Leadership in Hard Times

Germany, France, and the Management of the Eurozone Crisis[1]

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Abstract

France and Germany played a highly visible leadership role during the management of the Euro crisis and the efforts to design a reform governance framework for the Euro area. This article provides a conceptualization of this bilateral leadership, which is then applied to trace the process of Franco-German leadership during the ongoing crisis of the Euro area. Franco-German leadership grew ever more important as the crisis deepened. After the French presidential election of 2012, however, the divergences between the two core states of the Euro area deepened and made the exercise of joint leadership more difficult to achieve. I consider this leadership role to be based on a compromise by proxy logic in which France and Germany, starting from divergent positions, strike bilateral compromises acceptable to other member states that feel their own interests are represented by either France or Germany. Their common capacity to find suitable remedies to cope with crisis, however, is not beyond doubt. The Franco-German approach followed an additive logic, combining the temporary and permanent financial support schemes–a French preference–with a concomitant strengthening of fiscal rules advocated by Germany. In the end, the two governments did not develop a common comprehensive strategy based on a shared conceptual framework.

Keywords

France; Germany; Franco-German bilateralism; leadership; Euro area; Euro crisis.

Introduction

Since the spring of 2010, the EU and its member states have faced the risk of seeing the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) break apart, triggering

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strong disintegrative tendencies even for the wider European integration project. In this situation of acute and deep crisis, the future of the Euro area crucially depends on strong European political leadership. As crisis management activities and the redesign of the Euro area's governance structures deeply affect national financial resources and national competencies, the kind of leadership needed cannot come primarily from supranational European institutions–rather, it must originate from powerful and resourceful member states.

Since the very first steps towards European monetary integration in the late 1960s, France and Germany have always had a principal role in the process and in defining the institutional framework governing monetary policy and fiscal policy coordination.[2] This article attempts to shed light on the capacity of France and Germany to assume a crucial political leadership role during the Euro area crisis. I first lay out my understanding of political leadership in the European Union and then focus on the specific Franco-German leadership role during this crisis, in terms of both short-term crisis management and the contribution to a redesign of the rules governing the Eurozone.

Franco-German Leadership in the European Union

According to a definition advanced by Eckhard Lübkemeier, "leadership in the EU is provided by actors who are willing and capable, acting as co-leaders, to prompt other actors to contribute to the achievement of collective goals."[3] This definition of leadership emphasizes more than others the collective nature of leadership in Europe. It can neither be provided by a single actor, nor would the pursuit of narrowly self-interested goals qualify as leadership. According to this definition, Germany and France have repeatedly acted as co-leaders in the field of European integration, not least in monetary integration.

Franco-German bilateralism in Europe has involved three basic types of leadership in regional politics: (1) promoting European integration; (2) crisis management; and (3) encouraging closer cooperation in subgroups of member states (such as the Schengen free-travel area). All of these dimensions of European leadership can be found in the management of the current sovereign debt crisis.

The promoting European integration type of leadership roughly corresponds to the widespread idea of the "Franco-German engine" for Europe, either in the sense of deepening integration by expanding the EU's functional scope, or via geographical enlargement.[4] Crisis management—namely, attempts to manage, control, or overcome a looming or open crisis inside the EU—is a second type of European leadership. Bilateral leadership, finally, may be exercised in and through patterns of differentiated integration. Here, France and Germany (or other member states) move ahead, creating subgroups of EU member states. Other member states may join later, if they consider the group successful or deem non-participation costly politically or otherwise.

These three types of leadership—promoting integration, managing crises, and shaping subgroups of member states—may be exercised in three ways: (1) agenda-setting; (2) consensus building; and (3) coalition building. Franco-German agenda-setting includes the interpretation of a given political situation and the definition of a problem to be addressed by the EU as a whole or a subgroup of member states. In the past, Franco-German European agenda-setting frequently took the form of submitting common proposals to promote both institutional innovations and substantive policy changes.

Consensus building in EU-level negotiations refers to an entrepreneurial function of leadership.[5] Entrepreneurial leaders help to reap all the potential benefits on the negotiating table and work to overcome collective action problems. They provide focal points for negotiations or broker compromises, and they may help to overcome situations of decision-making deadlock. Consensus building in the context of Franco-German bilateralism often includes the shaping of "compromises by proxy,"[6] in which France and Germany strike bilateral compromises acceptable to other member states that feel their own interests are properly represented by either France's or Germany's position. In other words, this leadership function does not rest on converging preferences—quite the contrary.

In a different kind of entrepreneurial leadership, France and Germany may succeed in the art of coalition building, gathering support behind their own favorite solutions. In such cases, both are part of a powerful winning coalition. Thus, they try to side line or overrule opposition or, alternatively, establish subgroups of member states excluding reluctant states.

Table 1: Types and Ways of Providing European Leadership

Types of Leadership	Ways of Providing Leadership
promoting integration • deepening and enlarging the EU	agenda setting and common proposals – institutional blueprints – policy proposals
crisis management • overcoming decision-making deadlock at the EC/EU level and managing economic crises	consensus building/compromises by proxy
creating smaller subgroups of Member States • promoting permanent differentiated integration by establishing subgroups of Member States	coalition building

Situations of acute political and economic crisis stimulate a strong demand for European leadership that powerful member states with corresponding resources of influence can generally provide–for instance, the necessary financial "firepower" in the context of the Euro area crisis. Decision-making under severe time constraints provides strong incentives to bypass regular and time-consuming formal procedures in the multi-level fragmented power structure of the EU by making use of informal channels of communication and negotiation among key players.[7] During the sovereign debt crisis, the degree of urgency, high political and economic costs, and far-reaching political consequences called for a strong role of the European Council and of resourceful member states. The lack of strong EU competences in economic policy coordination–fiscal policy being largely decided at the level of member states–added to this need.[8] Germany and France were the most likely candidates to take on this leadership role, both based on their past record of leadership in monetary integration and on their combined resources.

France and (even more so) Germany, clearly stand out for their issue-specific leadership resources on EMU matters in terms of their combined GDP and their combined share of European Central Bank (ECB) capital: 48 percent of the Euro area, with 27 percent for Germany and 21 percent for France. Their standing in international financial markets provides them with another leadership resource. The two countries' sovereign bond ratings are among the highest in the Euro area, with Germany preserving its AAA rating and despite France being downgraded to an AA+ rating by Moody's on 19 December 2012, and by Standard and Poor's on 13 January 2012. Still, the translation of such resources into actual European leadership depends on a common interpretation of the situation, common or at least complementary preferences, and the willingness as well as the capacity to formulate a common strategy.

