BSS 186/486
NATO & European Security
Professor Schuyler Foerster
Department of Political Science
Masaryk University
Monday, 29 April – Friday, 10 May 2019

Course Objectives
üHistorical challenge of finding peace & security in Europe
üFormation of NATO and America’s unique peacetime security guarantee
üNATO in the Cold War … strategic debates, bipolar world
üNATO after the Cold War: enlargement in Europe, new missions & new challenges
üNATO’s future: prospects for sustained adaptability in a changing world
ü

Course Requirements
üWritten essays (60%)
ü2 x 30 points ~ 500 words …
üFriday, 3 May – assess NATO’s success in Cold War
üThursday, 9 May – assess NATO’s success SINCE Cold War
üCrisis simulation team strategy paper (25%)
üTeam GOALS – 10 points
üTeam LESSONS LEARNED – 5 points
üIndividual participation – 10 points
üSeminar preparation, engagement, participation (15%)
üPrepare
üEngage
üParticipate
A – 90-100%
B – 80-89%
C – 70-79%
D – 60-69%
E – 50-59%
F – 0-49%
ATTENDANCE MANDATORY EVERY DAY!

Main Textbooks
üGülur AYBET & Rebecca MOORE (eds).  NATO: In Search of a Vision (Washington: Georgetown University
Press, 2010)
üBrian J. COLLINS.  NATO: A Guide to the Issues (New York: Praeger, 2011)
üStan SLOAN.  Permanent Alliance?  NATO and the Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to Obama
(Continuum International Publishing Group, Inc, 2010)
üDavid YOST.  NATO’s Balancing Act (Washington: US Institute of Peace, 2014)
üOther readings distributed electronically through IS
ü

Course Overview
ü29.4 (1600): The Genesis of NATO
²30.4 (0800 & 1400): NATO in the Cold War
²Select NATO Crisis Simulation Country Teams
²2.5 (0800 & 1000): NATO After the Cold War: Enlargement
²3.5 (1200 &1400): NATO & Post-Cold War Conflicts – Essay #1 Due
²6.5 (1600 & 1800): NATO & Post-9.11 Conflicts
²7.5 (0800 & 1600): NATO, Russia, & Ukraine
²9.5 (0800 & 1000): NATO Crisis Simulation – Essay #2 Due
²Team Point Paper on GOALS Due
²10.5 (0800): Conclusion: NATO’s Future?
²Team Point Paper on LESSONS LEARNED Due

The Genesis of NATO
Session 1
Monday, 29 April 2019
1600-1740 (P22)

Backdrop to NATO
üPost World War II attempts at reconciliation w/USSR
ü1947-48 turning points
üTruman Doctrine
üMarshall Plan
üFall of Prague
üBerlin Airlift
üKennan – “containment” doctrine (1947)
üVandenberg (R-MI) Resolution in US Senate (1948)
üPrinciple of “self-help and mutual aid”

Formation of NATO
üTruman & UK Prime Minister Ernst Bevin
üDunkirk & Brussels Pact ~ “self-help & mutual aid”
üNo anticipation of enduring US military commitment
üPolitical statement was sufficient
üPrecedent – “constitutional processes” … Art IV vs Art V
ü1949 – another turning point (USSR; PRC)
ü1950 – NSC ’68 & Korean War
üAcheson to NATO Ministerial: armed FRG in NATO (1955)
üPleven Plan … Euro Defense Community … then FRG
ü

Look-ahead to 30 April
0800 (U43) & 1400 (U33)
üNATO in the Cold War
üReading Assignment:
üCollins, Chapters 4 & 5 [in FSS library]
üSloan, Chapters 3 & 4 [in FSS library]
üSelect NATO Country Teams – Foreign & Defense Ministers
üCzech Republic (CZ), Estonia (EE), France (FR), Germany (GE)
üGreece (GR), Hungary (HU), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT),
üNorway (NO), Poland (PL), Slovakia (SL), UK, US
üTime during 1400 class session to finalize selection

NATO in the Cold War
Sessions 2 & 3
Tuesday, 30 April 2019
0800-0940 (U43)
1400-1540 (U33)

