

Democratic Inclusion and Religious Nationalists in Israel

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DEMOCRATIC INCLUSION HAS BEEN LINKED to the moderation of religious parties in a wide variety of contexts, ranging from Christian parties in nineteenth-century Europe and Islamist parties in Turkey and Indonesia, to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India, among others. At the same time, political inclusion does not necessarily lead to moderation. Unlike the moderating effects generally seen elsewhere in Europe, radical religious parties in Greece, Poland, and Bosnia have not substantively moderated despite their participation in electoral politics. In authoritarian contexts, for example, despite analogous political openings in Yemen and Jordan, Islamist parties moderated only in the latter.¹ Why does including radical religious movements in the democratic game sometimes lead to their moderation and sometimes not?

¹For discussions of the link between inclusion and moderation of both religious and secular movements in a wide range of settings, see Graham Fuller, "A Phased Introduction of Islamists" in Yehuda Mirsky and Matt Ahrens, eds., *Democracy in the Middle East: Defining the Challenge* (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1993): 21-30; Glenn E. Robinson, "Can Islamists Be Democrats? The Case of Jordan," *The Middle East Journal* 51 (Summer 1997): 373-387; Augustus Richard Norton, "Hizballah: From Radicalism to Pragmatism?" *Middle East Policy* 5 (January 1998): 147-158; Vickie Langohr, "Of Islamists and Ballot Boxes: Rethinking the Relationship between Islamisms and Electoral Politics," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 33 (November 2001): 591-610; Ziya Onis, "Political Islam at the Crossroads: From Hegemony to Co-Existence," *Contemporary Politics* 7 (December 2001): 281-298; Susanne Hoerber

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This article argues that the balance of the countervailing trends unleashed by democratic inclusion is one source of this variation. The inclusion of radical parties in democratic politics and, more specifically, in the government itself, certainly provides strong institutional incentives for moderation. At the same time, the very temperance fostered by inclusion forces the moderating party to confront two political challenges that, if not overcome, can undermine any moderation. First, moderation makes the once-radical party less distinct from mainstream parties and thus more susceptible to losing support to these (usually larger and more significant) parties. Second, moderation also creates an opening for ideological hardliners to capture the newly vacated political space, creating radical flank effects. Most pathways through which inclusion is believed to foster moderation assume that these flank effects are positive. That is, to work as expected, the inclusion–moderation hypothesis (IMH) assumes that even if radical faction emerges to challenge the moderating wing of a movement, it will either be too marginal to matter, or its emergence would lead to increased external support for the relative moderates by third parties.

Rudolph and Lloyd I. Rudolph, “New Dimensions of Indian Democracy,” *Journal of Democracy* 13 (January 2002): 52–66; Reinhard Heinisch, “Success in Opposition—Failure in Government: Explaining the Performance of Right-Wing Populist Parties in Public Office,” *West European Politics* 26 (July 2003): 91–130; Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Unsecular Politics and Religious Mobilization: Beyond Christian Democracy” in Thomas Ksleman and Joseph A. Buttigieg, eds., *European Christian Democracy: Historical Legacies and Comparative Perspectives* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003): 293–320; Alexandre Dézé, “Between Adaptation, Differentiation and Distinction: Extreme Right-Wing Parties with Democratic Political Systems” in Roger Eatwell and Cas Mudde, eds., *Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right Challenge* (New York: Routledge, 2004):19–40; Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, “The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt’s Wasat Party,” *Comparative Politics* 36 (January 2004): 205–228; Mona El-Ghobashy, “The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 37 (August 2005): 373–395; Anthony J. McGann and Herbert Kitschelt, “The Right in the Alps: Evolution of Support for the Swiss SVP and Austrian FPÖ,” *Party Politics* 11 (March 2005): 147–171; Vali Nasr, “The Rise of ‘Muslim Democracy,’” *Journal of Democracy* 16 (April 2005): 13–27; Jillian Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Janine A. Clark, “The Conditions of Islamist Moderation: Unpacking Cross-Ideological Cooperation in Jordan,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 38 (November 2006): 539–560; Hilde Coffé, Bruno Heyndels, and Jan Vermeir, “Fertile Grounds for Extreme Right-Wing Parties: Explaining the Vlaams Blok’s Electoral Success,” *Electoral Studies* 26 (March 2007): 142–155; Michael Minkenberg and Pascal Perrineau, “The Radical Right in the European Elections,” *International Political Science Review* 28 (January 2007): 29–55; Mona Yacoubian, “Engaging Islamists and Promoting Democracy: A Preliminary Assessment,” *United States Institute of Peace*, Report No. 190 (2007); Sheri Berman, “Taming Extremist Parties: Lessons from Europe,” *Journal of Democracy* 19 (January 2008): 5–18; Catharin Dalpino, “Etzioni in Southeast Asia: The Indonesia Exception,” *American Behavioral Scientist* 51 (May 2008): 1400–1404; Miriam Fendius Elman and Carolyn M. Warner, “Democracy, Security, and Religious Political Parties: A Framework for Analysis,” *Asian Security* 4 (February 2008): 1–22; Laith Kubbu, “Institutions Make the Difference,” *Journal of Democracy* 19 (July 2008): 37–42; Manjeet S. Pardesi and Jennifer L. Oetken, “Secularism, Democracy, and Hindu Nationalism in India,” *Asian Security* 4 (February 2008): 23–40; William M. Downs, Carrie L. Manning, and Richard N. Engstrom, “Revisiting the ‘Moderating Effects of Incumbency’: A Comparative Study of Government Participation and Political Extremism,” *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 17 (August 2009): 151–169.

This paper uses the Israeli case to demonstrate that this is not necessarily the case. Not only can the relative radicals within a politicized religious movement defeat the relative moderates, but the relative moderates may also be squeezed between the relative radicals and the mainstream parties. As this squeeze progresses and the relative moderates are rendered politically less relevant, the public and institutional face of the religious movement can come to be represented by relative radicals, leading to the effective radicalization of the party representing the religious movement.

The use of the Israeli case to illustrate how inclusion can lead to a squeeze of the moderates and thus to the radicalization of religious parties contributes to the study of democratic inclusion and radical religious parties in at least three ways. First, the article shows that contrary to the dominant expectation among proponents of democratic inclusion, the same mechanisms (intra-party competition and the external political context) that are hypothesized to lead to moderation can also lead to radicalization, even in fully democratic contexts. Second, it deepens the conversation between the social movement literature and scholars concerned with democratizing radical parties by integrating radical flank effects into considerations of the IMH. Finally, the externalization of the intra-movement struggle and its articulation at the ballot box allows us to use the Israeli case to test empirically some of the key assumptions of the IMH in ways that are usually difficult to do.

The next section introduces the relative radicals and moderates in Israeli religious nationalism and elaborates the rationale for selecting this case. We then detail the various mechanisms through which the inclusion of radical movements in the political game in general, and in the government in particular, are thought to induce moderation. The article then shows that a negative flank effect characterizes the political landscape of religious nationalism in Israel and that the relative moderates among them have been squeezed between the radical flank and the mainstream secular parties. The final section considers some alternative explanations for the rise of the relative radicals at the expense of the relative moderates.

RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM IN ISRAEL

Israel has a long history of including religious movements in its political system; Jewish religious nationalists, ultra-orthodox Jewish political movements, and Islamists have all participated in electoral politics to varying degrees. We focus on the effects of the inclusion of the religious nationalists for a number of empirical and methodological reasons (which we discuss below). Unlike ultra-orthodox Jewry, which widely conceived of the Zionist project as

heretical, by the 1930s, the dominant strain within religious Zionism saw the Zionist project as having deep religious and messianic significance.²

As a result, religious Zionism, while adhering to the belief that the land of Israel was divinely promised to the Jewish people, simultaneously sanctified the state of Israel as the “Dawn of the Redemption” and as the harbinger of the Messiah. It envisioned the state as “the pedestal of God’s throne” and consecrated its institutions, especially the military.³ The sanctity of the state of Israel was understood as an ontological principle, disconnected from either the personal piety of its citizens or the actions of its leaders.⁴ Thus, when considering the possibility of territorial concessions, it engaged in a balancing test between two religious imperatives—the value of the land and the value of the state. In practical terms, this meant that the relative moderates within religious Zionism could support territorial concessions if these were seen to benefit the state of Israel. Indeed, led by this wing of the movement, the National Religious Party (NRP) did so when they supported Israel’s withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip in 1957. While these religious nationalists are still hawkish compared to the general Israeli population, the fact that they engage in this balancing test makes them relatively moderate compared to the radical wing of Jewish religious nationalism.

