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The New Counterterrorism: Contemporary Counterterrorism Trends in the United States and Israel

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In the first decade of the twenty-first century we are witnessing the emergence of a new form of counterterrorism in several democratic states. This new counterterrorism is ideological–religious in its rhetorical outlook, networked in its organizational structures, increasingly lethal in its operational tactics and more and more brutal in its methods. The shift to an ideological–religious discourse can be traced back to a conceptual transformation about the nature of terrorism, from the notion of terrorism as a “crime” to that as a “war”. The latter, differently from the former, requires ideological justification, which in states with strong religious constituencies, such as the USA and Israel, can partially be sought and acquired on a religious basis. Second, the new counterterrorism is based on normalization of extra-judicial means in the fight against terrorism. This has happened at three levels: by creation of overt and covert extra-jurisdictional domains—or legal black holes—outside of the human rights regimes of democratic states, by legitimization of torture at political, intellectual and popular cultural levels and by increasingly widespread use of extra-judicial killings of terrorist suspects. Third, the tactics used by new counterterrorism agencies are increasingly lethal and lead to disproportionately high number of casualties among innocent civilians. This development is to a large extent due to hardening of traditional counterterrorism targets and use of imprecise technology and intelligence in operations. Finally, the new counterterrorism is networked and often beyond the control of the judicial sovereignty of courts. This is largely due to informal contacts developed within the framework of the post 9/11 extraordinary rendition program and outsourcing and privatization of counterterrorism related activities and the ensuing contractual arrangements between state institutions and private enterprises.

The main argument of this article is perhaps a controversial one. In the first decade of the twenty-first century a new form of counterterrorism is emerging in several democratic states. This “new counterterrorism” is ideological–religious in its rhetorical outlook, networked in its organizational structures, increasingly lethal in its operational tactics, and more and more brutal in its methods. As a result of this qualitative change, counterterrorism efforts of these states display similarities with the “new terrorism”—the foe that they are meant to fight—at discursive, organizational, tactical, and methodological levels.¹

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This article will attempt to substantiate this argument with particular reference to two countries, the United States and Israel, that are world leading in the areas of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. The next section will focus on the ideological–religious dimension of the new counterterrorism discourses with specific reference to the presidential speeches in the United States and the current ideological outlook and composition of the military in Israel. In the case of the United States, this shift to an ideological–religious counterterrorism narrative will be traced back to a conceptual transformation as regards to the nature of terrorism, from the notion of “terrorism as an act of crime” to that of “terrorism as an act of war.” The latter, differently from the former, requires justification and legitimacy, which in countries with strong religious constituencies—such as the United States and Israel—can, to a certain extent, be sought and acquired on a religious basis. The theme of the following section is normalization of extra-judicial means. This aspect of new counterterrorism has three important dimensions: the creation of overt or covert extra-judicial domains that are unregulated by the human rights law of democratic states, the acceptance and legitimization of torture at political, intellectual, and popular levels, and the increasingly widespread use of extra-judicial killings as an acceptable method of eliminating terrorist suspects. The section after will explore the increasingly lethal tactics used by new counterterrorism agencies. One important consequence of the use of these tactics, such as airstrikes against terrorist suspects and terrorist havens, is the disproportionately large number of casualties among civilians who happen to live in the conflict areas. Hardening of terrorist environments, which have become impenetrable for surgical operations and technological problems involved in intelligence gathering may explain why such indiscriminate tactics are used in spite of their devastating consequences for innocent civilians. Finally, the last section focuses on the new counterterrorism networks. Informal contacts developed within the framework of the extraordinary rendition program and contractual arrangements between state institutions and private contractors, which emerged as a result of outsourcing and privatization of activities related to counterterrorism, strengthen horizontal counterterrorism networks with global reach at the expense of the vertical sovereignty of democratic states.

Two objections can be raised against this argument. First, it can be argued that the new counterterrorism argument is based on an overgeneralization: What is observed as new is nothing more than the idiosyncratic counterterrorism policies of two countries—the United States and Israel—and the equally peculiar approach to counterterrorism of one particular U.S. government—the post-11 September Bush administration. Thus, the argument could continue, the claim about the emergence of new counterterrorism does not apply to counterterrorism strategies of other democracies and of other U.S. administrations—including the present Obama administration. Although it would be desirable to broaden the analysis to comprise counterterrorism efforts of other countries such as Russia, Pakistan, India, and Indonesia (an enterprise that cannot be undertaken easily within the framework of an article) such a counterargument would be invalid on two accounts. First, it de-emphasizes the global importance of the United States and Israel in the fields of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. Both states have been prominent targets of international terrorism since the inception of modern terrorism in the late 1960s. Furthermore, with the marginalization of left-wing terrorist organizations and the emergence of Al Qaeda–style new terrorist networks, these states are two of a very few number of democratic states that are systematically targeted by *jihadi* terrorist organizations and that are on a continuous mode of terrorism alert.² Second, this counterargument over-emphasizes the role of individuals—the presidents—at the expense of institutions—the presidency. As it shall be seen in due course, contrary to many expectations, and regardless of the intentions of the current president Barack Obama,

the new U.S. government has not made any radical break with the past. It is true that secret CIA prisons have been allegedly shut down and religious metaphors have more or less disappeared from presidential speeches. However, two years into its tenure, the Obama administration is still replicating its predecessor's counterterrorism policies in many respects: the surge in Afghanistan, preservation of Guantanamo and Bagram detention centers, increased use of drones for targeted killings, and the ensuing civilians casualties.³ Moreover, in a parallel development, the public support for use of torture to extract vital information from terrorist suspects (i.e., normalization of torture) has continued to increase and reached a clear majority in opinion polls for the first time during Obama's presidency.⁴

The second possible counterargument is in some respects the opposite of the first. It could be argued that there is really nothing new about new counterterrorism, that ideology and religion have always permeated counterterrorism narratives; that civilian casualties and brutality has always been part of counterterrorism operations; and that counterterrorism agencies have always been entangled in various networks. Such a counterargument attempts to hit, what may after all be the Achilles heel of *any* claim about emergence of a new social phenomenon. In this specific context the argument would do little more than replicate, both in form and structure, "the new wars"⁵ and "the new terrorism"⁶ debate in a new area, that of "new counterterrorism." One of the purposes of the following pages is to counter this potential argument by tracing the changes in the nature of counterterrorism back to critical junctions, causal factors, overall social changes, opportunities emanating from technological developments, and by conducting historical comparisons whenever this is possible.

Ideological–Religious Discourse of the New Counterterrorism

One of the four dimensions of new counterterrorism has to do with discursive transformation of narratives related to fighting terrorism. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, counterterrorism discourses of modern democracies have increasingly acquired an ideological outlook. In countries such as the United States and Israel, where there are strong religious constituencies, this ideological outlook has also obtained a clear religious dimension and is often furnished with Christian and Jewish religious metaphors and Biblical allusions. In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, where religious constituencies are too weak to have a political impact, the ideological framework of counterterrorism is based on secular ideological metaphors such as "progress" and "modernity," brought from the Enlightenment discourse. This shift to ideology in general and to religion in particular in the rhetoric of counterterrorism can be traced back to a shift in the overriding conceptualizations of terrorism: from the notion of "terrorism as an act of crime" to that of "terrorism as an act of war." Fighting a war, differently from fighting crime, requires justification and legitimacy—thus the necessity of an ideology, religious or secular, on the basis of which such a justification can be made and legitimacy acquired.

The point of departure of the argument in this section is a distinction between two conceptualizations in the strategic thinking on counterterrorism: "terrorism as an act of crime" and "terrorism as an act of war."⁷ According to the former, terrorism, described simply as hostage taking, hijacking, killings, bombings, and assassinations is nothing more than a serious crime, which requires a criminal justice response. Terrorists, just like other culprits who commit homicide, tax evasion, money laundering, or mugging, should be tracked down, charged, tried, and convicted. Terrorism as an "act of war," on the other hand, conceptualizes terrorism as a belligerent activity, a kind of asymmetric warfare, launched by combatants who may or may not be sponsored by rogue states but who should,

nevertheless, be fought with military means. Thus, according to this view, counterterrorism is a matter of national defense rather than police action.⁸

In the United States—and to a lesser extent in the United Kingdom—there has been a shift from the conceptualization of terrorism as “an act of crime” to that as “an act of war.” The roots of this transformation can be traced back to Ronald Reagan’s first declaration of war on state-sponsored terrorism in the 1980s.⁹ Still, during the 1990s, a criminal justice response to terrorism was still prevalent in different departments of the U.S. administration,¹⁰ and a complete shift to the new paradigm did not take place before President Bush’s declaration of the “War on Terrorism” in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks.¹¹ In the United Kingdom, a similar but a half-hearted shift to the war paradigm took place, especially in connection with the invasion of Iraq in 2003, but British officials stopped using the term “War on Terror” after April 2007.¹² Israel, on the other hand, is perhaps an exception in this respect. From the very establishment of the Israeli state in 1948 until at least the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, Israeli counterterrorism responses have always been formed within the context of a state of war with the neighboring Arab states. Consequently, Israel adopted the “terrorism as a war” paradigm from the very outset of its existence.¹³

