

BSS 187/487

America's Changing Global Role

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Tuesday, 3 April – Friday, 13 April 2018

Course Objectives

- ✓ Evolution of America's global role -- 19th, 20th, & 21st centuries
- ✓ How America's global role has been shaped by (1) the changing structure of the international system, (2) the changing nature of state power, and (3) the transformed dynamics of international relations as a result of globalization.
- ✓ Critical analysis of U.S. past and current global and regional policies through case studies that demonstrate these changes.
- ✓ An inquiry into competing theories on how adaptive American and multinational institutions can be in addressing these changes.

Course Assessment

- ✓ Written essays (60%) – 2 x 30 points ~ 500 words
- ✓ Case study presentation (25%) – team presentation
- ✓ Seminar – Prepare – Engage – Participate (15%)
 - ✓ 14-15 points
 - ✓ 10-13 points
 - ✓ 7-9 points
 - ✓ 4-6 points
 - ✓ 0-3 points
 - ✓ YOU judge!

A – 90-100%
B – 80-89%
C – 70-79%
D – 60-69%
E – 50-59%
F – 0-49%

Essays

- ✓ **Two analytic essays ... 500 words ... 30 points each**
 - ✓ **Too short to ramble on aimlessly**
 - ✓ **Too long simply to express an opinion**
 - ✓ **Thesis – roadmap – argument – conclusion**
 - ✓ **Your work ... document sources ... plagiarism unacceptable**
 - ✓ **Late essay submissions will be penalized**
- ✓ **Essay #1 – due at beginning of class ... Friday, 6 April**
- ✓ **Essay #2 – due at beginning of class if NOT presenting**

Case Study Presentations

- ✓ **Wednesday & Thursday, 11-12 April**
 - ✓ **Teams** of 2 or 3 students each – **25 points**
 - ✓ **30 minutes + Q&A ... PowerPoint (email to me w/team roles)**
- ✓ **Teams & topics by Friday, 6 April – *propose early!***
- ✓ ***Describe issue ... analyze U.S. historical/current role***

... assess

- ✓ **Suggested topics:**
 - Nuclear proliferation
 - Climate change
 - Trade
 - Energy
 - Cyberconflict

- Economic development
- Managing regional conflict
- Role of multilateral institutions
- Terrorism
- Migration

Course Readings

- ✓ **All required readings distributed electronically through IS.**
- ✓ **Hints:**
 - ✓ **Read to understand main ideas & argument**
 - ✓ **Compare arguments ... critically assess assumptions**
 - ✓ **You are not expected to memorize or regurgitate on test**
 - ✓ **You are expected to analyze arguments and apply ideas to specific cases**
 - ✓ **Synthesize ... connect dots ... think critically**

Course Overview – Week 1

[indicates double session – check syllabus for times, room]*

- ✓ ***4.4: A Changing World: What? Why? How?**
- ✓ ***5.4: Evolution of U.S. Foreign Policy: What? Why? How?**
- ✓ **6.4: Globalization & U.S. Leadership: How Much Success?**
 - ✓ **Essay #1 due at beginning of class**

We can think about America's leadership role in 3 broad historical phases—(1) from the end of World War II through the Cold War, (2) in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, and (3) in the 21st century especially after 9.11.

How would you assess America's leadership during each of those periods?

Course Overview – Week 2

[indicates double session – check syllabus for times, room]*

- ✓ 9.4: Whither American Global Leadership?
- ✓ 10.4: The U.S. & Europe: What Kind of Future?
- ✓ ***11.4 & *12.4: Student Case Study Presentations**
 - ✓ **Essay #2 due at beginning of class if not presenting**

Drawing on your case study research as well as the course material, what do you think is the appropriate role for the United States, both generally and with respect to the issue of your case study research? Should the U.S. “lead,” and what does that leadership look like? Are there other states or institutions that should play a leadership role, either instead of the U.S. or in partnership with the U.S.? Why?

- ✓ 13.4: Implications for the Rest of Us **[YOU]**

Look-Ahead

Wednesday, 4 April

- ✓ ***A Changing World: What? How? Why?***
 - ✓ Double session (0800-0930 & 0945-1115)
 - ✓ Room U42
- ✓ **Focus on global trends**
 - ✓ Atlantic Council, *Global Risks 2035: The Search for a New Normal* (2016)
 - ✓ National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends: Paradox of Progress* (2017)
 - ✓ World Economic Forum, *Global Risks Report 2018* (13th Edition, 2018)
- ✓ **Executive summaries vs. details – *be prepared to discuss***

A Changing World: What? How? Why?

