89 re-thinking
intersectionality



Jennifer C. Nash
abstract
Intersectionality has become the primary analytic tool that feminist and anti-racist
scholars deploy for theorizing identity and oppression. This paper exposes and
critically interrogates the assumptions underpinning intersectionality by focusing on
four tensions within intersectionality scholarship: the lack of a defined intersectional
methodology; the use of black women as quintessential intersectional subjects; the
vague definition of intersectionality; and the empirical validity of intersectionality.
Ultimately, my project does not seek to undermine intersectionality; instead, I
encourage both feminist and anti-racist scholars to grapple with intersectionality’s
theoretical, political, and methodological murkiness to construct a more complex way
of theorizing identity and oppression.
keywords
intersectionality; race and gender; feminist theory; anti-racist theory
feminist review 89 2008
(1–15) c 2008 Feminist Review. 0141-7789/08 $30 www.feminist-review.com
1
introduction
Intersectionality, the notion that subjectivity is constituted by mutually
reinforcing vectors of race, gender, class, and sexuality, has emerged as the
primary theoretical tool designed to combat feminist hierarchy, hegemony,
and exclusivity. Leslie McCall stresses intersectionality’s importance, calling
it ‘ythe most important theoretical contribution that women’s studies, in
conjunction with related fields, has made so far’ (McCall, 2005: 1771).
This ‘important theoretical contribution’ has become the ‘gold standard’ multidisciplinary
approach for analysing subjects’ experiences of both identity
and oppression.
The term intersectionality, coined by legal scholar Kimberle´ Crenshaw,
underscores the ‘multidimensionality’ of marginalized subjects’ lived experiences
(Crenshaw, 1989: 139). Intersectionality emerged in the late 1980s and early
1990s from critical race studies, a scholarly movement born in the legal academy
committed to problematizing law’s purported colour-blindness, neutrality, and
objectivity. From its inception, intersectionality has had a long-standing interest
in one particular intersection: the intersection of race and gender. To that end,
intersectionality rejects the ‘single-axis framework’ often embraced by both
feminist and anti-racist scholars, instead analysing ‘y the various ways in
which race and gender interact to shape the multiple dimensions of Black
women’s y experiences’ (Crenshaw, 1991: 1244).
Intersectionality serves a few theoretical and political purposes for both
feminist and anti-racist scholarship. First, it subverts race/gender binaries in the
service of theorizing identity in a more complex fashion. The destabilization
of race/gender binaries is particularly important to enable robust analyses
of cultural sites (or spectacles) that implicate both race and gender, like
the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings,1
the O.J. Simpson trial,2
or the
Kobe Bryant rape case.3
Because intersectionality is attuned to subjects
who ‘exist y within the overlapping margins of race and gender discourse
and in the empty spaces between’, it is a tool particularly adept at capturing and
theorizing the simultaneity of race and gender as social processes (Crenshaw,
1992: 403).
Second, intersectionality aspires to provide a vocabulary to respond to critiques
of identity politics. While liberal critiques of identity politics criticize its failure
to transcend difference, Crenshaw argues that the real problem of identity
politics is that it elides intra-group difference, a problem that intersectionality
purports to solve by exposing differences within the broad categories of ‘women’
and ‘blacks’, and serving as a force for ‘ymediating the tension between
assertions of multiple identity and the ongoing necessity of group politics’
(Crenshaw, 1991: 1296). Ultimately, intersectionality seeks to demonstrate the
racial variation(s) within gender and the gendered variation(s) within race
1 Clarence Thomas
was appointed to
the Supreme Court in
1991 to replace
retired Justice
Thurgood Marshall
(the first black
Supreme Court
Justice). Later that
year, Anita Hill
testified at Thomas’
confirmation
hearing, alleging
that Thomas sexually
harassed her when
the two worked
together at the
Equal Employment
Opportunity
Commission (EEOC).
Thomas denied the
allegations, and
famously declared
that he was being
feminist review 89 2008 re-thinking intersectionality2
through its attention to subjects whose identities contest race-or-gender
categorizations.