This fundamental change in the overriding view about the nature of terrorism and the counterterrorism responses to it has one important consequence, which is directly relevant to the argument put forward here: differently from diminishing crime, fighting a war requires specific justification about its necessity and widespread legitimacy in the sense of popular approval of the war. As Jackson points out, “all projects of political violence, including counter-terrorism campaigns, require significant levels of *social and political consent*—which in turn necessitates a carefully constructed public communications strategy by policy officials.”¹⁴ In a detailed study of the discursive practices in the United States after the 11 September terrorist attacks, Croft similarly considers the construction of a dominant discourse on the “war on terror” as an “elite project” but he also emphasizes the specific role of “social institutions,” and the elites operating within the “media and popular culture.”¹⁵

But, what are the main features of this discourse of counterterrorism, and particularly, the “War on Terror”? There is a significant amount of evidence in the available literature to support the view that leaders and institutions of at least two democratic states are increasingly resorting to religious metaphors and rhetoric to justify their counterterrorism measures and to mobilize masses against perceived or actual terrorist threats. In the United States, a subtle switch to religious rhetoric can be traced back to the Reagan administration. For instance, Jackson points out that in the 1980s the dichotomies of “civilization” versus “barbarism” . . . evoking images of menacing nomadic armies attempting to conquer “Christian Europe” and “good” versus “evil,” a formulation which is “[d]eeply embedded in American rhetorical traditions and religious life”¹⁶ started to make their appearances in Reagan’s speeches on terrorism and state-sponsorship of terrorism. Resort to religious metaphors reappeared, but this time much more intensively, in the “War on Terror” narrative couched by the Bush administration after the 11 September terrorist attacks. According to Silberstein, President Bush’s speech on 14 September 2001 at the National Day of Prayer and Remembrance, with all its religious metaphors and connotations, was a “rhetorical turning point.”¹⁷ Writing about this same speech, Murphy claims that “Bush interpreted the [11 September] attacks much as a Puritan would have done,” that he framed them “as a biblical test of a chosen people” and that he “ended the speech with comfort and policy, put in the language of Christian love and Christian soldiers.”¹⁸ Overall, in various speeches, President Bush referred to the “War on Terror” as a “divine calling” and at least on one occasion as a “crusade.”¹⁹ Moreover, as noted by Lincoln, in a discreet change

of an age-old discursive practice, the deliberately religious “*May God continue to bless America*” replaced the conventional and rather neutral “*God Bless America*” in presidential speeches.²⁰ Thus, referring to one of the post 9/11 speeches of Bush, Jackson notes that,

Through the combination of language, religious symbolism and ritual, [Bush] appealed directly to the beliefs of millions of American evangelical Christians and imbued the second “war on terrorism” with God’s blessing and a divine sanction. Ironically, in doing so, Bush Jr. reflectively mimicked the language of Osama bin Laden’s initial call for holy war against the United States.²¹

In a similar manner, Croft finds a direct link between “War on Terror” and eschatological Christian fundamentalism:

It is . . . perhaps unsurprising that the “war on terror” connects so clearly with the evangelical discourse about the Endtimes. When there is a war about the future of civilization, in which all have to choose which side they are on, when the enemy is evil—all of which are elements of the “war on terror” discourse—the war speaks powerfully to those who are looking for signs of Tribulation.²²

A similar shift has also taken place in Israeli counterterrorism discourses. One recent study argues that since 1967 (i.e., since the Six Day War) religion and “hawkishness” have become increasingly correlated.²³ Another study refers to the “halachic discourse on *ius ad bellum* issues,” which coincides with the mobilization of “modern-orthodox” or “religious-Zionist” [Israeli-Jewish citizens] in contradistinction to the comparatively apolitical “ultra-orthodox (*haredi*) society.”²⁴ Consequently, it should come as no surprise that during the war in Gaza in 2008 the rabbis enrolled in the Israeli Army were distributing pamphlets depicting the war in religious terms. According to one testimony, “[a]ll the articles had one clear message. . . We are the people of Israel, we arrived in the country almost by miracle, now we need to fight to uproot the gentiles who interfere with re-conquering the Holy Land. . . Many soldiers’ feelings were that this was a war of religion.”²⁵ Resorting to religious metaphors, the leaflets, which carried the Israeli army’s official stamp, referred to Israeli soldiers as “the sons of light” and Palestinians as “the sons of darkness,” comparing them to Philistines, the biblical enemy of the Jewish people.²⁶ These developments in discursive practices are in line with changes that occurred in the code of ethics and the composition of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), the main operational tasks of which have consisted—almost exclusively—of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in South Lebanon, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip since 1982. In what Cohen identifies as “a bow in the direction of national-religious sentiment,” the recently revised code of ethics of IDF, *The Spirit of the IDF*, “specifically refers to the ‘tradition of the Jewish people throughout the ages’ as one of its four main sources of inspiration.”²⁷ In the meantime, the number of “nationalist-religious” Israelis is increasing among the ranks of the IDF, especially among junior officers who make day-to-day decisions—such as whether or not to open fire—during counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. According to Cohen, “the national-religious community has now superseded the kibbutz movement as the single largest source for commanders at this critical level.” Thirty percent of Israeli lieutenants and captains and 20 percent of the recruits to the infantry brigades have nationalist-religious affiliation. Servicemen from this sector are also overrepresented among elite reconnaissance units where “the ratio is larger than three to one.”²⁸ To conclude the argument, the religious rhetoric of the pamphlets

distributed by the Israeli army had a receptive audience among those soldiers and officers who were enrolled in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations.

The cases of the United States and Israel raise the question why the ideological framework of counterterrorism discourses in these countries acquired a specifically religious outlook. The clues of a possible answer can be found in the counterterrorism narratives prevalent in the United Kingdom. As mentioned earlier, the Blair government adopted the terrorism as “an act of war” notion in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks and especially after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. However, the ideological outlook of this counterterrorism rhetoric has remained mainly secular to the extent that it resorted to metaphors from the discourses of the Enlightenment and Modernity. Due to considerations of space it is not possible to conduct a detailed analysis of Blair’s speeches on terrorism and counterterrorism here—and in contrast to Bush’s speeches, there are no studies that can be quoted. Nevertheless, to give one example among many, referring to the “we versus them” dichotomy during a Foreign Policy Speech in March 2006, Blair stated that, “[t]his is not a clash between civilizations. It is a clash about civilization. It is the age-old battle between progress and reaction, between those who embrace and see opportunity in the modern world and those who reject its existence; between optimism and hope on the one hand; and pessimism and fear on the other.”²⁹ At least two factors, which can only be formulated tentatively here as hypotheses, may explain why the United Kingdom, in contrast to the United States and Israel, did not adopt a religious discourse to justify its counterterrorism measures. First, the United Kingdom lacks the type of strong, far-right, religious constituencies, such as the Christian fundamentalists in the United States or the Orthodox-Nationalist Jews in Israel that have been so decisive in American and Israeli elections. Second, the United Kingdom has a large Muslim minority group and any resort to Christian rhetoric with Biblical metaphors and allusions would alienate British Muslims, both as voters and citizens. Both hypothetical explanations require further research.

The New Counterterrorism and Normalization of Extra-Judicial Means

Another characteristic feature of new counterterrorism is the widespread use of extra-judicial means as normal and acceptable practice of counterterrorism operations. This new trend has three main components: creation of legal black holes and extra-jurisdictional domains outside of the human rights regimes prevalent in democratic societies; normalization of torture by policymakers, academics, and producers of popular culture; and finally, increased indifference on the part of public opinion toward extra-judicial killings.

One important aspect of the contemporary counterterrorism strategies is the creation of extra-jurisdictional domains, where terrorism suspects can be kept indefinitely and exposed to harsh interrogation techniques. The purpose of creating such legal vacuums is to circumvent the obstacles and restrictions provided by the legal systems of democracies to protect the human and civic rights of the suspects. Nowhere is this novel development as apparent as in the perverted logic of extraordinary rendition in the United States in the post-11 September era. In the old-style rendition of traditional counterterrorism, the aim of rendition was to bring terrorist or other criminal suspects *within* the jurisdiction of the United States, so that they could be charged, tried and convicted in due legal process. It is true that the most high profile case of this type rendition was a counternarcotics operation involving the arrest of General Manuel Noriega in Panama on drug-trafficking charges, following the invasion of this country by U.S. troops. Nevertheless, old-style rendition was also an integral part of the United States counterterrorism efforts during the 1980s. The

kidnapping and arrest of Lebanese national Fatwa Yuniz in 1987, two years after his involvement in the hijacking of a Jordanian airliner to Beirut International Airport,³⁰ rendition of Mir Aimal Kasi from Pakistan, four years after his murder of two CIA employees at the entrance of the CIA headquarters in Virginia in 1993, and the attempted rendition of Abu Abbas (Muhammad Zaidan), the leader of the Palestinian Liberation Front, following the *Achille Lauro* incident are examples that can be quoted here.

