2
Nuclear Power Development
2.1 Present Status of Nuclear Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.2 Early History of Nuclear Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3 Development of Nuclear Power in the United States . . . . . . . . . 31
2.4 Trends in U.S. Reactor Utilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.5 Worldwide Development of Nuclear Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.6 National Programs of Nuclear Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.7 Failures of Prediction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.1 Present Status of Nuclear Power
Nuclear reactors are now being used in 31 countries for the generation of
electricity. Overall, they supply about one-sixth of the world’s electricity [1].
As of November 2003, there were 440 operating nuclear power reactors in
the world, with a combined net generating capacity of 360 gigawatts-electric
(GWe) [2].1
Summary data on these reactors are presented in Table 2.1, which
lists for each country the total nuclear generation and nuclear power’s fraction
of the total electricity generation.
The United States is the leader in total generation and France, among
the larger countries, is the leader in the fraction of electricity obtained from
nuclear power. By and large, use of nuclear power is concentrated in the
industrialized countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) and of Eastern Europe. However, some countries in
the OECD have no nuclear power (for example, Italy) and some Asian countries
that are not OECD members are increasing their nuclear programs (e.g.,
China and India).
The listing in Table 2.1 includes only reactors used for electricity generation.
In addition, there are a large number of reactors throughout the world
used for research and the production of radioisotopes for medical and industrial
applications. Beyond these civilian reactors, an undisclosed number of
1
We here use data compiled by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
and posted, with periodic updating, on its website [2, 3].
25
26 2 Nuclear Power Development
Table 2.1. World nuclear status: Operating power reactors (November 2003), net
generation (2002), nuclear share of electricity generation (2002).
Status 11/17/03 Generation, 2002
Percent
Number Capacity Net Net Nuclear
Country of Units (Net GWe) TWh GWyr 2002
United States 104 98.2 780 89.1 20
France 59 63.1 416 47.4 78
Japan 54 44.3 314 35.8 34
Germany 19 21.3 162 18.5 30
Russia 30 20.8 130 14.8 16
South Korea 18 14.9 113 12.9 39
United Kingdom 27 12.1 81 9.3 22
Ukraine 13 11.2 73 8.4 46
Canada 16 11.3 71 8.1 12
Sweden 11 9.4 66 7.5 46
Spain 9 7.6 60 6.9 26
Belgium 7 5.8 45 5.1 57
Taiwan 6 4.9 34 3.9 21
Switzerland 5 3.2 26 2.9 40
China 8 6.0 23 2.7 1.4
Finland 4 2.7 21 2.4 30
Bulgaria 4 2.7 20 2.3 47
Czech Republic 6 3.5 19 2.1 25
Slovakia 6 2.4 18 2.0 55
India 14 2.5 18 2.0 4
Brazil 2 1.9 14 1.6 4
Lithuania 2 2.4 13 1.5 80
Hungary 4 1.8 13 1.5 36
South Africa 2 1.8 12 1.4 6
Mexico 2 1.4 9.4 1.1 4
Argentina 2 0.9 5.4 0.6 7
Slovenia 1 0.7 5.3 0.6 41
Romania 1 0.7 5.1 0.6 10
Netherlands 1 0.5 3.7 0.4 4
Armenia 1 0.4 2.1 0.2 40
Pakistan 2 0.4 1.8 0.2 2.5
WORLD TOTAL 440 360 2574 294
Note: IAEA data are used for this table. Other compilations diﬀer somewhat, due to
diﬀerences in deﬁning the status of some reactors and in dates (e.g., Nuclear News
lists 444 reactors worldwide at the end of 2002, with a capacity of 364 GWe [4]).
Source: Data from Refs. [2] and [3].
2.2 Early History of Nuclear Energy 27
reactors have been used for the production of plutonium and the propulsion
of ships.
2.2 Early History of Nuclear Energy
2.2.1 Speculations Before the Discovery of Fission
Atomic energy, now usually called nuclear energy,2
became a gleam in the eye
of scientists in the early part of the 20th century. The possibility that the atom
held a vast reservoir of energy was suggested by the large kinetic energy of the
particles emitted in radioactive decay and the resultant large production of
heat. In 1911, 15 years after the discovery of radioactivity, the British nuclear
pioneer Ernest Rutherford called attention to the heat produced in the decay
of radium, writing:
This evolution of heat is enormous, compared with that emitted in any
known chemical reaction. . . . The atoms of matter must consequently
be regarded as containing enormous stores of energy which are only
released by the disintegration of the atom. [5]
At this time, however, Rutherford had no concrete idea as to the source of
this energy. The magnitudes of the energies involved were gradually put on a
more quantitative basis as information accumulated on the masses of atoms,
but until the discovery of ﬁssion in 1938, there could be no real understanding
of how this energy might be extracted. In the interim, however, important
progress was made in understanding the basic structure of nuclei. Major steps
included the discovery by Rutherford in 1911 that an atom has a nucleus, the
discovery in 1932 of the neutron as a constituent of the nucleus, and a series of
experiments undertaken in the 1930s by Enrico Fermi and his group in Rome
on the interactions between neutrons and nuclei, which eventually led to the
discovery of ﬁssion.3
As these developments unfolded, there was general speculation about
atomic energy. One of the earliest scientists to have thought seriously about
the possibilities was Leo Szilard, who was later active in eﬀorts to initiate the
U.S. atomic bomb program and then to limit it. He attributed his ﬁrst interest
in the extraction of atomic energy to reading in 1932 a book by the British
novelist H. G. Wells. Writing in 1913, Wells had predicted that artiﬁcially
2
Although the two terms mean the same thing, there has been some shift in usage
with time. Originally, “atomic energy” was the more common designation, but
it has been largely replaced by “nuclear energy.” For example, the U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission was established in 1946 and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission in 1975.
3
Historically oriented accounts of these developments and the discovery of ﬁssion
are given in Refs. [6]–[8]. A discussion of basic nuclear physics concepts and
terminology is presented in Appendix A.
28 2 Nuclear Power Development
induced radioactivity would be discovered in 1933 (he guessed the actual year
of discovery correctly!) and also predicted the production of atomic energy for
both industrial and military purposes. In Szilard’s account, he at ﬁrst “didn’t
regard it as anything but ﬁction.” A year later, however, two things caused him
to turn to this possibility more seriously: (1) He learned that Rutherford had
warned that hopes of power from atomic transmutations were “moonshine”4
and (2) the French physicist Frederic Joliot discovered artiﬁcial radioactivity
as predicted by H. G. Wells5
[9, pp. 16–17].
Szilard then hit upon a “practical” scheme of obtaining nuclear energy. At
the time, it was thought that the beryllium-9 (9
Be) nucleus was unstable and
could decay into two alpha particles and a neutron. This was a misconception,
based on an incorrect value of the mass of the alpha particle. Actually, 9
Be
is stable if only by a relatively small margin. In any event, Szilard thought
that it might be possible to “tickle” the breakup of 9
Be with a neutron and
then use the extra neutron released in the breakup to initiate another 9
Be
reaction. In each stage, there is one neutron in and two neutrons out. This is
the basic idea of a chain reaction. This particular chain reaction cannot work,
as was soon realized, because too high a neutron energy is required to cause
the breakup of 9
Be, and even then, there is a net loss of energy in the process,
not a gain.
Szilard tried to ﬁnd other ways to obtain a chain reaction, but his eﬀorts
failed. Nonetheless, in the interim, he went so far as to have a patent on
neutron-induced chain reactions entrusted to the British Admiralty for secret
safekeeping, the military potential of nuclear energy being important in his
thinking [8, p. 225]. However, the key to a realizable chain reaction—ﬁssion
of heavy elements—eluded Szilard as well as all others.
In these early speculations, there was an awareness of the potential of
atomic energy for both military and peaceful applications, and the latter
loomed large in the thinking of some scientists. For example, in a document
dated July 1934, Szilard explained planned experiments that, if successful,
would lead to
power production. . .on such a large scale and probably with so little
cost that a sort of industrial revolution could be expected; it appears
doubtful for instance whether coal mining or oil production could
survive after a couple of years. [9, p. 39]
4
It is not clear from the Szilard reference whether the word “moonshine” was
Rutherford’s own or whether it was a paraphrase appearing in Nature in a summary
of Rutherford’s talk.