Finally, intersectionality invites scholars to come to terms with the legacy of
exclusions of multiply marginalized subjects from feminist and anti-racist work,
and the impact of those absences on both theory and practice (Crenshaw, 1989,
1991; Williams, 1989). As a response to the lengthy history of essentialism and
exclusion that has plagued both feminist and anti-racist scholarship, the
intersectional project centres the experiences of subjects whose voices have been
ignored. Undergirding this approach is a belief that ‘ythose who have
experienced discrimination speak with a special voice to which we should listen’
(Matsuda, 1987: 324). For intersectional theorists, marginalized subjects have an
epistemic advantage, a particular perspective that scholars should consider, if
not adopt, when crafting a normative vision of a just society. Critical race
scholars have evoked an array of terms to describe this methodology of drawing
upon marginalized subjects’ vantage points including ‘looking to the bottom’
(Matsuda, 1987), exploring ‘iterative energy’ (Wing, 1990: 182), and drawing on
black women’s ‘multiple consciousness’ (Harris, 1989: 584) or ‘outsider scholars’
status (Matsuda, 1992). These strategies enable intersectional theorists to draw
on the ostensibly unique epistemological position of marginalized subjects to
fashion a vision of equality.
While ‘intersectionality’ has become a scholarly buzzword, the notion that
identity is formed by interlocking and mutually reinforcing vectors of race,
gender, class, and sexuality has pervaded black feminist scholarship for decades.
The women-of-colour critique of conventional feminism’s essentialism emphasized
the disconnect between feminism’s claims to speak for all women and
feminism’s perennial inattention to racial, ethnic, class, and sexual difference(s)
(Davis, 1981; Moraga, 1983; Smith, 1983; Spelman, 1988; Higginbotham, 1992;
Collins, 2000). Myriad feminist scholars have destabilized the notion of a
universal ‘woman’ without explicitly mobilizing the term ‘intersectionality’,
arguing that ‘woman’ itself is contested and fractured terrain, and that the
experience of ‘woman’ is always constituted by subjects with vastly different
interests. To that end, intersectionality has provided a name to a pre-existing
theoretical and political commitment.
Despite intersectionality’s theoretical dominance as a way of conceptualizing
identity, a number of paradoxes embedded in its literature remain uninterrogated
by feminist and anti-racist scholarship. These unresolved conflicts seep into
feminist and anti-racist theory, practice, and politics, confusing their
conceptions of identity and oppression, and obscuring the normative goals of
their work. It is precisely because intersectionality is now ‘a leading feminist
paradigm’ with expansive interdisciplinary reach that it is a critical moment to
engage with its contradictions, absences, and murkiness (Zack, 2005: 1).
made the victim of a
‘high-tech lynching’.
Thomas was
confirmed by the
Senate in October
1991. The Thomas
confirmation hearing
has been of
particular interest to
black feminists, who
have examined and
debated the reasons
for the pervasive
cultural doubt
surrounding Hill’s
allegations. For
more on the Thomas
confirmation
hearings, see
Morrison (1992).
2 O.J. Simpson is a
former professional
football player
accused of
murdering his exwife
Nicole Brown
Simpson and her
friend Ronald
Goldman in 1994.
The Simpson trial
became a cultural
spectacle that
implicated race from
the very beginning.
When Simpson’s
attorney, Johnnie
Cochran, argued
that police bias
tainted evidence
collection practices,
the defence team
was accused of
‘playing the race
card’. Moreover, the
Simpson case is
often read as
culturally significant
because of the vast
differences between
how blacks and
whites interpreted
Simpson’s guilt.
When Simpson was
acquitted, media
captured pictures of
celebratory blacks
and distraught
whites, emphasizing
the trial as a
racially divisive site.
3 In 2003, Kobe
Bryant, a
professional
basketball player,
was accused of
sexual assault.
Bryant insisted that
the sex between him
Jennifer C. Nash feminist review 89 2008 3
My article exposes these unexplored paradoxes in the service of inviting scholars
to reconsider the goals and consequences of their push toward theoretical and
political inclusivity. In particular, my article centres on four unresolved questions
within intersectionality theory: the lack of a clearly defined intersectional
methodology, the use of black women as prototypical intersectional subjects, the
ambiguity inherent to the definition of intersectionality, and the coherence
between intersectionality and lived experiences of multiple identities. In
advancing these challenges, my hope is not to dismantle intersectionality.
Instead, my paper suggests questions and challenges that might help expose the
assumptions that underpin intersectionality, so that both feminist and antiracist
theorists can continue working to dismantle essentialism, to craft nuanced
theories of identity and oppression, and to grapple with the messiness of
subjectivity.