Dealing with the Crisis: Divergent Assessments, Divergent Approaches

In the spring of 2010, when the sovereign debt crisis came to its first climax due to the unsustainable fiscal position of Greece, Paris and Berlin interpreted the situation in quite different ways. French President Nicolas Sarkozy and his government grasped the destructive dynamic of the speculative attacks on Greece and their spillover potential early on, urging the EU to act. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, however, delayed common European action beyond the date of an important regional state election in North-Rhine Westphalia (9 May 2010), thus adding to the costs of redressing the situation.[9] Moreover, while German actors interpreted the sovereign debt crisis primarily as a consequence of fiscal profligacy, French Minister of Finance Christine Lagarde pointed to underlying problems of competitiveness and macro-economic imbalances. She criticized Germany for its huge current account surpluses, implicitly reproaching it for playing a non-cooperative game inside the Euro area.[10]

Nevertheless, France and Germany shared one overriding goal throughout this crisis: preventing the Euro area from breaking apart and keeping Greece in. "If the Euro fails, Europe fails," Merkel has repeated time and again.[11] The basic approaches of Berlin and Paris on how to secure the future of the Euro area, however, largely reflected well-known differences on how to organize the EU's Economic and Monetary Union. France continued to prefer a policy discretion approach, with the European Council and Euro summits of the heads of state and government serving as the economic government of the Euro area; whereas Germany still favored a rule-based approach.

In the past, the German approach to EMU had relied on three core pillars that should underpin a stable monetary order: an independent central bank pursuing a stability-oriented monetary policy and prohibited to monetize public debt; European-level safeguards against non-sustainable budgetary policies at the national level (the excessive deficit procedure and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)); and national responsibility for fiscal and broader economic policies assuring the necessary national adjustments to the constraints of EMU membership, reflected in the no bail-out clause of the treaty. The sovereign debt crisis demolished these pillars in a short period of time.[12]

The successive rescue packages for Greece (May 2010), Ireland (December 2010), Portugal (May 2011), and again for Greece (July 2011 and February 2012) as well as the establishment of temporary and permanent stabilization funds–the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM), based in Union law, and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)–violated a core principle of the Maastricht Treaty, the no bail-out clause (Art. 125 TFEU). The degree of independence of the ECB is also now open to debate, as politicians pressured it heavily to act boldly and to flood the markets with liquidity. The SGP, first violated, then watered down by France and Germany in 2003-2005,[13] could not prevent situations of excessive deficits and, in any case, did not address underlying factors such as growing divergence of competitiveness inside the Euro area. Moreover, international financial markets failed to exert disciplining pressures on the periphery members, as market actors did not perceive the risk of sovereign default early on. Thus, German success in uploading the German stability model at Maastricht was elusive, first because its European-level elements turned out to be less resilient than assumed, and second, because its "download" by the Southern periphery of the Euro area was incomplete, to say the least.

German attempts to remedy this situation and to prevent a recurrence of a similar crisis comprised familiar as well as new elements. A familiar element came with proposals to prevent moral hazard and to rely on market pressures providing strong incentives for member states to redress unsustainable fiscal positions. Hence, Germany insisted on the participation of private lenders in the restructuring of Greek debt and pushed to enshrine the principle of private sector participation in the restructuring of sovereign debts into the treaty establishing the permanent lending facility, the ESM. From the German government's point of view, providing for an orderly sovereign default procedure and thus making sovereign default a credible option inside the EMU was necessary to prevent both reckless borrowing and reckless lending.

A second familiar German element came with proposals to strengthen the SGP and to make sanctioning of Euro area members with unsustainable deficits more automatic, thus depoliticizing the excessive deficit procedure. We can see a new element of the German approach on economic policy coordination. In the past, Berlin had insisted on the non-binding nature of economic policy coordination in the Lisbon process and its follow-up, the Europe 2020 strategy. Now, it subscribed not only to tighter European fiscal policy surveillance through assessments of national draft budgetary plans ("European semester"), but also to the idea of extending multilateral surveillance to macro-economic imbalances, based on a scoreboard of indicators. In addition, Berlin put forward, together with France, the idea of a "competitiveness pact" designed to strengthen the economic pillar of EMU by politically (not legally) binding national commitments to foster competitiveness, employment, and the sustainability of public finance. Finally, Berlin staunchly refused the idea of Eurobonds implying a common liability of Eurozone members for each other's debts.

The French approach differed markedly from the German one. First, France displayed a clear preference for more vigorous and decisive crisis management action, such as rescue schemes for Greece and, later, Ireland and Portugal—as well as high firewalls (emergency funds and permanent lending capacities) to prevent contagion to Spain and Italy.[14] Sarkozy even supported the idea of giving the European Financial Stability Facility, established in May 2010, a banking license and hence unlimited access to ECB funds.[15] Second, Sarkozy, much more than German decision makers, put pressure on the ECB to act boldly, including unlimited purchases of sovereign debt on secondary markets to bring down skyrocketing risk premiums on sovereign bonds. Third, Paris emphasized solidarity values. According to the former State Secretary for European Affairs, Pierre Lellouche, "[t]he Euro 440 billion mechanism [of the EFSF, JS] is nothing less than the importation of NATO's Article 5 mutual defense clause applied to the Eurozone. When one member is under attack the others are obliged to come to its defense,"[16] the exact opposite of the no bailout logic advocated by Germany. Fourth, France forcefully used the window of opportunity of this sovereign debt crisis to promote major changes to the economic governance structure of the Euro area along the lines of its long-standing preferences. Finally, France perceived the risk of a financial market panic in case of private sector involvement (PSI) in debt restructuring. Raising the specter of PSI in the context of highly nervous financial markets makes the purchase of sovereign bonds an unattractive option for private investors, thus pushing up risk premiums—an assessment shared by the ECB.

Bilateral Leadership in Action

Considering the extremely high stakes in the crisis and the huge conceptual differences between France and Germany, this situation clearly entailed the risk of a deep and lasting rift between the two countries. Differing interpretations of the situation, different risk assessments, and diverging preferences indeed help to explain the slow and bumpy start to Franco-German cooperation during the early phase of the sovereign debt crisis in spring 2010.[17] From May 2010 onwards, however, France and

Germany intensified their cooperation and proved able to play a common, proactive, and often-decisive role at various moments. This held especially true after May-June 2011, when Italy and Spain came into the line of fire and when the breakup of the Eurozone, beyond the special case of Greece, became a credible scenario.

