The British Journal of Sociology 2005 Volume 56 Issue 4
Crompton and Lyonette (Department of Sociology, City University) (Corresponding author email: r.crompton@city.ac.uk)
© London School of Economics and Political Science 2005 ISSN 0007-1315 print/1468-4446 online.
Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden,
MA 02148, USA on behalf of the LSE. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-4446.2005.00085.x
The new gender essentialism – domestic and
family ‘choices’ and their relation to attitudes1
Rosemary Crompton and Clare Lyonette
Abstract
This paper critically examines two strands within contemporary gender essentialism
– that is, the argument that men and women are fundamentally different and
that it is this ‘difference’ that explains the continuing social and material differences
between the sexes. The first strand we examine is Hakim’s ‘preference
theory’, which has argued that persisting sex differences in employment patterns
are an outcome of the ‘choices’ made by different ‘types’ of women. We next
examine the claims of populist conservative feminism, that has argued that women
(and men) in partnerships will be happier if they adopt a gender role traditionalism
in the domestic sphere. Our empirical findings suggest that neither of these
theoretical explanations are supported by our data, which is derived from the
samples of six countries participating in the International Social Survey Programme
Family 2002 module.
Keywords: Gender essentialism; gender roles; traditionalism; employment; choices
Introduction
Differences between men and women are extensive, undeniable, and persisting.
However, there is considerable disagreement as to their origins. Gender
essentialists argue that the differences between the sexes are of an intrinsic
nature, closely associated with physical, physiological, and/or spiritual differ-
ences.2
In contrast, feminists have argued that although there are indeed biological
sex differences between men and women, much if not most of the
‘difference’ between men and women, as expressed in gender hierarchies and
patterns of inequality, is in fact socially constructed. Feminists have always
been rather wary of gender essentialism, and for a very simple reason. If it can
be demonstrated that the differences between the sexes (which would include
persisting patterns of inequality) rest upon the innate or essential qualities of
women and men, then not only may these inequalities be rendered legitimate,
but also, there can be little justification for change.
In this paper, no attempt will be made to arbitrate between ‘nature’ versus
‘nurture’, or the claims of sociobiologists and social constructionists (see Rose
and Rose 2000). Rather, we will critically examine two arguments, both resting
on essentialist assumptions, relating to the gendered division of market and
domestic work. The first is Hakim’s development of ‘preference theory’, that
seeks to explain the persisting differences between men’s and women’s
employment patterns, and the second is populist conservative feminism, that
argues that women (and men) will be happier if gender stereotypical roles are
assumed within the household and intimate relationships. It will be suggested
that both of these arguments are flawed, and that both serve to legitimize and
justify continuing inequalities in the gendered division of labour.
Over the last century, one of the major social changes in modern societies
has been the transformation in the social status and economic behaviour of
women. By the closing decades of the twentieth century, women in modern
democratic societies had largely gained civil and economic rights, and women’s
claims to equality have been largely accepted.3
Increasingly, women, including
mothers of young children, are entering and remaining in the labour market,
thus eroding, at least in part, the conventional ‘male breadwinner’ model of
employment and family life (inequalities in employment persist, however).
These changes in the status of women have been taking place in parallel with
other economic and political trends. In particular, at the political level,
neo-liberalism, with its emphasis on the primacy of individual ‘choice’, has
become increasingly influential (e.g. Reaganism, Thatcherism).
The expansion and acceptance of women’s equality claims have not taken
place without resistance – often described as a ‘backlash’ against feminism
(Faludi 1992). ‘Feminism’ (usually unspecified) has been targeted as responsible
for the increase in single parenthood and family dissolution (Morgan
1995). Massive social disruption, it is suggested, can only be averted if women
somehow rediscover their innate nurturing capacities and devote themselves
to the care of their young children, rather than seek success in the employment
sphere (Fukuyama 1999; Kristol 1998). More insidious, perhaps, has been
the emergence of populist conservative feminism.4
Popular works such as‘Men
are From Mars, Women are From Venus’ (Gray 1992) emphasize the emotional
and interpersonal differences between men and women, with women as
empathic carers and men as competitive fixers. Equally populist texts such as
‘The Rules’ (Fein and Schneider 1995) and ‘The Surrendered Wife’ (Doyle
2001) urge gender traditionalism in intimate relationships as the road to
gender harmony.
A common theme in these diverse texts is a return to gender essentialism.
Indeed, gender essentialist assumptions neatly resolve a potential logical
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contradiction for neo-liberal thinking. It might be argued that if all individuals
are to be seen as free to make choices, then why should a particular category
of individuals (i.e. women), be constrained in their choices (i.e.
traditionalism in gender roles would limit ‘choice’). However, this contradiction
is resolved if it is asserted that the differences between men and women
are ‘natural’ and that the choices made by women are in accordance with this
‘nature’ and therefore not constrained by dominant (male) norms and/or
inequalities of condition.
Hakim and ‘preference theory’
Hakim has developed what she describes as ‘preference theory’ over a number
of publications (Hakim 1998; 2000; 2003a; 2003b; 2004). She argues that the
characteristic patterning of women’s employment, as revealed by aggregate
level statistics – a tendency to part-time and flexible working, and overrepresentation
in lower-level occupations – is an outcome of the fact that there
are three different ‘types’ of women (or ‘preference groupings’). ‘Homecentred’
women give priority to their families, and either withdraw from the
labour market altogether or work only intermittently when they have children.
