

# Politics and Government in Israel

*The Maturation of a Modern State*

Gregory S. Mahler

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## The Peace Process

Israel has been in a state of war with many of its neighbors since before the time of its creation, and the challenge of peace has always been high on the nation's political agenda. The final chapter of this book discusses the elusive, frustrating, sometimes partially successful, yet ultimately (so far) unreachable goal of peace in the Middle East. This chapter also includes a brief introductory discussion of the peace process itself and of events leading up to the Camp David Peace Agreement and the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt in 1979. We also look at key events since that time, from Oslo and Madrid to Camp David (again). The chapter ends with a discussion of prospects for peace in the future.

### THE QUEST FOR PEACE

We saw earlier in this volume that to a substantial extent the history of modern Israel has been the history of a nation at war. Although the often-articulated goal of Israeli foreign policy has been for the country to live in a situation of stable and secure peace with its neighbors, that situation has not yet been achieved. In chapter 1 we noted that within twenty-four hours of its Declaration of Independence on May 14, 1948, the armies of Egypt, Jordan,

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Emblazoned with "Our Golan," this banner posted in the Golan Heights shows public support for Israel keeping the Golan territories.

Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq attacked Israel. The War of Independence lasted fifteen months, and early in 1949 negotiations began under the auspices of the United Nations between Israel and the other countries involved in the fighting, except Iraq, which wouldn't negotiate with Israel. These discussions resulted in armistices between Israel and her neighbors, as well as a *de facto* partition of the territories, with Israel controlling more land than had been proposed by the United Nations partition plan of 1947, Jordan controlling the West Bank, Egypt controlling the Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem being divided and under the control of both Israel and Jordan.<sup>1</sup>

In the more than five decades since that time, the struggle for peace has been the central component of Israeli foreign policy.<sup>2</sup> Both peace-seeking and peacemaking activities have been inconsistent over the years. At times real, substantive progress has been made. For years following Egyptian president Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977, observers continued to note how quickly the peace process was moving, given the historical context within which the Middle East conflict has existed. Recent years have seen the peace process sputter, stop, reverse directions, and apparently lie moribund, to the anguish of many.

The pursuit of a secure and lasting peace has been a very complicated challenge for both Israeli and Arab governments, not to mention nongovernmental actors such as the Palestine National Authority. The issue can be resolved not just on a bilateral basis by the governments involved, as there has also been significant political conflict domestically; indeed, domestic political issues can and do affect the peace process. Certainly, in the Israeli case inter- and intraparty politics<sup>3</sup> have affected the speed with which Israeli governments have felt comfortable pursuing peace and negotiating with other national and Arab groups. Issues we have already covered in this book, such as the right of return of Palestinian refugees<sup>4</sup> and ultimate jurisdiction over Jerusalem,<sup>5</sup> not only have proven irresolvable between the negotiating parties—specifically between Israel and the Palestine National Authority—but also have polarized Israeli society.<sup>6</sup> While Israelis have tended to agree on the need for secure borders as one of the major goals of negotiations, others issues have been on the table, too.<sup>7</sup>

Significant to the peace process has been the role of the United States.<sup>8</sup> As we see throughout this chapter, on several occasions over the last five decades, only because of pressure from or guarantees by the United States has Israel been either able or willing to make concessions necessary to move forward—however slowly or inconsistently—in the peace process. Although at the time of this writing the peace process has stalled and observers are far less optimistic about the likelihood of achieving peace in the near future than they have been at other times in the relatively recent past, the potential for

the development of peace remains. Once Anwar Sadat announced in 1977 that he was prepared to go to Jerusalem to talk with the Israeli government if it would help the cause of peace, the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt came (relatively speaking) remarkably quickly: Sadat visited Jerusalem in November 1977, the Camp David Accords (discussed below) were signed in September 1978, and the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt was signed in March 1979.

In this chapter we initially take an essentially chronological approach to the quest for peace in the region, moving from the period following the establishment of the state and the War of Independence through very recent developments. At that point we step back from a purely chronological approach and look at the several bilateral pairs of actors (Israel and Jordan, Israel and the Palestinians, Israel and Lebanon, and Israel and Syria), as we look to the future in the region and the prospects for peace in the coming months and years.

### PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE, POST-1948

Although many hoped that the several armistices that were developed in 1949 would lead quickly to secure and stable peaceful relations in the region, such was not the case.<sup>9</sup> The “disaster” or “catastrophe” of the survival of the state of Israel in Palestine—the term in Arabic is *al-naqba*<sup>10</sup>—left a situation in need of resolution. Resolution, however, was not likely when the Arab states involved were committed to not speaking to Israel and not negotiating with Israel. Israel charged that not only were the Arab nations not willing to participate in negotiations for a long-lasting peace treaty, but also,

in contradiction to the UN Security Council resolution of 1 September 1951, Israeli and Israel-bound shipping was prevented from passing through the Suez Canal; the blockade of the Straits of Tiran was tightened; incursions into Israel of terrorist squads from neighboring Arab countries for murder and sabotage occurred with increasing frequency; and the Sinai peninsula was gradually converted into a huge Egyptian military base.<sup>11</sup>

As we noted earlier in this book, the political and military situation in the Middle East grew more and more difficult for Israel in 1956; after an agreement was signed by Israel's three hostile neighbors, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, in October 1956, Israel's situation was even more bleak. This led Israel to join with Britain and France in a military action against Egypt. Following the 1956 military campaign, Israel controlled the Gaza Strip and virtually all of the Sinai Peninsula. As part of the cessation of that fighting, a United Nations

Emergency Force (UNEF) contingent was stationed along the new border between Israel and Egypt, along with Egyptian assurances that there would be free navigation in the Gulf of Eilat and Israeli agreement to withdraw from the newly occupied territories.

#### PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE, POST-1956

The fact that Israel withdrew from territories captured in the 1956 fighting did not result in peace in the Middle East, however. Israel continued to suffer from cross-border harassment on the Jordanian and Egyptian fronts, and periodic fighting and gunfire continued along the front with Syria, affecting Israeli kibbutzim, moshavim, and development towns in the Galilee. In May 1967 Egypt ordered the United Nations peacekeeping forces out of the Sinai (and it must be recalled that under United Nations procedures, peacekeeping forces would only be deployed to situations in which both sides of the border requested their presence; if one side requested that the peacekeeping forces depart, then the forces would necessarily depart), and the general situation in the Middle East became much more hostile. Shortly thereafter, Egypt again blockaded the Straits of Tiran—in direct violation of a promise made following the 1956 war—cutting off an important shipping route for Israeli commerce.

When Israel contacted the United States about the hostile Egyptian behavior (and it must be recalled that the United States had played a key role in the termination of the 1956 fighting, promising Israel that the United States would guarantee open international waterways for Israel) and received no assistance in the resolution of the new hostilities, some kind of military action proved unavoidable. The position of the Israeli government was that “Egypt had violated the arrangements agreed upon following the 1956 Sinai Campaign” and that Israel had a right to invoke “its inherent right of self-defense, launching a preemptive strike (5 June 1967) against Egypt in the south, followed by a counterattack against Jordan in the east and the routing of Syrian forces entrenched on the Golan Heights in the north.”<sup>212</sup>

As we noted earlier, by the end of six days of fighting, the working borders of the state of Israel were significantly greater than they had been prior to the fighting: Israel controlled all of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Sinai, and the Golan Heights. At that time Israel's efforts to use the results of the fighting as a diplomatic lever to bring its Arab neighbors to an arena in which peace could be negotiated were not successful. Although United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 called for the recognition of the sovereignty of all states in the region and their right to live in peace within secure and

recognized boundaries,<sup>13</sup> the Arab position at the August 1967 Khartoum Summit called for “no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it.”<sup>14</sup> It was not until 1970 that a cease-fire was finally adopted along the Suez Canal between Egypt and Israel.

In October 1973 Egypt and Syria attacked Israel yet again. While Israel had felt that an attack would be forthcoming, it had decided, at the intense urging of the United States, not to use the strategy employed in 1967 when it launched a preemptive strike. While the fighting brought about significant and extremely traumatic costs to Israel—in terms of loss of life and even fears about the ultimate outcome of the fighting—at the end of the two-week war, Israel found herself having crossed the Suez Canal into Egypt proper and having gone beyond the Golan Heights to within twenty miles of Damascus. While Israel withdrew from most of these new territories following protracted negotiations in response to United Nations Security Council Resolution 338,<sup>15</sup> it was clear that it would take a major diplomatic initiative to bring about a stable peace in the region.