Franco-German bilateralism performed leadership roles of all three types mentioned above–promoting integration, crisis management, and creating smaller subgroups of member states. The two core states of the Euro area provided leadership by way of agenda-setting by submitting important common proposals to their partners; they acted as entrepreneurial leaders, hammering out bilateral compromises, building bridges between opposing camps, and providing focal points for negotiations; and they were able to circumvent the resistance of individual member states by establishing subgroups of like-minded member states.

Promoting Integration

Berlin and Paris promoted deeper integration by pushing for changes to the economic governance rules and structures of the Euro area. Together, they endorsed reforming the rules governing the Eurozone along the lines of the European Commission's "six pack" of legislative proposals put forward in September 2010. Berlin and Paris indeed agreed on major points: the strengthening of the SGP's "preventive arm;" the new emphasis given to the debt criterion, which, better than deficits, reflects the sustainability of fiscal positions; the stricter budgetary *ex ante* surveillance with the so-called "European semester;" and the introduction of an excessive imbalance procedure to put pressure on member states that are showing major macroeconomic imbalances (mainly current account imbalances). France also subscribed to decision-making procedures designed to facilitate the sanctioning of non-compliant member states.

As part of their Deauville compromise in October 2010 (see below), Germany and France jointly promoted the establishment of a permanent lending facility, the ESM, and carried their partner along to subscribe to a revision of the treaty in order to provide a legal base in Art. 136 (2) TFEU. The article now states that "Member States whose currency is the Euro may establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole." Going beyond the SGP framework, Germany and France promoted in common a further tightening of fiscal rules with the fiscal compact treaty (Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and Governance in the EMU (TSCG)), including a balanced budget rule to be enshrined in national law.

Crisis Management

Paris and Berlin strongly contributed to the flurry of crisis management activities. Whenever the European Council, the Ecofin Council, or the Eurogroup summits decided on rescue packages, bilateral credits, credit guarantees, or permanent lending facilities, the power of the purse made Germany and France (albeit to a lesser extent) key actors at the bargaining table right from the beginning–little wonder, as together they had to foot almost half of the bill. This holds true for all major decisions on bilateral credits for Greece and the establishment and boosting of temporary support funds (the intergovernmental EFSF and the Union's European Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM), launched in May 2010), as well as the institution of a permanent lending facility (European Stability Mechanism (ESM)). When the situation worsened in Ireland and Portugal, France and Germany successfully put pressure on Dublin and Lisbon to make use of the EFSF funds–which they indeed did in November 2010 and May 2011, respectively–in order to calm the markets and prevent contagion.

A crucial moment came in June and July 2011, when the risk of contagion to Spain and Italy drew the Eurozone near to the abyss. France and Germany recognized the importance of preserving the strong bilateral bond, and of assuming a common responsibility for the Eurozone's survival under these conditions of extremely severe economic and political strain.[18] Against the backdrop of highly nervous international financial markets, Paris and Berlin defined a closely coordinated common line. For top-level political actors, the idea of Merkel and Sarkozy displaying divergent approaches and fissures at the end of a bilateral summit meeting was completely out of the question, as this would have risked sending shockwaves through the markets. In order to avoid Franco-German clashes on the European scene, they reached an understanding to bilaterally coordinate their positions ahead of all important European Council or Eurozone summit meetings dealing with the crisis.[19] The frequency of top-level Franco-German meetings in various formats prior to European summit meetings clearly increased starting in June 2011 (see Table 2).

This bilateral pattern of cooperation was embedded in the broader framework of intense crisis diplomacy at the level of the European Council and Euro Summit meetings. Franco-German bilateralism provided the inner link of wider Eurogroup and EU-27 negotiations. Important consultations took place on several occasions inside an inner circle of crisis communication and management, the so called "Frankfurt Group" composed of Merkel, Sarkozy, and the presidents of the European Council, the ECB,

Table 2: Bilateral and European Top-level Summit Meetings since 2010

Date	Place	Participants	Institutional Context
7-8 February 2013	Brussels	EU-27	European Council
5 February 2013	Paris	Hollande, Merkel	Informal meeting
21-22 January 2013	Berlin	Merkel, Sarkozy, French and German ministers and Members of Parliament	Franco-German Council of Ministers and celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Elysée Treaty
13-14 December 2012	Brussels	EU-27	European Council
23 November 2012 18-19 October 2012	Brussels Brussels	EU-27 EU-27 / EU-17	Special Meeting European Council European Council
22 September 2012	Ludwigsburg	Hollande, Merkel	Commemoration of De Gaulle's speech to the German youth in September 1962
23 August 2012	Berlin	Hollande, Merkel	Informal meeting
7 July 2012	Reims	Hollande, Merkel	Commemoration of the De Gaulle-Adenauer meeting Reims in July 1962
28-29 June 2012	Brussels	EU-27 / EU-17	European Council and Euro area summit
27 June 2012	Paris	Hollande, Merkel	Informal meeting
22 June 2012	Rome	Hollande, Merkel, Monti, Rajoy	Informal meeting with Italian and Spanish Prime Ministers Monti and Rajoy
16 May 2012	Berlin	Merkel, Hollande	Informal meeting, inaugural visit
6 February 2012	Paris	Merkel, Sarkozy, French and German ministers	Franco-German Council of Ministers
30 January 2012	Brussels	EU-27 / EU-17	Informal European Council / Euro area summit
9 January 2012	Berlin	Merkel, Sarkozy	Informal meeting
8-9 December 2011	Brussels	EU-27 / EU-17	European Council / Euro area summit
5 December 2011	Paris	Merkel, Sarkozy	Informal meeting
24 November 2011	Strasbourg	Merkel, Sarkozy, Monti	Informal meeting with the Italian Prime Minister Monti
2 November 2011	Cannes	Merkel, Sarkozy, Barroso, Van Rompuy, Juncker, and Lagarde	Informal meeting („Frankfurt Round") ahead of G20 summit
26 October 2011	Brussels	EU-17	Euro area summit
23 October 2011	Brussels	EU-27	European Council
20 October 2011	Frankfurt	Merkel, Sarkozy, Trichet, Draghi, Barroso, Van Rompuy, Lagarde, Schäuble, Baroin	Informal meeting of the "Frankfurt Round" at the farewell ceremony for ECB President Trichet
9 October 2011	Berlin	Merkel, Sarkozy	Informal meeting
16 August 2011	Paris	Merkel, Sarkozy	Informal meeting
21 July 2011	Brussels	EU-17	Euro area summit

