2
Hans Günter Brauch
2.1 Introduction1
The reconceptualization of security has been triggered
by the end of the Cold War, by the process of globalization,
and by the gradual transition from the
Holocene to the Anthropocene phase of earth history
(Brauch 2008, 2009, chap. 1 by Brauch/Oswald
Spring above). From a philosophical perspective, in
the contemporary security discussion the “dual moment
of prevention and compensation of genuinely
social and technical uncertainties” (Makropoulos
1995: 745–750) becomes decisive. These new uncertainties
are no manifest or latent dangers emerging
from individuals and societal groups that can be prevented
by police and political measures but ‘societal
risks’. This implies that security is no longer a situation
free of dangers, but rather an ‘insurance’ as a
‘technology of risks’ becomes a disposition of the social
steering of modern societies. With the shift of focus
from protection against concrete dangers towards
insurance in the context of abstract risks, security has
become “a general ‘societal idea of value’ (Wertidee)
and a universally employed ‘normative concept’, that
is used with different meanings in an affirmative manner”
(Makropoulos 1995: 749).
Today ‘security’ as a political value, at least in
Western thinking, has no independent meaning and is
related to individual or societal value systems. As a social
science concept, “security is ambiguous and elastic
in its meaning” (Art 1993: 820–22). Wolfers (1962)
pointed to two sides of the security concept: “Security,
in an objective sense, measures the absence of
threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the
absence of fear that such values will be attacked”.
From the perspective of social constructivist approaches
in international relations (Adler 1997;
Fearon/Wendt 2002; Risse 2003; Wendt 1992, 1999)
‘security’ is conceived as an outcome of a process of
social and political interaction where social values and
norms, collective identities and cultural traditions are
essential. From this perspective, security is always intersubjective
or “security is what actors make of it”
(Wendt 1992).
For Wolfers security refers to an absence of objective
dangers, i.e. of security ‘threats’, ‘challenges’, ‘vulnerabilities’
and ‘risks’, and of subjective fears or concerns,
and to the perception thereof. From a realist
perspective, objective security is achieved when the
dangers posed by manifold threats, challenges, vulnerabilities
and risks are avoided, prevented, managed,
coped with, mitigated and adapted to by individuals,
societal groups, the state or regional or global international
organizations. From a social constructivist approach,
security is achieved once the perception and
fears of security ‘threats’, ‘challenges’, ‘vulnerabilities’
and ‘risks’ are allayed and overcome. While objective
factors in the security perception are necessary, they
are not sufficient. Subjective factors influence security
perceptions. The perception of security dangers depends
on the worldviews or traditions of the analyst
(Bull 1977, Wight 1991) and on the mind-set of policymakers
(Booth 1979, 1987: 39–66) that have often distorted
the assessment of ‘new challenges’ and that
“freeze international relations into crude images, portray
its processes as mechanistic responses of power
and characterize other nations as stereotypes” (Booth
1987: 44; 1998: 28). Influenced by these worldviews
and mind-sets, security is a concept of s (Buzan/
Hansen 2009) and of peace and conflict research (Albrecht/Brauch
2008, 2009).
Since 1990 new debates have emerged between
traditional approaches, critical security studies, and
1 This chapter is based on several earlier papers of the
author most particularly on two reports he wrote for
UNU-EHS (Brauch 2005, 2005a), several chapters he
wrote for volume 39 of UNESCO’s Encyclopaedia of
Life Support Systems (Brauch 2007, 2007a, 2007b,
2007c), as well as on a contract report he wrote for
UNESCO (Brauch 2006, 2008a). The permission of
these institutions to use the previous material is kindly
acknowledged. The author appreciates the very useful
comments of three reviewers.
Concepts of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks
H.G. Brauch et al. (eds.), Coping with Global Environmental Change, Disasters and Security, Hexagon Series on Human 61
and Environmental Security and Peace 5, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-17776-7_2, © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011
62 Hans Günter Brauch
constructivist approaches. While national security has
the state as the major referent, human security has
human beings and humankind as the referent. The
answers to the questions of security for whom, from
whom, by whom, of what values, from what threats
and by what means differ fundamentally between
both concepts.
On the background of the observed widening,
deepening and sectorialization of the security concept,
this chapter reviews four objective security dangers
and subjective security concerns often referred to
as security ‘threats’ (2.2.), ‘challenges’ (2.3), ‘vulnerabilities’
(2.4) and ‘risks’ (2.5), and the use of these basic
concepts in different scientific research communities,
especially those working on global environmental
change, climate change, as well as hazards and disasters.
It discusses the relevance of these four concepts
for the ‘environmental’ security dimension (2.6) and
for ‘human security’ (2.7) approaches. The goal of this
chapter is to enhance synergies and to mainstream related
efforts to strengthen proactive policy initiatives
(2.8).
2.2 Reconceptualizing ‘Security
Threats’
2.2.1 ‘Threat’ as a Political Term
The English term ‘threat’, or ‘menace’ (Latin: ‘trudere’
or to push, thrust; French: ‘menace’; Italian: ‘minaccia’;
Spanish: ‘amenaza’ or: ‘conminación’; Portuguese:
‘ameaça’; German: ‘Drohung’ or ‘Bedrohung’)
refers to “a communication of a disagreeable alternative
to an individual or group by one in authority or
who pretends to be” (Koschnik 1992: 210). According
to Webster’s Dictionary a ‘threat’ is “1. a statement or
expression of intention to hurt, destroy, punish, etc.
in retaliation or intimidation”, and 2. “an indication
of imminent danger, harm, evil etc.; as, the threat of
war” (McKechnie 1979: 1901). Langenscheidt-Longman
(1995) defines ‘threat’ as: “1. a statement that you
will cause someone pain, unhappiness, or trouble…; 2.
the possibility that something very bad will happen
(famine, attack etc.)…; 3. someone or something that
is regarded as a possible danger”. For the Compact
Oxford English Dictionary threat means: “1. a stated
intention to inflict injury, damage, or other hostile action
on someone; 2. a person or thing likely to cause
damage or danger; 3. the possibility of trouble or danger”
(Soanes 2000: 1199). For the Shorter Oxford
English Dictionary threat refers to “1. A throng or
crowd of people; a troop, a band. … 2. Oppression,
compulsion; torment; distress, misery; danger. … 3. A
declaration of an intention to make some hostile action,
esp. a declaration of an intention to inflict pain,
injury, damage, or other punishment in retribution for
something done or not done. … An indication of the
approach of something unwelcome or undesirable; a
person or thing regarded as a likely cause of harm
etc.” (Oxford 5
2002: 3251). Thus, in the common use
of the term in contemporary British and American
English the word ‘threat’ has multiple meanings.
2.2.2 ‘Threat’ as a Scientific Concept
In security policy and studies ‘threat’ is used as a ‘political
term’ and as a ‘scientific concept’ that remains
undefined in many social science dictionaries. Robertson
(1987: 304–305) used the concept ‘threat assessment’
as an analysis of “the reasons behind an opponent’s
armament programmes” that was often made
during the Cold War “on a worst case basis”, where
“besides personnel and hardware totals” the opponent’s
strategic doctrine had also to be taken into ac-
count.
During the Cold War, within the framework of national
security, Buzan (1983: 57) pointed to a dual
threat to state institutions by force (capabilities) and
ideas (ideology). The state’s territory “can be threatened
by seizure or damage, and the threats can come
from within and outside of the state”. For Buzan different
components of the state are vulnerable to different
types of threats where strong states are primarily
threatened by outside forces while weak states
may be challenged both from within and outside.
From a national security perspective, Buzan (1983: 75–
83) distinguished between military threats (seizure of
territory, invasion, occupation, change of government,
manipulation of policy), economic threats (export
practices, import restrictions, price manipulations,
default on debt, currency controls etc., and
those to domestic stability), and ecological threats
(damaging the physical base of the state). These
threats, Buzan (1983: 88) argued, “define [the state’s]
insecurity, and set the agenda for national security as
a security problem”. These threats require to understand
the state’s vulnerabilities. Weapons development
as a combination of capabilities and intentions
has been semi-independent from threats. Dealing with
specific threats, an international security strategy focuses
on “the sources and causes of threats, the purpose
being not to block or offset the threats, but to reduce
63
or eliminate them by political action” (Buzan 1983:
218).
This type of ‘threat’ has disappeared in Europe
with the end of the East-West conflict in 1990, and
thus the threat perception has fundamentally
changed. Already during the first (1969–1975) and second
détente (1986–1989) the classic threat concept
lost in importance. Since 1990, threat is also defined
as referring to the dangers the planet earth is confronted
with due to the manifold destructive potentials
of the environment and its global and societal
consequences. Steiner (2001) pointed to the fundamental
change in the risks, dangers and threats since
1990, which has increased the dangers of violent domestic
wars and has reduced the effectiveness of arms
control regimes. But outside Europe, e.g. in the Middle
East, in South Asia or on the Korean Peninsula,
many of the old threats have not been overcome.
However, the increase in asymmetric forms of
warfare (Kaldor 1999; Kaldor/Vashee 1997; Münkler
2002, 2005), and of the increasing role of more
sophisticated and brutal non-state actors (or terrorist
networks) but also the negative global impacts of
uncontrolled financial activities (by greedy speculators
and hedge funds as a kind of ‘structural terrorism’2
with non-violent means provoking new forms of personal
and structural violence) have made the security
dangers more complex and the security risks less calculable
and predictable.
2.2.3 Redefining the Concept of ‘Threat’ to
Security since 1990
Two decades after the end of the Cold War, Buzan
and Hansen (2009: 11–12) referred to four key questions
that structure international security studies
(ISS) focusing on the state as the key referent object,
on including internal and external threats that have
been increasingly blurred by globalization, on the widening
beyond the military dimension and the use of
force and its close link to “a dynamic of threats, dangers
and urgency”. While during the Cold War a majority
of ISS focused on external threats, since its end
“ethnic conflict and civil wars came to the fore, so did
questions of domestic stability and cohesion (Posen
1993; Van Evera 1994; Kaufmann 1996)” (Buzan/
Hansen 2009: 29) that were discussed in the concept
of ‘societal security’ introduced by the Copenhagen
School (Wæver/Buzan/Kelstrup/Lemaitre 2003; Buzan/Wæver/de
Wilde 1998; Wæver 2008a).
The threat concept as the basis for military planning
and legitimating military programmes – at least
among many NATO countries – has fundamentally
changed after 1990. With the widening of the security
concept from the traditional military and diplomatic
security, to the new economic, societal and environmental
dimensions, the threat concept has also widened
and been applied to a series of new threats not
only to the ‘state’ but also to the other referents of
new security concepts, from human beings to global
security.
The early proponents of environmental security
have extended ‘threats’ from the military to the environmental
realm. Ullman (1983: 133) defined a national
security threat as “an action or sequence of
events that: 1) threatens drastically and over a relatively
brief span of time to degrade the quality of life
for the inhabitants of a state; or 2) threatens significantly
to narrow the range of policy choices available
to the government of a state or to private non-governmental
entities (persons, groups, corporations) within
the state”. For Mathews (1989) and Myers (1989,
1989a) the new security threats of the future included
population growth, resource scarcity, and environmental
degradation.
The Brundtland Commission (1987) also referred
to two great threats facing humankind: “The first is
that of nuclear exchange. … The second is that of environmental
ruin worldwide”. In 1988 President Gorbachev
stressed: “The relationship between man and
the environment has become menacing. … The threat
from the sky is no longer missiles but global warm-
2 The term ‘structural terrorism’ has been inspired by Galtung’s
(1969, 1975) differentiation between personal and
structural violence. This term has been used by Kapitan
(2004) for states: “States, in particular, accomplish such
structural terrorism by forcibly implementing or impeding
institutions, laws, policies, and practices that result
in harm to noncombatants.” F.H. Knelman: “Who Are
the Terrorists” (October 2001), in: Nuclear Peace Foundation;
at: <http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2001/
10/00_knelman_who.htm> (16 May 2010) referred to
“internal or structural terrorism derived from poverty,
disease, murder, hunger and deprivation of all kinds”.
The term ‘structural terrorism’ is used here in a different
meaning by pointing to non-state economic actors
and processes that have contributed to the worst global
financial crisis since 1929 and that have added with
speculation on food commodities to price hikes in basic
food staples and the resulting food riots causing many
casualties from protests and more who died of hunger.
Concepts of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks
64 Hans Günter Brauch
ing”. Brundtland (1993: 189–194) pointed to the new
‘threats’ to security that “may be caused by social unrest
caused by poverty and inequality, by environmental
degradation, by internal conflicts leading to new
flows of refugees”. She noted that “the pressure on
the environment from a rapidly growing world population
will increase the likelihood of such conflicts.
Climate change, desertification, deforestation, massive
loss of species and biological diversity, depletion
of freshwater resources and soil erosion are global
trends that are not sustainable”. As most serious she
saw “the threats to the world’s atmosphere”.
In 1992, Senator Al Gore referred to several environmental
threats from the local (tactical) to the global
(strategic) level such as global warming and ozone
depletion. In 1997, Eilen Claussen defined as global
environmental threats those “which are human-caused
and have, or can be expected to have serious economic,
health, environmental, and quality of life implications
for the United States”. Irrespective of the
application of this concept to environmental problems,
this author suggested to limit the threat concept
to hardware related military problems, and to describe
dangers posed by the environment as “environmental
security challenges, vulnerabilities and risks”
(Brauch 2005a, 2008a). However, in political practice,
e.g. in the US national security strategy papers (see
chap. 12 by Brauch below); this suggestion could not
be observed.
2.2.4 Application of a Widened Concept of
Security Threats
Several countries reacted in their national defence
white papers and national strategic documents to the
fundamental change in the nature of threats with an
extended security concept that included many new
non-military soft security threats such as: economic
vulnerabilities, environmental challenges, political and
societal instabilities (e.g. German Defence White Paper;
BMVg 1994: 25–26) pointing to a “multitude of
risk factors of a different nature with widely varying
regional manifestations”. The official German document
suggested that “risk analysis of future developments
must be based on a broad concept of security
… They must include social economic and ecological
trends and view them in relation to the security of
Germany and its allies.”3
In the United States, several national security strategy
papers of the Clinton administration have pointed
to the fundamental change in security threats (Matthew/Mc
Donald 2009). The administration of
George W. Bush in its Quadrennial Defense Review
Report (QDR) of 30 September 2001 announced: “to
shift the basis of defence planning from a ‘threatbased’
model that has dominated thinking in the past
to a ‘capabilities-based’ model in the future [that] …
focuses more on how an adversary might fight rather
than specifically who the adversary might be or where
a war might occur” (Brauch 2003b, chap. 12 by
Brauch). The first QDR of the Obama Administration
of 1 February 2010 referred to “Climate change and
energy [as] two key issues … in shaping the future security
environment”. It further acknowledged that
climate change could have significant geopolitical
impacts around the world, contributing to poverty, environmental
degradation, and the further weakening of
fragile governments. Climate change will contribute to
food and water scarcity, will increase the spread of disease,
and may spur or exacerbate mass migration. While
climate change alone does not cause conflict, it may act
as an accelerant of instability or conflict, placing a burden
to respond on civilian institutions and militaries
around the world. In addition, extreme weather events
may lead to increased demands for defense support to
civil authorities for humanitarian assistance or disaster
response both within the United States and overseas. …
DoD has undertaken environmental security cooperative
initiatives with foreign militaries that represent a
nonthreatening way of building trust, sharing best practices
on installations management and operations, and
developing response capacity (DoD 2010: 85).
The Pentagon now considers climate change as a
“legitimate national security concern” (Parthermore/
Rogers 2010), even though not yet specifically as a
‘national security threat’. This is also reflected in the
first National Security Strategy of the Obama Administration
(chap. 12 by Brauch).
The guarantee of “international peace and international
security” was emphasized in the Covenant of
the League of Nations (28 April 1919) and in the
United Nations Charter (26 June 1945) “to maintain
international peace and security”. But in 1919 and in
1945, “development” and “environment” were not yet
political concepts.
3 The most recent German Defence White Paper refers to
new opportunities as well as risks and threats posed by
globalization and it notes among the strategic framework
conditions “global challenges, opportunities, risks
and dangers” (BMVg 2006: 20–23) and lists among
them: globalization, terrorism, proliferation and armament
tendencies, regional conflicts, illegal arms trade,
impediments for development and fragile statehood,
transportation routes, resources, communication,
energy security, migration and pandemics.
65
The UN Charter distinguished among three security
systems: a universal system of collective security
(Chap. VI: Art. 33–38; Chap. VII: Art. 39–50); “regional
arrangements or agencies” (Chap. VIII: Art. 52
to 54); and a right of “individual or collective self-defence”
(WEU, NATO; WTO) in Art. 51. While the first
two systems deal with “threats to peace and international
security” from within, among member states,
the third is oriented against an outside threat. They
perform three functions: peaceful settlement of disputes,
peace enforcement and peacekeeping. Art. 1.1
of the UN Charter calls on its members “to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal
of threats to the peace, and for the suppression
of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace”,
“to develop friendly relations among nations” and “to
achieve international co-operation in solving international
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or
humanitarian nature”. The UN Charter relies on a
narrow ‘nation’-centred concept of ‘international
security’ and on a concept of ‘negative peace’, although
Art. 1.1, 1.2, and Art. 1.3 “indicate that peace is
more than the absence of war” (Wolfrum 1994: 50).
During the Cold War, collective self-defence prevailed
while collective security was paralysed (Brauch/
Mesjasz/Møller 1998). After 1990, collective security
was temporarily strengthened, but with the failure to
solve the Gulf War (1990–1991) and to cope with the
post-Yugoslav conflicts (1991–1999) within the framework
of the UN, NATO and the EU emerged as key
security institutions. Since 1990 the UN Security
Council decisions on humanitarian interventions and
the debate on ‘environmental’ and ‘human’ security
have moved beyond these constraints and also the
meaning of peace and security has significantly
changed (Bothe 2008).
The Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2 December
2004) reflects this widening of the ‘security’ concept
pointing to new tasks for the UN system in the
21st
century. In the new emerging security consensus,
collective security rests on three basic pillars (Synopsis
of the Report):
Today’s threats recognize no national boundaries, are
connected, and must be addressed at the global and
regional as well as the national levels. No State, no matter
how powerful, can by its own efforts alone make
itself invulnerable to today’s threats. And it cannot be
assumed that every State will always be able, or willing,
to meet its responsibility to protect its own peoples and
not to harm its neighbours. … Differences of power,
wealth and geography do determine what we perceive
as the gravest threats to our survival and well-being. …
Without mutual recognition of threats there can be no
collective security. … What is needed is nothing less
than a new consensus. … The essence of that consensus
is simple: we all share responsibility for each other’s
security.4
The High-level Panel distinguished among six clusters
of threats, ranging from economic and social threats
(including poverty, infectious disease and environmental
degradation, interstate and internal conflict,
weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and transnational
organized crime. Thus, for the first time “environmental
degradation” is listed among the threats
confronting the UN that require preventive action
“which addresses all these threats”. Development
“helps combat the poverty, infectious disease and environmental
degradation that kill millions and
threaten human security”. The High-level Panel (§ 53)
claims:
Environmental degradation has enhanced the destructive
potential of natural disasters and in some cases hastened
their occurrence. The dramatic increase in major
disasters witnessed in the last 50 years provides worrying
evidence of this trend. More than two billion people
were affected by such disasters in the last decade, and in
the same period, the economic toll surpassed that of
the previous four decades combined. If climate change
produces more flooding, heat waves, droughts and
storms, this pace may accelerate.
The High-level Panel notes that “rarely are environmental
concerns factored into security, development
or humanitarian strategies” and it points to the lack of
effective governance structures to deal with climate
change, deforestation and desertification, as well as to
the inadequate “implementation and enforcement” of
regional and global treaties. In the discussion of the
legitimacy of the use of military force, the High-level
Panel distinguishes between “harm to state or human
security”. Two of the 101 recommendations of the
High-level Panel deal with environmental issues, with
renewable energy sources and with the Kyoto Protocol.
The High-level Panel mentioned ‘human security’
several times, but its main focus remained on the
‘state’ as the cause and as a key actor in dealing primarily
with military and societal threats.5
4 See for download of the complete report and press
releases at: <http://www.un.org/secureworld/>.
5 For an assessment of the High-level Panel see von Einsiedel,
Nitzschke and Chhabra (2008); on the ‘security
development’ nexus see Sending (2008), Katseli (2008),
Klingebiel and Roehder (2008) and most recently see
Tschirgi, Lund and Mancini (2010).
Concepts of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks
66 Hans Günter Brauch
On 21 March 2005, in his own report: “In larger
freedom: towards development, security and human
rights for all”, Kofi Annan (2005) drew both on the
High-level panel and on the assessment of the Millennium
project. He analysed the three key goals of development
as ‘freedom from want’, of security as ‘freedom
from fear’, and human rights as ‘freedom to live
in dignity’. With regard to security, Annan (2005: 24)
noted a lack of consensus on the assessment of the
threat. He has listed among the present threats to
peace and security:
international war and conflict …, civil violence, organized
crime, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.