#### CAMP DAVID AND THE PEACE PROCESS, 1978–1982

Surely the most celebrated and controversial step toward resolution of the Middle East dilemma came in March 1979, when Israel signed her first peace treaty with an Arab state since independence in 1948. The process leading up to this watershed event was both extraordinarily rapid and excruciatingly slow. As we noted earlier, it was rapid in the sense that once Egyptian president Anwar Sadat expressed a willingness to go to Jerusalem and meet with Israeli leaders—a dramatic departure from previous Arab policy toward Israel—progress was made (in the historical context of the preceding six decades) remarkably quickly. The visit led to the Camp David negotiations and the resulting Camp David Accords, which included a framework for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. That framework included, for the first time, a specific proposal for Palestinian self-government. On the other hand, negotiations were slow in that they were consistently frustrated and bogged down by a seemingly endless stream of issues and details. In the end it would take eighteen months of extraordinary effort to complete the treaty-making process.

That process had, of course, commenced with Sadat's stunning announcement that he was prepared to be received in Jerusalem by Israeli leaders to discuss prospects for peace between the two nations.<sup>16</sup> This was the first public summit of an Israeli and an Arab head of state, and everyone involved

recognized its significance. (It should be noted that secret summits had taken place between King Hussein and Israeli leaders from time to time prior to this, although they failed to produce tangible result.) Sadat made it very clear from the outset that he was not seeking a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt separate from other issues in the region. He sought an overall framework for peace in the Middle East, including progress on the question of the Palestinians and their rights. In Sadat's words, "there could be no peace without the Palestinians."<sup>17</sup> The major issues to be negotiated were apparent to all: peace and diplomatic recognition between Israel and Egypt in exchange for the return of the Egyptian territories occupied by Israel and progress on the Palestinian question.

After Sadat and Begin's initial negotiations in Jerusalem, they met a month later in Ismailia, Egypt (on Christmas Day, 1977), to discuss Israel's counter-proposal. Sadat rejected Begin's plan because its autonomy arrangement for the Palestinians fell significantly short of Cairo's definition of acceptable progress. At this point the United States began to play a more active role in the proceedings.<sup>18</sup> Washington's expanding involvement reflected the fact that after a series of meetings between Israeli and Egyptian delegations during the early part of 1978, several problems persisted.

First, the Begin Government continued to argue that it had the right to develop settlements in the Occupied Territories. This view was strongly supported by significant segments of the Israeli electorate and especially by Ariel Sharon, Begin's minister of agriculture and a contender for leadership of Begin's Likud Party. The position of the Egyptians and other Arab powers, also the position of the United States, was that these settlements were not permitted under international law and thus should not be established or continued. Second, the question of the future of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was the subject of much discussion, with Begin and Likud willing to consider some form of limited self-rule or autonomy and a final decision to be decided upon later, while Egypt demanded total Israeli military withdrawal. Third, there was concern over the linkage between Israel's returning to the Sinai and the establishment of direct diplomatic relations between Jerusalem and Cairo, with Egypt preferring full and immediate Israeli withdrawal and phased-in diplomatic recognition, as distinct from Israel's goal of immediate full diplomatic recognition and phased withdrawal from the Sinai. Fourth, President Sadat continued to insist that foremost on the Israeli-Egyptian agenda had to be the Palestinian question, while Prime Minister Begin wanted the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty to be the centerpiece. Fifth, but by no means least important, the Jerusalem issue appeared irreconcilable, with Israel insisting on continued complete sovereignty (although it would permit Arab control of Islamic holy places) and Egypt insisting on Israeli

withdrawal from East Jerusalem, thereby reestablishing the status quo ante-1967, but this time with guaranteed Israeli access to Jewish holy places.

Although American presidents Nixon and Ford had devoted great energy to the quest for peace, it was President Jimmy Carter who was able to provide the setting and the momentum for the peace process to develop. In hindsight, this was to be the highlight of Carter's presidency. (On December 10, 2002, President Carter received the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in this event.) President Carter played an active role as broker between Israel and Egypt at the Camp David Summit in September 1978 and worked hard between then and the final treaty-signing ceremony the following March to keep the movement toward peace from being halted by one group or another. Although the United States had supported a comprehensive Geneva peace conference as the preferred mechanism for the development of peace treaties in the Middle East,<sup>19</sup> once the Begin-Sadat opening was made, President Carter supported that vehicle.

During a thirteen-day period, from September 5 to 17, 1978, Prime Minister Begin and Presidents Sadat and Carter met at Camp David, Maryland. Carter felt that an informal setting would be more productive than negotiations conducted in the glare of international publicity. Reflecting his position as facilitator and sense of the personalities involved, Carter was convinced that progress toward peace could only come if both Begin and Sadat had the chance, once again, to meet and talk face-to-face,<sup>20</sup> away from the harsh lights of the media. Over those two weeks at Camp David, he held a series of one-on-one talks with both Begin and Sadat, literally shuttling back and forth between their cabins, arranging sessions with their respective advisers, then conducting direct negotiations when the prospects of gain were more favorable.

The agreement on the exchange of the Sinai for peace and diplomatic recognition between Israel and Egypt was achieved in fairly short order. The difficult issue was Sadat's predictable insistence that he would only sign a peace treaty if it were linked in some way to broader progress toward peace in the Middle East and progress on the Palestinian issue. It would take all of their skills and powers of persuasion to bridge, however imperfectly, the distance dividing them.

Eventually, two agreements were reached, as table 11.1 indicates.<sup>21</sup> The first, a "Framework for Peace in the Middle East," dealt with the broader question of the West Bank and Gaza. It established a five-year transitional regime for the Occupied Territories, suggested that freely elected local authorities would gradually assume power, discussed the redeployment of Israeli armed forces into less visible positions, and set the stage for final nego-

Table 11.1 The Camp David Accords, 1978

<i>Framework for Peace in the Middle East</i>	<i>Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel</i>
* Five-year transitional regime for the Occupied Territories	* Return of Sinai to Egypt
* Freely elected local authorities to receive power	* Limitations on Egyptian forces in Sinai
* Redeployment of Israeli forces into less visible positions	* Timetable for withdrawal of Israeli forces in Sinai
* Final negotiations on West Bank, Gaza, and Israeli-Jordanian relations	* Establishment of diplomatic relations between Egypt and Israel
	* Schedule for Israeli withdrawal from Sinai
	* United Nations presence in the Sinai
	* Free passage through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran for Israeli vessels

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web site, "The Peace Process" > "Reference Documents" > "The Camp David Accords: September 17, 1978," at [www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH001e0](http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH001e0), accessed October 2003.

tations to determine the status of the West Bank, Gaza, and Israeli-Jordanian relations. It did not specifically mention the PLO.

The second document was a "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel." This document called for the return of the Sinai to Egypt, limitations on the number of Egyptian forces that could be stationed there, a timetable for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai tied to the signing of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, a date by which a total Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai was to be completed, a permanent stationing of U.N. troops in the Sinai, which could not be removed on the sole authority of either of the two parties alone,<sup>22</sup> and a guarantee of free passage for Israeli ships through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran.

The Arab world was not pleased with the outcome of the Camp David talks, and following the signing of the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, many Arab states cut Egypt off in terms of trade, diplomatic relationships, or both.<sup>23</sup> Eventually, most of those relationships were restored, however, and "the headquarters of the Arab League, which had been transferred to Tunis, was reinstated in Cairo in the early 1980s."<sup>24</sup> Although Sadat had insisted on linkage between a bilateral Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty and progress on the overall Palestinian issue, other Arab nations claimed that not enough progress on the broader Palestinian issue had been made, due largely to Israeli intransigence.<sup>25</sup> Arab criticism of Sadat increased when Israel later permitted the building of more settlements on the West Bank. In the end, the question of linkage was finessed by an agreement between Begin and Sadat on a specific timetable for negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza.

On March 26, 1979, the two treaties conceived at Camp David were finally signed in Washington, formally ending the state of war between Israel and Egypt.<sup>26</sup> In April 1982, under the terms of the peace treaty, Israel completed its staged withdrawal from the Sinai, returning this vast buffer zone to Egypt in exchange for a declaration of peace. In fact, to the surprise of many, the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty was implemented remarkably smoothly. Israel pulled out of the Sinai in distinct phases as called for in the treaty, returning portions of the Sinai on May 25, July 25, September 25, November 15, and November 25, 1979, and on January 25, 1980, with the final phase occurring on April 25, 1982.<sup>27</sup> Egypt, correspondingly, initiated and upgraded its level of diplomatic contact with Israel, eventually establishing open borders and beginning scientific and cultural exchanges. While the peace between Israel and Egypt has run hot and cold for more than two decades, primarily as a result of Israeli policy in Lebanon and on the West Bank, the peace has held.

