Institutionalist approaches
Dr Monika Brusenbauch Meislová
IRE110 Theory of International Relations and European Integration
2 April 2019
Institutionalist approaches
̶ Small-group activity: How much do institutions matter from a
theoretical point of view?
Institutionalist approaches
̶ Different institutionalist approaches have tried to capture (a) the nature of the field of the EU, and (b)
to explain how it shapes the behavior of actors, but also (c) the integration process itself.
̶ New institutionalisms (NI) are ‘middle range’ theories (or rather not a single theory, but a set of
approaches)
̶ NI rests on the assumption that ‘institutions matter’ in European politics (Nugent, 2003, p.488-9).
̶ Institutions are political structures that constrain or enable the actions of the actors that operate within
them.
→ The rise of institutionalist analysis of the EU did not develop in isolation, but reflected a gradual and widespread
reintroduction of institutions into a large body of theories (such as pluralism, Marxism, and neorealism)
Institutionalist approaches
̶ Different institutionalist approaches provide different answers to the questions of
̶ how and why they are established.
̶ how institutions shape the integration process.
̶ Thus, they also provide us with insights as to why integration in different policies proceeds in specific
ways or how specific institutional set-ups may constrain further integration in some areas.
Institutionalist approaches
̶ Key thinkers of new institutionalism
̶ Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell: The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective
Rationality in Organizational Fields. American Sociological Review Vol. 48, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 147-160.
̶ James G. March and Johan P. Olsen. The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life. The
American Political Science Review. Vol. 78, No. 3 (Sep., 1984), pp. 734-749. One of the founding fathers of new
institutionalism.
̶ James G. March and Johan P. Olsen. Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics. 1989.
̶ Pollack, Mark. The New Institutionalism and EC Governance: The Promise and Limits of Institutional
Analysis. 1996.
Institutionalist approaches
Rational choice institutionalism (RCI)
̶ Emerged in the late 1970s (began with the effort by American political scientists to understand the
origins and effects of US Congressional institutions on legislative behaviour and policy outcomes)
̶ Kenneth Shepsle (1979, 1986): ‘structure-induced equilibrium’.
̶ Quickly taken up by EU scholars.
Rational choice institutionalism
̶ Focus on material incentives or costs that institutions impose + how actors design institutions to
secure mutual gains.
̶ Key question: why states delegate responsibilities to institutions? (reduction of transaction costs’; costbenefit
rationalism).
̶ Epstein and O’Halloran (1999), and others (Huber and Shipan 2002): ‘transaction-cost approach’ to
the design of political institutions: legislators deliberately and systematically design political institutions
to minimize the transaction costs associated with the making of public policy.
Rational choice institutionalism
Principal-agent model
̶ Institutions follow the logic of efficiency by becoming agents of the principals (MSs).
̶ The agents have their own agendas → the institutional setting may provide possibilities to “slip“ →
institutions can secure their own goals rather than the principals’ preferences.
̶ The principal–agent problem occurs when one person or entity (the agent) is able to make decisions
and/or take actions that impact another person or entity (the principal)
Video on a principal-agent model
Historical institutionalism (HI)
̶ Focus on
̶ institutional structures and processes within institutions
̶ the way that member states’ decisions both within and about institutions create a set of structural
institutional conditions that constrain their future behaviour
̶ asymmetries of power within the operation and development of institutions
̶ impact of past choices and the gaps in Member States’ control of these processes
Historical institutionalism
̶ Pierson (1996): gaps emerging in Member State control over the evolution of European institutions
(why these are difficult to close → possibilities for actors other than Member States to influence the
further development of integration).
Unintended consequences
̶ Actors cannot foresee the exact consequences of their actions, and initial institutional choices can thus
have ‘unintended consequences’.
Historical institutionalism
Path dependency
̶ Concept of being constrained by previous decisions.
̶ Once a decision has been made, revoking and going back on that decision it costly → states therefore
have to live and work within their previous decisions.
̶ Political actors can only marginally correct certain institutional developments due to institutional path
dependence (Pierson 1996) and ‘joint decision traps’ (Scharpf 1988) even if they realise that
institutional developments contradict their initial preferences.
̶ Path-dependencies and lock-ins raise the costs of policy reversal to the point where it becomes
unpalatable.
Historical institutionalism
Sociological institutionalism (SI)
̶ Very broad definition of institutions including “not just formal rules, procedures or norms, but the
symbol systems and moral templates that provide the ‘frames of meaning’ guiding human action.”
̶ Interest in the non-material, sociological qualities of institutions (norms and shared values that
institutions represent and that in turn shape the policy that derives from them; values, ideas and
identities)
̶ Institutions shape preferences.
̶ IS conceives institutions as constitutive forces → they constitute and change actors’ understanding
of a situation and problem as well as their interests and identities.
Sociological institutionalism
̶ SI analyses different mechanisms and conditions for the transformation of interests and identities of
state and non-state actors in international institutions.
̶ Institutions shape the actors’ behavior by creating a logic of appropriateness = actors follow what is
normatively expected of them in a particular role or situation (March and Olsen 1989: 160–1).
Sociological institutionalism
̶ Social interaction within institutions involves dynamics of learning and socialization
̶ Three dynamics in the process of socialization (Checkel):
̶ the importance of individual agency (moral entrepreneurs as agents actively seeking to persuade
others)
̶ the importance of policy windows opening a possibility for entrepreneurs to turn ideas into
broader normative beliefs as previously held fixed preferences break down.
̶ the importance of social learning to create the persistence of ideas.
̶ Critique: Limited explicatory force: institutional change, as well as continued conflict and differentiated
power relations among actors, could not be explained well.
Thank you very much for your attention
(brusenbauch.meislova@email.cz)