules within any one country. While the communist election
practice was to employ single member districts requiring a majority vote
(except Hungary and Poland), most parliaments by the end of the second
decade employ multi-member districts using proportional seat allocation
systems (Luong 2000).
The three post-Soviet republics, and Slovenia as a post-Yugoslav Republic,
have made the greatest electoral system changes, for the early democratic elections
in each country were based upon the continuing practice of their former
communist federations. Ukraine faced a particularly difficult hurdle in its first
post-independence election in 1994, retaining the Soviet requirements of both
a 50 per cent voter turnout for the election to be valid, and 50 per cent of the
vote for a candidate to win (Birch 1995, Bach 1996, Wise and Brown 1996,
Herron 2002).
Changes from the communist single member district system with majority
voting to multi-member districts and proportional representation were made
early in the parliamentary democratic countries. One reason was the expectation
that communist leaders and party apparatus would be given advantage in single
member districts in the sudden initial election. This argument was clearly discussed
with respect to the debate about the Hungarian electoral system during
the transition (Benoit and Schiemann 2001) which eventually concluded in a
compromise to implement a mixed electoral system. On the other hand, there
was no way of knowing which of the many non-communist electoral groupings
and aspiring candidates would enter, much less win, in the early free elections.
They, too, were in conflict with each other. Variations of proportional representation
systems were the solution (Jasiewicz 1993, Olson 1998, Kopecky´ 2001),
while Russia opted for a mixed system in its early elections (Remington and
Smith 1996).
Two sets of rules seem to make the greatest difference to filter the scattered
party vote in elections to concentrated party seats in parliament. The electoral
threshold, the first, defines the minimum proportion of the vote in multimember
districts required for a party to enter parliament. The second rule is
CONCLUSION: DIVERGENT DEVELOPMENT 241
Downloadedby[MasarykovaUniverzitavBrne]at05:1507March2016
the definition of the minimum number of seats required to form a parliamentary
party group. Both rules, defined by parliament, the former before an election and
the latter following, are intended to encourage voters and candidates to pool their
efforts to form parties few and large enough to function within parliament
(Moraski and Loewenberg 1999, Moser 1999, Lewis 2001). Though seat size
(and other) rules are beyond voter control or even knowledge, and thus appear
‘arbitrary’ to voters (Horowitz and Browne 2005, p. 691), they are purposive
and integral to the multi-stage effort to build parliamentary majorities.
The long term consequence of both sets of rules, one in elections and the other
in parliament, has been to simplify and concentrate the party system. As context
for parliamentary development, the party system has emerged as a relatively
stable feature of parliamentary life by the end of the second decade for parliamentary
democracies and in Russia. In Moldova and Ukraine, however, flux in the
party system is an essential feature of the continuing struggle for power in
both parliament and the presidency. The number and relative size of parties
are, in the beginning, contingent, varied and variable outcomes, not a fixed
context, even if ‘the beginning’ lasts over two decades beyond the initial
regime change events.
In all seven countries under review, the intersection of the structure of
parliament–executive relationships and party system has been the key dynamic
in the formation of each other. Struggles over the drafting, adoption and
implementation of constitutions were themselves part of the process through
which new and tentative political parties developed. Though relatively stable
in some parliaments, party systems and the degree of parliamentary autonomy
continue to be developed together in the ‘conflicted’ parliaments, through their
interactions over two decades and perhaps beyond.
Types of Parliaments
By the end of the second decade, we find increasing variations among the seven
post-communist parliaments included in this study. At the end of the first decade,
the three major types of parliaments were the democratic, the presidentially
dominated, and the conflicted (Olson and Norton 2008). At the end of the
second decade, cross-cutting those categories are the distinctions of degrees of
party system polarisation and levels of autonomy of parliament from the executive
(Table 3).
We have chosen party system polarisation and autonomy against the executive
as the two dimensions of the typology because parliament is in the intersection
of these two institutional contexts. Parliament absorbs and identifies with
parties (and their conflicts) and it both creates and interacts with the executive.
The first source of division is the EE–ECE divide. In the East European (EE)
countries parliaments have a low level of autonomy but this will conclude in
different conditions in terms of conflict depending on the level of party
polarisation.
242 THE JOURNAL OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES
Downloadedby[MasarykovaUniverzitavBrne]at05:1507March2016
Of the three presidential cases, Moldova shows the highest level of party
polarisation – and as such this is also in the conflict category indentified in the
first decade. This conflict included challenges to the constitution and recurring
attempts to parliamentarise the regime. In Russia, at the other extreme of low
party polarisation, the low level of autonomy of the Duma against the president
is not subject to challenge.
Among the four parliamentary systems in East Central Europe (ECE), the low
and medium levels of party system polarisation among them partially explains the
medium and high level of autonomy of their parliaments: executive dominance is
more explicit when parties are more polarised. The Hungarian parliament and the
three other Central European parliaments are in different categories, as also in the
first decade. Only in Hungary has no party ever crossed the political line between
left and right in coalition formation, while in the other cases, government
coalitions occasionally have included both. These categories are subject to
change: Slovenia has moved towards the medium level of autonomy as a result
of organisational changes (Zubek, this issue).
At the end of the second decade, high levels of party polarisation occur with
high levels of party concentration, which makes parliament the prisoner of a
highly centralised government and the government’s party, while opposition
parties are too weak to challenge either the government or its supporting party
effectively.
