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ZIONISM AS REVOLUTION? ZIONISM AS REBELLION?*

I

Was there a Zionist revolution? If there was, what was its nature? And what happened to it? These, as best I can phrase them, are the questions to which I should like to sketch some preliminary answers.

That there is something to be said for regarding the impact of Zionism on the history of the Jews as at least verging on the revolutionary is beyond all question, it seems to me. Equally beyond question are the extraordinary consequences of the rise of Zionism in the international sphere. The general point can be made, that whatever it was particular Zionists thought they were doing at any particular moment, their movement, all in all, did mount the most penetrating attack on the established social and political structure of the Jewish people in modern times ever attempted. Yet, somehow, the more closely one examines the case, the less clear cut the specifically revolutionary character of the movement appears to be.

There was, for example, never any question of it being a violent revolution. If a revolution it was, it was not therefore of the class that normally catches the public eye. There were, needless to say, no Bastilles or Winter Palaces to storm, no kings to be decapitated, no parliaments to be dispersed, no generals to form a junta or, alternatively, to be shot. It is not that violence was unknown among the Zionists—any more than it was unknown in Jewry generally. But it was always of negligible proportions and, certainly, it was never central to the enterprise.¹ Was Zionism then in the category of what Macaulay called “noiseless revolutions,” those whose progress, as he put it, “is rarely indicated by what historians are pleased to call important events . . . [that] are not achieved by armies, or enacted by senates, [that] are sanctioned by no treaties, and recorded in no archives.”² Zionism does not seem to have been quite in that class, either. But it is worth recalling that all revolu-

*An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Brandeis University–Hebrew University Symposium on the 100th Anniversary of the Zionist Movement.

tions—noiseless, noisy, and other sub-species of the genus—have this in common, that they have both negative and positive aspects. There is that which revolutionaries seek to remove or destroy, and there is also that which they wish to construct and put into place.

One of the difficulties about the Zionists, however, is that, on the positive side of things, namely with regard to what they were actually striving for, they were rarely especially specific. Where they were specific, they were neither consistent nor united. On the contrary, it was deeply characteristic of the movement that many hyphenated versions of it proliferated: socialist Zionism, religious Zionism, political Zionism, cultural Zionism, practical Zionism, “general” Zionism, “monistic” Zionism, and other variations on the original theme, some of them quite obscure; and each one of these changed over time, more than once. It will be recalled, for example, that perfectly respectable members of the movement were prepared to settle for less than the political independence to which we now tend to assume all were striving for all of the time. Even at the point of no return in May 1948, there were quite a few Zionists who were prepared to retreat. Some opposed sovereignty on philosophical grounds. Some opposed it on grounds of natural justice. Some because they lived in anticipation of an eventual, all-embracing class revolution. And there were some who, in the dire circumstances of 1948, feared failure and a crushing military defeat of precisely the kind Mr. Secretary Marshall had been good enough to go out of his way to depict for them.

But then the movement had been marked all along by a congenital disinclination to commit itself, or the Jewish people, or in due course and by turns, the *yishuv* in Palestine and the embryonic State of Israel thereafter, to declared and finite goals. There was a pervasive vagueness about the political and constitutional ordering of the society that was eventually to be established by and for the Jews in their ancestral land. There were the multiple translations and interpretations of the Basel Programme itself. There was the notorious refusal in the 1930s to define the *Endziel* or final purpose to which the movement aspired. There was the movement’s continuing inability to make up its collective mind on the status and role of non-Jewish citizens in a State of Jews, if and when such a state were ever established. Most characteristically of all, there was an absence of consensus on the vital, central question, whether the State-to-be was to be a state of Jews, a *Judenstaat*, or rather a *Jewish* state—and therefore an animal of a very different color.

Why this should have been the case is an interesting question to which nobody, so far as I know, has ever provided a plausible answer. Whether this habitual drawing back from stating one’s case and purposes in full, and generally calling a spade a spade, proved to be a source of weakness or of strength is yet another topic for nice academic

debate. Conceivably, it never mattered much. The really defining feature of Zionism—seen whole and seen, as we now can see it, at some distance—lay elsewhere. It lay in those aspects of its fundamental message, recommendation, and significance that were, in the formal and morally neutral sense I have in mind, *negative*. It is when we note what Zionism was *against*, what it wished to remove, circumvent, or replace, or at least modify and diminish—before Europe was enveloped in darkness in 1939 and all options were dissolved, and of course, well before the apotheosis of 1948—that we are best placed to identify and understand its fundamental dynamic. To which I might add that few aspects of the Jewish social landscape in the final decades of the nineteenth century and the first few decades of the twentieth are as instructive as the rejection of Zionism by the overwhelming majority of the Jewish people: actively by some, passively by others, instinctively by most, as a matter of deliberate calculation by a few, but in virtually all cases, out of hand and as a matter of course.