Most importantly, scrutinizing intersectionality will enable both feminist
and anti-racist theorists to evaluate the possibilities and potential pitfalls of
‘inclusive’ theorizing. Both projects must attend to intersectionality’s
attention to difference while also strategically mobilizing the language of
commonality (however provisional or tentative that commonality might be) in the
service of constructing a coherent theoretical and political agenda. While
intersectionality has demonstrated the ways in which difference can fracture
seemingly unitary political movements, it has left activists struggling
with balancing the efficiency of working ‘as women’ or ‘as blacks’ with the
necessary attention to variation and diversity within ‘women’ and ‘blacks’.
Re-considering intersectionality enables activists to ask under what conditions
organizing as ‘women’ or ‘blacks’ or ‘black women’ makes sense, under what
conditions temporary coalition-building makes sense, and how to organize across
and beyond difference.
on methodology and the theoretical primacy of
black women
theories of intersectional methodology
McCall notes that ‘ydespite the emergence of intersectionality as a major
paradigm of research in women’s studies and elsewhere, there has been little
discussion of how to study intersectionality, that is, of its methodology’ (McCall,
2005: 1771, emphasis in original). Crenshaw’s conception of intersectionality, the
idea that a ‘yfocus on the most privileged group members marginalizes those
who are multiply-burdened and obscures claims that cannot be understood as
resulting from discrete sources of discrimination’ has given politically progressive
projects a way of describing both the simultaneity of multiple oppressions and
the complexity of identity (Crenshaw, 1989: 140). These projects have not yet
and the alleged
victim was
consensual. When
Bryant’s attorneys
emphasized the
alleged victim’s
behaviour and
reputation, she
elected not to
participate in the
prosecution any
longer. Later the
state dropped the
case.
feminist review 89 2008 re-thinking intersectionality4
developed a rigorous method of examining multiple subject positions. Robert
Chang and Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr. highlight the methodological murkiness of
intersectionality querying ‘How does one pay attention to the points of
intersection? How many intersections are there? Is the idea of an intersection the
right analogy?’ (Chang and Culp, 2002: 485). Chang and Culp’s query suggests the
necessity of assessing whether intersectionality describes lived experiences of
identity, and developing methodological tools that are sufficiently flexible to
attend to the myriad intersections that constitute identity.
Intersectionality’s relative inattention to methodology has been explained by the
difficulty of crafting a method adequately attentive to ‘ythe complexity that
arises when the subject of analysis expands to include multiple dimensions of
social life and categories of analysis’ (McCall, 2005: 1772). Yet despite the
methodological challenges of complex analyses, some scholars have worked to
develop various tools that can be used to craft an intersectional methodology.
McCall analyses three distinct intersectional methodologies, each with
theoretical and practical shortcomings and benefits.
The first approach, ‘anticategorical complexity’, ‘yis based on a methodology
that deconstructs analytical categories’ (McCall, 2005: 1773). This vision, born in
a theoretical moment ‘yin which hegemonic feminist theorists, poststructuralists,
and antiracist theorists almost simultaneously launched assaults on the
validity of modern analytical categoriesy’, starts from the theoretical
assumption that categories, including race and gender, are too simplistic to
capture the complexity of lived experience (McCall, 2005: 1776). This approach
emphasizes the fact that scholarly deployment of categories reinstalls the
regimes that progressive projects work to destabilize, and has successfully
produced ‘ygreat skepticism about the possibility of using categories in
anything but a simplistic way’ (McCall, 2005: 1773). That is, scholars working out
of this tradition call attention to the social processes of categorization, and the
workings of exclusion and hierarchy that mark boundary-drawing and boundary
maintenance.
The second approach, ‘intracategorical complexity’, takes marginalized intersectional
identities as an analytic starting point ‘yin order to reveal the
complexity of lived experience within such groups’ (McCall, 2005: 1774).
Hallmarks of this regime include the deployment of the narratives of black
women as a way of exposing the under-theorized experiences of doubly
marginalized subjects. In particular, intracategorical analyses attend to the
dangers of categorization, yet do not necessarily reject the categories
themselves. Instead, scholars working in this tradition problematize the
exclusionary repercussions of the act of categorization and use multiply
marginalized subjects’ experiences as ways of demonstrating the inadequacy of
categories.
