

BSS 186/486

NATO & European Security

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Monday, 29 April – Friday, 10 May 2019

Course Objectives

- ✓ Historical challenge of finding peace & security in Europe
- ✓ Formation of NATO and America's unique peacetime security guarantee
- ✓ NATO in the Cold War ... strategic debates, bipolar world
- ✓ NATO after the Cold War: enlargement in Europe, new missions & new challenges
- ✓ NATO's future: prospects for sustained adaptability in a changing world

Course Requirements

- ✓ **Written essays (60%)**
 - ✓ 2 x 30 points ~ 500 words ...
 - ✓ **Friday, 3 May** – assess NATO's success in Cold War
 - ✓ **Thursday, 9 May** – assess NATO's success SINCE Cold War
 - ✓ **Crisis simulation *team* strategy paper (25%)**
 - ✓ Team GOALS – 10 points
 - ✓ Team LESSONS LEARNED – 5 points
 - ✓ Individual participation – 10 points
 - ✓ **Seminar preparation, engagement, participation (15%)**
 - ✓ Prepare
 - ✓ Engage
 - ✓ Participate
- A – 90-100%**
B – 80-89%
C – 70-79%
D – 60-69%
E – 50-59%
F – 0-49%
- ATTENDANCE MANDATORY EVERY DAY!***

Main Textbooks

- ✓ Gülor **AYBET** & Rebecca **MOORE** (eds). *NATO: In Search of a Vision* (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2010)
- ✓ Brian J. **COLLINS**. *NATO: A Guide to the Issues* (New York: Praeger, 2011)
- ✓ Stan **SLOAN**. *Permanent Alliance? NATO and the Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to Obama* (Continuum International Publishing Group, Inc, 2010)
- ✓ David **YOST**. *NATO's Balancing Act* (Washington: US Institute of Peace, 2014)
- ✓ **Other readings distributed electronically through IS**

Course Overview

- ✓ **29.4 (1600): The Genesis of NATO**
- ✧ **30.4 (0800 & 1400): NATO in the Cold War**
 - ✧ *Select NATO Crisis Simulation Country Teams*
- ✧ **2.5 (0800 & 1000): NATO After the Cold War: Enlargement**
- ✧ **3.5 (1200 & 1400): NATO & Post-Cold War Conflicts – **Essay #1 Due****
- ✧ **6.5 (1600 & 1800): NATO & Post-9.11 Conflicts**
- ✧ **7.5 (0800 & 1600): NATO, Russia, & Ukraine**
- ✧ **9.5 (0800 & 1000): **NATO Crisis Simulation** – **Essay #2 Due****
 - ✧ *Team Point Paper on GOALS Due*
- ✧ **10.5 (0800): Conclusion: NATO's Future?**

The Genesis of NATO

Session 1

Monday, 29 April 2019

1600-1740 (P22)

Backdrop to NATO

- ✓ **Post World War II attempts at reconciliation w/USSR**
- ✓ **1947-48 turning points**
 - ✓ **Truman Doctrine**
 - ✓ **Marshall Plan**
 - ✓ **Fall of Prague**
 - ✓ **Berlin Airlift**
- ✓ **Kennan – “containment” doctrine (1947)**
- ✓ **Vandenberg (R-MI) Resolution in US Senate (1948)**
 - ✓ **Principle of “self-help and mutual aid”**

Formation of NATO

- ✓ Truman & UK Prime Minister Ernst Bevin
- ✓ Dunkirk & Brussels Pact ~ “self-help & mutual aid”
- ✓ No anticipation of enduring US military commitment
 - ✓ Political statement was sufficient
- ✓ Precedent – “constitutional processes” ... **Art IV vs Art V**
- ✓ 1949 – another turning point (USSR; PRC)
- ✓ 1950 – NSC 68 & Korean War
 - ✓ Acheson to NATO Ministerial: armed FRG in NATO (1955)
 - ✓ Plevan Plan – Euro Defense Community – then FRG

Look-ahead to 30 April

0800 (U43) & 1400 (U33)

- ✓ **NATO in the Cold War**
- ✓ **Reading Assignment:**
 - ✓ **Collins, Chapters 4 & 5 *[in FSS library]***
 - ✓ **Sloan, Chapters 3 & 4 *[in FSS library]***
- ✓ **Select NATO Country Teams – Foreign & Defense Ministers**
 - ✓ ***Czech Republic (CZ), Estonia (EE), France (FR), Germany (GE)***
 - ✓ ***Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT),***
 - ✓ ***Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Slovakia (SL), UK, US***
 - ✓ **Time during 1400 class session to finalize selection**