The main difference between the relative moderates and the relative radicals revolves around their disagreement over the relative importance of the state of Israel and of the land of Israel. The relative radicals within the movement clearly elevate the sanctity of the land of Israel over the state of Israel. They reject the premise that the state’s sanctity is independent of its actions. Instead, the religious value of the state is explicitly linked to the religious behavior of the government and, even more directly, to the state’s role in entrenching Israeli control over the territories Israel conquered in 1967.⁵ Since Israeli control of the territories is the yardstick for measuring

²Menachem Friedman, “The State of Israel as a Theological Dilemma,” in Baruch Kimmerling, ed., *The Israeli State and Society: Boundaries and Frontiers* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989):165–215; Aviezer Ravitzky, *Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Religious Radicalism* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Dov Schwartz, *Ha-zionut Ha-datit bein Higaion le-Meshichiyut* [Religious Zionism between Logic and Messianism] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1999).

³Ravitzky, *Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Religious Radicalism*, 82–83.

⁴Arye Naor, “Ribonut Medinat Yisrael Ba-Mahshava Ha-Yehudit-Ortodoxit,” [The Sovereignty of the State of Israel in Jewish Orthodox Thought] *Politika* (December 1998): 71–96.

⁵For a discussion of the debate between the values of the land of Israel and the state of Israel, and the rise of the relative radicals who prioritized the land over the state, see Ian S. Lustick, *For the Land and the Lord: Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994); Ravitzky, *Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Religious Radicalism*; Dov Schwartz, *Eretz Ha-Mamashut Vaha-Dimyon: Ma’amahda Shel Eretz-Yisrael Be-Hagut Ha-Tsiyonit Ha-Datit* [Land of Reality and Imagination: The Land of Israel in Religious Zionist Thought] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1997); Ehud Sprinzak,

the progress towards national and universal redemption, for the radicals, then, no balancing test is required to assess the costs or benefits of a territorial withdrawal. From this vantage point, the state profanes itself by engaging in territorial concessions of any kind. Once it does so, it no longer merits special consideration and can be resisted accordingly. The belief that the state transgressed against the divine destiny of the land and the nation in the territorial withdrawals it carried out in 1982, 1993, 1996, and 2005 underpins its willingness to sanction the use of violence against the Israeli state and its institutions. This willingness to sanction the use of force against the state and its institutions is one of the main differences between the relative radicals and relative moderates within religious Zionism.

In 1999 and 2009, the religious nationalist movement fielded two (and only two) political parties, one that represented the relative moderates (the NRP in 1999/the Jewish Home Party in 2009) and one that represented the relative radicals (the National Union Party). The fact that the ideological difference between relative moderates and radicals was expressed in the distinction between these two parties was plainly evident in their debate over the legitimacy of using force to resist the evacuation of settlements. The relative moderates (those in the Jewish Home Party) rejected the use of force out of hand. Reflecting the sanctification of the state and especially of the military, one of its leaders argued that those who engage in violence against state institutions “are desecrating the name of religious Zionism. They are desecrating the knit *kippa* [skullcap (a symbol of religious Zionism)]. Whoever throws stones at IDF (Israeli Defense Force) soldiers, curses and wars against the state of Israel is not part of religious Zionism.”⁶ The Jewish Home Party conditioned a potential alliance with the National Union Party on the latter’s disavowal of any violence against state institutions and of any organization “that curses and belittles the value of IDF soldiers and of the institutions of the state of Israel (the national anthem, the symbol of the state, the flag of the state, memorial and independence days, and the parliamentary and judicial systems).”⁷

“Extremism and Violence in Israel: The Crisis of Messianic Politics,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 555 (January 1998): 114–126; Schwartz, *Religious Zionism between Logic and Messianism*; Nadav G. Shelef, *Evolving Nationalism: Homeland, Religion and National Identity in Israel, 1925–2005* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010).

⁶Shimon Cohen, “Katz’le: Ein ha-Mafdal Nitpeset be-she’at Tzea’ara” [Katz: We Do Not Judge the NRP in Its Difficult Hour], *Arutz 7*, 31 December 2008, accessed at <http://www.inn.co.il/News/News.aspx/183541>, 10 May 2009.

⁷Hezki Ezra, “Habayit ha-Yehudi ve-halchud Haluemi be-Heskem Odafim” [Jewish Home and National Union Enter into Remainder Agreement], *Ibid.*, 22 January 2009, accessed at <http://www.inn.co.il/News/News.aspx/184553>.

The National Union Party, however, refused to reject the use of violence against state institutions and symbols or to condemn those who did so. In fact, while their representatives routinely spoke of the need to take care of the land of Israel and of the nation of Israel, they almost never included the welfare of the “state” of Israel among their concerns. Reflecting their clear prioritization of Jewish control of the land of Israel over concerns with the general welfare of the state of Israel, a group of significant rabbis and public leaders associated with the radical trend within religious Zionism conditioned their cooperation with the relative moderates on the definition of Israeli control of the territories as “the” paramount priority rather than as one among many concerns that might affect the welfare of the state and its people. The chairman of the National Union Party accused the relative moderates of supporting territorial concessions to the Palestinians and claimed that the Jewish Home Party’s willingness to focus on other issues was tantamount to abandoning the homeland.⁸

The fact that the struggle between relative moderates and relative radicals within the Israeli religious nationalist movement has been openly expressed at the ballot box makes the Israeli case especially useful as a site in which to directly test the assumptions underlying the IMH. Combined with the existence of some localities where we can reasonably assume that most of the voters are religious nationalists (an assumption that enables the empirical identification of radicalization), the Israeli case renders visible normally hidden internal dynamics and enables us to reasonably quantify the power relations among different factions of the radical religious movement over time.⁹ This empirical approach relies on the balance of power between the relatively moderate and relatively radical political parties within the religious nationalist movement as an indicator of the moderation (or not) of the movement as a whole. As a result, it gauges the direction of any radical flank effects directly, rather than relying on proxies such as fundraising ability, or assuming that the

⁸Uzi Baruch, “Rabanim: Dorshim Netzigim Yemaniyim Yoter” [Rabbis Demand More Right Leaning Representatives], *Ibid.*, 13 December 2008, accessed at <http://www.inn.co.il/News/News.aspx/182743>; Arye King, “Orlev Asah la-Politikayim Beit Sefer” [Orlev Is Educating the Politicians], *Ibid.*, 19 December 2008, accessed at <http://www.inn.co.il/News/News.aspx/182993>, 8 April 2010.

⁹We distinguish between ‘movements’ and ‘parties.’ A political party is “an autonomous group of citizens having the purpose of making nominations and contesting elections in hope of gaining control over governmental power through capture of public offices and the organization of the government.” Robert Huckshorn cited in John Kenneth White, “What Is a Political Party?” in Richard S. Katz and William Crotty, eds., *Handbook of Party Politics* (London: Sage Publications, 2006), 5. ‘Movements’ on the other hand, are “collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities.” Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 3–4.

main effect of the emergence of a radical movement is mediated by their impact on mainstream parties.

The Israeli case has at least two additional compelling advantages for the study of the impact of the IMH on radical religious movements in democratic contexts. First, much of the recent literature on the potential effects of democratic inclusion examines either non-democratic or democratizing contexts. Since Israel is a well-established democracy with long experience with the inclusion of radical religious parties in both the general political game and in the government in particular, it enables an investigation of the responses of radical religious movements to inclusion in ways that are difficult to explore elsewhere. Second, because democratic inclusion led to the moderation of Israeli religious nationalists in the past, the resurgence of a radical religious nationalist alternative makes it an especially “hard case” in which to explore the breakdown of the democratic inclusion hypothesis.

