CHAPTER 3
The Origins of the Palestinian Refugee Problem
BENNY MORRIS
The Palestinian refugee problem was born of war, not by design, Jewish or Arab. It was largely a by-product of Arab and Jewish fears and of the protracted, bitter fighting that characterized the first Israeli-Arab war. In part, it was the creation of deliberate actions by Jewish military commanders and politicians; in smaller part, it was the result of actions by Arab military commanders and politicians.
The emergence of the problem was almost inevitable, given the geographical intermixing of the Arab and Jewish populations; the history of Arab-Jewish hostility during 1917^47; the resistance on both sides to a binational state and Arab rejection of partition; the outbreak and prolongation of die war for Israel's birth and survival; the depth of Arab animosity towards the yishuv and Arab fears of falling under Jewish rule; and the yishuv's fears of what would happen should the Arabs win and, alternately, what would happen to a Jewish state born with a very large, potentially or actively hostile Arab minority in its midst.
Moreover, Palestinian Arab society suffered from a complex of interlocking structural weaknesses that, during 1948's trial of combat, facilitated the rapid socio-political disintegration that underlay the exodus. Among those weaknesses were a largely apolitical or politically primitive populace; enervating regionalism and village-centeredness; a mind-set of reliance on outsiders for succor; widespread illiteracy; a lack of representative norms and self-governing institutions; almost no internal communal taxation; a relatively small, selfish, and disunited elite and middle class, lacking in a national service orientation or tradition; the absence of a large, unified military organization; a lack
42
efugee Problem
war, not by design Jewish ) and Jewish fears and of ized the first Israeli-Arab actions by Jewish military it was the result of actions
iost inevitable, given the Jewish populations; the 17; the resistance on both )f partition; the outbreak ind survival; the depth of i fears of falling under ould happen should the :n to a Jewish state born úle Arab minority in its
red from a complex of I 1948's trial of combat, tion that underlay the y apolitical or politically 1 village-centeredness; a espread illiteracy; a lack institutions; almost no I, selfish, and disunited service orientation or try organization; a lack
ORIGINS OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM
43
■'0f weaponry and of a weapons-making capability; and the absence of :_ physical preparations for war (trenches, shelters, and fortifications). Since 1948, two mutually exclusive, all-embracing explanations have dominated discussion of the Palestinian exodus. The traditional Arab explanation has been that the yishuv in 1948 carried out a preplanned, systematic expulsion of the country's Arab inhabitants. The official Jewish explanation, somewhat more complex, has been that the exodus occurred "voluntarily"—that is, not under Jewish compulsion— and on the orders or at the behest of Palestinian and external Arab leaders, in order to tarnish emergent Israel's image and to clear the way, as it were, for the invading Arab armies. However, the massive documentation now available in recently opened Israeli and British archives definitively demonstrates that both these single-cause explanations are fallacious or at least grossly insufficient and that the process by which some 700,000 Arabs departed Jewish/Israeli territory over 1947—49 was multi-staged, varied, and complex.
The exodus occurred in four clearly identifiable stages, with an obvious chronology; December 1947—March 1948; April—June 1948; 9-18 July 1948; and October—November 1948. These stages were inextricably linked to the "stages" and development of the 1948 war. To them one may add the series of population transfers and expulsions that occurred along Israel's borders during the immediate postwar period, November 1948-July 1949.1
The Palestinian Arab exodus began in December 1947—March 1948 with the departure of many of the country's upper- and middle-class families, especially from Haifa and Jaffa, towns destined to be in, or at the mercy of, the Jewish state-to-be and from Jewish-dominated districts of western Jerusalem. Flight proved infectious. Household followed household; neighbor followed neighbor; street, street; and neighborhood, neighborhood (as, later, village was to follow neighboring village). The prosperous and educated feared death or injury in the ever-spreading hostilities, the anarchy that attended the gradual withdrawal of the British administration and security forces, the brigandage and intimidation of the Arab militias and irregulars, and more vaguely but generally, the unknown, probably dark future that awaited them under Jewish oi*, indeed, Husayni rule (the Husayni family and its supporters). Some of these considerations, as well as a variety of direct and indirect military pressures, also during these months, caused the almost complete evacuation of the Arab rural
44
BENNY MORRIS
communities of the coastal plain, which was predominantly Jewish and which was to be the core of the Jewish state.