5
Joliot, later Joliot-Curie, shared with his wife, Irene Joliot-Curie, the 1935 Nobel
Prize in Chemistry for their discovery in 1933 of artiﬁcial radioactivity. They
were the son-in-law and daughter of Marie and Pierre Curie, recipients (with
Becquerel) in 1903 of the Nobel Prize in Physics, awarded for the discovery of
radioactivity.
2.2 Early History of Nuclear Energy 29
Along the same lines, Joliot prophesied in his 1935 Nobel Prize acceptance
speech:
scientists, disintegrating or constructing atoms at will, will succeed
in obtaining explosive nuclear chain reactions. If such transmutations
could propagate in matter, one can conceive of the enormous useful
energy that will be liberated. [10, p. 46]
2.2.2 Fission and the First Reactors
Fission of uranium was discovered—or, more precisely, recognized for what
it was—in 1938.6
Scientists quickly recognized that large amounts of energy
are released in ﬁssion and that there was now, in principle, a path to a chain
reaction. By early 1939, it was veriﬁed that neutrons are emitted in ﬁssion,
and it soon became apparent that enough neutrons were emitted to sustain
a chain reaction in a properly arranged “pile” of uranium and graphite.7
It
took several more years to demonstrate the practicality of achieving a chain
reaction. This work was led by Fermi, who had left Italy for the United States,
and it culminated in the development and demonstration of the ﬁrst operating
nuclear reactor on December 2, 1942 at an improvised facility in Chicago.
The discovery and preliminary understanding of ﬁssion came at a time
when the prospect of war was much on people’s minds. The start of World
War II in Europe in August 1939 ensured that military, rather than civilian,
applications of atomic energy would take primacy, and the early work was
heavily focused on the military side, in both thinking and accomplishments.
A major goal of the nuclear program was the production of plutonium-239
(239
Pu), which was recognized to be an eﬀective material for a ﬁssion bomb.
The 239
Pu was to be produced in a reactor, by neutron capture on uranium-
238 (238
U) and subsequent radioactive decays.
The ﬁrst reactor in Chicago was very small, running with a total power
output of 200 W. However, even before the successful demonstration of a chain
reaction in this reactor, plans had started for the construction of the much
larger reactors required to produce the desired amounts of plutonium. A pilot
plant, designed to produce 1 MW, was completed and put into operation at
Oak Ridge, Tennessee in November 1943 [11, p. 392]. A full-size 200-MW
reactor began operating at the Hanford Reservation in Washington state in
September 1944—a millionfold increase in power output in less than 2 years.8
6
See Sections 6.1 and 6.2 for a brief description of ﬁssion and its discovery.
7
The uranium was the fuel. The graphite served as a “moderator,” to slow the
neutrons down to energies where they were most eﬀective in producing ﬁssion in
uranium. See Section 7.2 for a discussion of moderators.
8
Power is commonly measured in watts (W), kilowatts (kW), megawatts (MW),
and gigawatts (GW), where 1 kW = 103
W, 1 MW = 106
W, and 1 GW =
109
W. The basic energy output of a reactor is in the form of heat and often this
is explicitly recognized by specifying the power in megawatts-thermal (MWt).
30 2 Nuclear Power Development
The laboratories at Oak Ridge and Hanford were new wartime installations.
The Hanford site was not selected until early 1943, and construction of
the ﬁrst reactor began in June 1943. Workers completed the reactor within
about 15 months, despite the absence of any directly relevant prior experi-
ence.9
The speed with which the program was pursued is breathtaking by
present standards, but it can be understood in the context of the exigencies
of World War II.
The pressures of wartime bomb development pushed work on peaceful applications
largely into the background, but there was still considerable thinking
about future civilian uses. An oﬃcial report on the development of the
atomic bomb was prepared by Henry Smyth, a Princeton physicist. It was published
in 1945, shortly after the end of the war, to inform the public about the
bomb project. In a closing section, entitled “Prognostication,” Smyth pointed
out:
The possible uses of nuclear energy are not all destructive, and the
second direction in which technical development can be expected is
along the paths of peace. In the fall of 1944 General [Leslie] Groves
appointed a committee to look into these possibilities as well as those
of military signiﬁcance. This committee. . .received a multitude of suggestions
from men on the various projects, principally along the lines
of the use of nuclear energy for power and the use of radioactive byproducts
for scientiﬁc, medical, and industrial purposes. [12, pp. 224–
225]
With or without such a committee, it was inevitable that imaginative scientists
would consider ways of using nuclear energy for electricity generation.
The possibility, for example, of power production from a reactor that used water
at high pressure for both cooling the reactor and moderating the neutron
energies was suggested as early as September 1944, in a memorandum written
by Alvin Weinberg who was then working closely with Eugene Wigner on
reactor designs [13, p. 43]. This is the basic principle of the dominant reactor
in the world today, the pressurized light water reactor (PWR).10
For reactors designed to produce electricity, the more interesting quantity is the
output in megawatts-electric (MWe). (For a reactor operating at an eﬃciency
of 33%, the output in MWt is three times the output in MWe.) The maximum
electrical power of a nuclear reactor is its capacity. When the speciﬁcation is not
explicit, the term “megawatt” usually means MWe for reactors used to produce
electricity and MWt for reactors used for other purposes, including the early
WWII reactors.
9
An early summary of this chronology is given in Ref. [11], Chapter XIV.
10
Light water reactor (LWR) refers to a reactor cooled and moderated with ordinary
water, the word “light” being used to diﬀerentiate these reactors from those cooled
or moderated with heavy water [i.e., water in which the hydrogen is primarily in
the form of deuterium (2
H)]. The PWR is one version of the LWR. Characteristics
of LWRs are discussed at length in later chapters.
2.3 Development of Nuclear Power in the United States 31
2.3 Development of Nuclear Power in the United States
2.3.1 Immediate Postwar Developments
Interest in Commercial Nuclear Power
In the years immediately following World War II, the main activities of the
American nuclear authorities continued to be directed toward further military
developments, but increased attention was turned to electricity generation.
A somewhat guarded assessment of the future was presented in the Smyth
report:
While there was general agreement that a great industry might eventually
arise. . .there was disagreement as to how rapidly such an industry
would grow; the consensus was that the growth would be slow over
a period of many years. At least there is no immediate prospect of
running cars with nuclear power or lighting houses with radioactive
lamps although there is a good probability that nuclear power for
special purposes could be developed within ten years. [12, p. 225]
This turned out to be rather close to the mark, although the words “slow”
and “immediate” may have had diﬀerent connotations in 1945—in the wake
of the rapid pace of wartime development—than they do today.
There were, however, impediments to quick progress. For one, fossil fuels
were plentiful in the 1950s, so no immediate urgency was felt. Nuclear facilities
and technical knowledge were under the tight control of the AEC, with many
aspects kept secret because of the military connections. Further, there was
indecision as to the relative roles to be played by the government and private
utilities in the development of nuclear power. Finally, it was not clear which
type or types of reactor should be built.
The U.S. Navy made a decision ﬁrst and, under the leadership of Hyman
Rickover, built and began tests of pressurized light water reactors by the ﬁrst
part of 1953 [14, p. 188]. These reactors became the foundation of the U.S. nuclear
submarine ﬂeet. After some hesitation and consideration of alternative
designs for a reactor for the generation of commercial electric power, the AEC
announced in autumn 1953 that it would build a 60-MWe power plant [14,
p. 194]. Participation by utilities was sought. The general reactor conﬁguration
was to be the same as that used by the navy, namely a pressurized light
water reactor. A Pennsylvania utility won the competition to participate in
this project, contributing the land and buildings and undertaking to run the
facility when completed. The reactor was built at Shippingport, Pennsylvania
and was put into operation at the end of 1957 [14, pp. 419–423].
Early Enthusiasm: “Too Cheap to Meter”?