However, the main purpose of the current rendition program, which started during the Clinton administration³¹ but became a normal practice in the post 11 September era, is to transfer terrorism suspects *outside* of the United States's territorial jurisdiction and to cast them beyond the domain of law and due legal process. This novel aspect of extraordinary rendition has been emphasized by several human rights lawyers and academics. For instance, Said Olshansky remarks that by this new program, the "entire idea of rendition was turned on its head."³² Mayer, in turn, maintains that the main purpose of the program is to "subject the suspects to aggressive methods of persuasion that are illegal in America—including torture."³³ Similarly, Slater argues that "rendition is particularly sleazy, designed as it is to evade U.S. legal prohibitions against torture."³⁴ In short, extraordinary rendition is an instrument by which the United States tortures by proxy.

Thus, according to an accumulating amount of testimonies, during the post-11 September era, terrorist suspects have been abducted by masked CIA agents, bundled up and put into executive jets, and flown away to destinations such as Egypt, Morocco, Syria, and Jordan where the suspects would simply disappear from official records.³⁵ According to one conservative estimate, up to hundred and fifty persons have been affected by extraordinary rendition since 2001.³⁶ Moreover, according to a report made public in November 2006 by the European Parliament's Temporary Committee, EU member states were complicit in the extraordinary rendition program and cooperated extensively with the CIA officials who carried it out. Given the large number of democracies involved in the extraordinary rendition of terrorism suspects, including several ostensibly liberal states such as Sweden, it is possible to conclude that this type of extra-legal procedures has become a normalized aspect of post-11 September counterterrorism operations of democracies.

The post-11 September U.S. administration has also attempted to cast terrorist suspects beyond the United States's jurisdiction by establishing detention centers outside of the territories of the United States, where they could be kept indefinitely without any trial. Several of these centers are well known to the public, such as the notorious Camp X-Ray, and later Camp Delta, in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba where, by 2009, up to two hundred and fifteen men of various nationalities were still incarcerated.³⁷ Another such detention center is the prison compound in the Bagram Airbase in northern Afghanistan, where, according to one estimate, the number of detainees has increased sixfold during the last four years and, at the time of writing, around six hundred prisoners are thought to be confined there.³⁸ However, other detention centers were/are clouded in utmost secrecy. According to several reports, the CIA held "dozens of 'high value' terrorist suspects"³⁹ in secret locations—the so-called black sites—allegedly onboard U.S. warships, where they could be exposed to aggressive interrogation methods.⁴⁰ Furthermore, from the point of view of the main argument of this article, an important element in the normalization of such extra-judicial means is the strong public support that such counterterrorism measures receive: One public opinion poll conducted in January 2010 found that 55 percent of Americans supported the detention center in Guantanamo Bay and wanted it to be kept open.⁴¹ Another opinion survey revealed that only 20 percent of the American citizens thought that the treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo was unfair, while 36 percent believed that their treatment was better than what they deserved, and 34 percent that it was "about right."⁴²

The second important aspect of the normalizations of extra-judicial means is the increased tolerance, if not outright acceptance, of torture as a morally justifiable method for extracting information from terrorist suspects. This normalization of torture has taken place at political, intellectual, and popular cultural levels. At the political level, the Bush administration adopted a double strategy of combining allusions to the use of torture with time-old euphemistic redefinitions of what torture is. According to Bellamy, “there is evidence to suggest that successive US Attorneys-General [such as John Ashcroft and Alberto Gonzales in the post 11 September era] have attempted to create a permissive legal environment for the use of torture.”⁴³ During testimony to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees a year after the 11 September attacks, Cofer Black, who was then in charge of CIA counterterrorism operations, declared that detention and arrest of terrorists was “a highly classified area. All I want to say is that there was a ‘before 9/11’ and there was an ‘after 9/11.’ After 9/11, the gloves came off.”⁴⁴ Such hints about the use of torture and harsh interrogation methods, allegedly justifiable in a new era of mass casualty terrorism, were combined with various, euphemistically narrow, redefinitions of torture. The expressions used for this purpose were numerous, such as “Category III methods,” “full coercive treatment,” “measures short of torture,” “torture-light,” “stress and duress,” “enhanced interrogation techniques,” to name a few,⁴⁵ but often they were nothing more than repetitions of old clichés. Nevertheless, several of the methods, openly acknowledged by the U.S. administration as being used during interrogations of terrorist suspects, were torture according to even a narrow definition of this term: “forceful shaking, two types of slapping, forced standing, the cold cell, and . . . waterboarding.”⁴⁶ Thus, as it has been pointed out by Rejali, “[t]he United States is avoiding the brand ‘torturer’ only by sleight of word.”⁴⁷ However, a note of caution is necessary at this point. Due to weakening of terrorist threats from Al Qaeda, diminishing number of terrorist suspects being arrested, and most importantly, the ban of the Congress and the Obama administration of torture and/or “harsh interrogation techniques used since 9/11,”⁴⁸ normalization of torture at the political level has stagnated, or even may have been reversed. However, given the fact that the public opinion in the United States is deeply divided over the issue, that the proponents of harsh interrogation techniques—as it shall be seen in due course—have acquired a clear majority in opinion polls for the first time since the inauguration of Obama’s presidency, and finally, given the possibility of mass casualty terrorist attacks and/or threats in the future and of a new presidency with a more conservative outlook that may have to deal with this new, indiscriminate terrorist campaign, the picture may change rapidly.

These developments at the political level during the last decade can be contrasted with the role played by torture in the old-style counterterrorism. It is important to emphasize here that what is new in new counterterrorism is not the use of torture *per se*. “[T]here is,” according to a detailed study of torture conducted by Rejali, “a long history of torture in the main democracies,” but “the priority in these cases was on techniques that left few marks.”⁴⁹ By using such “clean torture techniques,” state authorities tried to evade public monitoring and were able to deny the use of torture against criminal suspects—terrorists or otherwise. Such a *modus operandi* would indicate that torture, even if condoned by state authorities, was not legally acceptable, morally justifiable, or politically defensible in democratic societies, which cherished human rights as one of its core values. Thus, it had to be exercised in stealth, leaving no traces.⁵⁰ However, with the new counterterrorism, the question of whether or not, for instance, waterboarding or “two types of slapping” leave any physical traces (i.e., whether they are “clean” or “scarring techniques of torture”⁵¹) is irrelevant: these techniques have been used during the interrogation of terrorist suspects and there have been diminishingly few attempts on the part of decision makers to conceal that

they have been used. Moreover, there have been systematic and unprecedented attempts on the part of a few, but influential, intellectuals to justify their use.

Despite an intense and widespread backlash on the part of liberal academics who categorically reject resort to torture under any circumstances,⁵² a number of scholars in several sophisticated works have attempted to justify use of torture in counterterrorism operations on the basis that it can provide accurate information about future terrorist attacks. The point of departure for arguments about permissibility of torture is the so-called ticking bomb scenario where a terrorist knows the whereabouts of a ticking bomb that would cause large number of casualties. In such a situation, it is argued, torture would be the lesser of two evils. From here, one line of reasoning argues for broadening of the use of torture on the basis that “. . . individuals give up certain moral and legal rights when they are complicit with terrorists.” From such a normative premise, it is but a small step to the assertion that “the criterion should be not a ticking bomb but the prevention of future threats.”⁵³ On the opposite end, another line of argument espouses a restrictive approach and provides a moderate defense for torture. Authors adopting this position are more concerned about “slippage” into widespread torture and the “preservation of a normative context hostile to torture.”⁵⁴ Thus, according to this line of argument, prohibition of torture should be preserved and resort to torture should be restricted to very exceptional circumstances. Yet, a third line of argument departs from the *de facto* situation that state officials have always been resorting to—and will always be resorting to—torture as a method of interrogation. Hence, it is said, there is a strong case for regulating it through “torture warrants.”⁵⁵

The question as to what extent such views are convincing or logically coherent is not material to the argument presented in this article. What is important is the discussion about the legitimacy of torture, *per se*. The debate constitutes a giant step in the direction of normalization of torture, to the extent that it indicates that torture is no longer “off-limits”⁵⁶ and that “[t]he torture issue is no longer considered to be beyond—or beneath—debate.”⁵⁷ Consequences of such a development is succinctly formulated by Slater, which deserves to be quoted at length:

Until quite recently, there has been considerable doubt among moral, legal, and political philosophers about whether there ought to be any public debate about torture. Most of these thinkers believed that torture should be regarded as simply beyond the pale; public discussion or debate might have the perverse consequence of legitimating it. Indeed, even the few scholars who argued that torture could sometimes be seen as a lesser evil sometimes conceded that the risk of legitimating precluded public discussion. Whatever the validity of this concern, the issue is not moot. In the last few years, there have been a number of discussions of the torture in leading media, as well as in academic conferences and, especially, in the recent publication of major works by some of America’s leading political, legal, and moral thinkers.⁵⁸