The use of the Israeli case as the site for a proof-of-principle argument that inclusion can lead to radicalization by squeezing the moderates out of contention could raise at least two potential concerns about the applicability of such a squeeze to other contexts. First, it is theoretically possible that because of its unusual history, Israel possesses an abnormally high reservoir of sympathy or at least tolerance for radical/extreme religious parties. The success of inclusion in moderating religious parties for nearly 40 years, however, gives us confidence that this is not the case, because this earlier success could not have happened if Israel had been characterized by a deep, constant reservoir of support for radical religious parties. Moreover, even if Israel does have a large reservoir of support for radical religious parties, such conditions are, by definition, likely to characterize all states in which the issue of whether inclusion might lead to moderation is relevant; otherwise, there would be no question about how to cope with religious parties in the first place.

Second, it is also possible that Israel’s institutional structure, especially its system of proportional representation and low threshold (2 percent), makes it unusually conducive to the emergence and success of radical parties. However, Israel’s institutional structure is not particularly unusual. Among democracies with systems of proportional representation, Israel’s average threshold places it exactly in the median, with the thirteenth lowest threshold out of 26 states.¹⁰ Rather than highlight its uniqueness, Israel’s

¹⁰Democracies were defined as scoring a 10 on Polity IV’s democracy variable. M. Marshall and K. Jaggers, *Polity IV Dataset* (University of Maryland, Center for International Development and Conflict Management, College Park, MD, 2004). Data on thresholds and electoral systems was taken from the World Bank

institutional structure actually increases the likelihood that lessons learned from the operation of the IMH there will apply to other democratic states with proportional representation systems.

Even so, it might be argued that Israel's fragmented party structure could reduce the incentives to moderate, because the governing party depends on smaller, perhaps more-radical, parties to form a coalition. However, the same fragmentation also means that the governing party usually has its choice of coalition partners and that, therefore, the need to remain an attractive coalition partner continues to serve as a moderating force. The need to be perceived as an attractive coalition partner is especially likely to exert a moderating force in Israel because entry to Parliament without inclusion in the governing coalition offers few benefits in terms of resources or influence on policy. Finally, the potential concern that the lessons learned about the IMH from the Israeli context might only apply in such fragmented systems is ameliorated by the finding that electoral systems have only a modest effect, if any, on the electoral strength of radical right parties in post-industrial democracies.¹¹ As a result, it is unlikely that the particularities of coalition formation significantly limit the applicability of the lessons learned. The Israeli case does raise the possibility, however, that changing levels of fragmentation in the political system could affect the ability of the IMH to sustain moderation.

Finally, even if there are aspects of the Israeli political system that make the particular lessons about the IMH less applicable to other contexts, this case still contributes to scholarship about the impact of democratic inclusion by pointing to scope conditions and probable intervening variables that scholars should take into account when considering the impact of democratic inclusion.

DEMOCRATIC INCLUSION AND THE MODERATION OF RADICAL MOVEMENTS

The inclusion-moderation hypothesis rests on an intuitively attractive combination of rational responses to material incentives, processes of social learning, and political incentives. The first pathway, relying on Samuel Huntington's "participation/moderation" tradeoff, sees moderation by radical religious movements as a condition for inclusion in the democratic

Database of Political Institutions. Thorsten Beck et al., "New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions," *World Bank Economic Review* 15 (September 2001): 165–176, December 2010 update. The ranking of Israel's threshold in the middle of the pack is qualitatively robust to a number of variations, including levels of democracy and details of the electoral system.

¹¹Herbert Kitschelt, "Growth and Persistence of the Radical Right in Postindustrial Democracies: Challenges in Comparative Research," *West European Politics* 30 (November 2007): 1176–1206.

system and access to power and resources.¹² The parties associated with a radical movement may thus moderate in order to achieve practical influence or the ability to provide goods to their constituency even at the potential cost of some popular support. These incentives to moderate are reinforced to the extent that providing a way for radical groups to influence politics and society through the political process reduces their incentives to act outside the existing institutional framework and thereby encourages reformist rather than revolutionary approaches.

This logic has been used to explain (or predict) the moderation of religious movements in general, of Islamists in the Middle East, of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, and of religious political parties in Morocco, Yemen, Indonesia, and Egypt.¹³ The effects of the participation/moderation tradeoff are also clearly visible in the case of Israeli religious nationalists. In the pre-state period, their agenda included establishing a theocracy, significantly expanding the territory under Jewish control, and a decided ambivalence toward democratic norms (especially voting rights for non-Jews). However, in order to participate in the ruling coalitions and to provide goods and services to their constituency, the party representing them abandoned its goal of establishing a theocracy and accepted conditions, such as democratic (as opposed to theocratic) rule and non-Jewish suffrage, that it was initially uneasy with. It even modified its territorial claims of the homeland. In exchange, they received a seat at the national decision-making table, a state-funded religious educational system under its control, a monopoly over personal status issues for the Jewish population, and state funding of religious services. As expected by the IMH, these benefits gave the religious nationalists a stake in maintaining and operating through the political system and were used by internal advocates of moderation to marginalize those who called for continued ideological purity.¹⁴

¹²Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: Oklahoma University Press, 1991).

¹³Elman and Warner, "Democracy, Security, and Religious Political Parties," 1–22; Fuller, "A Phased Introduction of Islamists," 21–30; Robinson, "Can Islamists Be Democrats," 373–387; Yacoubian, "Engaging Islamists and Promoting Democracy: A Preliminary Assessment"; Dalpino, "Etzioni in Southeast Asia," 1400–1404; Wickham, "The Path to Moderation," 205–228.

¹⁴Religious Zionists were certainly more open to democracy than were the ultra-orthodox groups in the pre-state period. On the relationship between religious Zionism, theocracy, and democracy and its development over time, see Shmuel Sandler, "Religious Zionism and the State: Political Accommodation and Religious Radicalism in Israel," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 8 (1996): 133–154; Asher Cohen, *Ha-Talit Veha-Degel: Ha-Tsiyonut Ha-Datit Ve-Hazon Medinat Ha-Torah Bi-Yeme Reshit Ha-Medinah* [The Talit and the Flag: Religious Zionism and the Concept of a Torah State, 1947–1953] (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1998); Yosef Achitov, "Lebetav Ha-Halachiyim Shel Harav Harashi Yitzhak Halevi Herzog Be-'Asor Ha-Rishon La-Medinah" [The Halachic Considerations of Chief Rabbi Isaac Halevi Herzog in the First Decade

A second link between inclusion and moderation is based on the political and social learning of democratic norms by the radicals. As Stathis Kalyvas argued, “the longer democratic institutions are at work, the less likely it is that parties will exhibit extremist behavior. Mature democracies with established institutions that ensure a legal transfer of power among political actors support a democratic political culture which reinforces the democratic institutions.”¹⁵ Leaders of radical movements who engage in democratic processes at any level (local, university, trade union, etc.) develop skills (how to organize, how to contest elections, how to form coalitions) that enable them to succeed at democratic contests at other levels. They also learn that the bargaining and coalition formation that are part of the democratic process can be an efficient means of achieving some of their goals, given their usual inability to win an outright majority. Those who successfully learn these lessons are expected to do better than those who do not, if only because they are able to secure more resources and achieve some of their goals. Scholars have highlighted processes of social learning to account for moderation by European Christian parties, the Justice and Development Party in Turkey, the Wasat party in Egypt, and the religious nationalists in Israel.¹⁶ The latter have participated in nearly every governing coalition since the establishment of the state and regularly contest elections at every level of Israeli society. As noted above, this participation has resulted in substantial gains in terms of power and resources, as well as the ideological benefits stemming from the significant extension of religion into the Israeli public realm.

A third link between inclusion and moderation highlights the political incentives faced by radical parties. The political incentive structure argument holds that radical parties “will invariably be pressured to tone down the radicalness of their agenda and political presentation” in order gain access to a share of power.¹⁷ Radical parties have incentives to moderate in order to appear as desirable coalition partners, to appeal to a (more-moderate) constituency beyond their core base of support, or to

of the State of Israel] in Mordechai Bar-On, ed., *Etgar Ha-Ribonut: Yetsirah Ve-Hagut Be-Asor Ha-Rishon La-Medinah* [The Challenge of Independence: Ideological and Cultural Aspects of Israel's First Decade] (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1999); Shelef, *Evolving Nationalism*, 109-147, 177-188.