Most of the upper- and middle-class families who moved from Jaffa, Haifa, Jerusalem, Ramie, Acre, and Tiberias to Nablus, Amman, Beirut, Gaza, and Cairo probably thought their exile would be temporary. These families had the financial wherewithal to tide them over; many had wealthy relatives and accommodations outside the country. The urban masses and the fellahin (peasants), however, had nowhere to go, certainly not in comfort. For them, flight meant instant destitution; it was not a course readily adopted. But the daily spectacle of abandonment by their "betters," the middle and upper classes, with the concomitant progressive closure of businesses, schools, law offices, and medical clinics and die abandonment of civil service and municipal posts led to a steady attrition of morale and a cumulative sapping of faith and trust in the world around them: their leaders were going or had gone; the British were packing. They had been left "alone" to face the Zionist enemy. Palestinian urban society began to disintegrate.
Daily, week-in, week-out, over December 1947, January, February, and March 1948, there were clashes along the "seams" between the two communities in the mixed towns, ambushes in the fields and on the roads, sniping, machine-gun fire, bomb attacks, and occasional mortaring. Problems of movement and communication, unemployment, and food distribution intensified, especially in the towns, as the hostilities continued.
There is probably no accounting for the mass exodus that followed without understanding the prevalence and depth of the general sense of collapse, of "falling apart," that permeated Arab Palestine, especially the towns, by April 1948. In many places, it would take very little to induce the inhabitants to pack up and flee.
With the Haganah and IZL-LHI (Irgun Zvai Leumi—Lohamei Herut Yisrael) offensives of April-May, the cumulative effect of die fears, deprivations, abandonment, and depredations of the previous months, in boUi towns and villages, overcame die natural, basic reluctance to abandon home and property and go into exile. The second and principal stage of die exodus unfolded. As Palestinian military power was swifdy and dramatically crushed and the Haganah demonstrated almost unchallenged superiority in successive conquests, Arab morale cracked, giving way to general, blind panic, to a "psychosis of flight," as one Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intelligence report put it.
BENNY MORRIS
ich was predominantly Jewish and sh state.
iss families who moved from Jaffa, iberias to Nablus, Amman, Beirut, their exile would be temporary, rewithal to tide them over; many lations outside the country. The its), however, had nowhere to go, Sight meant instant destitution; it it the daily spectacle of abandon-le and upper classes, with the isinesses, schools, law offices, and it of civil service and municipal ale and a cumulative sapping of lem: their leaders were going or They had been left "alone" to face 1 society began to disintegrate, cember 1947, January, February, long the "seams" between the two abushes in the fields and on the bomb attacks, and occasional and communication, unemploy-d, especially in the towns, as the i
or the mass exodus that followed : and depth of the general sense .; seated Arab Palestine, especially ; laces, it would take very little to I flee.
gun Zvai Leumi—Lohamei Herut ; cumulative effect of the fears, sdations of the previous months, the natural, basic reluctance to o into exile. The second and 1. As Palestinian military power and the Haganah demonstrated ccessive conquests, Arab morale anic, to a "psychosis of flight," as igence report put it.
ORIGINS OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM
45
rr -Towns fell first—-Tiberias, Haifa, Jaffa, Beisan, Safad—and their .-populations fled. The panic then affected the surrounding rural hinterlands: after Haifa came the flight from Balad ash Sheikh and Hawassa; after Jaffa, Salama, Al Kheiriya, and Yazur; after Safad, Dhahiriya Tahta, Sammu'i, and Meirun. For decades the villagers had looked to the towns for leadership; now they followed the townspeople into exile.
. if Jewish attacks directly and indirectly triggered most of the Arab exodus up to June 1948, a small but significant proportion of that flight was due to direct Jewish expulsion orders issued after the conquest of a site and to Jewish psychological warfare ploys (ta'amulat lahash or whispering propaganda, as it was called by the Haganah) designed to intimidate inhabitants into leaving. The Haganah ordered more than a do^en villages to evacuate during April—June. The expulsions were usually from areas considered strategically vital and in conformity with plan D, which called for clear main lines of communications and border areas.
i , Given Palestinian topography, the geographic intermingling of the two communities, and the nature of the partition plan and Palestine's frontiers, there were few Arab villages that did not, arguably, fall into either (or both) of these headings: most villages could be seen as either "strategically vital" or as lying within "border areas." Also, it was standard Haganah and IDF practice to round up and expel the remaining villagers (usually old people, widows, and cripples) from each site already evacuated by most of its inhabitants, mainly because the occupying force wanted to avoid having to leave behind a garrison. An undermanned Haganah/IDF understandably preferred empty to populated Arab villages behind its front lines.