Internal Structure and Procedures
Both internal reorganisation and rules revision are striking features of the seven
post-communist parliaments in the first two decades. They began with both
buildings and rules inherited from the communist era. Neither was sufficient
to meet the needs of an active parliament; the rules were overwhelmed by the
sudden formation of many and constantly changing party groups and by the
sudden expression of individual opinions on both substance and procedures
(Olson 1997, Khmelko, this issue).
Agendas at the beginning of sessions were debated and revised. Every new
problem was resolved by ad hoc procedures and through ad hoc structures.
The inherited rudimentary structure of committees was superseded by special
Table 3: Types of Legislatures – Post-Communist and Post Soviet: The Second Decade
Autonomy from Executive
Party System Low Medium High
Polarisation
Low Russia Slovenia
Medium Ukraine Poland
Czech Republic
High Moldova Hungary
CONCLUSION: DIVERGENT DEVELOPMENT 243
Downloadedby[MasarykovaUniverzitavBrne]at05:1507March2016
committees, each with a different composition, a different task, and different
procedures.
Both procedural and structural chaos in the democratic parliaments was
resolved through extensive rules revision, usually in the second or third term,
though later in Slovenia (Mansfeldova, this issue). Committees and parliamentary
party groups were standardised, steering bodies created, and procedures
for introduction and debate of bills defined. Rules and organisation provide the
basis of parliamentary activity and for future development (Crowther and
Olson 2002, Bach 2009).
The Central European parliaments have modified both rules and structures to
adapt to accession and membership in the EU, while post-Soviet parliaments
have faced a very different external environment of president–parliament conflict
(Mansfeldova, this issue, Fink-Hafner, this issue). Structure and rules have
been continual objects of controversy in both Moldova and Ukraine (Crowther,
this issue).
Parliamentary party groups (PPGs) have become the basic building blocks of
both internal organisation and of government formation (Heidar and Koole 2000,
Hazan 2006). They are not immutable, however, for old parties disappear or
disintegrate (Czech Christian Democrats, Polish Democratic Left), split (Polish
AWS), or new ones appear (Czech VVM). New parties (United Russia, Polish
PiS) may be closely linked to presidential election politics. PPGs are also
subject to extensive changes in both leadership and internal structure, depending
upon election results.
The allocation of leadership positions in post-communist parliaments is a
multi-stage process. The first stage is the distribution of the major leadership
offices, especially Speaker but sometimes also committee chairpersons, as part
of inter-party government formation negotiations. In the second stage the other
positions of vice-speakers and committee vice-chairs tend to be shared among
all PPGs on the principle of party size proportionality.
The development of parliamentary leadership councils (PLCs) has been an
important step in the institutionalisation of new parliaments. The powerful presidium
and its Speaker were unsuited, as noted by both Khmelko and Crowther
(this issue), to manage political diversity. The centralised internal leadership
system was neither democratic nor efficient (Kask 1996, Olson 1997).
Accompanying early changes in the constitutional and political authority of
post-Soviet presidencies, parliaments changed from presidium to Council, and
from committee chairs to PPG leaders as dominant positions in the Councils.
The Reconciliation Council formed in the second decade by the Ukrainian
Verkhovna Rada is an example. The Polish Sejm, by contrast, had a Council
of Elders from the Communist period to advise the Marshall. The formation of
PLCs was an important step to decentralise power from the Speaker (Khmelko,
this issue).
Leadership bodies, however, can exclude minority or opposition parties as
well as include them. How, and to what extent, to include all parliamentary
244 THE JOURNAL OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES
Downloadedby[MasarykovaUniverzitavBrne]at05:1507March2016
parties is an unresolved question of both organisational efficiency and of political
power. In deeply conflicted parliaments, the party proportionality principle
mainly includes only PPGs in the majority coalition, while other parties have
only minor shares in chamber leadership positions.
Party allocation principles follow the election returns. When, for example,
United Russia won a clear majority, the proportional formula for party group representation
on the Duma Council was abandoned, while proportionality was
restored for Permanent Bureau and committee positions in Moldova when the
2009 election yielded a small multi-party majority (Crowther, this issue).
The goal of assembling shares of power to form a majority of parliamentary
seats only begins, as noted above, in an election. The process of assembling a
majority in parliaments can create conflict, with disputes lasting for days if not
weeks, both expressing and linked to struggles for power outside parliament,
especially in our set of post-Soviet states. The conflicts, as Khmelko notes
(this issue) may be of majority vs. minority, or government vs. opposition, or
internal parliamentary majority vs. external president, as in Ukraine. The
longer internal conflicts persist, the greater the opportunity for external presidents
to intervene, as in the Duma, not only as negotiator and party leader, but also
through decree power.
Parliamentary rules are not exclusively a matter for parliaments’ own
decisions. Constitutions can define not only parliamentary authority but portions
of its structures and procedures. In addition, presidential decrees can impose
procedural constraints upon parliament (Olson 1995).
Though both chamber and party leadership have been temporary in the initial
two decades, the development of collective structures and work procedures can
become the basis for a stable organisation. Through leadership and member
change, leadership councils, committees, and procedures of legislative consideration
can develop incrementally through a succession of electoral terms. As
Zubek notes (this issue), rules of agenda access persist into subsequent terms,
even though party majorities in succeeding terms may change. For each new
set of members and leaders, the structures and procedures of predecessor terms
can become the fixed reality within which they learn to work, to which they
adapt and from which they may continue to innovate.