EDC “non” – FRG “ja”
ü1950 – Acheson: rearm FRG as NATO member
üPleven Plan … European Defense Community
üUltimately rejected by France in 1954 … concerns:
üResurgent Germany might pose a threat
üSuccessful EDC might encourage US to leave Europe
üUS might actually provoke a way & drag Europeans in
üUS focused on nuclear deterrent ... Others viewed as unreliable
üRussian proposals for “European Defense Conference” (no US)
ü1955 – rearmed, sovereign FRG joins NATO
ü

Debating European Defense
ü1952 Lisbon Force Goals
ü90 divisions for defense of Europe
üNever did happen … never could happen
üUS: 100,000 in 1950 … peak of 400,000 by 1954
üBurden sharing debate
üEuropeans could never make up the difference
üUS highest per capita expense
üConventional defense of Europe – Desirable?  Affordable?

US Forces in Europe
New
Look
End of
Cold War

Types of Deterrence
üHOW do we deter?
üDeterrence by denial
ü“I can defend … and you will not win”
üDeterrence by punishment
ü“I cannot defend … but you will pay an unacceptable price”
üON BEHALF OF WHOM do we deter?
üBasic (or “passive”) deterrence – deter attack on oneself
üExtended deterrence – deter attack on someone else
üDeterrence vs. Reassurance (Sir Michael Howard, 1982)

Deterrence vs Defense in NATO
ü1952:  Lisbon Force Goals – defend NATO with troops
ü1953:  Eisenhower/Dulles – US “New Look”
üConventional defense unaffordable to US AND to Allies
üAdvent of both “fusion” and “tactical” nuclear weapons
ü1955 “Carte Blanche” NATO exercise in FRG (simulated)
ü2 days – 300 “tactical” bombs – estimated 4.5 million casualties
ü1958: Berlin Crisis
üIs “defense” possible?  Is “deterrence” credible?
ü

“Flexible Response”
üKennedy/Johnson Administration (1961-1969)
üAdvent of the Missile Age (“Sputnik” 1957)
ü“New Look” too risky for the US
üUS & USSR only at risk if escalate to strategic nuclear weapons
üUS needs “options” – in Europe and in rest-of-world (Vietnam)
üEuropeans unwilling to risk “defense”
üBut need to keep US presence in Europe “sustainable”
üFrench – de Gaulle out of integrated military structure [‘66]

1967 “compromise”
üMC 14/3 NATO Strategy of Flexible Response
üAccepted by Defense Planning Committee (no French veto)
ü“as late as possible but as early as necessary”
üHarmel Report
ü“Military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary.”
üRecognition of irreconcilable contradictions
üNo “light switches” … must be “both/and” & controlled
üHope that political solution removes security contradictions

But it didn’t quite work out
üDétente enabled German Ostpolitik but still divided Europe
üArms Control provided inherently limited foundation
üStrategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I & SALT II)
üCSCE/Helsinki Final Act important to Germany, not US
üMutual & Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) not serious
üBy 1979, détente was “dead”
üSoviet invasion of Afghanistan
üSALT II signed by not ratified in US – viewed as destabilizing
üSoviet deployment of SS-20’s led to missile crisis

The Euromissile Debate
üIntermediate Range Forces (INF) changed strategic landscape
üUSSR could hold all of Europe “at risk” without using strategic systems limited under START
üUS could not hold USSR at risk unless US strategic systems
üPlausible scenario: Soviet conventional attack + ability to deter NATO’s use of nuclear weapons =
incentive to attack
üNATO’s 1979 “Double Zero” decision … 0 INF or deploy
ü1983 deployment of Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) & Pershing II capable of striking USSR

The Cold War thaws …
ü1983 INF missile deployments while Geneva arms control talks go nowhere – no one in Moscow to say
“Da”
üAfter 1986 … Gorbachev “perestroika” / “glasnost”
üBegin withdrawal from Afghanistan
üAccepts on-site-inspection in Stockholm (CDE Agreement)
üReykjavik Summit “failure” leads to INF Treaty in 1987
üSignal willingness to consider real reductions in conventional forces in Europe … leads to CFE in
1990
üSTART I (1991) & START II (1993) – real reductions