Jennifer C. Nash feminist review 89 2008 5
The third approach, ‘intercategorical complexity’ compels scholars to ‘...provisionally
adopt existing analytical categories to document relationships of
inequality among social groups and changing configurations of inequality along
multiple and conflicting dimensions’ (McCall, 2005: 1773). McCall favours this
methodological approach, which ‘ybegins with the observation that there are
relationships of inequality among already constituted social groups, as imperfect
and ever changing as they are, and takes those relationships as the center of the
analysis’ (McCall, 2005: 1784–1785). The main work that this approach performs
is to expose the relationships between inequality and the categories themselves,
and to use categories strategically in the service of displaying the linkages
between categories and inequality.
practices of intersectional methodology
McCall’s analytic frameworks highlight a tremendous gap between conceptions of
intersectional methodology and practices of intersectional investigations. In
particular, while intersectionality has worked to disrupt cumulative approaches
to identity (i.e. race þ gender þ sexuality þ class¼complex identity), and to
problematize social processes of categorization through strategic deployments of
marginalized subjects’ experiences, intersectional projects often replicate
precisely the approaches that they critique.
The re-creation of cumulative conceptions of identity is most apparent in
Crenshaw’s seminal critique of anti-discrimination law. Crenshaw attacks the
assumptions underpinning anti-discrimination law, arguing that black women are
compelled to assert either race-based or gender-based discrimination claims
instead of causes of action, which reflect their positions as intersectional
subjects. Because law recognizes only race- or gender-based injuries, black
women’s injuries as black women cannot be wholly addressed by the existing
doctrinal structure. That is, the existing legal apparatus renders the court unable
to see ‘ythat Black women can experience discrimination in ways that are both
similar to and different from those experienced by white women and Black men’
(Crenshaw, 1989: 149).
Crenshaw insists that simply adding black women to the existing regime will not
remedy their marginalization:
y because the intersectional experience is greater than the sum of racism and sexism, any
analysis that does not take intersectionality into account cannot sufficiently address the
particular manner in which Black women are subordinated .
(Crenshaw, 1989: 140)
For Crenshaw, it is the fixed mutually exclusive categorizations of race and
gender that marginalize black women. Only a regime that attends to the
‘particular manner in which Black women are subordinated’ can adequately
feminist review 89 2008 re-thinking intersectionality6
redress black women’s injuries. Ultimately, Crenshaw seeks to challenge law and
radical critiques of law (i.e. feminist legal theory, critical race theory) to attend
to the ‘intersectional experiences of those whom the movements claim as their
respective constituents’ (Crenshaw, 1989: 166). Rather than importing models
from the regimes they seek to disrupt, Crenshaw argues that these projects must
begin their analytic endeavours by attending to the most disadvantaged.
While Crenshaw endeavours to use black women’s incapacity to comply with race/
gender categories to demonstrate the inadequacy of the categories themselves,
her argument shores up the conception that black women’s identities are
constituted exclusively by race and gender. That is, Crenshaw focuses on black
women because they are ‘multiply burdened’, yet her analysis precludes an
examination of forms of ‘multiple burdens’ (or the intersections of privileges and
burdens) beyond race and gender. With little attention to the role that sexuality,
nationality, or class, for example, might play in mediating or entrenching black
women’s experiences of ‘burdens’, black women function exclusively as sites that
demonstrate the importance of race-and-gender, rendering black women’s
experiences the aggregate of race and gender. Furthermore, Crenshaw offers little
attention to the ways in which race and gender function as social processes in
distinctive ways for particular black women in varying historical moments. That
is, black women’s race and gender are treated as trans-historical constants that
mark all black women in similar ways.
While some scholars have reified cumulative notions of identity, others have used
poetry (Wing, 1990), narrative (Williams, 1989), and standpoint epistemology
(Matsuda, 1987) as a method for disrupting race-or-gender logic. Through nonobjective
and often non-linear theoretical formations, intersectional scholars
have been able to articulate the often ignored injuries of the ‘spirit-murder’
(Williams, 1989) of ‘racism/sexism’ (Wing, 1990).
Adrien Wing’s work exemplifies the reliance on literary devices to describe black
women’s experiences. She draws on poet E.E. Cummings’ lines ‘we’re anything
brighter than even the sun/(we’re everything greater/than books/might mean)/
we’re everyanything more than believe/(with a spin/leap/alive we’re alive/
we’re wonderful one times one’ to argue that black women’s experiences are
‘multiplicative’ or ‘one times one’. She argues, ‘We, as black women, can no
longer afford to think of ourselves or let the law think of us as merely the sum of
separate parts y . The actuality of our layered experience is multiplicative.