They also include poverty, deadly infectious disease and
environmental degradation since these can have equally
catastrophic consequences. All of these threats can
cause death or lessen life chances on a large scale. All of
them can undermine States as the basic unit of the international
system. … In our globalized world, the threats
we face are interconnected. The rich are vulnerable to
the threats that attack the poor and the strong are vulnerable
to the weak, as well as vice versa. A nuclear terrorist
attack on the United States or Europe would have
devastating effects on the whole world.
Following his High-level Panel, Annan discussed four
threats in detail: a) preventing catastrophic terrorism;
b) organized crime; c) nuclear, biological and chemical
weapons; and d) reducing the risk and prevalence
of war.
The European Union Security Strategy (European
Council 2003) also referred to five key threats: “terrorism,
weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts,
state failure, and organized crime”. But this
strategy also pointed to new global challenges and vulnerabilities
confronting the European Union. Since
2007, both the UN and the EU have repeatedly stated
that climate change poses new threats to international
security (chap. 1 by Brauch/Oswald Spring).
2.3 Reconceptualizing ‘Security
Challenges’ .
2.3.1 The Political Term of ‘Challenges’ for
Security
For ‘challenge’ (Lat.: ‘calumnia’, false accusation; Fr.:
‘defi’; Sp.: ‘desafío’, ‘reto’; Port.: ‘desafio’; It.: ‘sfida’;
Ger.: ‘Herausforderung’) the synonyms are “confrontation,
defiance, interrogation, provocation, question,
summons to contest, test, trial, ultimatum”, as well as
“questioning, dispute, stand opposition; difficult task,
test trial”. British English dictionaries offered these
meanings of the term challenge: “1. something difficult
… that tests strength, skill, or ability…; 2. questioning
rightness: a refusal to accept that something is
right and legal; 3. invitation to compete: a suggestion
to someone that they should try to defeat you in a
fight, game etc.; 4. a demand to stop: a demand from
someone such as a guard to stop and give proof who
you are, and an explanation of what you are doing”;
or: “a demanding task or situation”; as well as: “call to
try one’s skill or strength; demand to respond or identify
oneself; formal objection”; or: “a call to engage in
a fight, argument or contest; a questioning of a statement
or fact; a demanding or stimulating situation, career,
etc.”
2.3.2 The Political and Scientific Concept of
‘Security Challenges’
The term ‘challenge’ has often been used for security
and global issues but it has hardly been defined, and
in many cases it is used synonymously with ‘threat’
(chap. 12 by Brauch).6
Dodds and Schnabel (2001: 42–
43) pointed to ‘new’ and ‘non-traditional’ security
challenges as a major concern in the post-cold war security
environment. They argued “that the general
public’s conception of the security environment has
altered so dramatically as we enter the new millennium
is an indicator of how significantly this environment
may have actually changed”. They see as major
forces for the reconceptualization of security “the
increasing level of globalization” that “has engendered
a growing sense of vulnerability to … remote threats,
such as distant conflicts, contagions, crop failures and
currency fluctuations”.
2.3.3 Application of the Concept of ‘Security
Challenges’
Van Ginkel and Velásquez (2001: 58–70) pointed to
these environmental challenges: a) ozone depletion;
b) impact of toxic chemicals on the global ecosystem;
and c) increasing greenhouse emissions and their negative
reinforcements as well as to “uncertainty about
6 Security Challenges is the name of Australia’s leading
peer-reviewed journal on future security issues that
“reaches a wide audience of established military, government,
commercial and academic experts as well as upand-coming
younger players in the security field” that
aims for “innovative thinking about future challenges to
the security (broadly defined) of Australia and other
countries in the Asia Pacific region. See at: <http://
www.securitychallenges.org.au/index.html>.
67
the future and an element of surprise”, especially if
associated with natural and man-made environmental
disasters. They stressed eight sub-themes: “global environmental
governance, water, urbanization, industry
and sustainability, global food security, energy requirements
for the next millennium, global governance of
biological diversity, land degradation, and the atmos-
phere”.
In a report of the Trilateral Commission, Slaughter,
Bildt and Ogura (2004) tried “to integrate traditional
understandings of state security … with an appreciation
of the magnitude and importance of
‘global security issues’: terrorism, environmental degradation,
international crime, infectious diseases and
refugees”. They organized the many ideas and proposals
in five basic dichotomies: “State security versus human
security; hard versus soft interventions; legality
versus legitimacy; pre-emption versus prevention; and
states versus non-state actors” (Slaughter 2004).
The former director of the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Amb. Alyson
J.K. Bailes (2003; also chap. 6 below), in a talk on
“New Security Challenges for the EU” noted several
human security challenges confronting Europe: “such
as the collapse of the environment, pollution of food
and natural resources, human and animal disease and
genetic manipulation, employment, health care and
social security in general”. These are not just subjective
but also scientific perceptions. She referred to
many non-military, non-intentional threats, such as:
greenhouse effect, depletion of ozone, badly-handled
migration, ageing of the population, and an energy crisis
as well as the … case of a nuclear accident. …The lesson
is that many aspects of life in the EU which do fall
within the Union’s competence but are not normally
thought of as security matters are indeed highly relevant
to the survival and welfare of our populations, and the
more so precisely because of the high level of development
and interdependence we have attained. The … harmonized
approaches … should … be extended … to deal
e.g. with climatic damage (drought, heat, storm and
flood), major cases of pollution, and the interruption of
any type of energy supplies.
This comprehensive list of security challenges for the
EU in the post-Cold War period indicates a basic shift
since 1990 away from primarily military threats from
the rival superpower to a broad range of manifold
challenges from all dimensions of a widened security
concept. Security challenges may refer to less urgent
and sometimes non-violent soft security problems,
such as migration, human and drug trafficking. These
issues are less on the external and primarily on the internal
security agenda, and thus a topic for the home
and justice ministries and agencies, such as national
and international police organizations and of the
courts but also of non-governmental societal groups.
Migration may be a consequence of domestic conflicts
emerging from environmental degradation and
resource depletion but it will remain difficult to distinguish
push and pull factors.
2.4 Reconceptualizing ‘Security
Vulnerabilities’
While the concepts of threats and challenges are often
used synonymously for hard and soft security dangers,
the vulnerability concept has been utilized more
widely by many different policy and scientific communities
with different meanings.
2.4.1 The Political and Societal Term of
‘Vulnerability’
English dictionaries refer to these synonyms ‘vulnerability’
(Lat.: ‘vulnus’ or: ‘vulnerabilis’; Fr.: ‘vulnérabilité’;
It.: ‘vulnerabile’; Sp.: ‘vulnerabilidad’; Port.:
‘vulnerável’; Ger.: ‘Verwundbarkeit’) or ‘vulnerable’ as:
“accessible, assailable, defenceless, exposed, open to
attack, sensitive, susceptible, tender, thin-skinned, unprotected,
weak, wide open”; and: “1. in danger: in
peril, in jeopardy, at risk, endangered, unsafe, unprotected,
unguarded; wide open; undefended, unfortified,
unarmed, helpless, pregnable; 2. exposed to:
open to, liable to, prone to, prey to, susceptible to,
subject to, an easy target for; as well as: “non-immunity,
susceptibility, danger of, insecurity, exposure, nakedness,
helplessness”.
According to Webster’s ‘vulnerability’ is “the state
or property of being vulnerable” where vulnerable refers
to: “1. capable of being wounded or physically injured…;
2. open to criticism or attack…; 3. open to attack
or assault by armed forces. …; 4. in contract
bridge, liable to increase penalties and entitled to increased
bonuses”; or “the quality or state of being vulnerable”.
British dictionaries offer additional meanings:
“someone who is vulnerable is easily harmed or
hurt emotionally, or morally”; “susceptible to injury,
exposed to damage by weapon, criticism, etc.”; as well
as: “open to temptation, censure etc.”; as “unprotected
against attack; liable to be hurt or damaged”.
Concepts of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks
68 Hans Günter Brauch
2.4.2 Vulnerability as a Scientific Concept
The vulnerability concept is defined in encyclopaedias
in the geosciences where the referent object of ‘vulnerability’
are both human beings, especially children,
and the environment. The vulnerability concept is
used in the global change literature (Steffen/Sanderson/Tyson/Jäger/Matson/Moore
III/Oldfield/Richardson/Schellnhuber/Turner/Wasson
2004), on climate
change impacts (IPCC 2001a, 2007a) and in the
disaster community (ISDR 2004). Vulnerability results
from “poverty, exclusion, marginalization and inequities
in material consumption”, and it is generated by
“social, economic and political processes” (Barnett
2001: 132–133). In the context of the precautionary
principle O’Riordan (2002: 369) defined vulnerability
at the societal level as: “the incapacity to avoid danger,
or to be uninformed of impending threat, or to
be so politically powerless and poor as to be forced to
live in conditions of danger”.
For Oliver-Smith (2004: 10) “vulnerability is fundamentally
a political ecological concept”. As a theoretical
framework “vulnerability can become a key concept
in translating that multi-disciplinarity into the
concrete circumstances of life that account for a disaster”.
He argues that disasters “are channelled and distributed
in the form of risk within society to political,
social and economic practices and institutions”.
Wilches-Chaux (1989: 20–41, 1993) identified 11 types
of vulnerability, “natural, physical, economic, social,
political, technical, ideological, cultural, educational,
ecological and institutional vulnerability”. For OliverSmith
(2004: 11) “vulnerability is conceptually located
at the interaction of nature and culture” that also links
“social and economic structures, cultural norms and
values and environmental hazards”. He discussed four
questions: 1) the “general contributions of the cultural
construction of nature to the social production of disaster”;
2) “how the political and economic forms and
conditions that characterize vulnerability are inscribed
in an environment”; 3) “the relationship between cultural
interpretation and the material world of risk,
threat and impact of disasters”; and 4) “how do we
theorize the linkages among these three issues, particularly
in the context of current patterns of globalization”.
Nathan (2009: 1125) pointed to a dual vulnera-
bility:
on the one side … a tendency to undergo damages, i.e.
a state of fragility, or a set of conditions, that raise the
susceptibility of a community to the impact of a damaging
phenomenon. On the other side, vulnerability is an
incapacity to anticipate, cope with, resist to, adapt to
and recover from hazards. Vulnerable units are either
not resistant, i.e. not capable to withstand the shock
(without adapting); and/or not resilient, i.e. not capable
to absorb the shock and adapt to come back to an
acceptable state.
Nathan (2009: 1125) characterized vulnerability “as a
complex process encompassing multiple intricate
dimensions” that is constantly changing. In his view
vulnerability is:
often cumulative, causing disasters that in turn aggravate
it, or adding to vulnerabilities to other risks (such
as socio-economical risks, etc.). Furthermore, vulnerability
is both hazard-related … and subject-related. …
Therefore, one has to specify which vulnerability one is
talking about, and at which level of analysis (individual,
group, society). … Vulnerability is also highly differentiated:
different subjects, even at the same ‘level’, have different
vulnerabilities. … Generally, the most miserable
and isolated suffer most, as well as the less organized. …
Vulnerability is context-dependent, be it an individual
exposed to natural hazards at the household level, or
mankind at a global level. These ‘transversal’ features of
global vulnerability apply to each component of vulnerability
(Nathan 2009: 1125).
Nathan (2009: 1126) distinguished among two features
of vulnerability: exposure and insufficient capac-
ities.
a) physical exposure: presence and density of the people,
habitat, networks, goods and services in risk zones,
defining potential losses or damages, both human and
non-human (stakes); and b) socio-ecological: humaninduced
ecosystemic perturbations aggravating the natural
hazard – such as deforestation, land degradation,
street pavement, some engineering practices, climate
change, etc.
Furthermore, he pointed to “insufficient capacities to
prevent, prepare for, face and cope with hazards and
disasters” he separated as:
• physical weakness: physical incapacity to resist or
recover from a hazard’s impact;
• legal vulnerability: weak state of the legislative and
judiciary regulations to prevent, mitigate, prepare
for, face and recover from disasters;
• organizational vulnerability: weak state of the
organizational disposals, at all levels, to prevent,
mitigate, prepare for, face and recover from disas-
ters;
• technical vulnerability: inadequate knowledge
and/or use of risk management techniques;
• political vulnerability: weakness of the political
powers, their legitimacy and control. Inadequacy
of the control schemes, policies and planning, or
broad political conditions;
69
• socio-economical vulnerability: socio-spatial segregation,
large inequalities of wealth and of access
to the security disposals, misery, anomie and
social disorganization, poor social position and
social isolation of exposed people, existence of
higher social risks undergone by people;
• psychological and cultural vulnerability: inadequate
security paradigm or risk perceptions; cultural
anomie or weakness; attachment to risk
zones or risky behaviour, non-willingness or incapacity
to protect oneself (Nathan 2009: 1126).
Nathan (2009: 1126; see chap. 30 below) concluded
that “the overall vulnerability of an element (or stake)
to one or several hazards is a mix of these particular
vulnerabilities”.
Cardona (2004: 37–51; see also chap. 3 below) proposed
to rethink vulnerability and risk from a holistic
perspective arguing that in developing countries often
social, economical, cultural and educational aspects
are “the cause of the potential physical damage”. For
Cardona “vulnerability of human settlements is intrinsically
tied to different social processes. It is related to
fragility, susceptibility or lack of resilience of the exposed
elements. On the other hand, vulnerability is
closely linked to natural and human environmental
degradation at urban and rural levels”. Cardona
(2004: 49) argued that from a social view “vulnerability
signifies a lack or a deficiency of development”
that often contribute to “disaster vulnerability”. He
pointed out that population growth, rapid urbanization,
environmental degradation, global warming, international
financial pressures and war have all increased
vulnerability. Cardona argued that vulnerability
originates in:
• Physical fragility or exposure: the susceptibility of
a human settlement to be affected by a dangerous
phenomenon due to its location in the area of
influence of the phenomenon and a lack of physical
resistance;
• Socio-economic fragility; the predisposition to suffer
harm from the levels of marginality and social
segregation of human settlements, and the disadvantageous
conditions and relative weakness
related to social and economic factors; and
• Lack of resilience: an expression of the limitations
of access and mobilization of the resources of
human settlement, and its incapacity to respond
when it comes to absorbing the impact.
He pointed to the closely interrelated nature of efforts
reducing hazard or vulnerability, thus contributing
to risk reduction, and the possibility of future
disaster (chap. 3 by Cardona).
According to Heijmans (2004: 115–127) disaster
agencies have often focused on physical and economic
vulnerability. Based on the literature she distinguished
three strategies to address vulnerability:
1. Nature as cause technological, scientific solutions:
Reduce vulnerability by early warning systems,
technologies to withstand negative impacts
(monitor seismic activity, weather forecasting,
remote sensing for drought, fire, water control systems,
building codes, etc.).
2. Cost as cause economic and financial solutions:
Costly prediction and mitigation technologies;
reduction of vulnerability by national safety nets,
insurance and calamity funds.
3. Social structure as cause political solutions:
Socio-economic factors that generate vulnerability,
require political and development solutions that
transform the social and political structures breeding
poverty.
Heijmans (2004: 117ff.) discussed the conceptual relationship
between vulnerability and empowerment, argued
that the people’s perspectives are missing in all
three strategies, and also in the perception of vulnerability
by the aid agencies. According to Wisner (2004:
183–193) vulnerability is used in the hazard community
as:
• Structural engineering vulnerability;
• Lifeline infrastructural vulnerability;
• Communications systems vulnerability;
• Macro-economic vulnerability;
• Regional economic vulnerability;
• Commercial vulnerability; and
• Social vulnerability.
Wisner distinguished four approaches on social vulnerability:
a) demographic; b) taxonomic; c) situational;
and d) contextual or proactive approach. He
criticized that many studies on social vulnerability
have devalued local knowledge and coping capacities
and he supported efforts to empower people to reclaim
their local knowledge (chap. 52 by Laureano).
Frerks and Bender (2004: 194–205) argued that the
societal focus on vulnerability has shifted from disasters
as a natural event to exposure and a complex socially
constructed process.
Pelling (2003: 5; also in chap. 29) analysed the vulnerability
of cities to natural disasters and the role of
social resilience. He defined vulnerability as “exposure
to risks and an inability to avoid or absorb potenConcepts
of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks
70 Hans Günter Brauch
tial harm”, physical vulnerability as that “in the built
environment”, social vulnerability as that “experienced
by people and their social, economic and political
systems”, and human vulnerability as the combination
of “physical and social vulnerability”.
The ‘vulnerability’ concept has been widely used,
often with different meanings, by the global change
research (2.4.3), by the climate change (2.4.4), by the
natural hazard (2.4.5) and by the environment, development
and early warning community (2.4.6), while
the concept of ‘social vulnerability’ is intensively employed
both in the hazard and development research
and policy communities (2.4.7). The ‘vulnerability’
concept was also widely used in the security and strategic
community (2.4.8) while the concepts of ‘economic’
(Crawford 1992, 1993, 1995) and ‘financial’ vulnerability
have become crucial research and policy
objects for the economic and policy communities (see
chap. 5 and 6 by Czeslaw and Lidia Mesjasz).
2.4.3 Vulnerability as a Scientific Concept in
the Global Change Research
Community
Steffen, Sanderson, Tyson, Jäger, Matson, Moore III,
Oldfield, Richardson, Schellnhuber, Turner and Wasson
(2004) address the consequences of changes in
the Earth System due to human activities for human
well-being. The vulnerability concept offers a useful
framework for the study of consequences of global
change on human societies. Using a scenario-driven
approach they discuss linear projections and non-linear
surprises resulting from an integrated assessment
approach: “Scenario-driven approaches to impact assessment,
even the most sophisticated of the integrated
assessment methods, do not allow the vulnerability
or resilience of the impacted systems to be
assessed directly” (Steffen/Sanderson/Tyson/Jäger/
Matson/Moore III/Oldfield/Richardson/Schellnhuber/Turner/Wasson
2004: 204).
While impact assessment selects one specific environmental
stress and seeks to identify the most important
consequences for social and ecosystem properties
on environmental stress, vulnerability assessment
tries to assess the risk of diverse outcomes for a unit
of concern (e.g. landless farmers) “in the face of a variety
of stresses and identifies a range of factors that
may reduce response capacity and adaptation to stressors”
(Steffen/Sanderson/Tyson/Jäger/Matson/Moore
III/Oldfield/Richardson/Schellnhuber/Turner/Wasson
2004: 205). While impact assessment offers little guidance
among the many environmental stresses,
vulnerability assessment offers a maturing strategy to
provide such guidance. Vulnerability to global environmental
change has been conceptualized as the risk of
adverse outcomes to receptors or exposure units
(human groups, ecosystems and communities) in the
face of relevant changes in climate, other environmental
variables, and social conditions. … Vulnerability is
emerging as a multi-dimensional concept involving at
least exposure – the degree to which a human group or
ecosystem comes into contact with particular stresses;
sensitivity – the degree to which an exposure unit is
affected by exposure to any set of stresses; and resilience
– the ability of the exposure unit to resist or recover
from the damage associated with the convergence of
multiple stresses. … Vulnerability can increase through
cumulative events or when multiple stresses weaken the
ability of a human group or ecosystem to buffer itself
against future adverse events, often through the reduction
in coping resources and adaptive capacities (Steffen/Sanderson/Tyson/Jäger/Matson/Moore
III/Oldfield/Richardson/Schellnhuber/Turner/Wasson
2004:
205).
Steffen et al. (2004) point to the scale- and space-dependent
property of systems and thus differ on the local,
regional and global level. Complex vulnerability
analyses can address “multiple causes of critical outcomes
rather than only the multiple outcomes of a
single event”. Thus, scenario development becomes a
crucial element of vulnerability analysis. An important
precondition for the quantification of vulnerability parameters
could be vulnerability indicators. Along
these lines, Comfort, Wisner, Cutter, Pulwarty,
Hewitt, Oliver-Smith, Wiener, Fordham, Peacock and
Krimgold (1999) developed a “standardized all-hazards
vulnerability index”. Others have suggested an Index
of Human Insecurity (Lonergan/Gustavson/
Carter 2000). Steffen et al. (2004: 209) admit that the
current status of vulnerability research and assessment
“exhibit both a potential for substantial synergy in addressing
global environmental risks … as well as significant
weaknesses which undermine the potential”. A
major driver of GEC has been climate change where
the ‘vulnerability’ concept has been extensively dis-
cussed.
Brklacich, Chazan and Bohle (2010: 36–37) developed
“a conceptual framework for understanding human
vulnerability to GEC and other stressors” by
combining existing frameworks into a “comprehensive
human vulnerability-security model”. While human
vulnerability has been extensively researched
(Burton/Kates/White 1993; Mitchell 1989, 1990;
Emel/Peer 1989; Watts/Bohle 1993; Adger 1999) they
proposed to move “from a state of human vulnerability
to one of human security” (Bohle 2001; Twigg/
71
Bhatt 1998; O’Brien/Vogel 2004). Earlier Bohle
(2001) had pointed to the “double structure of vulnerability”
linking external or environmental with internal
or social vulnerability. While the external side
(structure) of vulnerability refers to exposure to social
and environmental stressors, the internal side
(agency) points to the policy response or the capacity
to mitigate, cope with, recover from, and adapt to
stressors with the goal to achieve human security.