The Members
While post-Soviet parliaments have experienced a ‘continuist transition’, the
Central European parliaments experienced a ‘turnover transition’. In the former,
members of the Soviet Republic legislatures remained in office in the midst of
the collapse of the USSR and of Communist Party rule, while in the latter, new
free initial elections brought sizeable portions of new and reformist members to
parliament.
The degree of member turnover in the initial elections varied among the four
democratic parliaments. In Poland, the initial 1989 compartmentalised election
CONCLUSION: DIVERGENT DEVELOPMENT 245
Downloadedby[MasarykovaUniverzitavBrne]at05:1507March2016
brought entirely new members to the newly created Senate, but in the Sejm the
majority coalition continued with the addition of new reformist members. In
Slovenia, the replacement of members was more gradual, with the continuing
members of the previous ruling parties transforming their old party into new
social democratic parties, while new reformist members also entered parliament
through new political parties. The Czech and Hungarian parliaments had the most
extensive and abrupt replacement of members in their 1990 elections (Shabad and
Slomczynski 2002, Ilonszki and Edinger 2008).
By the end of the second decade, the circulation of parliamentary elites from
the initial elections was complete. The average age of deputies in the four Central
European parliaments, as noted by Mansfeldova (this issue), is mid-to-late 40s.
The generation attaining adulthood at the moments of change two decades ago
has now largely displaced the members who entered parliament during the transitional
events.
The deputy incumbency rates, of 45 per cent to 71 per cent per election, have
been highly dependent upon changing party fortunes in the four democratic parliaments.
The disappearance of some parties and emergence of new is part of the
changing mix of experienced and novice members. The new practice in the Czech
2010 elections (Mansfeldova, this issue) of voting for candidates placed fairly
low on the party list has also lowered the incumbency re-election rate.
The majority of members of the Central European parliaments have had
university educations, with Hungary having the highest level. The proportion
of women members has been fairly low in the democratic parliaments, though
with an increase in the Czech Parliament as a result of not voting for leading
candidates on party lists.
In the three post-Soviet legislatures in the second decade, the constant
changes in party majorities in Moldova and Ukraine contrast with the continuing
majority position of the leading party in Russia. The period of ‘constitutional
recalibration’ in the post-Soviet parliaments (Crowther, this issue) has led to
high turnover rates for members and especially for leaders (and prime ministers).
Incumbency rates, however, vary among post-Soviet parliaments, as do their
associations with both the old Communist Party and with nomenklatura based
institutions and practices (Olson and Norton 2008, pp. 161–162; Crowther and
Matonyte 2009; Khmelko, this issue).
The term, ‘clientelist networks’ is often used to characterise political elites
generally, including parliamentary members, in the three post-Soviet states. In
the democratic parliaments, members are similarly thought to have personal
connections to industries and interest groups and act on their own behalf
across party lines (Fink-Hafner, this issue).
Speakers and vice-speakers have a tenuous hold on their offices in all parliaments.
PPG leadership is doubly subject to electoral results. If successful,
parliamentary leaders may become speakers, or ministers in the new government,
and even presidents; if unsuccessful, however, they may either resign from party
leadership or be defeated at the next party meeting.
246 THE JOURNAL OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES
Downloadedby[MasarykovaUniverzitavBrne]at05:1507March2016
The relatively high turnover rate, with members seeking other offices,
suggests that parliaments are a training ground for subsequent careers. Recruitment
from, as well as to, parliament, is an important dynamic. What members
learn in parliament can be transferred to other settings and for other applications.
One important function of internal structures and rules, discussed above, is to
provide stable anchors for parliamentary activity in the midst of constant changes
in parliamentary leadership. During two decades, continuing high turnover rates
leave new parliaments with continuously new members and leaders.
From Civil Society to Interest Groups
Though the broad term ‘civil society’ is used in democratisation studies
(Staniszkis 1984, Linz and Stepan 1996, Rengger 1997, Mudde 2007), the narrower
term ‘interest group’ is associated more with the promotion of public
policy preferences in parliament and government. Over two decades, in increasingly
divergent transitional political systems, the organisation and expression of
private preferences has ranged from organised interest groups to a ‘blurred
distinction between private life and public office’. Private–governmental relationships
also range from corporate representation to corruption (Fink-Hafner, this
issue).
Parliamentary systems lead to interest group organisation as external lobbying
groups, as shown by the four parliamentary democracies in this study, while
the three presidential systems lead towards a mix of personal gain and state
power. The four parliamentary systems, however, vary in types of lobby
regulations to structure the interactions of groups and MPs, similar to Western
European parliaments. The four countries also vary in the degree of corporatism
and in the viability of ‘social partnership’ relations among labour, business and
government.
The external relationships of the seven countries are also sources of variation.
The European Union, in particular, seems to have the effect of weakening both
parliaments and interest groups in favour of the executive within its member
states. Further, the emphasis of international agencies upon a private economy
and a limited budget policy also emphasises the decision-making responsibilities
of the executive during the two decades in all of our seven post-communist states
(Mansfeldova, this issue, Fink-Hafner, this issue).
Labour, business and local institutions are the predominant organisations and
clusters of interests active in national governmental affairs. The broad concept of
‘civil society’ during the transitions has been replaced by economic and regional
concerns, expressed through both personal action and interest group formation.
