Electoral accountability Lecture 3 Today •Theory of electoral accountability •Techniques for studying accountability •Postcommunist results 1. Theory of electoral accountability What is accountability? •“Relationships that formally give some actor the authority of oversight and/or sanction relative to public officials” •Vertical accountability: voters can sanction parties/representatives at elections for their performance •Horizontal accountability: state agencies are legally enabled and practically willing to sanction elected officials •Ombudsman, court, bicameralism •If government not held in check by these agencies, then will it pursue public good? • Digression – alternative definitions •Do politicians give an accounting or justification for their actions? •Don’t they always do this? •Do politicians take responsibility for their actions? •“I am responsible”, “The buck stops here” •What if they remain in office? •How do politicians apologize? •I’m sorry for… or I’m sorry that I… •I’m sorry if… (someone was hurt) or I’m sorry that you…(were offended) Case for electoral accountability •Easy for voters: simple judgment on performance of incumbents •Powerful incentive for politicians: they may lose office •Can remove bad politicians from office •Keeps politicians guessing: they don’t know what the standards are, so they need to try very hard Case against electoral accountability •Politicians under pressure to overreach because sanction is so powerful •Politicians have a free hand between elections •Backwards looking •Myopic: only what happened recently – so can be manipulated •Doesn’t utilize all of citizens’ knowledge • Types of economic voting Sociotropic: judgments about national economy Pocketbook or egocentric: judgments about personal situation Retrospective: judgments about past Has the economy performed well in recent years? Have I personally done well in recent years? Prospective: judgments about future Will the economy perform well in near future if party wins? Will I personally do well in near future if party wins? When will accountability yield the best policies? •Voters need to set the highest attainable standards for politicians •Standards can’t be too high – then politicians will give up •Or too low – then politicians won’t do their best •Voters need to distinguish what politicians have the power to change and what is beyond their power • 2. Techniques for studying accountability The key issues •What are the standards for judging performance? •Should we rely on subjective impressions of voters – approval ratings, confidence in economy? •Should we pick our own objective standards – eg, economic growth, corruption? •What are the punishments/rewards? •Voting reports from surveys •Actual vote totals (national, regional) •Survival in government •Jail/death – Athenian accountability Actual economic and election results (Powell & Whitten) •Look at differences in vote shares for governing parties •Vote % (t) – Vote % (t-1) •Are they related to economic conditions in the last year of the electoral term? •Why the last year of the term? •Results •Differences between left and right governments •Left governments held accountable for unemployment •Right governments held accountable for inflation •Differences based on type of government (clarity of responsibility) Clarity of responsibility •For voters to punish governments, they need to know who is responsible for outcomes •Not always easy to tell •Depends on institutional design •Veto points and consensus government make it difficult to judge •Coalition government, minority government, bicameralism, federalism, strong judiciary, strong parliamentary committees – who should I punish? •Westminster majority government easiest to judge •Who would you punish in US? An alternative method •Use regional differences in vote shares within a single country and regional economic conditions •Why can’t you use measures of how people actually vote? •But ecological inference problem •You can’t say anything about individuals from differences across regions •Eg, if poor regions vote for social democrats, does this mean that poor people vote for social democrats? Political business cycle •Politicians know that key is performance of economy just before an election because citizens are myopic (short-sighted) •Therefore they should time policies so that growth comes just before election •Expand money supply, tax cuts, spending increases in year before election •But this is often bad for welfare •After election, inflation or budget deficits => recession •But politicians then have three years to fix •Strong accountability gives politicians strong incentives for a political business cycle •This is reason why we have independent central banks Cross-sectional and subjective judgments Duch & Stevenson •Look at pre or post-election public opinion surveys •Performance: “Over the past year has the economic situation gotten better, stayed the same, gotten worse?” •Vote choice: Who will/did you vote for? •How much do judgments of economy affect vote choice? •Results •In most cases strong effect of economic perceptions: more negative judgments of economy lower vote probability by 4-5% •Clarity of responsibility effects •Problems •What explains different perceptions of economy across individuals? •Can we trust surveys? • Country differences in economic vote Time-series and subjective judgments Mackuen, Erikson, and Stimson •Time-series of presidential approval •“Do you approve of the job the president is doing?” •Judgments about economy •Sociotropic and pocketbook •Retrospective and prospective •Objective economic facts •What best explains presidential approval? •Prospective sociotropic judgments => voters are bankers •Problems •Does approval matter? •Are voters really so smart? But not individuals, only aggregate US Presidential approval wsj-chart.gif (554×337) What is missing? •Can voters hold politicians accountable for something other than economy? •Specific policies, broken promises, corruption & scandals •What should politicians be held accountable for? What can they actually influence? •Should we focus on votes or on office? Strong punishment in postcommunist region Roberts •Almost all incumbent governments lose •Usually lose big – average vote loss is 15% versus 2-3% in old EU members •Few parties return to government •Punishment is correlated with economy, particularly unemployment •Higher unemployment leads to fewer votes •1% increase in unemployment leads to 1-2% loss in vote share • Is it a good thing? •Strong accountability should keep governments honest •Incentive for good economic performance •But what happens if you punish everyone? •Governments lose incentive to perform •May as well shirk or steal if they will automatically lose •Why such consistent punishment? •Corruption? Incompetence? A vicious circle? •Few other ways of expressing dissatisfaction – civil society and protest weak • Dilemma of economic reform •Economic reforms (eg, privatization, price liberalization) often cause short-term inflation, unemployment, and slow growth •But they have positive benefits in long term •Klaus: “Unless unemployment rises to 8-10%, we will not be doing our job” •If voters use short-term economic voting, then they will punish governments for economic reform •Governments therefore will be reluctant to pursue economic reform •So how do we get transition from communism to capitalism? •Altruism, self-sacrifice? •Or are voters smarter? Other responses to decline Stokes •Intertemporal voting: voter believe that the worse things get, the more they will improve in the future •Exonerating or antidotal voting: voters blame previous government for problems What explains election of Trump? •Voters are not ideologues •Trump has non-traditional views for Republican, but popular with many voters •Voters organize opinions around social groups •Appeals to white identity and race •Politics about status not policy •The economy matters •Make people feel bad about economy Other factors •Strong partisans, weak parties •Clinton a weak candidate •https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pU06-3mPH1I •US not ready for a woman president •Republicans run on ideas, Democrats on policy proposals