¹⁵Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies: The Case of Religious Parties,” *Comparative Politics* 32 (July 2000): 379-398, 385.

¹⁶Kalyvas, “Unsecular Politics and Religious Mobilization,” 293-320; Wickham, “The Path to Moderation,” 205-228; Onis, “Political Islam at the Crossroads,” 281-298; Carolyn M. Warner, “Religious Parties in a Secularizing Political Space: The Case of Italy,” *Asian Security* 4 (February 2008): 61-78; Miriam Fendius Elman, “Does Democracy Tame the Radicals? Lessons from Israel's Jewish Religious Political Parties,” *Asian Security* 4 (February 2008): 79-99; Kubbu, “Institutions Make the Difference,” 37-42.

¹⁷Heinisch, “Success in Opposition—Failure in Government,” 101.

enable cooperation with non-radical (in the case of religious groups, secular) parties. Given these incentives, radical parties are usually expected to either moderate or to splinter into irrelevance.

The basic logic underlying this mechanism is especially useful because it does not require that radical groups sincerely accept democratic norms before their inclusion in the political game. Democratic inclusion can lead to moderation regardless of the sincerity of the radicals, because “the uncertainty about the outcome of political competition that is inherent to democracy, as well as the iteration that is built into the democratic process, can then transform initial commitments into long term values.”¹⁸ There is a great deal of evidence showing that the effect of the political incentives operates as expected around the globe.¹⁹ The Israeli case is also often presented as one in which the political incentive structure contributed to the moderation of the radical religious parties. Indeed, over the last 60 years, the religious nationalists in Israel have had to form coalitions with secular parties in order to gain access to power and resources and, as a result, have sought to remain attractive partners. Their initial moderation was openly driven by their acute awareness of their political weakness and their determination to be part of the governing coalition so that they would be able to secure power and resources.²⁰

BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE: NEGATIVE RADICAL FLANK EFFECTS AND THE SQUEEZING OF THE MODERATES

While the experience of the religious nationalist movement in Israel has historically confirmed the expectations of the inclusion–moderation hypothesis, more recently, the increasing violence perpetrated by religious settlers against the Israeli military in the West Bank and the rhetorical delegitimization of the state (by, for example, comparing it to Nazi Germany) suggest that this may be changing.²¹ In fact, in the 2009 Israeli elections, for the first time, the political party representing the relatively radical wing of the religious nationalists did better than the party that represented the relative moderates. The IMH fails to account for this possibility, because all of the pathways through which it is presumed to operate assume that the benefits of moderation outweigh its ideological costs.

¹⁸Kalyvas, “Unsecular Politics and Religious Mobilization,” 297.

¹⁹See note 1. For a criticism of the role of institutional constraints as perhaps necessary but insufficient to induce moderation, see Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation*.

²⁰Elman, “Does Democracy Tame the Radicals,” 79–99; Sandler, “Religious Zionism and the State”; Shelef, *Evolving Nationalism*, 50–80.

²¹There are other indicators of this as well. For example, the flagship seminary of the relatively moderate religious nationalists recently had to close its doors. See <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/1,7340,L-3604643,00.html>.

This otherwise-reasonable assumption, however, discounts the possibility that any radical flank effect could be negative rather than positive. There is good reason to believe that the real incentives offered by inclusion are likely to lead to flank effects of one kind or another. The notoriously fractious character of radical movements (both religious and secular) make it likely that a radical movement would be divided between those with different estimations of the tradeoffs between the benefits of moderation and the ideological costs associated with doing so.²² Relative moderates are those willing to accept these costs, while relative radicals are those for whom the ideological price is too steep. Inclusion in the democratic game, by offering tangible benefits, is likely to induce a political struggle between these two groups. When this struggle results in the fragmentation of the movement into ever smaller and ultimately irrelevant groups or in positive radical flank effects and the victory of the relative moderates over the relative radicals, then inclusion can lead to moderation. However, this is not the only possibility. Unlike their positive counterpart, negative radical flank effects expect that “the emergence of radical activists and organizations can undermine the position of the moderates... by discrediting movement activities and goals, by threatening the ability of moderates to take advantages of resources supplied by supporting third parties, or by otherwise rendering favorable responses to moderate claims less likely.”²³ As we show below, inclusion can lead to radicalization when the relative radicals, buoyed by negative radical flank effects, win this internal struggle and assume control of the movement.

Despite the widespread assumption of positive flank effects, there are at least two theoretical reasons (that we do not test here) to think that negative flank effects in the context of the IMH in democracies and the potential success of the relative radicals are possible. Negative radical flank effects and the success of relatively radical factions are rendered more likely to the extent that it is easier for the relative radicals to achieve critical mass as a result of the existence of a low bar for access to Parliament, fragmentation and the regular inclusion of smaller parties in coalition governments, the existence of a low threshold to being taken seriously, the presence of an

²²Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca, “Party Moderation and Politicians’ Ideological Rigidity,” *Party Politics* 10 (May 2004): 325–342.

²³Herbert H. Haines, *Black Radicals and the Civil Rights Mainstream, 1954–1970*, (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1988), 3. For more on radical flank effects, see Ruud Koopmans, “Protest in Time and Space: The Evolution of Waves of Contention,” in David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi, eds., *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* (New York: Blackwell Publishing, 2004): 19–46; Herbert A. Haines, “Black Radicalization and the Funding of Civil Rights: 1957–1970,” *Social Problems* 32 (October 1984): 31–43.

already-high number of relatively radical voters (either through a thick tail of preferences or multimodal distributions of preferences), or if the voting population is characterized by a relatively high weighing of ideological versus instrumental concerns. The relatively radical faction of a movement is also more likely to succeed to the extent that the relative distance in terms of policy positions required by the moderation is greater. Not only does this cede more political space to the relative radicals, but it means that the moderated wing will become less distinguishable from mainstream parties.

Evidence from Religious Nationalism in Israel

Observing the internal struggles within radical religious movements that would allow for the direct detection of the direction of radical flank effects or the contest between various factions, however, is usually difficult. Even in the Israeli case, until recently, it was difficult to estimate systematically the relative strength of the relative radicals and relative moderates within the religious nationalist movement. The elections in 1999 and 2009, however, provided an opportune setting in which to do so and in which to investigate empirically the logic of the IMH about the likelihood of moderates winning the internal struggle.²⁴ While the two elections were held in different contexts (which we address below), religious nationalist voters were presented with largely similar choices. The relatively clean binary division between the two parties fielded by the religious nationalist movement allows us to use their vote shares to measure the internal support of each wing of the movement and to evaluate the direction of any radical flank effect and the plausibility of a squeeze of the relative moderates between the relative radicals and the secular mainstream right parties. Broadly speaking, comparing the results of these elections shows that in contradiction to the expectations of the IMH, the relative radicals are getting stronger, not weaker. Indeed, between 1999 and 2009, the party appealing to the relative radicals gained vote share while the party appealing to the relative moderates lost vote share. A closer look (which we elaborate below) shows that this is taking place because of the existence of a negative radical flank

²⁴The moderate wing of the religious nationalist movement has been challenged by territorially more-hawkish parties since 1981, but the 1999 and 2009 elections are the only ones that provide for a good comparison of the relative strength of the internal moderates and radicals. Prior to 1999, the partisan divide did not map onto the internal schism cleanly. The 2001 elections involved only a vote for Prime Minister, with no votes for particular party lists. In 2003, the National Union Party was allied with a movement representing largely non-religious immigrants from the former Soviet Union, making it impossible to use the National Union's showing in 2003 as an indicator of the relative strength of the radical religious nationalists. Finally, in 2006, the radical and the moderate religious nationalists fielded a joint list, making it impossible to disentangle their relative strength.

effect and the resulting squeeze of the moderates between their two main opponents. These conclusions are based on an analysis of the votes for each political party, by locality, between 1999 and 2009, along with a number of locality characteristics and demographic data.²⁵