NATO in the Cold War

Sessions 2 & 3

Tuesday, 30 April 2019

0800-0940 (U43)

1400-1540 (U33)

EDC “non” – FRG “ja”


- ✓ **1950 – Acheson: rearm FRG as NATO member**
- ✓ **Pleven Plan ... European Defense Community**
 - ✓ **Ultimately rejected by France in 1954 ... concerns:**
 - ✓ **Resurgent Germany might pose a threat**
 - ✓ **Successful EDC might encourage US to leave Europe**
 - ✓ **US might actually provoke a way & drag Europeans in**
 - ✓ **US focused on nuclear deterrent ... Others viewed as unreliable**
 - ✓ **Russian proposals for “European Defense Conference” (no US)**
- ✓ **1955 – rearmed, sovereign FRG joins NATO**

Debating European Defense

- ✓ **1952 Lisbon Force Goals**
 - ✓ 90 divisions for defense of Europe
 - ✓ Never did happen ... never could happen
 - ✓ US: 100,000 in 1950 ... peak of 400,000 by 1954
- ✓ **Burden sharing debate**
 - ✓ Europeans could never make up the difference
 - ✓ US highest per capita expense
- ✓ ***Conventional defense of Europe – Desirable?
Affordable?***

US Forces in Europe

Total Forces – All Services



Types of Deterrence

- ✓ **HOW** do we deter?
 - ✓ Deterrence by denial
 - ✓ “I **can** defend ... **and** you will not win”
 - ✓ Deterrence by punishment
 - ✓ “I **cannot** defend ... **but** you will pay an unacceptable price”
- ✓ **ON BEHALF OF WHOM** do we deter?
 - ✓ Basic (or “passive”) deterrence – deter attack on oneself
 - ✓ Extended deterrence – deter attack on someone else
 - ✓ **Deterrence** vs. **Reassurance** (Sir Michael Howard, 1982)

Deterrence vs Defense in NATO

- ✓ 1952: Lisbon Force Goals – defend NATO with troops
- ✓ 1953: Eisenhower/Dulles – US “New Look”
 - ✓ Conventional defense unaffordable to US AND to Allies
 - ✓ Advent of both “fusion” and “tactical” nuclear weapons
 - ✓ 1955 “Carte Blanche” NATO exercise in FRG (simulated)
 - ✓ 2 days – 300 “tactical” bombs – estimated 4.5 million casualties
- ✓ 1958: Berlin Crisis
- ✓ *Is “defense” possible? Is “deterrence” credible?*

“Flexible Response”

- ✓ **Kennedy/Johnson Administration (1961-1969)**
 - ✓ **Advent of the Missile Age (“Sputnik” 1957)**
 - ✓ **“New Look” too risky for the US**
 - ✓ *US & USSR only at risk if escalate to strategic nuclear weapons*
 - ✓ **US needs “options” – in Europe and in rest-of-world (Vietnam)**
- ✓ **Europeans unwilling to risk “defense”**
 - ✓ **But need to keep US presence in Europe “sustainable”**
 - ✓ **French – de Gaulle out of integrated military structure [‘66]**

1967 “compromise”

- ✓ MC 14/3 NATO Strategy of Flexible Response
 - ✓ Accepted by Defense Planning Committee (no French veto)
 - ✓ “as late as possible but as early as necessary”
- ✓ Harmel Report
 - ✓ *“Military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary.”*
- ✓ Recognition of irreconcilable contradictions
 - ✓ No “light switches” ... must be “both/and” & controlled
 - ✓ Hope that political solution removes security contradictions

But it didn't quite work out

- ✓ ***Détente* enabled German *Ostpolitik* but still divided Europe**
- ✓ **Arms Control provided inherently limited foundation**
 - ✓ **Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I & SALT II)**
 - ✓ **CSCE/Helsinki Final Act important to Germany, not US**
 - ✓ **Mutual & Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) not serious**
- ✓ **By 1979, *détente* was “dead”**
 - ✓ **Soviet invasion of Afghanistan**
 - ✓ **SALT II signed by not ratified in US – viewed as destabilizing**
 - ✓ **Soviet deployment of SS-20's led to missile crisis**

The Euromissile Debate

- ✓ ***Intermediate Range Forces (INF) changed strategic landscape***
 - ✓ **USSR could hold all of Europe “at risk” without using strategic systems limited under START**
 - ✓ **US could not hold USSR at risk unless US strategic systems**
 - ✓ **Plausible scenario: Soviet conventional attack + ability to deter NATO’s use of nuclear weapons = incentive to attack**
 - ✓ **NATO’s 1979 “Double Zero” decision ... 0 INF or deploy**
 - ✓ **1983 deployment of Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) & Pershing II capable of striking USSR**

The Cold War thaws ...