Table 2: continued

Date	Place	Participants	Institutional Context
20 July 2011	Berlin	Merkel, Sarkozy, Trichet; Van Rompuy (by phone)	Informal meeting
23-24 June 2011	Brussels	EU-27	European Council
17 June 2011	Berlin	Merkel, Sarkozy	Informal meeting
24-25 March 2011	Brussels	EU-27	European Council
11 March 2011	Brussels	EU-17	Euro area summit
4 February 2011	Brussels	EU-27 / EU-17	European Council / Euro area summit
16-17 December 2010	Brussels	EU-27	European Council
10 December 2010	Freiburg	Merkel, Sarkozy, French and German ministers	Franco-German Council of Ministers
28-29 October 2010	Brussels	EU-27	European Council
18 October 2010	Deauville	Merkel, Sarkozy	Informal meeting
16 September 2010	Brussels	EU-27	European Council
17 June 2010	Brussels	EU-27	European Council
14 June 2010	Berlin	Merkel, Sarkozy	Informal meeting
25-26 March 2010	Brussels	EU-27 / EU-17	European Council / Euro area summit
11 February 2010	Brussels	EU-27	Informal European Council
4 February 2010	Paris	Merkel, Sarkozy, French and German ministers	Franco-German Council of Ministers

Entries are European Councils and Euro Summits as well as formal (Franco-German Council of Ministers) and informal meetings of Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy/François Hollande, including meetings of the "Frankfurt Round" with the presidents of the European Council, Van Rompuy, the Commission, Barroso, the ECB, Trichet and his successor Draghi, the Eurogroup, Juncker, and the IMF's managing director Lagarde.

Sources: www.france-allemagne.fr; http://www.european-council.europa.eu/council-meetings/conclusions/; press articles from Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Le Monde, and Der Spiegel.

the Eurogroup, and the Commission, with the occasional participation of the International Monetary Fund's managing director.[20]

Starting with their bilateral meeting on 17 June 2011 and the intense bilateral preparation of the July 2011 European Council,[21] Merkel and Sarkozy called the shots in European-level decision-making, earning themselves the nickname of "Merkozy." In November 2011, during a highly critical situation in which the Greek government announced plans to hold a referendum on the Greek rescue plan, "Merkozy," together with José Manuel Barroso, Christine Lagarde, Herman Van Rompuy, and Jean-Claude Juncker, threatened to immediately discontinue financial support for Greece. Moreover, breaking a taboo, they made clear that this vote would not only be about accepting or rejecting the rescue plan, but rather about the future of Greece in the Eurozone. This open and concerted pressure made Greek Prime Minister Papandreou think twice and dismiss his plan.[22]

Coalition Building and the Creation of Subgroups

Making use of a third type of leadership, France and Germany promoted the creation of subgroups of member states to overcome the opposition against their common proposals. The fiscal compact treaty provides the most important example of this type of leadership. Germany, supported by France, would have preferred to anchor this fiscal compact in primary European law. Both put reluctant partners under pressure by threatening to go ahead outside the treaty framework if a consensus on the treaty reform could not be found. This indeed happened when British Prime Minister David Cameron, isolated by France and Germany, refused to accept this treaty reform. France and Germany then rather quickly accepted the risk of lasting fault lines inside the EU when making the decision to conclude an international treaty outside Community law in a "17 plus" format, that is, between all Euro area members and other Member States willing to subscribe to these obligations. Eventually, twenty-five of twenty-seven member states signed this treaty, with only Britain and the Czech Republic keeping aloof. Here, we find an instance of Franco-German leadership by promoting a two-speed Europe or durable forms of differentiation inside the EU, which is quite characteristic for monetary cooperation and integration from the "Snake" and EMS to EMU.

Yet another example for this type of leadership can be found in the common promotion of the Berlin-inspired idea of an "Euro plus pact," intended to improve economic policy coordination on issues of key importance for competitiveness and for the long-term sustainability of public finance and social security systems–for instance, retirement age, wage indexation and wage setting, and unit labor costs. Berlin and Paris first put forward this project under the label of "competitiveness pact" in February 2011 before it was adopted by the European Council in March 2011 under the new heading of "Euro plus pact," with all Eurozone members as well as the majority of non-Eurozone members participating. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Sweden, and the United Kingdom stayed aloof.[23] A final example of Franco-German leadership by bringing together a coalition of member states establishing an institutionalized subgroup is provided by the financial transaction tax, strongly and successfully promoted by Angela Merkel together with Nicolas Sarkozy and later François Hollande. After Ecofin Council meetings in June and July 2012 had made clear that unanimous support for a Union-wide financial transaction tax was out of reach, eleven member states, led by France and Germany, asked the Commission to submit a proposal on enhanced cooperation of a subgroup of EU members in this area and the Commission indeed proposed to the Council in October 2012 to authorize the requested enhanced cooperation.[24]

Agenda-setting and Common Proposals

As regards agenda-setting, France and Germany used the familiar instrument of common statements and concrete proposals submitted to the other member states. The amount of input from the two governments since May 2010 was exceptional, even by the high Franco-German standards.[25] These common contributions served as an important point of reference for other actors, both for EU institutions and key personnel and for the other member states' governments. When France and Germany intensified the rhythm of their bilateral consultations in mid 2011, their partners even refrained from submitting their own contributions to the crucial debates on the strengthening of the rescue funds and on the fiscal compact, taking a reactive stance towards the proposals emanating from Franco-German consultations.[26]

Compromises by Proxy

France and Germany's capacity to take the lead in the context of the Eurozone crisis rests on their ability to bridge their own deep differences in preferences–reflecting divisions between other member states as well–by means of a bilateral exchange of concessions. The willingness of other EU members to subscribe to the results of such bilateral "pre-cooking" of European decisions does not simply rest on France and Germany's power resources. Bilateral prenegotiations and compromises by proxy reduce the transaction costs of complex multilateral negotiations and thus provide efficiency gains. Severe time constraints of decision making in situations of acute crisis tend to make this pattern of bilateral prenegotiations more acceptable.