' / Moreover, for military and political reasons, during the spring and early summer of 1948, Arab local commanders and the Arab Higher Committee (AHC) issued orders to evacuate close to two dozen villages. This included the Arab Legion order of 13 May for the temporary evacuation of villages north and east of Jerusalem for strategic reasons—to clear the prospective battle area. Military reasons also underlay orders to some local National Committees and villages to remove women and children to safer areas. Later in May, Arab irregulars' commanders intimidated villagers into leaving seven sites in the lower Galilee, apparently because they feared the villagers would acquiesce in Israeli rule.
46
BENNY MORRIS
In April—May and indeed again in October, the "atrocity factor" played a major role in precipitating flight from certain areas of the country. Arab villagers and townspeople took to their heels, prompted by the fear that the Jews, if victorious, would do unto them what, in the reverse circumstances, victorious Arab fighters would have done to defeated Jews (and did, occasionally, as in May in the Etzion Bloc, a bloc of four kibbutzim between Jerusalem and Hebron). The actual atrocities committed by the Jewish forces (primarily at Deir Yassin) reinforced such fears considerably, especially when amplified and magnified loudly and persistently in the Arab media, particularly by AHC spokesmen, for weeks thereafter.
To what extent was the Arab exodus up to July a product ofyishuv or Arab policy? The answer is as complex as was the situation on die ground. Up to die beginning of April 1948, there was no yishuv plan or policy to expel die Arab inhabitants of Palesdne, either from the area desdned for Jewish statehood or from those areas lying outside it. The Haganah adopted a forceful retaliatory strategy against suspected bases of Arab irregular bands which triggered a certain amount of flight. But it was not a strategy designed to precipitate civilian flight.
The prospect and need to prepare for the invasion gave birth to the Haganah's Plan D, prepared in early March. It was not a grand plan of expulsion (as Arab propagandists, such as Walid Khalidi, have depicted it), However, it gave the Haganah brigade and battalion-level commanders carte blanche to completely clear vital areas; it allowed the expulsion of hosdle or potentially hosdle Arab villages (and "potentially hostile" was, indeed, open to a very liberal interpretation). Many villages were bases for bands of irregulars; most villages had armed militias and could serve as bases for hostile bands.
During April—May, die local Haganah commanders, sometimes widi specific instruction from the Haganah General Staff, carried out elements of Plan D, each interpreting and implementing the plan in his area as he saw fit and in relation to the prevailing local circumstances. In general, the commanders saw fit to completely clear the vital roads and border areas of Arab communities—Allon in eastern Galilee, Carmel around Haifa and western Galilee, Avidan in die soudi. Most of die villagers fled before or during the fighting. Those who initially stayed put were almost invariably expelled.
There was never, during April—June, any national-political or General Staff decision to expel "the Arabs" from the Jewish state's areas. There was no "plan" or policy decision. The matter was never discussed
ORIGINS OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM
47
in die supreme, political, decision-making bodies; but it was understood by all concerned that, militarily, in the struggle to survive, the fewer Arabs remaining behind and along the front lines, the better and, politically, the fewer Arabs remaining in the Jewish state, the better. At each level of command and execution, Haganah officers in those April—Jurie days when the fate of the state hung in the balance, simply •understood" what the military and political exigencies of survival required. Even most Mapam (generally Ahdut Ha'avodah) officers— ideologically committed to coexistence with the Arabs—failed to "adhere" to the party line: conditions in the field, tactically and strategically, gave precedence to a mentality of immediate survival over the long-term desirability of coexistence.
The Arab leadership inside and outside Palestine probably helped precipitate the exodus in the sense that it was disunited, had decided on no fixed uniform policy vis-a-vis die civilian evacuation, and gave the Palestinians no consistent, hard-and-fast guidelines and instructions about how to act and what to do, especially during the crucial month of April. The records are incomplete, but they show overwhelming confusion and disparate purpose, with "policy" changing from week to week and area to area. No guiding hand or central control is evident.