Once the taboo concerning torture is broken, it should come as no surprise that torture starts to become an acceptable part of our daily lives, usually via popular culture and mass media output. Popular television series such as *24* and *Alias* are riddled with episodes where CIA officials torture terrorist suspects to extract information. In one episode of *Alias* a CIA official suffocates a terrorist suspect to death. None of the cases of torture or unlawful killings leads to arrests or trials of perpetrators⁵⁹ and “[o]fficially sanctioned torture occurs with regularity throughout the series.”⁶⁰ Furthermore, the change of attitudes as regards to torture has also reached popular conceptualizations of torture among ordinary American

citizens. According to a survey of American opinion polls on torture conducted by a group of scholars, support for torture among American citizens increased steadily between 2001 and 2009. Over this nine-year period, the mean was 40.8 percent in favor and 55 percent against the use of torture to extract vital information from terrorist suspects. However, by November 2007 the number of supporters and opponents of torture among the American public was equal. This trend of increased support for torture continued and in June 2009, six months into the inauguration of the Obama administration, supporters of torture showed a clear public majority in two separate opinion polls.⁶¹ During the same period, a similar majority also appeared in Israel. Although data for comparisons over time is not available, according to an opinion poll conducted by BBC in 2006, 53 percent of Israeli Jews (highest proportion among the 25 countries covered by the poll) would “allow terrorist suspects to be tortured for the sake of trying to get information that could save innocent lives.” In a manner that indicates some linkage between exposure to terrorism and acceptability of torture as an interrogation method of terrorist suspects, only 16 percent of the Israeli Muslims would agree with this statement.⁶²

The third aspect of normalization of extra-judicial means is the increasingly widespread use of extra-judicial killings as an acceptable method of eliminating terrorist suspects. It would not be an exaggeration to claim that at least in the counterterrorism operations of Israel and the United States, routine targeted assassinations have more or less replaced arrest warrants.⁶³ It is true that in Israel the government seeks an official verdict of the Attorney General before each targeted assassination, but such verdicts are nothing more than an attempt to provide a semblance of legality to what are after all extra-judicial killings and absence of due legal process.⁶⁴ In the United States, in turn, there has been a “sea change” in attitudes, from criticizing Israel for using targeted assassinations, to employing such tactics regularly in the “War on Terror”.⁶⁵ Furthermore, after the inauguration of the Obama administration, the scope and intensity of such extra-judicial killings have increased. The range of the so-called Predator Program, whereby unmanned aircrafts repeatedly attack terrorist suspects and targets, has been extended to comprise even Taliban insurgents in Pakistan.⁶⁶ Moreover, the list of the approved terrorist targets has been expanded to include even those Afghan drug lords suspected of giving financial support to the Taliban.⁶⁷ Similarly to the case of torture, this change of tactics at a practical level has been supported by normative arguments at a theoretical level.⁶⁸

Once again, it is important to identify precisely what is new in present-day counterterrorism operations. In the old-style counterterrorism, security agencies of democracies were periodically involved in assassinations of terrorism suspects. However, once revealed, such extra-judicial killings would rouse public outcry and cause embarrassment for the government, as illustrated by the case of the killing of 28 Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) suspects by Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación (GAL) death squads connected to the Spanish security services in the mid-1980s. What is new is that even in a state such as Israel, which has a long tradition of assassination of terrorist suspects and public condoning of such operations—and hence, which constitutes a hard case for the argument presented here—there have been further developments in the direction of normalization. One aspect of this normalization is related to the sheer scale of such extra-judicial killings. In Israeli counterterrorism operations, the scope of targeted killings have been broadened from being *sporadically* executed by the Israeli intelligence agency, Mossad, in territories *outside* of Israeli jurisdiction to being conducted *regularly* by Israeli Army and Air Forces *inside* territories which are under *de facto* Israeli sovereignty. Moreover, there is one further novel element to this normalization. Possibly due to suicide terrorism, the Israeli public seems to have become indifferent to the possibility that Israeli security forces might be

killing terrorist suspects who could easily have been captured, or even more, who may have already been captured.

In this respect, the case of the British wannabe suicide bomber Omar Khan Sharif is particularly illuminating. On 12 May 2003, the decomposed body of Sharif was found on a Tel Aviv beach almost two weeks after his explosive belt failed to detonate in a Tel Aviv bar. In the following days, the Israeli authorities disseminated several accounts of what had happened in the aftermath of the failed suicide attack. The common denominator of all these official accounts was that Sharif was murdered by his terrorist handlers. Such an explanation implied that Sharif had escaped from the crime scene, that Hamas had safe houses in Israel proper, either in Tel Aviv or in Jaffa, and finally, that alleged killers brought and dumped Sharif's body only a mile away from the crime scene—all of which are highly unlikely in a society which was on a continuous high terrorism alert during the Second Intifada and which is virtually impenetrable by terrorists in terms of establishing safe houses, conducting espionage on possible targets or recruitment among Israeli Arabs. Furthermore, the whole forensic investigation was kept under utmost secrecy and to this day, the Israeli authorities have not revealed the exact cause of Sharif's death. However, there is yet another explanation, at least equally plausible, according to which Sharif may have died in the hands of Israeli security officials during or after interrogation—or even before his arrest. Seen from the perspective of the argument presented here, the accuracy of all these explanations is irrelevant. The important thing is that except for Sharif's family and a radical Islamist organization, al-Muhajiroun, no one else has raised the possibility of an extra-judicial killing. No questions were asked, no explanations were given, and to this day not much is known about the circumstances surrounding Sharif's death.⁶⁹

This indifference toward the possible unlawful killing of a terrorist suspect can be contrasted with the public outrage caused by a comparable incident in Israel in the mid-1980s, the so-called Number 300 bus affair. On 12 April 1984 four members of the People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacked a bus en route to Ashkelon. After the ensuing standoff and the shoot-out, the Israeli government announced that all four gunmen were killed during the storming of the bus by the Israeli security forces. However, within a week, newspaper photographs emerged, revealing that at least one of the hijackers was alive and in handcuffs after the rescue operation. Suspicions grew that Shin Bet had extra-judicially killed two of the terrorists by crushing their skulls after they had been captured alive. The outcome was completely different from the case of Omar Khan Sharif: there was an outcry among liberal Israeli public opinion, an initial inquiry into the incident, trial of the general responsible for the storming of the bus together with eleven others, and finally, the establishment of the Landau Commission, which launched an investigation into the practices of the Israeli security services.⁷⁰

Increased Lethality of Counterterrorism Tactics

The new counterterrorism is also characterized by increased lethality of tactics used by counterterrorism agencies. Differently from the old-style counterterrorism of 1970s and 1980s, which consisted mainly of arrest warrants, surgical commando operations, and infrequent assassinations of terrorist leaders by hit teams, during the first decade of the twenty-first century, an increasingly large number of innocent civilians are becoming victims of often imprecise and disproportionately high levels of force used by counterterrorism agencies. It would not be an exaggeration to claim that for the villagers of Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Iraq or for the residents of Gaza, Lebanon, or Chechnya, the probability of getting killed during a counterterrorism or counterinsurgency operation is significantly higher than becoming a victim of a terrorist attack. This change in the impact of counterterrorism on

unarmed civilians is insufficiently captured by the expression “collateral damage,” which has entered our everyday vocabulary in the aftermath of the 11 September terrorist attacks.

At the outset, however, it is necessary to address a particular methodological problem related to identifying these lethal counterterrorism tactics precisely. With the aforementioned shift to the notion of terrorism as “an act of war,” the dividing line between counterterrorism and conventional warfare has to a very large extent blurred. One consequence of this is that the “War on Terror,” which also comprised the invasion of and the ensuing low-intensity warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq is conceptually indistinguishable from other conventional wars such as the Vietnam War or the World War II, where civilians were often deliberately targeted. As a result of this, it could be argued, as it has been done in a recent study, that respect of U.S. Armed Forces for “non-combatant immunity” has increased over the years.⁷¹ However, such a conclusion would say nothing *specific* about civilian and non-combatant casualties caused *only* by counterterrorism operations because it is based on a premise that does not distinguish between counterterrorism operations and conventional warfare. Thus, the methodological challenge is to shift the focus of attention from the behavior of conventional armed forces to the tactics used by them and other security forces and to identify specifically those tactics that are employed against terrorist suspects and terrorist havens. Only then would it be possible to measure the lethality of these counterterrorism tactics by looking at their impact on the rate of civilian casualties.

One such specific counterterrorism tactic is the use of “time sensitive” airstrikes to eliminate “high value” terrorist suspects.⁷² Such air attacks have been widely used by the United States, especially after the inauguration of the Obama administration, and by Israel. They have often been utilized as a method of targeted assassinations in the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Gaza and during the counterterrorism operations in Yemen, Pakistan, and Somalia. Regardless of the theater of operations, however, use of air force to kill individual terrorist suspects has invariably led to a large number of casualties among unarmed civilians—and often disproportionately so.