Wednesday, 4 April 2018

Three Global Trend Studies

- ✓ **Atlantic Council (2016)**
 - ✓ *Global Risks 2035: The Search for a New Normal*
- ✓ **National Intelligence Council (2017)**
 - ✓ *Global Trends: Paradox of Progress*
- ✓ **World Economic Forum (2018)**
 - ✓ *Global Risks Report*
- ✓ *What is the difference between “trends” & “predictions”?*
- ✓ *Does the “authorship” matter?*

Global Trends – The Good News

Economics

1. Globalization & the information age have enabled an explosion of global wealth and a reduction in extreme poverty.
 - ✓ Since the 1970s ... **global population has risen about 50%** (from 5 billion to 7.5 billion) ... But the number of people in the world living in **extreme poverty has been reduced by 50%** (from almost 2 billion to under 1 billion).
 - ✓ Principal “**winners**” have been:
 - ✓ **Middle classes** in emerging economies, especially China, India
 - ✓ The **most affluent** in the developed “post-industrial” world (including **10-15%** of U.S. population, **5%** in W Europe, Japan)

Global Trends – The Bad News

Economics

1. Expansion of global wealth has been accompanied by **greater gaps between rich and poor**, both in actual wealth and opportunities to access wealth
 - ✓ Principal “losers” in this global wealth expansion:
 - ✓ The **very poor** in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East ... [*The Bottom Billion*, Collier, 2007]
 - ✓ Citizens of rich countries with stagnating incomes, much of the population of former communist countries ... **exacerbated by changing nature of work**, less access to quality **education** & retraining, dependence on **debt** during 2008 financial crisis
 - ✓ **Both create a crisis of expectations, in both rich & poor societies**

Global Trends – The Good News

Demographics

2. Overall global **population growth rate is declining** after almost 50% growth in last half-century ... 7.6 billion today ... 8.6 billion (2030) ...9.7 billion (2050) ... 11.2 billion (2100)
- ✓ Declining fertility rates
 - ✓ Improved maternal and post-natal health (after baby boom)
 - ✓ Increasing numbers of women seeking employment out of the home
 - ✓ Growing urbanization
 - ✓ Higher life expectancy worldwide

Global Trends – The Bad News

Demographics

2. Changing distribution of global demographics will add stress – in different ways – to all countries.
 - ✓ Bulk of population growth in future decades confined to the **poorest countries** least able to cope with that growth
 - ✓ Africa ... Over 50% of global growth by 2050 ... Nigeria 3rd most populous country after India & China
 - ✓ “**Youth bulges**” persist in Africa, South Asia, Arab world
 - ✓ In **wealthy countries** – **population aging, working-age populations decreasing** ... Increased burdens on support systems for aging
 - ✓ People in distress will **migrate** to places where they perceive opportunities for a better life for themselves and their children

Global Trends – The Good News

Technology

- 3. Rapid technological growth has enabled:**
 - ✓ Explosive economic growth
 - ✓ Transformations in manufacturing and energy
 - ✓ Democratized access to information
 - ✓ New frontiers in healthcare and the fight against disease
 - ✓ People across boundaries and cultures to interact
 - ✓ An end to major conflict between major powers *[so far]*

Global Trends – The Bad News

Technology

3. Technology is a **value neutral tool** – for every benefit and advantage, there is also **vulnerability to its exploitation**:
- ✓ Socioeconomic dislocation as a result of the changing nature of work and increased automation
 - ✓ Proliferation – and fragmentation – of information and media place new burdens on the consumer to assess reliability, think critically
 - ✓ Advances in biotechnology raise difficult ethical & moral issues
 - ✓ Interconnectedness heightens localism & populism as people believe their identities are being threatened – **institutions lose legitimacy**
 - ✓ New weapons technologies ¹⁷ [e.g. cyber, bio, etc] enable even

Global Trends – The Good News

Politics

4. End of the 20th century witnessed an unprecedented rise in democratic governance and pluralist political institutions

- ✓ **Defeat of Fascism and Soviet Communism as credible contending models of development and governance**
- ✓ **Collapse of empires – imperial structures that had been the principal model of international relations for centuries**
- ✓ **Even among autocratic regimes, the “vocabulary” and “edifices” of democratic governance were essential both at home and abroad**
- ✓ **Projections of the “End of History” (Fukuyama) plus growth of information technologies foreshadowed converging interest globally and increased cooperation to tackle shared**

Global Trends – The Bad News

Politics

4. Globalization brought winners & losers ... *the losers fought back!*
- ✓ **Democratic governance is hard** ... it takes generations to develop the “civic virtues” that make pluralism work & **can't be imposed**
 - ✓ **Socioeconomic dislocation** reaped by globalization create fear, anxiety, and impatience with which governments can't cope
 - ✓ **More actors mean more voices** seeking to be heard – and frustrated by the result – but institutions are weak and exploitable
 - ✓ **Challenges to good governance increase beyond the capacity of most systems to cope ...**¹⁹ so governments cultivate distractions

Implications – “Top Ten”?