During the first months, the flight of the middle and upper classes from the towns provoked little Arab interest, except at the immediate local level affected. The rich families arrived in Nablus, Amman, and Beirut in a trickle and were not needy. It seemed to be merely a repeat of the similar exodus of 1936—39. The Husaynis were probably happy that many of the wealthy, opposition-linked families were leaving.
No Arab government closed its borders or otherwise tried to stem the exodus. The AHC, its members already dispersed around the Arab world, issued no blanket condemnation of the flight though, according to IDF intelligence, it tried during these early months to halt the flow out of Palestine, especially of army-age males. At the local level, some of the National Committees (in Haifa and Jerusalem, for example) and local irregulars' commanders tried to fight the exodus, even setting up people's courts to try offenders and threatening to confiscate the property of the departees. However, enforcement seems to have been weak and haphazard; the measures proved largely ineffective. The irregulars often had an interest in encouraging flight as money was to be made out of it (in the form of "departure taxes" or lootable Abandoned dwellings).
i       :• I
I IP
\4
48
BENNY MORRIS
As to April and the start of the main stage of the exodus, I have found no evidence to show that the AHC issued blanket instructions, by radio or otherwise, to Palestine's Arabs to flee. However, AHC and Husayni supporters in certain areas may have ordered or encouraged flight for various reasons and may have done so, on occasion, in the belief that they were doing what the AHC wanted or would have wanted them to do. Haifa affords an illustration of this.
While it is unlikely that Husayni or die AHC from outside Palestine on 22 April instructed the Haifa Arab leadership to opt for evacuation rather than surrender, Husayni's local supporters, led by Sheikh Murad, did so. The lack of AHC and Husayni orders, appeals, or broadcasts againsl the departure during the following week-long Haifa exodus indicates that Husayni and the AHC did not dissent from their supporters' decision. Silence was consent. The absence of clear, public instructions and broadcasts for or against the Haifa exodus over 23—30 April is extremely instructive concerning the ambivalence of Husayni and the AHC at this stage towards the exodus.
The Arab states, apart from appealing to the British to halt the Haganah offensives and charging diat the Haganah was expelling Palestine's Arabs, seem to have taken weeks to digest and understand what was happening. They did not appeal to the Palestinian masses to leave, but neither, in April, did they demand diat the Palestinians stay put. Perhaps the politicians in Damascus, Cairo, and Amman, like Husayni, understood that they would need a good reason to justify armed intervention in Palestine on the morrow of the British departure—and the mass exodus, presented as a planned Zionist expulsion, afforded such a reason.
But the dimensions and burden of the problem created by the exodus, falling necessarily and initially upon die shoulders of die host countries, quickly persuaded the Arab states—primarily Transjordan— that it was best to halt the flood tide. The AHC, too, was apparendy shocked by die ease and completeness of the uprooting of the Arabs from Palestine. Hence the spate of appeals in early May by Transjordan, die AHC, and various Arab leaders to die Arabs of Palestine to stay put or, if already in exile, to return to tiieir homes.
But die appeals, given the war conditions along the fronts, had litde effect: the refugees, who had just left an active or potential combat zone, were hardly inclined to return to it, and especially not on the eve of the expected pan-Arab invasion. Besides, in most areas the Haganah physically barred a return. Later, the Arab invasion of 15 May made
BENNY MORRIS .11
un stage of the exodus, I have ] issued blanket instructions, by 3 to flee. However, AHC am! iy have ordered or encouraged e done so, on occasion, in the
AHG wanted or would have lustration of this, he AHC from outside Palestine adership to opt for evacuation pporters, led by Sheikh Murad, orders, appeals, or broadcasts /ing week-long Haifa exodus
did not dissent from their t. The absence of clear, public : die Haifa exodus over 23—30 r the ambivalence of Husayni wdus.
ing to the British to halt the the Haganah was expelling eks to digest and understand il to the Palestinian masses to and that die Palestinians stay us, Cairo, and Amman, like ;ed a good reason to justify norrow of the British depar-a planned Zionist expulsion,
the problem created by the ion the shoulders of the host •—primarily Transjordan— e AHG, too, was apparendy the uprooting of the Arabs :als in early May by Trans-i to the Arabs of Palesdne to > their homes.
ns along the fronts, had litde acdve or potential combat nd especially not on the eve , in most areas the Haganah b invasion of 15 May made
ORPINS OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM
49
any thought of a refugee return impracdcable. And it substantially increased the readiness of Haganah commanders to clear border areas of Arab communities.