The case of Pakistan, where U.S. drone attacks against suspected Taliban and Al Qaeda targets have increased dramatically during the Obama administration, is particularly illustrative in this respect. According to a conservative estimate, which is based on press reports, 114 drone strikes in Pakistan’s tribal areas between 2004 and 2010 led to the death of between 830 to 1,210 individuals, of which 32 percent were civilians. Pakistani authorities, in turn, put the figure at 700 civilians in 2009 alone.⁷³ According to yet another report 60 drone attacks killed 687 civilians but only 14 Al Qaeda operatives.⁷⁴ Nowhere has the lethality of drone attacks been as evident as in the hunt of one of the Pakistani Taliban leaders, Baitullah Mehsud. In a period of fourteen months, CIA launched sixteen missile strikes against targets where he was suspected to be hiding. The attacks caused between 207 and 321 civilian deaths.⁷⁵

In other cases, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Gaza, it is not possible to acquire systematic data on the number of civilians killed during such airstrikes. This is due to the fact that number of civilian casualties is presented as a total toll that also includes *all* other civilians killed by armed forces at check points, tank and artillery fire, cross fire, inadvertent killing or intentional murder by soldiers—and sometimes even by insurgents. However, even the patchy data that is available suggests that increasingly high numbers of unarmed civilians are being killed in airstrikes against terrorist targets. According to a report released by Human Rights Watch in 2008, the number of civilians killed by U.S. and NATO airstrikes in Afghanistan has “nearly tripled from 2006 to 2007.”⁷⁶ Another report, this time from the UN, claims that the number of deaths and injuries caused by airstrikes in Afghanistan declined by 64 percent during the first six months of 2010 but notes that “aerial attacks . . .

remain the deadliest tactic used by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).⁷⁷ A report released by Iraq Body Count on Iraqi civilian casualties during the first two years of the invasion found that 53 percent of all civilian deaths were caused by explosives, and that of these 64 percent were due to airstrikes by coalition forces. The report does not differentiate between conventional warfare and counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations but notes that only 30 percent of these civilian deaths had occurred during the invasion phase of the conflict, that is, before 1 May 2003, when the hostilities had the nature of a conventional war.⁷⁸ A similar pattern of increased lethality among unarmed civilians is also discernable in Israeli counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. During the Second Intifada (2000–2003), in Lebanon in 2006 and in Gaza in 2008, Israeli counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations led to disproportionately high numbers of casualties among unarmed civilians and non-combatants. However, similar to other cases mentioned earlier, it is not possible to determine the percentage of civilian casualties caused by time sensitive airstrikes against high value terrorist targets.

A particularly ominous development in this respect is the disregard shown for the lives of the family members of terrorist suspects during these air attacks. For instance, during the Gaza War in 2008–2009, a one-ton Israeli bomb killed the Hamas leader Nizar Rayan and six members of his family on 1 January 2009.⁷⁹ In another notorious case during the Second Intifada, an Israeli airstrike killed one of the military leaders of Hamas, Salah Shehadeh, together with eleven civilians, among them seven children. Shehadeh's wife and three sons were among the death.⁸⁰ Similarly, the missile that killed Taliban leader, Baitullah Mehsud in Pakistan on 5 August 2009, also killed his wife, his father-in-law, and his mother-in-law.⁸¹ In another drone strike, this time in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda leader, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, was killed on 1 June 2010, together with his wife and three children.⁸² This modus operandi of disregard of the lives of the family members of terrorists and insurgents is a far cry from old-style counterterrorism of 1970s and 1980s, where surgical assassinations of terrorist leaders by intelligence agents or special forces units and taking special precautions to protect the third parties were the norm.⁸³

Given the large number of civilian casualties involved, one is prompted to ask why these tactics are used in the first place. Two possible reasons can be mentioned tentatively here: The first reason has to do with the *hardening of counterterrorism targets*, which have paradoxically gone through a similar development as the terrorist targets. Over the last two decades, leaders and cadres of terrorist organizations have become better protected against old-style counterterrorism tactics, such as surgical operations by Special Forces or assassinations by undercover agents. The terrorist environments have become increasingly impenetrable for security forces. New terrorists operate from inaccessible and hostile territories such as the tribal areas in Pakistan or stateless territories of Gaza, Afghanistan, or Somalia. Moreover, several of these organizations, such as Hizbullah in Lebanon, have developed state-like counterespionage networks that may give advance warning of counterterrorism operations and provide information that can be used effectively to thwart them. Finally, several incidents such as the unsuccessful Israeli commando operation in al-Ansariyah in Lebanon in 1997 which resulted in the ambush and deaths of 11 Israeli elite troops and the Battle of Mogadishu, in Somalia in 1993 where 19 American troops were killed after being trapped in a hostile zone of the city following an unsuccessful attempt to arrest several insurgent leaders, may have convinced decision makers about the difficulties involved in employing old-style counterterrorism and counterinsurgency tactics in hardened and vigilant terrorist environments.⁸⁴ As a result of such developments, use of special ground forces or intelligence agents for assassinations or other types of counterterrorism operations has become unacceptably dangerous for counterterrorism agencies

that are concerned with force protection. As has been aptly formulated by Etzioni, “[u]sing Special Forces or regular troops instead of UAS [Unmanned Aircraft Systems] increases our casualties and tends to undermine public support for the mission.”⁸⁵ Due to the absence of other, relatively risk-free alternatives, the answer, thus, is to attack such terrorist targets from the safety of air, despite the high number of casualties among innocent civilians that such airstrikes often cause. In the words of an observer, “[t]he reason the Administration continues to use it [the drone program] is obvious: it doesn’t really have anything else.”⁸⁶ It is somewhat ironic that increased indiscriminateness and lethality of counterterrorism on the one hand and terrorism on the other should have causes that are *structurally* similar: just as hardening of terrorist targets by antiterrorism measures such as crash barriers, enhanced VIP protection, and airport security, has caused terrorists to shift to soft targets and attack civilians,⁸⁷ a similar hardening of terrorist environments has led counterterrorism agencies to adopt tactics that lead to unacceptable levels of civilian casualties. The main difference seems to be related to the *agency* involved: while new terrorist organizations kill civilians intentionally the new counterterrorism agencies do so inadvertently—but, as it shall be seen in due course, not without exceptions and not without a certain amount of indifference.

The second possible reason has to do with *technological problems* involved in time sensitive targeting of high value terrorist suspects. While pre-planned airstrikes, according to a study on the use of air force in Iraq commissioned by the U.S. Air Force and conducted by Human Rights Watch and RAND, do not cause “significant numbers” of civilian casualties, this is not the case with strikes against “high value targets under time pressure.” Such attacks were usually based on poor intelligence acquired from “intercepts from satellite phones” although “the technology used for tracking the coordinates associated with these phones was known to be inaccurate.” Moreover, in most of these airstrikes in Iraq there was no human intelligence to confirm the target’s location or to estimate the collateral damage after the airstrike was launched.⁸⁸ Both of these explanations require further research.

Counterterrorism, Outsourcing, and Networks

The fourth characteristic feature of new counterterrorism is its increasingly horizontal and networked organizational structure. This feature is succinctly encapsulated in the frequently quoted maxim, “it takes a network to fight a network,”⁸⁹ whereby Al Qaeda in particular and new terrorism in general are regarded as horizontally networked terrorist activities that can *only* be countered by a similarly flat network of counterterrorism agencies.⁹⁰ Thus, both as a matter of normative statement and fact, vertical, hierarchical, and strictly controlled organizational structures are becoming something of the past not only in the sphere of terrorism but also in domain of counterterrorism.

One important aspect of horizontal counterterrorism networks has already been mentioned earlier: the extraordinary rendition program. As a network of counterterrorism agencies, the program is unprecedented both in terms of its global reach and with regard to its almost completely informal character. It is based on unofficial contacts and cooperation between intelligence agencies of the United States, a number of European Union member states, several Eastern European states, and, finally, the security services of a range of repressive states.⁹¹ This can be contrasted to one of the most notorious networks of old-style counterterrorism in 1970s, Operation Condor, which was limited to Latin America in its scope (despite the global scale of left-wing terrorism at that time), which, with the exception of the involvement of the United States, excluded participation of Western democracies, and that had institutionalized structures to the extent that it was established officially in November 1975 and had its formal headquarters in Santiago, Chile.⁹²

Similarly, to give another example from old-style counterterrorism, dissemination of the French counterterrorism experiences from the Algerian War of Independence took place through formal channels, as “nations states, including the U.S.” invited “French instructors into their military academies and special operations programs.”⁹³ Furthermore, the aforementioned purpose of the extraordinary rendition program to transfer suspects *from* U.S. jurisdiction *to* the custody of intelligence agencies of various repressive states implies, per definition, strengthening of horizontal networks at the expense of the vertical power of the legislature and judiciary. In the words of Slater, “. . . rendition is obviously inconsistent with the need to develop a system of executive, legislative, and judicial controls over torture and coercion.”⁹⁴ By contrast, the old-style rendition, which aimed at bringing terrorist and other criminal suspects *under* U.S. jurisdiction, was geared toward strengthening the top-down, judicial sovereignty of the U.S. courts.