- ✓ **1983 INF missile deployments while Geneva arms control talks go nowhere – no one in Moscow to say “Da”**
- ✓ **After 1986 ... Gorbachev “perestroika” / “glasnost”**
 - ✓ **Begin withdrawal from Afghanistan**
 - ✓ **Accepts on-site-inspection in Stockholm (CDE Agreement)**
 - ✓ **Reykjavik Summit “failure” leads to **INF Treaty in 1987****
 - ✓ **Signal willingness to consider real reductions in conventional forces in Europe ... leads to **CFE in 1990****
 - ✓ **START I (1991) & START II (1993) – real reductions**

NATO: “*now what?*”

- ✓ **1990-1992 – NATO’s world had fundamentally changed:**
 - ✓ Reunified Germany in NATO (4+2 Agreement)
 - ✓ Warsaw Pact dissolved ... Soviet forces out of Europe
 - ✓ Soviet Union dissolved (December 1991)
 - ✓ US draws down NATO troop levels after Desert Storm
 - ✓ US pulls out almost all nuclear weapons from Europe
- ✓ **NATO’s chronic, insoluble strategic dilemma ended [??]**
 - ✓ No more dominant conventional threat on its borders
 - ✓ No more need for reassurance of Allies on US deterrent

Look-ahead to 2 May

0800-1140 (U41)

- ✓ ***NATO After the Cold War: The Dilemmas of Enlargement***
- ✓ **Reading Assignment:**
 - ✓ Sloan, Chapters 5, 6, & 10 *[in FSS library]*
 - ✓ Yost, Chapter 8 *[in FSS library]*
 - ✓ Aybet & Moore, Chapter 7 (Kanet) *[in FSS library]*
 - ✓ NATO's Strategic Concepts – 1991 & 1999 *[NATO website]*
- ✓ **ESSAY #1 DUE FRIDAY, 3 MAY**

NATO After the Cold War: Dilemmas of Enlargement

Sessions 4 & 5

Thursday, 2 May 2019

0800-0940 (U41)

1000-1140 (U41)

Reminder ... Essay #1 Due Friday

Essay #1

- ✓ **Assess** whether NATO was successful during the Cold War ... and **explain** reasons for NATO's success (or lack thereof).
 - ✓ Thesis paragraph – define what you mean by success
 - ✓ Analysis – be specific
 - ✓ Conclusion – can be “mixed” but ensure analysis supports
 - ✓ **WRITE CLEARLY ... PROOFREAD**
- ✓ 500 words ... typed ... double spaced
- ✓ Hard copy delivered at beginning of class **FRIDAY**

Looking back ...

- ✓ The problem with “lines” ...

To include a broader membership in this new alliance
“... would amount to a *final militarization of the present line through Europe* ... [and] create a situation in which *no alteration or obliteration of that line could take place without having an accentuated military significance.*”

*George Kennan memorandum to US Secretary of State
George Marshall & Deputy Secretary of State Bob Lovett,
1948*

- ✓ *So what to do when the “line” finally disappears?*

1991 Strategic Concept

- ✓ **Historic changes ~ fulfillment of Harmel Report**
- ✓ **“Monolithic, massive & potentially immediate threat ... has disappeared.”**
- ✓ **“Great deal of uncertainty and risks to security remain.”**
- ✓ **Adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social, and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes ... may lead to crises inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts.”**
- ✓ **Seek broader patterns of bilateral & multilateral cooperation**

1999 Strategic Concept

- ✓ **“Broad approach to security” ~ pol / econ / soc / environ**
- ✓ **New “EuroAtlantic security structure in which NATO plays a central part” (OSCE, EU, WEU, UN)**
- ✓ **“Essential new activities in interest of wider stability”**
 - ✓ **Depth of commitment ~ end suffering & conflict in Balkans**
 - ✓ **Conflict prevention ... crisis management ... crisis response**
- ✓ **Emphasis on cooperation with EU**
 - ✓ **European Security and Defense Identity**

Tasks of the Alliance

1991

- ✓ Provide indispensable stable security foundation through democratic institutions and peaceful resolution of disputes
- ✓ Serve as forum for Allied consultations (Article 4)
- ✓ Deter & defend (Articles 5 & 6)
- ✓ **“Preserve the strategic balance in Europe”**