While the ‘structure’ is influenced by the ecological
and geographic context, the ‘agency’ depends on the
institutional context and both rely on the distribution
of rights and resources as well as on the control over
and access to assets. For the analysis of the linkages
between human vulnerability and security they suggest
research on four interrelated drivers “control of and
access to assets, institutional factors, distribution of
rights and resources, and ecological and geographic
conditions” (Brklacich/Chazan/Bohle 2010: 42). These
drivers are influenced by environmental change
(change in type, frequency, and scale of environmental
threats) and by societal change (change in economic,
political, social and demographic conditions).
They concluded arguing that
Movement along the continuum from vulnerability to
security is most likely influenced by context-specific,
sure to threats, capacity for response, and socio-environmental
drivers. This contextual nature of vulnerability
supports trends towards micro-level approaches to vulIn
analysing the linkages between environmental
change and violent conflict, Barnett and Adger (2010:
120) listed among the factors affecting violent conflicts
besides poverty, migration, and weak states also
‘vulnerable livelihoods’ that directly influence water,
agricultural productivity, the frequency and intensity
of extreme events and the distribution of diseases.
“These affect livelihoods by exposing people to risks,
thereby increasing their vulnerability. The impacts are
more significant in sectors of the population with
high resource-dependency, and located in more environmentally
and socially marginalized areas.”
Barnett, Matthew and O’Brien (2010a: 308ff.)
pointed to several areas of future research on GEC,
vulnerability and human security, such as 1) social
causes of vulnerability (including gender differentiations)
to environmental change; 2) the mediating role
of perceptions between GEC and policy responses
and the roles of values, beliefs and worldviews, 3) the
interface of GEC and human health, 4) shift to peaceful
responses to the linkage of GEC and human security
(e.g. environmental peacemaking), 5) the impacts
of violent conflict on human security and vulnerability
to environmental change, 6) need for more consideration
to linkages among human rights, human security
and GEC, and 7) to reflect on the coping capabilities
and resilience of the affected people.
2.4.4 Vulnerability as a Political and Scientific
Concept in the Climate Research
Community
Climate change impacts, adaptation and vulnerability
have been analysed by the second IPCC working
group (1990, 1996a, 2001a, 2007a) whose mandate is
“to assess the vulnerability of ecological systems, socio-economic
sectors, and human health to climate
change”. The IPCC also distinguishes between sensitivity,
adaptive capacity and vulnerability (“the degree
to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to
cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including
climate variability and extremes”).
In The Regional Impacts of Climate Change: An
Assessment of Vulnerability, the IPCC (1998) explores
potential consequences of climate change for ten regions
based on “assessing sensitivities and vulnerabilities
of each region, rather than attempting to
provide quantitative predictions of the impacts of climate
change”, i.e. to assess “the extent to which climate
change may damage or harm a system” taking
into account the sensitivity of the region to climate
and the adaptive ability. The report tries to explain:
“how projected changes in climate could interact with
other environmental changes (e.g. biodiversity loss,
land degradation, stratospheric ozone depletion, and
degradation of water resources) and social trends (e.g.
population growth, economic development and
technological progress” (IPCC 1998: ix). It calls for
more research on “interlinkages among environmental
issues”. This IPCC report assessed the vulnerability
of natural and social systems of major regions to climate
change with qualitative methods. These regional
assessments focus on: a) ecosystems, b) hydrology
and water resources, c) food and fibre production, d)
coastal systems, human settlements, human health,
and other sectors or systems including the climate system
of relevance for the 10 regions analysed.
In the Third Assessment Report (TAR), the WG II
examines “climate change impacts, adaptations and
vulnerabilities of systems and regions” with the goal
“to provide a global synthesis of cross-system and
cross-regional issues”, and “in the context of sustainalocal
interactions between multi-scale stressors, expo-
49).
nerability assessment (Brklacich/Chazan/Bohle 2010:
Concepts of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks
72 Hans Günter Brauch
ble development and equity” (IPCC 2001a: 22–25). In
its regional assessment, the IPCC (1998) explores potential
consequences of climate change by “assessing
sensitivities and vulnerabilities of each region, rather
than attempting to provide quantitative predictions of
the impacts of climate change”. The IPCC cautions:
“The estimates … serve as indicators of sensitivities
and possible vulnerabilities” (IPCC 1998: 4). The report
suggests an “anticipatory adaptation in the context
of current policies and conditions” and so-called
“win-win” or “no-regrets” options by adding that:
“adaptation will require anticipation and planning. …
Additional analysis of current vulnerability to today’s
climate fluctuations and existing coping mechanisms
is needed.” As has been argued, the vulnerability concepts
in the GEC and in the climate change communities
have differed significantly from those concepts
that have been employed in the hazard research community,
but even within this research community conceptual
differences have existed.7
In the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), the WG
II has extensively used the concepts of ‘vulnerabilities’,
‘vulnerability assessment’ and ‘vulnerability hotspot’
(IPCC 2007a: 974–975) with regard to Africa,
Amazonia, Asia, Australia and New Zealand, Latin
America, coastal systems and mega-deltas. For the
AR4:
Vulnerability to climate change is the degree to which
geophysical, biological and socio-economic systems are
susceptible to, and unable to cope with, adverse impacts
of climate change. The term ‘vulnerability’ may therefore
refer to the vulnerable system itself (e.g. low-lying
islands or coastal cities), the impacts to this system (e.g.
flooding of coastal cities and agricultural lands or
forced migration), or the mechanisms causing these
impacts (e.g. disintegration of the West Antarctic ice
sheet). Based on a number of criteria in the literature
(i.e., magnitude, timing, persistence/reversibility, potential
for adaptation, distributional aspects, likelihood and
‘importance’ of the impacts, some of these vulnerabilities
might be identified as ‘key’. Key impacts and resultant
key vulnerabilities are found in many social, economic,
biological and geophysical systems (IPCC
2007a: 73).
These potential key vulnerabilities are to help decision-makers
to identify “levels and rates of climate
change that may be associated with ‘dangerous anthropogenic
interference’ (DAI) with the climate system”.
The Technical Summary of the AR4 also points
to the link with “systemic thresholds where non-linear
processes cause a system to shift from one major state
to another”. Besides these potential ‘tipping points’ of
the climate system (Lenton/Held/Kriegler/Hall/
Lucht/Ramstorf/Schellnhuber 2008) key vulnerabilities
may be linked to “‘normative thresholds’ defined
by stakeholders or decision-makers (e.g. a magnitude
of sea-level rise no longer considered acceptable by
low-lying coastal dwellers” (IPCC 2007a: 73). AR4 argues
that “some key vulnerabilities have been associated
with observed climate change”, such as “increases
in human mortality during extreme weather
events, and increasing problems associated with permafrost
melting, glacier retreat and sea-level rise”.
AR4 distinguished among three different climate
change regimes associated with a global mean temperature
increase of up to 2°C, between 2 to 4°C, and
above 4°C until the end of the 21st
century.8
With regard to security risks posed by climate
change, the WBGU (2008: 242) defined vulnerability
as “the susceptibility of a social group or (environmental)
system to crises and pressures” by distinguishing
between social and biophysical vulnerability.
The report of the UN Secretary-General on “Climate
change and its possible security implications” (UN-SG
2009: 1) approached this linkage “from a perspective
of interdependence between human vulnerability and
national security” and it identified ‘vulnerability’
among the five channels through which climate
change could affect security, arguing that “Climate
change threatens food security and human health, and
increases human exposure to extreme events,” especially
for the poor countries that “are among the most
vulnerable, and the best way to reduce their vulnerability
is to help lift them out of poverty”. The use of
the vulnerability concept by the climate community
7 There is an extensive literature on the vulnerability concept
as used by the climate change community, see e.g.
Füssel (2007); O’Brien, Eriksen, Nygaard and Schjolden
(2007); Roberts and Parks (2007); Adger (2006); Kates
and Millman (1990); Kates and Millman (1990); Füssel
and Klein (2006); Watts and Bohle (1993); Bohle (2001);
Bohle, Downing, Watts (1994); Ribot (1995); Turner II,
Matson, McCarthy, Corell, Christensen, Eckley, Hovelsrud-Broda,
Kasperson, Luers, Martello, Mathiesen,
Naylor, Polsky, Pulsipher, Schiller, Selin and Tyler (2003).
8 Table TS.8 in the Technical Summary of WG II of the
Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC (2007a: 74)
offers an overview of the key vulnerabilities of the global
social, regional, biological and geophysical systems
as well as of the risks from extreme events for global
average temperature changes from 0°C up to 5°C above
1990.
73
partly overlaps with its employment by the natural
hazard community.
2.4.5 Vulnerability as a Political and Scientific
Concept in the Hazard Research
Community
From the perspective of the hazard research community,
Blaikie, Cannon, Davis and Wisner (1994) redefined
vulnerability commonly used as “being prone to
or susceptible to damage or injury”. Their working
definition is:
By ‘vulnerability’ we mean the characteristics of a person
or group in terms of their capacity to anticipate,
cope with, resist, and recover from the impact of a natural
hazard. It involves a combination of factors that
determine the degree to which someone’s life and livelihood
is put at risk by a discrete and identifiable event in
nature or in society. … We use the term to mean those
who are more vulnerable. When used in this sense, the
implied opposite of vulnerable is sometimes indicated
by our use of the term secure. … Our definition of vulnerability
has a time dimension built into it. Since it is
damage to livelihood and not just life and property that
is at issue, the more vulnerable groups are those that
also find it hardest to reconstruct their livelihoods following
disasters. … Our focus on vulnerable people
leads to give secondary consideration to natural events
as determinants of disasters. Normally, vulnerability is
closely correlated with socio-economic position.
In the context of the research on hazards the concept
of vulnerability assessment was used to refer to an:
“evaluation of the sensitivity of a particular ecosystem,
resource or activity to a broad range of environmental
and socio-economic stresses” (Bass 2002: 346–347).
According to Hewitt (2002: 299) a vulnerability
perspective “considers especially how communities
are exposed to dangers, the ways in which they are
readily harmed, and the protection that they lack”.
Vulnerability to a hazard is to a large extent created by
the respective social order on the division of labour,
cultural values and on legal rights. Thus, according to
Hewitt (2002: 300), vulnerability is a “relative condition,
and can only be defined and assessed in relation
to the safety which others actually enjoy”.9
The International Strategy on Disaster Reduction
(ISDR 2002: 24, 342) defined vulnerability “as a set
of conditions and processes resulting from physical,
social, economical, and environmental factors, which
increase the susceptibility of a community to the impact
of hazards”. These conditions are shaped “continually
by attitudinal, behavioural, cultural, socio-economic
and political influences at the individuals,
families, communities, and countries”. Vulnerability is
closely linked to development.
Physical factors include the location and susceptibility
of the built environment and are often influenced
by the “density levels, remoteness of a settlement,
its sitting design and materials used for critical
infrastructure and for housing”. Among the social factors,
at the level of individuals, communities and society,
ISDR (2002: 47) listed “levels of literacy and education,
the existence of peace and security, access to
basic human rights, systems of good governance, social
equity, positive traditional values, knowledge
structures, customs and ideological beliefs, and over
all collective organizational systems”. Vulnerability
highly depends on economic factors, including poverty,
“individual, community and national economic
reserves, levels of debt and the degree of access to
credit and loans as well as insurance”, but also access
to communication networks and socio-economic infrastructure.
Finally, among the ecological factors,
ISDR (2002: 47, 60) referred to the “very broad range
of issues in the inter-acting social, economic and ecological
aspects of sustainable development as it relates
to disaster risk reduction” and distinguished among:
“1) the extent of natural resource depletion; 2) the
state of resource degradation; 3) loss of resilience of
the ecological systems; 4) loss of biodiversity; and 5)
exposure to toxic and hazardous pollutants.”
Efforts to increase the ability of people “to cope
effectively with hazards, and that increase their resilience,
or that otherwise reduce their susceptibility, are
considered as capacities” (ISDR 2002: 23–24). Vulnerability
to hazards is higher in many developing countries,
where they are “exacerbated by socio-economic
and environmental conditions”, including “the occupation
of hazard-prone areas, the concentration of industrial
infrastructure and critical facilities” (ISDR
2002: 62–64).
For disaster reduction, vulnerability and capacity
assessment is essential (ISDR 2002: 69–78) which was
addressed initially by the ISDR Interagency Task
Force Working Group 3 on Risk, Vulnerability and Impact
Assessment which has become the Global Platform
for Disaster Reduction.10
A lot of work has been
9 See for more recent literature on vulnerability and disasters:
Cannon (2000); Downing (1991); Kasperson, Dow,
Archer, Caceres, Downing, Elmqvist, Eriksen, Folke,
Han, Iyengar, Vogel, Wilson and Ziervogel (2005);
Smucker and Wisner (2008); Cannon, Twigg and Rowell
(N.d.. 2003?); Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon and Davis
(2
2004).
Concepts of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks
74 Hans Günter Brauch
done on methodologies and instruments for Vulnerability
and Capacity Assessment (VCA) and in the
framework of a Capabilities and Vulnerability Analysis
(CVA), together with the International Federation
of the Red Cross (IFRC 2002) as a major proactive
promoter. The ISDR (2002: 78) considered hazard,
vulnerability and capacity as “the operational basis for
a culture of prevention” with four priority areas:
• Risk assessment for decision-making;
• Terminology, data and methodology;
• Higher visibility and priority to reduce vulnerability
and strengthen capacities; and
• Addressing new trends in hazard and vulnerability.
ISDR (2002) defined vulnerability as: “a set of conditions
and processes resulting from physical, social,
economical and environmental factors, which increase
the susceptibility of a community to the impact
of hazards”, while UNDP (2004) stressed “a human
condition or process resulting from physical, social,
economic and environmental factors, which determine
the likelihood and scale of damage from the impact
of a given hazard”. The ISDR (2002) definition
juxtaposed vulnerability with its complementary component
capacity, which is defined as “a combination
of all strengths and resources available within a community
or organization that can reduce the level of
risk or the effects of a disaster”.
Bohle (2001, 2002) distinguished between external
(environmental) and internal (human) vulnerability,
thus clearly identifying vulnerability as a potentially detrimental
social response to environmental events and
changes. Vulnerability can cover susceptibilities to a
broad range of possible harms and consequences; it
implies a relatively long time period, certainly exceeding
that of the extreme event itself, which might have triggered
its exposure. This interpretation of vulnerability is
unavoidably related to resilience, the ability to return to
a state similar to the one prevailing prior to the disaster.
Thus, vulnerability is not only ill-defined, but its manifestation
and magnitude depend on many partially
unknown factors and their coincidence.
Plate (2002) recommended a critical index of vulnerability
measured as the distance between the part of
the GNP per person needed for maintaining minimum
social standards and the available GNP per person.
This index would focus on the financial resources
available within a society or a community, or
even an individual household that can reduce the effect
of a disaster. This vulnerability measure would
cover only some problems, while the environmental
dimension cannot adequately be expressed in monetary
terms.
Bogardi and Birkmann (2004) analysed the potential
of vulnerability assessment for sustainable risk reduction,
given the uncertainty of the vulnerability concept
that was defined by Wisner (2002) as the
“likelihood of injury, death, loss, disruption of livelihood
or other harm in an extreme event, and/or unusual
difficulties in recovering from such effects”. They
call for more direct indicators of national and regional
scale which could be linked to strategic goals and
instruments of vulnerability assessment. For them “an
interdisciplinary approach will be essential to take
into account economic, social and environmental consequences
as well as different objects of protection
(individual, community features). While the potential
economic losses caused by floods can often be quantified
and estimated, methods and data to measure social,
cultural, institutional and environmental features
of vulnerability and coping capacity are still not sufficiently
developed”. The vulnerability concept has also
been used by those researchers who have worked on
early warning of hazards while other concepts have
been used by those who work on early warning of
conflicts.
With regard to cities, for Satterthwaite, Huq, Reid,
Pelling and Romero Lankao (2009: 19):
vulnerability to climate change is understood to mean
the potential of people to be killed, injured or otherwise
harmed by the direct or indirect impacts of climate
change. This is most obvious with regard to risk from
extreme events (such as storms or floods); but it
includes risk from direct impacts – for instance, declining
freshwater availability or livelihoods dependent
upon climate sensitive resources.
Sherbinin, Schiller and Pulsipher (2009: 131) framed
vulnerability of global cities to climate hazards as “the
degree to which a system or unit is likely to experience
harm due to exposure to perturbations or
stresses”. They argued that by using this concept it became
clear
that the ability of a system to attenuate stresses or cope
with the consequences through various strategies or
10 See at: <http://www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/
GP/>. The Global Platform is the main global forum for
representatives of governments and other stakeholders
… to: 1. Assess progress made in implementation of the
Hyogo Framework for Action. 2. Enhance global awareness
of disaster risk reduction. 3. Share experiences
among countries and learn from good practice. 4. Identify
remaining gaps and actions needed to accelerate
national and local implementation of the Hyogo Frame-
work.
75
mechanisms constituted a key determinant of system
response, and ultimately, of system impact. … Vulnerability
in the social sciences is typically identified in terms
of three elements: systems exposure to crises, stresses
and shocks; inadequate system capacity to cope; and
consequences of attendant risks of slow (or poor) system
recovery. … The most vulnerable individuals,
groups, classes and regions or places are those that
experience the most exposure to perturbations or
stresses; are the most sensitive to perturbations or
stresses (i.e. most likely to suffer from exposure), and
have the weakest capacity to respond and ability to
recover.
They aimed at ‘gap analysis’ of areas of exposure and
vulnerability pointing “to areas of greatest need for
strengthened adaptive capacity and risk management”
(Sherbinin/Schiller/Pulsipher 2009: 132). By linking a
scenario-based ‘top-down’ approach with ‘bottom-up’
assessments using vulnerability mapping techniques
they reached a better understanding “of likely future
climate impacts while assessing the resilience of the
current socio-ecological system in the face of bundles
of stresses that are partly related to climate impacts
and partly to fragilities in the system itself” (Sherbinin/Schiller/Pulsipher
2009: 152).
In an extensive review of the vulnerability concept
in disaster management, environmental change and
development research, Birkmann (2006: 16) stated
that “the concept is still somewhat fuzzy and often
used with different connotations” and that it would
be “misleading to try to establish a universal definition”.
In his review of the literature, Birkmann (2006:
17–39) distinguished among five key spheres of the
vulnerability concept: a) vulnerability as an internal
risk factor (intrinsic vulnerability); b) vulnerability as
the likelihood to experience harm (human centred);
c) vulnerability as a dualistic approach of susceptibility
and coping capacity; d) vulnerability as a multiple
structure: susceptibility, coping capacity, exposure,
adaptive capacity; and e) multi-dimensional vulnerability
encompassing physical, social, economic, environmental
and institutional features. After a review of the
different conceptual and analytical frameworks pertaining
to vulnerability Birkmann (2006: 39–40) distinguished
among at least six different schools:
• the school of the double structure of vulnerability
(Bohle 2001, 2002);
• the analytical framework for vulnerability assessment
of the disaster risk community (Davidson
1997; Bollin/Cárdenas/Hahn/Vatsa 2003);
• the analytical framework for vulnerability assessment
in the global change community (Turner/
Kasperson/Matson/McCarthy/Corell/Chris-
tensen/Eckley/Kasperson/Luers/Martello/Polsky/Pulsipher/Schiller
2003);
• the school of political economy, which addresses
the root causes, dynamic pressures and unsafe
conditions that determine vulnerability (Wisner/
Blaikie/Cannon/Davis 2004);
• the holistic approach to risk and vunerability
assessment (Cardona 1999a, 2001, chap. 3 below;
Cardona/Barbat 2000; Carreño/Cardona/Barbat
2004, 2005a, 2005b);
• the BBC conceptual framework, which places vulnerability
within a feedback loop system and links
it to the sustainable development discourse (Bogardi/Birkmann
2004; Cardona 1999, 2001).
However, the use of the ‘vulnerability concept’ has
not been limited to these six schools but it was also in
the broader environment, development and early
warning community (2.4.6) and in peace research and
security studies (Albrecht/Brauch 2008, 2009; Buzan/
Hansen 2009) and in security policy both during the
Cold War period and less in the post-Cold War US national
security strategy documents (chap. 12 by
Brauch).
2.4.6 Vulnerability in the Environment,
Development and Early Warning
Community
The vulnerability concept has also been widely used in
the broader environment, in the development
(Naudé/Santos-Paulina/Mc Gillivray 2009) and also
in the two early warning communities with regard to
natural hazards and conflicts and by officials in the respective
offices of international organizations
(UNDP, UNEP, UNISDR et al.).