NATO: “now what?”
ü1990-1992 – NATO’s world had fundamentally changed:
üReunified Germany in NATO (4+2 Agreement)
üWarsaw Pact dissolved … Soviet forces out of Europe
üSoviet Union dissolved (December 1991)
üUS draws down NATO troop levels after Desert Storm
üUS pulls out almost all nuclear weapons from Europe
üNATO’s chronic, insoluble strategic dilemma ended [??]
üNo more dominant conventional threat on its borders
üNo more need for reassurance of Allies on US deterrent

Look-ahead to 2 May
0800-1140 (U41)
üNATO After the Cold War: The Dilemmas of Enlargement
üReading Assignment:
üSloan, Chapters 5, 6, & 10 [in FSS library]
üYost, Chapter 8 [in FSS library]
üAybet & Moore, Chapter 7 (Kanet) [in FSS library]
üNATO’s Strategic Concepts – 1991 & 1999 [NATO website]
üESSAY #1 DUE FRIDAY, 3 MAY

NATO After the Cold War:
Dilemmas of Enlargement
Sessions 4 & 5
Thursday, 2 May 2019
0800-0940 (U41)
1000-1140 (U41)

Reminder … Essay #1 Due Friday
üEssay #1
üAssess whether NATO was successful during the Cold War … and explain reasons for NATO’s success
(or lack thereof).
üThesis paragraph – define what you mean by success
üAnalysis – be specific
üConclusion – can be “mixed” but ensure analysis supports
üWRITE CLEARLY … PROOFREAD
ü500 words … typed … double spaced
üHard copy delivered at beginning of class FRIDAY
ü

Looking back …
üThe problem with “lines” …
üTo include a broader membership in this new alliance “... would amount to a final militarization
of the present line through Europe ... [and] create a situation in which no alteration or
obliteration of that line could take place without having an accentuated military significance.”
üGeorge Kennan memorandum to US Secretary of State George Marshall & Deputy Secretary of State Bob
Lovett, 1948
üSo what to do when the “line” finally disappears?

1991 Strategic Concept
üHistoric changes ~ fulfillment of Harmel Report
ü“Monolithic, massive & potentially immediate threat … has disappeared.”
ü“Great deal of uncertainty and risks to security remain.”
üAdverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social, and
political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes … may lead to crises
inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts.”
üSeek broader patterns of bilateral & multilateral cooperation

1999 Strategic Concept
ü“Broad approach to security” ~ pol / econ / soc / environ
üNew “EuroAtlantic security structure in which NATO plays a central part” (OSCE, EU, WEU, UN)
ü“Essential new activities in interest of wider stability”
üDepth of commitment ~ end suffering & conflict in Balkans
üConflict prevention … crisis management … crisis response
üEmphasis on cooperation with EU
üEuropean Security and Defense Identity
üCombined Joint Task Force

Tasks of the Alliance
ü1991
üProvide indispensable stable security foundation through democratic institutions and peaceful
resolution of disputes
üServe as forum for Allied consultations (Article 4)
üDeter & defend (Articles 5 & 6)
ü“Preserve the strategic balance in Europe”
ü1999
üProvide indispensable stable security foundation through democratic institutions and peaceful
resolution of disputes
üServe as forum for Allied consultations (Article 4)
üDeter & defend (Articles 5 & 6)
üContribute to effective conflict prevention, crisis response ops
üPartnership beyond membership

Partnership for Peace (1994)
üAll former Soviet, Warsaw Pact, neutrals in Europe
üOther “global partners” since 2011
ü“build individual relationship” with NATO
üEuroAtlantic Partnership Council [today]
ü29 Members [soon to be 30]
ü21 Partners [soon to be 20]
ü7 from Mediterranean Dialogue
ü4 from Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
ü8 “global partners”
ü
ü

Who’s Who … & When?
1.Belgium
2.Canada
3.Denmark
4.France
5.Italy
6.Luxembourg
7.Netherlands
8.Iceland
9.Norway
10.Portugal
11.UK
12.USA
13.Greece (‘52)
14.Turkey (’52)
15.Germany (‘55)
1.Armenia
2.Azerbaijan
3.Belarus
4.Georgia
5.Kazakhstan
6.Kirgizstan
7.Moldova
8.Russia
9.Tajikistan
10.Turkmenistan
11.Ukraine
12.Uzbekistan
13.Bosnia-Herzegovina
14.Serbia
ü
15.Austria
16.Finland
17.Ireland
18.Malta
19.Sweden
20.Switzerland
PARTNERS
MEMBERS