France and Germany opposed each other on two conflict dimensions underlying the debates on concrete measures and instruments to tackle the crisis: European financial solidarity and limiting market dynamics versus national responsibility and liability, using market pressures to trigger structural reforms and sustainable fiscal policies; and the divide between adherents of a rule based approach of a fiscal union versus a policy discretion approach advocating a European "economic government." In order to reach European agreements, compromises between two schools of thoughts and two groups of countries had to be found. France and Germany played important roles in bringing these compromises about at several crucial moments.

One important moment for Franco-German relations and leadership in the EMU crisis came with the bilateral informal summit meeting at Deauville in October 2010. In the negotiations on new governance rules for the Euro area, Germany might have been tempted to build a coalition with like-minded countries such as the Netherlands and Finland supporting a tough line on strengthening fiscal rules; while France might have led a counter coalition of southern countries in favor of stronger emergency measures in terms of well-equipped rescue funds and more "European solidarity" through the introduction of Eurobonds. Berlin and Paris, however, took the decision to strike compromises with their partner across the Rhine, thus building bridges between opposing camps of northern and southern member states. Neither had a credible alternative winning coalition. A counter coalition against France and Germany did not exist, nor could any other member state claim to exert leadership in EMU matters, Britain being outside the Euro area and both Italy and Spain under heavy pressure from the markets. In the Franco-German deal struck at Deauville, Germany made a concession on the automaticity of sanctions against "fiscal sinners" in exchange for French support for treaty reform. Before this date, Germany found itself almost isolated in its demand to head for yet another politically risky treaty change in order to provide a legal basis for a permanent lending facility, the ESM. A second French concession came with Paris–very reluctantly–subscribing to private sector participation in sovereign debt restructuring.

This Deauville deal earned France and Germany strong criticism from participants in an Ecofin and Eurogroup meeting in Luxembourg on the same day, working on the same subject in the framework of the Van Rompuy Task Force on the reform of the EMU's economic governance. They had notice of this bilateral Deauville deal only through news agency reports, giving rise to criticisms of a "Franco-German diktat."[27] Merkel and Sarkozy apparently did not feel the need for broader consultations with other member states before striking their bilateral deal that surely did not help to make it more acceptable at the level of the EU-27. However, the basic elements of this bilateral compromise carried the day.

The most important examples of Franco-German bilateralism and compromise building occurred in the period ranging from June 2011 to the end of that year. First, in a bilateral compromise found in June 2011, Merkel and Sarkozy agreed to give the European Council a central role.

Merkel publicly subscribed to the idea of the European Council acting as an "economic government" of the Euro area, a very negatively loaded expression in the German debate since Maastricht.[28] She also accepted Euro area summits, even though she had repeatedly underlined the need to avoid creating fault lines between the "ins" and "out" of the currency union. With these concessions to France, Merkel gave up the German position, held since the Maastricht IGC, of preventing the European Council from taking center stage, as well as the stance of limiting the Eurogroup's role to an informal framework at the level of ministers of finance. On 16 August 2011, Merkel and Sarkozy suggested holding Euro area summits twice a year and advanced the name of Van Rompuy to chair these meetings. This important reform of the Euro area's economic governance structure, first suggested by France and then advocated together by France and Germany, made its way to the European level. On 26 October 2011, a Euro Summit agreed upon regular Euro Summit meetings to be convened at least twice a year; another Euro Summit on 2 March 2012 appointed Van Rompuy as its president.[29] All of this was fully in line with long-standing French preferences.

In exchange for more financial solidarity–that is expanding the remit of the EFSF and providing for the possibility of leveraging this fund–Germany received commitments to more national fiscal responsibility. Berlin very actively promoted the idea of a "fiscal stability union" and found valuable support from France.

The new "fiscal compact," forcefully advanced by Germany with French backing, ahead of the October and December 2011 European Council meetings,[30] even reinforced the recently reformed rules governing the excessive deficit procedure. For member states recognized by the Commission to be in breach of the 3 percent deficit ceiling, it foresees "automatic consequences unless a qualified majority of Euro area member states is opposed."[31] In order to make reluctant Euro area members subscribe to their concept of fiscal stability union, Germany and France followed a linkage strategy, making the ESM funds available only for countries signing the TSCG (fiscal compact).[32]

In the light of previous experiences with the old SGP in 2003, the binding nature of European-level rules is surely not beyond doubt. Another, possibly more important ingredient of the Franco-German "fiscal compact" package attacked the problem of compliance with fiscal rules from a different angle: the national level. At their bilateral meeting in Paris on 16 August 2011, Merkel and Sarkozy joined forces to advocate the introduction of balanced budget rules in national constitutions, inspired by a similar rule enshrined in 2009 into the German Basic Law (Art. 109 GG).[33] This, of course, represents an important departure from the French policy discretion approach. When Spanish Prime Minister José-Luis Zapatero promoted the enshrinement of such a "golden rule" into the Spanish constitution ahead of the November 2011 parliamentary elections, he admitted that this move was the result of the pressure exerted on him by Merkel and Sarkozy.[34]

In exchange for his support of the German-sponsored fiscal compact, Sarkozy got two strong reassuring signals to financial markets thanks to German concessions. Contrary to the common approach adopted at Deauville, Germany seems to have accepted in bilateral talks in Paris on 5 December 2011 that the private sector involvement in debt restructuring would remain limited to the Greek case. Furthermore, Berlin subscribed to the idea of starting the ESM in July 2012, one year earlier than initially planned.[35]

At the European level, Germany and France basically got their way. The December 2011 Euro area summit statement contains a commitment that general government budgets must be balanced or in surplus, a commitment later laid down in the TSCG signed on 2 March 2012.[36] The parties to this new international treaty must introduce this rule into their national legal systems "at constitutional or equivalent level," provide for an automatic correction mechanism in case of deviation, and "recognize the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to verify the transposition of this rule at national level."[37]

Table 3 summarizes a number of examples of Franco-German leadership since the beginning of the Eurozone crisis.

The Hollande Effect: Breaking with Franco-German Bilateralism?