Why was this so; and what does it tell us?

II

However incoherent the Zionists were in other respects, there was one on which they were united: they were modernists. They might be divided on where the Jews should go (actually or figuratively) on what cultural baggage they should take with them, on what they should discard, and on what precisely they should do with themselves upon arrival at their destination. But what none of them doubted at any time was that the Jewish people in its entirety was very painfully in need of radical *aggiornamento*, of being brought up to date, in one form or another. Of this goal they made no secret, and it sufficed to bring them into inexorable conflict with those who, on the contrary, maintained—if anything with greater passion and conviction—that it was of the very essence of Judaism that in all major departments of private and collective existence, everything of importance had already been ordained. For those for whom even change at a virtually imperceptible rate was problematic, a free, serious, and open-ended discussion of the question whether, and if so, by what means (but most especially to what extent), the Tradition in its established form should or should not be preserved was, of course, anathema.

What was at issue and at work here was not the familiar matter of the rigor or otherwise of religious observance. Nor was it even that of the dismay, given the accelerating rate of alienation, dissidence, and disaffection at the edges of Jewry, with which those still faithful to Orthodoxy regarded the outlook for the Jewish people as a whole. What was

hardest for the traditionalists to bear was the determination of this particular class of modernists, the Zionists, to remain within the camp, to retain a presence within Jewry, to establish themselves as a legitimate, and in due course, leading component of it. To Orthodoxy it was this that was the unforgivable challenge. It was no accident, therefore, as the phrase went, that it was developments in the Zionist wing of Jewry (resolutions passed at the 1911 Congress)—rather than, for example among the strictly religious reformers—that precipitated the effort just before the First World War to mount a great supracommunal, all-European, offensive Orthodox alliance. For what was Agudat Israel, if not a circling of traditionalist Jewry's wagons to beat off what was seen as a mortal threat to the authority and the *raison d'être* of the rabbinate, along with those who wielded social power in its name? The Orthodox had reason to feel threatened. They would have been surprised to discover, close to a century later, that their successors had fought the Zionists to a draw.

After all, the Zionists were not alone in their modernism. There were others who brought into question the established patterns of personal and collective conduct, as well as the thinking and beliefs that we crudely, but usefully gather together under the portmanteau term *tradition*. There were the Bundists, the Russifiers, the Polonizers, the Germans of Mosaic persuasion, the Israélites of France, the Jewish Englishmen, the various contending schools of religious reformers, and so on. All favored an *aggiornamento* of one kind or another. Some were prepared to go a good deal further in their antitraditionalism than the Zionists. Yet, no great alliance of modernists, no counterpart and rival to Agudat Israel, was ever formed.

One obvious obstacle to anything of that kind was the division in the modernist camp on the issue of Jewish nationhood and nationality. Yet even there, the Zionists were not alone. The Autonomists and, with reservations, the Bundists, too, had similar ideas. Where the Zionists were unique was in the view they took of the *existential* basis of Jewry and Judaism: the condition of Exile itself. The Zionists asked whether it was tenable in practice. They went on to pose the trickier question whether it was tolerable in principle. Having given a flatly negative answer to both questions, they proceeded to consider on what other basis Jewry might be held together and have its particular needs and interests met. Most urgently of all, they took the position, that if indeed it was imperative to re-examine the condition of the Jews, and to do so in a frank and even favorable anticipation of change, the always nervous matter of relations between Jews and Gentiles on which so much in Jewry itself hinged, had to be radically revised. On all this, they parted company with the other modernists. They did so, moreover, in a way that struck at the foundations of the other, the lay wing of established authority in Jewish society in late nineteenth-century Europe—the plutocratic. In

the first instance, it was because the Zionists were attacking the *status quo*. But there were two other, more specific respects in which Zionists engaged the plutocratic notables of Jewry in bitter conflict, and to which it is appropriate, I think, to devote a few words.