Despite the considerable caution in initiating the U.S. nuclear power program,
many euphoric statements about the future of nuclear power were made in
32 2 Nuclear Power Development
the 1940s and 1950s. Such statements even go back as far as H. G. Wells in
1913. Nuclear power was to be abundant, clean, and inexpensive. Of course,
thoughtful observers modulated and qualiﬁed even their optimistic prophecies,
but some of the optimism was quite unbridled. For example, an article in
Business Week in 1947 stated, “Commercial production of electric power from
atomic engines is only about ﬁve years away. . . . There are highly respected
scientists who predict privately that within 20 years substantially all central
power will be drawn from atomic sources” [15].
However, among all the enthusiastic quotations from that era, one in particular
has come to haunt nuclear advocates. In the 1980s, as nuclear power
became more expensive than electricity from coal, an earlier phrase, “too
cheap to meter,” was thrown back in the faces of proponents of nuclear power
as illustrating a history of false promises and overweening and foolish opti-
mism.
The phrase originated with Lewis L. Strauss, the chairman of the Atomic
Energy Commission (AEC) in the 1950s. Speaking at a science writers meeting,
he stated: “It is not too much to expect that our children will enjoy
electrical energy in their homes too cheap to meter.” The phrase was used in
a New York Times headline on September 17, 1954, the day after the speech.11
A fuller version of Strauss’ remarks, as they appeared in his prepared text, indicated
a broadly euphoric technological optimism about nuclear energy and
its applications [16, p. 2].
It is doubtful that many professionals shared this euphoria at the time.
A more oﬃcial version of the AEC position, expressed in Congressional testimony
in June 1954, held out the hope that
. . .[nuclear power] costs can be brought down—in an established
nuclear power industry—until the cost of electricity from nuclear fuel
is about the same as the cost of electricity from conventional fuels,
and this within a decade or two. [16, p. 4].
Overall, the history appears to have been one of hesitation and examination,
followed by a conviction developing in the 1960s that nuclear power
would indeed be less expensive than the fossil fuel alternatives. For a period,
in the 1970s, this expectation was fulﬁlled in the United States, and it is still
partially fulﬁlled in some countries. The failure of this expectation in later
11
An account of the history of the remark is given in a brief report prepared by
the Atomic Industrial Forum (AIF), a nuclear advocacy organization [16]. There
is a good chance that Strauss was thinking of fusion power, not ﬁssion power,
although he could not be explicit because the practicalities of fusion were secret
in 1954, with the development of the hydrogen bomb only recently started. The
AIF report quotes Lewis H. Strauss, the son of Lewis L. Strauss and himself
a physicist: “I would say my father was referring to fusion energy. I know this
because I became my father’s eyes and ears as I travelled around the country for
him.”
2.3 Development of Nuclear Power in the United States 33
years in the United States was a surprise and disappointment to nuclear proponents
as well as to many neutral analysts. There was a serious misjudgment,
but not as egregious a folly as connoted by the “too cheap to meter” phrase.
2.3.2 History of U.S. Reactor Orders and Construction
The First Commercial Reactors
The Shippingport reactor was a unique case. Although used to supply commercial
electricity, it was largely ﬁnanced by the federal government and built
under navy leadership. Following the order of the Shippingport reactor in
1953, there was a ﬁtful pattern of occasional orders by utilities during the
next 10 years. This early period of reactor development was characterized by
extensive exploration, with a wide variety of reactors being developed for military
and research applications and for electricity generation. For the latter,
a total of 14 reactors were ordered in the period from 1953 through 1960 [17].
They included nine light water reactors (LWRs), not identical by any means,
plus ﬁve other reactors with a wide variety of coolants and moderators.12
With three exceptions, these reactors all had capacities under 100 MWe.
The three reactors ordered in this period that had capacities above 100
MWe were the 265-MWe Indian Point 1 (New York), the 207-MWe Dresden
1 (Illinois), and the 175-MWe Yankee Rowe (Massachusetts) reactors, which
were ordered in 1955 and 1956 [17].13
These were all LWRs. The ﬁrst to go
into operation was Dresden 1, in 1960.
Growth Until the Mid-1970s
The exploratory period ended quickly. There was a brief lull in reactor orders
after 1960, with only ﬁve more orders until 1965, and then a period of rapid
increase from 1965 through 1974. The dominance of LWRs in U.S. reactor
orders was complete after 1960, the only exception being the gas-cooled Fort
St. Vrain reactor, ordered in 1965.
None of the reactors ordered before 1962 had a capacity as large as 300
MWe. After that, there was a substantial escalation in reactor size, in an eﬀort
to gain from expected economies of scale. Some critics believe that the growth
in size was too fast to permit adequate learning from experience. The mean
size of reactors ordered in 1965 was about 660 MWe, but by 1970, the mean
size exceeded 1000 MWe, with some above 1200 MWe. The largest reactors
completed and licensed to date in the United States have a (net) capacity of
1250 MWe.
12
These were a fast breeder reactor, a sodium graphite reactor, a high-temperature
gas-cooled reactor, an organic moderator reactor, and a heavy water reactor. The
variety of reactor types is discussed in Chapter 8.
13
These reactors have all been shut down, most recently Yankee Rowe in 1991.
34 2 Nuclear Power Development
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
YEAR
ORDERED
CANCELLED
OPERATING
SHUTDOWN
NUMBEROFREACTORS
Fig. 2.1. Cumulative history of nuclear reactor orders in the United States, 1953–
2001, including cancellations and shutdowns. (Data from Ref. [18], p. 253.)
The history of nuclear reactor deployment from 1953 through 2001 is summarized
in Figure 2.1, which shows the cumulative pace of reactor orders as
well as the number of reactors that were in operation, that have been canceled,
or that have been shut down. There was a period of rapid growth in
the number of orders from 1965 to 1975. At ﬁrst, reactors were completed
within about 6 years, and by the early 1970s nuclear power had begun to assume
signiﬁcant proportions. At the end of 1974, there were about 55 reactors
in operation, with a total capacity of almost 32 GWe, providing 6% of U.S.
electricity [18, p. 255].
Reactor Deployment Since the Mid-1970s
The picture changed abruptly in the mid-1970s. In contrast with the 4-year
period from 1971 to 1974, when 129 reactors had been ordered, only 13 reactors
were ordered during 1975–1978. After 1978, new orders ceased entirely
and all reactors ordered after 1973 have been canceled. The de facto moratorium
on commercial reactor orders has continued in subsequent years, and at
the time of this writing (early 2004), no new orders are in clear prospect.
A major factor in this change was a sharp drop in the growth in electricity
demand, as reﬂected in Figure 1.1. The growth in electricity consumption
averaged over 7% per year from 1953 to 1973—a doubling time of under 10
years. This growth ended in 1974, with an actual drop of 0.4% that year,
precipitated by the economic shock of OPEC’s oil embargo in late 1973. Af-
2.3 Development of Nuclear Power in the United States 35
ter 1974, with a reduced rate of economic growth and a new emphasis on
conservation, electricity sales grew at a much slower rate than in preceding
decades, averaging about 2.7% per year during 1975–2000. Utilities that had
previously placed orders for generating facilities found themselves facing a
surplus of planned capacity. A ﬁrst response was to stop plans for expansion.
Nuclear power was particularly impacted by the lessening demand for electricity,
because it was additionally confronted by growing opposition and by
increasing costs of reactor construction. These factors all worked to slow nuclear
deployment after 1974, although reactors continued to go on line until
the Three Mile Island accident in March 1979. The accident led to a 1-year
hiatus, followed by a gradual resumption of deployment of reactors that were
already in the pipeline. Overall, 51 new reactors have been put into commercial
operation since 1979. The last of these was in 1996—the Watts Bar I
reactor operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).
At the end of 2003, there were 104 operating reactors in the United States
with a net capacity of 98 GWe.14
All are light water reactors. Total net generation
in 2002 was 772 billion kilowatt-hours, or, in alternative units, 88
gigawatt-years (GWyr) where 1 gigawatt-year = 8.76 × 109
kWh [20]. The
fraction of electricity provided by nuclear power has risen to about 20% in
recent years. Until 1990, the driving force in the increased nuclear output was
the addition of new reactors. Since 1990, there has been little change in nuclear
capacity, with 7 new reactors having gone into operation and 11 reactors
(in general smaller) shut down. Nonetheless, there was an increase of 34% in
total nuclear generation due to improved operation of existing reactors (see
Section 2.4.2).