1. Industrial & information revolutions created transformative opportunities ... heightened expectations ... seeded dangers
2. The global economy – and the nature of work – are shifting (*again*)
3. Societies – both rich and poor – are unraveling at home
4. The rich are aging ... the poor aren't (*but they ARE urbanizing*)
5. Technology accelerates progress ... but creates disruptive discontinuities

²⁰
Can you “feel” the paradox?

Implications – “Top Ten”?

6. Ideas and identities can create **new communities** ... but they can also drive a wave of **exclusion & intolerance**
7. Governing is getting more **necessary** ... but **harder**
8. Conflict is more **lethal** – blurring civilian/military lines ... also more **likely** ... and less **manageable**
9. **Societies and institutions** are more vulnerable to **systemic risks** – interdependence of complex systems (environmental, financial, informational, etc)
10. 20th century **“liberal world order”** – and the institutions that sustained it – is breaking down

Choices ... [not predictions]

- ✓ How will **“we”** – individuals, groups, and governments – renegotiate expectations of one another to create a **legitimate** political order?
- ✓ To what extent will **“we”** craft new or adapt existing architectures of international cooperation & competition?
- ✓ To what extent will **“we”** prepare for complex and multifaceted global issues like climate change and transformative technologies?

How will the U.S. respond?

How do these questions play into your case study?

Look-Ahead

Thursday, 5 April

- ✓ ***Evolution of U.S. Foreign Policy: What? How? Why?***
 - ✓ Double session (1700-1830 & 1845-2015)
 - ✓ Room U43
- ✓ **Focus on competing themes in U.S. foreign & security policy**
 - ✓ ***Betts, Conflict or Cooperation? Three Visions Revisited***
 - ✓ ***Bacevich, Saving “America First”: What Responsible Nationalism Looks Like***
 - ✓ ***Jones, Order from Chaos: The New Geopolitics, Brookings***
 - ✓ ***Mead, The Jacksonian Revolt: American Populism and the Liberal Order***
 - ✓ ***U.S. National Security Strategy 2010 & 2017: skim, but compare***

***Evolution of U.S. Foreign
Policy:
What? How? Why?***

Thursday, 5 April 2018

Core & Enduring Debates

- ✓ **“Values” vs. “Interests”**
- ✓ **“Enlightened self-interest” vs. “Pragmatism”**
- ✓ **“American Primacy” – what & how**
- ✓ **“Isolationism” vs. “Engagement”**
- ✓ **“Regionalism” vs. “Globalism”**

America's Early Worldview

- ✓ **Constitutional foundations – a maritime power:**
 - ✓ “raise and support” an army (with state militias)
 - ✓ “provide and maintain” a navy
- ✓ ***Washington's Farewell Address:***
 - ✓ *“It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and, at no distant period, a great nation, to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel **example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence.**”*
- ✓ ***American Exceptionalism? ~ geopolitical realities***

19th Century Priorities

- ✓ **Preserve the Union**
 - ✓ Domestic focus ... block foreign interference (UK)
- ✓ **Keep foreign powers out of the Hemisphere**
 - ✓ **Monroe Doctrine, 1823**
- ✓ **Expand and settle the continent – Manifest Destiny**
 - ✓ **War with Mexico, 1848**
- ✓ **Maintain freedom of the seas**
 - ✓ **Barbary Pirates in Mediterranean**
 - ✓ **Open trade with Asia – inherit Spanish colonies by 1898**

World Wars I & II

- ✓ **By 20th century, US was by any measure a “great power”**
 - ✓ **But a “status quo” power intent on preserving principles of non-interference and freedom of the seas**
- ✓ **World War I**
 - ✓ **German submarine warfare against US shipping**
 - ✓ **Wilson: “make the world safe for democracy” ... but 1917**
 - ✓ **Postwar League of Nations & Versailles blocked by Senate**
- ✓ **World War II**

Backdrop to “containment”