III

The Zionists stood for policy on the major issues confronting Jewry being subject to free and open debate. They wanted decisions to be arrived at competitively, rationally, disinterestedly, and according to an established procedure. They had been taught by Herzl that those who claimed to lead the Jews needed to be publicly answerable to elected institutions of some kind. If there was considerable wavering on this point from time to time, they did broadly stick to this position: rightly so, because it was one of the principal sources of their moral strength. None of it, however, was, or could be, remotely acceptable to the Rothschilds, the Schiffs, the Guenzburgs, and the other great men of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Jewry. Nor was it to the individually worthy and devoted figures who labored in the Jewish interest in the great men's shadows and to some extent on their behalf—the Paul Nathans, the Lucien Wolfs, the Sylvain Lévy's, and their like.

The other respect in which the Zionists struck at what may be fairly called the Jewish Establishment—its plutocratic lay component in the first instance, but indirectly and for different reasons at its rabbinical component as well—was that of migration. Let me be clear about this. I have the years prior to the First World War in mind. Although the motive forces were less desperate than later, they were powerful enough: poverty, persecution, and deepest of all, perhaps, the desire to shake off the externally and internally determined trammels by which unemancipated Jews in Eastern Europe were hemmed in. Their lives were not rendered solitary, to be sure, but were certainly lives Hobbes might have recognized as nasty, brutish, and short. It will be recalled that both emigration and immigration were still relatively free at this stage. Exit and entry were therefore matters of personal choice and the rational calculation of advantage. It did not seem to anyone in those days that it was illegitimate to debate the pros and cons and general social and political desirability of Jews leaving the lands of their birth *en masse*. In fact, instances of firm opposition from on high in Jewry to anything that smacked of mass movement were legion. In the West, it was driven by fear, lest the integrationist boat be dangerously rocked. In the East, it was chiefly for fear, lest the credentials of Jews as loyal subjects of the Tsar or perhaps the King of Rumania be laid open to embarrassing question. It was not, of course, directly and exclusively a function of the

appearance of the Zionists on the scene: it can be found to have preceded them by several decades at least.³ But it was the Zionists before all others who predicated their solution to the Jewish Problem on migration; and did so, moreover, on the basis of what was termed, in its day, the *catastrophic* view of the condition of eastern Jewry. This was the idea, that the Jews of Eastern Europe were on the edge of an abyss. No one foresaw what was eventually to happen, needless to say. But all roads did arguably point downward: official and unofficial persecution, discrimination, denigration, violence, and pauperization. The Zionists thought that it was unconscionable to wait for the patient to be *in extremis* before coming to his aid; that conventional philanthropy could never be more than palliative; and that what the Jews were in need of was rescue. Such, at all events, had been the initial position of the movement as articulated by Pinsker and Lilienblum, Herzl and Nordau.

That rescue unfailingly meant emigration was bad enough. What was in many ways worse was that the notion of impending catastrophe ran counter to the conventional belief in the merits of liberal society as then conceived. None were more fervent in this belief than those who saw themselves, and who were seen by most others, as the natural lay leaders of Jewry. This was as true of those in Eastern Europe who had been denied the advantages of emancipation thus far no less than of those who were, as anyone could see, its greatest beneficiaries. To admit to the possibility of a catastrophe engulfing the greater part of the Jewish people in the unspecified, but by no means remote, future was tantamount to abandoning this confidence in the stability and validity of the very social order that had allowed every single one of them, in his own way, to rise to those degrees of wealth, comfort, influence, and social prominence that quite ordinary Jews had for so many centuries been in the habit of assuming were fair indicators not only of legitimate power but of social and political wisdom.

But alas for consistency and neat dichotomies in human affairs, it was not many years before the so-called catastrophic foundations of Zionism began to be played down by the Zionists themselves; even, astonishingly, by the all-important Russian Zionists. But then they, too, were men of their time. By 1905 Herzl was in his grave, Nordau was effectively in retirement, and a semi-constitutional, marginally liberalized regime had been instituted in Russia. That upper-class, semi-Russified Jews would begin to think about the prospects for the Jews in the prison house of nations, and therefore the merits or otherwise of their own involvement in Russia's political affairs, in somewhat different terms than in the past was inevitable. And so, more than a little contradictorily, considering the terrible impact the Revolution of 1905 had on the Jews of Russia, the notion that the problem of the Jews was one of extreme urgency and requiring radical treatment was set aside for the time being.