Three additional reactors, with capacities of roughly 1200 MWe each, are
in something of a state of limbo [4]. They are each listed as more than 50%
completed, but construction has been halted for many years, and as of mid-
2003, there were no announced plans to resume construction.15
They all belong
to the TVA, which has six licensed reactors, including Browns Ferry 1.
No further nuclear reactors are on the immediate horizon in the United
States, and for the time being, nuclear power in the United States is at a
plateau. However, the federal government in recent years has looked with more
favor on nuclear power. The U.S. Department of Energy in 1998, acting upon
the recommendation of the President’s Committee of Advisors on Science and
Technology (PCAST), launched a Nuclear Energy Research Initiative (NERI)
designed to stimulate innovative thinking on topics such as:
14
One of these reactors, the 1065-MWe Browns Ferry 1 reactor, operated by the
TVA, was shut down in 1985 along with four other TVA reactors that have since
gone back into service. The TVA Board voted in May 2002 to restart Browns
Ferry 1 [19]. Major changes are to be made in the reactor building and contents,
and the restart will not occur for several years. (During the shutdown period,
Browns Ferry 1 has been included in most U.S. government compilations as an
“operating reactor” because it has an operating license.)
15
The three reactors are Bellefonte 1 & 2 and Watts Bar 2.
36 2 Nuclear Power Development
proliferation-resistant reactors or fuel cycles; new reactor designs with
higher eﬃciency, lower cost, and improved safety to compete in the
global market; low-power units for use in developing countries; and
new techniques for on-site and surface storage and for permanent disposal
of nuclear waste. [21, p. 5–13]
The DOE in 1998 also established the Nuclear Energy Research Advisory
Committee (NERAC) to advise on nuclear technology programs. The work
of NERI has led to a number of imaginative proposals for new reactors, and
NERAC has developed plans to encourage the deployment of new reactors
by 2010 as well as the development of advanced designs for later deployment.
These initiatives are discussed further in Chapter 16.
2.3.3 Reactor Cancellations
Quantitative detail on the history of orders and cancellations is given in Figure
2.2, which indicates the numbers of reactors ordered in each year and the
number of these orders that were not canceled. Overall, almost all reactors
now in operation were ordered in the period from 1965 through 1973. This is
a very compressed interval, and one that did not allow much opportunity for
the manufacturers and utilities to learn from experience.
A striking feature of the data shown in Figure 2.2 is the large number of
cancellations of reactors after they had been ordered. In fact, the number of
canceled reactors exceeds the number of reactors that are still in operation.
The wave of orders in the 1965–1974 period was followed by a wave of cancellations
in 1974–1984. The overall record is summarized in Table 2.2, which
gives the total nuclear reactor orders from the 1950s to the end of 2002 and a
summary of the disposition of the orders.
As seen in Table 2.2, almost one-half of the reactors that were ordered
since 1953 have had their orders canceled. In many cases, although not most,
cancellation came after construction had started. The other half of the ordered
reactors were completed and put into operation, but some of these have since
been permanently shut down. The large number of cancellations reﬂects the
same forces that led to the cessation of new orders: the decline in the electricity
growth rate, public or political opposition to nuclear power, and increased
costs.
2.4 Trends in U.S. Reactor Utilization
2.4.1 Permanent Reactor Closures
One of the threats to the nuclear industry has been the prospect of the permanent
shutdown of reactors before the expiration of their operating licenses
(commonly issued for 40 years). This has happened to 28 reactors out of 132
2.4 Trends in U.S. Reactor Utilization 37
0
10
20
30
40
50
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975
TOTAL ORDERS
NOT CANCELLED
CAPACITYOFORDERS(GWe)
YEAR
Fig. 2.2. Reactor orders in the United States, 1953–1978 (in GWe of total capacity).
Annual ﬁgures are given for all orders and for those that were not subsequently
canceled. The “not canceled” category includes operating reactors, reactors that
have been shut down, and three partially completed reactors. (Data from Ref. [17];
the plot does not reﬂect several additional cancellations since 1994.)
Table 2.2. Cumulative record of nuclear power in the
United States, 1953–2003.
Number of
Status Reactors
Orders for power reactors 259
Construction permit issued 177
Order canceled before reactor operated 124
Construction halted, but not canceled 3
Put into operation 132
Operable as of 12/31/03 104
Permanently shut down, before 12/31/03 28
Source: Ref. [18], p. 253, for period through 12/31/01;
there were no changes during 2002 or 2003.
38 2 Nuclear Power Development
that have gone into operation.16
However, the large majority of the closed
reactors began operating in the 1960s, including 12 with capacities under 80
MWe that were shut down before 1970. Some of the larger of the 1960s reactors
remained in operation considerably longer, with several lasting until
the 1990s. The largest of the 1960s reactors was the Hanford N reactor (860
MWe), which was built in part for plutonium production and was operated
by the U.S. Department of Energy, not by an electric utility. It was shut down
in 1988.
In addition to the closing of these older reactors, nine reactors that went
into operation after 1970 have been shut down. These are listed in Table 2.3.
Their total capacity was 7.5 GWe. They fall into several categories:
◆ Three Mile Island 2, which went into operation in 1978. It was severely
damaged in 1979 in one of the world’s two major reactor accidents (the
other being the much worse accident at Chernobyl). The damage to the
reactor and resulting contamination to the building made it impossible to
put the reactor back into operation.
◆ Shoreham in Long Island, New York, which operated brieﬂy at very low
power after issuance of a low-power license in 1985. Local and state opposition
prevented the issuance of a license to operate at full power and,
Table 2.3. U.S. reactors that went into operation after 1970
and that have been shut down.a
Capacity Year of Year of Initial
Reactor (MWe) Shutdown Operation
Millstone 1 660 1998 1971
Zion 1 1040 1998 1973
Zion 2 1040 1998 1974
Maine Yankee 860 1997 1972
Trojan 1095 1992 1976
Shorehamb
809 1989 —
Fort St. Vrain 330 1989 1979
Rancho Seco 913 1989 1975
Three Mile Island 2 792 1979 1978
a
Status as of December 31, 2003.
b
The Shoreham reactor received a low-power license but was never
put into full-scale operation.
Source: Ref. [4].
16
The precise numbers of reactors in these categories is a matter of deﬁnition. The
DOE tabulation of Ref. [18] indicates that 28 reactors have been shut down. A
tabulation in Nuclear News names 24 closed reactors [4], and an IAEA listing
names 22 closed reactors [3]. The latter list includes three reactors, none larger
than 22 MWe, that were shut down in the 1960s that are not in the Nuclear News
list. The discrepancies in the listings all involve special cases, where the question
of whether the reactor was ever in “commercial operation” is blurred.
2.4 Trends in U.S. Reactor Utilization 39
after lengthy negotiations, the reactor was closed, with neither its status
as having been in operation nor its date of “shutdown” crisply deﬁned.
◆ Three reactors that were shut down by 1992 that had a history of poor
performance and low capacity factors, which weakened their economic and
political viability (Rancho Seco, Fort St. Vrain, and Trojan). Considerable
public controversy surrounded the decisions as to their fates.
◆ Four reactors that were shut down in 1997 and 1998, in ﬁnancial decisions
by the utilities that operated them. From the utility standpoint, it was
less costly to shut down the reactor than to continue to operate it, and
these actions elicited little controversy.
Each of these categories carries a cautionary note. In the case of Three
Mile Island it is obvious: A serious accident must be avoided. The case of the
Shoreham reactor has probably been the most worrisome to utilities, because
in this instance a reactor was completed, but public hostility prevented its
use. The weak performers in the third group are a reminder that a reactor is
vulnerable, for both economic and political reasons, if its performance is poor.
The fourth group provides additional warning on the need to be economically
competitive.
The reactor closures of the 1990s were interpreted by some as the forerunner
of a cascade of further closures, but, in fact, they stopped after 1998.