‘Work-centred’ women, in contrast, give priority to their employment and are
often not married and/or childless. A further category of ‘adaptives’5
– by far
the largest – shift the emphasis of their ‘preferences’ over their work/family
life cycles. These work/family preference categories are also found amongst
men, although in different proportions, as fewer men are ‘home-centred’ or
‘adaptive’.
Hakim argues that ‘preference theory’ has been created as a consequence
of the contraceptive revolution, the expansion of equal opportunities, and
changes in the employment sphere that have generated flexible, white-collar
jobs that are attractive to women (Hakim 2004: 14). As a consequence, ‘. . . a
new scenario in which women have genuine choices’ has been created and
‘. . . female heterogeneity is revealed to its full extent’ (Hakim 2004: 14). It
predicts that ‘men will retain their dominance in the labour market, politics
and other competitive activities, because only a minority of women (i.e. the
‘work-centred’) are prepared to prioritise their jobs . . . in the same way as
men’ (Hakim 2004: 15).
She argues that Britain and the USA represent a particularly favourable
‘test case’ for the application of preference theory (Hakim 2004: 19). In Britain
and the USA, women have secured equal opportunities, and the flexible,
deregulated labour markets in these countries (a consequence of neo-liberal
economic policies), allow women to freely exercise their ‘choices’ – particularly
in respect of part-time work. Although Hakim’s argument might justifiably
be described as voluntarist with its emphasis on the overwhelming
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significance of individual ‘choices’, allowance is made for the impact of
structural constraints and factors. Opportunities for choice are more restricted
in other countries (such as Spain, the major focus of Hakim’s comparative
work), particularly in respect of opportunities for part-time employment.
Structural constraints, however, are inexorably becoming less important,
and Hakim argues that as more ‘good’ part-time work becomes available ‘. . .
secondary earners who are currently forced to choose full-time jobs . . . will
switch to part-time or temporary jobs instead’ (Hakim 2003a: 262). Thus
. . . the only cleavages that will matter within the workforce in the twentyfirst
century will be the continuing differences between primary and secondary
earners . . . Sex and gender will cease to be important factors and
are already being replaced by lifestyle preferences as the only important
differentiating characteristic in labour supply. (Hakim 2003a: 261)
Moreover, Hakim claims that the three lifestyle preference groups she identifies
‘. . . cut across social class, education, and ability differences’ (Hakim
2003a: 247).
Hakim’s work has generated a considerable, and sometimes acrimonious,
debate, which will not be reviewed in its entirety here. Her emphasis on the
primacy of ‘choice’ over contextual constraint has been challenged (Ginn et
al. 1996; McRae 2003; Procter and Padfield 1998). The stability of the ‘preference’
categories she identifies, as well as the utility of ‘preferences’ as an explanation
of work orientations or ‘choices’, has also been questioned (Crompton
and Harris 1998). Our strategy in this paper will not be to attempt an exhaustive
evaluation of ‘preference theory’.6
Indeed, we take the view that preferences
and attitudes will often be linked to behaviours. As many others have
argued, (McRae 2003: 329; Glover 2002) both normative and structural constraints
shape women’s decisions relating to the ‘balance’ achieved by individual
women in respect of market and caring work. We also take the view
that neither identities nor behaviours in respect of women’s employment are
fixed, but adapt to each other in a process of positive feedback (Himmelweit
and Sigala 2003: 23).
‘Preference theory’ rests upon the identification of ‘preference categories’
that vary in their distribution between men in aggregate and women in aggregate.
Thus the explanation of these variations is key to the theory. Here Hakim
draws upon the work of Goldberg (1993) who argues that male hormones such
as testosterone are a major source of sex differences in motivation, ambition
and behaviour (Hakim 2004: 4, see also Hakim 2000: 258–62). Thus men (in
aggregate) are more aggressive and competitive than women in the world of
employment, and ‘Women accept hierarchy so long as it is men who are in
positions of power and authority. Male dominance is accepted, as Goldberg
argued; female dominance goes contrary to sex-role stereotypes and is unwelcome,
uncomfortable, and frequently rejected’ (Hakim 2004: 110). Hakim
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argues that her theory is ‘unisex’, and thus not biologically essentialist (Hakim
2004: 16) in that a minority of men are ‘home-centred’ (as well as the majority
of women). However, this argument is not persuasive. As biological gender
essentialists are careful to argue, they do not claim that their theories identify
characteristics that apply to ‘all women’ or ‘all men’ (Baron-Cohen 2004), but
they do not seek to reject the ‘essentialist’ label.7
The ISSP study
Our analysis will draw upon a number of individual country data sets gathered
within the International Social Survey Programme’s (ISSP) Family 2002
module (Britain, Finland, France, Norway, USA and Portugal). In 2002, interviews
were carried out with a stratified random sample of 1475 respondents
in Norway, 2312 in Britain, 1353 in Finland, 1903 in France, 1171 in the USA
and 1092 in Portugal. The same questions are asked in all countries. The
common language of the ISSP is English, and questions are agreed and backtranslated
in order to ensure cross-national comparability of meaning.8
The
ISSP Family 2002 module asked a series of questions relating to gender role
attitudes, attitudes to mother’s employment, as well as satisfactions with family
life and life in general. If the assumptions of ‘preference theory’ are correct,
then we might expect that attitudes to mothers’ employment and its impact
on children and family life would be the major determinant of women’s
employment behaviour – particularly in countries such as Britain. If the arguments
of populist conservative feminism are valid, (that gender traditionalism
in intimate relationships is the road to gender harmony), then we would anticipate
that women involved in more traditional domestic relationships will be
happier than those who are not.