A new “synthetic” Zionism was coined to replace it. The need to press the Turks for a Charter was allowed to fall away. “Practical” work in Palestine, as opposed to “diplomacy,” was pressed forward with greater energy than before. The “cultural” work that so infuriated the Orthodox rose to the top of the agenda. And so forth.

It could be argued, of course, that this measured view of the emergency was not new. Ahad Ha’Am had long been of the opinion that even if catastrophe were looming, it was beyond the power and resources of the movement to deal with it. And in one way or another, this Ahad-Ha’Amian (and, I should add, Gruenbaumian) view would persist for decades. When the first great wave of the disaster came unmistakably, in the immediate aftermath of the First World War, Weizmann, for one, was not sure he even wanted to deal with it.⁴

Still, the defining issue remained the doctrinal one. If many had mixed feelings about the possibility of life in the Diaspora, few doubted its impropriety. On what was once known as *shelilat ha-golah*—the negation (or repudiation) of the Exile—all Zionists, in principle at any rate, were (once upon a time) agreed. And it was the arch-thesis that *Galut* was commensurate neither with national survival nor individual dignity that finally and definitively set the Zionists apart from every other significant movement in contemporary Jewry. It served as the sharpest and most painful weapon in their ideological armory. We may even think it the only one to prove to be of enduring consequence and power—so long, that is, as those who counted themselves Zionists were prepared to wield it.

Of course, in our own day, it is exceedingly rare for a sharp distinction between the reality and the propriety of the Exile to be drawn. Some think it unnecessary. Some think it is impolite. Many, in their innocence, fail to see its significance. Such, more or less, has been the fate of that other equally old, valid and latterly understated, underlying principle of the movement, namely that its character and intentions were not, and could not be, other than secular. An entire school of thought is currently committed to denying mightily that such was or ever could have been the case. There are other ways, too, in which, having regard to the discounting of what it once stood for, it is possible to discern the central *contemporary* truth about the Zionist Revolution—if that is what it was—that is, as is the way with all revolutions sooner or later, it is over, all passion spent.

But was it ever a *revolution*?

I should like to try, in the little space left to me, to deal quite summarily with this question.

IV

The Zionists were certainly engaged in the promotion of a revolution—for a time, at least. There is a strong sense in which their final achievement, the State of Israel, constituted a revolutionary event—no other term is appropriate—in the lives of the Jews immediately concerned, as well as in those of their neighbors. But beyond that? Perhaps a “noiseless” revolution in the sense in which Macaulay used the term? Even that is uncertain. Once one separates out that which pertains to the undoubted reality and authority of the sovereign state of Israel from that which pertains to the hearts and minds of the Jews as such, and in all parts; and when one bears in mind that a “noiseless” revolution, too, denotes mutation, sea-change; and, generally speaking, much being left behind never to be present or available again—the questions multiply.

So I return to my point that it is the resistance to revolution and the consequent dialectic between the revolutionaries and the counter-revolutionaries—if, indeed, that is what they were—that offer the best keys to understanding and assessing such cases. Seen in this light, it will be noted that Zionism met instantly—and from its point of view promisingly—with very great hostility because, indeed, there were aspects of the movement that the more perceptive spirits in the Jewish world were quick to grasp and to fear. On the other hand, not very many decades passed before this hostility largely waned, fear subsided, and the bogeyman was admitted to the club. Why so? Was this because the putative revolutionaries had won? Was it, contrariwise, because their teeth had been pulled? Or had it much more to do with that old, deep-seated indeterminacy within the movement itself about its aims and purposes to which I have alluded earlier? Was it then, less a revolution than a rebellion? A great rebellion, to be sure, but, as the term implies, perhaps a phase in the history of the Jews rather than a true turning point?

I hesitate to offer an answer. A single century may be too short a period for the *general* trend in Jewry in so important a matter to emerge with adequate clarity. Even the full significance of the Emancipation has yet to work its way through the Jewish body politic. More than enough has happened in the past hundred years to have altered the structure, features, and not least, the aspirations of the Jewish people. What the Jews are actually in process of making of the great changes wrought by the events that have overtaken them is, however, still far from clear.