(The last—almost symbolic—source of tension between Israel and Egypt involved a border dispute over 250 acres of land at Taba, just south of the city of Eilat. The area was occupied by Israel after the 1967 war. The dispute was complicated by the fact that a deluxe beach resort was then built there. When Israel returned its final installment of the Sinai in April 1982, it maintained that Taba was exempt from return, using a map from 1906 that placed the land occupied by Taba inside of what is today Israel. After much negotiation within the Israeli cabinet [favored by Labor's Peres, opposed by Likud's Shamir], Israel agreed in 1986 to an Egyptian proposal to accept binding arbitration from a five-member international tribunal. In September 1988 the panel ruled that Taba belonged to Egypt.<sup>28</sup> From September 30, 1988, through February 1989 Israel and Egypt negotiated over the financial settlement Israel would accept for the hotel that had been built on the land. Finally, in March 1989 the Israeli flag was lowered from the front of the Sonesta Beach Hotel, and the Egyptian flag was raised, signaling the end of the final chapter of Israeli-Egyptian disputes over their precise boundary.)

While progress was being made in bilateral talks between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Jordan—to which we will return shortly—all was not well on Israel's northern borders. In June 1981 Israel attacked PLO and Syrian forces in Lebanon to try to stop the consistent cross-border acts of violence there that were so adversely affecting the quality of life in many of Israel's northern cities and villages. U.S. mediator Philip Habib was able to bring about a cease-fire between Israel and the PLO in the next month, but tensions remained high.

In October 1981 Egyptian president Anwar Sadat was assassinated. As we noted earlier, President Sadat had received a great deal of criticism from other Arab leaders for his reaching out to Israel in 1977, and while many of

the other governments had ended their official sanctions against Egypt, many of the more conservative segments of Egypt's population saw Sadat as an enemy for his willingness to negotiate with Israel. The fact that Sadat was assassinated by what were called right-wing forces did not surprise observers.

Upon the assassination of Sadat, one of the first reactions of Israel was to be concerned about the state of the peace agreement with Egypt. The question was raised whether Israel, in fact, had a peace with Egypt or a peace with Sadat. President Hosni Mubarak (who had been Sadat's vice president) was quick to announce that "we are committed to all charters, treaties, and international obligations which Egypt had concluded" and stated clearly that Egypt would honor all agreements with Israel, something that relieved Israeli leaders considerably.<sup>29</sup>

From June through August 1982 Israel was involved militarily in southern Lebanon in what was called Operation Peace for Galilee. While Israel declared that "the international boundary line with Lebanon has never been challenged by either side,"<sup>30</sup> the relocation of the PLO from Jordan to Lebanon in 1970 (following the Black September actions of the Jordanian government, discussed earlier) had led to increased acts of terrorism across the Israeli-Lebanese border directed at Israeli cities in the north. By the end of the military action, Yasser Arafat and his PLO forces had to leave areas of Beirut that had been under their control; they relocated their base of operation to Tunisia. Following a protracted series of negotiations mediated by the United States between Israel, Syria, and the PLO leadership, a multinational force made up of American, French, and Italian troops provided stability in Beirut during the period of PLO departure. After the PLO's departure from Lebanon, Israel maintained a security zone across the southern border of Lebanon to help prevent the cross-border acts of violence. In September 1982 President Ronald Reagan announced a new United States initiative to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict, based upon the Camp David Accords and United Nations Resolution 242.<sup>31</sup>

There were serious problems in Lebanon associated with this period of time, including two major issues: Lebanese president Bashier Gemayel was assassinated, and a significant massacre of several hundred civilian Palestinians took place in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Beirut.<sup>32</sup> One important dimension of that massacre by the Lebanese Christian Militia was that Ariel Sharon, Israel's defense minister at the time, was seriously implicated in the event<sup>33</sup> and was forced to resign over the incident in 1983. In May 1983 an American-mediated Israel-Lebanon peace and withdrawal agreement was signed, and in June 1985 Israel completed its withdrawal from most of Lebanon, retaining effective control over a narrow security zone in southern Lebanon.

In December 1987 the (first) Palestinian *intifada*, or uprising, started in the Gaza Strip, eventually spreading to the West Bank. Shortly thereafter, King Hussein of Jordan formally renounced any claims that Jordan had made to the West Bank, cutting legal and administrative ties to the territory. The following December, the Palestine National Council formally accepted the original U.N. partition plan (United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181) for Palestine, Israel's right to exist, and United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. It also formally renounced terrorism, which led to the United States opening a dialogue with the PLO, the first formal contacts with the PLO in thirteen years.

#### ISRAEL'S PEACE INITIATIVE, 1989

In May 1989 Israel's Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir announced a four-point Israeli peace plan that involved elections in the West Bank and Gaza "for representatives who would negotiate an agreement on interim self-rule and serve as a 'self-governing authority'."<sup>34</sup> The plan proposed further talks to take place later dealing with a permanent solution to the Palestinian situation. U.S. secretary of state James Baker began an effort to mediate renewal of the peace process, but Israel rejected Baker's five-point Middle East peace plan (which had a broader role for the Palestinians and a broader interpretation of Palestinian self-government than the Israeli plan), which was originally endorsed by Egypt and accepted with some reservations by the Palestinians.<sup>35</sup> Domestic Israeli politics and the vulnerability of Shamir's coalition government interacted with the peace process, and Shamir's hesitancy or unwillingness to move more vigorously resulted in his Government's losing a confidence vote in the Knesset.<sup>36</sup>

On March 16, the Israeli Knesset voted out the Government of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir after he refused to accept a U.S. plan for beginning Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. It was the first time an Israeli government had fallen in a no-confidence vote.

The sixty-to-fifty-five vote climaxed several weeks of intense political struggle between Shamir's right-wing Likud Party and the center-left Labor Party of Shimon Peres. The two parties had shared power in an uneasy Likud-dominated coalition formed after inconclusive general elections in November 1988. A similar Labor-Likud national unity government, in which Peres and Shamir rotated the premiership, had ruled in the four years before that.<sup>37</sup>

In June 1990 President George H. W. Bush stopped the formal negotiations between the United States and the PLO because of American feeling

that the PLO was not taking a sufficiently firm position against acts of terrorism being directed against Israel. The PLO's position vis-à-vis terrorism and refusal to strongly condemn acts of terrorism directed against Israel have remained an issue in the relations between the United States and the Palestine National Authority in recent years.

In August 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait. The significance of this for the peace process was that Yasser Arafat declared his support for Saddam Hussein, which resulted in the Gulf States' cutting off funds to the PLO. Also, tens of thousands of Palestinians were forced out of the Gulf States. After the United States and a coalition of allies (including Arab countries) attacked Iraq, Iraq responded by firing missiles at Israel. At least one of Iraq's intentions behind this attack was to draw Israel into the war against Iraq so that Iraq could appeal to pan-Arab unity and break up the alliance between the United States and its Arab allies. Responding to requests from the United States, however, Israel did not retaliate to Iraq's missile attack. Iraq lost the war, and the Palestinians lost much political capital in the Arab world because they were among the most vocal supporters of Saddam Hussein.

In March 1991 President George H. W. Bush announced that the Gulf War victory opened a window of opportunity for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict<sup>38</sup> and sent Secretary of State James Baker to the Middle East on the first of many peace missions that would ultimately lead to the Madrid Conference.

### THE MADRID PEACE CONFERENCE, 1991

In October 1991 President George H. W. Bush of the United States and President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union cosponsored a conference held in Madrid, Spain.<sup>39</sup> At the opening of the Madrid Conference, President Bush said that the objective of the conference was

to achieve "real peace . . . security, diplomatic relations, economic relations, trade, investment, cultural exchange, even tourism. We seek a Middle East, where vast resources are no longer devoted to armaments." Outsiders can assist, he said, "but in the end, it is up to the peoples and the governments of the Middle East to shape the future of the Middle East."<sup>40</sup>

The conference was also attended by a delegation of Palestinians that was formally part of the Jordanian delegation. Syria and Lebanon had delegations, as well.

The framework for the Madrid Conference called for both bilateral talks (Israel-Jordan, Israel-Syria, Israel-Lebanon, and Israel-Palestine) and multi-

lateral talks to take place in "two separate yet parallel negotiating tracks."<sup>41</sup> The bilateral track was constructed to "resolve the conflicts of the past," and the first direct talks between Israel and its Arab neighbors began on November 3, 1991, after the opening session of the Madrid Conference. Many rounds of bilateral talks would take place over time, as table 11.2 shows. Israeli negotiators met with the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, the Lebanese delegation, and the Syrian delegation. At the same time, a multilateral track was designed to be future-oriented and to open negotiations focused upon issues that would be important in the future. Five working groups were established, focusing upon water, environment, arms control and regional security, refugees, and economic development. These talks took place in various locations around the world.