Pascal Peduzzi (2000: 2), head of the Early Warning
Unit at UNEP/DEWA/GRID-Europe and of a
team of authors have contributed together with
UNEP to the development of key indicators for ‘global
vulnerability and risk mapping’. Initially he defined
risk as “a measure of the expected losses due to hazard
event of a particular magnitude occurring in a
given area over a specific time period” (Tobin/Montz
1997) and vulnerability as “the degree of loss to each
element should a hazard of a given severity occur”
(Coburn/Spence/Pomonis 1991: 49) and as the “expected
percentage of population loss due to socio-politico-economical
context”.
In their feasibility study report on “Global Risk
and Vulnerability Index”, Peduzzi, Dao, Herold, Rochette
and Sanahuja (2001) and their ‘GRAVITYTeam’
defined vulnerability as: “the extent to which a
Concepts of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks
76 Hans Günter Brauch
community, structure, service or geographic area is
likely to be damaged or disrupted by the impact of a
particular hazard” (Tobin/Montz 1997). They separated
vulnerability into geophysical (low evaluation
along the sea, high vulnerability to Tsunami), socioeconomical
parameters (cultural, technical, economic
factors using indicators as: GDP, literacy, life expectancy,
corruption, population density, and (urban population
growth), and mitigation capacities.
Vulnerability cannot be directly measured but estimated
“by a set of socio-economic variables and compared
to actual disaster losses as reported by CRED”
(Centre for Research on Epidemiology of Disasters in
Louvain, Belgium). It “measures how easily the exposed
people, physical objects and activities may be
affected in the short or long-term”. Vulnerability can
be defined as “what turns a hazard into a disaster”
(Peduzzi/Dao/Herold/Rochette/Sanahuja 2001: 45).
They distinguish between economic (impact of a disaster
on the economy), human (human losses and injuries)
and social vulnerability (social structure influences
the impact of a hazard, e.g. on women, families
etc.). Vulnerability is specific to a hazard and a region.
To measure vulnerability they used disaster data (especially
on observed damages) from the CRED database
and socio-economic indicators.
In their report on “Phase II: Development, analysis
and results” Peduzzi, Dao, Herold (2002: 4–5) and
the GRAVITY-Team noted that the vulnerability concept
“is perhaps the most difficult to approach”
(Coburn/Spence/Pomonis 1991: 49) and “depends on
socio-politico-economical context of this population”
where vulnerability factors are “socio-economic factors
having an influence on the level of losses for a
given hazard type”.
In their report on “Phase III: Drought analysis”,
Peduzzi, Dao, Herold and Muton (2003: 4–5) and the
GRAVITY-Team focused both on the natural and
human induced (conflicts, bad governance) causes of
this complex hazard and developed indicators for
drought and food insecurity. They distinguished
among eight vulnerability indicators, which they
grouped as a) economic (GDP, HDI); b) type of economic
activities (percentage of agriculture’s dependency
for GDP, of labour force in agricultural sector);
c) dependency and quality of the environment
(human induced soil degradation: GLASOD); d)
development (HDI); and e) health and sanitation
(percentage of people with access to safe water, mortality
rate of under five-year-olds).
In their report on “Phase IV: Annex to WVR and
Multi Risk Integration”, Dao and Peducci (2003: 1)
described the “concepts, data and methods applied to
achieve the Disaster Risk Index (DRI)”. They offered
two definitions of vulnerability. The first is reflecting
“the range of potentially damaging events and their
statistical variability at a particular location” (Smith
1996), and the second is pointing to “the degree of
loss to each element should a hazard of a given severity
occur” (Coburn/Spence/Pomonis 1991: 49). As a
specificity of their research they noted “the discrepancies
of casualties induced by different vulnerabilities
are used to identify socio-economical indicators reflecting
such vulnerabilities”.
They also broadened the scope of their vulnerability
indicators and distinguished them for two types of
hazards: drought, and floods, cyclones and earthquakes;
and nine categories of vulnerability: 1) economic
(GDP, HDI, debt, inflation, unemployment);
2) type of economic activities (arable land, urban population,
percentage of agriculture’s dependency for
GDP, of labour force in the agricultural sector); 3) dependency
and quality of the environment (forests,
woodlands, per cent of irrigated land, human induced
soil degradation: GLASOD); 4) demography (population
growth, urban growth, population density, age
dependency ratio); 5) health and sanitation (calorie
supply per person, access to sanitation, safe water,
physicians, hospital beds, life expectancy, mortality
rate of under five year of age); 6) politics (corruption);
7) early warning capacity (number of radios); 8) education
(illiteracy, school enrolment, secondary, labour
force with primary, secondary or tertiary education);
and 9) development (HDI).
The UNDP (2004) report on Reducing Disaster
Risk – A Challenge for Development includes a Disaster
Risk Index (DRI) – developed by the GRAVITYTeam
– which provides decision-makers with an overview
of risk and vulnerability levels in different countries.
This risk is measured in terms of the number of
deaths during disasters. The Report has defined ‘human
vulnerability’ as a
human condition process resulting from physical, social,
economic and environmental factors, which determine
the likelihood and scale of damage from the impact of
a given hazard. In the DRI, human vulnerability refers to
the different variables that make people more or less
able to absorb the impact and recover from a hazard
event. The way vulnerability is used in the DRI means
that it also includes anthropogenic variables that may
increase the severity, frequency, extension and unpredictability
of a hazard (UNDP 2004: 98).
Based on their previous work, Dao and Peducci
(2004) discussed methodological aspects of the Disaster
Risk Index (DRI) in the UNDP (2004) report on
77
Reducing Disaster Risk. The report is based on the
assumption “that differences in risk levels faced by
countries with similar exposures to natural hazards
are explained by socio-economic factors, i.e. by the
population’s vulnerability” with a special focus on “socio-economical
indicators reflecting human vulnerability
to hazards”. They used a total of 38 variables dealing
with economic features, dependency on environment
quality, demography, health and sanitation,
politics, infrastructure, early warning and capacity of
response, education and development, and they discussed
the global risk and vulnerability patterns for
four hazards: cyclones, droughts, earthquakes, and
floods. The concept ‘social vulnerability’ has been extensively
used both in the development and in the hazard
community.
2.4.7 ‘Social Vulnerability’ in the Hazard and
Development Research and Policy
Community
‘Social vulnerability’ has been used in many definitions
in the hazard research community to distinguish
the social and societal factors from the manifold physical,
economic, political and human aspects (Adger
1999; Cutter/Boruff/Shirley 2003; Downing/Patwardhan
2005; Warner 2007). In the development policy
community in the UK, a DFID (Department for International
Development) White Paper (1997) and a policy
paper (1999: 4) focused on socio-economic factors
that made people vulnerable to disasters. It listed
among its humanitarian policy goals “to save lives and
relieve suffering, hasten recovery, and protect and
rebuild livelihoods and communities, and reduce risks
and vulnerability to future crises” thus stressing the
link between “the sustainability approach and vulnerability
reduction”. Cannon, Twigg and Rowell (2003:
4) argue that vulnerability analysis can “become an
integral part of humanitarian work … [and] enable
[this] work to be more closely integrated with the SL
[sustainable livelihood] approach, by using vulnerability
analysis in both the operation of emergency preparedness
and reducing poverty”. In their view:
[V]ulnerability should involve a predictive quality: it is
supposedly a way of conceptualizing what may happen
to an identifiable population under conditions of particular
risks and hazards. … VA should be capable of directing
development aid interventions, seeking ways to protect
and enhance peoples’ livelihoods, assist vulnerable
people in their own self-protection, and support institutions
in their role of disaster prevention (Cannon/
Twigg/Rowell 2003: 4).
Disasters occur when a natural hazard affects a population
unprepared to recover without assistance. The
impacts of hazards differ for people at different levels
of preparedness, resilience, and with varying capacities
for recovery.
Vulnerability … involves much more than the likelihood
of their being injured or killed by a particular hazard,
and includes the type of livelihoods people engage in,
and the impact of different hazards on them. … Social
vulnerability is the complex set of characteristics that
include a person’s
• initial well-being (nutritional status, physical and
mental health, morale);
• livelihood and resilience (asset pattern and capitals,
income and exchange options, qualifications);
• self-protection (the degree of protection afforded by
capability and willingness to build safe home, use
safe site);
• social protection (forms of hazard preparedness provided
by society more generally, e.g. building codes,
mitigation measures, shelters, preparedness); and
• social and political networks and institutions
(social capital, but also role of institutional environment
in setting good conditions for hazard precautions,
peoples’ rights to express needs and of access
to preparedness) (Cannon/Twigg/Rowell 2003: 5).
According to the DFID study, the vulnerability conditions
are distant from the impact of a hazard. Vulnerability
variables are connected with peoples’ livelihoods
and poverty. Thus, development work should
reduce disaster vulnerability and make people become
more resilient to hazards by
• the strengthening of peoples’ ‘base-line’ conditions
(nutrition, health, morale …);
• reinforcement of their livelihood and its resilience
to possible hazard impacts;
• peoples’ own efforts … to reinforce their home
and workplace against particular hazards;
• or by access to proper support … by institutions of
government or civil society (Cannon/Twigg/ Rowell
2003: 6).
Livelihoods are influenced by social and political networks
that may have varying levels of cohesion and
resilience in the face of hazards. When disasters
occur, relief and recovery is tied with the restoration
of livelihoods, and the strengthening of self-protection.
Vulnerability can be seen as a term that encompasses
all levels of exposure to risk. There are two
separate approaches to vulnerability and capacity. The
first conceives people who have a high degree of vulnerability
and are low in capacity. The second perceives
them as two distinct sets of factors. A capacity
Concepts of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks
78 Hans Günter Brauch
might include institutional membership, group cohesion
or literacy. Vulnerability can include poverty,
house quality, or illiteracy. Some capacities are not the
opposite of vulnerabilities, and some low-level vulnerability
characteristics are not amenable to being considered
capacities.
The concept of ‘capabilities’ (Sen 1981, 1999;
Comin/Qizilbash/Alkire 2008) emerged in response
to the term ‘vulnerability’. It was suggested that speaking
of people as being vulnerable ignored many capacities
which make them competent to resist hazards.
Some characteristics may be considered capacities
when they score well, and vulnerabilities when they
score badly, even when they are in fact opposite ends
of a scale. There can be high and low levels of vulnerability
without implying victimhood.
One of the reasons why capacities seem to be often
separated from vulnerability is that capacities are
regarded as dependent on groups or some form of social
organization, while vulnerabilities are socially-determined.
One way around the problem is simply to
acknowledge that high capacities likely reduce the vulnerability.
If we accept that measuring vulnerability includes
any factor or process that can alter the exposure
of a person or household to risk, then capacities
can also be considered as scaled factors leading to
greater danger (vulnerability) when they are low, and
reduced danger when they are high.
Vulnerability analysis offers DFID the opportunity
to integrate development work with disaster preparedness,
prevention and recovery. By adopting a vulnerability
assessment (VA) approach, disaster prevention,
preparedness and recovery work should be
integrated with development work. With VA as a
means of integrating its development and disaster
work, DFID may also be able to foster a better integration
and convergence of the wide range of vulnerability
and capacity methods what can assist in its
work of creating partnerships.
Since 2005, the MunichRe Chairs on Social Vulnerability
of UNU-EHS have made significant contributions
to the theoretical and conceptual development
of social vulnerability, in relation to Gender and
Disasters (Oswald Spring 2008, 2001), on Livelihoods
and Human Security in Risky Environments (Bohle
2007), and on Sea Level Rise and the Vulnerability of
Coastal Peoples (Oliver-Smith 2009) and on Nature,
Society, and Population Displacement (Oliver-Smith
2009a). In the first three summer academies of UNUEHS,
PhD candidates from many disciplines and all
parts of the globe provided theoretical and empirical
inputs to the debate on social vulnerability with a
focus on Perspectives on Social Vulnerability (Warner
2007); on Megacities - Resilience and Social Vulnerability
(Bohle/Warner 2008) and on Linking Environmental
Change, Migration & Social Vulnerability
(Oliver-Smith/Shen 2009).11
From the review of many scientific vulnerability
concepts used in the global change, climate change,
hazard, environment, development and early warning
communities no consensus has emerged on a definition,
on criteria and indicators for the measurement
of vulnerability. For the hazard community, vulnerability
is the combination of additional contributing factors
causing a hazard due to natural variability or human
inducement to a disaster. The selection and
inclusion of these contributing factors is configured
by the worldview, mind-set, perception, the theories
and models of the analyst. Thus, vulnerability is always
socially constructed. ‘Vulnerability’ is how the
analyst or policy-maker has defined it, and which definition
has become accepted by a consensus within
the respective research community.‘
2.4.8 The Vulnerability Concept in Strategic
and Security Studies
During the Cold War period, the concept of vulnerability
was widely used for technical systems (e.g. of
the land based strategic deterrent with regard to both
intercontinental bombers and fixed land-based
ICBMs), critical military and command, control and
communication infrastructure but also of urban centres
and the highly sensitive industrial and transportation
systems. Since the global turn of 1990, at least in
US national security guidance papers this concept has
been used much less and with a specific meaning
(chap. 12 by Brauch).
2.5 Reconceptualizing ‘Security
Risks’
2.5.1 The Term ‘Risk’
For the term ‘risk’ (Lat.: ‘risicare’ navigate around
cliffs; Fr.: ‘risque’; It.: ‘risico, risco’; Sp.: ‘riesgo’; Port.:
11 Selected contributions by participants are included in
part IV of this book (see chap. 30–38 by Fabien Nathan
(France); Mabel-Cristina Marulanda and Carmen
Lacambra (Colombia); Monalisa Chatterjee, Reena
Singh and Nanda Kishor (India) Xiaomeng Shen
(China); Sidika Tekeli-Yesil, and Ebru Gencer (Turkey).
79
‘risco’; Ger.: ‘Risiko’) many synonyms are used: danger,
peril, jeopardy, hazard; chance, gamble, possibility,
speculation, uncertainty, venture; unpredictability,
precariousness, instability, insecurity, perilousness,
riskiness, probability, likelihood, threat, menace, fear,
prospect.
For Webster’s Third International Dictionary
‘risk’ means “1. the possibility of loss, injury, disadvantage,
or destruction: contingency, danger, peril, threat
…; 2. someone or something that creates or suggests
a hazard or adverse chance: a dangerous element or
factor …; 3. the chance of loss or the perils to the subject
matter or insurance covered by the contract; the
degree of probability of such loss; amount at risk; a
person or thing judged as a specified hazard to an insurer;
an insurance hazard from a cause or source
(war, disaster); 4. the product of the amount that may
be lost and the probability of losing it” (Gove 2002:
1961). Langenscheidt-Longman (1995) defines ‘risk’ as:
“1. possibility of bad result: the possibility that something
bad, unpleasant, or dangerous may happen …; 2.
take a risk: to decide to do something even though
you know it may have bad results; 3. at risk: be in a situation
where you may be harmed …; 4. run a risk: to
be in a situation where there is a risk of something
bad happening to you …; 5. at the risk of doing something:
used when you think that what you are going to
say or do may have a bad result, may offend or annoy
people etc.; 6. at your own risk: if you do something
at your own risk, you do it even though you understand
the possible dangers and have been warned
about them; 7. cause of dangers: something or someone
that is likely to cause harm or danger…; 8.
insurance/business: a person or business judged according
the danger involved in giving them insurance
or lending them money” (Langenscheidt-Longman
1995). The Oxford Guide to the English Language
gives this concise definition: “possibility of meeting
danger or suffering harm; person or thing representing
a source of risk” (Weiner/Hawkins 1985).
Besides these many meanings of this term in contemporary
American and British English, the ‘risk’
concept has been employed in many natural and
social science disciplines as a concept that is also
widely used by policy-makers to justify specific policy
goals and programmes.
2.5.2 Risk as a Political and Scientific Concept
in Encyclopaedias
As a scientific concept, risk is defined in major encyclopaedias
and scientific dictionaries in many disciplines,
including philosophy, political science, sociology,
psychology, economics and in the geosciences.
The Brockhaus Enzyklopädie (19
1992, XVIII: 440–
444) offers a detailed assessment of the different
meanings of the term ‘risk’, of its historic development,
as well as ‘risk measures’, ‘risk assessment’, ‘risk
factors’ and ‘risk indicators’, ‘risk society’, ‘risk capital,
‘risk policy and management’ and ‘risk premiums’.
The Brockhaus distinguishes among these meanings
of risk”: 1. a possibility that an action or activity causes
damage or loss of material or persons; and 2. risk is
used when the consequences are uncertain. The
Brockhaus differentiates among pure (crash of an airplane),
speculative (stock market), insured and technical
risks (of equipment).
For the quantitative measurement of risks, often
simple risk indicators are used: ‘Risk estimates’ always
involve a prospective estimate based on the probability,
frequency and intensity of damages that are often
based on specific ‘risk analyses’. ‘Risk assessment’ is
used in the daily practice in many disciplines and it is
often influenced by the personal risk acceptance. The
risk assessment e.g. of nuclear technologies differs
among groups and countries. The concept ‘risk factors’
is used in social medicine, public health and epidemiology
to point to factors which may increase the
probability to get affected by a disease, while risk indicators
may also be indirect contributing factors (e.g.
social conditions for the breakout of a disease). Beck’s
(1986, 1992, 1999, 2007, preface essay by Beck) concept
of an (international) ‘risk society’ initiated a global
debate in the social sciences that impacts on security
risks. ‘Risk policy and politics’ as well as ‘risk
management’ comprise all measures of an enterprise
to improve its financial performance.
2.5.3 Risk as a Political and as a Scientific
Concept in Scientific Dictionaries
The term ‘risk’ evolved since the 15th
century referring
to the financial danger associated with trade. This
concept was primarily used with reference to insurance
in economic activities. The term is widely
employed in the probability theory (Bernoulli 1738,
Laplace 1816), in economics (A. Smith 1776, Ricardo
1821, J.S. Mills 1848, Knight 1921), in existential philosophy
(Kierkegaard 1844, Heidegger, Jaspers 1932,
1956, Sartre 1948, Camus 1958) and in decision-making
theory (Neumann/von Morgenstern 1944). The
risk concept is used as a political term in nuclear technology
for estimating how much security of technology
is needed and how much insecurity is acceptable
Concepts of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks
80 Hans Günter Brauch
for society. Here risk is equated with the expectation
of security contributing to risk acceptance. Since the
1970’s the concept has been intensively discussed in
economics, psychology, sociology and political science
(Rammstedt VIII, 1992: 1049). Koschnick (1993:
1325) refers to ‘risk’ in the context of decision-making
theory where
risk is defined as imperfect information, leading to a situation
in which one is forced to take chances that certain
outcomes or events will occur. Risk can range from
risk that is close to perfect uncertainty to risk that
approaches perfect uncertainty. … In face of risk, one
may proceed in three stages. First, one evaluates the various
possible consequences of alternative policies on
their merits. Second, one specifies the probability relationships
between given policies and these evaluated
outcomes. And finally, one tries to rank policies by the
probabilistically weighted values of the consequences to
which they may lead.
As complete certainty is hardly possible, Llewllyn
(1996: 744–746) argues that “risk and uncertainty are
an integral part of most human behaviour”, especially
in economics and finance: “Uncertainty arises when
the future is unknown but no actual probabilities
(objective or subjective) are attached to alternative
outcomes. Risk arises when specific numerical probabilities
are attached to alternative outcomes.” Risk
analysis relies on probability theory.
Behaviour is … influenced both by the risk of an event
to occur or outcome and the potential seriousness if it
occurs. This … gives rise to the concept of disaster myopia.
… Risk analysis is applied to situations which have
multiple, uncertain outcomes. …. Risk analysis and management
for a bank involves five key processes: first,
identification and measurement of risk…; second, what
can be done to lower the probability of default; third,
measures to limit the damage in the event that the risk
materializes…; fourth, action to shift risk to others, that
is, risk-sharing, and fifth, how the residual risk is
absorbed. … The same principles apply in all risk analysis.
… Risk analysis is inseparable from risk manage-
ment.
An economic dictionary (Grüske/Recktenwald 1995:
528–529) includes ‘risk’, ‘risk premium’, ‘risk theory’
and ‘risk management’ where ‘risk’ is defined
as an economic and social danger of loss in reputation,
position, wealth resulting from the market dependence
of the entrepreneur and the financier. In the economy it
is closely linked with responsibility. Knight distinguishes
between risk, where the probable distribution of results
of possible actions is known and insecurity where this is
not the case. Thus, insecurity cannot be measured and
cannot be insured against, while risks may be insured
against. In the literature the risk concept is manifold: 1)
the danger to make a loss, or the distance between possible
profit and loss; 2) risk expresses the positive and
negative deviation from the expected value, or 3) risk as
the difference between the planned data and the facts.
… The risk policy of companies tries to remove unnecessary
risks, … as a result of careful market analyses and
to secure it legally. ... Decision theory has developed …
procedures, to constrain risks (Grüske/Schneider 2003:
456).