Multiply each of my parts together, one  one  one  one, and you have one
indivisible being’ (Wing, 1990: 194). Wing’s use of poetry is not simply to explain
the ‘multiplicative’ nature of black women’s experiences; poetry also exemplifies
black women’s particular relationship with the creative. She argues:
yI want to assert affirmatively to the legal academy and to ourselves as well, that we
black women are more than ‘multiply-burdened’ entities subject to a multiplicity of
Jennifer C. Nash feminist review 89 2008 7
oppression, discrimination, pain and depression. Our essence is also characterized by a
multiplicity of strength, love, joy, (with a spin leap alive we’re alive) and transcendence
that flourishes despite adversity.
(Wing, 1990: 196, italics in original)
While the use of poetry as a mechanism for disrupting logocentrism is a
convention of feminist theory, and the use of narrative is a conventional critical
race tool for dislodging law’s claims of objectivity, the deployment of poetry as
the primary vehicle for evoking the experiences of marginalized subjects
suggests a shortcoming in the methodological orientation of intersectional
theory. In particular, it suggests that the project has yet to produce a mechanism
for systematically articulating, aggregating, or examining the ‘multiple levels
of consciousness’ that form the basis of their study of subjectivity (Wing,
1990: 182).
Furthermore, it suggests that there is something poetic about black
women’s experiences of both identity and oppression, and that black
women are inherently resilient subjects who retain an innate creativity
even in the midst of the opposition that a patriarchal white-dominated
culture produces. These assertions, while useful for problematizing the
notion that black women’s experiences can be reduced solely to marginalization,
ultimately romanticize and idealize positions of social subordination
and reinstall conceptions that black women’s bodies are sites of
‘strength’ and ‘transcendence’ rather than complex spaces of multiple
meanings.4
the theoretical importance of black women
Intersectionality’s reliance on black women as the basis for its claims to complex
subjectivity renders black women prototypical intersectional subjects whose
experiences of marginality are imagined to provide a theoretical value-added.
That is, black women enable scholars to ‘ask the other question’, to expose the
spectres of racism and sexism, which leave their traces even in progressive
analyses (Matsuda, 1987). Because ‘black women are theoretically erased’,
centring black women’s experiences makes feminism and anti-racist work’s
systematic inattention to black women apparent and demonstrates the
necessity of deepening feminist and anti-racist conversations (Crenshaw, 1989:
139). To that end, black women’s experiences are used as a theoretical
wedge, designed to demonstrate the shortcomings of conventional feminist and
anti-racist work.
The problems with a theoretical reliance on black women’s experiences are twofold.
First, while seeking to underscore problems of exclusion within feminist and
anti-racist theory, black women are treated as a unitary and monolithic entity.
That is, differences between black women, including class and sexuality,
4 Wing is not alone
in this tendency to
romanticize black
women’s lived
experience as a site
of ‘strength’ and
‘transcendence’.
Alice Walker’s earlier
definition of
‘womanism’ as:
‘A black feminist
or feminist of color
y A woman who
loves other women,
sexually and/or
nonsexually.
Appreciates and
prefers women’s
culture, women’s
emotional flexibility
(values tears
as natural
counterbalance of
laughter), and
women’s strength.
Sometimes loves
individual men,
sexually and/or
nonsexually.
Committed to the
survival and
wholeness of entire
feminist review 89 2008 re-thinking intersectionality8
are obscured in the service of presenting ‘black women’ as a category that
opposes both ‘whites’ and ‘black men’. For example, Crenshaw’s seminal
analysis of the ways in which black women’s experiences of sexual assault and
domestic violence are mediated by both race and gender neglects the
ways in which these experiences are also complicated by class, nationality,
language, ethnicity, and sexuality. While she concedes that ‘yfactors I address
only in part or not at all, such as class or sexuality, are often critical in
shaping the experiences of women of color’, the wholesale abandonment
of addressing how factors beyond race and gender shape black women’s
experiences of violence demonstrates the shortcomings of intersectionality to
capture the sheer diversity of actual experiences of women of colour (Crenshaw,
1991: 1244–1245).