The multilateral talks were intended to permit the actors to focus on regional problems that were broader than the issues of past conflicts. As well, they were intended to serve as confidence-building measures, recognizing that after literally decades of war and mistrust, it would be unrealistic to assume that the nations involved would likely move immediately into a

Table 11.2 The Madrid Peace Conference, October 30–November 1, 1991

Track I: Bilateral Negotiations: Israel and:				
Goals	Palestinians	Jordan	Syria	Lebanon
Short-term	Interim self-government arrangements for five years			
Long-term	Permanent status	Peace treaty signed October 26, 1994	Goal: peace treaty	Goal: peace treaty

\*The purpose of the bilateral negotiations was to resolve past conflicts.  
 \*The goal of talks with Arab states was to conclude peace treaties.  
 \*The goal of talks with the Palestinians was to achieve a two-stage settlement over five years.

Track II: Multilateral Negotiations Steering Committee Working Groups				
Economic cooperation and development	Water	Environment	Refugees	Arms control and regional security

\*The purpose of the multilateral negotiations was to reorient debate toward future issues.  
 \*Discussion of issues should promote cooperation and build confidence in partnerships.

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web page, "The Peace Process" > "Guide to the Peace Process" > "Madrid," at [www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH003j](http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH003j), accessed October 2003.



smoothly operating working relationship. A secure future would be achieved only with open borders, broad economic development, and regional cooperation over a period of time.<sup>42</sup>

In mid-December 1991 talks between Israel and the other parties resumed in Washington, D.C., and a spokesman for the U.S. Department of State said "that the talks are continuing. . . . [This] is a very big step forward in the region that's had hostility for forty-three years."<sup>43</sup> The talks continued intermittently and were scheduled to take place in the United States, Moscow, Lisbon, Belgium, Japan, Canada, and London, among other sites. In the fourth round of talks, in Washington, D.C., the Palestinians proposed direct elections in the West Bank, Gaza, and Arab East Jerusalem. Israel rejected the proposal, and the talks ended inconclusively.

In the sixth round of the bilateral talks in August 1992, Israel and Syria reached a new stage of progress when Israel openly acknowledged the possibility of withdrawing from part of the Golan Heights, one of Syria's demands since the beginning of the talks. In the seventh round of talks in October 1992, Israel continued to indicate its willingness to pull out of the Golan Heights, but emphasized that it would not give up the entire region.

January 1993 began with the Israeli Knesset rescinding its 1986 ban on contacts with the PLO. The Government was committed to making the gesture to the PLO as a partner in negotiations, but a number of Israeli political leaders opposed the measure strongly. Although Prime Minister Rabin was confident that the Knesset would, in fact, pass the bill (because his Government controlled a majority in the Knesset), it was unclear how difficult it would be to have enough coalition members support the bill. At the end of the day the vote for the bill was 39 to 20 (out of 120 MKs!) in favor of the bill.<sup>44</sup>

In August 1993, in a major breakthrough in the peace process, the PLO announced that in secret talks in Oslo it had reached tentative agreement with Israel on partial autonomy in the Occupied Territories. Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres announced that Israel and the PLO had reached an agreement on Palestinian autonomy in Gaza and Jericho. The agreement, which became known as the Oslo Agreement because of the location in which the secret talks took place, was seen as a true breakthrough in the peacemaking process.

#### THE OSLO ACCORDS, 1993<sup>45</sup>

As a result of the Oslo Accords, Israel and the PLO agreed to recognize each other after forty-five years of conflict, as shown in box 11.1. PLO leader Yas-

### Box 11.1 The Oslo Accords, August 1993

The accord provided for:

- A substantial degree of Palestinian autonomy and the establishment of interim self-government. This would come first in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank town of Jericho, and later in the rest of the West Bank (excluding Jewish settlements).
- Internationally supervised elections for an interim Palestinian legislature to administer limited Palestinian self-rule. Elections would be held within nine months of the formal signing of the accord.
- The legislative council would have power in the areas of taxation, health, education, welfare, culture, tourism, and the establishment of a police force.
- Israeli military would retain authority for overall security, although Israeli forces would be pulled back from Palestinian population centers, and the Israeli military would continue to supervise all border crossings.
- Negotiations on the sensitive issues of the final status of Jerusalem and the rights of Palestinian refugees and Jewish settlers would take place when talks convened on permanent arrangements for the occupied Palestinian territories, no later than two years after the signing of the self-rule accord.
- The interim legislative council would cease to exist at the end of the transitional period, which was to last no longer than five years.
- Israeli-Palestinian negotiations sought to achieve "a permanent settlement based on (U.N.) Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338."

Source: "Israel and Palestine Liberation Organization Sign Preliminary Accord; Mutual Recognition Declared," *Facts on File*, accession number: 1993054779; story date: September 13, 1993.

ser Arafat signed a letter recognizing Israel and renouncing violence. As part of the agreement, Arafat's letter was hand-carried to Israel by Norwegian foreign minister Johan Joergen Holst, whose country brokered the PLO-Israel pact. At the same time, Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin signed a document recognizing the PLO<sup>46</sup> and agreeing to participate in a signing ceremony on August 13 in Washington, D.C. American president Bill Clinton called the Oslo Agreement "a bold breakthrough." "Today marks a shining moment of hope for the people of the Middle East; indeed, of the entire world," he said.<sup>47</sup>

On September 13, 1993, Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO chairman Yasser Arafat met and watched Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres and PLO Executive Council member Abou Abbas sign the Oslo Agreement, witnessed by President Bill Clinton, former presidents George Bush and Jimmy Carter, and numerous dignitaries. The next day Israel and Jordan agreed to an Israel-Jordan Common Agenda in Washington, D.C., marking the end of the state of war between the two nations and paving the way for talks leading to a formal peace treaty. Rabin and Arafat met again in October to coordinate the talks and hold a minisummit.<sup>48</sup>

In July 1994 Israel and Jordan agreed upon a peace treaty, three years after the beginning of the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference.<sup>49</sup> This officially ended the forty-six-year state of war that had existed between the two nations. The next month Israel and the Palestine National Authority signed the Agreement on the Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities<sup>50</sup> at the Erez border checkpoint between Israel and the Gaza Strip. The agreement covered such subjects as the expansion of Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank in such policy areas as education, taxation, social welfare, tourism, and health.

Later in the year, on October 17, 1994, the peace treaty was initialed at the border crossing between Eilat, Israel, and Aqaba, Jordan, with U.S. president Bill Clinton witnessing the ceremony. At the end of October the treaty of peace between the state of Israel and the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan was signed at the White House. Although Israel and Jordan had been de facto at war with each other for almost five decades, in fact, on many occasions during that period of time, there were secret contacts between the governments (including secret visits of Israeli prime ministers to Jordan and secret visits of Jordanian leaders to Israel). In August 1995 the Jordanian parliament "rescinded its adherence to the Arab boycott of Israel."<sup>51</sup>

In May 1995 U.S. secretary of state Warren Christopher announced that Israel and Syria had reached a set of understandings on security arrangements.

In late September 1995 the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip<sup>52</sup> was signed in Washington, D.C., indicating even more progress in the negotiations on some of the central issues involved in the conflict, in this case the issue of transferring power. The agreement covered such subjects as redeployment of troops and security, elections, civil affairs, legal matters, economic relations, cooperation programs, and prisoner release.

On November 4, 1995, Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated following a peace rally in Tel Aviv by an Israeli university student, Yigal Amir. Rabin was succeeded by former foreign minister Shimon Peres. Peres was strongly behind the peace initiatives that had been pursued by Rabin—

indeed, he had been one of the individuals pressing Rabin to move in that direction most strongly—and he was strongly committed to doing whatever was necessary to achieve peace.

Peres found, however, that he was unable to stem the increasing tide of Palestinian violence and terrorism. Indeed, in the May 1996 elections for prime minister in Israel, Peres was defeated by Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu, primarily on the issue of security and Netanyahu's argument that he could bring more safety against terrorism to Israelis than could Peres.

The Israeli-Palestinian peace process was faltering, however. Some said that this was unavoidable because the easier issues had already been resolved and only the harder issues remained, such as questions dealing with Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories, the return of Palestinian refugees, control of Jerusalem, and the like. In January 1998 President Clinton met with both Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat in Washington to try to restart the peace process. The next month U.S. secretary of state Madeline Albright returned to the region, meeting with both Netanyahu and Arafat. In May Secretary Albright met with Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat in London in yet another effort to restart the peace process. She met with both leaders again in September, and both Netanyahu and Arafat met with President Clinton in Washington. In early October Secretary Albright met with both leaders again in preparation for a new meeting that would take place at the Wye River Plantation on October 23, 1998.

#### THE WYE RIVER MEMORANDUM, OCTOBER 23, 1998

From October 15 to 23, 1998, negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians took place at the Wye River Conference Center in Maryland. The resulting memorandum was very significant,<sup>53</sup> because it was the result of nine hard days of negotiations out of the public eye, reminiscent of the Camp David negotiations two decades earlier. It demonstrated to the public that both Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat could negotiate with each other to a successful conclusion, something that was not certain prior to the public announcement of a productive period.