Sources of Divergent Parliamentary Trends
Of the many and varied background factors considered as explanations for postcommunist
politics extending from centuries of history to today’s economy
CONCLUSION: DIVERGENT DEVELOPMENT 247
Downloadedby[MasarykovaUniverzitavBrne]at05:1507March2016
(Elster et al. 1998, pp. 293–295), three are especially relevant to two decades of
post-communist legislatures: transitions, legacies, and international influences.
Transitions and Legislatures
No single pattern characterised the transitions of post-communist nations. Of the
seven countries reviewed in this study, the four nations with democratic postcommunist
parliaments had ‘breakaway’ transitions; the three post-Soviet
countries and parliaments had longer-term ‘continuist’ transitions.2
The four democratic parliaments in Central Europe began their very
different transitions from communist rule in the compressed 1989–90 period.
Perhaps Hungary had the only genuine single ‘founding’ election among all
the post-communist states (Hibbing and Patterson 1992). The other three
countries had not a single ‘founding’ election, but rather, an initial breakaway
election in a series of decade-long steps resulting in their current political
systems and parliaments (Olson 1993, Bunce 2003, Tworzecki 2003, Nalewajko
and Wesołowski 2008).
The four democratic parliaments were active participants in the system transition.
While none of these four parliaments elected under communist rules
initiated the transition, each authorised election law changes in the initial elections
to permit multiple candidates, parties and electoral coalitions which, in
turn, became participants in the longer road to the completed transition. The
Central European pattern was clear, and each country closely monitored the
others; both the party reformers and the opposition groups had several decades
to think about political system changes (Fisher 1996).
In the continuist transition states of the former USSR, the Republics became
internationally sovereign, not as a result of their own decisions (unlike the three
Baltic states) but from the collapse of the Soviet Federation. Each of their Republic
level legislatures, elected under Communist Party rules in 1990 and organised
under Soviet practices, had the same tasks of coping with domestic and international
policies as did the parliaments of Central Europe. But what was not
clear was how they should be elected and organised (Way 2004). The sudden
combination of political system uncertainty with national independence placed
the post-Soviet Republics as new countries in precarious and uncharted territory,
leading to protracted conflict over the allocation of power among parliament,
cabinet and president (Ishiyama 2000).
As the only existing governmental body, the republic Soviets were the
location and object of political action. The new republic office of the president,
modelled after the Gorbachev USSR innovation, emanated from the powerful
position of the Presiding Officer of the Supreme Soviet. As Crowther shows
(this issue), their pattern of shared experiences was that of the USSR improvisations
morphing into the Russian constitution with Yeltsen as president.
There was a double transition in political life for many of the post-communist
and post-Soviet states: not only from communism to another form of rule, but also
from provincial to sovereign international status. The new condition of statehood
248 THE JOURNAL OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES
Downloadedby[MasarykovaUniverzitavBrne]at05:1507March2016
imposed upon the previously provincial legislatures (and governments) a completely
new range of tasks and responsibilities for which they were ill prepared.
One of the most important potential functions of all seven parliaments was to
become the arena in which nascent political parties developed. The parliamentarisation
of parties (A´ gh 1995) proved to be a major instrument of party consolidation
but happened with a different speed and outcome in the ECE and EE
countries. While in the four Central European countries the first democratic elections
were for parliament, in the post-Soviet republics the newly created office of
president was the first opportunity for contested elections. Their first contested
independent state level legislative elections were not held until 1994.
Independence also freed the new nations from the previous party system; the
centre, whether Moscow, Belgrade or Prague, had disappeared as a constraint
upon expression of provincial opinions on provincial level problems through
independent political organisations.
Basic constitutional questions about the definition and allocation of power
were undecided at the time of the earliest competitive elections. In the democratic
parliaments, these questions were resolved by reformist members within the first
decade. In the post-Soviet parliaments, improvised political system decisions
were made with the same members and legal structures as in the late Soviet period.
Legacies: The Communist Legislatures
The most immediate communist legacy for post-communist parliaments is the
‘real-existing’ communist legislature. Over time, communist legislatures had
gradually increased in organisational complexity, especially in the formation of
committees (Simon and Olson 1980, Nelson and White 1982, Racz 1989). The
same organisational development of committees, coupled with acceptance of
one-party rule and its leaders, are also found in the contemporary communist
legislatures of Cuba and China (Gasper 1982, O’Brien 1988, Roman 1999).
The political party, too, was gradually formed in communist legislatures as an
organised tool to manage legislative activity. At one early point in Poland, even
the ruling party was prohibited from forming an organisation in the Sejm, resulting
in the ‘Silent Parliament’ (Burda 1978, p. 163). By the end of communist rule,
by contrast, Poland had even developed an organisational structure for each of its
three parliamentary parties, among whom floor proceedings and votes were
negotiated. In Hungary, the last communist parliament, with opposition and
reform-oriented MPs in the lead, initiated many legislative decisions concerning
systemic change (Ilonszki 1993).
The ‘leading role’ of the Communist Party meant that there was no inherited
parliamentary experience in either rules or structure of how to accommodate the
open and organised existence of more than one legitimate political party. While
disagreements on policy choices were expressed, especially within committees,
those disagreements were topical and ad hoc, not in disagreement against
either the party or its government. The Polish and Hungarian parliaments, in particular,
could become active in both plenary and committee forums. Martial law
CONCLUSION: DIVERGENT DEVELOPMENT 249
Downloadedby[MasarykovaUniverzitavBrne]at05:1507March2016
in Poland was a particular occasion for assertive parliamentary action (Mason
1991). The current Polish Parliament is the most active among our set of seven
parliaments in administrative review and oversight, based upon communist era
organisation and procedures (Olson 2008).