Instead, as discussed in Section 2.4.5, there has been a switch in the opposite
direction, with a wave of applications for operating license renewals.17
2.4.2 Capacity Factors
The cessation of reactor orders, the absence of any new orders on the horizon,
and a spate of closures have represented discouraging trends for U.S. nuclear
power. A bright spot, however, has been the recent improvement in operating
performance. We discuss a number of speciﬁc indicators of improved performance
in Section 14.4. An overall, more immediate measure of how well a
reactor is performing is given by its capacity factor. The capacity factor for
a reactor in any period is the ratio of its total electrical output during that
period to the output if it had run continuously at full power. Capacity factors
are usually expressed in percent, the ideal being 100%.
Although a capacity factor above 90% for an individual reactor in a given
year was not uncommon before the late 1990s,18
the capacity factors were
usually well below 90% over a more extended period due to scheduled and
17
This does not mean that no reactors will be shut down before their 40 years of
operation are completed. For example, there is pressure from some local environmental
groups and political bodies to shut down the Indian Point nuclear plant
located north of New York City. They argue that terrorist attacks could lead to
large releases of radioactive material from the plant and that emergency plans
to evacuate people within a 10-mile radius are inadequate. The plant has two
PWRs, each rated at about 1000 MWe.
18
For example, the 90% level was exceeded by 29 U.S. reactors in 1994 [23].
40 2 Nuclear Power Development
unscheduled maintenance and variations in demand. For many years, a capacity
factor greater than 80% was considered to be very good. However, in
a development that probably even took most nuclear enthusiasts by surprise,
the average capacity factor for U.S. reactors has been above 85% since 1999.
The average capacity factor for U.S. reactors since 1973 is plotted in Figure
2.3. After hovering around 50%, it gradually rose to over 60% in 1977 and
1978, but dropped following the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, which precipitated
a period of precautionary repairs and modiﬁcations. Some of these
entailed long periods during which a reactor was out of operation. With the
completion of most of these modiﬁcations, there has been a signiﬁcant increase
in the annual average capacity factor beginning in 1988. The capacity factor
reached 66% in 1990 and then rose to 77% in 1995 and to 90% in 2002 [20,
Table 8.1].
The improvement in capacity factors has been attributed by the nuclear
industry to concerted eﬀorts at improvement, including modiﬁcations in equipment
and operator training, as well as better communications within the nuclear
industry to facilitate learning from experience. These eﬀorts resulted in
fewer unintended shutdowns and a shortened period for planned shutdowns,
such as those for refueling the reactor. Some of the capacity factor increase
may also be due to the abandonment of reactors that had been below average
in performance.
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
YEAR
AVERAGECAPACITYFACTOR(PERCENT)
TMI ACCIDENT
Fig. 2.3. Average capacity factor of U.S. reactors in a given year, 1973–2002. (Data
from Ref. [22].)
2.4 Trends in U.S. Reactor Utilization 41
The improvement in capacity factors has important implications for the
economic position of nuclear power. An increase from, say, 60% to 90% corresponds
to an increase in output of 50%—equivalent to the addition of roughly
50 reactors—and leads to a large reduction in the cost of electricity. The expenses
of a nuclear utility do not change greatly as its electricity output rises
or falls, because the capital costs are ﬁxed and the operating costs are insensitive
to changes in output. The cost of electricity from a given reactor
is therefore reduced by almost one-third if its capacity factor increases from
60% to 90%. A higher capacity factor also reﬂects a lesser need for repairs or
modiﬁcations in the reactor, making further savings likely.
2.4.3 Consolidation in the U.S. Nuclear Industry
One of the trends in the U.S. nuclear industry in recent years has been a consolidation
of companies that operated nuclear reactors. In early 1998, there
were 105 reactors in the United States being operated by 44 separate entities
[24]. By the beginning of 2003, the number of operating entities had been
reduced to 31, with 104 reactors [4]. The largest of the operators was Exelon
Generating, with eight reactors formerly run by Commonwealth Edison
and four reactors formerly run by Philadelphia Electric Company. At least
in principle, this sort of consolidation allows for greater eﬃciencies and more
concentrated expertise.
Even with the consolidation to date, the U.S. nuclear industry is very fragmented
compared to other countries. France is at the other extreme. All but
one of its 59 reactors is operated by Electricit´e de France. The one exception
is the Phenix fast breeder reactor, operated by the French atomic energy
commissariat.
2.4.4 Renewal of Reactor Operating Licenses
Reactors in the United States operate under Nuclear Regulatory Commission
licenses that are issued for a period of 40 years. This period was speciﬁed
by Congress, according to the Nuclear Energy Institute, because it “was a
typical amortization period for an electric power plant,” not because of “safety,
technical or environmental factors” [25]. Experience with reactors to date
indicates no compelling reason to shut them down at the end of 40 years,
although, in some cases, retroﬁts and replacement of components may be
necessary.
If a reactor continues to run safely, without the need for a major overhaul,
the incentive to extend its operating life is obvious. The capital costs
of the reactor have been paid oﬀ and the remaining costs of operating the
plant are relatively low. Extending the license means relatively inexpensive
power for the continued life of the plant. The requirements for obtaining a
license renewal are set forth by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
42 2 Nuclear Power Development
and include a study of the eﬀects of aging on reactor safety [26, Part 54]. If
granted, a license renewal is speciﬁcally limited to 20 years.
The ﬁrst applications for license renewals were received by the NRC in
1998. By October 2003, the NRC had approved 18 applications and was reviewing
12 more [27]. Looking ahead, the NRC indicated that it expected to
receive applications for more than 25 additional reactors by 2006. In view
of the ﬁnancial beneﬁts of continued operation, applications for renewal may
eventually be made for most presently operating reactors.
An application for license renewal indicates an intent but not an irrevocable
commitment. Just as some reactors have been shut down before the
expiration of their original 40-year licenses, it is possible that some renewal
applications will be withdrawn, denied by the NRC, or not implemented by
the utility. Nonetheless, the rather sudden increase in activity in this area
indicates a revived optimism in the U.S. nuclear industry.
2.5 Worldwide Development of Nuclear Power
2.5.1 Early History of Nuclear Programs
The above discussion has emphasized the U.S. nuclear program. However, the
United States was not alone in having an early interest in nuclear energy.
Other countries had similar interests, although their development lagged because
they lacked the head start provided by the U.S. World War II atomic
bomb program and they had smaller technological and industrial bases.
For the countries that wanted nuclear weapons, the priority was the same
as that of the United States. The bomb came ﬁrst and peaceful nuclear energy
later. Thus, the construction and testing of nuclear weapons was achieved
by the USSR in 1949, Britain in 1952, France in 1960, and China in 1964.
Commercial nuclear electricity followed: The USSR started with several 100MWe
reactors in 195819
, Britain with a 50-MWe reactor at Calder Hall in
1956 (preceding the U.S. reactor at Shippingport), France with a 70-MWe
prototype reactor at Chinon in 1964, and China with three reactors that went
into commercial operation in 1994 [4].
Additional countries had no intention of building nuclear weapons and
went directly to nuclear reactors for electric power. These included other countries
of Western Europe, beyond France and Britain, as well as Japan. As in
the United States, the reactors put into operation in the late 1950s for electricity
generation were relatively small in size and few in number, and exploitation
of nuclear power remained on a relatively modest scale until the 1970s.
19
A 5-MWe electric plant was put into operation in Obinsk in June 1954, which
has been cited by some Soviet authors as being the “ﬁrst nuclear power plant in
the world” (see Ref. [28]).
2.5 Worldwide Development of Nuclear Power 43
2.5.2 Nuclear Power Since 1973
Trends in Nuclear Growth
Worldwide nuclear power generation grew rapidly from the 1970s through the
1980s and then slowed. Details on the growth from 1973 to 2000 are shown in
Table 2.4 for the world, Western Europe, and the Far East, as well as for the
three countries with the greatest individual outputs of nuclear energy.