- ✓ **West sought to build postwar liberal world order**
 - ✓ **Democracy, free markets, human rights, trade, rule of law**
- ✓ **1947-8 turning points ~ no reconciliation w/USSR**
 - ✓ **Truman Doctrine & Marshall Plan**
 - ✓ **Fall of Prague ... Berlin blockade**
- ✓ **Vandenberg Resolution in US Senate (1948)**
 - ✓ **Principle of “self-help and mutual aid”**
- ✓ **NATO Treaty (1949) – unprecedented U.S. commitment**

Kennan's "X" Article (1947)

"Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*

- ✓ **Conclusions about Soviet behavior:**
 - ✓ **Innate antagonism between capitalism and socialism**
 - ✓ **Infallibility of the Kremlin ~ Communist Party discipline**
 - ✓ **No ideological compulsion for urgency**
 - ✓ **Soviet diplomacy both easier and more difficult to deal with**
 - ✓ **Intransigent ... and flexible**
- ✓ ***"[T]he main element of any U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union ... must be that of **long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment** of Russian expansive tendencies."***

Paradox of Power

✓ Late 1940's: U.S. 55% of global GDP ... most powerful military ... moral & political leadership within “the West”

✓ Yet, there are limits to that power:

“We are great and strong; but we are not great enough or strong enough to conquer or to change or to hold in subjugation by ourselves all ... hostile or irresponsible forces. To attempt to do so would mean to call upon our own people for sacrifices which would in themselves completely alter our way of life and our political institutions, and would lose the real objectives of our policy in trying to defend them.” (Kennan,1948)

The NSC 68 Critique

- ✓ Paul Nitze ... January 1950 ... after “changes” of 1949
 - ✓ Soviet test of atomic bomb + PRC Revolution
 - ✓ *“Containment not enough ... “In a shrinking world, which now faces the threat of atomic warfare, it is not an adequate objective merely to seek to check the Kremlin design.”*
 - ✓ *“Kremlin is able to select means We have no such freedom of choice, least of all in the use of force. Resort to war is not only a last resort for a free society; it is also an act which cannot definitively end the fundamental conflict in the realm of ideas.”*

The Cold War Legacy

- ✓ **The bad news** – the Cold War was a frigid standoff
 - ✓ Kennan ... “final militarization” of the line through Europe
 - ✓ Berlin ... Cuba ... Budapest ... Prague ... Warsaw ... etc
 - ✓ Crises – escalatory threats and ultimatums – crushing freedom
 - ✓ NATO doctrine ~ dilemmas of **extended deterrence**
- ✓ **The good news** – Cold War stayed “cold” ... “thawed”
 - ✓ No major war between major powers
 - ✓ Reasonably good record of U.S.-Soviet crisis management

Post-Cold War Priorities

- ✓ Consolidate U.S. domestic position
 - ✓ *“It’s the economy, stupid”* [which is why Bush lost in 1992]
 - ✓ 27% global GDP ... 5% population ... only 10% through trade
- ✓ Enlargement of western liberal democratic “space”
 - ✓ Tony Lake (NSC): *“The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement ...of the world’s free community of market democracies.”* [1993]
 - ✓ Work with “newly independent states” ~ privatization
 - ✓ Partnership for Peace... then NATO [and EU] enlargement

The 1990's brought challenges...

- ✓ **Iraq** ~ the residue from Desert Storm's 43 day war
- ✓ **Israel-Palestine** ~ extremism takes over
- ✓ **Somalia** ~ humanitarian missions gone bad
- ✓ **Haiti** ~ so near but yet so far
- ✓ **Rwanda** ~ what genocide?
- ✓ **Bosnia** ~ "we don't have a dog in this fight"
- ✓ **Kosovo** ~ "the indispensable nation"?
- ✓ **Strategic Response ... or disconnect?**
 - ✓ **Promote democracy & free markets**
 - ✓ **Promote stability & security**

Betts: *Three Visions Revisited*

- ✓ Fukuyama, *The End of History & the Last Man* (1992)
 - ✓ **Ideas matter**
- ✓ Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations* (1996)
 - ✓ **Culture matters**
- ✓ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (2002)
 - ✓ **Power matters**

“None of the three visions won out as the new conventional wisdom

....

“Yet all three ideas remain beacons ... even practical policymakers who shun ivory-tower theories still tend to think roughly in terms of one of them, and no other visions have yet been offered that match their scope and depth. Each outlines a course toward peace and stability if statesmen make the right choices—but none offers any confidence that the wrong choices will be avoided.”