- Already in April—May, on the local and national levels, the yishuv's military and political leaders began to contemplate the problem of a refugee return: should they be allowed back? The approach of the First Truce in early June raised the problem as one of the major political and strategic issues to be faced by the new state. The Arab states, on the local level on each front and in international forums, had begun pressing for Israel to allow the refugees back, And the United Nations' Mediator for Palestine, Folke Bernadotte, had vigorously taken up the cause.
However, politically and militarily, it was clear from the start to most Israelis that a return would be disastrous. Militarily—and the war, all understood, was far from over—it would mean die introduction of a large, potential Fifth Column; politically, it would mean the rcintroduction of a large, disruptive Arab minority into die Jewish state. The military commanders argued against a return; so did political common sense. Botii were reinforced by strident anti-return lobbying by Jewish settlements around the country,
The mainstream national leaders, led by Ben Gurion, had to confront the issue within two problematic political contexts—the international context of future Israeli-Arab relations, Israeli-United Nations relations, and Israeli-United States relations; and the local political context of a coalition government, in which the Mapam ministers advocated future Jewish-Arab coexistence and a return of "peace-minded" refugees after the war. Hence the cabinet consensus of 16 June was that there would be no return during the war and that die matter could be reconsidered after die hostilities. This left Israel's diplomats widi room for maneuvering and was sufficiendy flexible to allow Mapam to stay in die government, thereby leaving national unity intact.
On the practical level, from the spring of 1948, a series of developments on die ground increasingly precluded any possibility of a future refugee return. The developments were an admixture of incidental, "natural" processes and steps specifically designed to assure the impossibility of a return. These developments and steps included the gradual destruction of the abandoned Arab villages, the destruction or cultivation and long-term takeover of Arab fields, the establishment
I.
50
BENNY MORRIS
of new settlements on Arab lands, and the settlement of Jewish immigrants in abandoned Arab villages and urban neighborhoods.
The second half of the war, between the end of the First Truce (8 July 1948) and the signing of the Israeli-Arab armistice agreements in the spring and summer of 1949, was characterized by short, sharp Israeli offensives interspersed with long stretches of cease-fire. In these offensives, the IDF defeated the Transjordanian and Egyptian armies and the Arab Liberation Army, and conquered large tracts of territory earmarked in 1947 by the United Nations for a Palestine Arab state. These offensives—primarily those in July 1948 in the north (Operation Dekel in the Nazareth area) and the center (Operation Dani in the Lydda-Ramle area); and those in October—November in the north (Operation Hiram in the Upper Galilee) and the south (Operation Yoav in the southern coastal plain and the northern Negev)—precipitated, respectively, the third and fourth waves of the exodus. These accounted for the flight of an additional 300,000 refugees from the Israeli-controlled parts of the country.
Again, during these offensives, there was no cabinet or IDF General Staff-level decision to expel. Indeed, the July fighting (the "Ten Days") was preceded by an explicit IDF General Staff directive to all units and corps to avoid destruction of Arab villages and expulsion of Arab communities without prior authorization by the Defense Minister. That order was issued as a result of the cumulative political pressure on Ben Gurion during the summer by the Mapam ministers and Bekhor Shalom Shitrit, the Minister of Minority Affairs.
But from July onwards, there was a growing readiness in the IDF units to expel. This was at least partly due to die political feeling, encouraged by the mass exodus from Jewish-held areas to date, that an almost completely Jewish state was a realistic possibility. There were also powerful vengeful urges at play—revenge for Jewish losses and punishment for having forced upon theyishuv and its able-bodied young men the protracted, bitter battle. Generally, all that was needed in each successive newly conquered area was a little nudging.
The tendency of IDF units to expel Arab civilians increased just as the pressures on the remaining Arabs by leaders inside and outside Palestine to stay put grew, and just as their motivation to stay put increased. During the summer, the Arab governments intermittently tried to bar the entry of new refugees into their territory. The Palestinians were encouraged to remain in Palestine or to return to their homes.