Grüske and Schneider (2003: 456) defined risk management
as: “The analysis of risks as well as the implementation
of measures to manage risks”. This covers
insurance contracts of households, strategies of companies
to differentiate production, and speculation in
money markets as part of risk management. A major
task of risk management is risk limitation.
In psychology ‘risk’ (Städtler 2003: 937–938) is
used in decision-making theories, especially for decision
situations taken under risk, synonymously for decision
and decision behaviour. Risk implies that individuals
show in decisions variance preferences that do
not always follow the principle of maximizing benefits,
but also reflect the relationship between maximum
gain and loss. The portfolio theory of risks by
Coombs (1975) implies a preference function for risks
where the optimal value of risk is to find a balance between
greed, challenge and fear. Some theories try to
explain the risk-taking behaviour of humans given possible
cognition of dangers.
The risk concept was gradually introduced in
sociology, with a reference to environmental issues. In
a German dictionary of sociology (Endruweit/Trommsdorff
1989) the term ‘risk’ was still missing, while in
a sociological lexicon (Fuchs/Klima/Lautmann/
Rammstedt/Wienold 1978, 1988) ‘risk’ was included
as “readiness to take risks” (Risikobereitschaft), as
“risk population” and as “risky shift”. In the dictionary
of sociology (Hillmann 1994: 740–741) risk is defined
as a decision situation with incomplete information.
In game and decision-making theory risk is
distinguished from uncertainty. Subjective risk perceptions
have often differed from the objective level of
risk (Nathan 2010; chap. 30 in this vol.).
2.5.4 The Debate on ‘Risk’ and ‘Risk Society’
in the Social Sciences
The concept of risks has been used in the social sciences
and especially in sociology, with a special reference
to environmental issues.12
Löfstedt and Frewer
(1998, 2004: 3–27) reviewed the debates on ‘risk management’
tracing the origin of risk analysis to the
response of psychologists to an engineer’s work on
81
technological risks, and to the Chicago school of geography
and argued that the people’s response to hazards
depended on their experience and knowledge.
The debate on risk perception was provoked by Starr
who pointed to the importance of contextual factors in
risk perception pertaining to natural and technological
hazards.
In the 1990’s, a new school doubted the existence
of objective risks pointing to the social construction
of risk that influenced risk perceptions and risk-taking
behaviour. Others have criticized risk comparisons
because they ignored the societal risk context. A cultural
theory of risks emerged in the UK but the empirical
results in other countries were mixed. In the
1980’s and 1990’s research moved from ‘risk perception’
to ‘risk communication’ including the role of the
media and of the social amplification of risk. In analysing
the failure of risk communication initiatives,
research increasingly has focused on the lack of trust
towards policy-makers with regard to hazardous industrial
plants and installations.
One reason for distrust has been the growing relevance
of globalization (Giddens 1990, 1994).13
The
concept ‘risk society’ was introduced by Ulrich Beck
(1986, preface essay above) and has widely influenced
the debate in the social sciences.14
Beck (1986, 1992)
has argued that risk is increasing with the complexity
of technology. Regaining trust requires competence
and credibility of policy-makers. Research on mental
models gained in importance focusing on misperceptions
regarding different kinds of risks. Others have focused
on the optimistic bias or the unreal optimism
that has become a major barrier to effective risk
communication. Due to the crisis of confidence, the requests
on social scientists have increased to contribute
to an improved risk management. Löfstedt and Frewer
(1998, 2004: 19–20) argue on the future of risk research
that the model of social amplification of risk should be
developed further, as well as the research on risk perception
and risk communication, and on public responses
to transboundary risks.
In his book On Risk, Bonß (1995) reviewed the development
of the ‘sociology of risk’ that has gradually
emerged since the late 1960’s in response to the disasters
of Seveso, Harrisburg, Bhopal or Chernobyl
which Luhmann (1990: 138) has described as an “articulated
displeasure”. With his theory of a ‘risk society’,
Beck tried to place the problem of risk in the context
of a theory of modernity focusing primarily on technical
dangers and less on social action. Bonß (1995: 18–
19) suggested to broaden the sociological risk debates
in two respects: 1) the linkage between risk and technology
must be dissolved and it should be analysed as
a problem of insecurity; and 2) from a historical perspective
the treatment of uncertainty should be reconstructed.
He offered a systematic history of the discourse
on the risk concept as a social and cultural
construct with a special focus on the transition from
a reactive towards an active orientation of insecurity.
Among several classifications of risk concepts Bonß
pointed to two alternatives to analyse risk as a social
phenomenon from an action (ex ante) or systems (ex
post) perspective. From an action perspective, risks
are reduced to risk decisions, while from a systems
perspective risks are treated as threats or danger of
loss. Bonß suggests analysing risks in the context of
the social construction of uncertainties. While uncertainties
due to dangers exist irrespective of human actions,
uncertainties as risks include both the intentions
and implementation of action. Thus, risks are
often the result of decisions made under uncertainty.
12 Keith Smith (3
2001: 6) noted that risk is sometimes used
synonymously with hazards whereby “risk has the additional
implication of the chance of a particular hazard
actually occurring. … Risk is the actual exposure of
something of human value to a hazard and is often
regarded as the product of probability and loss”.
13 Tester (1996: 747) noted that risk is a major theme in
Giddens’s works who “distinguishes pre-modern (traditional)
and modern environments of risk: ‘The risk environment
of traditional cultures was dominated by
hazards of the physical world’ while the modern risk
environment is ‘structured mainly by humanly created
risks’ (Giddens 1990). Giddens stresses the importance
of the environment, war and personal relationships in
modern experiences and construction of risk. In so
doing, Giddens makes plain that ‘risk is not just a major
individual action. There are environments of risk that
collectively affect masses of individuals’”.
14 Tester (1996: 747) summarized and interpreted Beck’s
key concept of risk’ and risk society’: “In a risk society
the future has become uncertain. Possible events which
technology unintentionally generates cannot be insured
against because they have unimaginable implications.
….. The residual risk society has become an uninsured
society (Beck 1992a: 101). Instead of belief in progress
and the future, risk society is experienced in terms of
short-term calculations of danger: ‘In this sense, one
could say that the calculus of risk exemplifies a type of
ethics without morality, the mathematical ethics of the
technological age (Beck 1992a: 99). … He has faith in
the potential of a self-critical technological enterprise to
solve risk problems. Secondly, Beck emphasizes the sociological
significance of the environment and ecology”.
Concepts of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks
82 Hans Günter Brauch
Jaeger, Renn, Rosa and Webler (2001: 9) reviewed
the thinking of risk, uncertainty and rational action.
In their view “risk developed over the past several decades
as the key analytical lens for attempting to anticipate
the consequences of our purposive actions on
the environment and ourselves”. Risk has always been
constitutive of the conditio humana. However, the
nature of risks has changed, while they were originally
local in impact, today many risks are eco-centric (i.e.
they are linked to environmental problems or related
to environmental conditions), and global. They are increasingly
perceived as common risks, be it as systematic
cumulative environmental risks, often affecting
the globe as a whole (e.g. climate change), and the increasing
risk consciousness of high technology. With
the adoption of ‘risk’ as the imprimatur of our age, as
suggested by Beck and Giddens, the direction of Western
thought has shifted from “the expectation of
progress, of continued improvement in the social
world” to an epoch “in which the dark sides of
progress increasingly come to dominate social debate”,
shifting from the ‘goods’ of modernization to
the often unintended ‘bads’ (Jaeger/Renn/Rosa/Webler
2001: 15).
In Giddens’ terminology (1984, 1991) social fabric
produces “ontological security”15
, he specified as “the
confidence that most human beings have in the continuity
of their self-identity and the constancy of the
surrounding social and material environments of
action” (1991: 92). Today they often “take the form of
uncertainties, and risks associated with them”, i.e.
increasing these risks results from human choice
threatening both environmental conditions and individual
identity.
For Jaeger, Renn, Rosa and Webler (2001: 16) “reducing
uncertainties in order to maintain ontological
security is clearly a task worthy of sociological investigation”.
With a special focus on risks, they discuss
first rational action, as the dominant worldview “for
understanding and managing risk”, and then shift to
alternative approaches: “reflexive modernization, critical
theory, systems theory, and postmodernism”.
While there are many meanings of risk, they argue
that “all conceptions of risk presuppose a distinction
between predetermination and possibility” (Jaeger/
Renn/Rosa/Webler 2001: 17).
Risk implies uncertainty, an indispensable element
of risk. Risk “is present only to the extent that uncertainty
involves some feature of the world, stemming
from natural events or human activities that impacts
human reality. Risk, in human terms, exists only when
humans have a stake in outcomes”. Jaeger, Renn,
Rosa and Webler (2001: 17) defined risk as “a situation
or event in which something of human value (including
humans themselves) has been put at stake and
where the outcome is uncertain”.
In the late 20th
century, for industrialized societies
the new risks have reached a level that could endanger
human life and survival on the planet. Technological
and industrial developments have created new
dangers that could endanger life in all its forms. These
new risks for survival cannot be geographically limited
nor can they be insured against. The competition on
the division of resources has partly been replaced by
the management of these global risks of survival.
They require a reflexive modernization where prevailing
views, values, norms, conventions and behavioural
patterns are an object of sociological reflection (Hillmann
1994). Ulrich Beck (1999: 3–4) defined ‘risk’ as
the modern approach to foresee and control the future
consequences of human action, the various unintended
consequences of radicalized modernization. It is an
(institutionalized) attempt, a cognitive map, to colonize
the future. Every society has … experienced dangers. But
the risk regime is a function of a new order: it is not
national, but global. … Risks presuppose decision.
These decisions were previously undertaken with fixed
norms of calculability, connecting means and ends or
causes and effects. These norms are precisely what
‘world risk society’ has rendered invalid. … What has
given rise to the prominence of risk? The concept of
risk and risk society combines what once was mutually
exclusive – society and nature, social sciences and material
sciences, the discursive construction of risk and the
materiality of threats.
15 Giddens (1991) calls the need for stable expectations,
e.g. of states, ‘ontological security’. According to Mitzen
(2005: 3) this refers to a “need to secure one’s identity.
Actors do this through cognitive and behavioural routines;
and because the resulting routines stabilize the
self, actors become attached to them”. Based on Huymans
(1998) and Mc Sweeney (1999), Mitzen (2005)
argues that states also need ontological security and she
proposes “that states achieve ontological security by
routinizing relations with other states and apply that
argument to entrenched interstate conflict. This reveals
another, second ‘security dilemma’ in international politics:
ontological security can impede physical security”.
If states try to break out of security dilemmas, Mitzen
(2005: 3–4) argues that this could “generate ontological
insecurity”. Thus, “parties may prefer to remain in security
dilemmas, even if offered credible opportunities for
escape. In short, ontological security turns security
dilemma logic on its head, suggesting that the persistence
of conflict is rooted not in uncertainty but in the
certainty such dilemmas offer their participants”.
83
Beck (1999: 55–57) distinguished between predictable
risks and unpredictable threats and offered a typology
of three types of global threats: 1) wealth-driven ecological
destruction and technological-industrial dangers
(ozone hole, global warming, regional water
shortage) and the unpredictable risk of genetic engineering;
2) risks related to poverty (environmental
destruction); and 3) weapons of mass destruction.
Zürn (1995: 51) saw an essential difference between
environmental destruction as a result of wellbeing
and poverty: “Whereas many wealth-driven ecological
threats stem from the externalization of production
costs, in the case of the poverty-driven ecological
destruction it is the poor who destroy themselves
with side-effects for the rich.” Thus, wealth-driven environmental
destruction becomes international only
through side-effects in the medium term.
Beck (1999: 36) argued that ecological destruction
may promote war either as an outgrowth of resource
scarcity (water) or because Western eco-fundamentalists
use force to stop ongoing destruction. Such ecological
destruction may trigger mass emigration which
may lead to war. This may result in a spiral of destruction
where different crisis phenomena converge. In
the world risk society, these
‘global threats’ have together led to a world where the
basis of established risk-logic has whittled away, and
where hard to manage dangers prevail instead of quantifiable
risks. The new dangers are removing the conventional
pillars of safety calculation. Damage loses its spatio-temporal
limits and becomes global and lasting. It is
hardly possible any more to blame definite individuals
for such damage. … Often, too, financial compensation
cannot be awarded for the damage done; it has no
meaning to insure oneself against the worst-case effects
of spiralling global threats (Beck 1999: 36).
The analysis of risk has become an objective of many
disciplines. While the calculation of risk as a function
of the probability that an event becomes real is a task
of the natural science, of medicine and applied mathematics,
the response of human beings to risky situations
is an area for psychology, anthropology and the
social sciences and how organizations and whole societies
regulate risks is being analysed by political science,
sociology and of law departments (Renn/
Schweizer/Dreyer/Klinke 2007: 13).
These authors distinguished among seven scientific
risk concepts of: 1) of the expected risk (tool: statistics;
application: insurance companies); 2) risk assessment
(tool: modelled risk expectance in
toxicology and epidemiology; application: health, environmental
protection); 3) probabilistic risk assessment
(tool: event, error tree analysis; application: security
analysis); 4) economic risks (tool: portfolio
analysis; application: preparation of decisions); 5) risk
perception (tool: psychometric experiments); 6) social
risk assessment (tool: group surveys, structural analysis);
7) culture and risk assessment (tool: network
analysis). The likely application of the last three risk
concepts is as risk policy and regulation, conflict management,
risk communication (Renn/Schweizer/
Dreyer/Klinke 2007: 25; Renn 2008: 15). Renn (2008:
24–40) further distinguished among seven “social science-based
theoretical approaches to risk”:
1. the rational choice approach (Renn/Schrimpf/
Büttner/Carius/Köberle/Oppermann/Schneider/
Zöller 1999; Renn/Sirling/Müller-Herold/Fisher/
Dreyer/Losert/Klinke/Morisini/van Zwanenberg
2003; Jaeger/Renn/Rosa/Webler 2001);
2. the reflexive modernization approach by Beck
(1986, 1992) and Giddens (1991, 2000);
3. the systems theory approach of Luhmann (1986,
1989, 1993);
4. the critical theory approach based on Habermas
(1984, 1987);
5. the post-modern perspective introduced by
Foucault (1982) and further developed by Ewald
(1986), Burchell, Gordon, Miller (1991) and Dean
(1999);
6. a cultural theory approach, originally introduced
by Douglas (1966, 1985) and Douglas and Wildavsky
(1982), recently re-presented by Adams
(1995) and Lupton and Tulloch (2002);
7. the framework of the social amplification of risk
as an example of an integrative framework that
promises to link psychological, social and cultural
risk theories (Kasperson/Renn/Slovic/Kasperson/Emani
1988; Kasperson/Kasperson/Pidgeon/
Slovic 2003; Renn/Webler 1992; Breakwell 2007).
Since the mid 1990’s, the concept of ‘risk society’
(Beck 1986, 1992) and ‘world risk society’ (Beck 1999,
2007, preface essay) also became a new concept in
political science and in international relations (M.G.
Schmidt 1995, 2004). Beck’s concept of risk society
has also triggered a debate on ‘risk policy’ in political
science.
2.5.5 From Security and Defence Policy to the
Management of Political Risks
In security policy (Brauch chap. 12) and in national
and international security studies (ISS) in the postCold
War era the management of global risks has
become a major security task arguing “that risk rather
Concepts of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks
84 Hans Günter Brauch
than security captured the nature of the post-Cold
War era (Rasmussen 2001b, 2004; Beck 2002; Coker
2002; Griner 2002; Heng 2002, 2006; M.J. Williams
2008)” (Buzan/Hansen 2009: 250). By focusing both
on ‘every day risk management’ and on catastrophic
risks, Buzan and Hansen (2009: 205–251) argued that
risk analysis was a topic of ISS before the events of 11
September 2001, but since then many risk theorists
argued that risk analysis was better suited for dealing
with issues of terrorism and migration.
Furio Cerutti (2007: 27) raised the question
whether the two major global challenges of nuclear
war and global warming are risks whereby he defined
risk “as a function, that is, the product of the probability
and size of loss”, where risk is understood as
risk-taking and where the selection of damage is culturally
determined. Facing risks implies two kinds of
uncertainty: “one regards the probability of a loss, the
other our evaluation of its size and significance”
(Cerutti 2007: 28).
Cass R. Sunstein (2007: 9) pointed to uncertainties
in specifying the probabilities of a worst-case scenario
of a dangerous climate change. In comparing
the two major security dangers posed by terrorism
and climate change, Sunstein (2007: 53) pointed to a
specific risk perception of many Americans, for whom
“the idea of terrorism conjures up intense images of
disaster, as the idea of climate change does not”. For
Kahan and Braman (2006) and Slovic (2000) these
different risk-related judgements are a product of a
‘cultural cognition’ or of cultural orientations that
may help to explain “public reactions to numerous
risks, including those associated with climate change”
(Sunstein 2007: 66–67).
Henry N. Pollack (2003: 6) addressed the ambivalence
between uncertainty in science and risk-taking
that is referred to in “many cultures as an attribute of
a successful person. But risk arises precisely because
of uncertainty. The willingness and the ability to formulate
and take action and accept risk in the face of
uncertainty is considered a character strength. … An
unwillingness to be motivated by uncertainty is indeed
a real barrier to progress.” But he also noted that “science
can never produce absolute certainty, and definitely
not on a schedule” (Pollack 2003: 213). With regard
to the tipping points in the climate system,
Pollack (2003: 232) acknowledged that “climate scientists
do not yet know how to identify the thresholds
for such events, and the uncertainties remain formida-
ble”.
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA
2005: 193–195) noted the problems in dealing with
risk and uncertainties that are inherent in all human
activity and cannot totally be eliminated. Ecological
risk assessment has many tools and a large “potential
for informing the decision process” by providing 1)
analysis and a knowledge base for supporting sound
decisions; 2) deliberation based on a consultation
process and stakeholder involvement; 3) and relying
increasingly on the precautionary principle.
A group of German scholars at the Free University
of Berlin developed a new concept of ‘international
risk policy’ for dealing with the new dangers in international
relations, such as nuclear proliferation and
terrorism, as well as the soft security challenges of
migration, climate change, computer crime, drug trafficking
and dealing with financial markets. Daase
(2002: 9–35) argued that these new dangers require a
paradigmatic change in security policy from defence
against threats to crisis prevention. He distinguished
between risks due to transformation and globalization
and new political and international risks. Since 1990,
the traditional threat triangle of an actor, his intentions
and capabilities, has been replaced with different
dangers that are often indirect, non-intended and
uncertain. The fundamental difference between security
threats and risks, in his view, has been that the
certainty of expectation has disappeared with the
departure of a clearly defined threat. Instead of reacting
to perceived security threats, a proactive security
policy should focus on the prevention of the causes
and effects of risks. This would lead to four ideal-type
strategies of international risk policy that may be
described as cooperation, intervention, compensation
and preparation to contain risks.
The goal of the first strategy is to reduce the probability
of risks becoming reality by reducing misperceptions
and by fostering a cooperative risk manage-
ment;16
the second intends reducing the probability
of a future damage occurring by using political and
military coercion; the third aims at a cooperative reduction
of the level of the probable future damage by
risk sharing strategies; and finally, the fourth strategy
aims at a repressive reduction of the level of probable
future damage by an efficient use of political, economic,
legal and military measures that try to prevent
16 Such a strategy may lead to the creation of new institutions,
e.g. of the crisis prevention centre of the OSCE,
or to the adaptation of existing institutions to new
tasks, e.g. of NATO. The task of scientific efforts is to
review the methods and procedures of risk assessment
(e.g. of prognoses, projections, estimates of probabilities)
to point to shortcomings and to proposed alternative
procedures (Daase 2002: 19).
85
follow-on damages. He distinguished economic, psychological,
technical, and sociological approaches for
dealing with risks. This paradigm was applied in several
case studies on non-proliferation, migration, climate
change, terrorism, drug trafficking, computer
crimes and financial markets – but none on hazards.
These studies focused on risk perception, risk policy,
and a risk paradox.
Daase, Feske and Peters (2002: 267–276) concluded
on risk perception that while material factors
played a role in the perception of dangers, socio-cultural
factors determined the different risk perceptions
of states. Risk perception is not stable and it may
change during a political process or as a result of scientific
discourses. Risk perception is a process. It is an
important but not the only factor for the explanation
of risk policy. To justify proactive political action the
danger is often oversold, a threat is being created and
several risks are combined.
2.5.6 ‘Reflexive Security’ and ‘Risk Society’ as
Key Concepts of Security Studies
The sociologists Giddens and Beck have stimulated in
parts of the international relations research community
a debate on ‘ontological security’ (Giddens
1991; Huymans 1998; Mc Sweeney 1999; Mitzen 2005)
as well as an emerging debate on ‘reflexive security’.
Rasmussen (2004: 381–395) outlined a research programme
on ‘reflexive security’ by applying Beck’s ‘risk
society’ to security studies. While during the Cold
War the balance of power and deterrence theory constituted
an expert system with its own rationality and
bureaucracy, since 1990 and especially 2001 they were
challenged by new non-state actors, new military technologies
and terrorists who “fight for values other
than those of national interests”. Rasmussen asks
whether the transatlantic debate focuses more on different
means than on goals, or on the scale, degrees
and urgency of risks.