1999

- ✓ Provide indispensable stable security foundation through democratic institutions and peaceful resolution of disputes
- ✓ Serve as forum for Allied consultations (Article 4)
- ✓ Deter & defend (Articles 5 & 6)
- ✓ **Contribute to effective conflict prevention, crisis response ops**

Partnership for Peace (1994)

- ✓ All former Soviet, Warsaw Pact, neutrals in Europe
 - ✓ Other “global partners” since 2011
- ✓ “build individual relationship” with NATO
- ✓ EuroAtlantic Partnership Council *[today]*
 - ✓ 29 Members *[soon to be 30]*
 - ✓ 21 Partners *[soon to be 20]*
 - ✓ 7 from Mediterranean Dialogue
 - ✓ 4 from Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
 - ✓ 8 “global partners”

Who's Who ... & When?

MEMBERS

1. Belgium
2. Canada
3. Denmark
4. France
5. Italy
6. Luxembourg
7. Netherlands
8. Iceland
9. Norway
10. Portugal
11. UK
12. USA
13. Greece ('52)
14. Turkey (52)
15. Germany ('55)
16. Spain ('82)
17. Czech Republic ('99)
18. Hungary ('99)
19. Poland ('99)
20. Estonia ('04)
21. Latvia ('04)
22. Lithuania ('04)
23. Bulgaria ('04)
24. Romania ('04)
25. Slovakia (04)
26. Slovenia ('04)
27. Albania ('09)
28. Croatia ('09)
29. Montenegro ('17)
30. North Macedonia ('19)

PARTNERS

1. Armenia
2. Azerbaijan
3. Belarus
4. Georgia
5. Kazakhstan
6. Kirgizstan
7. Moldova
8. Russia
9. Tajikistan
10. Turkmenistan
11. Ukraine
12. Uzbekistan
13. Bosnia-Herzegovina
14. Serbia
15. Austria
16. Finland
17. Ireland
18. Malta
19. Sweden
20. Switzerland

The Enlargement Debate

- ✓ April 1993: Clinton w/Vaclav Havel & Lech Walesa
- ✓ Clinton foreign policy theme: promote democracy
 - ✓ Tony Lake (NSC): *“The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement ...of the world’s free community of market democracies.”* [1993]
- ✓ Bureaucratic pushback:
 - ✓ Defense: Partnership for Peace more practical
 - ✓ State: Enlargement would antagonize Russia

The Enlargement Decision

- ✓ **Decisive arguments:**
 - ✓ **Democracy in Central Europe fragile; need assurance**
 - ✓ **Russia had cooperated on 4+2 ... why not this?**
- ✓ **Need to coordinate “enlargement track” and new initiatives regarding Russia & Ukraine**
 - ✓ **Gradual ... not “fast track” time line: 1994-1997**
 - ✓ **Practicalities: 1,200 NATO Standardization Agreements**
- ✓ **May 1997 – signing of NATO-Russia Founding Act**
- ✓ **July 1997 – invitation to PO, HU, CZ**

Consultation Commitments

Article 4, Washington Treaty (1949)

“The Parties will *consult* together whenever, *in the opinion of any* of them, the *territorial integrity, political independence, or security* of any of the Parties is threatened.”

Paragraph 8, Partnership for Peace Framework Document (1994)

“NATO will *consult* with *any active participant* in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its *territorial integrity, political independence, or security.*”

NATO-Russia Founding Act

[May 1997]

- ✓ “NATO and Russia will promptly **consult** within the *Permanent Joint Council* in case one of the Council members perceives a threat to its *territorial integrity, political independence or security*.
- ✓ “... to the *maximum extent possible, where appropriate, ... joint decisions and joint action*
- ✓ “... *do not provide* NATO or Russia, in any way, with a *right of veto* over the actions of the other, nor do they infringe upon or restrict the rights of NATO or Russia to independent decision-making and action.”
- ✓ Recite international obligations ... **aspirational** cooperation

Unilateral NATO Assurances

- ✓ “... in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will [ensure] the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement *rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces*.
- ✓ Russia will exercise similar restraint in its force deployments
...
- ✓ “... *no intention, no plan and no reason* to *deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members*, ... and do not foresee any future need to do so.
- ✓ “... *no intention, no plan, and no reason* to establish *nuclear weapon storage sites* on the territory of those members

NATO Ukraine Charter

July 1997

- ✓ “Distinctive partnership” between NATO and Ukraine
- ✓ “Allies ... support Ukrainian *sovereignty* and *independence, territorial integrity, democratic development, economic prosperity* and its *status as a non-nuclear weapon state*, and the principle of *inviolability of frontiers*”
 - ✓ ~ December 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances
- ✓ “NATO and Ukraine will develop a crisis consultative mechanism to *consult together* whenever *Ukraine perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.*”
- ✓ Anticipated closer, substantive cooperation

Reaffirming the “Open Door”?