Second, in defining intersectionality as an analytic tool that ‘ydenote[s] the
various ways in which race and gender interact to shape the multiple dimensions
of Black women’s y experiences’, intersectionality recycles black feminism
without demonstrating what new tools it brings to black feminism to help it
fashion a more complex theory of identity (Crenshaw, 1991: 1244). Black
feminism has, since its inception, sought to use black women’s experiences to
demonstrate the shortcomings of race/gender binary schemes (this is epitomized
by the edited anthology entitled All the Women Are White, All the Blacks
Are Men, But Some of Us Are Brave: Black Women’s Studies, whose title alone
suggests the primacy black feminists place on jamming the race/gender
binary). In particular, black feminism imagines black women’s subjectivities as
an inherent disloyalty to race-or-gender thinking and marshals black
women’s stories, experiences, and narratives as a way of continuously and
strategically jamming the workings of binary thinking. While intersectionality
positions itself as a theoretical advance from black feminism, its work continues
in the tradition of black feminism with the addition of a new name for
conceptualizing the workings of identity. If, in fact, intersectionality purports to
theorize identity in a way that departs from or adds to black feminism, a more
explicit engagement with the nature (and distinctiveness) of its theoretical
contribution would be useful.
who is intersectional?
In its emphasis on black women’s experiences of subjectivity and oppression,
intersectional theory has obscured the question of whether all identities are
intersectional or whether only multiply marginalized subjects have an
intersectional identity. While some feminist scholars insist that intersectionality
refers to all subject positions (which are all fundamentally constituted by the
interplay of race, gender, sexuality, class, etc.), the overwhelming majority of
intersectional scholarship has centred on the particular positions of multiply
people, male and
female. y Loves
music. Loves dance.
Loves the moon.
Loves the Spirit.
Loves love and food
and roundness.
Loves struggle. Loves
the Folk. Loves
herself. Regardless’
(Walker, 1983: xi–
xii) has a strong
resonance with
Wing’s interest in
poetry as a tool for
theorizing black
women’s
experiences. Walker
is particularly
interested in
drawing on black
women’s experiences
as a locus of theorybuilding;
it is
precisely because
‘womanism’ is
rooted in ‘music’,
‘dance’, ‘moon’, and
‘Spirit’, and in the
experiences of the
‘Folk’ that it
connects the
personal, the
political, and the
practical, privileging
experience as a
significant form of
knowledge.
Jennifer C. Nash feminist review 89 2008 9
marginalized subjects (Ferguson, 2000).5
This unresolved theoretical dispute
makes it unclear whether intersectionality is a theory of marginalized subjectivity
or a generalized theory of identity.
Generally, intersectional literature has excluded an examination of identities
that are imagined as either wholly or even partially privileged, although those
identities, like all identities, are always constituted by the intersections of
multiple vectors of power. Peter Kwan notes:
y straight white maleness arguably is a multiple identity, but intersectionality theorists
would resist the claim by straight white males that theirs is an intersectional subjectivity.
Central to intersectionality theory is the recovery of the claims and identities of those who,
like African American women, are pushed to the margins of racial discourse because of
assumptions of patriarchal normativity, and simultaneously pushed to the margins of the
feminist discourse because of assumptions of racial normativity.
(Kwan, 1996: 1275)
Kwan’s intervention suggests that intersectionality has generally been opposed to
imagining non-multiply marginalized subjects as central to its theoretical and
political project, particularly because of its investment in ‘recovering’
marginalized subjects’ voices and experiences.
Yet other scholars emphasize that intersectionality’s most significant contribution
is its general theory of identity. Zack argues that ‘the term ‘intersectionality’
refers to multiple oppressions experienced by nonwhite and poor women in
particular, but more generally to all women because differences in sexuality, age,
and physical ableness are also sites of oppression’ (Zack, 2005: 7). For Zack, all
women are intersectional subjects, precisely because of the possibility that their
womanhood (already a socially disadvantaged position) will intersect with other
social positions to multiply disadvantage them. Zack’s work suggests that the
fact that some women experience privilege along particular axes (whether class,
sexuality, light-skinnedness, able-bodiedness, etc.) does not undermine all
women’s claims to intersectional identities.
If intersectionality is solely an anti-exclusion tool designed to describe ‘the
multiplier effect’, or the ‘lifelong spirit injury of black women’, then it is
incumbent upon both feminist theory and anti-racist work to develop a
conceptualization of identity that captures the ways in which race, gender,
sexuality, and class, among other categories, are produced through each other,
securing both privilege and oppression simultaneously (Wing, 1990: 191). That is,
progressive scholarship requires a nuanced conception of identity that recognizes
the ways in which positions of dominance and subordination work in complex and
intersecting ways to constitute subjects’ experiences of personhood. If, however,
intersectionality purports to provide a general tool that enables scholars to
uncover the workings of identity, intersectionality scholarship must begin to
broaden its reach to theorize an array of subject experience(s).