Although the Zionist movement’s material and political achievements have been greater than any of its pioneers could have imagined, none of the issues which fueled it doctrinally have been resolved. That they have not been resolved either in fact or in principle in the Jewish Diaspora may be unfortunate but is readily understandable.⁵ That there has been a consistent failure to resolve them in what one was entitled to

suppose was Zionism's own stronghold, Israel itself, is a continuing disaster.

Consider the fundamental operative principle that drove the founders of the movement. It is easily stated. It is that *public* policy for the Jewish people must be geared before all else to the core interests of the Jews themselves, men, women, and children: their safety, their welfare, and their dignity. Considerations of an abstract and collective character, not excluding those that may rightly be thought to be of very great importance in themselves—the national cultural and religious tradition, attachment to the ancestral land, and so forth—must be secondary. It was this goal that ruled the minds of Herzl and Nordau, and Pinsker before them, and in his odd way, Zangwill, too. Their successors did not go so far as to deny that this was what Zionism was ultimately about. But they dithered perpetually. And now, for all to see, old battles are being refought, old wounds reopened, old dissatisfactions revived.

So perhaps: not really a revolution; rather a rebellion. In which case the decisive transformation of Jewry, the real revolution, is still to come. *Will* it come? I myself am inclined to think that it will. But then I am among those who would hate to see this stupendous enterprise being reduced to mediocrity, its work only half done.

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NOTES

1. It is the case, or so it seems to me, that the men and women who took the movement over in the 1930s and pushed the Zionist enterprise to its eventual conclusion had something in common with their exact contemporaries, the rulers of Soviet Russia: absolute devotion to Party, ferocious single-mindedness, and the habit of being economical with the truth. It was not without reason that their enemies, and even some of their friends, called them Bolsheviks. But, and it is an important *but*, there was no Dzerzhinsky or Yagoda among them, no Lubianka, no Gulag, certainly no Stalin; and if Ben-Gurion, like Lenin, was a great maker of political structures, he had nothing like the fanaticism and totally uncompromising ruthlessness of the maker of Soviet Russia.

2. T. B. Macaulay, "History," *Miscellaneous Essays* (London, n.d.), p. 34.

3. For example: A conference of Jewish notables convened in Brussels in October 1872 to discuss the miserable condition of Romanian Jewry went so far as to declare, that it "unanimously rejected all thought of emigration from the soil of Romania" and that such thinking was "regarded as criminal [*sic*] by the Jews of Romania whose devotion to their country was splendidly in evidence in the course of the conference deliberations." It went on to affirm "that any such decision would amount to a casting of an aspersion on the justice of the Romanian Christians to whom their brothers, the Romanian Jews, owe their loyal sup-

port in the effort to secure and consolidate the destiny of their common fatherland." ("La conférence a unanimement rejeté toute pensée d'émigration du sol de la Roumanie. Cette pensée est regardée d'ailleurs comme criminelle [sic] par les Israélites roumains dont le dévouement à la patrie s'est manifesté avec tout l'éclat dans les délibérations de la conférence; la conférence dit qu'une pareille décision serait le plus vif soupçon contre la justice des chrétiens roumains dont les Israélites roumains sont frères et à qui ils doivent leurs concours pour assurer et consolider la destinée de la patrie commune.") *Bulletin AIU*, 2ème semestre, 1872, p. 56. Cited in Carol Iancu, "Benjamin Franklin Peixotto, l'Alliance Israélite Universelle et les Juifs de Roumanie. Correspondance inédite (1871–1876)", *Revue d'études juives*, Vol. 137, Nos. 1–2 (1978), p. 95. My translation.