Data analysis
We classified couple households according to their working hour strategies,
using a modified version of the categories devised by Moen and her colleagues
(Moen 2003: 19):
1) High commitment couples: both partners work more than 40 hours a
week.
2) Dual moderate couples: both partners work between 35 and 40 hours a
week.
3) Neo-traditionalist couples: the man works over 40 hours a week and the
woman works less than 40 hours, characteristically part-time.
4) Alternate commitment couples: both partners work under 40 hours a
week but one works less than 35 hours per week.9
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5) Finally, we have included a further category, described here as traditional
couples: the man works full-time and the woman is not in employment.
In our classification, we have set ‘full-time’ hours for ‘traditionals’ at 35
(so as not to exclude male sole earners in those countries in which
working hours are regulated), but the large majority (60 per cent) of men
in category five work over 40 hours a week.
Table I graphically illustrates the impact of national labour market regimes
on couples’ working arrangements. France, which has a statutory 35-hour
working week, has the lowest proportion of ‘high commitment’ couples, followed
by Finland, where average hours of full-time work are also relatively
short. The low proportions of ‘neo-traditionalists’ (where the woman typically
works part-time) in Finland and Portugal reflect both traditions of full-time
work and the non-availability of part-time work for women in these countries
(OECD 2001). Britain, which has the second highest level of part-time
working amongst women in Europe as a whole, has the greatest proportion of
respondents in ‘neo-traditional’ households. Couples’ working arrangements
reported by respondents, therefore, are highly conditioned by national
working time regimes (indeed, when country was included in a multinomial
regression on couples’ working arrangements, this explained most of the variance
between individuals).
National or country-specific factors, therefore, clearly have an important
impact on couples’ working arrangements. This fact is explicitly recognized by
Hakim, who has, as we have seen, argued that the lack of external constraint
in the case of Britain and the USA renders these countries important
‘test cases’ for ‘preference theory’. However, national factors will not be the
whole of the explanation for couples’ working arrangements. Attitudes and
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TABLE I: Couples’ work arrangements x country (men and women in couple relationships)
Britain Finland France Norway USA (% Portugal Total
(% of (% of (% of (% of of (% of (% of
country) country) country) country) country) country) total)
High 99 26 39 62 60 70 356
commitments (12.1%) (6.5%) (6.1%) (7.4%) (16.9%) (17%) (10.3%)
Dual moderates 134 221 233 272 46 140 1,046
(16.4%) (55.1%) (36.2%) (32.4%) (13.0%) (34%) (30.2%)
Neo-traditionalists 265 50 140 209 61 49 774
(32.4%) (12.5%) (21.8%) (24.9%) (17.2%) (11.9%) (22.3%)
Alternate 156 79 143 237 71 39 725
commitments (19.1%) (19.7%) (22.2%) (28.2%) (20.0%) (9.5%) (20.9%)
Traditionalists 163 25 88 59 117 114 566
(20%) (6.2%) (13.7%) (7%) (33.0%) (27.7%) (16.3%)
Total 817 401 643 839 355 412 3,467
preferences will play a part, as will proximate factors such as the presence of
children in the household, education and age.
We constructed a measure of attitudes to women’s employment, using five
items from the ISSP dataset, previously used by Knudsen and Waerness (2001)
in a comparative analysis of national context, individual characteristics and
attitudes to women’s employment in Britain, Sweden and Norway:
A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with
her children as a mother who does not work;
A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works;
Family life suffers if a woman goes out to work;
Work is alright, but what a woman really wants is a home and family;
A man’s job is to earn money, a woman’s job is to look after the home and
family
Scores ranged from five to twenty-five, with lower scores indicating more
positive attitudes towards women’s employment.10
Table II shows that respondents in traditional male breadwinner couples
had significantly more negative attitudes to women’s employment. If we make
the assumption that attitudes are an indication of ‘preferences’, then the significantly
greater attitudinal traditionalism of respondents with a traditional
pattern of work-life articulation might be taken as a prima facie confirmation
of Hakim’s theory. However, Table III shows that a number of other factors
also have an impact on couple work arrangements: respondents in traditional
households were also more likely (on average) to be older, to have a child
under sixteen in the household, to be less well educated, and more likely to
be manual employees. These findings raise the thorny question of the determinants
of attitudes, as well as their consistency over time.
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TABLE II: Attitudes to women’s employment x couples’ working arrangements (all countries, men
and women)
Working arrangements N Mean Std. Deviation
High commitments 328 12.53 4.77
Dual moderates 945 12.33 4.37
Neo-traditionalists 669 12.92 4.08
Alternate commitments 653 12.93 4.35
Traditionalists 503 15.17 4.54
Total 3,097 13.06 4.48
Note:
ANOVA F = 37.142; d.f. = 4; p < 0.001. Post-hoc tests showed that traditionalists had significantly
more negative attitudes towards women’s employment than all other groups.
Which factors affect attitudes?
In the same way that couples’ working arrangements are influenced by certain
factors (including attitudes), attitudes may also be influenced by contextual
factors, including couples’ working arrangements. For example, Himmelweit
and Sigala (2003: 20–1) showed that women in the UK who were in the contradictory
position of being in employment but believing that pre-school children
suffered as a consequence were more likely to change their attitudes than
their behaviour (i.e. giving up paid work) over a two-year period. In our analysis,
in order to explore the factors associated with variations in attitudes to
mother’s employment,a multiple linear regression analysis was first performed
with attitudes to women’s employment as the dependent variable. Factors
included as independent variables in two blocks were: couples’ working
arrangements, respondent’s age, education level, whether or not there was a
child in the household and whether or not the respondent’s mother worked.