Before demonstrating the existence of this squeeze, it is important to acknowledge that using vote shares for these parties as estimates of the relative strength of each wing of the radical religious movement poses at least four challenges. First, one might question the assertion that these two religious nationalist parties faithfully reflect the intra-movement division between relative moderates and relative radicals. To be sure, the range of actual positions within the religious nationalist movement in Israel is not entirely reducible to this division, the parties shared many ideological positions, and the National Union Party contains a small secular contingent. Nonetheless, religious Zionist leaders and their public saw the National Union Party and the NRP/Jewish Home Party as two religious Zionist parties. They quite specifically understood (and lamented) the simultaneous existence of both parties in terms of an internal struggle between relative moderates and relative radicals within the religious nationalist movement. For example, the campaign of the NRP in 1999 focused explicitly on their relative moderation compared to the National Union Party.²⁶ In 2009, leading rabbis explicitly identified the two parties as “religious nationalist parties,” and leaders of the National Union Party summarized the elections as an “internal primary” within religious Zionism.²⁷

Second, because we observe aggregate votes rather than individual behavior, we cannot empirically conclude that particular individuals changed their voting behavior. While we show evidence of a negative radical flank effect and that a squeeze of the moderates is taking place, the voting results on their own cannot distinguish between a squeeze that is taking place at the individual level and one that reflects the repositioning of political parties. This is also a conceptual limitation of the IMH, which

²⁵Additional supporting information may be found in the Appendix accompanying the online version of this article and available at www.psqonline.org and the *Political Science Quarterly* page of the Wiley Online Library.

²⁶See, for example, the campaign advertisement from that year, accessed at http://movies.walla.co.il/?w=/2654/865743_9/30/2010.

²⁷Uri Ariel, “Yesh Datyim Normalim” [There Are Normal Religious People], *Arutz 7*, 13 February 2009, accessed at <http://www.inn.co.il/News/News.aspx/185480> 13 February 2009; Yehoshua Shapira, “Harakevet she-shma Habayit HaYehudi Yoredet me-Hapasim” [The Train Called the Jewish Home Is Derailing], *Arutz 7*, 14 December 2008, accessed at <http://www.inn.co.il/News/News.aspx/182793>, 8 April 2010; Zalman Melamed, “Habayit Hayehudi ve-haIchud Haleumi” [The Jewish Home and the National Union], *Arutz 7*, 1 January 2009, accessed at <http://www.inn.co.il/News/News.aspx/183675> 8 April, 2010.

tends to be concerned with the moderation of parties without regard to the votes of individuals. However, our empirical analysis is based on votes. To link the two, we assume that the moderation of parties under the IMH is reflected in votes—either because the moderation is at the level of individual behavior or because voters respond sincerely to repositioned parties. Unfortunately, individual-level data that would allow us to directly gauge any radicalization of religious nationalists are unavailable.²⁸ At the same time, we can garner some analytical leverage on the question because the relative position of the relevant parties was largely stable. An examination of the religious nationalist parties' platforms in 1999 and 2009, for example, shows that the two maintained their positions relative to one another.²⁹ While the composition of the competing secular mainstream party, the Likud, differs in the two elections, its electoral campaign was roughly equivalent in both contests—attempting to simultaneously run to the center of the general electorate while appealing to relatively moderate religious nationalists.³⁰ The squeeze of the moderates that we see is thus probably caused by a combination of radicalization by some religious nationalists and the decision to support mainstream secular parties by others. (We address some potential alternative causes below.)

Third, we cannot identify votes by religious nationalists for mainstream parties because there is no direct measure of the size of the religious nationalist or even of the religiously observant populations in Israeli localities. Most estimates of the religious nationalist population rely on the vote totals for religious nationalist parties. This measure assumes that only religious nationalists vote for religious nationalist political parties and that the share of religious nationalists that vote for religious nationalist parties is consistent across different localities. However, the voting behavior of religious nationalists (whether they vote for religious nationalist parties, and if not, where their votes go), is precisely that part of the squeeze that we want to demonstrate.

²⁸To the best of our knowledge, there are no representative sample surveys of members of this movement. Existing national-level surveys are not helpful either, because the potential attitudinal shifts among religious nationalists are swamped by shifts within society more generally and because the number of respondents who are likely to be religious nationalists in national surveys is usually too small to generate robust statistical results. See the online Appendix for a more-detailed discussion. The lack of individual-level data also precludes a number of alternative data analysis methods, such as multilevel models, that consider effects at both individual and institutional levels.

²⁹National Union Party, 1999, "Platform for the 15th Knesset"; National Union Party, 2009, "Principles for a Party Platform"; National Religious Party, "Platform," accessed at http://www.knesset.gov.il/elections/knesset15/mafdal_m.htm, 9 September 2010; Jewish Home Party, "Platform of the Jewish Home-the New NRP" For the 18th Knesset," (2009).

³⁰The change was caused by the split off of Kadima from the Likud. See the online Appendix for a discussion of the implications of this change for the argument about the IMH.

Finally, we also face the possibility that the voting patterns of the religious nationalists and of the rest of the voting public could co-vary systematically. Such covariance could cause effect and significance to be falsely attributed to changes in the behavior of the religious nationalists when it was really caused by the majority non-religious population. In many locations, religious nationalist voters make up a small portion of the total electorate. Even if there were large changes in how they split their vote, shifts in the votes of non-religious nationalist voters could easily swamp such changes. For example, an increase in the votes for a mainstream secular party in a locality dominated by secular voters between 1999 and 2009 could be a function of religious nationalists voting for it in greater numbers or a much smaller shift toward it by the much larger non-religious nationalist population.³¹

We can partially compensate for the latter two concerns by focusing on the behavior of voters in those locations where we can reasonably assume that nearly all the voters are religious nationalists. We identify these relatively homogenous localities based on Cohen's (2005) categorization of religious nationalist localities (RNLs), as places with "a clear religious Zionist character."³² These RNLs are roughly equally divided between Israel and the territories, including 48 localities in Israel, 37 localities in the West Bank (including 15 west of the separation barrier and 22 localities to its east), and 6 localities in the Golan Heights.³³ Alternative definitions of RNLs do not substantively affect the results.³⁴ This empirical approach addresses the challenges we noted above because it provides local measures of the number of religious nationalist voters (all the voters in the locality) and alleviates our concern about the confounding influence of changes in the voting behavior of the non-religious nationalist population (there is none).³⁵ This assumption requires the reasonable extension that the trends that we see in these localities also apply to religious nationalists elsewhere as well. (We include robustness tests of this assumption below.) This empirical

³¹For additional discussion of these issues, see David Newman, "Voting Patterns and the Religious Parties in Israel," *Contemporary Jewry* 10 (Fall 1989): 65–80.

³²Asher Cohen, "Religious Zionism and the National Religious Party in the 2003 Elections: An Attempt to Respond to the Challenges of Religious, Ethnic, and Political Schism" in Asher Arian and Michal Shamir, eds., *The Elections in Israel 2003* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2005): 187-214. See the online Appendix for a more-detailed discussion of the process of identifying RNLs.

³³See Figure A-1 in the online Appendix for a map showing the location of RNLs. The separation barrier is a physical wall that Israel is currently building between Israel and the West Bank. Some in Israel envision it as the future border between Israel and a Palestinian state.

³⁴See Tables A-2 and A-3 in the online Appendix.

³⁵This empirical strategy also allows us to reasonably ensure that our results are not driven by the political behavior of the secular supporters of the National Union Party.

TABLE 1
Paired t-Tests of the Average Vote Shares in RNLs

<i>Party</i>	<i>1999 (%)</i>	<i>2009 (%)</i>	<i>Change</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>p-Value</i>
NRP/Jewish Home	37.42	30.16	-7.26	1.08	0.000
National Union	26.77	31.73	4.96	1.17	0.000
Likud	9.19	21.47	12.27	0.73	0.000
Non-Nationalist religious parties	13.10	6.67	-6.43	0.86	0.000
Other left parties	9.01	5.16	-3.85	0.63	0.000
Other right parties	1.24	2.30	1.06	0.24	0.000
Other marginal parties	3.26	2.51	-0.75	0.30	0.007

Note: ($N = 91$) The Change, Standard Error, and p -value columns report the same values that would result from regressions for each party over a panel dataset of vote shares for 1999 and 2009, including fixed effects for locality or a t -test of first-differences. As such, it is robust to a number of concerns, including unit heterogeneity across localities or parties, as well as time and election invariant characteristics of localities.

approach thus allows us to use the vote shares gained by the NRP/Jewish Home and the National Union Party in these localities as a measure of the strength of the relative moderates and the relative radicals, respectively, within the Israeli religious nationalist movement. This proxy, in turn, enables us to test the expectation of the IMH that the moderates will win.