The Enlargement Debate
üApril 1993: Clinton w/Vaclav Havel & Lech Walesa
üClinton foreign policy theme: promote democracy
üTony Lake (NSC): “The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement …of
the world’s free community of market democracies.” [1993]
üBureaucratic pushback:
üDefense: Partnership for Peace more practical
üState: Enlargement would antagonize Russia

The Enlargement Decision
üDecisive arguments:
üDemocracy in Central Europe fragile; need assurance
üRussia had cooperated on 4+2 … why not this?
üNeed to coordinate “enlargement track” and new initiatives regarding Russia & Ukraine
üGradual ... not “fast track” time line: 1994-1997
üPracticalities: 1,200 NATO Standardization Agreements
üMay 1997 – signing of NATO-Russia Founding Act
üJuly 1997 – invitation to PO, HU, CZ

Consultation Commitments
üArticle 4, Washington Treaty (1949)
ü“The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial
integrity, political independence, or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”
üParagraph 8, Partnership for Peace Framework Document (1994)
ü“NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a
direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.”
ü

NATO-Russia Founding Act
[May 1997]
ü“NATO and Russia will promptly consult within the Permanent Joint Council in case one of the
Council members perceives a threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or
security.
ü“… to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate, ... joint decisions and joint action ….
ü“... do not provide NATO or Russia, in any way, with a right of veto over the actions of the
other, nor do they infringe upon or restrict the rights of NATO or Russia to independent
decision-making and action.”
üRecite international obligations … aspirational cooperation
ü

Unilateral NATO Assurances
ü“… in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will [ensure] the necessary
interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent
stationing of substantial combat forces.
üRussia will exercise similar restraint in its force deployments …
ü“… no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members,
… and do not foresee any future need to do so.
ü“… no intention, no plan, and no reason to establish nuclear weapon storage sites on the territory
of those members

NATO Ukraine Charter
July 1997
ü“Distinctive partnership” between NATO and Ukraine
ü“Allies ... support Ukrainian sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity, democratic
development, economic prosperity and its status as a non-nuclear weapon state, and the principle of
inviolability of frontiers ....”
ü~ December 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances
ü“NATO and Ukraine will develop a crisis consultative mechanism to consult together whenever
Ukraine perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or
security.”
üAnticipated closer, substantive cooperation
ü

Reaffirming the “Open Door”?
ü2008 Bucharest Summit:  “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for
membership in NATO.  We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO …
üMembership Action Plan …
ü2016 Warsaw Summit … “recognized progress”
üMontenegro – 2017 (post-coup attempt on date of vote)
üNorth Macedonia – 2019? (what’s in a name?)
üBosnia-Herzegovina … Serbia (ever?)

Look-ahead to 3 May
1200-1540 (U43)
üNATO & Post-Cold War Conflicts: The Balkans
üReading Assignment:
üSloan, Chapter 8 [in FSS library]
üWebber, “The Kosovo War” [posted in IS]
üAybet & Moore, Chapter 8 (Cascone) [in FSS library]
üEssay #1 DUE AT BEGINNING OF CLASS:
üAssess whether NATO was successful during the Cold War … and explain reasons for NATO’s success.
üThesis paragraph – define what you mean by success
üAnalysis – be specific
üConclusion – can be “mixed” but ensure analysis supports
üWRITE CLEARLY … PROOFREAD

NATO & Post-Cold War Conflicts: The Balkans
Sessions 6 & 7
Friday, 3 May 2019
1200-1340 (U43)
1400-1540 (U43)

Yugoslav Civil War
ü1980: death of Tito … power-sharing arrangements
ü1989: Milosevic at 600th anniversary of Battle of Kosovo
ü1991: Slovenia & Croatia declare independence
ü1992: Bosnia declares independence … Sarajevo shelling
ü1993: UN 6 x “Safe Areas” … [Srebrenica massacre 1995]
ü1994: NATO first air combat sorties
ü1995: Dayton Peace Accords re Bosnia
ü1995: NATO IFOR (32 states; 52,000 troops); SFOR til 2004
ü