5 Kimberle´ Crenshaw
explains
intersectionality
noting that ‘the
concept of
intersectionality [is
used] to denote the
various ways in
which race and
gender interact to
shape the multiple
dimensions of Black
women’s
employment
experiences’
(Crenshaw, 1991:
1244). Yet later she
notes ‘my focus on
the intersections of
race and gender only
highlights the need
to account for
multiple grounds of
identity when
considering how the
social world is
constructed’
(Crenshaw, 1991:
1245). Thus, the text
rests on an internal
paradox:
intersectionality as
a theory about black
women’s experiences
and intersectionality
as a theory of
‘multiple grounds of
identity’.
feminist review 89 2008 re-thinking intersectionality10
processes of identity formation
If intersectionality theory purports to provide a general theory of identity, it must
grapple with whether intersectionality actually captures the ways in which
subjects experience subjectivity or strategically deploy identity. In particular,
intersectionality has yet to contend with whether its theory explains or describes
the processes and mechanisms by which subjects mobilize (or choose not to
mobilize) particular aspects of their identities in particular circumstances. The
theory has not attended to questions like: do black women use their multiple
identities to interpret the social world or do they deploy one at a time? What
determines which identity is foregrounded in a particular moment, or are both
always simultaneously engaged? What is the relationship between the ‘matrix of
domination’ (Collins, 2000: 299), the various forms of power that are inflicted on
all bodies, and the processes and articulations of identity? Answering questions
about the fit between intersectionality and lived experience of identity requires
intersectionality to craft a theory of agency and to grapple with the amount of
leeway variously situated subjects have to deploy particular components of their
identities in certain contexts.
the ‘so what’ question(s): theoretical advances
for a new intersectionality
While there are a number of unresolved paradoxes in intersectional theory,
attending to these contradictions will provide intersectional theory with an
opportunity to broaden its explanatory power and to develop its answer to what
Chang and Culp call the ‘so what’ question. Chang and Culp note ‘it’s one thing to
say that race, gender, sexuality, class, and nation operate symbiotically,
cosynthetically, multidimensionally, or interconnectedly. y The next step is to
be able to prescribe or imagine points of intervention’ (2002: 490). Simply
identifying particular intersections as undertheorized or unacknowledged is only
the first step in a larger theoretical and political project, which intersectionality
has yet to articulate with specificity. While the work emerging from critical race
feminism has sought to challenge law to alter its doctrinal structure to attend to
black women’s particular subject positions, the work emerging from feminist
theory has suggested that feminism itself must better examine its history of
exclusions. Yet neither of these projects has assessed or theorized the
repercussions of conceptualizing of identity as ‘symbiotically, cosynthetically,
multidimensionally, or interconnectedly’ formed.
One ‘so what’ question that remains unexplored by intersectional theorists is the
way in which privilege and oppression can be co-constituted on the subjective
level. That is, while intersectionality purports to describe multiple marginalizations
(i.e. the spectre of the multiply-marginalized black woman that haunts
Jennifer C. Nash feminist review 89 2008 11
intersectionality) and multiple privileges (i.e. the spectre of the (heterosexual)
white man that haunts intersectionality), it neglects to describe the ways in
which privilege and oppression intersect, informing each subject’s experiences.
In painting black women, for example, as wholly oppressed and marginalized,
intersectional theory can not attend to variations within black women’s
experiences that afford some black women greater privilege, autonomy, and
freedom. In troubling the monolithism of ‘black womanhood’, intersectionality
could be strategically disloyal to dominant conceptions of black women as ‘the
mules of the world’, exploding the tendency of radical projects to elide critical
differences within ostensibly marginalized subject positions (Hurston quoted in
Churchill, 1999: 199). Mari Matsuda suggests that intersectionality works by
enabling scholars to ‘ask the other question’. She argues:
The way I try to understand the interconnection of all forms of subordination is through a
method I call ‘ask the other question.’ When I see something that looks racist, I ask, ‘where
is the patriarchy in this?’ When I see something that looks sexist, I ask, ‘Where is the
heterosexism in this?’ When I see something that looks homophobic, I ask, ‘Where are the
class interests in this?’.