A common, bilateral, and closely concerted Franco-German leadership role during the sovereign debt crisis was a deliberate choice of German Chancellor Merkel and French President Sarkozy, hence their nickname "Merkozy." With the French presidential elections of 2012, the crucial question arose whether the new French President Hollande would make a strategic choice different from his predecessor's. The incoming Socialist president and government indeed had criticized Sarkozy for staying to close to the course charted by Chancellor Merkel and had called for a more balanced Franco-German relationship, perceiving a growing Franco-German power asymmetry in favor of Germany during the management of this crisis.[38]

Table 3: Examples of Franco-German Leadership

<table>
<tr><th>Types of leadership</th><th>Ways of providing leadership</th></tr>
<tr><td>Promoting Integration
– strong support for "six pack" of legislation strengthening SGP framework and establishing excessive imbalance procedure
– promoting a tightening of fiscal rules in the framework of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and Governance in the EMU (TSCG)
– promoting a permanent lending facility, the ESM</td><td rowspan="3">Agenda Setting and Common Proposals
– October 2010: Deauville summit proposal for treaty reform to allow for the establishment of the ESM and private sector involvement
– Spring 2011: proposal for Euro plus pact
– August 2011: proposal for institutionalisation of Euro area summits and putting forward Herman Van Rompuy as chairman
– August 2011: common advocacy of a balanced budget rule to be enshrined in national (constitutional) law
– Autumn 2011: proposal for a fiscal compact;
Consensus Building/ Compromises by Proxy
– bilateral deals combining elements of short-term crisis management and elements of "economic government" with decisions on the strengthening of fiscal rules, thus bridging differences between "Northern" and "Southern" Member States
Coalition Building
– coalition building mainly by way of establishing subgroups and excluding reluctant partners such as the UK and the Czech Republic (fiscal compact)</td></tr>
<tr><td>Crisis Management
– core role in setting up of Greek rescue package in Mai 2010, and of the EFSF and EFSM
– pressure on Ireland (November 2010) and Portugal (May 2011) to make use of EFSF money
– core role in beefing up the EFSF in autumn 2011
– pressure on Greek government to abandon referendum plans in autumn 2011
– linkage strategy: making the ratification of the TSCG by a given country a prerequisite for its access to ESM money</td></tr>
<tr><td>Creating Smaller Subgroups of Member States
– promoting Euro plus pact
– promoting the TSCG to overcome British resistance against treaty reform
– promoting introduction of a financial market transaction tax in the framework of an enhanced cooperation scheme</td></tr>
</table>

Hollande stressed the need for a European growth strategy; called for a renegotiation of the fiscal compact treaty; made the case for the rapid introduction of Eurobonds; advocated the monetization of debt by the European Central Bank; wanted to give the EFSF permission to directly finance banks in trouble; and saw a European guarantee for bank deposits as an appropriate way to deal with the shaky foundations of national banks, especially in Greece and Spain.[39] This did not reflect a shift in basic preferences, only a shift in the emphasis given to individual issues such as Eurobonds or a European growth strategy. Germany subscribed to this agenda only as far as the first point of adding a growth component to the fiscal stability policy is concerned, but without adding new debts to old by way of a deficit-financed reflation policy. On all the other major points that Hollande raised, he met with staunch German opposition. Immediately after the second ballot of the French presidential elections, Chancellor Merkel made clear that the renegotiation of the fiscal compact, signed by twenty-five EU member states including France, was out of the question.[40] Berlin clearly sees the introduction of Eurobonds and the direct lending by the ECB to crisis-ridden Euro area members as no-go areas. Regarding Eurobonds, the German government even hardened its stance after the election of Hollande. Whereas Chancellor Merkel seemed for a while to keep the option of Eurobonds open at least for the (distant) future, in June 2012 she came out very strongly against this idea, declaring that there would be no full debt sharing “as long as I live.”[41]

Hollande has little to gain from a showdown with Germany. First, being denied its AAA-rating by Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s and having its sovereign debt financed overwhelmingly by foreign investors, France is vulnerable to international financial market pressures. Second, member states in the southern periphery do not automatically follow the French lead on contentious issues such as Eurobonds, the Spanish Rajoy government being an example. Third, Germany still has the one veto that matters on key issues in which France asks for more German solidarity. Moreover, Berlin can very credibly play two-level games, as the odds of getting domestic support in Germany for the French wish list are very low–giving the German chancellor and minister of finance a strong hand at the European negotiating table.

Overall, it seems unlikely that France could build a winning coalition against Germany on crucial issues. Hence, if Hollande wants to go beyond gesture politics for a domestic public and seriously influence the European course of events, he has little choice but to seek a concerted approach with Germany, perhaps in a less exclusively bilateral way than his predecessor did. Based on its financial resources and the comparative success of its economic model and economic policy of the last decade, Germany will remain the key actor in this play. France, however, has to rebuild its economic and fiscal credibility and regain lost ground in terms of competitiveness in order to rebuild a more balanced pattern of Franco-German leadership and influence in the EU.

The first statements and the first steps of the new French president on the European scene indeed corroborated this assessment. Hollande's France does not seek a role as a leader of a southern group of EU member states opposing Germany and its northern allies head-on. Rather, he described the French role as a kind of "linchpin," holding together the EU's northern and southern parts and building bridges between them.[42] A more confident French president who wants to be on an equal footing with the German chancellor seeks to broaden the decision-making process beyond the *tête-à-tête* with the powerful German partner. Hollande, having criticized the exclusive bilateral approach of his predecessor, established close contacts to the Prime Ministers of Italy and Spain, Monti and Rajoy, and tried to embed Franco-German bilateralism in a broader framework of multilateral consultations. The informal meeting of Hollande, Merkel, Monti, and Rajoy on 22 June 2012 in Rome, ahead of the European Council, is just such an example. He also advocated a stronger role for European institutions, often sidelined by Franco-German bilateralism during the crisis.

Contrary to his campaign statements, he did not insist on a formal renegotiation of the TSCG (fiscal compact treaty) that would have brought him in open conflict with Germany. He had to content himself with a growth pact (with few new elements) at the European Council of 28-29 June 2012, complementing the TSCG.

A new line of division emerged towards the end of 2012, when France and Germany opposed each other with regard to a key element of the Van Rompuy report "Towards a Genuine EMU,"[43] namely the idea to create a separate Eurozone budget. Deep conceptual differences remain as regards the function for such a budget. France advocated a macroeconomic stabilization function whereas Germany saw its purpose in providing financial incentives for structural reforms in individual member states.