Spillover to Kosovo
üAlbanian/Muslim enclave in Serbia (Serb enclave within)
üAutonomous region status revoked 1989 by Milosevic
üKosovo Liberation Army formed 1991 … attacks 1995
üSpiral of violence & atrocities
üSep 1998 – UNSC Resolution ~ 250,000 refugees
üNext day … NATO “activation warning”
ü30 January 1999 … NAC gave “preauthorization” of bombing
ü23 March-3 June – bombing campaign

Lessons Learned?
üThere is a difference between “legal” and “legitimate”
üThe sometimes inadequacy of law and diplomacy
üForce in the pursuit of peace is justified
üBut it still may not succeed
üMilitary force can change the “situation on the ground”
üBut it may not always “compel” a political solution
üIf force is used, then be clear about the objectives
ü… which must be political, not military
üDiplomacy is necessary before using military force …
ü… and just as necessary afterwards to avoid renewed conflict

Look-ahead to 6 May
1600-1940 (U41)
üNATO & Post-9.11 Conflicts: Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria
üReading Assignment:
üSloan, Chapters 9 & 11 [in FSS library]
üYost, Chapters 4 & 5 [in FSS library]
üTeams should be preparing for Simulation on Thursday, 9 May
üTeam & Role SIGNS
üTeam GOALS Due Thursday, 9 May
üEssay #2 Due Thursday, 9 May
ü

NATO & Post 9.11 Conflicts: Afghan, Iraq, Libya, Syria
Sessions 8 & 9
Monday, 6 May 2019
1600-1740 (U41)
1800-1940 (U41)

Essay #1 Comments
üOverall – good … no “wrong” answers
üThe best essays were those that “dug deeper” into the nature of success and the reasons
üMore than simply … no war, therefore success
üBringing Europe together … restoring Germany … creating security structure that former Warsaw Pact
wanted to join?
üEnglish not your first language … practice writing
üCapitalization
üWord choice – be more efficient [“unnecessarily wordy”]
üParagraph structure

Reminder … Essay #2 Due Thursday
üAssess whether NATO has been successful since the Cold War in adapting to new strategic challenges
… and explain reasons for NATO’s success or lack of success.
üThesis paragraph – define what you mean by success
üAnalysis – be specific
üConclusion – can be “mixed” but ensure analysis supports
üWRITE CLEARLY … PROOFREAD
ü500 words … typed … double spaced
üHard copy delivered at beginning of class THURSDAY
ü
ü

Post 9.11 Conflicts
Global NATO?
üAfghanistan ~ response to invocation of Article 5
üIraq ~ thanks but no thanks, US
üLibya ~ France & Italy force NATO’s hand
üSyria ~ paralysis
ü
üIs there a pattern?
üIs NATO “stretching its legs” or “finding its limits”?
ü

Afghanistan
üInitially U.S. reluctant to engage NATO in Afghanistan
ü“The coalition must not be permitted to determine the mission.”  (SecDef Rumsfeld, September 2001)
üBy December 2001 … Bonn Agreement
üInternational Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
üUK command … then Turkey … then Germany/Netherlands
üAugust 2003 – NATO officially takes command of ISAF
ü6,500 to 10,000 troops in 2003 … over 60,000 by 2009
üOperation Enduring Freedom … additional 38,500 U.S. troops

Afghanistan – An Assessment
üThe Good News:
üNATO comprehensive support in spite of Iraq War
üAlliance consensus over a decade in global mission despite challenges in Afghanistan and domestic
support at home
üSome effective reconstruction efforts

Afghanistan – An Assessment
üThe Good News:
üNATO comprehensive support in spite of Iraq War
üAlliance consensus over a decade in global mission despite challenges in Afghanistan and domestic
support at home
üSome effective reconstruction efforts
üThe Bad News:
üAs a counterinsurgency effort, it has not been a success
üNo consensus on priorities:
üCounterterrorism vs Counterinsurgency vs Reconstruction

Iraq 2003
ü2002 UN Security Council debate
üU.S. & UK vs. France & Germany
üNo “trigger”
üNo credible connection between Saddam & 9.11
ü“coalition of the willing: U.S., UK, Poland, Spain [why?]
üMarch 2003-June 2004 … war & U.S. occupation
üNATO officially on the sidelines
üOthers (e.g. Germany) joined post-war training effort, once Iraqi sovereignty restored … but
impact?