Another and a much more conspicuous new development in counterterrorism networks has to do with the outsourcing and privatization of counterterrorism-related activities. This unprecedented development is in line with a more general trend in advanced democracies where, due to the specialized nature of warfare and a normative drive toward increased privatization, private security markets have expanded tremendously since 1980s and private firms have overtaken some of the key military, security, and police functions that were traditionally performed by the state.⁹⁵ Especially in the aftermath of the 11 September terrorist attacks, this form of outsourcing and privatization has expanded to comprise even those areas that are closely related to counterterrorism.⁹⁶ It is true that resort to private enterprise in several of these areas, such as logistics and construction, do not pose any deviation from the past, as state authorities have always tended to use the private sector to acquire such services. However, other privatized key areas are highly sensitive and non-state activity would have been inconceivable just a couple of decades ago. Business corporations and private contractors are currently involved in “intelligence gathering and analysis and the making of operational combat plans,”⁹⁷ maintaining, loading, and flying unmanned aircraft used in targeted assassinations (the so-called Predator Program),⁹⁸ convoy and public VIP protection, and finally, and perhaps most controversially, participation in combat operations including “serving the CIA paramilitary units” as in Afghanistan.⁹⁹

In two respects, outsourcing and privatization in these key areas is related to the emergence of new counterterrorism networks. First, in a manner similar to the extraordinary rendition program mentioned earlier, this transfer of counterterrorism tasks from public service to private enterprise *weakens hierarchical institutional structures* that are based on vertical principal-agent relationships, transparency, and democratic accountability. In other words, what one has here is, to use Kenney’s eloquent expression, gradual replacement of “sovereignty-bound bureaucracies” with “sovereignty-free networks.”¹⁰⁰ This has taken place in several ways. First of all, relations between state agencies, such as the Department of Homeland Security or Department of Defense on the one hand and private military companies and other private suppliers on the other are regulated by business-style contracts among equals. Such a contract may be broken or upheld or disputed, but it does not entail authoritative questioning on the part of state agents, and hence, any form of political or administrative accountability. Consequently, differently from civil servants of a state institution, the private companies remain autonomous, both in theory and in practice, and monitoring of their activities, during the duration of the contract, remains highly problematic.¹⁰¹ Furthermore, outsourcing and privatization of military and counterterrorism activities infringes on the checks and balances of the U.S. political system and undermines the top-down authority of the legislative power. By means of using private military companies, the U.S. administration (i.e., the executive power) can weaken legislative

oversight by circumventing the cap on troop deployments put by the Congress,¹⁰² by exploiting the existent high threshold for the value of contracts for the mandatory notification of the Congress,¹⁰³ and finally, by circumventing policy restrictions put by the legislature or the public opinion by asking the country wishing to receive U.S. training and support to purchase these services from designated private companies.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, another factor that weakens vertical links and control of these private actors is the specific nature of contractual arrangements. Differently from U.S. military personnel, private military companies and private contractors, as pointed out by Von Hoffman, “have not taken an oath of allegiance to the United States and its Constitution, nor are they subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice.”¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, these private actors are not subject to the Freedom of Information Act and “[t]hey can act entirely in private, abetted by a Defense Department that blocks inquiries by invoking its obligation to protect the firms’ ‘propriety information.’”¹⁰⁶ In short, one consequence of outsourcing and privatization of counterterrorism-related activities is the weakening of top-down, Weberian monopoly of legitimate use of violence against terrorists and its substitution with counterterrorism networks that comprise both state and private actors.

Second, privatization and outsourcing in the fields of military, security, and counterterrorism have also *strengthened horizontal networks* among a range of private, non-state actors where various state institutions are nothing more than participants in a complicated set of contractual arrangements. For instance, many private military companies work as “virtual companies” similar to Internet companies and rather than having permanent employees “draw from databases of qualified personnel and specialized subcontractors on a contract-by contract basis.”¹⁰⁷ Moreover, such private companies are also enrolled in a complex web of financial arrangements with other companies, which may or may not be operating in the same field.¹⁰⁸ Finally, states and other private firms are not the only consumers of the services of private military contractors: in a paradoxical strengthening of worldwide horizontal networks, private military companies also provide services to militia groups, sub-state private armies, organized crime, and, most perplexingly, terrorists.¹⁰⁹ Thus, through this muddle of horizontal networks, new counterterrorism agencies are indirectly—and somewhat ironically—connected to their adversaries, which they are meant to annihilate.

Conclusions

It would be appropriate to finish this article with a final note about the similarities between the new counterterrorism and the new terrorism. In the academic literature, it is a common practice to study terrorism and counterterrorism separately from each other as if they were mutually independent entities. Even the methods and aims of research on these subjects tend to be different. Research on terrorism usually employs social scientific methods with the purpose of achieving conceptual clarity, finding behavioral patterns and causal explanations, conducting historical case studies about specific terrorist campaigns, understanding rationality of terrorist organizations, and formulating psychological explanations about individual participation. Research on counterterrorism, on the other hand, is inclined to be prescriptive and policy orientated. The purpose is often to predict future terrorist threats in order to supply current governments with a range of policy options to counter such threats. However, once one looks at both terrorism and counterterrorism from the same perspective, similarities and parallel developments are noticed at strategic, tactical, structural, and discursive levels. This should perhaps come as no surprise as both terrorism and counterterrorism operate within the same political and social context and are influenced by the same societal factors and changes. More importantly, both terrorist organizations

and counterterrorism agencies learn from each other through what Kenney has aptly called, “competitive adaptation.”¹¹⁰

In some cases this parallel development in terrorism and counterterrorism is explicitly interrelated and, to a certain extent, the outcome of advice given by academics, think tanks, and terrorist ideologues. Nowhere is this feature clearer than in the aforementioned maxim “it takes a network to fight a network,” a notion that is promoted by several counterterrorism strategists and according to which fighting terrorist networks requires equally flexible and flat counterterrorism networks that can rapidly react to changing circumstances. This is in line with a similar development among new terrorist organizations, which have openly adopted a “new strategic concept” that aims to replace hierarchical elements of central organizations with individual initiative of locally recruited *jihadists*.¹¹¹ Furthermore, in the secularized world of the 1960s and 1970s, God was, to paraphrase one of President Bush’s famous speeches,¹¹² neutral in the fight between terrorists, who were almost always inspired by secular and often left-wing ideologies and counterterrorism efforts of the law enforcement agencies of democratic states, which were overwhelmingly secular in their outlook. However, with the ascendancy of religion as a reaction to globalization,¹¹³ religious metaphors have infused the discourses of both terrorists organizations engaged in violent campaigns and state officials enrolled in counterterrorism efforts—although this is much more clear in the rhetoric of the former, who are putatively launching a religious war, than in the language of the latter, who still have a large secular constituency to take into account. Finally, the era of easy targets is over, both for terrorist organizations and for counterterrorism agencies. The classical terrorist targets such as VIPs, symbolic state buildings, governmental officials, and civilian aircrafts have gradually been hardened since 1970s and they are now well protected. However, a similar development has also occurred with traditional targets of counterterrorism agencies. The United States’s unsuccessful attempts to capture or kill Al Qaeda leaders, Osama bin Laden (until recently), and Ayman al-Zawahiri or Israel’s foiled attempts to locate and assassinate the Hizbullah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, during the 2006 War in Lebanon or its disastrous attempt to assassinate the Hamas leader, Khaled Mashal, in 1996 are indicative of a more general trend. Unfortunately, hardening of targets has had devastating consequences for innocent civilians: Once the conventional terrorist targets became off-limits, terrorist organizations turned to soft targets whereby innocent civilians became the victims and once the conventional counterterrorism targets became well-protected, counterterrorism agencies took to the skies—with, once again, unarmed civilians becoming the victims, even if unintentionally so.

Notes

1. According to one academic school of thought, the contemporary “new terrorism” is characterized by religious or mystical motivation, horizontal networks, indiscriminate targeting, and possible use of weapons of mass destruction (characterized). See Peter Neumann, *Old and New Terrorism—Late Modernity, Globalization and the Transformation of Political Violence* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009); Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (London, Victor Gollancz, 1998); John Arquilla et al., “Networks, Netwar, and Information Age Terrorism,” in Ian O. Lesser et al., eds., *Countering the New Terrorism* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999); Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin, “America and the New Terrorism,” *Survival* 42(1) (2000).

2. It could be argued that certain developments, such as setbacks experienced by Marxist-Leninist terrorist organisations, Shining Path and Tupac Amaru in Peru and *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—FARC) in Colombia, the end of

the Provisional Irish Republican Army's (IRA's) terrorist campaign, the increasing inactivity of Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), the defeat of Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, which indicate that a significant number of states have achieved—or, are on the verge of achieving—their strategic counterterrorism goals, have increased the representativeness of the cases of the United States and Israel.