Looked at broadly, one sees a rapid expansion in the 1970s and 1980s
followed by a marked slowdown in the pace of growth in the 1990s. World
generation [excluding the former Soviet Union (FSU) and Eastern Europe]
increased by more than a factor of 9 between 1973 and 1990—an average
increase of 14% per year. Even in the latter part of this period, from 1980
to 1990, the rate was 11% per year. However, it dropped to 2.5% for these
countries for 1990 to 2000. For the world as a whole (including all countries),
the average annual growth was 2.4% in the period from 1992 to 2001.20
The growth rate has become even slower in the most recent years. Six new
reactors, with a total capacity of 5.0 GWe, are listed by the IAEA as having
been connected to the local electrical grids in 2002 [3]. This represents a 1.4%
increase in the world’s total nuclear capacity. Five of these additions were in
Asia, continuing the recent trend of Asian leadership seen in Table 2.4.21
Table 2.4. World growth of nuclear power, 1973 to 2000.
World West United
(inc.)a
Europe Asia States France Japan
Gross generation (GWyr)
1973 22 8.4 1.4 10 1.7 1.1
1980 71 24 11 30 7.0 9.5
1990 202 84 32 69 36 22
2000 260 102 57 89 47 37
Average increase (% per year)
1973–1980 18 16 34 17 23 36
1980–1990 11 13 11 8.6 18 8.8
1990–2000 2.5 1.9 5.7 2.6 2.8 5.2
a
The world ﬁgures are incomplete; they exclude Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union. Nuclear generation for these countries was 32 GWyr in 2000, raising
the world total to 292 GWyr.
Source: Ref. [20]; data not included for Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
(FSU) prior to 1992.
20
These data are from the U.S. DOE publication Monthly Energy Review, which
does not include data for the FSU and Eastern Europe for the years prior to
1992 [20].
21
The ﬁve reactors in Asia included four in China (Qinshan 2-1 and 3-1 and Lingao
1 and 2), and one in South Korea (Yonggwang 6). The other reactor was in the
44 2 Nuclear Power Development
10
100
1000
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
NUCLEARPOWERGENERATION(grossTWh)
YEAR
USA
FRANCE
JAPAN
GERMANY
UK
S. KOREA
Fig. 2.4. Growth of annual nuclear power generation in selected countries, 1973–
2002. (Data from Ref. [20].)
The history of nuclear generation from 1973 to 2002 is shown in Figure 2.4
for several countries with relatively large nuclear programs. France, Japan, and
Germany began large-scale use of nuclear power after the United States, but
then had larger fractional growth rates, especially in the 1975–1985 period.
South Korea, the latest major entry, has had rapid growth in the past 15
years, but its overall program is still relatively small. The United Kingdom,
one of the original leaders in nuclear power, later lagged substantially.
Recent Developments in Individual Countries
Despite the overall negative recent history for nuclear power, there were favorable
developments in some countries:
◆ France added 10 new reactors from 1990 through 2002. These were large
reactors, each 1300 MWe or more. In most of this period, nuclear power
Czech Republic (Temelin-2). Construction had started in 1996 or later on the
Asian reactors and in 1987 on the Czech reactor.
2.5 Worldwide Development of Nuclear Power 45
accounted for more than 75% of France’s electricity generation, and France
was an exporter of electricity to its neighbors. However, no further reactors
are presently in the pipeline.
◆ Japan added 16 new reactors in the same period, most with capacities
above 1000 MWe.
◆ South Korea added nine new reactors in this period, more than doubling
its nuclear generation.
◆ The average capacity factor of U.S. reactors grew from 66% in 1990 to 90%
in 2002, giving a large increase in total output, despite a slight decrease
in total capacity.
◆ In Switzerland, voters rejected proposals to phase out nuclear power, in
referenda held in May 2003.
On the other side of the ledger, there has been a turning away from nuclear
power among some countries that used it. The ﬁrst to take this step was Italy,
which by 1990 had completely shut down its small reactor program, consisting
of four reactors with a combined capacity of 1.4 GWe [3]. Since then, decisions
to phase out nuclear power has been taken by the governments of Sweden,
Germany, and Belgium, each of which obtain a large fraction of its electricity
from nuclear power (see Table 2.1). The phasing out is planned to be gradual.
By the end of 2003 these decisions had led to two closures, that of the 615MWe
Barsebaeck-1 reactor in Sweden at the end of 1999 and the 640-MWe
Stade reactor in Germany in late 2003. The policy was adopted for generalized
political or environmental reasons, rather than speciﬁc problems with the
existing reactors, and could be modiﬁed or reversed.
Beyond these broad decisions, there have been several major closures of
nuclear power plants in Europe involving special circumstances:
◆ After the reuniﬁcation of Germany, the government in 1990 shut down ﬁve
Soviet-manufactured reactors (1.7 GWe total).
◆ The four reactors at Chernobyl have all been shut down, the ﬁrst by the
accident in 1986 and the last by the decision of the Ukrainian government
in December 2000 (3.8 GWe total).
◆ France closed its 1200-MWe breeder reactor, Superphenix, in 1998 following
a troubled operational history and a lack of an immediate need for a
breeder program.
There have been other reactor closures throughout the world, but in most
cases, these have involved relatively old and small reactors.
2.5.3 Planned Construction of New Reactors
The pace of reactor construction is now quite slow. According to an IAEA
compilation, 32 reactors were under construction as of November, 2003 with
a total capacity of 26 GWe. Completion of all these reactors would add 7% to
the then existing capacity of 360 MWe, and if accomplished within 5 years, the
46 2 Nuclear Power Development
Table 2.5. Nuclear reactors under construction as of November,
2003.
No. of Capacity Mean Cap.
Country Units (GWe) (MWe)
Asia
Japan 3 3.70 1232
India 8 3.62 453
China 3 2.61 870
Taiwan 2 2.70 1350
Iran 2 2.11 1056
South Korea 2 1.92 960
North Korea 1 1.04 1040
TOTAL ASIA 21 17.70 843
Eastern Europe
Ukraine 4 3.80 950
Russian Federation 3 2.83 942
Slovak Republic 2 0.78 388
Romania 1 0.66 655
TOTAL E. EUR. 10 8.06 806
Other: Argentina 1 0.69 692
WORLD TOTAL 32 26.45 827
Source: Ref. [2].
average annual rate of increase would be about 1.4%. Details of the construction
plans, subdivided by country and region, are summarized in Table 2.5.
Consistent with the small number of reactors under construction, the
IAEA estimated in 2002 that worldwide nuclear capacity will grow at an
average rate of only 0.8–1.6% per year for the period from 2001 to 2010 [29,
p. 17]. A 2002 U.S. DOE summary projected even slower growth, with world
capacity changing from 350 GWe in 2000 to 385 GWe in 2010 in the “high
growth case” and to 340 GWe in 2010 in the “low growth case” [30, p. 93].
The “high” ﬁgure represents an average annual growth rate of 1.0%.
Table 2.5 clearly shows Asia’s dominance in the planned construction.
About two-thirds of the reactors listed as being constructed are in Asia. The
remainder are almost entirely in Eastern Europe. Even these reactors are not
necessarily a sign of vitality in their nuclear programs. Construction on the
Eastern Europe reactors was begun in 1987 or earlier, and the current plans
therefore reﬂect projects that have been long delayed and, in most cases, have
no announced completion dates [3]. In contrast, with the exception of the
Iranian reactors, all the reactors in Asia were started after 1996. Typically,
their expected time from the start of construction to commercial operation is
7 years or less.
The only deﬁnite move in recent years to start construction of a new reactor
outside Asia was in Finland, where the Parliament in May 2002 voted to build
2.6 National Programs of Nuclear Development 47
a ﬁfth reactor. This plant is not reﬂected in the IAEA listing in Table 2.5
because actual construction had not yet been started. It is noteworthy that
no new reactors are presently slated for the United States or Western Europe.
Here, there is either a pause or a planned retraction. Among the leading
countries in this group, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom
are standing pat, whereas Germany, Sweden and Belgium are scheduled to
phase out nuclear power, absent a change in national policy.
However, this may be an incomplete picture. In a number of countries,
there are reactors that have been ordered but are not now actively under construction.
Some of them could be completed before 2010, given a decision to
move ahead. In addition, with a 5-year construction time, additional reactors
could be ordered and completed by 2010. For example, Russia has announced
plans that call for putting nine additional plants into operation by 2010, primarily
by completing delayed projects (see Section 2.6.3), and the U.S. DOE
has adopted the goal of having a new commercial nuclear reactor completed
by 2010. Conversely, additional plants may be shut down. In particular, there
is pressure to shut down two Chernobyl-type reactors that are still operating
in Lithuania.