Fukuyama (1992)

Ideas matter

- ✓ Post-Cold War “consensus” on democracy & capitalism
- ✓ *“Homogenization of all human societies”*
 - ✓ Convergence ~ technology & wealth [*means*]
 - ✓ Enabling achievement of human dignity [*end*]
- ✓ *“Liberal democracy remains the only coherent political aspiration that spans different regions and cultures across the globe.”*
- ✓ Rejected inevitability of war
- ✓ Recognized that conflicts remain ... progress not linear

Huntington (1996)

Culture matters

- ✓ Modernization ≠ Westernization
 - ✓ Conflict ... not convergence
 - ✓ Conflict may or may not mean war
- ✓ *“Forces of integration are real ... generating counterforces of cultural assertion.”*
- ✓ *“Western belief in the universality of Western culture suffers from three problems: it is **false** ... it is **immoral** ... and it is **dangerous**.”*
- ✓ West vs. “the rise of the rest” [*Fareed Zakaria??*]
- ✓ Focused on China ... but fed post-9.11 notions of West vs. Islam

Mearsheimer (2002)

Power matters

- ✓ End of the Cold War was not the end of great power politics ... not the end of the “state”
- ✓ **Conflict ... competition for power ... the prospect of war – all remain an inevitable part of international relations**
 - ✓ Includes both military and economic power
 - ✓ Nuclear weapons changed the way the game is played but not “the game” itself.
- ✓ *“There are no status quo powers ... save for the occasional hegemon that wants to maintain its dominating position.” [e.g., the U.S.]*
- ✓ Emerging powers (China most of all) more than declining powers (e.g. Russia) ... *Simply a matter of time*

Back to Betts ...

“The most significant similarity, and a dispiriting one, is that **all three authors were out of step with the attitudes that have dominated U.S. foreign policy** and made it **overreach** after the Cold War. ...

- ✓ “First, in different ways, all three saw beyond **Davos-style liberalism** and recognized that noneconomic motives would remain powerful roiling forces. ...
- ✓ “Second, none supported **crusading neoconservatism**. ...

“The problem is that Davos-style liberalism and militant neoconservatism have both been more influential than the three more profound and sober visions of Fukuyama, Huntington, and Mearsheimer.”

Humanitarian Interventionism

- ✓ *“In an increasingly interdependent world, **Americans have a growing stake in how other countries govern or misgovern themselves.**”*

*(Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, **Foreign Affairs**, November 1996)*

- ✓ *“We can then say to the people of the world, whether you live in Africa, or Central Europe, or any other place, if somebody comes after innocent civilians and tries to kill them en masse because of their race, their ethnic background, or their religion, and **if it is within our power to stop it, we will stop it.**”*

(President Clinton, speech in Macedonia, June 22, 1999)

Neococonservatism

*“Today, America sits at the summit. Our military strength is the envy of every nation on earth It would be tragic indeed if we did not use this **extraordinary historical moment to promote the ideals at the heart of our national enterprise** and, by so doing, take the steps that will ensure stability and the steady growth of freedom throughout the world.”*

*William J. Bennett, in Kagan & Kristol [eds], *Present Dangers*, 2000*

*“Today, the United States enjoys a position of **unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence**. ... We seek ... to create a **balance of power that favors human freedom**: conditions in which all nations and all societies can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty.*

U.S. National Security Strategy, September 17, 2002

Realism

*“Some Americans, exulting in their country’s power, **urge the explicit affirmation of a benevolent American hegemony.** But such an aspiration would impose on the the U.S. a burden no society has ever managed successfully for an indefinite period of time ... would **gradually unite the world against the U.S.** and force it into positions that would eventually leave it **isolated and drained.**”*

*(Henry Kissinger, **Does America Need a Foreign Policy?**, 2000)*

✓ Stephen Walt (2014) ... **“Realists are the new doves.”**

Injected into this debate ...

9.11

“September 11th did not so much change the world as show how the world had changed, while our means of managing it had not.”

-- David Gompert, RAND Corporation, November 2001

- ✓ No more “illusion of invulnerability”
- ✓ Instinct for unilateral U.S. solutions ~ **overreach?**
 - ✓ **Afghanistan 2001 ... Iraq 2003**
 - ✓ **UN to legitimize U.S. actions??**
- ✓ Strategic disconnect – military means / political ends?