‘Risk society’ is one way to explain what is missing in the
debate between soft and hard security. The point is not
on how to apply the concept of security, but that the concept
of security itself is changing. Surveying the history of
the concept of security from the Romans to the present,
Ole Wæver (2002) thus argues that today’s considerations
of safety are increasingly about managing risks rather
than achieving perfect security. The focus on risk society
turns the ‘broad conception of security’ inside out. It is
not only the case that security policy needs to take many
more issues into consideration, it is argued, but along
with the many other policy areas, the way security issues
are being handled politically is being transformed (Rasmussen
2004: 388 –389).
Rasmussen (2004: 389–395) proposes to apply the
sociological theories of reflexive modernity to “reflexive
security studies”17
and to translate the empirical
findings back to sociological theory.18
However, the
social science debate on the concepts of ‘risk’ and
‘risk society’ was largely detached from the specific
issues addressed in the environment and hazard communities
to which we turn next. While some authors
of international security studies argued that
risk rather than security captured the nature of the postCold
War era (Rasmussen [2001a, 2001b, 2002], 2004,
[2006]; Beck 2002; Coker 2002; Griner 2002; Heng
2002, 2006; M.J. Williams 2008). … Risk analysis had
been brought into ISS prior to 9/11, but the surprise
attack on 9/11 as well as the utility of ‘everyday risk
management’ to identify the enactment of anti-terrorism
and anti-migration policies made risk theorists hold that
they offered a better account of security and terrorism
(Buzan/Hansen 2009: 250).
Buzan and Hansen argued that the risk literature is an
inherent part of ISS while many traditional American
reviews of security studies have ignored the discourse
17 Rasmussen (2004) has mapped “the current achievements
and future challenges of this emerging research
programme on risk arguing that it offers a way to overcome
the debate about whether to apply a ‘broad’ or
‘narrow’ concept of security; a debate which is stifling
the discipline’s ability to appreciate the ‘war on terrorism’
as an example of a new security practice. Discussing
the nature of strategy in a risk environment, the
paper outlines the consequences for applying the concept
of reflexive rationality to strategy”. See also:
Shlomo Griner (2002).
18 Rasmussen (2004: 389–395) identified three research
themes on: 1. globalization; 2. region and individual level
of non-sate actors; and 3. study of specific strategies. He
argues that reflexive security studies that make conceptual
change an empirical matter “offer one possibility for
taking account of the transformation of practice”. This
requires a clear definition of this scope: “Are reflexive
security studies about certain ‘risky’ policy areas or has it
something to say about the entire security agenda?” He
argues that the polarized debate on the policy response
to 9/11 illustrates “one of the basic facts of life in reflexive
modernity: that the way by which we try to solve problems
… become a ‘theme and a problem itself’.” He
points to a need “to develop a shared discourse on how
to manage risks that takes account of strategic necessities,
as well as concerns of world order, legitimacy and human
rights. … It highlights the need for security studies to
catch up with the present practices of security policy and
help develop a vocabulary that enables a reflexive debate
on security priorities in the future”.
Concepts of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks
86 Hans Günter Brauch
provoked by Beck. In The Politics of Climate Change
Anthony Giddens (2009: 7) argued that “climate
change politics is all about risk and how to manage it”
and that “the long-term thinking needed to counter
climate change has to operate against the backdrop of
uncertainty”. To develop such a forward looking politics
of climate change, Giddens (2009: 8) suggested
several new concepts that of the “ensuring state” that
acts as a “facilitator, an enabler” and “political and
economic convergence”.
The first refers to how far climate change policy overlaps
in a positive way with other values and political
goals. Political convergence is crucial to how far climate
change policy becomes innovative and energetic, but
also to whether it receives widespread support. … In the
developed countries, we can no longer equate progress
with economic growth. … Economic convergence concerns
how far economic and technological innovations
that are developed to combat global warming also generate
competitive advantage to those who deploy them
(Giddens 2009: 8–9).
Giddens calls for “a positive model for a low-carbon
future” that requires a transition strategy towards sustainable
development (Grin/Rotmanns/Schot 2010)
that should aim at a “Fourth Green Revolution”
(chap. 95 by Oswald Spring/Brauch). In moving towards
that end, Gidden’s (2009: 12–13) advice to policy-makers
is:
1. Promote political and economic convergence wherever
possible and do so in an active way. …
2. Look first and foremost to embed a concern with
climate change to people’s everyday lives, while recognizing
the formidable problems involved in doing
so. …
3. Avoid making political capital out of global warming.
…
4. Set up detailed risk assessment procedures, stretching
into the long run, since the implications of climate
change policy are complex. We have to construct
a future in which renewable sources will
comprise the bulk of energy use. It will be a farreaching
transition indeed, with a whole raft of
complex social and economic effects.
In conclusion, Giddens (2009: 229–230) argues that
“coping with climate change could be a springboard
for creating a more cooperative world. It might be a
means of reinvigorating the UN and other institutions
of global governance”. But he cautioned that “all governments
face deep dilemmas in reconciling climate
change with energy policy with sustaining popular
support, especially in times of economic difficulty”.
However, “technological innovation is one of the several
major jokers in the pack”, where a quantum leap
is needed to move humankind towards a new enlightenment
and to avoid new Dark Ages.
This requires from the social sciences conceptual
contributions to develop strategies for an ecological
transition (Grin/Rotmanns/Schot 2010) to cope with
the projected impacts of climate change during the
21st
century with a complex set of adaptation and mitigation
measures. Toward that end, Nair, Tanner and
Bhadwal (2009: 399ff.) in a study by TERI, IISD and
CICERO suggested a “climate risk screening” with an
“evaluation of adaptation to climate change” that includes
a portfolio screening using the ORCHID (Opportunities
and Risks of Climate Change and Disasters
process) methodology (chap. 64 by Nair).
Finally, from an economic perspective, Nicholas
Stern (2009: 12) suggested to include ethical considerations
in the long-term thinking on “how to reduce
risks for future generations”. Given the lack of knowledge,
“policy on climate change involve decision-making
under risk and uncertainty” (Stern 2009: 16–19),
where ‘risk’ refers to an estimated probability and
‘uncertainty’ to the impossibility to make educated
guesses on the probability. But besides risks, Stern
(2009: 135) refers to the many economic opportunities
due to the “transformation of energy systems
from high- to low-carbon” that creates “new, multibillion-dollar
markets, which are now attracting significant
capital”.
2.5.7 Global and Regional Environmental Risk
as a Scientific Concept
In security and environment policy, the risk concept is
sometimes used without a clear delineation from the
other concepts of threats and challenges. From an
environmental perspective, Kasperson and Kasperson
(2001: 1) tried to combine all four basic concepts:
“global environmental risk is about threat; it is also
about opportunity”. The goal of their book is to take
stock of “distinctive challenges posed by global environmental
risks, the ability of the knowledge system
to identify and characterize such threats, and the capability
of societies to address the management of challenges”
(emphasis added).
They distinguish between systemic risks (e.g. of
global warming) and cumulative environmental
change that may cause both short- and long-term consequences.
They used risk synonymously with hazard,
referring to “human beings and what they value”. For
them, global environmental risk “refers to threats …
resulting from human-induced environmental change,
either systemic or cumulative, on the global scale”.
87
They focus on five themes: 1) Global environment risk
is the ultimate threat. 2) Uncertainty is a persistent
feature both of understanding process and causation
as well as predicting outcomes. 3) Global environment
risk manifests itself in different ways at different spatial
scale. 4) Vulnerability is a function of variability
and distribution in physical and socio-economic systems,
the limited human ability to cope with additional
and sometimes accumulating hazard, and the
social and economic constraints that limit these abilities.
5) Futures are not given, they must be negotiated.
The authors claim that global environmental risks
“threaten international security and peaceful relations
among states” contributing to differentiation of
wealth and “increasing competition, tensions, and
conflict”. They refer to five risk sources: a) disputes
arising from human-induced local environmental degradation;
b) ethnic clashes arising from population
migration and deepened social cleavage due to environmental
scarcity; c) civil strife caused by environmental
scarcity that affects economic productivity
and, in turn, people’s livelihoods, elite groups, and
the ability of states to meet changing demands; d)
scarcity-induced interstate war over, for example, wa-
ter19
; and e) North-South conflicts over mitigation of,
adaptation to, and compensation for global environmental
problems (Homer-Dixon 1999: 5). On the environmental
security debate they admit “that such
frameworks and models remain very limited in providing
satisfactory interpretations” and that “causal linkages
between environmental change and attributes of
environmental security are yet poorly defined and un-
derstood”.
Kasperson, Kasperson, Turner, Dow and Meyer
(1995: 5–8) distinguished between geocentric and anthropocentric
approaches to the study of environmental
criticality which they defined as “a state of both environmental
degradation and associated socioeconomic
deterioration”. A critical region refers to
“an area that has reached such a state of interactive
degradation”. The geocentric approach defines criticality
“in terms of changes in physical attributes or social
dimensions” due to human-induced perturbations
that have altered the biophysical system. While the geocentric
approach focuses purely on the physical environment,
the anthropocentric perspective focuses
solely on human inhabitants. Therefore, the authors
suggest an integrative, holistic approach to the criticality
of environmental threats which they describe with
the conflicting terms – sensitivity, resistance, resilience,
marginality, fragility, and vulnerability. Any analysis
of criticality requires an assessment of what and
who is threatened by environmental degradation.
From the literature and their discussion they drew several
lessons for the study of ‘environmental criticality’
of relevance for a regional approach:
Human-environment trajectories appear particularly
likely to lead to criticality in situations that have some
combination of:
• economies of high sensitivity and low resilience to
environmental change;
• human societies with high social and economic vul-
nerability;
• economies strongly dependent upon local environmental
resources;
• frontier areas exposed to new forms of use; and
• close linkage with, and dependent position vis-à-vis,
global markets or distant political authority (Kasperson/Kasperson/Turner/Dow/Meyer
1995: 22–
23).
Non-linear environmental change may exacerbate
societal diagnosis and delay responses. Criticality refers
to situations where emerging environmental degradation
may lead to a loss of a capability to survive.
The ‘critical region’ concept does not adequately capture
the identifiable situations, rather additional categories
are needed. A lot of the change inflicted by human
pressures on the environment may impose costs
on future generations that must be included in approaches
to endangerment and criticality. But many of
the currently perceived environmental threats may disappear
in the near future. These authors differentiate
“criticality” from lesser degrees of environmental
threats such as environmental endangerment and impoverishment.
The ‘critical regions’ are characterized
by environmental degradation (water, air, soil, biomass
productivity), wealth (GNP, income, savings),
well-being (longevity, mortality, infant mortality, nutrition,
environmentally induced disease) and economic
and technological substitutability (cash-crop dependency,
technological monocultures, innovation, economic
diversity). Before a region reaches a status of
environmental criticality, many warning signals alert
experts and the society to impending or recurring
damage. The degree of response depends largely on
the political and societal sensitivity but also on the resources
available to cope with these challenges.
19 While both international officials and national policymakers,
journalists and defence officials have used the
water war argument, this hypothesis has been disputed
by many recent scientific publications in the social sciences
(e.g. Wolf 2002; WWAP 2003; Kipping/Lindemann
2005).
Concepts of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks
88 Hans Günter Brauch
Based on nine case studies they concluded that a)
external factors were more important than internal
ones; and b) state policy and institutions were key factors
of change while the I = PAT formula (Impact =
population – affluence – technology) was criticized for
overstressing affluence and neglecting poverty. In
most third world cases “poverty rather than affluence
has driven unsustainable resource use”. On the regional
level, they pointed to “three aspects of environmental
and socio-economic conditions [that] suggest
an increasing potential for higher or catastrophic
losses: 1. Vulnerability and overshoot … 2. market
conditions and overcapitalization… [and] 3. loss of
options and safety nets” (Turner/Kasperson/Kasperson/
Dow/Meyer 1995: 560). They discussed different
societal responses, symptoms of emerging criticality,
spatial and temporal categories. Contrary to global
environmental change, the trajectories of change
in these threatened areas provide a warning, … that supplements
those recent discoveries … at the global scale.
In nearly all these regions, trajectories of change are
proceeding to greater endangerment, … while societal
efforts to stabilize these trajectories and to avert further
environmental deterioration are lagging and are generally
only ameliorating the damage rather than intercepting
the basic human driving forces of change. … The trajectories
of change in most … regions are rapidly
outstripping societal responses. … The future populations
… are being environmentally impoverished by
these trends. … The trajectories suggest growing longterm
costs of regional substitution, adaptation, and
remedial measures. … In the future, these trends will
also eclipse regional societal capabilities to respond
(Turner/Kasperson/Kasperson/Dow/Meyer 1995: 580).
They noted a rich variety of human causation and
they argued that no single dominant human driving
force can explain “the historical emergence of environmental
degradation”, nor could the grand theories
offer satisfying interpretations. They conclude that
“the regional dynamics of change – the interplay
among the trends of environmental change, vulnerabilities
and fragility, human driving forces, and societal
responses – must be examined within their cultural,
economic, and ecological contexts”. For them
“the most satisfying interpretations … recognize the
shifting complexes of driving forces and responses
over time, tap diverse social science theory, and are
firmly grounded in … empirical work”. The regional
trajectories of change and associated regional dynamics
must be analysed in the broader framework of extra-regional
linkages, such as processes of economic
globalization, including trade policies in the WTO
framework that have a major environmental impact.
In conclusion, Turner, Kasperson, Kasperson, Dow
and Meyer (1995: 582–583) suggest a regional tailoring
of global initiatives:
The regional dynamics of change … reveal a recurring
disjuncture between the fast rate of environmental
change and the slow pace of societal response. … The
global scale reveals a much more mixed picture where
societal responses to such changes as stratospheric
ozone depletion, global warming, and industrial accidents
have often been quite rapid, if less than totally
effective. Still, signals of environmental threat have been
processed with considerable speed and coping actions
undertaken. But the trajectories of change … provide
considerable confirmation of the argument of overshoot
… by Donella Meadows and her colleagues (1972,
1992).
This debate on risk in the environmental research
community has been developed further with a slightly
different focus in the international scientific and political
hazard community.
2.5.8 Risk as a Scientific Concept in the
Hazard Community
A major area of the debate on risks in many scientific
disciplines have been natural, human-induced natural,
man-made hazards, technical calamities and manifold
disasters or catastrophes that have focused on problems
of ‘risk perception’, ‘risk analysis’, ‘risk assessment’
and ‘risk management’. Slovic (2000) summarized
the results of a research team that examined
“the gap between expert views of risk and public perceptions”,
how these perceptions have evolved and
changed over time, increasingly recognizing “the importance
and legitimacy of equity, trust, power and
other value-laden issues underlying public concern”.
They described “new methods for assessing perceptions
of risk” and they discussed “the implications for
regulation and public policy”. In a follow-up study
Pidgeon, Kasperson and Slovic (2003) analysed “how
both social and individual factors act to amplify or
dampen perceptions of risk and through this created
secondary effects such as stigmatization of technologies,
economic losses, or regulatory impacts”. They
focus on “risk perception and communication” and
draw lessons “for public policy, risk management, and
risk communication practice”.
Posner (2004) offers an interdisciplinary perspective
that combines the insights of a lawyer, a social
and physical scientist in weighing risks and possible
responses to a major catastrophe such as global warming,
bioterrorism or a major accident. He argues that
the risks of global catastrophe have grown due to the
89
technological advance and industrial applications, the
growth of the world economy and population, and
the rise of apocalyptic global terrorism that are often
underestimated due to low probability that they may
happen in the near future. However, there is a difference
in public attention and response between creeping
natural disasters (climate change) and intended catastrophes,
such as nuclear attacks, bioterrorism, and
cyber terrorism that have become an objective of the
military and of criminal justice. Posner calls for a mutual
rethinking of the liberals “in the face of technological
terrorism” and of the conservatives on global
warming, many of them deny that these global challenges
and risks require a global response based on international
cooperation.
Blaikie, Cannon, Davis and Wisner (1994) as well
as Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon and Davis (2004)20
offered
a comprehensive theoretical framework on the
challenges of disasters, on disaster pressure and release
models, and access to resources and coping in
adversity as well as an empirical analysis of famine
and natural hazards, biological hazards, floods,
coastal storms, earthquakes, volcanoes and landslides
and on action for disaster reduction. They look for
“the connections between the risks people face and
the reasons for their vulnerability to hazards”. For
them disasters “are not only natural events that cause
them. They are also the product of the social, political,
and economic environment … because of the way
it structures the lives of different groups of people”.
Many disasters are a complex mix “of natural hazards
and human action”. In their definition:
A disaster occurs when a significant number of vulnerable
people experience a hazard and suffer severe damage
and/or disruption of their livelihood system in such
a way that recovery is unlikely without external aid. By
recovery we mean the psychological and physical recovery
of the victims, the replacement of physical resources
and the social relations required to use them (Blaikie/
Cannon/Davis/Wisner 1994: 21).
To understand risk in terms of their vulnerability analysis,
they use two models of disaster: a) a pressure
and release model (PAR), and b) an access model that
relates to both human vulnerability and exposure to
physical hazard. In the PAR model they distinguish
three stages of vulnerability: a) the root causes (access
to power, structure, resources; ideologies, political
and economic systems); b) dynamic pressures (lack of
local institutions, training, skills, local investment and
markets, press freedom; macro forces: population
growth, urbanization, arms expenditure, debt repayment,
deforestation, decline in soil productivity); and
c) unsafe conditions (fragile physical environment:
dangerous location, unprotected buildings, infrastructures;
fragile local economy: livelihoods at risk, low income
levels; vulnerable society: special groups at risk,
lack of local institutions; public actions: lack of disaster
preparedness, prevalence of endemic disease).
They refer to hazards of a biological (virus, pest),
geophysical (earthquake, volcano) or hydro-meteorological
(storms, floods, drought) nature. They defined
risk as hazard + vulnerability (R=H+V). Thus, vulnerability
refers to “unsafe conditions”.
Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon and Davis (2004: 10) differed
from the conventional approach to disasters
that in their view stressed “the ‘trigger’ role of geo-tectonics,
climate or biological factors arising in nature
(… Bryant 1991; Alexander 1993; Tobin/Montz 1997;
K. Smith 2001)”. They argued that other authors “focus
on the human response, psychosocial and physical
trauma, economic, legal and political consequences
(Dynes/DeMarchi/Pelanda 1987; Lindell/Perry 1992;
Oliver-Smith 1996; Platt 1999)”. Both approaches from
the natural and from the social sciences “assume that
disasters are departures from ‘normal’ social functioning,
and that recovery means a return to normal”. Wisner,
Blaikie, Cannon and Davis (2004: 10) do
not deny the significance of natural hazards as trigger
events, but [their book] puts the main emphasis on the
various ways in which social systems operate to generate
disasters by making people vulnerable. In the 1970’s and
early 1980’s, the vulnerability approach to disasters
began with a rejection of the assumption that disasters
are ‘caused’ in any simple way by external natural
events, and a revision of the assumption that disasters
are ‘normal’. Emel and Peet (1989), Oliver-Smith (1986)
and Hewitt (1983a) review these reflections on causality
and ‘normality’. A competing vulnerability framework
arose from the experience of research in situations
where ‘normal’ daily life was itself difficult to distinguish
from disaster. This work related to earlier notions
of ‘marginality’.
To overcome the separation of the hazard from the
social system (figure 2.1), they have developed a second
access model that focuses on “the way unsafe
conditions arise in relation to the economic and polit-
20 Parts of the revised second edition are available at:
<http://www.unisdr.org/eng/library/Literature/7235.pdf>.
In the introduction the authors discuss more recent literature
on the basic idea and some variations, on Beck’s
theory of risk society, on various deconstruction
approaches as well as on vulnerability and normal, daily
life. Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon and Davis (2004: 8) outlined
their approach in a figure on the social causation
of disasters.
Concepts of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks
90 Hans Günter Brauch
ical process that allocates the assets, income, and
other resources in a society” (Blaikie/Cannon/Davis/
Wisner 1994: 46) and to include “nature in the explanation
of hazard impacts”. For them vulnerability is a
hypothetical term “which can only be ‘proved’ by observing
the impact of the event when, and if, it occurs.
By constructing the household access model for the
affected people we can understand the causes and
symptoms of vulnerability” (Blaikie/Cannon/Davis/
Wisner 1994: 58).