Libya 2011
üFebruary 2011 – Libyan “Arab Spring” uprisings
üUNSC – sanctions, froze bank assets, arms embargo, war crimes to ICC
üArab League suspended Qaddafi, asked for no-fly zone
üUNSCR 1973 authorized states, “regional organizations”
ü“… all necessary means to protect civilians …” [meaning Qaddafi]
ü“… excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory
üFirst invocation of “Responsibility to Protect”
ü
ü

Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
2005 UN “World Summit Document”
ü138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of
such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that
responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as
appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United
Nations in establishing an early warning capability.

Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
2005 UN “World Summit Document”
ü139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and
VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity.
üIn this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner,
through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a
case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should
peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

Syria
üLimits to coalition
üNo UNSC Resolution
üNo Alliance consensus
üInevitable conflict with Russia
üComplications with Turkey
üNATO SecGen: “use of force would complicate matters …”
ü
ü

Global NATO?
üClear competence when:
üBacking by UN Security Council resolution
üEuropean allies not otherwise directly involved
üDefined political objectives
üConfined role of military force
üNot a diversion from more “core” missions
ü
üAre Afghanistan and Libya exceptions or harbingers?
ü WHY or WHY NOT?

Lessons Learned?
Would you change any of these from Balkans?
üThere is a difference between “legal” and “legitimate”
üThe sometimes inadequacy of law and diplomacy
üForce in the pursuit of peace is justified
üBut it still may not succeed
üMilitary force can change the “situation on the ground”
üBut it may not always “compel” a political solution
üIf force is used, then be clear about the objectives
ü… which must be political, not military
üDiplomacy is necessary before using military force …
ü… and just as necessary afterwards to avoid renewed conflict

Look-ahead to 7 May
0800 (U43) & 1600 (P22)
üNATO, Russia, & Ukraine
üReading Assignment:
üSloan, Chapter 7 [in FSS library]
üAybet & Moore, Chapter 5 (Smith) [in FSS library]
üFoerster, “NATO’s Return” [posted in IS]
üCecire, “Russia’s Art of War” [posted in IS]
üNATO Strategic Concept (2010) [NATO website]
üNATO-Russia-Ukraine documents [NATO website]
ü1600 – team consultation time [no formal class meeting]

NATO, Russia, & Ukraine
Sessions 10 & 11
Tuesday, 7 May 2019
0800-0940 (U43)
1600-1740 (P22)

NATO 2010 Strategic Concept
Active Engagement – Modern Defense
ü“fundamental & enduring purpose … safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by
political and military means.”
üCollective Defense ~ Article 5 … deter & defend
üCrisis Management ~ “political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the
potential to affect Alliance security”
üCooperative Security ~ “engage actively to enhance int’l security”
ücontribute actively to arms control, non-proliferation, & disarmament
ükeep the door to membership … open to all European democracies that meet NATO’s standards.
ü“Today, the EuroAtlantic area is at peace … the threat of conventional attack is low” …  “historic
success”

Wales Summit Declaration
 September 2014
ü“Russia’s aggressive actions against Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe
whole, free, and at peace.”
üGrowing instability from Middle East to North Africa … transnational threats
üNATO Readiness Action Plan + Spearhead Force (5,000)
üSupport reinforcement capacity – 8 C2 centers
ü2 combat brigades of prepositioned equipment
üNATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF)
ü“aim to move towards the 2% guideline within a decade”
ü

ü“We condemn in the strongest terms Russia’s escalating and illegal intervention in Ukraine …
ü“… violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty & territorial integrity …
ü“... do not and will not recognize illegal and illegitimate ‘annexation’ of Crimea”
ü“We support sanctions imposed by the EU and others …”
ü“Suspend all practical civilian & military cooperation between NATO & Russia … political channels
… remain open” [Amb]
ü“commend people of Ukraine … encourage Ukraine to further promote an inclusive political process …
show restraint”
Wales Summit Declaration
 NATO – Russia – Ukraine

Warsaw Summit Communique
 July 2016
ü“There is an arc of insecurity and instability along NATO’s periphery and beyond … a range of
security challenges and threats that originate both from the east and from the south.”
ü“Enhanced forward presence”
üBeginning 2017 [January 2017 exercise in Poland: 1,500 troops]
üMultinational forces … voluntary, sustainable, rotational basis”
ü4 battalions (CA, GE, UK, US) in Estonia Latvia, Lithuania, Poland
ü4,000 U.S. troops (combat brigade) + 2,000 prepositioned equipment
üRomania ~ multinational “framework brigade” for training for operations in SE Europe, Black Sea