Only women were included in the regression, as it was specifically women’s
situations within the different couples’ working arrangements which were of
interest here, and it was expected (and has previously been shown) that men’s
and women’s attitudes towards female employment are very different
(Knudsen and Waerness 2001), with women significantly more positive overall
than men.11
The results of the regression analysis show that being less well-educated,
older, having traditional working arrangements and having a mother who did
not work were the most significant predictors of negative attitudes to women’s
employment, explaining around 15 per cent of the variance in attitudes
(adjusted r2
= 0.148). Dual moderate women were more likely than neotraditional
and traditional women to have positive attitudes to women’s
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TABLE III: Couples’ working arrangements by mean age, level of education, social class, child in
household (all countries, men and women)
Variables High Dual Neo- Alternate Traditionalist
commitment moderates traditionalists commitments
Age (mean) 44.03 41.69 43.27 42.69 44.31
Education (%):
Low 16.9% 14.8% 14.7% 14.3% 28.4%
Middle 36.6% 51.1% 47.6% 49.4% 38.4%
High 46.5% 34.1% 37.7% 36.2% 33.2%
Child (%):
Yes 37.7% 43.0% 50.9% 50.1% 59.0%
No 62.3% 57.0% 49.1% 49.9% 41.0%
Social class (%):
Professional 61.0% 41.7% 43.7% 41.2% 41.2%
Intermediate 18.2% 31.7% 27.9% 33.6% 24.2%
Manual 20.8% 26.6% 28.4% 25.3% 34.6%
employment, that is, as Himmelweit and Sigala’s findings suggest, employment
status will itself have an impact on attitudes. Having a child in the household
did not predict women’s attitudes. Separate regressions for each couples’
working arrangement groups were also performed: having a child in the household
was not predictive of attitudes for women in any of the working arrangement
groups, whereas education level was consistently predictive.
Which factors affect couples’ working arrangements?
We then attempted to unravel the factors having an influence on couples’
working arrangements via a multinomial regression analysis, with working
arrangements as the dependent variable. In this instance, attitudes to women’s
employment was included as a potential predictor of couples’ working
arrangements, along with other attitudinal variables, including attitudes to
men’s involvement in household tasks, using two items from the ISSP data:
Men ought to do a larger share of household work that they do now;
Men ought to do a larger share of childcare than they do now.
Scores ranged from two to ten, with higher scores indicating more traditional
attitudes towards men’s involvement in household tasks (i.e. that they
should not do more).12
If couples’ working arrangements are indeed shaped
by women’s home-centred or work-centred ‘nature’, it may be expected that
those women with more traditional working arrangements (i.e. man works,
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TABLE IV: Multiple regression on attitudes to women’s employment by couples’ working arrangements,
age, education, whether mother worked and child in household (women only, all countries,
final model)
Variable B Beta t-value
(Constant) 9.113 17.124***
High commitments -0.314 -0.022 -0.805
Dual moderates -0.695 -0.072 -2.380*
Alternate commitments -0.233 -0.022 -0.753
Traditionalists 2.184 0.177 6.319***
Education 1.819 0.199 8.512***
Mother worked -0.833 -0.093 -3.846***
Child in household -0.023 -0.003 -0.107
Age 0.064 0.181 6.998***
Notes:
*p < 0.05; ***p < 0.001.
Reference category = neo-traditionalists (man works full-time, wife works part-time).
Education: low = 1; high = 0.
Mother worked when respondent under 14: yes = 1; no = 0.
Child in household: yes = 1; no = 0.
Couples’ working arrangement groups were dummy coded, e.g. high commitments = 1; other = 0,
etc.
woman stays at home) will be less likely to think that men should do more in
the home. Given the importance that Hakim (2003a; 2003b) attaches to preferences
in determining individual attitudes to employment, we also include
data on attitudes to career development,13
as ‘work-centred’ women should be
more likely to agree that it is important to move up the job ladder than ‘homecentred’
women. Other independent variables included whether or not the
respondent’s own mother had worked when the respondent was under
fourteen, as this had an impact on attitudes to women’s employment. Our
reference category is neo-traditional households, where the man works fulltime
and the woman typically works part-time (when the traditional, ‘male
breadwinner’ group was used as the reference category, all groups were significantly
different from traditionalists, which masked some of the more interesting
variations within the working arrangement groups). Again, only women
were included in the regression analysis.
Having a child in the household was not a significant predictor of attitudes
to women’s employment for female respondents in all categories (Table IV),
but it was highly predictive of couples’ working arrangements. All of the categories
of women (except women in alternate couple arrangements) were significantly
less likely than traditional women to have a child in the home.
Neo-traditional women were the next most likely to have a child in the home
and high commitment women the least likely, adding support to the claim that
the presence of children in the home affects women’s working arrangements.
Although having a mother who worked was a significant predictor of different
attitudes among women (Table IV), this was not a direct predictor of work
behaviour. Education was consistently predictive of both attitudes to women’s
employment and actual working arrangements, with traditional women having
a significantly lower level of education than all other women, and high commitment
women having a higher level of education.
Contrary to Hakim’s argument that lifestyle preferences ‘. . . cut across
social class, education, and ability differences’ (2003a: 247), in aggregate,
couples’ working arrangements do appear to be affected by women’s level of
education. As those with higher education are also more likely to be in higher
social classes (see Table III), her argument has little support from the data presented
here. Age also had an impact, with dual moderate women significantly
more likely to be in the younger age range than other women, especially traditional
women. There were no significant effects of career aspirations and
attitudes to men’s involvement in the home. Although traditional women were
significantly more negative in attitudes to women’s employment than all other
groups in which women were in employment, there were no significant
differences in attitude between the ‘working women’. On the basis of this
evidence, it would seem, therefore, that ‘structural’ factors are at least as
important, if not more important, than ‘attitudinal’ factors in shaping the
working arrangements of couples.