The accord, known formally as the Wye Memorandum, would implement the second of three slated Israeli troop pullbacks from the West Bank as outlined in the second-phase agreement on interim Palestinian self-rule, signed by the two sides in September 1995.

...  
Netanyahu, who had conditioned the pact on enhanced security guarantees for

Israel, declared at a signing ceremony in the White House that "Israel and our entire region are more secure" as a result of the agreement. Arafat, at the signing, referred to Netanyahu as a "copartner in peace" and said, "We [Palestinians] will never leave the peace process, and we will never go back to violence and confrontation."<sup>54</sup>

The Wye River Memorandum was signed at the White House on October 23. A month later President Clinton hosted a Middle East Donors Conference in Washington, D.C. In addition to Clinton's promising to ask Congress to approve a contribution of \$400 million to the Palestine National Authority over a five-year period, nearly forty other nations pledged over \$3 billion in economic assistance to the Palestine National Authority.<sup>55</sup>

The point of the Wye Agreement was to get the parties involved thinking again in terms of cooperation and to urge them to continue the progress toward peace made in the past.<sup>56</sup> As shown in box 11.2, the agreement combined the transferring of control for the Palestinians over more territory in the West Bank and the release of a number of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails with an obligation upon the Palestinians to arrest suspected terrorists, increase antiterrorism measures, and perform a number of actions designed to increase Israeli security. It also included agreement over a Palestinian airport and a transportation corridor to link the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

On May 17, 1999, Ehud Barak was elected prime minister of Israel, defeating Benjamin Netanyahu by a margin of 56 to 44 percent of the vote in direct voting.<sup>57</sup> Peace and willingness to negotiate with the Palestinians were significant issues in the campaign, and many believed that Barak would be able to guide Israel toward a lasting peace agreement with the Palestinians.

September 2000 marked a turning point in the peace process. On September 28 Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount area, including the area near the Al-Aqsa Mosque, setting off massive rioting in the West Bank. "It was not my visit that lit the fire, but Palestinian incitement," he observed in response to accusations that he intentionally aggravated Palestinian tensions by making a gesture of Israeli dominance that was certain to arouse the emotions of Palestinians.

Sharon said his visit was intended to reaffirm Israeli sovereignty over the area, which Israel had annexed when it captured East Jerusalem in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Sovereignty over Jerusalem and its holy sites was one of the most contentious unresolved issues of the Palestinian-Israeli peace talks. Sharon, the leader of the opposition Likud Party, used the occasion to criticize Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak's willingness to make concessions to the Palestinians regarding Jerusalem's status.<sup>58</sup>

On September 28 Sharon had said of his visit, "It was no provocation

### Box 11.2 The Wye River Agreement, October 23, 1998

Highlights of the accord:

- Called for Israeli military withdrawal from 13.1 percent of the West Bank to be carried out in three stages over three months. As well, the agreement included a transfer of an additional 14 percent of the West Bank to sole Palestine National Authority control from joint Israeli-Palestinian control.
- Called for a reconvening of the Palestine National Council (PNC), the Palestinian parliament, to reconfirm the deletion of twenty-six clauses in the 1964 Palestine National Charter calling for the destruction of Israel.
- Called for an increase in Palestinian Authority antiterrorism measures to enhance Israeli security.
- Called for a reduction of the Palestinian Authority police force by 25 percent.
- Called for the Palestinian Authority arrest of thirty Palestinian terrorism suspects, as well as the confiscation of illegal weapons in Palestinian hands.
- Called for the release of 750 Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails.
- Called for the opening of a Palestinian airport and an industrial park in the Gaza Strip.
- Called for the opening of a transportation corridor to allow Palestinians to travel between the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
- Called for the formation of a joint Israeli-Palestinian committee to discuss further Israeli troop withdrawals from occupied Palestinian territory.

Source: "Middle East: Highlights of Wye Accord," *Facts on File*, accession number: 1998114840; story date: October 23, 1998.

whatsoever. . . . Arabs have the right to visit everywhere in the land of Israel, and Jews have the right to visit every place in the land of Israel." However, Palestinian headquarters in East Jerusalem on September 28 issued a statement saying, "The visit struck at the very heart of the peace process."<sup>59</sup>

Unfortunately, Barak proved to be unable to stop the acts of terrorism that took place on his watch, especially following the start of the *Al-Aqsa Intifada*, and his political mandate in the Knesset was not strong enough to permit

him to stand up to the short-term pressures. On December 9, 2000, Barak announced his resignation as prime minister.<sup>60</sup> Elections were scheduled for February 2001.

In that election, of course, Ariel Sharon was elected prime minister of Israel. During the campaign Sharon "declared that he considered the 1993 Palestinian-Israeli Oslo peace accord completely defunct. That interim agreement had provided the primary framework for all peace negotiations since 1993, and the Oslo process had been intended to culminate in Palestinian self-rule."<sup>61</sup> Immediately following Sharon's election, the more moderate Arab leaders—especially Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak and Jordanian prime minister Ali Abu Ragheb—appealed to other Arab leaders "not to condemn Sharon too quickly."<sup>62</sup>

Since the end of 2000, and especially under Prime Minister Sharon, the peace process has slowed to a crawl and often stopped completely. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has assembled a Web site that lists "Palestinian Violence and Terrorism Since September 2000," and includes an effort to comprehensively document acts of Palestinian terrorism that have been directed toward Israel during that time.<sup>63</sup> Although leaders on both sides of the conflict have periodically called for the cessation of violence and terrorism and the resumption of negotiations, the cycle of violence in Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip has reached a level of intensity unseen in recent memory. As we noted in the last chapter, Palestinian suicide bombers have delivered violence and casualties to Israel's heartland. Israel has responded with helicopter gunship attacks upon strategic targets in Palestinian cities, destruction of homes, Palestinian casualties, and mass arrests. The Palestinians have responded with more acts upon terrorism. And the violence has simply made negotiations for peace unimaginable.

Some government leaders have considered renewed talks, but negotiations have not made great progress. In November 2000 former U.S. senator George Mitchell was asked by President Clinton to chair a fact-finding commission to look into the causes of recent violence between the Israelis and Palestinians. In April 2001 his report, known as the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum for the location of the announcement of the report, was released.

#### THE SHARM EL-SHEIKH MEMORANDUM, APRIL 30, 2001

On April 30, 2001, the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, chaired by former U.S. senator George J. Mitchell, issued its final report on what could be done to break the cycle of violence that had developed between Israel and

the Palestinians and how the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations might be reenergized, leading to a solution to the conflict (see box 11.3). The report called for an immediate cease-fire, a renunciation of terrorism, and a resumption of peace talks, as well as a freeze on the construction of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. The report indicated that "the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority must act swiftly and decisively to halt the violence. Their immediate objectives then should be to rebuild confidence and resume negotiations."<sup>64</sup> The report singled out Ariel Sharon's visit on September 28, 2000, to the Temple Mount area as significant in the start of the *Al-Aqsa Intifada*<sup>65</sup> and suggested that the Israeli settlement building, Palestinian acts of terrorism, Israeli military responses to those acts, and injudicious public statements had all contributed to the cycle of violence in the Middle East.

The report concluded that leaders needed to do nothing new, nothing that had not been done before. There was no need to reinvent the wheel. All that was needed—and the report did not minimize the difficulty of doing this—was for leaders on both sides to do what they had pledged to do in the past.

More recently, other sources of ideas for a peaceful outcome have been introduced. In March 2002 Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia proposed a peaceful two-state settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.<sup>66</sup> The Saudi plan did not put much that was new on the negotiating table, as it suggested that Israel withdraw completely from all territory occupied in 1967, including the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem, in return for full normalization of relations with all Arab countries. The plan's significance lay in its source, which never would have been thought possible two or three decades earlier! Following the Saudi proposal's announcement, the Arab League, meeting in Beirut, adopted the Saudi proposal.