There is some evidence of a renewed Franco-German bilateralism after a moment of hesitation. Hollande and Merkel met on 23 August 2012 immediately ahead of their separate talks with Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras who asked for more time to bring down the Greek public deficit. They carefully prepared their statements in order to find a common line of communication, both of them reminding Greece of its duty to honor its obligations. Moreover, German and French Ministers of Finance, Wolfgang Schäuble and Pierre Moscovici, set up a bilateral task force in order to prepare joint decisions to tackle the sovereign debt and banking crisis, which was another indicator of a renewed Franco-German bilateralism after the change of office holders in Paris.[44] Nevertheless, Hollande and Merkel did not (yet) continue the pattern of close bilateral top-level preparation of important European summits (see Table 3). A bilateral meeting to bridge Franco-German differences on the key issues of a European banking union–including a timetable and the potential reach of European-level supervision–only took place in the hours immediately before the start of the summit meeting.

Conclusion

The current sovereign debt crisis generated a strong demand and provided ample opportunity for the exercise of European political leadership. After initial hesitations, Germany together with France provided this political leadership at important moments, especially as the crisis reached a critical point in mid 2011. They contributed to the promotion of deeper integration in terms of more constraining national commitments in fiscal policy; they most actively cooperated in situations of urgency to provide leadership in crisis management when the Euro area approached the abyss both in May 2010 and in the second half of 2011; and they promoted differentiated forms of integration when they could not get their way with their preferred solutions at the level of the EU-27, pushing successfully for the establishment of a subgroup of member states in order to get the fiscal compact treaty adopted and promoting another subgroup to implement a financial transaction tax.

Germany and France strongly influenced the European agenda by way of submitting a number of common contributions. They succeeded in defining the key parameters of the European rescue funds (EFSF and ESM) in terms of sums available, functions, and institutional setup, and they proved able to strike bilateral compromises acceptable to their partners defining a balance between solidarity and fiscal responsibility (see the overview in Table 3). In order to provide this leadership, Paris and Berlin made full use of the exceptionally dense network of their "regularized ingergovernmentalism," the institutionalized formal and informal channels of communications, cooperation, and accommodation of interests between the two governments.[45]

Even though we find ample evidence for Franco-German leadership since the start of the sovereign debt crisis, their common capacity to find suitable remedies to cope with it is by no means beyond doubt. Berlin, grudgingly followed by Paris, adopted a stepwise approach. The two governments, however, did not develop a common comprehensive strategy based on a shared conceptual framework. The approach rather followed an additive logic, combining the gradual strengthening of temporary and permanent financial support schemes, a French preference, with a concomitant strengthening of fiscal rules that was advocated by Germany. This left the impression of buying time, allowing for the stabilization of the banking sector and preventing contagion in case Greece could one day no longer avoid leaving the euro area. Nevertheless, there is no Franco-German leadership in the sense of providing orientation by developing a coherent and convincing governance framework for the future of the Eurozone.

As the leadership role of Franco-German bilateralism in the European management of the Euro area crisis is not built on converging preferences but on the ability of France and Germany to bridge their differences and to strike "compromises by proxy," its continuation is by no means self-evident. It implies a strategic choice at the top level. The French elections of 2012 seemed to disrupt this pattern of exceptionally close Franco-German consultations in view of defining a common line ahead of all important European summits. At the time of writing, it is still too early to tell whether the President Hollande will make the strategic choice to build his European policy on a continuation of the established and time-tested pattern of Franco-German bilateralism. Other presidents before him (including Sarkozy) hesitated before fully realizing the strategic importance of a close Franco-German relationship for the achievement of key French policy goals in Europe. They had to learn the lesson that France has little to gain from neglecting this special bilateral relationship, as alternative patterns of cooperation and strategic partnerships are not easily available in the European Union–neither for France, nor for Germany.

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Notes

1. This project has been funded with support from the European Commission. This article reflects the views only of the author, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.
2. See Ulrich Krotz and Joachim Schild, *Shaping Europe. France, Germany, and Embedded Bilateralism from the Elysée Treaty to Twenty-First Century Politics* (Oxford, 2013). This article draws on Chapters 1 and 8 of this book.
3. Eckhard Lübkemeier, "Führung ist wie Liebe. Warum Mit-Führung in Europa notwendig ist und wer sie leisten kann," *SWP-Studien*, S 30 (Berlin, 2007), 7 (author's translation).
4. Robert Picht and Wolfgang Wessels, eds., *Motor für Europa. Deutsch-französischer Bilateralismus und europäische Integration* (Bonn, 1990); David P. Calleo and Eric R. Staal, eds., *Europe's Franco-German Engine* (Washington, 1998).
5. Oran R. Young, "Political Leadership in Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society," *International Organization*, 45 (1991): 281-308, here: 293-298.
6. Martin Koopmann, "A Driving Force Despite Everything. Franco-German Relations and the Enlarged European Union," *Notre Europe, Studies and Research* 36 (2004), 13; available at www.notre-europe.eu/uploads/tx_publication/Etud36-MKoopman-Moteur-Malgretout-en.pdf, accessed 12 December 2012.
7. Tobias Kunstein and Wolfgang Wessels, "Die Europäische Union in der Währungskrise: Eckdaten und Schlüsselentscheidungen," *Integration*, 34 (2011): 308-322, here 310.
8. Christian Deubner, *Saving the Euro–My Way. Competing French and German Visions for Euro Governance* (Berlin, 2011); available at https://ipjournal.dgap.org/en/article/18457/print, accessed 12 December 2012.
9. Erik Jones, "Merkel's Folly," *Survival* 52, no 3 (2010): 21-38.
10. See the interview with the French Minister of Finance, Christine Lagarde, "Il faut modifier le fonctionnement du pacte de stabilité," *Le Monde*, 4 May 2010.
11. "'If the Euro Fails, Europe Fails.' Merkel Says EU Must Be Bound Closer Together," *Spiegel Online International*, 7 September 2011; available at www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,784953,00.html, accessed 12 December 2012.
12. Deubner (see note 8).
13. See Michele Chang, "Reforming the Stability and Growth Pact: Size and Influence in EMU Policymaking," *Journal of European Integration* 28 (2006): 107-120.
14. See"Schäuble gegen größeren Rettungsfonds," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 28 January 2012.
15. See "Du clash de Francfort au sommet de Bruxelles, la folle semaine de l'Europe," *Le Monde*, 28 October 2011.
16. See his interview in *The Financial Times*, 27 May 2010 in which he also publicly recognized that the rescue package for Greece and the emergency stabilization funds decided in May 2010 de facto altered the treaties; available at www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d6299cae-69b5-11df-8432-00144feab49a.html#axzz1wRJJ5AZM, accessed 12 December 2012.
17. For the Franco-German leadership role during the first phase of crisis management and reform debates from spring 2010 to the end of 2010, see Joachim Schild, "Quel leadership franco-allemand en matière de gouvernance économique européenne?," *Annuaire Français des Relations Internationales*, XII (2011), La documentation Française/Bruylant, 493-510.
18. At their common press conference on 6 February 2012, Sarkozy attributed the Euro's rescue from the abyss to the "strategic" and "unwavering alliance" between France and Germany, see Conférence de presse conjointe de M. le Président de la République et de Mme. Angela Merkel Chancelière de la République Fédérale d'Allemagne, Palais de

l'Elysée; available at www.elysee.fr/president/root/bank/pdf/president-12958.pdf, accessed 12 December 2012.