Table 1 compares the electoral fortunes of the relevant political parties in such locations. The principal finding contradicts the expectation of the IMH. Between 1999 and 2009, the vote share of the party representing the relative moderates (the NRP/Jewish Home) declined by 7.3 percent, whereas the party representing the relative radicals (the National Union Party) increased its vote share by 5 percent. These changes are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

The net vote shift away from the moderate religious nationalist party is clearly consistent with negative radical flank effects and with the existence of a “squeeze” in both directions. The party representing the relative moderates lost more support than was gained by the party representing the relative radicals. While almost a third of the growth of the secular right mainstream party, Likud, is probably explained by other left parties shrinking,³⁶ it is impossible to account for the remainder of its growth between 1999 and 2009 without a substantial increase from voters who had voted for the relatively moderate religious nationalists in 1999. This result is robust to varying ways of identifying religious nationalist localities.³⁷

While the arithmetic suggests pathways for the votes, on its own, the analysis in Table 1 does not provide direct evidence about from where the support for the radicals came or to where the supporters of the moderates

³⁶This probably reflects a “return home” to the Likud by Kadima voters who split from the Likud in 2005.

³⁷See Table A-2 in the online Appendix.

went. Further, it does not tell us if these shifts vary among RNLs. We might expect, for example, that variations in geography or the level of past support for one of the wings of the movement would matter in this regard. For example, given the cardinal importance of the dispute over the Occupied Territories in Israel, we might expect greater radicalization among religious nationalist voters in the West Bank compared to those in Israel. Similarly, religious nationalist voters who live east of the separation barrier, and who therefore live in areas that are especially likely to be ceded in negotiations with the Palestinians, can be expected to be more susceptible to radical appeals than those in the settlement blocs, which many observers expect to remain in Israel under a peace agreement.

To explore these possibilities, we performed a cross-sectional analysis of the magnitude of the changes in the votes for NRP/Jewish Home, National Union, and Likud in RNLs. Each column in Table 2 reports a regression with robust standard errors where the left-hand side variable is the absolute change in the vote share of a political party and the right-hand side variables are the location (in Israel, in the West Bank west of the separation barrier, in the West Bank east of the separation barrier, or in the Golan Heights), the character of the community as a religious kibbutz, the change in turnout between the two elections in each locality, and the share of the population that was under 15 in 1995.

The coefficients reported in Table 2 reflect the percentage point increase in the vote share of each party between 1999 and 2009 caused by a unit change in the explanatory variable. For example, looking at the first coefficient reported for the NRP/Jewish Home column, we find that the effect of being in the West Bank, west of the separation barrier on the votes for the NRP/Jewish Home was an increase of approximately 12 percentage points relative to the increase inside Israel proper (the omitted geographic category). Note that these are differential effects; they do not suggest that NRP/Jewish Home vote share increased by those amounts. Rather, they show that the increase was that much greater. Since NRP/Jewish Home lost vote share on average, these coefficients tell us that the NRP/Jewish Home lost fewer votes in these locations between 1999 and 2009 than they did elsewhere. The columns for National Union and Likud can be interpreted in the same manner, noting, however, that the average change for those parties was an increase in vote share.

The results provide further evidence that the observed vote changes reflect a gain by the relative radicals at the expense of the relative moderates (negative radical flank effects) because we observe corresponding changes between the two parties. Comparing the columns for NRP/Jewish Home and the National Union, we see that the statistically significant coefficients

TABLE 2
*Differential Changes in Vote Shares of the Religious Nationalist and Likud Parties
 1999 to 2009 in RNLs*

	<i>Change in NRP/Jewish Home</i>	<i>Change in National Union</i>	<i>Change in Likud</i>
West Bank, west of the separation barrier	0.1238 [0.0350]	−0.1467 [0.0590]	0.0287 [0.0548]
West Bank, east of the separation barrier	0.0838 [0.0367]	−0.0155 [0.0496]	−0.0818 [0.0503]
Golan Heights	0.0936 [0.0418]	−0.0786 [0.0488]	−0.0226 [0.0442]
Religious kibbutz	0.1424 [0.0298]	−0.0442 [0.0446]	−0.0338 [0.0346]
Change in turnout 1999 – 2009	0.2211 [0.2795]	−0.2550 [0.3656]	0.0599 [0.2667]
Share of population under 15 in 1995	0.0020 [0.0036]	0.0027 [0.0056]	−0.0010 [0.0044]
Observations	76	76	76
Adjusted R^2	0.403	0.290	0.209

Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Bold coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level. Controls (not reported) are included for time-invariant demographic, ethnic, and socioeconomic characteristics of each locality (share of households born in Asia or Africa, average household size, median age, dependency ratio, child-to-women ratio, average number of children, share of households with new immigrants), as well as controls for a locality's size, turnout in 2009, vote shares for the relevant parties in 1999 (NRP and National Union aggregated, Likud, Yisrael Beiteinu, and Shas), and the political affiliation of the towns' founders (indicator variables for localities founded by Amana, Haredi, and Hapoel Hamizrachi), and age structure (share of population in 1995 aged: 0–15 (reported), 15–17, 18–24, 25–44, and 45–64).

have the opposite signs (in fact, this is true of most of the coefficients). In other words, where the relative moderates lost votes, the relative radicals gained votes, and vice versa. While the analysis in Table 2 does not provide additional evidence of the pressure exerted on the relative moderates by the mainstream secular right, this result is not surprising because of the number of other, perhaps correlated, sources of variation in support for the mainstream center-right Likud. Moreover, because Table 2 reports differential results, it is possible that the effects of this part of the squeeze would be obscured if they are evenly distributed among RNLs.

The first three coefficients reported for each column identify the geographic location of each RNL. If religious nationalists in the West Bank and/or Golan Heights are radicalizing faster than those in Israel, we would expect these coefficients to be negative for the NRP/Jewish Home regression, and positive for National Union. However, the opposite is true. In RNLs in the West Bank (both east and west of the separation barrier) and the Golan Heights, the NRP/Jewish Home lost (and the National Union gained) a smaller percentage of votes than it did in RNLs in Israel.³⁸ Contrary to the

³⁸The discussion excludes the Golan Heights, since there are only six RNLs in it, but the effect there is similar to that seen in the settlement blocs.

expectation of the IMH, the relative radicals are doing better than the relative moderates even in those places where we would least expect them to succeed (inside Israel rather than in the Occupied Territories).

Support for the assumption that the same processes are taking place among the religious nationalists in RNLs and those in other locations in Israel is provided because changing the definition of RNLs, including a definition that accounts for 96 percent of the votes cast for religious nationalist parties, does not change the direction or significance of the main variables.³⁹ Nonetheless, to get more directly at those trends that may be taking place among the majority of religious nationalist voters who do not live in RNLs, the proportion of the vote for religious nationalist parties that went to the party representing the relative moderates in 1999 and 2009 were regressed separately on geographic location, the same set of locality characteristics as in the earlier analysis, and size and demographic controls. The regressions identify cross-sectional variation between localities. Looking at the impact of geographic location, we can conclude that in 1999, moderate religious nationalists inside Israel received about 16 percent more of the votes for religious nationalist parties than in locations outside the green line and about 14 percent more in 2009.⁴⁰ This ratio tilts toward the party appealing to the relative moderates inside Israel more than it does in the West Bank or the Golan Heights. This is consistent with a process of self-selection in which relatively radical religious nationalists are more likely to live in the territories than relatively more moderate ones.

A closer look also shows that the converse (and conventional) story—that inclusion continues to have moderating effects on the Israeli religious nationalists because their “silent majority” (those in Israel) are not radicalizing—is not supported. A Chow test shows that the decrease in the support of the relative moderates inside Israel between 1999 and 2009 is statistically significant.⁴¹ As a result, we can conclude that the balance between the relative moderates and the relative radicals in Israel and in the West Bank is (slowly) converging. Recall that we have already demonstrated that the trend in the entire population is moving toward the radicals. As a result, it must be the case that the gap between the support for the moderates and support for the radicals is narrowing faster in Israel than in the territories. In other words, contrary to the expectations of the IMH, not only were religious nationalists in Israel proper more likely to support the

³⁹See Table A-3 in the online Appendix.