We have, however, little information on provincial level legislatures, greatly
limiting our understanding of their preparation for post-communist sovereignty.
The corporatist second chamber in Slovenia, for example, is based on the
Yugoslav experience (Fink-Hafner, this issue).
Though the level of activity of communist legislatures varied in each
country through alternating party crises and reforms, the organisational
structure, especially the presidium and the committees, was the inheritance of
post-communist legislatures. Especially in post-Soviet states, it was the authority
and composition of the presidium that was rapidly abandoned, while the more
functional committee system, at least as an organising template, was continued.
International Resources and Constraints
The impact of the European Union upon the Central European democratic
parliaments has been two-fold. First, the EU has encouraged and supported the
development of independent, active, and democratic parliaments. The 1993
Copenhagen declaration required each candidate country to guarantee ‘democracy,
the rule of law, [and] human rights’ (European Council in Copenhagen
1993). The EU in general, and the EU Parliament in particular, has been active
in working with, training, and conducting conferences and workshops with
their post-communist counterparts. This broad support by the EU has been
reinforced by other European entities, such as the Council of Europe, and by
international organisations, such as the UN’s Development Programme, the
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, and the International Parliamentary
Union (Ware 1995, Bunce 2003, Mudde 2007). National programmes, especially
the ‘Frost-Solomon Task Force’ of the US House of Representatives, have also
been actively engaged with the members and staff of post-communist parliaments
(Hibbing and Patterson 2006).3
The second type of international impact has been an increase in the power of
the executive over parliament. To support economic policies consistent with EU
objectives, the EU has encouraged the development of ‘core executives’ to lead
both in cabinet and parliament. The consolidation process automatically brought
about the strengthening of the executive – as was also observed in the southern
European newly democratising countries’ parliaments (Liebert and Cotta 1990).
At the same time, as noted by both Mansfeldova and Fink-Hafner (this issue),
this emphasis began with the EU membership accession process and continues
with full membership. While speed of gaining membership was viewed as an
acceptable if inevitable parliamentary price to pay, there is increasing notice
of, and disquiet with, EU-induced constraints upon the parliament–executive
relationship (Brusis and Dimitrov 2001, Grabbe 2001, Lippert et al. 2001,
Kabele and Linek 2004, Zajc 2004, Fink-Hafner 2007).
250 THE JOURNAL OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES
Downloadedby[MasarykovaUniverzitavBrne]at05:1507March2016
The EU impact upon post-Soviet parliaments is negligible, for there have
been no accession negotiations, excepting the three Baltic states, during the
two decades following the collapse of the USSR. The impact of international
influences on new democratic post-communist parliaments, in pursuit of both
democracy and efficiency, international organisations, has been ambiguous.
The impact of all three sources upon divergent post-communist parliaments
has been cumulative. The capacity of communist era parliaments to act in the
transitions was an amalgam of their communist era attributes and of the transitions
themselves. International actors responded to support democratic parliaments
but also to increase executive authority both in cabinet and parliament.
Beyond the Second Decade
By the end of the second decade, the all-encompassing term of ‘post-communist’
has outlived its usefulness. The varieties of hybrid post-Soviet states, the varieties
of Balkan states and the institutionalised parliamentary democracies of Central
Europe and the Baltic states require their own understandings. They differ not
only in their current political systems and conditions of parliament, but also in
their transitions, and in the types and duration of communist rule, suggesting
cumulative differentiation in their future political systems and in parliamentary
organisation and activity.
If the first decade was the transitional decade, and the second was the consolidation
decade for some but the decade of conflict for others, the third decade
begins as the decade of uncertainty.
Note on Authors
David M. Olson∗
is Professor Emeritus of Political Science and Co-director of
the Center for Legislative Studies, University of North Carolina at Greensboro,
USA, email: dmolson@uncg.edu; Gabriella Ilonszki is Professor of Political
Science at Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary, email: gabriella.
ilonszki@uni-corvinus.hu
∗
Corresponding author
Acknowledgements
Gabriella Ilonszki would like to express her thanks to the TAMOP. 4.2.1/B-09/
1/KMR research support scheme which made her contribution possible.
Notes
1. The ‘effective’ or equivalent number of parties is an index to measure the degree of concentration/
dispersal of the party system, based upon both the number and relative size of parties (Taagepera
and Shugart 1989, pp. 77–91). This index can also be inverted to form a party concentration index
(Horowitz and Browne 2005, p. 691). It is not, however, a count of the number of parties which are
effective – that is a very different question. It is genuinely difficult to wrap the fluid and varied
CONCLUSION: DIVERGENT DEVELOPMENT 251
Downloadedby[MasarykovaUniverzitavBrne]at05:1507March2016
phenomena of post-communist parties into statistical measures, as illustrated by the many critics of
this specific measure, the different ways in which the index is measured, and by the different
numbers reported in the literature (Linz and Stepan 1996, p. 278; Lewis 2000, pp. 87–88; Birch
2001, 2007, Brusis 2004, Millard 2004, Gel’man 2006, p. 546, Grzymała-Busse 2007, pp. 51–
54, Mainwaring and Zoco 2007, p. 162). Some of the controversy arises from the fact that
average figures or snapshots at one particular date cannot reflect changes during a term.
2. The initial events in each post-communist country are reviewed in the four-volume series by
Dawisha and Parrott (1997) and in Kraatz and von Steinsdorff (2002).