- ✓ 2008 Bucharest Summit: “NATO welcomes **Ukraine’s** and **Georgia’s** Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. **We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO ...**
 - ✓ Membership Action Plan ...
 - ✓ 2016 Warsaw Summit ... “recognized progress”
- ✓ **Montenegro – 2017** (post-coup attempt on date of vote)
- ✓ **North Macedonia – 2019?** (what’s in a name?)
- ✓ **Bosnia-Herzegovina ... Serbia** (ever?)

Look-ahead to 3 May

1200-1540 (U43)

- ✓ **NATO & Post-Cold War Conflicts: The Balkans**
- ✓ Reading Assignment:
 - ✓ Sloan, Chapter 8 [*in FSS library*]
 - ✓ Webber, “The Kosovo War” [*posted in IS*]
 - ✓ Aybet & Moore, Chapter 8 (Cascone) [*in FSS library*]
- ✓ **Essay #1 DUE AT BEGINNING OF CLASS:**
 - ✓ **Assess** whether NATO was successful during the Cold War ... and **explain** reasons for NATO’s success.
 - ✓ Thesis paragraph – define what you mean by success
 - ✓ Analysis – be specific
 - ✓ Conclusion – can be “mixed” but ensure analysis supports
 - ✓ **WRITE CLEARLY ... PROOFREAD**

NATO & Post-Cold War Conflicts: The Balkans

Sessions 6 & 7

Friday, 3 May 2019

1200-1340 (U43)

1400-1540 (U43)

Yugoslav Civil War

- ✓ **1980: death of Tito ... power-sharing arrangements**
- ✓ **1989: Milosevic at 600th anniversary of Battle of Kosovo**
- ✓ **1991: Slovenia & Croatia declare independence**
- ✓ **1992: Bosnia declares independence ... Sarajevo shelling**
- ✓ **1993: UN 6 x “Safe Areas” ... [*Srebrenica massacre 1995*]**
- ✓ **1994: NATO first air combat sorties**
- ✓ **1995: Dayton Peace Accords re Bosnia**
- ✓ **1995: NATO IFOR (32 states; 52,000 troops); SFOR til 2001**

Spillover to Kosovo

- ✓ **Albanian/Muslim enclave in Serbia (Serb enclave within)**
 - ✓ **Autonomous region status revoked 1989 by Milosevic**
 - ✓ **Kosovo Liberation Army formed 1991 ... attacks 1995**
 - ✓ **Spiral of violence & atrocities**
- ✓ **Sep 1998 – UNSC Resolution ~ 250,000 refugees**
 - ✓ **Next day ... NATO “activation warning”**
 - ✓ **30 January 1999 ... NAC gave “preauthorization” of bombing**
 - ✓ **23 March-3 June – bombing campaign**

Lessons Learned?

- ✓ There is a difference between “legal” and “legitimate”
 - ✓ *The sometimes inadequacy of law and diplomacy*
- ✓ Force in the pursuit of peace is justified
 - ✓ *But it still may not succeed*
- ✓ Military force can change the “situation on the ground”
 - ✓ *But it may not always “compel” a political solution*
- ✓ If force is used, then be clear about the objectives
 - ✓ *... which must be **political**, not military*
- ✓ Diplomacy is necessary before using military force ...
 - ✓ *... and just as necessary afterwards to avoid renewed conflict*

Look-ahead to 6 May

1600-1940 (U41)

- ✓ **NATO & Post-9.11 Conflicts: Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria**
- ✓ **Reading Assignment:**
 - ✓ Sloan, Chapters 9 & 11 *[in FSS library]*
 - ✓ Yost, Chapters 4 & 5 *[in FSS library]*
- ✓ ***Teams should be preparing for Simulation on Thursday, 9 May***
 - ✓ ***Team & Role SIGNS***
- ✓ ***Team GOALS Due Thursday, 9 May***
- ✓ ***Essay #2 Due Thursday, 9 May***

NATO & Post 9.11 Conflicts: Afghan, Iraq, Libya, Syria

Sessions 8 & 9

Monday, 6 May 2019

1600-1740 (U41)