In the second edition, Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon
and Davis (2004: 13-) referred to four new streams of
thought on vulnerability (e.g. by Wilches-Chaux 1992;
Jeggle/Stephenson 1994; Davis 1994; Buckle 1998/99;
Buckle/Marsh/Smale 2000; Currey 2002) since the
early 1990’s: a) emphasizing the people’s ‘capacity’ to
protect themselves rather than just the ‘vulnerability’
that limits them (Hewitt 1997: 167); b) quantifying vulnerability
as a tool of planning and policy-making
(Gupta/Kakhandiki/Davidson 1996; Davidson/Gupta/
Kakhan-diki/Shah 1997; Davidson/Villacis/Cardona/
Tucker 2000; Hill/Cutter 2001; UNDP 2003; Gheorghe
2003); c) pointing to the cultural, psychosocial
and subjective impacts of disasters (Rosa 1998; Perry/
Mushkatel 1986; Oliver-Smith/Hoffman 1999; Johns
1999; Tuan 1979); and d) shifting from ‘vulnerable
groups’ to a concern with ‘vulnerable situations’
(Harding 2001).
In the first edition they distinguish several types of
coping strategies: a) preventive strategies; b) impactminimizing
strategies; c) creation and maintenance of
labour power; d) building up stores of food and saleable
assets; e) diversification of the production strategy;
f) diversification of income sources; g) development
of social support networks; and h) post-event
coping strategies.
To release the pressures contributing to vulnerability
and thus to reduce disasters, Blaikie, Cannon,
Davis and Wisner (1994) suggest to address the root
causes, to reduce pressure, and to achieve safe conditions
aiming at: no loss of life, no casualties, restricted
damage and food security, and to reduce hazards by
improved flood control, shelter breaks, etc. The management
of vulnerability reduction should follow 12
principles: 1. vigorously manage mitigation; 2. integrate
the elements of mitigation; 3. capitalize on a disaster
to initiate or develop mitigation; 4. monitor and
modify to suit new conditions; 5. focus attention on
protection of the most vulnerable; and 6. on lives and
livelihoods of the vulnerable; 7. on active rather than
passive approaches; and 8. on protecting priority sectors;
9. measures must be sustainable over time; 10. assimilate
mitigation into normal practices; 11. incorporate
mitigation into specific development projects;
and 12. maintain political commitment. They propose
efforts “towards sustainable reduction of disasters”.
In the second edition, Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon
and Davis (2004: 20–35) pointed to new developments
in disaster research reflecting the theoretical,
practical and institutional work in the framework of
the United Nations’ International Decade for Natural
Disaster Reduction (IDNDR, 1990–1999), with a special
focus on: a) urban growth and urban concerns; b)
changes in earth care, of the climate change negotiations
and lessons learned from wildfires, tropical
storms, floods and landslides; c) the emergence of the
‘precautionary principle’; d) critiques of globalization;
e) changes in human development and well-being; f)
war and humanitarian relief; g) media and policy se-
lectivity.
In Chinese, the word risk combines the characters
meaning ‘opportunity’ and ‘danger’ what implies that
risks cannot be eliminated but only managed. From a
hazard perspective, Smith (3
2001: 14) defined risk as:
the actual exposure of something of human value to a
hazard and is often regarded as the product of probability
and loss. Thus we may define hazard (or cause) as ‘a
potential threat to humans and their welfare’ and risk
(or consequences) as ‘the probability of a hazard occurring
and creating loss’. … An earthquake hazard can
exist in an uninhabited region but an earthquake risk
can occur only in an area where people and their possessions
exist. Clearly, both hazard and risk can be
increased and reduced by human actions.
For Smith (2001: 55) risk management “means reducing
the threats posed by known hazards, whilst simultaneously
accepting unmanageable risks, and maximizing
any related benefits”. Risk assessment
“involves evaluating the significance of a risk, either
quantitatively or qualitatively”. He conceptualizes: risk
= hazard (probability) x loss (expected) : preparedness
(loss mitigation). Both risk assessment and management
depend on value judgments that are conditioned
by beliefs and circumstances. Perceived risks are often
distinguished as 1. involuntary risks (in a hazard
prone environment); and 2. voluntary risks (more
susceptible to control). Based on Kates and Kasperson
(1983) for Smith (2001: 59) risk assessment comprises
three steps:
1 The identification of local hazards likely to result in
disasters, what hazardous events may occur?
2 The estimation of the risks of such events, that is,
what is the probability of each event?
91
3 The evaluation of the social consequences of the
derived risk, that is, what is the likely loss created by
each event?
Risk is thus defined as the product of probability and
loss: R = p x L. While risk assessment depends on
expert assessments, risk perception depends on an
individual’s intuition, estimation and evaluation. It
may be determinate, dissonant or probabilistic.
From a natural hazard perspective Tobin and
Montz (1997: 281–283) defined risks as a part of hazard
but both are not synonymous.
Risk is an important component of hazard analysis and
risk analysis forms an important subdivision of the study
of natural hazards. … Frequently risk is seen as the product
of some probability of occurrence and expected
loss. … To get a better assessment of hazard risk, details
of vulnerability must be incorporated in the analysis.
Statistically, this relationship can be expressed as:
Risk = probability of occurrence x vulnerability.
This formula … fails to incorporate geographic differences
in population size and density (or … exposure) as
well as communal adjustments undertaken to minimize
loss. Mitchell (1990) conceptualizes hazards as a multiplicative
function of risk, exposure, vulnerability, and
response:
Hazard = f (risk x exposure x vulnerability x response)
where
risk = the probability of an adverse effect
exposure = the size and characteristics of the at-risk
population
vulnerability = the potential for loss
response = the extent to which mitigation measures
are in place.
Just as risk is only one component of hazards…. It comprises
two elements that must be considered separately
and together. These are (1) a choice of action and (2) an
outcome, which includes a probability of occurrence
and a consequence (or magnitude).
For Tobin and Montz (1997: 331–332) a combination
of physical characteristics and political factors defines
risks. “By contrast, vulnerability is determined by all
the elements in various combinations; this suggests
that if we alter one of the elements, we have altered
vulnerability. … Risk and vulnerability are a part of the
context, and they are changed when any one element
in any of the three categories is changed.” This is crucial
for hazard mitigation efforts that focus on reducing
exposure, risk, economic losses and death as well
as stress. Structural changes in society can reduce vulnerability
and thus impact on reducing economic
losses, death and stress. The above quotes indicate
that within the natural hazard community no consensus
exists on the definition of the risk concept. This
definition has been used in several studies by the
‘GRAVITY team’ of UNEP/DEW/GRID and by the
UNDP/BCPR Report on Reducing Disaster Risk
(2004).
2.5.9 Risk as a Practical Concept in the
Hazard Research Community
For the practical and policy-oriented hazard community
‘risk’ has been the key operative concept. In July
1979, a UN expert meeting suggested a framework for
the analysis of risks and natural disasters (UNDRO
1980) and in 2009, the International Standardization
Organization (ISO) published ISO 31000 (2009) on
principle and guidelines of risk management.
From an American perspective, the American Society
of Civil Engineers (Haimes/Stakhiv 1989) reviewed
‘risk analyses’, ‘risk communication decisionmaking’,
‘environmental risk analysis’ and health hazards,
global warming and climate change, as well as
‘risk management strategies’ for natural and technological
hazards.21
The US National Research Council
(NRC 2000) analysed the application of ‘risk analysis’
techniques for US institutions, especially for the US
Army’s Corps of Engineers, and the US Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA).22
Risk analysis
should deal with temporal and spatial natural variability,
knowledge uncertainty (parameters, models), and
decision model uncertainty (time preferences, values,
objectives). Based on a review of global disaster reduction
initiatives, UN-ISDR (2002: 24) defined ‘risk’ as:
The probability of harmful consequences, or expected
loss (of lives, people injured, property, livelihoods, economic
activity disrupted or environment damaged)
resulting from interactions between natural or human
induced hazards and vulnerable/capable conditions.
21 In the introductory chapter, W.D. Rowe (1989: 1–2)
defined risk as “the downside of a gamble” [that]
“implies a probability of outcome, and the gamble may
be involuntary or voluntary, avoidable or unavoidable,
controllable or uncontrollable. The total gamble in
which risk is imbedded must be addressed if the risk is
to be analyzed, both the upside (benefits) and down-
side.”
22 The NRC Study (2000: 179) defined “risk as the probability
of failure during a flood event. For reaches without
levees, failure means exceeding a target stage. For
reaches with levees, it means a levee failure.” And residual
risk as: “the portion of the flood risk that still exists
with the flood damage reduction project implemented”.
Concepts of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks
92 Hans Günter Brauch
Conditionally risk is expressed by the equation Risk =
Hazards x Vulnerability/Capacity.
In the second edition (ISDR 2004, II: 6) a slightly different
definition of ‘risk’ is offered:
Conventionally risk is expressed by the notation: Risk =
Hazards x Vulnerability. Some disciplines also include
the concept of exposure to refer particularly to the physical
aspects of vulnerability. Beyond expressing a possibility
of physical harm, it is crucial to recognize that
risks are inherent or can be created or exist within social
systems. It is important to consider the social contexts
in which risks occur and that people therefore do not
necessarily share the same perceptions of risk and their
underlying causes.
ISDR (2004: II: 6) described ‘risk assessment and
analysis’ as:
A methodology to determine the nature and extent of
risk by analysing potential hazards and evaluating existing
conditions of vulnerability that could pose a potential
threat or harm to people, property, livelihoods and
the environment on which they depend. The process of
conducting a risk assessment is based on a review of
both the technical features of hazards such as their location,
intensity, frequency and probability, and also the
analysis of the physical, social, economic and environmental
dimensions of vulnerability and exposure, while
taking particular account of the coping capacities pertinent
to the risk scenarios.
However, the social contexts are crucial in which risks
occur, and thus often the perceptions of risks and of
their causes differ (Nathan 2001). Accordingly, the
process of risk assessment relies on a review of both
technical features of hazards and of the physical,
social and economic dimensions of vulnerability,
reflecting the different coping capabilities. ISDR
(2002: 24) defined ‘risk assessment and analysis’ as:
“A process to determine the nature and extent of risk
by analysing conditions of vulnerability/capacity that
could pose a potential threat or harm to people, property,
livelihoods and the environment on which they
depend.”
Based on Tobin and Montz (1997), Peduzzi, Dao,
Herold, Rochette and Sanahuja (2001: 9–10) defined
risk as “a measure of the expected losses due to hazard
event of a particular magnitude occurring in a
given area over a specific time period” – The GRAVITY-team
focused on risks “faced by population, in terms
of wounded and killed while confronted to natural
disasters”. This risk definition includes: “the probability
of occurrence and severity of a specific hazard for
a given area and length of time, the vulnerability of
the population and the capacity of mitigation, this last
could be introduced in the vulnerability or taken separately,
depending on authors”. They offer this formula
of risk:
Riski = (Hazardi - Preventioni) x [Population x
(Vulnerabilityi - Mitigationi)]
As no data were available on both preparedness and
mitigation, they proposed a simplified model:
Riski = Hazardi x Population x Vulnerabilityi
Where the hazard multiplied by the population represents
the physical exposure, risk is also:
Risk = Physical exposure x Vulnerability or
Risk/Physical exposure = Vulnerability
In their second report, Peduzzi, Dao and Herold
(2002: 3) used the term ‘risk’: “to describe potential
losses resulting from expected future hazard”. Their
research focused on human aspects (i.e. persons
killed) from natural hazards, and they relied on the
database of the Centre for Research on Epidemiology
of Disasters (CRED) in Louvain, Belgium for ‘killed’,
‘wounded’, ‘homeless’, ‘affected’ and ‘total affected’,
but due to a high variation they only used the number
of persons killed as risk indicators. Based on a definition
by the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator
(UNDRO 1979) for them risk results from three
components: “hazard occurrence probability, defined
as the probability of occurrence of a specified natural
hazard as a specified severity level in a specified future
time period, elements at risk, an inventory of those
people or artefacts which are exposed to the hazard
and vulnerability, the degree of loss to each element
should a hazard of a given severity occur” (Coburn/
Spence/Pomonis 1991: 49). Peduzzi, Dao and Herold
(2002: 3) proposed for modelling risk to multiply the
three factors explaining risk: Risk = Hazard x Population
x Vulnerability.. Thus, there is no risk if no hazard
exists or nobody lives in the affected area, or if
the vulnerability is reduced by preparedness and mitigation
measures.
In the fourth report of the GRAVITY-Team, Dao
and Peduzzi (2003: 3) repeated their previous definitions
and they used as risk indicators the “number of
killed, percentage of killed, percentage of killed as
compared to the exposed population with their
respective advantages and inconveniences”. The Disaster
Risk Index (DRI) is based on a combination of
the first two indicators. In a brief article, Dao and
Peduzzi (2004: 2) relied on the definition of risk by
UNDRO (1979) that “refers to the expected losses
from a particular hazard to a specified element of risk
in a particular future time period” that may occur in
93
terms of “human lives, or building destroyed or in
financial terms”. Thus, if risk represents the losses,
then “hazard can be defined as a potential threat to
humans and their welfare” (Smith 1996). As extreme
events, hazards “may create risk and potentially turn
into disasters if the exposed elements are vulnerable”.
The UNDP Report (2004: 2): Reducing Disaster
Risk – A Challenge for Development has applied the
methodology and the DRI developed by the GRAVITY-Team
of UNEP. In responding to the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs), the UNDP report tried
to mainstream disaster reduction and developing concerns
by a) a collection of basic data on disaster risk
and the development of planning tools; b) collection
and dissemination of best practice in development
planning; and c) galvanizing of political will to reorient
both the development and disaster management
sectors. The initial Disaster Risk Index (DRI) points
to three limitations by a) focusing only on the risk of
death; b) examining only risks associated with largeand
medium-scale disasters; and c) representing risks
associated with earthquakes, tropical cyclones and
floods.
2.5.10 From Yokohama to Kobe: Global Policy
Goals for Natural Disaster Prevention,
Preparedness, and Mitigation
Since the adoption of the Yokohama Strategy for a
Safer World: Guidelines for Natural Disaster Prevention,
Preparedness and Mitigation and its Plan of Action
in 1994 significant conceptual and practical policy
progress has been made. The Review of the
Yokohama Strategy (A/Conf.206/L.1) listed five major
accomplishments and remaining challenges, dealing
with governance, risk identification, knowledge
management, reducing underlying risk factors and
preparedness for effective response and recovery. Under
risk identification they referred to assessment,
monitoring and early warning. The review stressed a
need for “greater awareness of the social and economic
dimensions of vulnerability”, for improved data
and analytical tools, it pointed to emerging risks (urban
risks and exposure of complex infrastructure,
greater attention to the interaction between natural
and human-induced hazards (technological risks), including
climate change impacts. With regard to reducing
underlying risk factors, the review addressed (i)
environmental and natural resource management; (ii)
social and economic development practices; (iii) landuse
planning and other technical measures; and (iv)
advanced technologies (including remote sensing).
The World Conference on Disaster Reduction
(WCDR) in Kobe (18 to 22 January 2005), in its
Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015 promoted
“a strategic and systematic approach to reducing vulnerabilities
and risks to hazards” by underscoring “the
need for … building the resilience of nations and communities
to disasters” (A/Conf.206/L.2/Rev.1: 3).
The final document maintained:
Disaster risk arises when hazards interact with physical,
social, economic and environmental vulnerabilities.
Events of hydro-meteorological origin constitute the
large majority of disasters. Despite the growing understanding
and acceptance of the importance of disaster
risk reduction and increased disaster response capacities,
disasters and in particular the management and
reduction of risk continue to pose a global challenge.
At the Kobe conference, among the five main areas
where gaps for action for 2005 to 2015 were identified,
two dealt with “risk identification, assessment,
monitoring and early warning” and with “reducing underlying
risk factors”. To achieve these aims, the conference
adopted three strategic goals of which the
third called for “the systematic incorporation of risk
reduction approaches into the design and implementation
of emergency preparedness, response, recovery
programmes for disaster affected communities”. The
Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015 proposed
enhanced international cooperation and assistance in
the field of disaster risk reduction, including knowledge
transfer, sharing of research results, enhance governance,
financial assistance to reduce existing risks
and setting-up of governance systems that “can avoid
the generation of new risk”. The strategy called for
preventive and proactive measures (early warning efforts
and systems).
In order to identify, assess and monitor disaster
risk and enhance early warning, the Kobe strategy
listed among the key activities: i) National and local
risk assessments (risk maps, indicators of disaster risk
and vulnerability); ii) early warning (people-centred,
information systems, institutional capacities, better
cooperation); iii) capacity (support for infrastructures,
databases, support for methods and capacities);
and iv) regional and emerging risks (cooperation,
early warning, research on long-term changes: climate
trends, diseases, land-use, environmental hotspots,
slope deforestation, demographic changes and density,
rapid urbanization, relevant trade factors). For reducing
underlying risk factors, the document has referred
to: i) environmental and natural resource
management; ii) social and economic development
Concepts of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks
94 Hans Günter Brauch
practices; and iii) land-use planning and other technical
measures.
On a regional European level, the Commission of
the European Communities, in its “Strategic Objectives
2005–2009 – Europe 2010: A Partnership for European
Renewal: Prosperity, Solidarity and Security”
(26 January 2005) stated that the security of the citizen
“can be put at risk by natural disasters, environmental
or health crises and transport and energy
threats”. The President of the Commission stated that
“the Union has a role to play at all stages: risk prevention,
early warning, crisis management, and acting in
solidarity with the victims of disasters”. One of the
five key security themes will be: “managing risk in the
modern world”. The Commission documents as the
first of three tasks:
Environmental and health risks such as the increased
threats of floods or droughts following climate change,
the fallout from potential biological, chemical or radiological
attacks of serious outbreaks of disease have
immediate EU-wide implications. They must be tackled
in two ways: by the ability to offer early warning and
immediate response to a particular crisis, and by longterm
prevention. Information and surveillance networks
need to be effective if they are to cope adequately with
cross-border threats.
With regard to “Europe as a world partner”, the strategic
objectives of the European Commission called
for: 1) a stronger actor in the world economy; 2) global
solidarity; and 3) making security work worldwide
to enable Europe “to tackle stability and security issues
at their root by strongly promoting sustainable
development through both multilateral and bilateral
channels”.
The security part of the EU Commission’s “Strategic
Objectives” reflected the debate on reconceptualization
of security by shifting the focus from narrow
military threats to: a) non-military security challenges
for justice and home affairs (to counter crime, terrorism,
human and drug trafficking); b) natural disasters,
environmental and health risks; c) energy supply crises
and vulnerability of traffic and energy infrastructure;
and d) promoting global solidarity with sustainable
development.
These declaratory policy goals of the UN’s Hyogo
Declaration and the EU’s Strategic Objectives reflect
both a reconceptualization and a redefinition of security
‘threats’, ‘challenges’, ‘vulnerabilities’ and ‘risks’
with an application to natural hazards. In 2005, the
Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015 requested
the UNISDR secretariat to “update and widely disseminate
international standard terminology related
to disaster risk reduction”. In the 2009 version, the
terms were revised and are now defined by a single
sentence (table 2.1).23
These adopted definitions apply to the risk related
activities of many international organizations and they
are also used by many governments for guidance.
2.6 Environmental Security Threats,
Challenges, Vulnerabilities and
Risks
The contextual change since 1990 and the scientific
changes in several disciplines have contributed to a
widening and a deepening of ‘security’ and accordingly
the related concepts of security threats, challenges,
vulnerabilities and risks have also changed.
Since 1989 a debate has evolved on the ‘environmental
security dimension’ and on ‘environmental’ or ‘ecological’
threats, challenges, vulnerabilities and risks for
national, international and human security.
2.6.1 The Environment as New ‘Threats’ to
National Security
The scientific debate on environmental security
started at the end of the Cold War. Westing (1988:
257–264) pointed to both the military impact on the
environment and to environmental factors of security,
such as territorial, shared or extra-territorial resources
that require mechanisms for the non-violent resolution
of resource conflicts. The former Norwegian Foreign
Minister Holst (1989: 123–128) saw a triple relationship
between conflict and environment: a)
environmental deterioration (space, atmosphere,
lithosphere, hydrosphere, biosphere) as a consequence
of armed conflict; b) environmental degradation
(due to poverty, injustice, population growth) as
a cause of conflict; and c) self-reinforcing environmental
degradation (refugees, food riots, urban
violence) as a contribution to armed conflict. Both
environmental impacts of military activities and of
wars, and the environment as a cause or contributing
factor to hazards, migration, crises and in the extreme
case also to conflicts have posed ‘threats’, ‘challenges’,
‘vulnerabilities’ and ‘risks’ that have been conceptualized
since the late 1980’s in the context of US ‘na-
23 See the complete list of UNISDR key terminology on
Disaster Risk Reduction at: < http://www.unisdr.org/
eng/terminology/terminology-2009-eng.html> that
reflects the ISO guide on risk management.
95
Table 2.1: Selected UNISDR key terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction. Source: UNISDR; at: <http://www.unisdr.org/
eng/terminology/terminology-2009-eng.html>.
Term Definition Comment
Acceptable
risk
The level of potential losses that a
society or community considers
acceptable given existing social, economic,
political, cultural, technical
and environmental conditions.
In engineering terms, acceptable risk is also used to assess and
define the structural and non-structural measures that are needed
in order to reduce possible harm to people, property, services
and systems to a chosen tolerated level, according to codes
or ‘accepted practice’ which are based on known probabilities of
hazards and other factors.