When, a generation later, a somewhat similar conference convened in London in the wake, this time, of the shattering wave of pogroms to which the Jews of Russia had been subject in October 1905, much the same note was sounded—although, fortunately for the posthumous reputations of those concerned, without any attempt being made to ascribe to the Jews of Russia boundless loyalty to the Russian Empire or to the Tsar himself. The exceedingly influential and well connected group of men, who had assembled in London under the leadership of Lord Rothschild and Jacob Schiff, to assess what aid should be provided to those who had been most seriously hit by violence and arson, so as to set them back on their economic feet, were too serious and well informed, and also not so timorous, to espouse that kind of nonsense. But they made no bones about their belief and hope that the aid they provided would help to make Jewish emigration from East to West unnecessary. "The prevention of migration [*die Verhinderung der Auswanderung*]," they resolved, would constitute one of the overall criteria guiding them in their endeavors. ("Die generellen Gesichtspunkte, die uns bei unserer Hilfsaktion geleitet haben, blieben unausgesetzt die folgenden: Verhinderung der Auswanderung, soweit irgend durchführbar. Keine Almosen sondern sofortige Gewährung einer Unterstützung in dem Umfange, dass die Betroffenen ihre ursprüngliche wirtschaftliche Tätigkeit, wenn auch in bescheidenem Umfange, aufzunehmen in der Lage sind." Cited in Paul A. Alsberg, "Documents on the Brussels Conference of 1906," *Michael*, Vol. 2 (Tel Aviv, 1973), p. 150, n. 16.) A mission of inquiry was duly sent to Russia to see exactly what was required. On its return, a more widely attended meeting of representatives of the relevant Jewish philanthropic organizations was convened in Frankfurt to draw up concrete measures of relief in the light of what had been learned. At this point, early in 1906, the Zionists enter the picture.

In the event, the conference in Frankfurt preempted by several weeks a conference the Zionists had themselves been trying to convene. The Zionists had in mind a very much broader and more representative gathering than that which was to meet in Frankfurt. The Zionists wished, moreover, to try to delve deeper into the problem, to have the matter of Russian Jewry discussed in all its aspects, not only the economic one. To that end, David Wolffsohn, the president of the organization sought desperately to make plain that theirs would not be a specifically Zionist conference. He and his colleagues would not seek to press their ideas on anyone. All plans and projects would rate an equal and fair examination, and attention would be focused on what was agreed to be fundamental in the intolerable conditions to which the Jews of Russia were subject, and to what

Jews in all parts and of all persuasions could and should do on their behalf. Wolffsohn's conference, when it met in Brussels at the end of January, was a fiasco. Almost to a man, the established worthies of Jewry had turned the Zionists' invitation down, the masters of the Jewish Establishment being determined to prevent the conference from succeeding. Even the chief rabbi of Brussels refused to put in an appearance. The sole, rather cold-blooded, but agreed exception to the rule of nonappearance and noncooperation was provided by Paul Nathan of the German *Hilfsverein*. Cast partly in the role of Trojan horse, partly in that of nanny, the good man turned up in Brussels after all with a brief to make sure the Zionists got up to no mischief. But if this was not an occasion that invites admiration for the leading figures in Jewry of the early twentieth century, it is necessary to understand what they thought was at stake.

To have invited the Zionists to Frankfurt would have been to recognize them as legitimate members of their club. That was one difficulty. A further difficulty about the Zionists in the specifically Russian connection was that they were known to be involved in the promotion and organization and, so far as possible, the equipping of Jewish self-defense groups. This made excellent sense in Russia itself, both on the straightforward grounds of preserving life and property and also because the Zionists were in competition in this respect with the Bund and other radical Jewish organizations. On the other hand, it was an activity of which the strict philanthropists, greatly concerned for their own respectability, strongly disapproved, and that they had no intention of supporting, however indirectly. There was, too, most probably, the argument that being neither a charity nor having any funds of its own to speak of to disburse, the Zionist organization was in no position to contribute anything more substantial to the relief of the victims of the pogroms than *ideas*. It was, of course, the ideas of the Zionists that the convenors most especially abominated. Yet the decisive reason for keeping the Zionists out of the Frankfurt conference and refusing to join Wolffsohn in his conference in Brussels several weeks later was of a somewhat different order. It had to do with the overall view of the collective and public affairs of the Jews taken in each case. Here, the salient differences between the contending schools were unbridgeable.

4. "We must not be told as the Poles are trying to do [we find Weizmann writing privately to the Foreign Editor of the *Times*], 'You have your Palestine, clear out of here!' [For] if so, we shall have all the miserable refugees who will be driven out of Poland, Galicia, Rumania, etc., at the doors of Palestine. We shall be swamped in Palestine and shall never be able to set up a community worth having there." Letter to H. Wickham Steed, 30 November 1918. *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1980) Vol. 9, No. 45, p. 50.

5. Of all the oxymorons with which the world of ideas is cluttered, *Diaspora Zionism* is surely one of the silliest.