ORIGINS OF THE PALES:
At the same time, the of the misery that was th« of the salvation and re< generally preferred to st Israeli rule. Staying put i to flight in the second hal days. Hence, there was m either to stay put or to le
Ben Gurion clearly v the Jewish state. He hop colleagues and aides in n But no expulsion policy • refrained from issuing cl< that his generals "under; avoid going down in histc the Israeli government policy. In addition, he sc
Although there was i November offensives w< indeed, brutality towards Yet events varied from p the largest expulsion of same time the IDF North' at his behest, left Nazaret place. The "Christian fa-the center of the country, Jisr az Zarka (along the Jerusalem)—were allow' wishes of the military.2
Again, the IDF offen were marked by ambiva the overrun civilian popi command, almost no Are to expel and let his subo where Moshe Carmel w Upper Galilee Arabs, < contrary to Ben Gurion' to the fact that before Oc the war or its privations
BENNY MORRIS
i the settlement of Jewish nd urban neighborhoods, the end of the First Truce i-Arab armistice agreements haracterized by short, sharp etches of cease-fire. In these ianian and Egyptian armies ered large tracts of territory s for a Palestine Arab state. 1948 in the north (Operation ter (Operation Dani in the :r—November in the north d the south (Operation Yoav hern Negev)—precipitated, he exodus. These accounted refugees from the Israeli-
is no cabinet or IDF General ily fighting (the "Ten Days") aff directive to all units and ;es and expulsion of Arab the Defense Minister. That /e political pressure on Ben am ministers and Bekhor fairs.
awing readiness in the IDF ue to the political feeling, i-held areas to date, that an tic possibility. There were enge for Jewish losses and v and its able-bodied young Ily, all that was needed in i little nudging, b civilians increased just as leaders inside and outside ur motivation to stay put overnments intermittently nto their territory. The Palestine or to return to
ORIGINS OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM
51
At the same time, those Palestinians still in their villages, hearing of the misery that was the lot of their exiled brethren and despairing of the salvation and reconquest of Palestine by the Arab armies, generally preferred to stay put, even though facing the prospect of Israeli rule. Staying put was to be preferred to flight. Arab resistance to flight in the second half of 1948 was far greater than in the pre-July days. Hence, there was much less "spontaneous* flight: villagers tended either to stay put or to leave under duress.
Ben Gurion clearly wanted as few Arabs as possible to remain in the Jewish state. He hoped to see them flee. He said as much to his colleagues and aides in meetings in August, September, and October. But no expulsion policy was ever enunciated and Ben Gurion always refrained from issuing clear or written expulsion orders; he preferred that his generals "understand" what he wanted done. He wished to avoid going down in history as the "great expeller" and he did not want the Israeli government to be implicated in a morally questionable policy. In addition, he sought to preserve national unity in wartime.
Although there was no "expulsion policy," die July and October-November offensives were characterized by more expulsions and, indeed, brutality towards Arab civilians than in the first half of the war. Yet events varied from place to place. In July, Ben Gurion approved the largest expulsion of the war from Lydda and Ramie; but at the same time the IDF Northern Front, with Ben Gurion's agreement if not at his behest, left Nazareth's population, which was mostly Christian, in place. The "Christian factor" was allowed to determine policy, and in the center of the country, three Arab villages—Al Fureidis and Khirbet Jisr az Zarka (along the Haifa-Tel Aviv road), and Abu Ghosh (near Jerusalem)—were allowed to stay, the politicians overriding the clear wishes of the military.3
Again, the IDF offensives of October in the Galilee and the south were marked by ambivalence concerning the troops' attitude towards the overrun civilian population. In the south, where Yigal Allon was in command, almost no Arab civilians remained, anywhere. Allon tended to expel and let his subordinates know what he wanted. In the north, where Moshe Carmel was in charge, the picture was varied. Many Upper Galilee Arabs, overrun in Operation Hiram, did not flee, contrary to Ben Gurion's expectations. This was probably due in part to the fact that before October the villagers had hardly been touched by the war or its privations.
52
BENNY MORRIS
The varied religious makeup of the population contributed to the mixed picture. The IDF generally related far more benignly to Christians and Druse than to Muslims. Most Christian and Druse villagers stayed put and were allowed to do so. Many of the Muslim villagers fled; others were expelled. But many other Muslim villagers—for example, in Deir Hanna, Arraba, Sakhnin, and Majd al Kurum—stayed put, and were allowed to stay. Much depended on specific local factors.