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Nevertheless, it might still be argued that our data simply reports on the
impact of constraints,rather than on the operation of‘preferences’.As we have
seen, Hakim has argued that Britain stands out as a country where women can
exercise ‘choice’, given the extensive opportunities for part-time work in this
country. We might expect, therefore, that preferences (as expressed in attitudes)
might be of particular significance in the British case. Repeating the
regression in Table V for separate countries was problematic given that the
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TABLE V: Multinomial regression to identify the determinants of couples’ working arrangements
(all countries, women only)
High Dual Traditionalists Alternate
commitments moderates commitments
Exp (B) Exp (B) Exp (B) Exp (B)
Age of respondent:
18–34 0.860 2.956*** 0.785 1.536
35–54 1.282 2.021** 0.673 1.256
55+ – – – –
Attitudes to women’s
employment:
More positive 1.502 1.413 0.320*** 1.270
Middle range 0.969 1.094 0.657 1.188
More negative – – – –
Attitudes to men’s involvement
in the home:
Men should do more 1.267 1.156 1.527 0.918
(+)
Men should do more (-) – – – –
Importance of moving
up the job ladder:
Agree 1.534 0.869 1.233 0.918
Neither agree nor 1.465 1.031 1.584 0.740
disagree
Disagree – – – –
Respondent’s education level:
Lowest or no 0.939 1.512 3.127*** 1.628
qualification
Above lowest 0.456** 1.371 0.721 1.162
qualification
Above higher – – – –
secondary or university
degree completed
Child(ren) in
household:
Yes 0.510** 0.667* 3.110*** 0.930
No – – – –
Mother worked when
respondent under 14:
Yes 1.349 0.946 1.017 1.016
No – – – –
Note:
p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. Nagelkerke R2 = 0.146. Reference category is neo-
traditionalists.
low numbers involved meant that we could not be confident of model fit.
Nevertheless, repeating the multinomial regression (not reported here) for
British women did not reveal a pattern that varied from that reported in Table
V; that is, having a child in the household, and level of education, were significant
determinants of couples’ working arrangements, as well as attitudes to
women’s employment. In short,the British case did not emerge as one in which
attitudes were of particular importance in affecting couples’ work arrangements.
Without current longitudinal data, it is impossible to conclusively determine
whether attitudes affect work behaviour or whether work behaviour,
perhaps as a consequence of structural constraints, affects attitudes – although
as we have seen, Himmelweit and Sigala’s longitudinal analysis of the British
case suggests that work behaviour has a greater impact than attitudes. Our
data so far suggest that attitudes and behaviour act in a bi-directional manner,
with both influencing, and being influenced by, the other. Those women who
stay at home (traditionalists) may be more likely to have negative attitudes to
women’s employment precisely because they stay at home, rather than viceversa.
As traditional women have lower levels of education than working
women, meaning that their opportunities for well-paid employment are more
limited, the low provision of affordable childcare in Britain is more likely to
act as a constraint upon employment (see McRae 2003). We would argue,
therefore, that it is unlikely that couples’ working arrangements are ‘chosen’
simply in accordance with women’s attitudes, but are more likely to be the
result of a complex interplay of attitudes and practical constraints.
With these kinds of arguments in mind, it is instructive to examine the association
between attitudes and couples’ working arrangements for another of
the countries included in our data set, Norway. As we have seen (Table I),
there are ample part-time employment opportunities available in Norway (in
2002, 43 per cent of employed Norwegian women were classified as part-time
workers). Moreover, as a ‘Nordic’ welfare state, Norway is also characterized
by the availability of low-cost, high quality childcare provision as well as
general supports for families such as extensive maternity and paternity leaves
(Ellingsaeter 2003; Korpi 2000).14
In short, it could be argued that in Norway
parents are able to make even more unfettered ‘choices’ relating to parental
working arrangements than in Britain. If the assumptions of preference theory
are correct, we might reasonably expect that attitudes and preferences would
play an important role in making these ‘choices’.15
However, as Table VI
demonstrates, for Norwegian women, there was no relationship between attitudes
to women’s employment and couples’ working arrangements.16
This suggests
that in Norway, a country in which there is extensive capacity to ‘choose’
arrangements relating to employment and family life, individual attitudes do
not appear to play a substantial part in the choices that are made. Other factors
are obviously more important. Indeed, a regression analysis showed that the
variations in Norwegian women’s attitudes to employment were related to
612 Rosemary Crompton and Clare Lyonette
© London School of Economics and Political Science 2005
education (t = 5.788; p < 0.001) and age (t = 3.895; p < 0.001), rather than
couples’ working arrangements.17
We have not carried out an exhaustive evaluation of ‘preference theory’,
which would require longitudinal data (see McRae 2003). However, to the
extent that preference theory would suggest a major role for attitudinal factors
in shaping women’s employment decisions, particularly in countries such as
Britain, our data suggests otherwise.18
We do not dispute that preferences and
related attitudes will shape individual behaviour, or that particular sets of attitudes
to work and family may be found (albeit to varying extents) across a
range of social positions and education levels. However, it would seem unwise
to assume that women’s employment behaviours may be primarily accounted
for by the hypothesized existence of different ‘types’ of women, as ‘preference
theory’ suggests.