### BILATERAL PROGRESS

#### Israel and Jordan

As noted above, Israel and Jordan signed the Israeli-Jordanian Common Agenda on September 14, 1993. This served as the basis for further discussions and negotiations on key bilateral issues, including water, security, refugees and displaced persons, borders, and territorial matters.<sup>67</sup> In July 1994 King Hussein and Prime Minister Abdel Salem al-Majali signed the Washington Declaration, which terminated the state of war between Jordan and Israel, agreed to seek a just and lasting peace based on United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338, and granted to Jordan a special role over Muslim holy shrines in Jerusalem. Discussion of a number of very pragmatic issues pre-

### Box 11.3 The Sharm el-Sheikh Report, April 30, 2001

1. Summary of recommendations
  - End the violence
  - Rebuild confidence
  - Resume negotiations
2. Introduction
3. Discussion
4. What happened?
5. Why did it happen?
  - Divergent expectations
  - The Palestinian perspective
  - Divergent perspectives
  - The Israeli perspective
6. End the violence
  - Cessation of violence
  - Resumption of security cooperation
7. Rebuild confidence
  - Terrorism
  - Economic and social impact of violence
  - Settlements
  - Holy places
  - Reducing tension
  - International force
  - Actions and responses
  - Cross-community initiatives
  - Incitement
8. Resume negotiations
9. Recommendations
  - End the violence
  - Rebuild confidence
  - Resume negotiations

Source: The final report of the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact Finding Committee can be found on the U.S. State Department Web page, "U.S. Department of State, International Information Programs" > "The U.S. and Middle East Peace" > "Mitchell Report," at [usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/mitchell.htm](http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/mitchell.htm), accessed October 2003.

ceded the declaration as well, including telephone links, electrical grids, border crossings, tourist mobility, problems of drug smuggling, and opportunities for economic cooperation.<sup>68</sup>

The treaty of peace between Israel and Jordan was signed on October 26, 1994. The treaty established full diplomatic relations between the two nations and opened the door for significantly increased economic relations between the parties. Many bilateral agreements have been signed in the last eight years, covering environmental protections, commerce and trade, transportation, air transport, water, agriculture, crime and illicit drugs, communications and mail, science and culture, education, health, borders, tourism and energy, and regional development of the Eilat-Aqaba region.<sup>69</sup>

### Israel and Lebanon

Historically, two other issues have clouded the bilateral relationship between Israel and Lebanon: Lebanon as a satellite state for Syria and Lebanon as a base of operations for Palestinian acts of terrorism. As noted above, Israel has been very clear over the years that it does not have any claims on Lebanese territory; its military actions into and against Lebanon and its security zone in southern Lebanon were motivated by the insecurity of the Lebanese-Israeli border and the acts of violence directed against the Israeli population from Lebanese territory.

In the bilateral talks that took place in Washington in 1994, Israel proposed three key principles:

1. The Lebanese army would prevent terror activities against the security zone and against Israel for six months. Three months after that period, Israel would be willing to sign a peace treaty with Lebanon.
2. Israel would have to be convinced that terror groups based in Lebanon had been disbanded before withdrawing from Lebanon.
3. Lebanese citizens and Southern Lebanese Army personnel who had helped Israel would not suffer after Israeli withdrawal.

In April 1996, after many months of terrorist activity coming from the Lebanese side of Israel's northern border, Israel invaded Lebanon in what was called Operation Grapes of Wrath.<sup>70</sup> We discussed earlier the difficulty in domestic politics caused by the Lebanese action and the resistance of Israeli soldiers to serving in Lebanon. In the campaign for the 1999 election, Ehud Barak pledged to bring Israeli troops out of Lebanon, and the guidelines of his Government indicated that "The Government will act toward bringing the IDF out of Lebanon, while guaranteeing the welfare and security

of residents of the north, and aspiring to conclude a peace treaty with Lebanon.<sup>71</sup>

Following Barak's election, on March 5, 2000, the Government passed a resolution to redeploy the IDF forces by July of that year; on May 23, 2000, Israel completed a unilateral withdrawal of military forces from southern Lebanon. This ended an eighteen-year presence in Lebanon for Israel.<sup>72</sup>

### Israel and Syria

In 1994 Israel and Syria engaged in several negotiation sessions, some at the ambassadorial level in Washington, D.C., and some at other levels, including one between the Israeli and Syrian chiefs of staff in December 1994 and June 1995. Later talks, in December 1995 and January 1996, focused on security and other key issues.

As we noted earlier, Israel has agreed to a key demand of Syria in negotiations: that Israel accept the general principle of withdrawal from the Golan Heights. The issue of contention in the negotiation is whether this includes total withdrawal and what trade-off Syria will offer in exchange. Specifically, in negotiations Israel has identified four key questions in need of resolution:

1. How far Israel will withdraw. Syria wants a total withdrawal; Israel has indicated that a total withdrawal is not at all automatic.
2. The schedule and duration of the withdrawal. Syria wants a rapid and brief withdrawal; Israel has indicated that it will move deliberately and carefully.
3. The linkage between the withdrawal and normalization. Syria has offered normalization after withdrawal; Israel has insisted that the two must be linked in time and that "there be a protracted phase of normalization—open borders and embassies" before withdrawal is complete.
4. Agreement about security arrangements.<sup>73</sup>

Prime Minister Ehud Barak was anxious to pursue negotiations with the Syrians. In the election campaign of 1999, he promised, as a response to those strongly opposed to giving territory in the Golan Heights back to Syria, that any agreement with Syria would be submitted to the Israeli public in a referendum for approval. Unfortunately, his Government was not able to reach an agreement with Syria, and negotiations with Syria stalled. While negotiations between Israel and Syria were renewed in January 2000 in Shepherds-town, West Virginia, after a pause of more than three years, no substantive outcomes appeared from the negotiations.<sup>74</sup>

### Israel and the Palestinians

The Israeli-Palestinian bilateral negotiations have made real progress in the decade since the Oslo Accords, and on several occasions have come very, very close to reaching what many feel is a critical threshold of progress toward peace. While Prime Minister Barak hoped to conclude negotiations with the Palestinians for an enduring and stable peace, acts of violence against Israeli targets by terrorists reached a point during his administration at which he felt it necessary to take a time-out in the negotiations with the Palestinians.<sup>75</sup>

The issue, again, was the association between the Palestine National Authority, on one hand, and Palestinian terrorism, on the other. The Israeli position has been that while the Palestine National Authority generally, and Yasser Arafat specifically, has paid lip service to the values of peace and has at times criticized acts of terrorism, on other occasions the Palestinian leadership has given decidedly different messages to a different constituency.

The negotiations have been adversely affected by rejectionism on both sides.<sup>76</sup> While the vast majority of Palestinians may prefer progress toward peace and stability, individuals prepared to commit suicide, even if only a very small number, in the process of committing acts of terrorism have the ability to derail progress toward peace by pushing the Israeli government to retaliate, which leads to more Palestinian acts of violence, and so on, and so on. The same can be said about Israeli extremists who are willing to do whatever is necessary to stop the peace process. Extremists on both sides have assassinated political leaders, President Anwar Sadat on the Arab side and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on the Israeli side.

As we noted above, the Oslo Accords resulted from months of secret negotiations in Oslo between negotiators for Israel and the PLO. On September 9, 1993, PLO chairman Yasser Arafat sent a letter to Prime Minister Rabin recognizing Israel's right to exist, accepting United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, committing the PLO to a peaceful resolution of the negotiation, renouncing terrorism and the use of violence, promising to prevent violations of agreements, and declaring that articles of the PLO covenant denying Israel's right to exist were no longer operative. In exchange, Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.<sup>77</sup>

The Declaration of Principles (DOP) that came from the negotiations was signed on September 13, 1993.<sup>78</sup> It described self-government arrangements for the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.<sup>79</sup> The DOP had two stages. In stage one, the "Interim Self-Government Arrangements" stage, progress would be made over a multiyear period. The Gaza-Jericho Agreement was signed in May 1994 and brought about a withdrawal of Israeli forces and administration from specific areas. It also described the transfer of

powers and responsibilities to the Palestine National Authority, with specific attention paid to security arrangements.

In August 1994 a second document was signed titled "Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities between Israel and the Palestine National Authority." This document transferred powers in specific areas other than those covered in the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, including education and culture, health, social welfare, taxation, and tourism. (An expansion of this was signed on August 27, 1995, adding labor, trade and industry, gas and gasoline, insurance, postal services, statistics, agriculture, and local government to the powers previously agreed on.)

Finally, on September 28, 1995, the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was signed and dealt with the transfer of powers in the West Bank from Israel to an elected Palestinian council.<sup>80</sup> The Interim Agreement was the basis for a December 1995 redeployment of Israeli troops from heavily populated areas in the West Bank, the January 1996 elections to the Palestinian council, the January 1997 withdrawal of forces from Hebron, the October 1998 Wye River Memorandum, and the September 1999 Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum.

Stage two of the DOP was supposed to focus on permanent-status arrangements, including agreement on the borders of Jerusalem, rights of refugees, policies affecting settlements, and security arrangements and borders. The negotiations started in Taba, Egypt, in May 1996. While the talks only lasted for two days (May 5-6), they ended with a joint statement that indicated a commitment to the process leading to a lasting peace. In the Wye Memorandum of October 23, 1998, both sides agreed to resume negotiations, and a meeting took place in November 1998, with no significant results. The Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum called for the talks to resume in September 1999. As a result of these talks, Israel completed the first and second phases of the Further Redeployment (FRD) process in March 2000. The third FRD is still under negotiation at the time of this writing.

At the invitation of President Clinton, Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat attended a summit at Camp David in July 2000 to resume negotiations and to try to reenergize the peace process. Unfortunately, the summit ended without any agreement being reached.