During the following months, with the cabinet in Tel Aviv increasingly persuaded that Israeli-Arab enmity would remain a central feature of the Middle East for many years, the IDF was authorized to clear Arab communities from Israel's long, winding, and highly penetrable borders to a depth of five to fifteen kilometers. One of the aims was to prevent infiltration of refugees back to their homes. The IDF was also afraid of sabotage and spying. Early November saw a wave of IDF expulsions or transfers of villagers inland along the northern border. Some villagers, ordered out, were "saved" by last-minute intervention by "soft-hearted" Israeli politicians. The following months and years saw other border areas cleared or partially cleared of Arab inhabitants.
In examining the causes of the Arab exodus from Palestine over 1947—49, accurate quantification is impossible. I have tried to show that the exodus occurred in stages and that causation was multi-layered: a Haifa merchant who fled to Beirut in March 1948 did not leave only because of the weeks or months of sniping and bombings; or because business was getting bad; or because of intimidation and extortion by irregulars; or because he feared the collapse of law and order when the British left; or because he feared for his prospects and livelihood under Jewish rule, He left because of the accumulation of all these factors. A Haifa laborer, who fled with his family at the end of April 1948, left because he had endured months of strife, unemployment, a breakdown of administration and law and order, and intermittent material privations; had seen his "betters"—the rich and privileged, doctors, lawyers, teachers, civil servants—leave in a steady stream during the preceding months; had noted Arab incompetence and weakness and relative Jewish prowess; had seen the Haganah's swift demolition of Arab military power on 21—22 April; had been traumatized by the Jewish mortar barrages during the conquest; had noted the swift Arab collapse and his leaders' decision to quit the city; had witnessed the panic flight of his neighbors, friends, and relatives; and feared for his
BENNY MORRIS
tion contributed to the far more benignly to t Christian and Druse . Many of the Muslim my other Muslim vil-Sakhnin, and Majd al /. Much depended on
cabinet in Tel Aviv would remain a central IDF was authorized to
winding, and highty tilometers. One of the k to their homes. The ; &rly November saw a jers inland along the , were "saved" by last-iticians. The following I or partially cleared of ■
is from Palestine over I have tried to show ion was multi-layered: 948 did not leave only bombings; or because ition and extortion by w and order when the 5 and livelihood under >n of all these factors, ind of April 1948, left oyment, a breakdown ntermittent material d privileged, doctors, dy stream during the ce and weakness and s swift demolition of i traumatized by the ! noted the swift Arab .y; had witnessed die as; and feared for his
ORIGINS OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM
53
future under Jewish rule and feared, as well, for what would happen to him should die Arab armies invade Palestine and bomb and assault Haifa.
The decision of rural Arabs to quit their homes and land was often more clear-cut and simple. Usually, the villagers fled as a Haganah/IDF column approached or laid down a preliminary mortar barrage. But here, too, multiple causation often applied, as in Qaluniya, near Jerusalem. There were months of hostilities in the area, intermittent shortages of supplies, severance of communications with Jerusalem, lack of leadership or clear instruction about what to do or expect, rumors or reports of Jewish atrocities, and, finally, a Jewish attack on Qaluniya itself (by which time most of the inhabitants had left). Again, evacuation was the end product of a cumulative process.
Even in the case of a Haganah or IDF expulsion order, the actual departure was often die result of a process rather than of that one act. In Lydda, largely untouched by batde before July 1948, there were unemployment and skyrocketing prices during the first months of die war and the burden caused by the presence of armed irregulars. In April, diousands of refugees from Jaffa and its hinterland arrived in the town, camping out in courtyards and on the town's periphery. They brought demoralization and sickness. Some wealthy families left. There was uncertainty about Abdullah's commitment to the town's defense, and by June there was a feeling diat Lydda's "turn" was imminent. Then came the attack, with bombings and shelling, Arab Legion pull-out, collapse of resistance, sniping, massacre—and the expulsion orders of 12—13 July.
What happened in Palestine/Israel over 1947—49 was so complex and varied, the situation radically changing from date to date and place to place, diat a single-cause explanation of the exodus from most sites is untenable. At most, one can say that certain causes were important in certain areas at certain times, witii a general shift in the spring of 1948 from a prevalence of cumulative internal Arab factors—lack of leadership, economic problems, breakdown of law and order—to a predominance of external, compulsive causes. These included Haganah/IDF attacks and expulsions, fear of Jewish attacks and atrocities, lack of help from the Arab world and AHC, a feeling of impotence and abandonment, and orders from Arab institutions and commanders to leave. In general, in most places, the final and decisive precipitant to flight was a Haganah, IZL, LHI, or IDF attack or the inhabitants' fear of imminent attack.