✓ **Democracy/free markets ... security/stability?**

Obama ... idealism + restraint

- ✓ ***“America must always lead on the world stage. If we don’t, no one else will. The military ... is, and always will be, the backbone of that leadership.”***
- ✓ ***“But U.S. military action cannot be the only – or even primary – component of our leadership in every instance. Just because we have the best hammer does not mean that every problem is a nail.”***
 - President Barack Obama, West Point commencement, 28 May 2014
- ✓ **Focus on allies, engagement, support for multilateralism**
 - ✓ **But still *“the indispensable nation”*?**
 - ✓ **Afghanistan ... Iraq ... Libya ... Ukraine ... Syria**

Trump – “America First”

*“The American people elected me to make America great again. I promised that my Administration would put the safety, interests, and well-being of our citizens first ... That we would **revitalize the American economy, rebuild our military, defend our borders, protect our sovereignty, and advance our values.** ...*

*“My Administration’s National Security Strategy lays out a strategic vision for protecting the American people and preserving **our** way of life, promoting **our** prosperity, preserving peace through strength, and advancing **American** influence in the world. We will pursue this **beautiful vision—a world of strong, sovereign, and independent nations, each with its own cultures and dreams, thriving side-by-side in prosperity, freedom, and peace**—throughout the upcoming year.”*

-- President Donald Trump, U.S. National Security Strategy, December 2017

“Principled Realism”?

- ✓ Defining a world of **zero-sum competition** ... elevating “sovereignty” to a formula for peace and cooperation.
- ✓ Rejecting the presumed premise of globalization – that inclusion and multilateralism promote cooperation.
 - ✓ *But presuming that others’ culturally unique “prosperity, freedom and peace” always align with U.S. interests.*
- ✓ Emphasizing **hard power** ... De-emphasizing diplomacy.
- ✓ Retreating from global commitments

Critiques

- ✓ **Mead**: *The challenge for international politics in the days ahead is therefore less to complete the task of liberal world order building along conventional lines than to find a way to **stop the liberal order's erosion and reground the global system on a more sustainable basis.***
- ✓ **Bacevich**: *As for the United States ... preeminence does not imply hegemony. Washington's calling should be not to impose a Pax Americana but to promote mutual coexistence. **Compared with perpetual peace and universal brotherhood, stability and the avoidance of cataclysmic war may seem like modest goals, but achieve that much, and future generations will be grateful.***

Look-Ahead

Friday, 6 April

- ✓ ***Globalization & U.S. Leadership: How Much of a Success?***
 - ✓ **Single session (0945-1115)**
 - ✓ **Room U33**
- ✓ **Focus on the implications of globalization**
 - ✓ ***Blyth, Global Trumpism***
 - ✓ ***Li, The End of Globalism: Where China & the United States Go From Here***
 - ✓ ***The Next War: The Growing Danger of Great-Power Conflict, Economist,***
 - ✓ ***Roberts, Strategic Stability under Obama and Trump, Survival***
 - ✓ ***White, What's So Great About American World Leadership? The Atlantic***

***Globalization & U.S.
Leadership
How Much of a Success?***

Friday, 6 April 2018

Blyth – Global Trumpism

- ✓ **Economic thesis**
 - ✓ **Populism is both left and right ... both sides of Atlantic**
- ✓ **Roots in response to 1930s depression ...**
 - ✓ **Keep people employed ... inherently inflationary**
 - ✓ **Inflation encourages spending, wage growth, more inflation**
 - ✓ **Disinflation ... credit becomes cheap**
 - ✓ **Wages lag, but buying power appears stable**
 - ✓ **Debt becomes unmanageable ... loss of wealth**

Li - The End of Globalism

- ✓ **Globalization vs “globalism” – reality vs. ideology**
- ✓ **Within U.S. ... hollowed out middle class, failing infrastructure, inadequate education ...**
 - ✓ *“In the name of globalization ... American elites had been building up an empire at the expense of the nation.”*
 - ✓ **Ditto Europe ... in the name of European integration**
- ✓ **Are there opportunities or pitfalls for China?**

The Economist – The Next War

- ✓ **Growing danger of great power conflict?**
 - ✓ *Both [Russia and China] have benefited from the international order that America did most to establish and guarantee. But they see its pillars—universal human rights, democracy and the rule of law—as an imposition that excuses foreign meddling and undermines their own legitimacy. They are now revisionist states that want to challenge the status quo and look at their regions as spheres of influence to be dominated.*
 - ✓ **While no one wants war, conflict over regional influence & access.**
 - ✓ **Traditional models of deterrence based on nuclear weapons may not contribute to stability ... add to uncertainty and miscalculation.**

Roberts – Strategic Stability?

- ✓ **Strategic stability ~ nuclear balance of power**
 - ✓ **Maintain clear deterrent**
 - ✓ **Reassure allies**
 - ✓ **Reduce risk of war by removing incentives for it to start**
 - ✓ **Preserve communications to manage crisis, end conflict**
- ✓ **Changed strategic realities**
 - ✓ **No longer bipolar – multiple powers**
 - ✓ **Asymmetric powers posing symmetrical threats -- DPRK**
 - ✓ **No longer uni-dimensional ... space, cyber, hybrid, etc**
 - ✓ **New technological challenges (precision strike, hypersonic)**

White – So What?