1800-1940 (U41)

Essay #1 Comments

- ✓ Overall – good ... no “wrong” answers
- ✓ The best essays were those that “dug deeper” into the nature of success and the reasons
 - ✓ More than simply ... no war, therefore success
 - ✓ Bringing Europe together ... restoring Germany ... creating security structure that former Warsaw Pact wanted to join?
- ✓ English not your first language ... practice writing
 - ✓ Capitalization
 - ✓ Word choice – be more efficient [“unnecessarily wordy”]

Reminder ... Essay #2 Due Thursday

- ✓ **Assess** whether NATO has been successful **since the Cold War in adapting to new strategic challenges ...** and **explain** reasons for NATO's success or lack of success.
 - ✓ Thesis paragraph – define what you mean by success
 - ✓ Analysis – be specific
 - ✓ Conclusion – can be “mixed” but ensure analysis supports
 - ✓ **WRITE CLEARLY ... PROOFREAD**
- ✓ 500 words ... typed ... double spaced
- ✓ Hard copy delivered at beginning of class **THURSDAY**

Post 9.11 Conflicts

Global NATO?

- ✓ **Afghanistan** ~ response to invocation of Article 5
- ✓ **Iraq** ~ thanks but no thanks, US
- ✓ **Libya** ~ France & Italy force NATO's hand
- ✓ **Syria** ~ paralysis

- ✓ *Is there a pattern?*
- ✓ *Is NATO “stretching its legs” or “finding its limits”?*

Afghanistan

- ✓ **Initially U.S. reluctant to engage NATO in Afghanistan**
 - ✓ *“The coalition must not be permitted to determine the mission.”* (SecDef Rumsfeld, September 2001)
- ✓ **By December 2001 ... Bonn Agreement**
 - ✓ **International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)**
 - ✓ UK command ... then Turkey ... then Germany/Netherlands
- ✓ **August 2003 – NATO officially takes command of ISAF**
 - ✓ 6,500 to 10,000 troops in 2003 ... over 60,000 by 2009
 - ✓ Operation Enduring Freedom ... additional 38,500 U.S. troops

Afghanistan – An Assessment

- ✓ **The Good News:**
 - ✓ NATO comprehensive support **in spite of** Iraq War
 - ✓ Alliance consensus over a decade in global mission despite challenges in Afghanistan and domestic support at home
 - ✓ Some effective reconstruction efforts

Afghanistan – An Assessment

✓ The Good News:

- ✓ NATO comprehensive support in spite of Iraq War
- ✓ Alliance consensus over a decade in global mission despite challenges in Afghanistan and domestic support at home
- ✓ Some effective reconstruction efforts

✓ The Bad News:

- ✓ As a counterinsurgency effort, it has not been a success
- ✓ No consensus on priorities:
 - ✓ Counterterrorism vs Counterinsurgency vs Reconstruction

Iraq 2003

- ✓ **2002 UN Security Council debate**
 - ✓ **U.S. & UK vs. France & Germany**
 - ✓ **No “trigger”**
 - ✓ **No credible connection between Saddam & 9.11**
 - ✓ **“coalition of the willing: U.S., UK, Poland, Spain [why?]**
- ✓ **March 2003-June 2004 ... war & U.S. occupation**
 - ✓ **NATO officially on the sidelines**
 - ✓ **Others (e.g. Germany) joined post-war training effort, once Iraqi sovereignty restored ... *but impact?***

Libya 2011

- ✓ February 2011 – Libyan “Arab Spring” uprisings
- ✓ UNSC – sanctions, froze bank assets, arms embargo, war crimes to ICC
- ✓ Arab League suspended Qaddafi, asked for no-fly zone
- ✓ UNSCR 1973 authorized states, “regional organizations”
 - ✓ *“... all necessary means to protect civilians ...”*
[meaning Qaddafi]
 - ✓ *“... excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory*

Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

2005 UN “World Summit Document”

138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.

Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

2005 UN “World Summit Document”

139. **The international community**, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate **diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means**, in accordance with Chapters **VI** and **VIII** of the Charter, to **help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity**.

In this context, we are prepared to take **collective action**, in a timely and decisive manner, **through the Security Council**, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter **VII**, on a **case-by-case basis** and **in cooperation with relevant regional organizations** as appropriate, **should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity**.

Syria

- ✓ **Limits to coalition**
 - ✓ **No UNSC Resolution**
 - ✓ **No Alliance consensus**
 - ✓ **Inevitable conflict with Russia**
 - ✓ **Complications with Turkey**
 - ✓ **NATO SecGen: “use of force would complicate matters ...”**

Global NATO?