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BENNY MORRIS
During the second half of 1948, international concern mounted over the refugee problem. Concern translated into pressures. These pressures, launched by Bernadotte and the Arab states in the summer of 1948, increased as the months passed, as the number of refugees swelled, and as their plight became physically more acute. The refugee problem moved to the forefront of every discussion of the Middle East conflict and the Arabs made their agreement to a settlement with Israel contingent on a solution of the refugee problem by repatriation.
From the summer of 1948, Bernadotte, and from the autumn, the United States pressed Israel to agree to a substantial measure of repatriation as part of a comprehensive solution to the refugee problem and to the general conflict. In December 1948, the United Nations General Assembly upheld the refugees' "right of return." But, as the abandoned villages fell into ruin or were bulldozed or settled, and as more Jewish immigrants poured into the country and were accommodated in abandoned Arab houses, the physical possibility of substantial repatriation grew more remote. Allowing back Arab refugees, Israel argued, would commensurately reduce Israel's ability to absorb Jewish refugees from Europe and the Middle East.
Time worked against a repatriation of the Arab refugees. Bernadotte and the United States wanted Israel to make a "gesture" in the coin of repatriation, to get the efforts for a comprehensive settlement off the ground. In the spring of 1949, the thinking about a "gesture" matured into the United States' demand that Israel agree to take back 250,000, with the remaining refugees to be resettled in the neighboring Arab countries. America threatened and cajoled, but never with sufficient force or conviction to persuade Tel Aviv to relent.
In the spring, in a final major effort, the United Nations and United States engineered the Lausanne Peace Conference. Weeks and months of haggling over agenda and secondary problems led nowhere. The Arabs made all progress contingent on Israeli agreement to mass repatriation. Under American pressure, Tel Aviv reluctantly agreed in July to take back 65,000-70,000 refugees (the "100,000 offer," so called because it would have included an additional 25,000 refugees who had already returned to the country illegally, and 10,000 more who would return under a family reunification scheme) as part of a comprehensive peace settlement. But by the summer of 1949, public and party political opinion in Israel—in part, due to government propaganda— had so hardened against a return that even this minimal offer was greeted by a storm of public protest and howls within Mapai. In any
BENNY MORRIS
concern mounted pressures. These es in the summer ; mber of refugees ; :ute. The refugee )f the Middle East ement with Israel \ repatriation. 1 the autumn, the i titial measure of refugee problem ■ ; United Nations ] irn," But, as the i )r settled, and as I were accommo- | lity of substantial ^ » refugees, Israel to absorb Jewish i
efugees. Berna- J "gesture" in the ' nsive settlement | bout a "gesture" J ree to take back -l the neighboring ■'; but never with i elent.
xl Nations and nee. Weeks and ns led nowhere, eement to mass J .antly agreed in offer," so called fugees who had ore who would comprehensive blic and party propaganda— imal offer was Mapai. In any
ORIGINS OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM
55
case, die sincerity of the Israeli offer was never tested: the Arabs rejected it out of hand. The United States, too, regarded it as decidedly insufficient, as too little, too late.
The insufficiency of the "100,000 offer," the Arab states' growing lejeclionism, their unwillingness to acceptand concede defeat, and their inability to publicly agree to absorb and resettle most of the refugees if Israel agreed to repatriation of the rest, the expiry of the "Gaza Plan" (which would have placed the Gaza Strip, with its sizable population of Aiab local and refugee populations, under Israeli sovereignty), and America's unwillingness or inability to apply persuasive pressures on Isi icl and the Arab states to compromise—all meant that the Arab-Tsiaeli impasse would endure and that Palestine's exiled Arabs would lcinain refugees, to be utilized during the following years by the Arab slates as a powerful political and propaganda pawn against Israel. The memory or vicarious memory of 1948 and the subsequent decades of humiliation and deprivation in the refugee camps would ultimately turn generations of Palestinians into potential or active guerrillas and terrorists and the "Palestinian problem" into one of the world's most intractable.