2.6 National Programs of Nuclear Development
2.6.1 France
France is widely cited as the leading success story for nuclear power. Each year
since 1986, nuclear power has accounted for over 70% of electricity generation
in France. Another large fraction, averaging about 15%, but with considerable
year-to-year variations, has come from hydroelectric power. Therefore, France
is virtually saturated in terms of the replacement of fossil fuels. Taking advantage
of its ample nuclear capacity, France now exports substantial amounts of
electricity to its neighbors.
The chief avenues for further major nuclear growth are through increased
exports or a greater electriﬁcation of the French energy economy, but there
are no visible indications that this is a high priority for France. The last new
reactors to go into operation in France were four large PWRs each with a
capacity of about 1450 MWe, and no new reactors are under construction.
The French and German nuclear industries are continuing to consider a large
next-generation reactor, the European Pressurized Water Reactor (EPR), a
version of which has been ordered as Finland’s ﬁfth reactor.
Over the past two decades, nuclear power has greatly changed the structure
of French energy supply. It was an almost negligible contributor in 1970, but
in 2001, nuclear power provided 39% of all primary energy in France [1]. The
period from 1971 to 1995, in which most of the nuclear growth was achieved,
has been described in some detail in Section 1.3.3. It was marked by decreases
in fossil fuel use and CO2 emissions while gross domestic product and energy
48 2 Nuclear Power Development
consumption rose. Total electricity generation more than tripled, accompanied
by a change from almost total reliance on fossil fuels and hydroelectric power
to a dominant reliance on nuclear power (see Table 1.3). The French experience
has been pointed to as demonstrating the impact that nuclear power can
have in curbing dependence on fossil fuels and on the emission of greenhouse
gases.
There have been a number of attempts to explain why French nuclear
history has developed so diﬀerently from that of other major countries. Several
factors have been advanced, although many of them need not have been unique
to France:
◆ France is poor in fossil fuels, and nuclear power was seen as the most
expeditious way to reduce French dependence on oil and coal imports.
◆ There has been a concentration on a single type of reactor (a PWR
originally modeled on Westinghouse designs), operated under the aegis
of a single utility, Electricit´e de France, and built by a single reactor
manufacturer, Framatome. This has allowed for standardization to a few
PWR types, with resulting economies in design, construction, and opera-
tion.
◆ Although France has open political debate, there were few mechanisms
whereby opposition to nuclear power could impede its development, short
of changing the policy of the central government. In the United States, on
the other hand, individual state governments have considerable independent
authority and often have taken positions against nuclear development.
Further, fewer opportunities for intervention through the courts are available
in France than in the United States, especially as the state structure
in the United States provides an extra layer of courts.
◆ The Communist party, which in the early years of nuclear power was
still an important political force in France, supported nuclear power.
In most other European countries, the political left opposed nuclear
power.
◆ With the initial success of the French nuclear program, the maintenance
of French leadership became a matter of national pride.
Despite these factors, there exists some opposition to nuclear power in France.
There is no suggestion that this opposition will reverse the French use of
nuclear power, but it may inhibit France from increasing its electricity exports
to other European countries.
2.6.2 Japan
Japan is another country with a continuing strong nuclear program, although
a smaller one than that of France, especially when adjusted for its larger population
and economy. Its nuclear program is particularly driven by Japan’s
dependence on energy imports, which account for virtually all of Japan’s fossil
fuels. The chief domestic resources are nuclear energy and hydroelectric
2.6 National Programs of Nuclear Development 49
power.22
An increase in the nuclear share of the total energy budget is the
most direct way of moving toward greater energy independence. As part of
this general strategy, Japan is taking steps toward a self-contained fuel cycle,
which could eventually rely on breeder reactors.
To date, Japan has depended for reprocessing on a small domestic plant
and reprocessing contracts with facilities in France and Great Britain. Japan’s
own reprocessing facilities will be greatly expanded with the construction of
the Rokkasho-mura plant, started in 1993 and now scheduled for completion
in 2005 (see Section 9.4.2). The plant will have a capacity of 800 tonnes per
year, suﬃcient to handle the output of about 25 1000-MWe reactors, each
discharging about 30 tonnes of fuel per year. A uranium enrichment plant
at Rokkasho-Mura began operation in 1992 and now has an annual capacity
suﬃcient to produce about one-ﬁfth of Japan’s requirements of enriched
uranium [31, pp. 30–31].
The pace of deployment of new reactors has slowed since the 1990s. However,
reactor construction times are relatively short in Japan, averaging under
5 years, so that rapid changes in the program are possible [3, p. 50]. Conversely,
political opposition to nuclear power in Japan could interfere with
present plans. This opposition has been growing in recent years, exacerbated
by incidents that have reﬂected adversely on the management of Japan’s nuclear
enterprise.23
2.6.3 Other Countries
The Former Soviet Union
The breakup of the Soviet Union left nuclear reactors in a number of the new
states, mostly in Russia and Ukraine, but also two in Lithuania and one each
in Armenia and Kazakhstan. The 1986 Chernobyl accident led to a cutting
back of reactor construction in Russia. Nonetheless, six reactors that had
been started before the accident were connected to the grid in Russia between
the time of the accident and the end of 2001—ﬁve of which were 950-MWe
PWRs and one was a 925-MWe RBMK reactor (Smolensk-3 in 1990) [3].24
From 1988 to 1990, nine older reactors with capacities of 100 MWe to 336
22
In this discussion, use of imported oil to generate electricity is not counted as indigenous
production, but electricity generated from imported uranium is counted
as indigenous. This is not symmetric, but it is not unreasonable given that the
cost of the fuel in the case of nuclear energy is a small fraction of the total
cost.
23
The most notable of these was an accident at the Tokaimura facility in 1999,
when two workers died of radiation exposure due to carelessness in their handling
of enriched 235
U that was to be used in fuel for a research reactor.
24
The Chernobyl reactor was an RBMK reactor. These reactors have design features
that make them more vulnerable to accidents than are the light water reactors
more commonly used (see Sections 8.1.4 and 15.3.1).
50 2 Nuclear Power Development
MWe were taken out of operation. There was also a considerable scaling down
of plans. The number of operating plants in Russia rose from 24 in 1992 to
27 in 2002, but over the same period, the number of plants listed as being
under construction or on order dropped from 16 to 6 [4, 32].25
Of the six, two
were 750-MWe breeder reactors and it is not clear when, if ever, these will be
built.
It is possible that there will be a substantial development of nuclear power
in Russia during the next two decades. Several reactors were under construction
in Russia in 2003, and Russia is actively engaged in the export market,
including reactors under construction in China, India, and Iran. Following a
plan formulated by the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MiniAtom) in
2000, the Russian government has adopted a strategy to raise nuclear capacity
(which is now 21 GWe) to a level of 52 GWe by 2020 in their “optimistic”
economic scenario and to about 35 GWe in their “pessimistic” scenario [33,
pp. 171–190]. In the ﬁrst instance, this will be accomplished by extending the
lives of existing plants beyond the originally scheduled 30 years and completing
some projects begun earlier. The next phase calls for the construction of
31 GWe of new capacity [33, p. 187]. However Russia is rich in fossil fuels and,
for reasons of geography, may be less concerned than most countries about
the eﬀects of global warming.
Ukraine was the site of the 1986 Chernobyl accident. The response has
been to shut down the three undamaged Chernobyl reactors—the last not
until December 2000—but continue with nuclear power. Six PWRs that had
been under construction at the time of the accident were completed by 1989,
before the Ukraine separated from the USSR. One additional PWR went into
commercial operation in 1996, giving a total of 13 operating reactors by the
beginning of 2003. Four more reactors are oﬃcially under construction (see
Table 2.5).
Lithuania led the world in dependence on nuclear electricity in 2002, obtaining
80% of its electricity from two 1380-MWe RBMK reactors that went
into operation in 1985 and 1987. However, it has been under pressure to shut
these reactors down, given the fears created by their design similarity to the
Chernobyl reactors. Lithuania’s admission to the European Union, scheduled
for 2004, has been made contingent on the subsequent closure of these reac-
tors.