Gender role attitudes and reported levels of happiness amongst men and
women
We next address the question of whether traditionalism in domestic and
gender roles is associated with greater happiness, particularly family happiness,
for men and women. As discussed in the introduction to this paper, populist
conservative feminism, which is rooted in essentialist assumptions about
‘natural’ differences between men and women, has argued that women will
achieve greater happiness and life satisfaction if they assume a traditional role
in relation to men, particularly in the domestic sphere. Life and family happiness
were measured using three questions from the ISSP survey:19
If you were to consider your life in general, how happy or unhappy would
you say you are, on the whole;
All things considered, how satisfied are you with your family life;
My life at home is rarely stressful.
The new gender essentialism 613
© London School of Economics and Political Science 2005
TABLE VI: Attitudes to women’s employment x couples’ working arrangements (Norwegian
women)
Working arrangements N Mean Std. Deviation
High commitments 40 10.83 3.83
Dual moderates 127 11.54 4.11
Neo-traditionalists 89 11.97 4.49
Alternate commitments 117 11.66 3.86
Traditionalists 28 10.57 3.99
Total 401 11.53 4.09
Note:
ANOVA F = ns.
There were country-specific variations in the answers given to these questions,
but they did not follow a consistent pattern. American and British men
were more likely to say that they were ‘completely’ or ‘very’ happy with life
in general than men in the other four countries, as were American and British
women. However, Finnish and French men were more likely than men in the
other countries to say that life at home was rarely stressful, while women in
Britain, the USA and Portugal were more likely to find their home lives stressful.
British, American and Norwegian men were more likely to say that they
were ‘completely’ or ‘very’ satisfied with family life than men in other countries,
while British and American women were also more likely to say that they
were ‘completely’ or ‘very’ satisfied with family life.
We also examined, using the same three questions, levels of reported happiness
between men and women in the different couple working arrangements
described above.Again,no consistent picture emerged. Men and women in traditional
and neo-traditional household work arrangements were more likely to
say that they were ‘completely or very’ happy with life in general. There were
no significant differences found for women as far as the level of general satisfaction
with family life was concerned, although men in traditional household
working arrangements were somewhat more likely to say that they were ‘completely
or very’ satisfied with family life. However, on the third question – life
at home is rarely stressful – dual moderate men were significantly more likely
than other men to agree, but women with traditional working arrangements
were significantly less likely to agree than women in the other categories. It
would seem, therefore, that traditionalism in working arrangements might possibly
bring some marginal advantages as far as men are concerned, but there is
little evidence that gender traditionalism in the balance of domestic and paid
work is associated with greater family happiness for women.
One possibility might be that a contradiction between attitudes and practice
in relation to domestic work might be a source of dissatisfaction. For example,
an individual might have ‘liberal’ or ‘non-traditional’ gender role attitudes, but
be involved in a rather traditional domestic division of labour, and this might
be a source of resentment. This possibility was explored by developing a combined
measure of gender role attitudes and the domestic division of labour.
Responses relating to gender role attitudes (using the single question:‘A man’s
job is to make money,a woman’s job is to look after the home and family’) were
dichotomized and cross-tabulated with a dichotomized version of a task-based
scale describing reported levels of gender traditionalism in the domestic division
of labour.20
This generated four categories which were combined into three
as follows: (1) ‘congruent liberals’, those respondents with more liberal gender
role attitudes, and a less traditional division of domestic labour; (2) ‘inconsistents’
– a combination of those with more liberal gender role attitudes and a
more traditional division of domestic labour, as well as those with less liberal
gender role attitudes and a less traditional division of domestic labour, and (3)
614 Rosemary Crompton and Clare Lyonette
© London School of Economics and Political Science 2005
‘congruent traditionals’, those respondents with less liberal gender role attitudes
and a more traditional division of domestic labour.
These congruence categories bring attitudes and behaviour together in a
single variable. Table VII summarizes the measures of life and family happiness
by congruence categories, separately for men and women.
It can be seen that for women, but not for men, a combination of gender
role liberalism together with a less traditional allocation of domestic work is
systematically associated with enhanced life happiness, satisfaction with family
and lower stress at home. Congruent traditionalists (or gender conservatives)
report lower levels of ‘happiness’ on all three questions. It would seem, therefore,
that contrary to the assertions of feminist conservatives, for women,
domestic gender traditionalism is not associated with an enhanced level of personal
and family happiness. Repeating the analysis on an individual country
basis revealed that in all countries, it was the women with the least traditionalism
in their domestic lives (i.e., the congruent liberals) who reported the
highest levels of personal and family happiness.21
It is not being claimed that the data available from the ISSP surveys has
facilitated an exhaustive exploration of the links between traditionalism in
gender relations and personal happiness for women. Nevertheless, the evidence
we do have suggests that for women (but not men), gender traditionalism
in attitudes and/or practice (as indicated by gender role attitudes and the
domestic division of labour) is not associated with greater general or family
contentment and happiness, but indeed, the opposite. There is some slight indication
that men find a traditional division of domestic labour more agreeable
in that those men with non-employed partners are somewhat more likely to
say that they are ‘completely’ or ‘very’ happy with life in general, but this
The new gender essentialism 615
© London School of Economics and Political Science 2005
TABLE VII: Life and family happiness for men (M) and women (F) by congruence categories (6country
pooled sample, percentages, respondents in partnerships only)
Congruent Inconsistent Congruent Total
liberal traditional
‘Completely’ or ‘very’ M 48% 48% 49% 48%
happy with life in F 57% 45% 48% 48%
general (1)
‘Completely’ or ‘very’ M 64% 63% 64% 64%
satisfied with family F 71% 55% 56% 58%
life (2)
‘Strongly agree’ or M 58% 59% 61% 59%
‘agree’ that life at F 53% 43% 45% 45%
home is rarely
stressful (3)
Notes:
(1) Men: n.s., women: c2
= 47.909; d.f. = 6; p < 0.001.