### THE COPENHAGEN TRACK

In 1995 and 1996 a group of influential Israeli and Egyptian intellectuals, politicians, and writers met in Louisiana, Denmark, at the Danish Museum of Modern Art. The idea was to inject some warmth into the cold peace

between Egypt and Israel and to seek ways to advance the peace process. The Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs arranged the meetings. Participants attended the meetings in their personal capacities, and the meetings were kept secret. In the fall of 1996, it was decided to include Palestinians and Jordanians.

In January 1997 some one hundred participants, including representatives from Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestine National Authority, met in Copenhagen at a conference opened by the Danish minister for foreign affairs. The conference established "the international alliance for Arab-Israeli peace" and passed a resolution known as "The Copenhagen Declaration." Although participants of the process have held positions in their countries and several of them had close connections with their governments, the alliance was a purely nongovernmental project with the aim of promoting peace in the region. Meetings took place in each of the years between 1998 and 2003. The 2000 meeting received the European Award for Peace.

The 2003 meeting took place in May 2003 in Copenhagen. The focus of the 2003 meeting was "The Road Map" for peace, sponsored by the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations, referred to in the agreement as "the Quartet."

The Road Map was a departure from past approaches to peace in the Middle East. "In the old model, we started walking and wanted to see how far we could go," said Danish foreign minister Per Stig Møller. The problem with this was that this involved "too much process and too little peace."<sup>81</sup>

The Road Map started with what in other peace agreements was an ending: a specific date for the creation of a Palestinian state by 2005 and security for Israel. The Road Map replaced bilateralism (Israel and Palestine, with others watching) with multilateralism: the Quartet would guarantee movement from stage to stage.

The Road Map required commitment on the part of the parties: they would agree that whatever the provocation by the other party, there would be no more conflict or terrorism sponsored by the Palestine National Authority and no more threat of invasion by Israeli tanks. The Palestinians could count on their own state.

The key ideas of the Road Map were threefold:<sup>82</sup>

1. The necessity of security guarantees for Israel, provided by the Quartet
2. The necessity of independence for the Palestinians and the end of occupation
3. The removal of Israeli settlements and the restoration of Palestinian infrastructure

To insulate the process from the lone suicide-bomber events, the plan called for the Quartet to monitor peace, deeming international involvement essential. It specifically suggested the following:

- The Palestinians must fight violence and work for security.
- Israel must help the Palestinians, ease restrictions, withdraw from Palestinian areas, and freeze settlement activities.
- The Palestinian state must be a viable state, not a Bantu state.
- There must be a commitment to peace. Both parties must agree that they cannot permit a single extremist to derail the peace process. For example, an Egyptian soldier who started shooting at Israeli tourists many years ago did not derail the peace.
- And the final key, the ultimate territory must be the 1967 lines, plus or minus some territory. Land swaps to accommodate changes on the ground are acceptable, but the ultimate size of Palestine must correspond to 1967 lines and must include Jerusalem.

The Danish foreign minister Per Stig Møller said on more than one occasion that “Peace is not a question of who doesn’t throw the first stone. Peace is a question of who doesn’t throw the second stone.”<sup>83</sup> The joint declaration that came from the May 2003 Copenhagen Conference ended with the phrase “Peace is too important to be left only to governments.”<sup>84</sup>

### THE QUEST FOR PEACE, AGAIN

The legitimacy of the Palestinian claim to statehood and, by extension, the legitimacy of Israeli jurisdiction over territories in the West Bank and Gaza (the other half of the agenda) has been perhaps the central issue in the quest for peace in the region since the 1967 war. As the late Edward Saïd has said, there is a Palestinian people. No party to the debate disputes that. The dispute, rather, is over what to do about the Palestinian people and their claim to land and nationhood. Related to this, of course, is the issue of Israeli security. Time and time again, when Israel has made concessions to the Palestinians without adequate security guarantees, the product of those negotiations has not long endured.

We have seen here that there are many different responses to these questions, usually intensely held and articulated, and usually not subject to change through debate and discussion. Yet, one thing remains clear: without a resolution of the Palestinian question, there can be no stability and long-term peace in the Middle East.

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17. C. Paul Bradley, *The Camp David Peace Process: A Study of Carter Administration Policies (1977-1980)* (Grantham, N.H.: Thompson and Rutter, 1981), p. 19.
18. Analysis of the long-term peace process can be found in, inter alia, Melvin Friedlander, *Sadat and Begin: The Domestic Politics of Peacemaking* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983); and Lester Sobel, ed., *Peace-Making in the Middle East* (New York: Facts on File, 1980).
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21. For the text of the agreements, see "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David," and "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel," *Middle East Journal* 32:4 (1978): 471-494. The text is available online on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web page, "Peace Process," > "Reference Documents," > "13. Camp David Accords," at [www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH000ie0](http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH000ie0), accessed October 2003.
22. This was an important issue, since in 1967 President Nasser had unilaterally told the U.N. Peacekeeping Forces in the Sinai to leave their positions, and they were obligated to obey, thus precipitating the start of the fighting in 1967. See "Egypt-Israel: Protocol Establishing the Sinai Multinational Forces and Observers," *International Legal Materials* 20:5 (1981): 1190-1197.
23. An example of reaction can be found in "Egyptian-Israeli Treaty: An Appraisal," *Pakistani Horizon* 32:3 (1979), pp. 15-29.
24. See Ministry of Foreign Relations, *Facts about Israel*, "Among the Nations," > "Arab Countries," > "Egypt," at [www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH000p0](http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH000p0), accessed October 2003.
25. Typical of this literature is the contribution of Fayeze Sayegh, "The Camp David Agreement and the Palestine Problem," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 8:2 (1979): 3-54.
26. For a detailed chronology of the progress made in the period between Camp David and the eventual signing of the treaties, see Cleite Hinton, *Camp David Accords* (Los Alamitos, Calif.: Hwong Publishing, 1980). The full text of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty can be found on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web page: "Ministry of Foreign Affairs," > "Peace Process," > "Reference Documents," > "14. Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt, March 26, 1979," at [www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH000pq0](http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH000pq0), accessed October 2003.
27. An analysis of stages of the return of Sinai to Egypt appeared in "Sinai Returns to Egypt," *New York Times* (April 26, 1982): 1.
28. "Conflict Resolved," *The New York Times* (September 30, 1988): 1.
29. See "Sadat of Egypt Is Assassinated at Military Parade," *Facts on File*, accession number: 1981033590; story date: October 6, 1981.

30. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Facts about Israel*, online edition, "Ministry of Foreign Affairs," > "History," > "State of Israel," at [www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00i0](http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00i0), accessed October 2003.
31. See the Web page supported by the U.S. Department of State, "International Information Programs," "The U.S. and Middle East Peace," > "Middle East Peace Chronology," > "1978-1988," at [usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/summit/chron1.htm](http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/summit/chron1.htm), accessed October 2003. Much of the chronology that follows in this chapter is based upon the chronology found here.
32. See "Palestinians Slain in Lebanese Refugee Camps; Storm over Israeli Role; Israel Bars Inquiry," *Facts on File*, accession number: 1982031430; story date: September 16, 1982; later in the process more information emerged as shown in the article "Massacre Inquiry Warns Top Israeli Leaders," *Facts on File*, accession number: 1982039880; story date: November 24, 1982.
33. The charges against Sharon were that he permitted a Christian militia to enter two Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut, and that he must have known that the Christians would kill the Muslim refugees. Hundreds of Palestinians were killed in the event.
34. See the Web page supported by the U.S. Department of State, "International Information Programs," "The U.S. and Middle East Peace," > "Middle East Peace Chronology," > "1989-1991," at [usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/summit/chron2.htm](http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/summit/chron2.htm), accessed October 2003. The full text of the Israeli Peace Initiative can be found on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web page: "Ministry of Foreign Affairs," > "Peace Process," > "Reference Documents," > "18. Israel's Peace Initiative, May 14, 1989," at [www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00p0](http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00p0), accessed October 2003.
35. See "Middle East: Egypt Approves Baker Plan on Talks; Other Developments," *Facts on File*, accession number: 1989036930; story date: December 6, 1989.
36. "Israel: Cabinet Crisis Ends," *Facts on File*, accession number: 1990041521; story date: January 2, 1990.
37. "Shamir Loses Confidence Vote, Israeli Government Falls," *Facts on File*, accession number: 1990042205; story date: March 16, 1990.
38. See the Web page supported by the U.S. Department of State, "International Information Programs," "The U.S. and Middle East Peace," > "Middle East Peace Chronology," > "1989-1991," at [usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/summit/chron2.htm](http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/summit/chron2.htm), accessed October 2003.
39. The full text of the invitation to the Madrid Peace Conference can be found on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web page: "Ministry of Foreign Affairs," > "Peace Process," > "Reference Documents," > "Invitation to Madrid Peace Conference, October 30, 1991," at [www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00p60](http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00p60), accessed October 2003.
40. See the Web page supported by the U.S. Department of State, "International Information Programs," "The U.S. and Middle East Peace," > "Middle East Peace Chronology," > "1989-1991," at [usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/summit/chron2.htm](http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/summit/chron2.htm), accessed October 2003.
41. See the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web page, "The Peace Process," > "Guide to the Peace Process," > "Madrid," at [www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00ig0](http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00ig0), accessed October 2003. All of the opening and closing speeches from the conference itself can be found on this Web page at [www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00dg10](http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00dg10), accessed October 2003.