⁴⁰Coefficients of 0.1606 and 0.1378 with robust standard errors of 0.032 and 0.037, respectively. Both are significant at the 1 percent level.

⁴¹Difference: -0.0228 , χ^2 statistic: 418.91. p value: 0.000.

radicals than the moderates in 2009 compared to 1999, but this difference was bigger in Israel than in the territories.

Alternative Explanations for the Rise of the Radicals at the Expense of the Moderates

There are, of course, other reasons that might account for the failure of inclusion to lead to moderation. Some observers have argued that at least some radical religious parties are inherently undemocratic and incapable of changing their ideological positions. A more-nuanced version of this argument holds that radical parties may be more concerned with articulating their positions for the sake of doing so, rather than with achieving any particular policy or political objective.⁴² To the extent that radical religious parties are purely expressive, the incentives to moderate posed by the IMH will fall on deaf ears. Moderation may also not take place as expected because the leaders of radical religious movements learn the wrong lesson from their experience of inclusion. Especially in non-democracies, leaders may learn only that their efforts to play by the rules of the democratic game will be met by the authoritarian regime not respecting those rules. More generally, where inclusion is partial, accompanied by repression, or does not yield the expected benefits, the leaders of religious movements may reasonably conclude that moderation is simply not worth the ideological price. Finally, democratic inclusion may fail where processes of “outbidding” take hold. In this case, the emergence of a radical religious party provides incentives for relative moderates to take increasingly extreme positions and thus provides counter-pressure to the incentives offered by democratic inclusion.⁴³

The Israeli case, however, enables us to address these alternative possibilities. The long Israeli experience with democratic inclusion demonstrated the ability of this same religious nationalist movement to change its ideological positions in response to instrumental incentives. As a whole, then, they are not purely expressive. Moreover, as we reviewed above, their inclusion has yielded both tangible and ideological benefits, making it difficult to argue that the leaders of the Israeli religious nationalist movement learned that moderation does not pay. Finally, we

⁴²For more on the distinction between expressive and instrumental parties, see Matt Golder, “Explaining Variation in the Success of Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe,” *Comparative Political Studies* 36 (May 2003): 432–466.

⁴³Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle, *Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory in Democratic Instability* (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1972), 66–88; Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 349–364.

can discount the potential effect of an outbidding dynamic because its observable implications are not matched by the empirical experience of religious nationalists over the past decade. If radicalization were the product of outbidding, we would expect the party representing the relative moderates to radicalize in response to the emergence and growth of the relative radicals as an organized force. Indeed, the NRP has shifted to the right since the emergence of other territorially hawkish parties to its right in the 1980s. If in the early years of the state, the NRP had been willing to form a coalition with either the left or the right in Israel, once it had to compete for the votes of the territorially hawkish religious population, it increasingly committed itself to forming coalitions only with the right. While this suggests that the dynamics of the IMH began to break down well before 1999, the comparison between the results in 1999 and 2009 allows us to measure and quantify the change in ways that are not possible for the earlier elections.⁴⁴ Between 1999 and 2009, however, there is no indication that the relatively moderate party continued to shift to the right despite the continued growth of the relative radicals. At the very least, a comparison of the platforms of Jewish Home/NRP (the party representing the relative moderates) in 1999 and 2009 reveals few changes.⁴⁵ In fact, more strongly undermining the plausibility of outbidding as an explanation, the 2009 campaign of the Jewish Home Party was widely understood as an attempt to return to the considerably more moderate version of religious nationalism by prioritizing education, the Jewish identity of the state of Israel, and social welfare, over the settlements.⁴⁶ Rather than challenge our findings, the attempt to tack in a moderating direction, especially its failure to unify religious Zionism as a result of the reaction of the relative radicals, shows the latter's relative strength. Further, we view the Party's inability to win electoral support through moderation as evidence of its marginalization as it is squeezed between more-moderate and more-radical parties.

Even if these general alternative explanations do not hold, it is still possible that history effects or the differences in the electoral rules governing the 1999 and 2009 elections could account for the observed increased electoral support for the relative radicals at the expense of the relative moderates. A closer look at these alternatives shows, however, that

⁴⁴See note 24 above for a discussion of the limitations of other elections.

⁴⁵National Religious Party, "Platform" and Jewish Home Party, "Platform of the "Jewish Home-the New NRP" For the 18th Knesset." Available from authors' collection.

⁴⁶Amnon Meranda, "Sof Eidan haMafdal: Mifleget Yamin Nolda" ["The End of the NRP Era: The Party of the Right Is Born"], *Ynet*, 3 November 2008, accessed at <http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3616970,00.html>, 12 April 2009.

they also fail to provide a better account of the empirical results than the “squeeze” that we demonstrate is taking place.

A potential concern with history effects arises because contextual changes between 1999 and 2009, such as shifts in economic conditions, changes in the voting populations of the localities we examine, exogenous shocks in the interim (especially the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005), or campaign effects might conceivably account for the relative decline of the moderates compared to the radicals. We limit these concerns because the analysis above displays several patterns that are difficult to reconcile with a general contextual shift. First, the shifts in vote share are not in one direction. Instead we find religious moderates moving to support both the more-radical wing of the religious nationalist movement and the (effectively more-moderate) mainstream secular-right party. This allows us to reject the possibility that our results could be produced by an overall rightward shift in the electorate between these elections. In fact, given the scholarly consensus that such a shift has taken place within the Israeli electorate as a whole over the last decade, the finding of a shift to the left among some religious nationalists provides even stronger evidence for the squeeze that we outlined.

Second, because our analysis compares differential effects among localities, if the shifts in vote share (reported in Table 1) reflected changes in the aggregate economic fortunes or in another broad contextual factor, the regressions reported in Table 2 would have no significant coefficients because we would expect such systematic changes to affect these localities in the same way. Any alternative explanation of the changes in the votes cast for each party thus has to explain not just a squeeze of the moderates at an aggregate level but also to have the reported differential geographic effects on localities. Similarly, contextual factors or other proposed pathways that might be hypothesized to cause the net shifts in vote shares would also have to account for the statistically significant patterns in the differential effects by prior political vote shares and by the movements that founded the localities.⁴⁷ Substantively moreover, it is unlikely that economic factors, despite their role in affecting the fortunes of the radical secular right, had a significant differential impact in this case because the voter base that the relative radicals and relative moderates are appealing to and their positions of on economic issues are not appreciably different. Nor, importantly, were economic issues central to their campaigns in these elections.

⁴⁷See Table A-3 in the online Appendix.

Population changes could, however, have such an effect. Indeed, Israel's voting population did not remain static between 1999 and 2009. By far the most significant change was the doubling of the Jewish population of the West Bank between 1995 and 2008 from 132,900 to 277,200 (not including East Jerusalem) and a corresponding increase of 74 percent in the population of eligible voters. Most of this growth is due to natural increase rather than internal migration.⁴⁸ The introduction of a large new cohort of voters raises the possibility that the growing appeal of the relative radicals reflects a generational shift among religious nationalists rather than the political squeeze we identify. It is especially likely that the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005 played a role in radicalizing religious nationalists. Anecdotal evidence—such as the prominence of the so-called “hilltop youth” in the resistance to potential territorial withdrawals and protest activity—does suggest that the relative radicals have been more successful in mobilizing younger potential supporters compared to the relative moderates. Importantly, such successful social mobilization is not inconsistent with our argument. Indeed, the successful mobilization of the youth by radicals may be one reason that relative moderates are choosing to cast their political support to secular mainstream parties rather than continue to try and shape the organizational behavior of the religious nationalist movement through the NRP/Jewish Home.

We can get at the potential influence of generational change empirically, however imperfectly. If generational change played a large role in the shift of support to the radicals, we would expect, other things being equal, localities with larger cohorts of new voters between 1999 and 2009 to be associated with larger increases in support for the relative radicals. Table 2 reports the coefficient on the share of population in each locality aged less than 15 in 1995. This corresponds to the cohort of voters who became first eligible to vote between 1999 and 2009. Despite the plausibility of the anecdotal story, we find no significant results to support the hypothesis that the shifts in voting trends are due to changes in the voting cohorts.