3. The US House Democracy Assistance Program currently works with the post-communist parliaments
of Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Mongolia and Ukraine (Price 2009).
References
A´ gh, A., 1995. The Experiences of the First Democratic Parliaments in East Central Europe. Communist
and Post-Communist Studies, 28 (2), 203–214.
A´ gh, A., 1998. The Politics of Central Europe. London: Sage.
Bach, S., 1996. From Soviet to Parliament in Ukraine: The Verkhovna Rada During 1992–94. In:
D.M. Olson and P. Norton, eds. The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe. London:
Frank Cass, 211–230.
Bach, S., 2009. Rules of Procedure for National Assemblies: An Introduction. In: Comparative
Assessments of Parliaments (CAP Notes). Albany, NY: Center for International Development,
Rockefeller College, University at Albany. Available from: http://www.cid.suny.edu/capnotes1/
Stan%20Bach%20CAP%20Note.pdf (accessed 19 April 2011).
Benoit, K. and Schiemann, J.W., 2001. Institutional Choice in New Democracies: Bargaining over
Hungary’s 1989 Electoral Law. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 13 (2), 159–188.
Birch, S., 1995. The Ukrainian Parliamentary and Presidential Elections of 1994. Electoral Studies, 14
(1), 93–99.
Birch, S., 2001. Electoral Systems and Party Systems in Europe East and West. Perspectives on
European Politics and Society, 2 (3), 355–377.
Birch, S., 2007. Electoral Systems. In: S. White, J. Batt and P.G. Lewis, eds. Developments in Central
and East European Politics 4. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 161–173.
Bra¨uninger, T. and Debus, M., 2009. Legislative Agenda-Setting in Parliamentary Democracies.
European Journal of Political Research, 48 (6), 804–839.
Brusis, M., 2004. Europeanization, Party Government or Legacies? Explaining Executive Governance
in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Comparative European Politics, 2 (2), 163–184.
Brusis, M. and Dimitrov, V., 2001. Executive Configuration and Fiscal Performance in PostCommunist
Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of European Public Policy, 8 (6), 888–910.
Bunce, V., 2003. Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Postcommunist Experience.
World Politics, 55 (2), 167–192.
Burda, A., 1978. Parliament of the Polish People’s Republic. Warsaw: Ossolineum.
Cheibub, J.A., Przeworski, A., and Saiegh, S., 2004. Government Coalitions and Legislative Success
under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism. British Journal of Political Science, 34, 565–587.
Crowther, W.E. and Matonyte, I., 2009. Parliamentary Elites as a Democratic Thermometer: Estonia,
Lithuania and Moldova Compared. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 40 (3), 281–299.
Crowther, W.E. and Olson, D.M., 2002. Committee Systems in New Democratic Parliaments:
Comparative Institutionalization. In: D.M. Olson and W.E. Crowther, eds. Committees in PostCommunist
Democratic Parliaments: Comparative Institutionalization. Columbus, OH: Ohio
State University Press, 171–206.
Dawisha, K. and Parrott, B., ed., 1997. Democratization and Authoritarianism in Postcommunist
Societies, 4 Vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Elgie, R., 2004. Semi-Presidentialism: Concepts, Consequences and Contesting Explanations.
Political Studies Review, 2 (3), 314–330.
Elgie, R., 2008. The Perils of Semi-Presidentialism: Are They Exaggerated? Democratization, 15 (1),
49–66.
Elster, J., 1993. Bargaining over the Presidency. East European Constitutional Review, 2 (4), 3(1),
95–98.
252 THE JOURNAL OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES
Downloadedby[MasarykovaUniverzitavBrne]at05:1507March2016
Elster, J., Offe, C., and Preuss, U.K., 1998. Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies:
Rebuilding the Ship at Sea. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Enyedi, Z. and Casal Be´rtoa, F., 2010. Patterns of Party Competition. In: P. Lewis and R. Markowski,
eds. Europeanising Party Politics: Comparative Perspectives on Central and Eastern Europe.
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 147–168.
European Council in Copenhagen, 1993. Relations with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
In Conclusions of the Presidency, Section 7, 21–23 June. Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/
bulgaria/documents/abc/72921_en.pdf (accessed 19 April 2011).
Fink-Hafner, D., 2007. Europeanization in Managing EU Affairs: Between Divergence and Convergence,
a Comparative Study of Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia. Public Administration, 85 (3),
805–828.
Fisher, M.E., ed., 1996. Establishing Democracies. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Garlicki, L.L., 1997. The Presidency in the New Polish Constitution. East European Constitutional
Review, 6 (2–3), 81–88.
Gasper, D., 1982. The Chinese National People’s Congress. In: D. Nelson and S. White, eds. Communist
Legislatures in Comparative Perspective. London: Macmillan Press, 160–190.
Gel’man, V., 2006. From ‘Feckless Pluralism’ to Dominant Power Politics? The Transformation of
Russia’s Party System. Democratization, 13 (4), 545–561.
Goetz, K.H. and Wollmann, H., 2001. Governmentalizing Central Executives in Post-Communist
Europe: A Four-Country Comparison. Journal of European Public Policy, 8 (6), 864–887.
Grabbe, H., 2001. How does Europeanization Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and
Diversity. Journal of European Public Policy, 8 (6), 1013–1031.