3. The Obama administration declared that it is planning to close down the detention center in Guantanamo in 2010. At the time of writing (March 2011), this promise is yet to be fulfilled. For a detailed comparison between the detention policies of the Bush and Obama administrations, which identifies strong elements of continuity, see Leonard Cutler, "Bush vs. Obama Detainee Policy Post-9/11—An Assessment," *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 4(2) (Summer 2010), pp. 63–87.

4. Paul Gronke et al., "U.S. Public Opinion on Torture, 2001–2009," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 43 (July 2010), p. 438.

5. For the "new wars" debate see Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars—Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity, 1999) and Stathis Kalyvas "'New' and 'Old' Civil Wars—A Valid Distinction," *World Politics* 54(1) (2001).

6. For the "new terrorism" debate see Thomas Copeland, "Is the 'New Terrorism' Really New?—An Analysis of the New Paradigm for Terrorism," *The Journal of Conflict Studies* (Winter 2001); David Tucker, "What's New About the New Terrorism and How Dangerous Is It?" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13(3) (2001); Isabelle Duyvesteyn, "How New is the New Terrorism?" *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 27 (2004); Alexander Spencer, "Questioning the Concept of New Terrorism," in *Peace Conflict and Development* Issue 8 (2006); Doron Zimmermann, "Terrorism Transformed: The 'New Terrorism,' Impact Scalability, and the Dynamic of Reciprocal Threat Perception," *Connections* 3(1) (March 2004); Anthony Field, "The 'New Terrorism': Revolution or Evolution," *Political Studies Review* 7 (2009); Martha Crenshaw, "'New' vs. 'Old' Terrorism: A Critical Appraisal," in Rik Coolsaet, ed., *Jihad Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge in Europe* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008).

7. For the distinction between these two conceptualizations see Richard Jackson, "Genealogy, Ideology, and Counter-Terrorism—Writing Wars on Terrorism from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush Jr.," *Studies in Language and Capitalism* (2006), p. 166; for a theoretical elaboration based on these two concepts see Ami Pedahzur and Magnus Ranstorp, "A Tertiary Model for Countering Terrorism in Liberal Democracies: The Case of Israel," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13(2) (2001), pp. 1–26; see also a comparison between the United States and United Kingdom in Ian Lesser, "Countering the New Terrorism—Implications for Strategy," in Ian Lesser et al., eds., *Countering the New Terrorism* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), pp. 115–116.

8. Such a conceptual transformation about the nature of terrorism has been promoted by at least one scholar. See Caleb Carr, "Terrorism as Warfare—The Lessons of Military History," *World Policy Journal* (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 1–12.

9. Richard Jackson, "Genealogy, Ideology, and Counter-Terrorism—Writing Wars on Terrorism from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush Jr.," *Studies in Language and Capitalism* 1 (2006), pp. 166 and 165.

10. See, for instance, the response to the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 in Clark McCauley, "Jujitsu Politics: Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism," Paul Kimmel and Chris Stout, eds., *Collateral Damage: The Psychological Consequences of America's War on Terrorism* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), pp. 53–54. Furthermore, U.S. intelligence communities persistently refused to adopt this new paradigm during the 1990s [see Richard Shultz and Andreas Vogt, "It's War! Fighting Post-11 September Global Terrorism through a Doctrine of Preemption," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 15(1) (2003), pp. 3–5.

11. See, for instance, John Murphy, "'Our Mission and Our Moment'—George W. Bush and September 11th," *Rhetoric and Public Affairs* 6(4) (2003), p. 614. This shift to the new paradigm was supported by several academics, such as Caleb Carr who argued that "...only the intervention of American armed forces will put an end to terrorism" (Caleb, "Terrorism as Warfare," p. 12).

12. See BBC. Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6558569.stm> (accessed 6 September 2010). See also *The Daily Telegraph*, 19 January 2008.

13. Cf. Lesser, "Countering the New Terrorism," pp.120–124.

14. Author's emphasis, Jackson, "Genealogy, Ideology, and Counter-Terrorism," pp. 163–164. For a general study of rhetorical strategies used to justify and legitimize counterterrorism measures see Richard Leeman, *The Rhetoric of Terrorism and Counterterrorism* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991).
15. Stuart Croft, *Culture, Crisis and America's War on Terror* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 2; see also pp. 256–263.
16. Jackson, "Genealogy, Ideology, and Counter-Terrorism," pp. 172 and 174. See also Sandra Silberstein, *War of Words—Language, Politics and 9/11* (New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 14, 47–48, and 53.
17. Silberstein, *War of Words*, p. 40.
18. Murphy, "Our Mission and Our Moment," pp. 611–612.
19. Carol Winkler, *In the Name of Terrorism—Presidents on Political Violence in the Post-World War II Era* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), p. 175 and Jonathan Raban, September 11, *The Price We've Paid* (Independent, 8 September 2006).
20. Author's emphasis, Bruce Lincoln, *Holy Terrors—Thinking about Religion after September 11* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, Second Edition, 2006), pp. 39–40.
21. Jackson, "Genealogy, Ideology, and Counter-Terrorism," p. 185. See also Richard Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism—Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), p. 177.
22. Croft, *Culture, Crisis and America's War on Terror*, p. 262; see also 256–263.
23. Jonathan Rynhold, "Religion, Postmodernization, and Israeli Approaches to the Conflict with Palestinians," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 17 (2005), p. 371.
24. See Stuart Cohen, "The Changing Jewish Discourse on Armed Conflict: Themes and Implications," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 17 (2005), p. 355.
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26. Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/8232340.stm> 9 July 2009 (accessed on 10 January 2009).
27. Cohen, "The Changing Jewish Discourse on Armed Conflict," p. 365.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 364–365.
29. Blair's Foreign Policy Speech, 21 March 2006. Available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2006/mar/21/iraq.iraq1> (accessed 9 September 2010).
30. See Stephen Grey, *Ghost Plane—The Inside Story of the CIA's Secret Rendition Programme* (London: Hurst and Company, 2006), pp. 118–120.
31. See *ibid.*, pp. 118, 121, and 125.
32. Olshansky quoted in *ibid.*, p. 121.
33. Jane Mayer, "The Hidden Power: The Legal Mind Behind the White House's War on Terror," *New Yorker*, 2 July 2006, p. 2.
34. Jerome Slater, "Tragic Choices in the War on Terrorism: Should We Try to Regulate and Control Torture," *Political Science Quarterly* 121(2) (2006), p. 207.
35. For a detailed account of the CIA's extraordinary rendition program see Grey, *Ghost Plane*; see also Mayer, "The Hidden Power," pp. 2–4.
36. NYU Law School and New York City Bar Association quoted in *ibid.*, p. 2.
37. BBC News. Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/guides/457000/457023/html/> (accessed 27 October 2010).
38. Leonard Cutler, "Bush vs. Obama Detainee Policy Post-9/11—An Assessment," *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 4(2) (2010), p. 77.
39. Mayer, "The Hidden Power," p. 3.
40. *The Guardian*, 2 June 2008. According to one estimate "[s]ince 2001, the CIA and allied intelligence agencies have picked up three thousand individuals worldwide," Darius Rejali, *Torture and Democracy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 504; see also Mark Bowden, "The Dark Art of Interrogation," *The Atlantic Monthly* (October 2003), p. 54.
41. See CBS News. Available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8300-503544_162-503544.html?keyword=Guantanamo±Bay (accessed 29 October 2010).