(2) Men: n.s., women: c2
= 55.666; d.f. = 6; p < 0.001.
(3) Men: n.s., women: c2
= 21.472; d.f. = 4; p < 0.001.
evidence is by no means conclusive. There can be no doubt that the considerable
shifts in gender roles and the relationships between the sexes that have
been taking place over the last half-century will have brought about considerable
upheavals in the personal lives of many women and men. However, it
would seem to be misleading, as gender conservatives have argued, to suggest
that these transformations have brought with them any greater unhappiness
for women.
Discussion and conclusions
In this paper, we have empirically explored Hakim’s arguments that women’s
employment patterns may, in aggregate, be seen as an outcome of their
choices. We have seen that patterns of couples’ working arrangements would
seem to be shaped by structural, as well as, attitudinal factors – even in Britain,
a country that Hakim (2004: 19) has described as a ‘theoretically important
social context’ for the study of women’s employment given that ‘. . . there are
no major constraints limiting choice or forcing choice in particular directions’.
Indeed, in the case of Norway, a country where, it might be argued, structural
constraints relating to mothers’ employment decisions are relatively minor,
individual variations in (women’s) attitudes to women’s employment do not
correlate at all with couples’ working arrangements.
As noted in the Introduction to this paper, gender essentialism has many
affinities with conservative and/or neo-liberal thinking.22
More particularly,
conservative feminism (of all kinds) serves to undermine the legitimacy of
women’s claims to equality, as the unequal status quo is thereby rendered
‘natural’. Indeed, traditional explanations of inequality have always had
recourse to ‘naturalism’:
It is thus clear that there are by nature free men and slaves, and that servitude
is agreeable and just for the latter . . . Equally, the relation of the male
to the female is by nature such that one is superior and the other inferior,
one dominates and the other is dominated . . . (Aristotle, cited in
Dahrendorf 1969)
As Dahrendorf argues, this kind of argument renders impossible a sociological
treatment of inequality, as that which exists ‘by nature’ does not have to be
explained or challenged. Similarly, feminists have long argued that differences
and inequalities between men and women do not exist ‘by nature’, but are
socially constructed. As we have seen, gender conservatism re-affirms the
‘naturalness’ of gender differences, thus the inequalities which arise as a
consequence of these differences are themselves legitimized.
In taking a stance against gender essentialism, we do not intend to advocate
a return to debates relating to gender ‘equality versus difference’, which have
616 Rosemary Crompton and Clare Lyonette
© London School of Economics and Political Science 2005
The new gender essentialism 617
© London School of Economics and Political Science 2005
taken up so much space in feminist discussions (see Bock and James 1992). As
Fraser (2000) has argued, it is necessary to move beyond these polarized positions
and reconstruct both equality and difference within a framework of
diversity in which ‘participatory parity’ can be achieved. This would mean the
. . . creation of conditions that facilitate the meeting of human need and the
exercise of caring responsibilities in such a way as to ensure that all individuals
can develop and flourish as citizens. In this way difference is incorporated
into strategies for gender equity without reference to potentially
essentialist notions of women’s qualities and nature. (Lister 2002)
In a similar vein, Williams (2000: 272) argues:
It is time to admit that women as a group do not perform the same as men
as a group when jobs are designed around an ideal worker with men’s
physique and/or men’s access to a flow of family work most women do not
enjoy. Once we invent a language that defines this situation as the result of
discrimination against women, rather than mothers’ choice, we can face the
facts and make new demands to restructure work. (emphasis in original).
Nevertheless, although we are emphatic in our desire not to return to the
polarized positions of earlier debate,we would suggest that our findings (which
we would agree cannot be conclusive) of a greater degree of domestic and
family happiness amongst women professing liberal gender role attitudes and
involved in a less traditional division of domestic labour merits further consideration.
With this in mind, and in the light of the issues raised in our previous
paragraph, we will conclude with a brief reference to another of our
empirical findings. The ISSP survey included a series of questions on work-life
conflict that generated a robust scale (see Crompton and Lyonette, in press).
We found that ‘congruent liberals’ (that is, men and women with liberal gender
role attitudes and a less traditional division of domestic labour) reported significantly
lower levels of work-life conflict than either ‘congruent traditional’
or ‘inconsistent’ respondents. This suggests that a sustained rethinking of the
division of labour between men and women, in both the domestic and market
spheres, might result in improvements for both men and women.
(Date accepted: August 2005)
2. Gender essentialism may be biological,
arguing that ‘maleness’ and ‘femaleness’
derive from the impact of different levels of
sex hormones, particularly in early development.
See Goldberg 1993, Baron-Cohen
2004. These biological differences are held
Notes
1. We would like to acknowledge ESRC
support for two projects that enabled this
research to be carried out:‘Employment and
the Family’ R000239727 and ‘Families,
Employment and work-life integration in
Britain and Europe’ RES 000220106.
618 Rosemary Crompton and Clare Lyonette
© London School of Economics and Political Science 2005
to account for behavioural differences
between men and women. Psychological
versions of gender essentialism locate
gender differences in psychosexual development.
See Chodorow 1989. Women have
also been argued to be inherently more
moral and spiritual than men, see Williams
1991. Biology and spirituality may often be
employed in combination, see Footnote 4
below.