Grzymała-Busse, A., 2007. Rebuilding Leviathan: Party Competition and State Exploitation in PostCommunist
Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hazan, R.Y., ed., 2006. Cohesion and Discipline in Legislatures. London: Routledge.
Heidar, K. and Koole, R., 2000. Parliamentary Party Groups in European Democracies: Political
Parties Behind Closed Doors. London: Routledge/ECPR Studies in European Political Science.
Herron, E.S., 2002. Electoral Influences on Legislative Behavior in Mixed-Member Systems:
Evidence from Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 27 (3), 361–382.
Hibbing, J.R. and Patterson, S.C., 1992. A Democratic Legislature in the Making: The Historic
Hungarian Elections of 1990. Comparative Political Studies, 24 (4), 430–454.
Hibbing, J.R. and Patterson, S.C., 2006. The U.S. Congress’ Modest Influence on the Legislatures of
Central and Eastern Europe. In: T.J. Power and N.C. Rae, eds. Exporting Congress? The Influence
of the U.S. Congress on World Legislatures. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press,
119–136.
Horowitz, S. and Browne, E.C., 2005. Sources of Post-Communist Party System Consolidation:
Ideology Versus Institutions. Party Politics, 11 (6), 689–706.
Ilonszki, G., 1993. Traditions and Innovations in the Development of Parliamentary Government in
Hungary. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 5 (2), 163–181.
Ilonszki, G. and Edinger, M., 2008. MPs in Post-Communist and Post-Soviet Nations: A Parliamentary
Elite in the Making. In: D.M. Olson and P. Norton, eds. Post-Communist and Post-Soviet
Parliaments: The Initial Decade. London: Routledge, 131–152.
Ishiyama, J., 2000. Institutions and Ethnopolitical Conflict in Post-Communist Politics. Nationalism
and Ethnic Review, 6 (3), 51–67.
Jasiewicz, K., 1993. Structures of Representation. In: S. White, J. Batt and P.G. Lewis, eds. Developments
in East European Politics. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 124–146.
Kabele, J. and Linek, L., 2004. Decision-Making of the Czech Cabinet, EU Accession and Legislative
Planning between 1998 and 2004. Paper read at ECPR Joint Sessions Workshop No. 10, Uppsala,
Sweden, 13–18 April.
Kask, P., 1996. Institutional Development of the Parliament of Estonia. In: D.M. Olson and P. Norton,
eds. The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe. London: Frank Cass, 193–212.
Kopecky´, P., 2001. Parliaments in the Czech and Slovak Republics: Party Competition and Parliamentary
Institutionalization. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Kopecky´, P., 2007. Structures of Representation. In: S. White, J. Batt and P.G. Lewis, eds.
Developments in Central and East European Politics 4. Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
145–160.
Kraatz, S. and von Steinsdorff, S., 2002. Parlamente und Systemtransformation im postsozialistischen
Europa. Opladen: Leske+Budrich.
CONCLUSION: DIVERGENT DEVELOPMENT 253
Downloadedby[MasarykovaUniverzitavBrne]at05:1507March2016
Leston-Bandeira, C., 2004. From Legislation to Legitimation: The Role of the Portuguese Parliament.
London: Routledge.
Lewis, P.G., 2000. Political Parties in Post-Communist Eastern Europe. London: Routledge.
Lewis, P.G., 2001. European Parties East and West: Comparative Perspectives. Perspectives on
European Politics and Society, 2 (3), 481–494.
Liebert, U. and Cotta, M., ed., 1990. Parliament and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe:
Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey. London and New York: Pinter Publishers.
Linz, J.J., 1997. Introduction: Some Thoughts on Presidentialism in Postcommunist Europe. In: R.
Taras, ed. Postcommunist Presidents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1–14.
Linz, J.J. and Stepan, A., 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern
Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins
Press.
Lippert, B., Umbach, G., and Wessels, W., 2001. Europeanization of CEE Executives: EU Membership
Negotiations as a Shaping Power. Journal of European Public Policy, 8 (6), 980–1012.
Loewenberg, G. and Patterson, S.C., 1979. Comparing Legislatures. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.
Luong, P.J., 2000. After the Break-up: Institutional Design in Transitional States. Comparative
Political Studies, 33 (5), 563–592.
Mainwaring, S. and Zoco, E., 2007. Political Sequences and the Stabilization of Interparty Competition:
Electoral Volatility in Old and New Democracies. Party Politics, 13 (2), 155–178.
Mansfeldova, Z. and Rakusˇanova, P., 2008. Legislative Budgeting in the Czech Republic. In:
R. Stapenhurst, R. Pelizzo, D.M. Olson and L. Trapp, eds. Legislative Oversight and Budgeting:
A World Perspective. Washington, DC: World Bank Institute, WBI Development
Studies, 279–291.
Mason, D., 1991. The Polish Parliament and Labor Legislation During Solidarity. In: D.M. Olson and
M. Mezey, eds. Legislatures in the Policy Process: The Dilemmas of Economic Policy.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 179–200.
Millard, F., 2004. Elections, Parties, and Representation in Post-Communist Europe. New York:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Moraski, B. and Loewenberg, G., 1999. The Effect of Legal Thresholds on the Revival of FormerCommunist
Parties in East-Central Europe. Journal of Politics, 61 (2), 151–170.
Moser, R.G., 1999. Electoral Systems and the Number of Parties in Post Communist States. World
Politics, 51 (3), 359–384.
Mudde, C., 2007. Civil Society. In: S. White, J. Batt and P.G. Lewis, eds. Developments in Central
and East European Politics 4. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 213–228.