(Matsuda, 1990: 1189)
Matsuda’s intervention demonstrates the interconnections of forms of
subordination, yet gestures toward the tendency of intersectional theorists to
ignore the intimate connections between privilege and oppression. Her framework
underscores the ways in which patriarchy, racism, and heterosexism buttress each
other, but ignores the ways in which subjects might be both victimized by
patriarchy and privileged by race (it also ignores the ways in which subjects might
take pleasure in some of the trappings of patriarchal power) in particular social,
cultural, historical, and political moments. In conceiving of privilege and
oppression as complex, multi-valent, and simultaneous, intersectionality could
offer a more robust conception of both identity and oppression.
Conceptualizing ‘black womanhood’ as its own contested, messy terrain requires
that intersectionality theory abandon its commitment to sameness, what Rinaldo
Walcott has termed (in an admittedly different context, a critique of black
studies’ tendency to elide differences among blacks) ‘ya regime that trades on
the myths of homogeneity’ (Walcott, 2005: 93). In following Walcott’s lead,
intersectionality can consider the differences between black women, producing a
potentially uncomfortable disunity that allows for a richer and more robust
conception of identity.
Another critical ‘so what’ question for intersectionality theory is to consider race
and gender as social processes that inform each other, but which operate in
distinct and particular ways. Currently, much of intersectionality theory conforms
to what Loic Wacquant terms the ‘logic of the trial’, a scholarly tradition of
locating practices that injure multiply marginalized subjects (Wacquant, 1997:
feminist review 89 2008 re-thinking intersectionality12
222). While the ‘logic of the trial’ enables scholars to locate the racist and sexist
practices that undergird seemingly neutral and objective sites (like law), it also
tends to ignore the mechanisms through which domination operates, proliferates,
and entrenches itself (Wacquant, 1997). Wacquant advocates that social
scientists ‘y skirt issues of origins and abandon the search for a single
overarching concept to develop an analytic of racial domination, y a
parsimonious set of categories designed to anatomize the diverse manners in
which ethnoracial government is exercised’ (Wacquant, 1997: 230). Wacquant’s
conception of an ‘analytic of racial domination’ circumvents a search for ‘origins’
and, instead, examines how various processes of racial subordination coincide in
particular social moments.
Intersectionality scholars can draw on Wacquant’s intervention in a number of
important ways: examining how race and gender utilize differing technologies
of categorization and control, disciplining bodies in distinctive ways, and
coalescing (or colliding) in particular formations in certain historical, social,
cultural, representational, legal, and technological moments. In analysing
race and gender both as co-constitutive processes and as distinctive and
historically specific technologies of categorization, intersectionality scholars will
be able to offer insights that far exceed imagining race and gender as
inextricably bound up.
Crenshaw’s articulation of intersectionality has galvanized an array of disciplines
to consider questions of essentialism, exclusion, and complex identity in new
ways. Crenshaw argues:
With identity thus reconceptualized, it may be easier to y summon the courage to
challenge groups that are after all, in one sense, ‘home’ to us, in the name of the parts of
us that are not made at home. y The most one could expect is that we will dare to speak
against internal exclusions and marginalizations, that we might call attention to how the
identity of ‘the group’ has been centered on the intersectional identities of a few. y
Through an awareness of intersectionality, we can better acknowledge and ground the
differences among us and negotiate the means by which these differences will find
expression in constructing group politics.
(Crenshaw 1991: 1299)
Crenshaw’s intervention suggests the importance of ‘speak[ing] against internal
exclusions and marginalizations’ to challenge institutions and radical political
projects to hear the voices that have been silenced. Now that intersectionality
itself has become an institutionalized intellectual project, and the dominant
tool for excavating the voices of the marginalized, it is incumbent upon
intersectional scholars to critically interrogate the goals of the intersectional
project as they determine how to chart the future of this theoretical and political
movement. The important insights that identity is complex, that subjectivity is
messy, and that personhood is inextricably bound up with vectors of power are
Jennifer C. Nash feminist review 89 2008 13
only an analytic starting point; it is time for intersectionality to begin to sort out
the paradoxes upon which its theory rests in the service of strengthening its
explanatory power.
author biography
Jennifer C. Nash is a PhD candidate in African American Studies at Harvard
University, where she is writing her dissertation on representations of black
women in Golden Age pornography.
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