The final “history effect” that might account for the decline of the moderates relative to the radicals is a campaign effect in which the Jewish Home Party ran a particularly poor campaign in 2009. Since we only have two data points that allow us to get at the comparison between relative radicals and relative moderates, we cannot completely discount this possibility. There is also little doubt that the campaign of the Jewish Home

⁴⁸Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, “Statistical Abstract of Israel 2009,” Report No. 60 (2009); Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, “Immigration to Israel, 2002–2006,” Report No. 1365 (2009). See the online Appendix for a fuller discussion of this and other (smaller) population changes.

Party in 2009 was hampered by the inclusion of a nationally unknown political novice at the head of the list, bitter infighting, poor organizational capacity, and the Gaza war in the middle of the election campaign. However, analysts of the conduct of the religious parties in the 1999 elections concluded that the relative moderates ran a particularly ineffective campaign that year as well.⁴⁹ As a result, it is not clear that the inefficacy of the campaigns in 1999 and 2009 were fundamentally different. We can also get at this question empirically because we might expect the quality of the campaigns to affect the turnout of their respective voters. However, as Table 2 shows, we do not find a significant differential effect in this regard. Finally, even if the political failure of the moderate religious nationalists was the product of campaign effects, the result still reinforces the notion that the moderation fostered by democratic inclusion is contingent on (perhaps idiosyncratic) developments that shape the political fortunes of the moderates.

A final potential concern in analyzing differences between Israel's 1999 and 2009 elections is that they were conducted under different rules. In 1999, voters could vote separately for a party and for the Prime Minister. If in a straightforward Proportional Representation system, voters for smaller parties were restrained by a desire to "have one's vote count" by influencing the outcome of the contest for Prime Minister, the institution of a double ballot allowed Israelis to use one ballot to influence that contest directly and freed them to vote for the party closest to their hearts with the second. After 2001, Israel abandoned the direct election of the Prime Minister and returned to a more-straightforward proportional representation system. The existence of a single ballot in 2009 conceivably put additional pressure on religious nationalist voters to vote for the mainstream party compared to 1999. As a result, it would be reasonable to assume that part of the growth in the Likud's vote share and the shrinkage in NRP/Jewish Home shares could be due to the different electoral rules that governed Israeli elections in 1999 and in 2009.

Empirically, however, the different electoral rules did not have this expected effect in RNLs. Table 3 shows that the religious nationalist parties received virtually the same combined vote shares in RNLs regardless of the electoral system in place. This contradicts the prediction that voters would move toward their prime ministerial choice once the double ballot was

⁴⁹Etta Bick, "The Shas Phenomenon and Religious Parties in the 1999 Elections" in Daniel J. Elazar and M. Ben Bollov, eds., *Israel at the Polls, 1999* (London: Frank Cass, 2001): 55-100; Ami Pedahzur, "The Downfall of the National Camp?" in Daniel J. Elazar and M. Ben Mollov, eds., *Israel at the Polls 1999* (London: Frank Cass, 2001): 37-54.

TABLE 3
Average Vote Shares of Religious Nationalist Parties in RNLs

	1999	2003	2006	2009
<i>Electoral Rule</i>	<i>Double Ballot</i>	<i>Single Ballot</i>	<i>Single Ballot</i>	<i>Single Ballot</i>
NRP/Jewish Home	37.4%	47.7%	N/A	30.2%
National Union	26.8%	15.8%	N/A	31.7%
Combined	64.2%	63.5%	65.7%	61.9%

rescinded (at least in these localities). Also contradicting the general finding that smaller parties benefited from the double ballot, the NRPs received a larger vote share in RNLs under the single ballot system in 2003 (48 percent) than under the double ballot system (37 percent). If the decline in the support for the relative moderates was driven by the different electoral rules, we would expect the drop in their support between 1999 and 2009 to have been greater than the changes that took place between 2003 and 2009, when the same rules were in place. In fact, the opposite is true. Another reason to discount the changed electoral rules as an explanation of the increased vote share of the relative radicals is its inability to account for the different directions in which the parties representing the different factions of the religious nationalist movements are going. Both the NRP/Jewish Home and the National Union Party are small parties that ought to be affected in similar ways by the change (both would be expected to lose support with the re-introduction of the single ballot). As a result, the fact that one party lost support but the other gained vote share cannot be explained by the electoral rules.

CONCLUSION

The main lesson from the experience of the Israeli religious nationalist movement is that the same basic mechanisms (intra-party competition and the external political context) that are assumed to lead to moderation by the IMH can also lead to radicalization, and that such radicalization can take place even in fully democratic contexts. Certainly, since our identification of the squeezing out of the relative moderates is based on the results of only two elections in one movement, we cannot rule out the possibility that the effect is a transient or stochastic one. However, even if this were the case, the Israeli experience still provides a proof-of-principle that the assumed mechanisms of democratic inclusion do not always work as hypothesized and that politically contingent results need to be integrated into our understanding of how democratic inclusion works. While the empirical investigation focuses on two ultimately small parties in Israel, it allows us to explicitly explore the dynamics of inclusion and to empirically measure the

relative strengths of radicals and moderates in ways that are usually difficult to do. The dynamics of the IMH that the analysis reveals are likely to apply to a wide range of cases in which parliamentary democracies include radical religious movements in the political game. Based on our results, we would expect that inclusion is likely to lead to radicalization in contexts with fractious and divided radical movements, institutional features which allow small groups significant influence, and, ironically, a successful history of moderation. Additional cross-national research is needed to examine the degree to which these factors affect the variation in the outcome of inclusion–moderation more generally.

Our demonstration that the results of democratic inclusion can vary over time reinforces the reality that democratic inclusion is not a one-time decision for either the polity or the movement being included. It is a continuous process. This means that even if the relative moderates are initially victorious in the intra-movement struggle, this moderation can still be reversed if the hardliners, who are likely to continue jockeying for control, win a later “round.”

Using voting data as an indicator of the strength of the relative factions, the experience of the radical religious nationalists in Israel supports the argument that the IMH is contingent on the direction (positive or negative) of the flank effects generated by inclusion. The role of negative flank effects in squeezing the moderates is itself significant for three reasons. First, it runs counter to the dominant expectations in contemporary social movement theories that positive flank effects would dominate. Second, it raises the possibility (which we cannot explore further here) that determining the direction of flank effects might be sensitive to the measure used to do so since our measure of the impact of the presence of radical and moderate factions on one another relies on a direct measure of their strength in the constituency they are attempting to mobilize (the votes they get) rather than on other proxies such as fundraising from external actors. Finally, much of the social movement literature’s attention to flank effects focuses on the impact of the fracturing of a movement on external third-party actors. As we show above, the political struggle between the moderate and radical factions can have a direct impact on their relative strength and hence on the direction of any flank effects.

The stakes involved in moderating radical religious parties make the normative appeal and past ability of democratic inclusion to foster the moderation of radical parties an attractive option for states coping with radical religious movements. The finding that strategies of isolation, ostracism, and demonization are ineffective at containing threats to the democratic order from party-based extremism also suggests that

democratic inclusion may still be the best answer.⁵⁰ At the same time, the Israeli experience over the last decade adds a cautionary note. As we have demonstrated, the ability of democratic inclusion to foster moderation depends on the victory of relative moderates over relative radicals within the movement, a victory that is by no means guaranteed. At the very least, the role of intra-movement politics and the potential squeeze of the relative moderates, including those discussed as negative radical flank effects, need to be integrated into our thinking about the inclusion-moderation hypothesis.*

⁵⁰Downs, Manning, and Engstrom, “Revisiting the ‘Moderating Effects of Incumbency.’”

*Previous versions of this paper were presented at the University of Wisconsin Political Behavior Workshop, the Association for Israel Studies, the Midwest Political Science Association, the American Political Science Association, and the workshop “On the Moderation and Immoderation of Religious Political Parties in Democratic Societies,” University of Eichstätt-Ingersoll. The authors are also grateful to Abraham Diskin for making some electoral data available and for the helpful comments of the anonymous reviewers.