Nalewajko, E. and Wesołowski, W., 2008. Five Terms of the Polish Parliament, 1989–2005. In: D.M.
Olson and P. Norton, eds. Post-Communist and Post-Soviet Parliaments: The Initial Decade.
London: Routledge, 48–71.
Nelson, D. and White, S., ed., 1982. Communist Legislatures in Comparative Perspective. London:
Macmillan Press.
O’Brien, K.J., 1988. China’s National People’s Congress: Reform and its Limits. Legislative Studies
Quarterly, 13 (3), 343–374.
Olson, D.M., 1993. Compartmentalized Competition: The Managed Transitional Election System of
Poland. Journal of Politics, 55 (2), 415–441.
Olson, D.M., 1994. Democratic Legislative Institutions: A Comparative View. Armonk, NY: M.E.
Sharpe.
Olson, D.M., 1995. Organizational Dilemmas of Postcommunist Assemblies. East European Constitutional
Review, 4 (2), 56–60.
Olson, D.M., 1997. The Paradoxes of Institutional Development: The New Democratic Parliaments of
Central Europe. International Political Science Review, 18 (4), 401–416.
Olson, D.M., 1998. Party Formation and Party System Consolidation in New Central European
Democracies. Political Studies (UK), 43 (3), 432–464.
Olson, D.M., 2008. Administrative Review and Oversight: The Experience of Postcommunist Legislatures.
In: R. Stapenhurst, R. Pelizzo, D.M. Olson and L. von Trapp, eds. Legislative Oversight
and Budgeting: A World Perspective. Washington, DC: World Bank Institute, 161–72.
Olson, D.M. and Norton, P., 2008. Post-Communist and Post-Soviet Parliaments: Divergent Paths
from Transition. In: D.M. Olson and P. Norton, eds. Post-Communist and Post-Soviet Parliaments:
The Initial Decade. London: Routledge, 153–185.
254 THE JOURNAL OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES
Downloadedby[MasarykovaUniverzitavBrne]at05:1507March2016
Price, D., 2009. Global Democracy Promotion: Seven Lessons for the New Administration. The
Washington Quarterly, 32 (1), 159–170.
Racz, B., 1989. The Parliamentary Infrastructure and Political Reforms in Hungary. Soviet Studies, 41
(1), 390–366.
Remington, T.F., 2008. Separation of Powers and Legislative Oversight in Russia. In: R. Stapenhurst,
R. Pelizzo, D.M. Olson and L. von Trapp, eds. Legislative Oversight and Budgeting: A World
Perspective. Washington, DC: World Bank Institute, 173–182.
Remington, T.F. and Smith, S.S., 1996. Political Goals Institutional Context and the Choice of an
Electoral System: The Russian Parliamentary Election Law. American Journal of Political
Science, 40 (4), 1253–1279.
Rengger, N.J., 1997. Toward a Culture of Democracy? Democratic Theory and Democratisation in
Eastern and Central Europe. In: G. Pridham, E. Herring and G. Sanford, eds. Building Democracy?
The International Dimension of Democratisation in Eastern Europe. London: Leicester University
Press, 56–80.
Roman, P., 1999. People’s Power: Cuba’s Experience with Representative Government. Boulder, CO:
Westview Press.
Roper, S.D., 2008. From Semi-Presidentialism to Parliamentarism: Regime Change and Presidential
Power in Moldova. Europe-Asia Studies, 60 (1), 113–126.
Sartori, G., 1976. Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Shabad, G. and Slomczynski, K.M., 2002. The Emergence of Career Politicians in Post-Communist
Democracies: Poland and the Czech Republic. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 28 (3), 333–359.
Simon, D.M. and Olson, D.M., 1980. Evolution of a Minimal Parliament: Membership and Committee
Changes in the Polish Sejm. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 5 (2), 211–232.
Staniszkis, J., 1984. Poland’s Self-Limiting Revolution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Stepan, A. and Skach, C., 1993. Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism
versus Presidentialism. World Politics, 46 (1), 1–22.
Szczerbiak, A., 2008. The Birth of a Bipolar System or Referendum on a Polarizing Government?
The October 2007 Polish Parliamentary Election. Journal of Communist Studies and Transition
Politics, 24 (3), 415–443.
Taagapera, R. and Shugart, M.S., 1989. Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral
Systems. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Tworzecki, H., 2003. Learning to Choose: Electoral Politics in East-Central Europe. Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press.
Ware, R., 1995. Transferability of Parliamentary Experience: The Russian Example. Journal of
Legislative Studies, 1 (2), 264–282.
Way, L.A., 2004. The Sources and Dynamics of Competitive Authoritarianism in Ukraine. Journal of
Communist Studies and Transition Politics. 20 (1), 143–161.
Wise, C.R. and Brown, T.L., 1996. Laying the Foundation for Institutionalisation of Democratic
Parliaments in the Newly Independent States: The Case of Ukraine. Journal of Legislative Studies,
2 (3), 216–244.
Zajc, D., 2004. Changing Functions of National Parliaments. In: Z. Mansfeldova, D.M. Olson and
P. Rakusˇanova, eds. Central European Parliaments: First Decade of Democratic Experience
and Future Prospectives. Prague: Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech
Republic, 60–75.
CONCLUSION: DIVERGENT DEVELOPMENT 255
Downloadedby[MasarykovaUniverzitavBrne]at05:1507March2016