Range of Security Threats
üMilitary intimidation ~ force presence, incursions in air, sea and land operations … intent to
use?
ü“Hybrid” or “non-linear” warfare
üGoals political ~ means are disruptive, cheap, risk-averse
üShaping the narrative – defining alternative realities
ü“Reflexive Control” to shape opponents’ responses
ü“Four D’s” of disinformation
üDismiss – Distort – Distract – Dismay
üHow to assess – defeat – deny – coordinate NATO response
ü
ü

Strategic Questions
A guide for crisis decision-making
üWhat “end states” does NATO want to achieve?
üWhat “end states” can NATO accept?  At what cost?
üWhat are Russia’s strategic goals?  Others’?
üHow does NATO address those goals to avoid conflict yet maintain the integrity of the Alliance?
üWhat are NATO’s “redlines”?
üDoes NATO have a comprehensive set of political and military tools with which to respond?
üMeans must be commensurate with ends
ü

Overview of Crisis Simulation
September 2019


Overview of Crisis Simulation
September 2019
üUkraine
üRussia still supporting separatists in Eastern Ukraine
üDeteriorating economic situation in Crimea ~ Land Bridge?
üSporadic violations of ceasefire
üNo progress in Minsk negotiations
üUS-Russian relations
üIncreasingly hard line toward US
üRussian military exercise near Baltics … forces within 100 km
üIncreased sea/air patrols in Baltic & Black Seas
üKaliningrad – unofficial request to Putin for “land bridge”
ü

Overview of Crisis Simulation
September 2019
üBaltic & Central European States
üGrowing anti-Russian sentiment, anxiety, in Estonia & Latvia
üPublic protests by Russian speakers … also unknown protesters
üBaltic governments increased “resistance training”
üPoland lobbying US for military base & nuclear weapons storage
üTHIS WEEK
üViolence in Riga & Tallinn; shops burned; arrests; dozens killed
üMany arrested suspected of being Russian intelligence “infiltrators”
üKremlin warnings; increased air patrols, troops moving west
üCyber attacks vs. Estonian government, finance, anti-Russian NGOs
ü
ü

Overview of Crisis Simulation
September 2019
üTODAY
üThis morning, the governments of both Estonia and Latvia—joined by Lithuania and Poland—issued an
urgent request to NATO for military reinforcements to be sent immediately to Estonia and Latvia to
deter what they said was an increasing possibility of Russian military intervention.
üTHURSDAY
üNAC to meet with Foreign & Defense Ministers
üSecretary General issues guidelines … asks for recommendations
üEACH DELEGATION SHOULD PREPARE GOALS
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ü
ü

NATO Simulation Roles
NATO MEMBER
FOREIGN MINISTER
DEFENSE MINISTER
Czech Republic
Ondřej Čábelka
Stanislav Štěpánek
Estonia
Natálie Zelinková
Michal Sojka
France
Maxime Biesaga
Kristýna Pavlíčková
Germany
Tomáš Mičík
Terézia Rekšáková
Greece
Jozef Mačák
Kryštof Šír
Latvia
Christian Alfonso Bruccoleri
Yann Alexis Schafeitel
Hungary
Jan Rumlena

Lithuania
Peter Köles
Eliška Benešová
Norway
Viktória Neradná
Marek Bukovský
Poland
Pavel Brejcha
Michalis Christou
Slovakia
Daniel Perjan
Michaela Bennárová
United Kingdom
Denis Janšta
Alexandra Pavelová
United States
Javad Ahmadov
Natálie Kozáková

Look-ahead to 9 May
0800-1140 (U41)
üNATO’s Future: How will it respond to the next crisis?
üADVANCE BACKGROUND PAPER [posted in IS]
üAdditional Press Reports to be provided through IS late 8 May
üReading Assignment:
üFoerster, “Structural Change in Europe” [posted in IS]
üCrisis Simulation TEAM Point Paper on GOALS due in class
üEssay #2 due in class
üCome prepared to:
üThink hard! … Work creatively in a team! … Have fun!