- ✓ **Challenges to America’s “global vision”**
 - ✓ **Middle East**
 - ✓ **Asia (China)**
 - ✓ **Central and Eastern Europe**
- ✓ *America is not as overwhelmingly preponderant as most people thought it would be, but it remains an exceptionally powerful country ...”*
- ✓ *America can do little without partners—real partners, not followers.*
- ✓ *America ... will have no choice but to share power, which will mean constant compromise and accommodation of conflicting views and aims. The alternative to dealing with other major powers as equals is to confront them as rivals.*

Look-Ahead

Monday, 9 April

- ✓ ***Whither American Global Leadership?***
 - ✓ **Single session (0800-0930)**
 - ✓ **Room U43**
- ✓ **Focus on U.S. “global leadership” – foundations & future?**
 - ✓ **A. Posen, *Post-American World Economy: Globalization in the Trump Era*,**
 - ✓ **B. Posen, *Rise of Illiberal Hegemony: Trump’s Surprising Grand Strategy***
 - ✓ **Sullivan, *The World After Trump: How the System Can Endure***
- ✓ ***Seminar format ... come prepared to discuss!***
- ✓ **Email me your personal assessment of your**

Whither American Global Leadership?

Monday, 9 April 2018

Essay #1 Comments

- ✓ Read the question! **Then read it again** (or write at top of paper)!
- ✓ **Critical analysis** – not unsubstantiated assertions!
- ✓ Key is “nuance” ... not “either-or” ... not “good” or “evil”
 - ✓ **“Self-interest” vs. “self-less” – “enlightened self-interest”**
- ✓ Watch out for words that carry “baggage”
 - ✓ **“Dominant” vs. “Primacy”**
- ✓ Be efficient in your language
 - ✓ **Avoid long intro paragraphs that do not add anything**
- ✓ **Essay #2 – 500-1,000 word range is OK**

A. Posen – Post-American Economy

- ✓ **U.S. contributions to the global economic order**
 - ✓ **Umbrella of security guarantees**
 - ✓ **Free navigation of seas and airspace**
- ✓ **Importance of rules ... and data transparency (e.g. IMF)**
- ✓ **Implications of U.S. withdrawal/retrenchment from rules-based free trade and financial systems**
 - ✓ **Loss of U.S political influence**
 - ✓ **Increasing U.S. vulnerability**

B. Posen – Illiberal Hegemony

- ✓ **“Liberal hegemony”:**
 - ✓ **“Hegemonic”:** U.S. aimed to be most powerful state
 - ✓ **“Liberal”:** create rules-based order ~ multilateral institutions
 - ✓ **Promote market-oriented democracies & free trade**
- ✓ **“Illiberal hegemony” ... Hegemony without multilateralism**
 - ✓ **Less concern for rules-based multilateral institutions**
 - ✓ **Increased focus on military power ... Asia, Europe, Middle East**
 - ✓ **Undercut multilateral trade, security arrangements**

Sullivan – World After Trump

- ✓ **Resilience in the international system**
 - ✓ **Much of the world remains invested in U.S. leadership**
 - ✓ **Passing of U.S. dominance ≠ loss of U.S. leadership**
[??]
- ✓ **International arrangements becoming more flexible**
 - ✓ **“Coalitions of the willing”**
 - ✓ **Informal multilateral agreements (not treaties) – JPCOA**
 - ✓ **Regional trade arrangements (TPP, TTIP)**
- ✓ **Domestic constraints on political power – U.S. and abroad**

Look-Ahead

Tuesday, 10 April

- ✓ ***The United States & Europe: What Kind of Future?***
 - ✓ **Single session (0800-0930)**
 - ✓ **Room U43**
- ✓ **Focus on the U.S. role in Europe ... foundations and future?**
 - ✓ **Stelzenmüller, *Normal is Over: The New Geopolitics/Europe*, Brookings**
 - ✓ **Wright, *A Post-American Europe & the Future of U.S. Strategy*, Brookings**
 - ✓ **Wicket, *Transatlantic Relations: Converging or Diverging?* Chatham House read Executive Summary & Introduction; skim remainder**
- ✓ ***Essay #2 & Case Study Presentations Wednesday &***

The United States & Europe: What Kind of Future?