- ✓ **Clear competence when:**
 - ✓ **Backing by UN Security Council resolution**
 - ✓ **European allies not otherwise directly involved**
 - ✓ **Defined political objectives**
 - ✓ **Confined role of military force**
 - ✓ **Not a diversion from more “core” missions**

***Are Afghanistan and Libya exceptions or harbingers?
WHY or WHY NOT?***

Lessons Learned?

Would you change any of these from Balkans?

- ✓ There is a difference between “legal” and “legitimate”
 - ✓ *The sometimes inadequacy of law and diplomacy*
- ✓ Force in the pursuit of peace is justified
 - ✓ *But it still may not succeed*
- ✓ Military force can change the “situation on the ground”
 - ✓ *But it may not always “compel” a political solution*
- ✓ If force is used, then be clear about the objectives
 - ✓ *... which must be **political**, not military*
- ✓ Diplomacy is necessary before using military force ...
 - ✓ *... and just as necessary afterwards to avoid renewed conflict*

Look-ahead to 7 May

0800 (U43) & 1600 (P22)

- ✓ **NATO, Russia, & Ukraine**
- ✓ **Reading Assignment:**
 - ✓ Sloan, Chapter 7 *[in FSS library]*
 - ✓ Aybet & Moore, Chapter 5 (Smith) *[in FSS library]*
 - ✓ Foerster, “NATO’s Return” *[posted in IS]*
 - ✓ Cecire, “Russia’s Art of War” *[posted in IS]*
 - ✓ NATO Strategic Concept (2010) *[NATO website]*
 - ✓ NATO-Russia-Ukraine documents *[NATO website]*
- ✓ **1600 – team consultation time [no formal class meeting]**

NATO, Russia, & Ukraine

Sessions 10 & 11

Tuesday, 7 May 2019

0800-0940 (U43)

1600-1740 (P22)

NATO 2010 Strategic Concept

Active Engagement – Modern Defense

- ✓ “fundamental & enduring purpose ... safeguard the freedom and security of all its **members** by **political and military** means.”
- ✓ **Collective Defense** ~ Article 5 ... deter & defend
- ✓ **Crisis Management** ~ “political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security”
- ✓ **Cooperative Security** ~ “engage actively to enhance int’l security”
 - ✓ contribute actively to arms control, non-proliferation, & disarmament
 - ✓ keep the door to membership ... open to all European democracies that meet NATO’s standards.

Wales Summit Declaration

September 2014

- ✓ “Russia’s aggressive actions against Ukraine have **fundamentally challenged our vision** of a Europe whole, free, and at peace.”
- ✓ Growing instability from Middle East to North Africa ... transnational threats
 - ✓ NATO Readiness Action Plan + Spearhead Force (5,000)
 - ✓ Support reinforcement capacity – 8 C2 centers
 - ✓ 2 combat brigades of prepositioned equipment
 - ✓ NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF)
 - ✓ “aim to move towards the **2% guideline** within a decade”

Wales Summit Declaration

NATO – Russia – Ukraine

- ✓ “We **condemn** in the strongest terms Russia’s escalating and illegal intervention in Ukraine ...
 - ✓ “... violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty & territorial integrity ...
 - ✓ “... do not and will not recognize illegal and illegitimate ‘annexation’ of Crimea”
- ✓ “We support **sanctions** imposed by the EU and others ...”
- ✓ “**Suspend** all practical civilian & military cooperation between NATO & Russia ... political channels ... remain open” *[Amb]*
- ✓ “**commend** people of Ukraine ... **encourage** Ukraine to further promote an **inclusive political process** ... **show restraint**”

Warsaw Summit Communique

July 2016

- ✓ “There is an **arc of insecurity and instability** along NATO’s periphery and beyond ... a range of security challenges and threats that originate both from the **east** and from the **south**.”
- ✓ “**Enhanced forward presence**”
 - ✓ Beginning 2017 [*January 2017 exercise in Poland: 1,500 troops*]
 - ✓ Multinational forces ... voluntary, sustainable, rotational basis”
 - ✓ 4 battalions (CA, GE, UK, US) in Estonia Latvia, Lithuania, Poland
 - ✓ 4,000 U.S. troops (combat brigade) + 2,000 prepositioned equipment
 - ✓ Romania ~ multinational “framework brigade” for training for