The two other FSU countries with nuclear reactors at the time of Chernobyl
were Armenia and Kazakhstan. Armenia had two 376-MWe PWRs, one
of which was shut down in 1989 (before the breakup of the FSU) while the
other continues to operate, providing 40% of Armenia’s electricity in 2002.
The one Kazakhstan reactor was a 50-MWe fast breeder that was shut down
in 1999, leaving no operating reactors in that country.
25
Note: These numbers, from Nuclear News, diﬀer from the IAEA data of Table 2.1.
A major reason for the diﬀerence is that the IAEA, but not Nuclear News, includes
four Russian 11-MWe reactors.
2.6 National Programs of Nuclear Development 51
Former Soviet Bloc Countries
With only a few exceptions, nuclear power has been at a standstill in Europe
since the late 1980s. The main exception, other than France, has been in
countries in which there has been construction directed toward completing
reactors started in the 1980s under Soviet inﬂuence. The operating reactors in
the former Soviet bloc as well as those under construction are primarily PWRs
of the Russian VVER series. The quality of construction and performance of
these reactors has varied among countries, and some of these reactors have
been viewed as constituting safety hazards. However, problems of air pollution
from coal burning are severe in Eastern Europe, and this may favor nuclear
power. Further, a number of these countries are heavily dependent on nuclear
energy for their electricity, and it would be diﬃcult to abandon it. For example,
the share of electricity in 2002 from nuclear power was 55% in the Slovak
Republic, 47% in Bulgaria, and 36% in Hungary (see Table 2.1).
Each of these countries has followed its own path, and we describe these
developments brieﬂy (with the number of operating reactors, as of the end of
2003, shown in parentheses):
◆ East Germany (0). The most draconian remedial measures were taken
following the merger of East and West Germany in 1990. The East German
reactors—primarily VVERs—were all removed from service, as not
meeting Western safety standards.
◆ Czech Republic (6). The division of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic
and Slovakia left four operating reactors in each, and two reactors under
construction in the Czech Republic (each about 900 MWe). One of these
reactors, Temelin 1, was connected to the grid in 2000. It was located near
the Austrian border and its operation was a source of contention with
Austria. The second, Temelin 2, was connected to the grid in December
2002.
◆ Slovakia (6). Slovakia completed construction of two 388-MWe VVERs in
the late 1990s and has put them both into commercial operation. Two
more remain nominally under construction.
◆ Bulgaria (4). Four 440-MWe PWRs of Soviet design were in operation
in Bulgaria at the time of Chernobyl, and two new 953-MWe Soviet-type
PWRs were brought on line in 1988 and 1992. The two oldest were permanently
shut down in December 31, 2002, reducing the total number of
reactors to four.
◆ Romania (1). Romania is an anomaly in Eastern Europe, and for that
matter a rarity in the world, in opting exclusively for Canadian-type heavy
water reactors. Five 625-MWe pressurized heavy water reactors of the
CANDU design were under construction in the early 1990s. One went into
operation in 1996, but only one of the other four reactors was listed as
being under construction in 2003 [3].
52 2 Nuclear Power Development
Other European Countries
Beyond this activity in Eastern Europe—essentially a cleanup of long-standing
projects—nuclear power development has almost stopped, or is in regression,
in Europe. Outside of France, the one new reactor built in Western Europe
in the 1990s was a 1188-MWe PWR (Sizewell B) that started operation in
the United Kingdom in 1995. The only other further step toward European
development of nuclear power was the decision of Finland in May 2002 to
build its ﬁfth reactor. There have been no tangible signs of other countries
following suit, as of early 2004.
Western Hemisphere (Other Than the United States)
Canada embarked on a large program of nuclear construction, mostly in the
late 1970s, and in 1995 had 22 operating reactors, all based on the CANDU
reactors, which have made Canada a leading country in nuclear capacity and
generation. However, in the 1990s, 8 of the 22 reactors in Canada were put
into a temporary “laid-up” status, one in 1995 and 7 in late 1997 and early
1998. These eight were the oldest ones in operation, all having started up in
the 1970s. This step was taken at the behest of Canada’s nuclear regulatory
authority to avoid a degradation of the “long-term safety and performance” of
Canada’s nuclear ﬂeet [34, p. 248]. However a 2003 IAEA summary suggested
that the eight closed plants “might re-start in the future” [3, p. 46], and
three of these reactors were back in service by early 2004 (Bruce 3 and 4
and Pickering 4). There are also nuclear reactors in use in Argentina, Brazil,
and Mexico, but these are small programs, with no imminent expansion plans
except for one reactor nominally under construction in Argentina.
Other Asian Countries
Beyond Japan, there are active ongoing nuclear programs in other Asian countries
(with number of operating reactors in parentheses):
◆ South Korea (18). South Korea is a relative late-comer to nuclear power,
but in recent years, it has had rapid growth. Since 1990, it has been second
only to Japan in the addition of new nuclear capacity and it plans further
expansion. It uses PWRs and heavy water reactors.
◆ India (14). India has followed a path of its own, and now has 12 small heavy
water reactors in operation—the largest with a capacity of 202-MWe—
and two small BWRs. Its eight plants now under construction include four
reactors similar to the existing ones and four that are larger, including—in
a new departure—two Russian designed 905-MWe PWRs.
◆ China (8). China’s civilian nuclear power program started comparatively
late. Its ﬁrst three reactors went into operation in 1994 and its next ﬁve
in 2002 and 2003. China has drawn on many diﬀerent foreign companies
in these ﬁrst stages, but is developing its own national capabilities.
2.7 Failures of Prediction 53
◆ Taiwan (6). Taiwan’s six operating reactors are a mix of PWRs and BWRs
with capacities ranging from 604 to 948 MWe [4]. They were all in operation
by 1985, giving Taiwan a relatively early nuclear program. There was
a subsequent lull, but construction is now underway on two 1350-MWe
advanced BWRs.
◆ Iran and North Korea (0). The plans to build civilian nuclear power plants
in these countries are intertwined with nuclear weapons proliferation issues,
and we discuss them further in Section 18.2.3.
Although recent construction activity in Asia has far exceeded that in
Europe and North America, it has not been very rapid compared either to
the size of the populations involved or to earlier history elsewhere. The United
States and Western Europe each still has a larger total nuclear capacity than
does Asia. The Asian countries that are pursuing nuclear power appear to
be doing this in a deliberate manner, not in the spirit of “crash programs.”
However, Asian nuclear leaders have an optimistic view of the future Asian
role (see Section 20.4.3).
2.7 Failures of Prediction
In the preceding discussions, the trends of events for nuclear power has been
reviewed, and such discussions may appear to suggest the nature of future
trends. However, any suppositions as to how nuclear power will develop over
1
10
100
1000
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
YEAR
NUCLEARCAPACITY(GWe)
ACTUAL
PROJECTED
ACTUAL
Fig. 2.5. Comparison of U.S. nuclear capacity, projected in 1972 and actual.
54 2 Nuclear Power Development
the next several decades should be viewed with caution. Past predictions have
been rife with errors, and there is no reason to assume we will do better today.
The changing fortunes of nuclear power in the United States oﬀers a cautionary
lesson. In Figure 2.5, we compare an early projection for the growth
of U.S. nuclear power with the actual subsequent developments. In 1972, the
Forecasting Branch of the AEC’s Oﬃce of Planning and Analysis made a projection
for future growth in nuclear capacity, based on past trends in energy
use and electricity capacity [35]. Its forecast for the “most likely” case are
shown in Figure 2.5, together with the actual history. The projected capacities
for 1990 and 2000 were 508 GWe and 1200 GWe, respectively. The actual
capacities for 1990 and 2000 were 100 GWe and 98 GWe, respectively [20,
p. 113].
This was a spectacular failure of prediction, but one that was in tune
with the conventional wisdom of the time. It is natural to speculate on the
implications for today. Alternatively, we can believe we now have the wisdom
to avoid comparable errors, or we can wonder what new predictive errors
are being made. We will return to considering the future of nuclear power in
Chapter 20.
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56 2 Nuclear Power Development
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