42. Detailed notes on each of the working groups and the progress they have made to date can be found on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web page, "The Peace Process," > "Guide to the Peace Process," > "Madrid," > "Multilateral," at [www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00ii0](http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00ii0), accessed October 2003.

43. See the Web page supported by the U.S. Department of State, "International Information Programs," "The U.S. and Middle East Peace," > "Middle East Peace Chronology," > "1989-1991," at [usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/summit/chron2.htm](http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/summit/chron2.htm), accessed October 2003.

44. See Dan Izenberg, "Knesset Repeals Ban on Meetings with Terror Groups," *Jerusalem Post* (January 20, 1993): 1.

45. Uri Savir, *The Process: 1,100 Days That Changed the Middle East* (New York: Random House, 1998); Robert O. Freedman, *The Middle East and the Peace Process: The Impact of the Oslo Accords* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1998); Robert Rothstein, Moshe Mat'oz, and Khalil Shiqaji, eds., *The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Oslo and the Lessons of Failure; Perspectives, Predicaments, and Prospects* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2002).

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47. See the Web page supported by the U.S. Department of State, "International Information Programs," "The U.S. and Middle East Peace," > "Middle East Peace Chronology," > "1989-1991," at [usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/summit/chron3.htm](http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/summit/chron3.htm), accessed October 2003.

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49. The full text of the Treaty of Peace between Israel and Jordan documents can be found on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web page: "Ministry of Foreign Affairs," > "Peace Process," > "Reference Documents," > "Treaty of Peace between Israel and Jordan, October 26, 1994," at [www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00pa0](http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00pa0), accessed October 2003.

50. The full text of the Agreement on the Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities (Israel-PLO), August 29, 1994, documents can be found on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web page: "Ministry of Foreign Affairs," > "Peace Process," > "Reference Documents," > "Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities, August 29, 1994," at [www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00q90](http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00q90), accessed October 2003.

51. See Ministry of Foreign Relations, "Facts about Israel," "Among the Nations," > "Arab Countries," > "Jordan," at [www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00lp0](http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00lp0), accessed October 2003.

52. The full text of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip documents can be found on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web page: "Ministry of Foreign Affairs," > "Peace Process," > "Reference Documents," > "Interim Agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, September 28, 1995," at [www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00qa0](http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00qa0), accessed October 2003.
53. "Israel, Palestinians Sign Land-for-Peace Deal, Interim Accord Breaks 19-Month Stalemate in Talks," *Facts on File*, accession number: 1998114830; story date: October 23, 1998.
54. "Israel, Palestinians Sign," *Facts on File*.
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56. The full text of the Wye River Memorandum documents can be found on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web page: "Ministry of Foreign Affairs," > "Peace Process," > "Reference Documents," > "The Wye River Memorandum, October 23, 1998," at [www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH07o10](http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH07o10), accessed October 2003.
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60. "Barak Resigns, Forcing New Election within 60 Days," *Facts on File*, accession number: 2000195460; story date: December 9, 2000.
61. "Middle East: Sharon Declares Oslo Accord Dead; Other Developments," *Facts on File*, accession number: 2001200670; story date: January 10, 2001.
62. "Likud Leader Sharon Elected Israel's Prime Minister," *Facts on File*, accession number: 2001203210; story date: February 6, 2001.
63. The site includes a wide range of reference materials, including answers to frequently asked questions; Palestinian violence and terrorism; the international war against terrorism; special reports by a wide range of government agencies (last update November 1, 2002); graphs and statistics authored by the IDF spokesman of recent terrorist attacks; a list of victims of Palestinian violence and terrorism since September 2000; the Tenet Cease-Fire Document; the report of the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee; a list of suicide bombings; a report on the Arab summit in Cairo (October 21–22); the Sharm el-Sheikh summit (October 16–17); documentation on the participation of Palestinian children in violence; copies of the legal indictments of terrorists; background of events; statements, briefings, interviews (by Israelis and non-Israelis); official position papers by Israel and the UN (speeches and documents); and other government communiqués. The site is at the "Ministry of Foreign Affairs," "The Peace Process," > "Terrorism: Obstacle to Peace," at [www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0i0f0](http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0i0f0), accessed October 2003.
64. The final report of the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact Finding Committee can be found on the U.S. State Department Web page, "U.S. Department of State, International Information Programs," > "The U.S. and Middle East Peace," > "Mitchell Report," at [usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/mitchell.htm](http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/mitchell.htm), accessed October 2003.
65. Fact Finding Committee, p. 5.
66. "Saudi Peace Plan Linking Arab Recognition of Israel to Withdrawal from Occupied Lands Gains Support," *Facts on File*, accession number: 2002242540; story date: February 17, 2002.
67. The text for the Common Agenda can be found at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web page, at [www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00q10](http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00q10), accessed October 2003. See also Madha Rashid Al-Madfai and Efraim Karsh, "Jordan, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process, 1974–1991," *Political Studies* 44:4 (1996): 778–780; Adnan Abu Odeh, *Jordanians, Palestinians, and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999); and Curtis R. Ryan, "Jordan in the Middle East Peace Process: From War to Peace with Israel," in Peleg, ed., *Middle East Peace Process*.
68. See the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web page, "The Peace Process," > "Guide to the Peace Process," > "Bilateral Negotiations," > "Jordan," at [www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00sm0](http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00sm0), accessed October 2003.
69. Further discussion of these areas of cooperation can be found on the MFA Web page, at [www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00sm0](http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00sm0), accessed October 2003.
70. Documents related to Operation Grapes of Wrath can be found on the MFA Web page, at [www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00ss0](http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00ss0), accessed October 2003.
71. See the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web page, "The Peace Process," > "Guide to the Peace Process," > "Bilateral Negotiations," > "Lebanon," at [www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00sp0](http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00sp0), accessed October 2003.
72. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Facts about Israel*, online edition, "History," > "State of Israel," at [www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00li0](http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00li0), accessed October 2003.
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74. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Facts about Israel*, online edition, "History," > "State of Israel," at [www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00li0](http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00li0), accessed October 2003.
75. "Israel Suspends Middle East Peace Process; Barak Takes 'Time Out' for Assessment, Seeks Coalition Government," *Facts on File* 60:3125 (2000): 797.
76. Ilana Kass, Bard O'Neill, and Sheila Katz, "The Deadly Embrace: The Impact of Israeli and Palestinian Rejectionism on the Peace Process," *The Middle East Journal* 51:4 (1997): 611–617. See also Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, "Israel's Peace-Making with the Palestinians: Change and Legitimacy," in Karsh, ed., *Agenda*.
77. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web page, "The Peace Process," > "Guide to the Peace Process," > "Bilateral Negotiations," > "Palestinians," at [www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00rv0](http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00rv0), accessed October 2003.
78. See "Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements September 13, 1993," at [www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00q00](http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00q00), accessed October 2003.
79. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Facts about Israel*, online edition, "History," > "State of Israel," at [www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00li0](http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00li0), accessed October 2003.
80. The Interim Agreement created three different types of areas in the Occupied Territories, according to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web page, "The Peace Process," > "Guide to the Peace Process," > "Bilateral Negotiations," > "Palestinians," at [www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00rv0](http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00rv0), accessed October 2003.

“Area A—comprising the main cities of the West Bank: full Palestinian Council responsibility for internal security and public order, as well as full responsibility for civil affairs. (The city of Hebron was subject to special arrangements set out in the Interim Agreement; the Protocol concerning the redeployment in Hebron was signed in January 1997.)

“Area B—comprising small towns and villages in the West Bank: Palestinian Council responsibility for civil affairs (as in Area A) and maintenance of public order, while Israel retained overriding security responsibility to safeguard its citizens and to combat terrorism.

“Area C—comprising all Jewish settlements, areas of strategic importance to Israel and largely unpopulated areas of the West Bank: full Israeli responsibility for security and public order, as well as civil responsibilities related to territory (planning and zoning, archeology, etc.). The Palestinian Council assumes responsibility with regard to all other civil spheres of the Palestinian population.”

81. Mr. Per Stig Møller at an interview in Copenhagen, Denmark, May 9, 2003.

82. References to the Road Map come from documents provided by Danish foreign minister Per Stig Møller.

83. Foreign Minister Møller, May 9, 2003.

84. Foreign Minister Møller, May 9, 2003.