Range of Security Threats

- ✓ **Military intimidation ~ force presence, incursions in air, sea and land operations ... *intent to use?***
- ✓ **“Hybrid” or “non-linear” warfare**
 - ✓ **Goals political ~ means are disruptive, cheap, risk-averse**
 - ✓ **Shaping the narrative – defining alternative realities**
 - ✓ **“Reflexive Control” to shape opponents’ responses**
 - ✓ **“Four D’s” of disinformation**
 - ✓ **Dismiss – Distort – Distract – Dismay**
- ✓ **How to assess – defeat – deny – coordinate NATO response**

Strategic Questions

A guide for crisis decision-making

- ✓ What “end states” does NATO want to **achieve**?
 - ✓ What “end states” can NATO **accept**? At what cost?
- ✓ What are Russia’s strategic goals? **Others’**?
- ✓ How does NATO address those goals to avoid conflict yet maintain the integrity of the Alliance?
 - ✓ What are NATO’s “redlines”?
- ✓ Does NATO have a comprehensive set of **political** and **military** tools with which to respond?
 - ✓ *Means must be commensurate with ends*

Overview of Crisis Simulation

September 2019

Major Defense Industry Facilities in the Baltic States



Overview of Crisis Simulation

September 2019

- ✓ **Ukraine**
 - ✓ **Russia still supporting separatists in Eastern Ukraine**
 - ✓ **Deteriorating economic situation in Crimea ~ Land Bridge?**
 - ✓ **Sporadic violations of ceasefire**
 - ✓ **No progress in Minsk negotiations**
- ✓ **US-Russian relations**
 - ✓ **Increasingly hard line toward US**
 - ✓ **Russian military exercise near Baltics ... forces within 100 km**
 - ✓ **Increased sea/air patrols in Baltic & Black Seas**
 - ✓ **Kaliningrad – unofficial request to Putin for “land bridge”**

Overview of Crisis Simulation

September 2019

- ✓ **Baltic & Central European States**
 - ✓ Growing anti-Russian sentiment, anxiety, in Estonia & Latvia
 - ✓ Public protests by Russian speakers ... also unknown protesters
 - ✓ Baltic governments increased “resistance training”
 - ✓ Poland lobbying US for military base & nuclear weapons storage
- ✓ **THIS WEEK**
 - ✓ Violence in Riga & Tallinn; shops burned; arrests; dozens killed
 - ✓ Many arrested suspected of being Russian intelligence “infiltrators”
 - ✓ Kremlin warnings; increased air patrols, troops moving west

Overview of Crisis Simulation

September 2019

✓ TODAY

- ✓ This morning, the governments of both Estonia and Latvia—joined by Lithuania and Poland—issued an urgent request to NATO for military reinforcements to be sent immediately to Estonia and Latvia to deter what they said was an increasing possibility of Russian military intervention.

✓ THURSDAY

- ✓ NAC to meet with Foreign & Defense Ministers
- ✓ Secretary General issues guidelines ... asks for recommendations
- ✓ EACH DELEGATION SHOULD PREPARE GOALS

NATO Simulation Roles

NATO MEMBER	FOREIGN MINISTER	DEFENSE MINISTER
Czech Republic	Ondřej Čábelka	Stanislav Štěpánek
Estonia	Natálie Zelinková	Michal Sojka
France	Maxime Biesaga	Kristýna Pavlíčková
Germany	Tomáš Mičík	Terézia Rekšáková
Greece	Jozef Mačák	Kryštof Šír
Latvia	Christian Alfonso Bruccoleri	Yann Alexis Schafeitel
Hungary	Jan Rumlana	
Lithuania	Peter Köles	Eliška Benešová
Norway	Viktória Neradná	Marek Bukovský
Poland	Pavel Brejcha	Michalis Christou
Slovakia	Daniel Perjan	Michaela Bennárová
United Kingdom	Denis Janšta	Alexandra Pavelová
United States	Javad Ahmadov	Natálie Kozáková

Look-ahead to 9 May

0800-1140 (U41)

- ✓ **NATO's Future: How will it respond to the next crisis?**
- ✓ **ADVANCE BACKGROUND PAPER [posted in IS]**
- ✓ **Additional Press Reports to be provided through IS late 8 May**
- ✓ **Reading Assignment:**
 - ✓ **Foerster, "Structural Change in Europe" [posted in IS]**
- ✓ **Crisis Simulation TEAM Point Paper on GOALS due in class**
- ✓ **Essay #2 due in class**
- ✓ **Come prepared to:**
 - ✓ **Think hard! ... Work creatively in a team! ... Have fun!**