42. Rasmussen Reports Survey. Available at <http://legacy.ramussenreports.com/2005/Gitmo.htm> (accessed 14 October 2007).
43. Alex Bellamy, "No Pain, No Gain? Torture and Ethics in the War on Terror," *International Affairs* 82(1) (2006), p. 123. See also Ashcroft and Gonzales quoted in *ibid.*, same page.
44. Black quoted in Bowden, "The Dark Art of Interrogation," p. 56.
45. See, for instance, Bellamy, "No Pain, No Gain?" pp. 122, 127–128; Bowden, "The Dark Art of Interrogation," pp. 70–71; Rejali, *Torture and Democracy*, p. 500.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 500–501.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 72.
48. BBC News. Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/americas/7847405.stm>, 29 January 2009 (accessed 17 April 2009).
49. Rejali, *Torture and Democracy*, p. 8.
50. *Ibid.*, pp. 4–6 and *passim*.
51. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 4.
52. For opponents of torture see, for instance, David Luban, "Liberalism, Torture and the Ticking Bomb," *Virginia Law Review* 91(6) (2005), pp. 1425–1461; David Luban, "Human Dignity, Humiliation and Torture," *Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal* 19(3) (2009), pp. 211–230; Sumner Twiss, "Torture, Justification, and Human Rights: Towards an Absolute Proscription," *Human Rights Quarterly* 29(2) (2007), pp. 346–367 and David Sussman "What is Wrong with Torture?" *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 33(1) (2005), pp. 1–33.
53. Fritz Allhoff, "Terrorism and Torture," *International Journal of Applied Philosophy* 17(1) (2003), pp. 108 and 111.
54. Bellamy, "No Pain, No Gain?" pp. 145 and 146.
55. Alan Dershowitz, *Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 156–160 and 247–249.
56. Bellamy, "No Pain, No Gain?" p. 131.
57. Slater, "Tragic Choices in the War on Terrorism," p. 193.
58. *Ibid.*, pp. 193–194; see also Eyal Press, "In Torture We Trust?" *The Nation* 276(12) (31 March 2003), p. 12.
59. *Ibid.*, same page; Bellamy, "No Pain, No Gain?" p. 131.
60. Neil MacMaster "Torture: from Algiers to Abu Ghraib," *Race and Class* 46(2) (2004), p. 4.
61. Paul Gronke et al., "U.S. Public Opinion on Torture, 2001–2009," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 43 (July 2010), pp. 437–439. See also MacMaster, "Torture: from Algiers to Abu Ghraib," p. 4. Mac Master writes that "[t]his process of normalization seems to have set the agenda for the US debate on torture after September 11" (*ibid.*, same page). A similar development of normalization of torture has also taken place in Israel. As Stanley Cohen, an Israeli sociologist, has noted, "the 'open' debate on torture in Israel has led to a whole body of rationalizations through which even liberals have come to accept such practices" (Cohen referred to in *ibid.*, p. 11).
62. BBC opinion poll quoted in "Saying No to Torture—Why Some are Willing to See it Used," *The Economist*, 20 October 2006. Available at <http://www.economist.com/node/8070066> (accessed 14 July 2011).
63. For instance, during an interview with Peter Taylor from the BBC, the former director of CIA, Michael Hayden, claimed that "a significant fraction of al-Qaeda's senior leadership in the tribal region has, the euphemism we have used is 'taken off the battlefield.' By the way 'taken off the battlefield' used to mean killed or captured. In the last couple of years 'taken off the battlefield' simply means killed. We just aren't doing many, any, capturing." [My emphasis, Michael Hayden interviewed by Peter Taylor, *The Secret War on Terror*, BBC (accessed 26 March 2010)].
64. One important aspect of targeted assassinations is the increase in civilian casualties, euphemistically called "collateral damage." This issue will be addressed in the next section.
65. Jane Mayer, "The Predator War," *The New Yorker*, 26 October 2009, p. 4.
66. See *ibid.*, p. 6; Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, "The Year of the Drone— An Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan 2004–2010," *New America Foundation* (24 February 2010), p. 1.

67. Mayer, "The Predator War," p. 6.

68. See, for instance, Amitai Etzioni, "Unmanned Aircraft Systems—The Moral and Legal Case," *Joint Force Quarterly* 57(2) (2010), p. 66.

69. See *The Times*, 20 May 2003.

70. John Conroy, *Unspeakable Acts, Ordinary People, The Dynamics of Torture—An Examination of the Practice of Torture in Three Democracies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), pp. 212–213.

71. See Colin Kahl, "In the Crossfire or the Crosshairs?—Norms, Civilian Casualties, and U.S. Conduct in Iraq," *International Security* 32(1) (2007), pp. 7–46.

72. There are two reasons for regarding drone attacks as a counterterrorism rather than a counterinsurgency tactic in this context. Firstly, with the exception of the recent killing of Osama bin Laden by the U.S. Navy Seals, drone attacks have been the main tactic used in the War on Terror against Al Qaeda operatives. In some respects, they can be regarded as the functional equivalent of hit teams used by old counterterrorism agencies to eliminate terrorism suspects. Secondly, drones attacks have also been used in countries, such as Yemen and Pakistan, where the United States is not enrolled in counterinsurgency operations.

73. Bergen and Tiedemann, "The Year of the Drone," pp. 1–3.

74. Mir quoted in *ibid.*, p. 6.

75. Mayer, "The Predator War," p. 8.

76. Available at <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/09/07/afghanistan-civilian-deaths-airstrikes> (accessed 21 September 2010).

77. See <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-10922405> (accessed 21 September 2010).

78. Available at <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/reference/press-releases/12/> (accessed 21 September 2010).

79. Available at <http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/world-news/israel-kills-hamas-leader-and-his-family-with-onetonne-bomb-14126609.html?a=3232> (accessed 23 September 2010).

80. Available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/jul/23/israel1> (accessed 23 September 2010).

81. Mayer, "The Predator War," pp. 1–2.

82. BBC, 1 June 2010. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/10200712.stm (accessed 23 September 2010).

83. *Operation Wrath of God*, which was launched by Mossad in the aftermath of the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre, provides a good illustration of the modus operandi of the old style counterterrorism. The only known third-party casualty of the operation, which targeted dozens of Black September operatives and other terrorist suspects in Europe, was a Moroccan waiter named Ahmad Bouchiki who was killed in Lillehammer, Norway in 21 July 1973. The incident entered the annals of intelligence history as *Lillehammer Affair* or *Lillehammer Disaster* and led to changes in the operational procedures of the Israeli intelligence services. During another operation from that same period, *Operation Spring of Youth*, only two civilians—one of them the wife of one of the three Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) leaders targeted—were killed accidentally. Given the complications involved in the operation—the storming of two high-rise apartment blocks at night in a hostile urban environment—this probably indicates a significant amount of restraint on the part of Israeli commandos involved in the operation.

84. This argument is in line with reports about high-level discussions within the U.S. administration on "what-ifs and negative scenarios" that preceded the operation of U.S. Navy Seals against Osama bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad. A senior official informed *The New York Times* that "[t]here wasn't a meeting when someone didn't mention 'Black Hawk Down'"—that is, the aforementioned unsuccessful military operation in Somalia in 1993. *The New York Times* also notes that "[t]he failed mission to rescue hostages in Iran in 1980 also loomed large." Mark Mazzetti et al., "Behind the Hunt for Bin Laden" *The New York Times*, 2 May 2011. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/03/world/asia/03intel.html?_r=2&scp=1&sq= (accessed 11 July 2011).

85. Etzioni, "Unmanned Aircraft Systems," p. 71.
86. Bruce Riedel quoted in Mayer, "The Predator War," p. 9.
87. Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism versus Democracy—The Liberal State Response* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), p. 50.
88. Human Rights Watch and RAND study quoted in Kahl, "In the Crossfire or the Crosshairs?" pp. 18 and 24.
89. See for instance, Arquilla et al., "Networks, Netwar, and Information Age Terrorism," p. 55.
90. See *ibid.*, pp. 55–56; See also Tucker, "What's New About the New Terrorism," pp. 9–10.
91. See, Grey, *Ghost Plane*, *passim*.
92. Cf. Patrice McSherry, "Tracking the Origins of a State Terror Network— Operation Condor," *Latin American Perspectives* 29(1) (2002), pp. 40–41.
93. MacMaster, "Torture: from Algiers to Abu Ghraib," p. 8.
94. Slater, "Tragic Choices in the War on Terrorism," p. 207.
95. Rejali, *Torture and Democracy*, p. 59; Nicholas Von Hoffman "Contract Killers—How Privatizing the U.S. Military Subverts Public Oversight," *Harper Magazine*, June 2004, p. 79; P. W. Singer, "Corporate Warriors—The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for International Security," *International Security* 26(3) (2001/2), p. 187.
96. See P. W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors—The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), pp. 16–17. Another study finds a clear link between Al Qaeda's attack on U.S.S. *Cole* and 11 September terrorist attacks and the rise of Blackwater, one of most (in)famous private military companies. See Jeremy Schahill, *Blackwater—The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army* (London: Serpent's Tail, 2007), pp. 40–41.
97. Von Hoffman, "Contract Killers," p. 79.
98. Mayer, "The Predator War," p. 2.
99. Singer, *Corporate Warriors—The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*, pp. 16–17.
100. Michael Kenney, *From Pablo to Osama, Trafficking and Terrorist Networks, Government Bureaucracies and Competitive Adaptation* (Philadelphia: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007), p. 14.
101. Singer "Corporate Warriors—The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for International Security," pp. 203–205.
102. *Ibid.*, p. 217.
103. Lora Lumpe, *US Foreign Military Training—Global Reach, Global Power, and Oversight Issues*, Foreign Policy in Focus—Special Report (May 2002). Available at <http://globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/199/41042.html> (accessed 29 November 2010).
104. See Singer, *Corporate Warriors—The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*.
105. Von Hoffman, "Contract Killers," p. 80.
106. *Ibid.*, p. 79.
107. Singer, "Corporate Warriors—The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for International Security," p. 199.
108. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 191–192.
109. *Ibid.*, p. 181.
110. This is the term that Kenney uses to depict the mutual learning processes between "narcs" and "narcos" but that can as well be applied to the interplay between counterterrorism agencies and terrorist organizations. Cf. Kenney, *From Pablo to Osama*, pp. 6–7.
111. This new concept has been formulated by Abu Musab al-Suri and displays similarities with the notion of "leaderless resistance" (see Paul Cruickshank and Mohannad Hage Ali, "Abu Musab Al Suri: Architect of the New al-Qaeda," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30 [2007], p. 8.).
112. "Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them." Bush quoted in Silberstein, *War of Words*, p. 14.
113. For such a link between globalization and religious revival see Neumann, *Old and New Terrorism*, pp. 83–117.