19. Interview with a high official at the Bundeskanzleramt (German Chancellery), 14 March 2012.
20. For instance on 8 December 2011, immediately before the start of the European Council, see "Sarkozy and Merkel unveil two-speed EU plan to shore up euro," *The Guardian online*, 7 December 2011; available at www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/07/sarkozy-merkel-two-speed-eu-plan, accessed 12 December 2012. See also the overview in Table 2.
21. Interview with a high official at the Bundeskanzleramt, 14 March 2012.
22. See "Tough Words. Merkel and Sarkozy Halt Payments to Athens," *Spiegel Online International*, 3 November 2011; available at www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,795638,00.html, accessed 12 December 2012.
23. See "The divisiveness pact," *The Economist*, 12 March 2011.
24. See "Eleven EU Countries Agree on Transaction Tax," *Spiegel International*, 10 September 2012; available at www.spiegel.de/international/europe/eleven-eu-finance-ministers-agree-to-support-financial-transaction-tax-a-860320.html, accessed on 12 December 2012.
25. See their joint letters to the Presidents of the European Council and the Commission dating from 6 May 2010; available at www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Pressemitteilungen/BPA/2010/05/2010-05-06-brief-englisch.html; the Franco-German Economic and Financial Council's statement on the economic governance of the Eurozone, Paris, 21 July 2010; available at www.france-allemagne.fr/Conseil-economique-et-financier,5682.html#Gouvernement-economique-europeen; the Franco-German declaration issued at Deauville on 18 October 2010; available at www.france-allemagne.fr/Renforcons-le-gouvernement,5764.html; the Franco-German communiqué on the Eurozone dating from 8 August 2011; available at www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Pressemitteilungen/BPA/_2011/2011-08-07-dt-fr-kommunique.html; and again a common letter to the president of the European Council dating from 8 December 2011; available at www.london.diplo.de/Vertretung/london/en/03/__Political__News/12/MerkelSarkozy__letter.html; accessed 12 December 2012.
26. Interview with a high official at the Bundeskanzleramt, 14 March 2012.
27. See "Déficits: les eurodéputés dénoncent un 'diktat' franco-allemand," *Les Echos*, 20 October 2010.
28. See the press conference of Merkel and Sarkozy after their bilateral meeting at Berlin on 14 June 2010; available at www.france-allemagne.fr/Bundeskanzlerin-Merkel-trifft,5591.html, accessed 12 December 2012.
29. See the Euro Summit statements from 26 October 2011 and 2 March 2012; available at www.european-council.europa.eu/council-meetings/conclusions, accessed 12 December 2012.
30. Andreas Rinke, "Stunde der Entscheidung. Wie 'Merkozy' die Grundlagen eines neuen Europa schufen," *Internationale Politik* (Online), (January-Feburary 2012); available at https://zeitschrift-ip.dgap.org/de/ip-die-zeitschrift/themen/europaeische-union/stunde-der-entscheidung, accessed 12 December 2012.
31. See the statement of the Eurogroup summit on 9 December 2011; available at www.european-council.europa.eu/council-meetings/conclusions, accessed 12 December 2012.
32. "Union streitet vor dem EU-Gipfel über den Inhalt des Fiskalpakts," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 30 January 2012.
33. See "Euro: Paris et Berlin se font architectes, pas pompiers," *Le Monde*, 18 August 2011.
34. See "Zapatero will Schuldenbremse rasch durchsetzen," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 25 August 2011.

35. See "L'accord franco-allemand. Enfin une bonne note," *Le Monde*, 7 December 2011. After a delay during the German national ratification process due to a pending case before the Federal Constitutional Court, the ESM started its work only in October 2012.
36. This means that the annual structural deficit should, as a rule, not exceed 0.5 percent of GDP. See "Statement by the Euro Area Heads of State or Government," Brussels, 9 December 2011; available at www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/126658.pdf, accessed 12 December 2012.
37. See "Statement of the Eurogroup Summit,"2 March 2012; available at www.european-council.europa.eu/council-meetings/conclusions, accessed 12 December 2012.
38. See "Hollande zu Gast bei den Pickelhauben," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 6 December 2011.
39. See "François Hollande se fait fort d'imposer la renégociation du traité européen," *Le Monde*, 9 February 2012; "Konflikt um Euro-Bonds spaltet Europa," *Handelsblatt*, 25 May 2012.
40. See "Merkel: Fiskalpakt wird nicht neu verhandelt," FAZ-Net, 7 May 2012; available at www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/nach-wahlen-in-paris-und-athen-merkel-fiskalpakt-wird-nicht-neu-verhandelt-11742735.html, accessed 12 December 2012.
41. See "The Coming EU Summit Clash: Merkel Vows 'No Euro Bonds as Long as I Live.'" *Spiegel Online*, 27 June 2012, available at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/chancellor-merkel-vows-no-euro-bonds-as-long-as-she-lives-a-841163.html, accessed 7 March 2013.
42. See his press conference after his first European Council of 29 June 2012; available at www.elysee.fr/president/root/bank/pdf/president-13521.pdf, accessed 12 December 2012.
43. Herman Van Rompuy et al., "Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union," Report by Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, in close collaboration with José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the Eurogroup, Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank (Brussels, 5 December 2012); available at www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/134069.pdf, accessed 12 December 2012.
44. See "Paris et Berlin créent un groupe de travail sur l'euro," *Les Echos*, 28 August 2012; available at www.lesechos.fr/economie-politique/france/actu/0202232580268-paris-et-berlin-creent-un-groupe-de-travail-sur-l-euro-356059.php, accessed 12 December 2012.
45. See Ulrich Krotz, "Regularized intergovernmentalism: France-Germany and beyond (1963-2009)," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 6, no 2 (2010): 147-185.