Tuesday, 10 April 2018

Case Studies

Wednesday

- ✓ Migration
 - ✓ Liz Anderson
 - ✓ Jen Purser
- ✓ Nuclear Proliferation
 - ✓ Jan Běláč
 - ✓ Julie Vinklová
 - ✓ Helena Worthington
- ✓ Regional Conflict
 - ✓ Peter Köles
 - ✓ Terézia Rekšáková
 - ✓ Kryštof Šír
- ✓ Cyber Conflict
 - ✓ Emre Ar
 - ✓ Melis Sabanci
- ✓ Trade
 - ✓ Tomáš Lalkovič
 - ✓ Pavla Pitrunová
 - ✓ Michal Sojka

Thursday

- ✓ Climate Change
 - ✓ Camilla Kelényová
 - ✓ Vojtěch Kyselý
 - ✓ Anna Mezhenskaya
 - ✓ Pavel Šaradín
- ✓ Multilateral Institutions
 - ✓ Veronika Blablová
 - ✓ Lucie Řeháková
 - ✓ Natálie Zelinková
- ✓ Conflict in South China Sea
 - ✓ Tomáš Daněk
 - ✓ Luboš Přikryl
- ✓ Terrorism
 - ✓ Marek Bukovský
 - ✓ Elise Gustavsen
 - ✓ Viktória Neradná

Chatham House – Transatlantic Relations: Converging or Diverging?

- ✓ **Sources of “divergence”:**
 - ✓ **Different political and military capabilities**
 - ✓ **Political polarization at home and within NATO/EU**
 - ✓ **Leadership personalities**
 - ✓ **Economics – different vulnerabilities and resiliencies**
 - ✓ **Demographics – aging populations; need immigration**
 - ✓ **Resources -- different food and energy dependencies**
 - ✓ **Perceived decline in capacity of international institutions**

Stelzenmuller – Normal is Over

- ✓ February 2018: *“...the trans-Atlantic security community has also been breathing a sigh of relief, because many of their worst expectations seem to have been averted: trade wars, an attack on North Korea, the end of NATO.”*
- ✓ Hedging options:
 - ✓ Cling to Atlanticist institutions
 - ✓ EUR security & defense cooperation to “complement” NATO
 - ✓ Reject Atlanticism ... speak of “post-NATO”
- ✓ *Can Atlanticism survive a “zero-sum” worldview?*

Wright – Post-American Europe

- ✓ *“While [Europe] faces a wide array of problems ... Washington is strikingly absent from efforts to resolve them.”*
- ✓ **Bush / Obama / Trump: expect Europeans to invest more**
- ✓ **Litany of Europe’s problems ...**
 - ✓ **Can Europe resolve them?**
 - ✓ **Does U.S. have a role or capability even if it wanted one?**
- ✓ **Advocates return to U.S. “deep engagement” in Europe ... but doubts it will happen under Trump (or beyond?)**
 - ✓ **Europe should hedge – build integrated autonomous capacity**

Core Questions for US

[and not just U.S.]

- ✓ Does U.S. have an “obligation” to lead?
- ✓ Is U.S. leadership valuable?
- ✓ Is it sustainable?
- ✓ What should it look like, if it is to endure?
 - ✓ U.S.-dominated liberal order containing challengers?
 - ✓ U.S. + Allies managing multipolar system?
 - ✓ Focus on multilateral institutions to share costs, risks, benefits?
- ✓ How do we achieve these ends?
- ✓ What obligations do others have?

Look-Ahead

Wednesday, 11 April, & Thursday, 12 April

- ✓ **Case Study Presentations & Discussion**
 - ✓ **Wednesday, 11 April:**
 - ✓ **Double session (1700-1830 & 1845-2015) Room U41**
 - ✓ **Thursday, 12 April:**
 - ✓ **Double session (1515-1645 & 1700-1830) Room P22**
- ✓ **Your Presentation should ...**
 - 1. Describe issue**
 - 2. Analyze U.S. historical/current role in dealing with this issue**
 - 3. Assess U.S. role ... what IS vs. what SHOULD BE**
- ✓ **If you are presenting ... email slides & team contribution to me**
- ✓ **If you are not presenting ... Essay #2 due at beginning of class**

Look-Ahead

Friday, 13 April

- ✓ ***Implications for the Rest of Us (you)***
 - ✓ **Single session (1130-1300)**
 - ✓ **Room U42**
- ✓ **Focus on “lessons learned”**
- ✓ **Bring to class at least THREE “lessons learned”:**
 - ✓ ***What did you learn from this course that was most valuable to you, either intellectually, professionally, or personally?***
- ✓ **Give me (by email or on paper) your personal assessment of your **preparation, engagement, and participation** in the seminar**

Implications for the Rest of Us ...

Friday, 13 April 2018