3. The distinction between ‘traditional’
and ‘modern’ societies may seem anachronistic
and value-laden. It is used here simply
in order to make a distinction between those
societies (usually, but not always, democracies)
in which the equal rights of women are
at least formally accepted as legitimate, and
theocracies or semi-feudal ‘states’ such as –
for example – Saudi Arabia or Afghanistan.
4. These sentiments, of course, are not
confined to populist conservative feminism.
For example, the ‘Letter to the bishops of
the Catholic Church on the collaboration of
men and women in the church and in the
world’ (Offices of the Congregation for the
doctrine of the Faith, May 31, 2004) asserts
that women, ‘in her deepest and original
being, exists “for the other”’, linked to their
‘physical capacity to give life’. Furthermore,
women live the ‘dispositions of listening,
welcoming, humility, faithfulness, praise
and waiting’ with ‘particular intensity and
naturalness’.
5. Hakim originally identified this group
as ‘drifters’, but they have undergone a
change of name (and assumed considerably
more importance) as she has developed her
argument.
6. Hakim (2003b) would argue that we
would not be in a position to do this in any
case, given that we will be relying on generalized
‘attitude’ questions rather than direct
questions relating to personal ‘preferences’
in our analysis.
7. ‘I would weep with disappointment if a
reader took home from this book the
message that ‘all men have lower empathy’
or ‘all women have lower systematising
skills’. Hopefully, I have made clear that
when we talk about the female brain or
the male brain, these terms are short for
psychological profiles based upon the average
scores obtained when testing women as
a group, or the average scores obtained
when testing men as a group’ (Baron-Cohen
2004 183).
8. For a description of the ISSP programme,
see Davis and Jowell 1989, also
Jowell, Brook and Dowds 1993, also Jowell
1998. Methods of data collection vary
amongst the participant countries, and
include face-to-face interviews as well as
telephone and postal surveys. For a full
description of individual country surveys,
see www.issp.org. A comparative analysis is
not a major objective of this paper (for a discussion
of the impact of societal factors, see
Crompton and Lyonette, in press), and
national differences will only be featured as
and when they contribute to the argument
that we develop. Our thanks to Gunn
Birkelund, Yannick Lemel, Karin Wall and
Anneli Anttonen for access to ISSP national
datasets.
9. Moen’s classification included a further
category of‘crossover’ couple arrangements,
in which the woman took the ‘breadwinner’
role and worked long hours. As this category
was (a) very small and (b) could not reasonably
be grouped with any of the other
categories, we have omitted it from our
analysis.
10. Factor analysis for all countries combined
showed one factor with an Eigen
value of 2.69, explaining 54% of the variance.
All five items loaded on the single
factor >0.66. A reliability analysis recorded
a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.78. Separate
country analyses also demonstrated good
reliability.
11. It is not possible to present separate
regressions for women in each country due
to the small numbers in some groups.
12. Factor analysis showed one factor
with an Eigen value of 1.64, explaining over
82% of the variance. A Cronbach’s alpha of
0.78 demonstrated good reliability of the
two-item scale.
13. The question was the level of agreement
(or disagreement) expressed in relation
to the statement: ‘It is important to
move up the job ladder at work, even if this
The new gender essentialism 619
© London School of Economics and Political Science 2005
gets in the way of family life’. This question
was not asked in the USA, which is not
included in the regression.
14. Hakim (2004: 78) would argue that
the extent of childcare services do not affect
women’s employment levels.
15. It may be noted that Hakim (2004: 20)
argues that Scandinavian societies are too
homogeneous in ‘race, religion and culture’
to provide lessons for other countries. We do
not hold to this view.
16. There was also no relationship
between couple work arrangements and
attitudes to women’s employment when
men were included. Couple arrangements in
Norway were also evaluated against gender
role attitudes, and again, there was no
association.
17. These findings support those of
Knudsen and Waerness (2001) who found
large differences in age and education in
Norwegian attitudes to women’s employment,
due to rapid changes in women’s
employment and family policy, compared
with Britain and Sweden.
18. Other authors have suggested that
‘gendered moral rationalities’ are significant
in determining the employment behaviour
of different groups of women. However, the
origins of these different rationalities are
associated with class differences (Duncan
2005). As we have seen, Hakim rejects this
argument.
19. The topic of happiness has recently
received increased academic attention see,
for example Layard 2005. Layard employs
quantitative measures of ‘happiness’ similar
to those we employ here. He does not,
however, explore gender differences apart
from noting that ‘happiness levels’ are
rather similar as between men and women.
20. DDL made up of 5 items: In your
household, who usually does the: laundry;
cares for sick family members; shops for
groceries; household cleaning; prepares
the meals (always me, usually me, about
equal, usually spouse/partner, always
spouse/partner). Scores ranging from 5–25;
higher scores indicate more traditional
DDL. Factor analysis showed 1 factor, Eigen
value 2.699, explaining over 54% of the variance.
Cronbach’s alpha for all 5 items =
0.786.
21. An analysis by country resulted in
some rather small cell sizes – for example,
there are low numbers of ‘congruent traditional’
women in Finland and Norway. The
difference between the ‘congruent liberal’
women and the other two categories was not
uniformly statistically significant by country,
but nevertheless, their happiness scores
were uniformly higher.
22. Hakim’s work has been enthusiastically
taken up by right-leaning media and
politicians. For example, she has been
invited to advise the Australian (right wing)
government (see B. Arndt, Sydney Morning
Herald Feb. 7 2003), which has introduced a
number of policies designed to encourage
women to stay at home with their children
(for example, the introduction of a ‘baby
bonus’ for women who stay at home).
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