Corrective
disaster risk
management
Management activities that address
and seek to correct or reduce disaster
risks which are already present.
This concept aims to distinguish between the risks that are
already present, and which need to be managed and reduced
now, and the prospective risks that may develop in future if risk
reduction policies are not put in place. See also Prospective risk
management.
Disaster risk The potential disaster losses, in lives,
health status, livelihoods, assets and
services, which could occur to a particular
community or a society over
some specified future time period.
The definition of disaster risk reflects the concept of disasters as
the outcome of continuously present conditions of risk. Disaster
risk comprises different types of potential losses which are often
difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, with knowledge of the prevailing
hazards and the patterns of population and socio-economic
development, disaster risks can be assessed and mapped, in
broad terms at least.
Disaster risk
management
The systematic process of using
administrative directives, organizations,
and operational skills and capacities
to implement strategies, policies
and improved coping capacities
in order to lessen the adverse
impacts of hazards and the possibility
of disaster.
This term is an extension of the more general term ‘risk management’
to address the specific issue of disaster risks. Disaster risk
management aims to avoid, lessen or transfer the adverse effects
of hazards through activities and measures for prevention, mitigation
and preparedness.
Disaster risk
reduction
The concept and practice of reducing
disaster risks through systematic
efforts to analyse and manage the
causal factors of disasters, including
through reduced exposure to
hazards, lessened vulnerability of
people and property, wise management
of land and the environment,
and improved preparedness for
adverse events.
A comprehensive approach to reduce disaster risks is set out in
the United Nations-endorsed Hyogo Framework for Action,
adopted in 2005, whose expected outcome is “The substantial
reduction of disaster losses, in lives and the social, economic and
environmental assets of communities and countries.” The International
Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) system provides a
vehicle for cooperation among Governments, organizations and
civil society actors to assist in the implementation of the Framework.
Note that while the term ‘disaster reduction’ is sometimes
used, the term ‘disaster risk reduction’ provides a better recognition
of the ongoing nature of disaster risks and the ongoing
potential to reduce these risks.
Disaster risk
reduction
plan
A document prepared by an authority,
sector, organization or enterprise
that sets out goals and specific objectives
for reducing disaster risks together
with related actions to accomplish
these objectives.
Disaster risk reduction plans should be guided by the Hyogo Framework
and considered and coordinated within relevant
development plans, resource allocations and programme activities.
National level plans need to be specific to each level of administrative
responsibility and adapted to the different social and
geographical circumstances that are present. The time frame and
responsibilities for implementation and the sources of funding
should be specified in the plan. Linkages to climate change adaptation
plans should be made where possible.
Extensive risk The widespread risk associated with
the exposure of dispersed populations
to repeated or persistent hazard
conditions of low or moderate intensity,
often of a highly localized
nature, which can lead to debilitating
cumulative disaster impacts.
Extensive risk is mainly a characteristic of rural areas and urban
margins where communities are exposed to, and vulnerable to,
recurring localized floods, landslides storms or drought. Extensive
risk is often associated with poverty, urbanization and environmental
degradation. See also ‘Intensive risk’.
Concepts of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks
96 Hans Günter Brauch
Intensive risk The risk associated with the exposure
of large concentrations of people
and economic activities to intense
hazard events, which can lead to
potentially catastrophic disaster
impacts involving high mortality and
asset loss.
Intensive risk is mainly a characteristic of large cities or densely
populated areas that are not only exposed to intense hazards
such as strong earthquakes, active volcanoes, heavy floods,
tsunamis, or major storms but also have high levels of vulnerability
to these hazards. See also ‘Extensive risk’.
National
platform for
disaster risk
reduction
A generic term for national mechanisms
for coordination and policy
guidance on disaster risk reduction
that are multi-sectoral and inter-disciplinary
in nature, with public, private
and civil society participation involving
all concerned entities within a
country.
This definition is derived from footnote 10 of the Hyogo Framework.
Disaster risk reduction requires the knowledge, capacities
and inputs of a wide range of sectors and organizations, including
United Nations agencies present at the national level, as
appropriate. Most sectors are affected directly or indirectly by
disasters and many have specific responsibilities that impinge
upon disaster risks. National platforms provide a means to
enhance national action to reduce disaster risks, and they represent
the national mechanism for the ISDR.
Prospective
disaster risk
management
Management activities that address
and seek to avoid the development
of new or increased disaster risks.
This concept focuses on addressing risks that may develop in
future if risk reduction policies are not put in place, rather than on
the risks that are already present and which can be managed and
reduced now. See also Corrective disaster risk management
Residual risk The risk that remains in unmanaged
form, even when effective disaster
risk reduction measures are in place,
and for which emergency response
and recovery capacities must be
maintained.
The presence of residual risk implies a continuing need to
develop and support effective capacities for emergency services,
preparedness, response and recovery together with socio-economic
policies such as safety nets and risk transfer mechanisms.
Risk The combination of the probability of
an event and its negative conse-
quences.
This definition closely follows the definition of the ISO/IEC Guide
73. The word ‘risk’ has two distinctive connotations: in popular
usage the emphasis is usually placed on the concept of chance or
possibility, such as in ‘the risk of an accident’; whereas in technical
settings the emphasis is usually placed on the consequences,
in terms of ‘potential losses’ for some particular cause, place and
period. It can be noted that people do not necessarily share the
same perceptions of the significance and underlying causes of
different risks.
Risk assess-
ment
A methodology to determine the
nature and extent of risk by analysing
potential hazards and evaluating existing
conditions of vulnerability that
together could potentially harm
exposed people, property, services,
livelihoods and the environment on
which they depend.
Risk assessments (and associated risk mapping) include: a review
of the technical characteristics of hazards such as their location,
intensity, frequency and probability; the analysis of exposure and
vulnerability including the physical social, health, economic and
environmental dimensions; and the evaluation of the effectiveness
of prevailing and alternative coping capacities in respect to
likely risk scenarios. This series of activities is sometimes known
as a risk analysis process.
Risk
manage-
ment
The systematic approach and practice
of managing uncertainty to minimize
potential harm and loss.
Risk management comprises risk assessment and analysis, and
the implementation of strategies and specific actions to control,
reduce and transfer risks. It is widely practised by organizations
to minimize risk in investment decisions and to address operational
risks such as those of business disruption, production failure,
environmental damage, social impacts and damage from fire and
natural hazards. Risk management is a core issue for sectors such
as water supply, energy and agriculture whose production is
directly affected by extremes of weather and climate.
Term Definition Comment
97
tional security’ and since the 1990’s increasingly also
as dangers to ‘human security’.
Within the framework of national security Mathews
(1989) and Myers (1989, 1989a) argued: “First
there was a need to redefine security and to include a
new range of threats. … Second, there was an acceptance
that the object of security was no longer simply
the state, but ranges to levels above and below the
level of the state” (Lonergan 2002: 270–271). Mathews
(1989: 162) proposed a “broadening definition of
national security to include resource, environmental
and demographic issues”. She warned that global
changes “in the chemical composition of the atmosphere,
in the genetic diversity of species inhabiting the
planet, and in the cycling of vital chemicals through
the oceans, atmosphere, biosphere and geosphere”
could lead to irreversible damage. Myers (1989: 23–41)
pointed to several environmental factors (soil erosion,
ozone layer, climate change) as legitimate causes for
international concern that may have repercussions for
US security policy. Myers (1993, 1994, 1996: 12) also
claimed that the “principal threat to security and
peace stems from environmental breakdown” and
that environmental problems can “figure as causes of
conflict”, such as water in the Middle East, desertification
in the Sahel, water diversion or flooding in
Bangladesh. Myers (1993: 20–21) equated security
with “human well-being; not only from harm and injury
but access to water, food, shelter, health, employment,
and other basic requisites”. He warned if the
environmental foundations are depleted:
the nation’s economy will eventually decline, its social
fabric will deteriorate, and its political structure will
become destabilized. The outcome is all too likely to be
conflict, whether in the form of disorder and insurrection
within a nation or tensions and hostilities with
other nations. … National security is no longer about
fighting forces and weaponry alone. It relates to watersheds,
croplands, forests, genetic resources, climate, and
other factors rarely considered by military experts and
political leaders, but that taken together deserve to be
viewed as equally crucial to a nation’s security as military
prowess.
Myers (1996: 22) analysed as environmental factors
contributing to conflict: population growth, ozone
layer depletion and global warming, mass extinction
of species and as a direct consequence: environmental
refugees. These ‘Neo-Malthusian’ (Malthus 1789
[1993]) and ‘realist’ concerns that focused on the
‘state’ as the major referent object had a conceptual
impact on the US defence and security policy during
the Clinton administration but they were discontinued
by his successor (Matthew/McDonald 2009).
2.6.2 ‘Environmental Security Agenda’ as an
Object of Securitization
Simultaneously the Copenhagen school has widened
the scope of security from a ‘constructivist perspective’.
According to Buzan, Kelstrup, Lemaitre, Tomer
and Wæver (1990) “Environmental security concerns
the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere
as the essential support system on which all
human enterprises depend.” Later, Buzan, Wæver and
de Wilde (1998: 71–93) noted a scientific and a political
agenda on how to analyse and deal with these con-
cerns.
The scientific agenda underpins securitizing moves,
whereas the political agenda is about three areas: (1)
state and public awareness of issues on the scientific
agenda …; (2) the acceptance of political responsibility
for dealing with these issues; and (3) the political management
questions that arise: problems of international
cooperation and institutionalization – in particular
regime formation, the effectiveness of unilateral
national initiatives, distribution of costs and benefits,
free-rider dilemmas, problems of enforcement, and so
forth (Buzan/Wæver/de Wilde 1998: 72).
On the scientific environmental agenda the following
issues are often included (Buzan/Wæver/de Wilde
Risk
transfer
The process of formally or informally
shifting the financial consequences
of particular risks from one party to
another whereby a household, community,
enterprise or state authority
will obtain resources from the other
party after a disaster occurs, in
exchange for ongoing or compensatory
social or financial benefits provided
to that other party.
Insurance is a well-known form of risk transfer, where coverage of
a risk is obtained from an insurer in exchange for ongoing premiums
paid to the insurer. Risk transfer can occur informally within
family and community networks where there are reciprocal
expectations of mutual aid by means of gifts or credit, as well as
formally where governments, insurers, multilateral banks and
other large risk-bearing entities establish mechanisms to help
cope with losses in major events. Such mechanisms include insurance
and re-insurance contracts, catastrophe bonds, contingent
credit facilities and reserve funds, where the costs are
covered by premiums, investor contributions, interest rates and
past savings, respectively.
Term Definition Comment
Concepts of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks
98 Hans Günter Brauch
1998: 74–75): a) Disruption of ecosystems (climate
change; biodiversity loss, deforestation, desertification,
soil erosion; ozone layer depletion; pollution); b)
energy problems (natural resource depletion, pollution,
disaster depletion, nuclear energy, oil transportation,
chemical industries, scarcities, uneven distribution);
c) population problems (population growth,
consumption beyond carrying capacity, epidemics,
poor health conditions, declining literacy rates, uncontrollable
migrations, unmanageable urbanization);
d) food problems (poverty, famines, overconsumption,
diseases related to extremes; loss of fertile soils
and water resources; epidemics and poor health conditions;
scarcities, uneven distribution); e) economic
problems (protection of unsustainable production, societal
instability leading to cyclical and hegemonic
breakdowns, structural asymmetries and inequality);
and f) civil strife (war-related environmental damage
and violence related to environmental degradation).
Securitization efforts were made at all levels but the
most effective were on the local level. For Buzan
(2004), the ‘state’ and the ‘society’ remained major
referents of securitization, and he was sceptical to the
human security concept. More recently, Buzan and
Hansen (2009) reviewed the gradual development of
environmental security in a broader and systematic
context of the evolution of international security stud-
ies.
2.6.3 ‘Environmental Security Issues’ as New
Causes of Conflicts
So far four phases of research on environmental security
issues have been distinguished. Dalby, Brauch and
Oswald Spring (2009) have recently reviewed the first
three phases of environmental security research and
Oswald Spring, Brauch and Dalby (2009; Brauch
2003, 2003a) have suggested to include in the research
agenda for the fourth research phase, a human
security perspective and to address gender issues and
natural hazards. In this volume, Brauch, Dalby and Oswald
Spring (chap. 94) suggest a new multidisciplinary
approach of a ‘political geoecology’ and to introduce
the ‘political’ dimension into Earth Systems
Science as well as knowledge from the natural sciences
into the discourses on environmental and human
security.
In the centre of the second empirical phase of the
debate on environmental security have been many
case studies conducted by two research teams in
Toronto (Homer Dixon 1991, 1994, 1999, 2000), and
in Zurich and Berne (Bächler/Spillmann 1996, 1996a,
1996b; Bächler 1999; Bächler/Spillmann/Suliman
2002). They focused on the linkages between environmental
stress and extreme outcomes: societal crises,
domestic or international conflicts and cooperation.
While these case studies focused primarily on environmental
scarcity (‘grievance’) other more recent
studies have argued that resource abundance (diamonds,
coltan et cetera) or ‘greed’ has been a major
cause for the new wars by local war lords (Gleditsch
2001, 2003; Conca/Dabelko 2002; Collier 2000, Bannon/Collier
2003; Collier/Elliott/Hegre/ Hoeffler/
Reynal Querol/Sambanis 2003). A recent study by
Kipping (2009) has shown that water scarcity in the
Senegal River basin has been the reason for cooperation
between Senegal and Mauritania. But after the
building of dams and introduction of irrigated agriculture
water abundance had became a cause of violent
conflict.
John Gerard Ruggie (1998: 155–171) argued on the
eco-demographic contexts of emerging new conflicts
in developing countries that a part of the populations
may experience “institutional barriers long before
they encounter absolute physical scarcity” which may
result in a spillover of population pressures into international
conflict behaviour. On rapid urbanization,
Ruggie (1998: 163) emphasized that social turmoil may
result from the “insufficient capacity on the part of
the cities to service such large increments of population
in so short a time. A social turmoil in turn may
provide targets of opportunity, either for domestic
forces to internationalize the problem or for foreign
forces to meddle in domestic affairs”. Ruggie concluded
that in contrast to the past, the “interplay
between socio-economic forces and biophysical factors
have reached a planetary scale”.
Paul Kennedy (2000: 239–245) stated that environmental
pressures “could produce threats to human
well-being and social stability” and that, if the projected
effects of climate change are accurate, “then
mankind will face atmospheric turbulences and environmental
hazards in the future that will cause distress:
melting of the polar ice caps, rise in sea levels,
more extreme weather conditions, greater storm damage,
crop displacement, and habitat changes”, challenges
that could be addressed with regular means, at
least in the US. But on the regional and local level
these environmental damages could result in unrest
and migration often combined with violence. He argued
that the new global challenges, including global
warming and migration pressure, which are further intensified
by demographic and environmental stress,
bring some societies to worrying thresholds and thus
99
could become threats to national and international
stability.
Since 2007, climate change has been added to the
political and scientific agenda as an object of securitization
and as a potential cause of international, national
and human security as well as a trigger or force
multiplier resulting in different forms of primarily
small-scale conflict.24
At least five different approaches
may be distinguished of policy analysis,
causal analysis, scenario analysis, discourse analysis
(of securitization moves by policy-makers and international
organizations) and quantitative correlation anal-
yses.
2.6.4 Environmental Security ‘Threats’,
‘Challenges’, ‘Vulnerabilities’, and
‘Risks’
Security with its dual focus is achieved if there is an
absence of objective threats and subjective fears to basic
values. The ecosystem was introduced as the reference
object of ‘environmental security’. Its values at
risk are sustainability and the sources of dangers are
humankind and global environmental change. The environment
is considered both as a cause and an object
of specific threats, challenges, vulnerabilities, and
risks posed by GEC, by environmental pollution and
by natural hazards to the ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ security
of human beings and humankind (human security),
of societal groups (societal security), of nation
states (national security), and of association of states
(European security) from the impacts in the most affected
states outside of the EU, for macro regions (regional
security), and in a few extreme cases, such as
‘abrupt climate change’ (NRC 2002) also for the
Earth (global security). While most securitization efforts
have focused on the ‘state’ or on the ‘society’ as
major referent objects, Westing (1989, 1989a: 129–134)
introduced the environment into a ‘comprehensive
human security’ concept that requires both a protection
(quality of the environment) and a utilization requirement
(human welfare). In this concept renewable
natural resources must be used in a sustainable
way.
Table 2.2 provides a heuristic compilation of possible
linkages between environmental causes, stressors,
impacts or outcomes that may pose security
threats, challenges, vulnerabilities, and risks for
human beings or humankind within their respective
natural environment. Natural and human-induced hazards
are rapid onset events also influenced by longterm,
creeping or structural factors or processes.
Hazards and hazard-induced distress or forced
migration may trigger socio-political consequences
beyond the traditional scope of the hazard community,
such as societal crises among residents and
migrants competing for scarce soil and water for food
security and survival.25
These socio-political consequences
have become an object of securitization in
the context of a human security approach with the
affected human beings as referent objects.
2.6.5 Environmental Factors as Security
Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities, and
Risks
Contrary to the ‘state-centred national security’ concepts
of the realist school, global environmental
change, as well as hydro-meteorological hazards, affect
primarily the individual or humankind whose perception
of ‘insecurity’ therefore change. Environmental
factors, both rapid-onset hydro-meteorological
hazards and creeping challenges posed by global environmental
change have increased ‘human insecurity’
by confronting the highly vulnerable and poor people
with a ‘survival dilemma’ (Brauch 2008b): either to
stay at home in their village continuing their traditional
livelihood, or to move first to the next major urban
centre. The young and those who can afford it
have of course a third possibility: to move to a country
or a region that offers them better economic conditions
and future prospects for survival of their family.
Hazard-induced or environmentally triggered distress
migration has become a major ‘human’ and
‘societal’ security challenge for the 21st
century. In
Europe, in the US, but also in India, the counter strategies
have been similar in tightening border controls.
However, these measures could neither stop nor prevent
immigration, they rather increased the number
of illegal immigrants from Mexico to the US (Oswald
24 There is rapidly growing political, consultancy and scientific
literature on the ‘climate change-security-conflict’
nexus: BMU 2002; WBGU 2007, 2008; EU 2008;
UNSG 2009; Maas/Tänzler 2009; Bushby 2009; Breitmeier
2009; Gleditsch/Nordas 2009; Brauch 2009a;
chap. 1 by Brauch/Oswald Spring and 95 by Oswald
Spring/Brauch; chap. 41 by Bauer; chap. 42 by Schef-
fran.
25 See e.g.: Biermann and Boas (2007); Brown (2008);
Warner, Afifi, Dun, Stal and Schmidl (2008); Black
(2006).
Concepts of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks
100 Hans Günter Brauch
Table 2.2: Compilation of environmental threats, challenges, vulnerabilities, and risks. Source: Compiled by the author.
Environmental causes,
stressors, effects
and natural hazards
that pose
Natural and economic factors Societal impact factors (exposure)
Substantial threats for Challenges affecting Vulnerabilities for Risks for
Security objects (for what or whom?)
Climate change
• temperature
increase
(creeping, long-term)
• Human health
• agriculture (yield
decline)
• biodiversity
• desertification
• tourism
• food security
• fisheries
• government action
• economic action
• infectious disease
• damage to crops
• natural systems
• water scarcity
• forest fire
• human populations
• the poor, old people
and children due to
heatwaves
Climate change
• sea level rise
(creeping, long-term)
• Small island states
• marine ecosystem,
• indigenous com-
munities,
• industry, energy
• deltas
• coastal zones
• marine, freshwater
ecosystems
• coastal cities, habitats,
infrastructure,
jobs
• cities, homes, jobs
• livelihood
• poor people,
• insurance,
• financial services
Climate change
• -Extreme weather
events:
• storms (hurricanes,
cyclones, winter
storms)
• Habitat, technical
infrastructure, transportation,
etc
• forests (health of
trees)
• food security
• coastal ecosystems
• forests, settlements
• electricity transmis-
sion
• human life & prop-
erty
• insurance,
• financial services
Climate change
• Extreme weather
events: floods
• Habitat, technical
infrastructure and
people
• vulnerable, floodprone
areas
• persons living in
flood-prone areas
• human life & prop-
erty
Climate change
• Extreme weather
events: drought
• Availability of water
and food, survival of
people
• decreased crop
yield and water
quality & quantity
• arid and semi-arid
zones, agriculture
• forests (tree health)
• human life & animals,
property
Tipping points in the
climate system (crossing
thresholds due to
linear climate change
impacts)a)
• unforeseeable con-
sequences
• for water, soil, food
and livelihood secu-
rity
• agriculture,
• tourism
• urban habitats
• damage to crops
• natural systems
• water scarcity
• forest fire
• human populations
• the poor, old people
and children due to
heatwaves
Abruptclimatechange
(shutoff of the Gulf
Stream in the North
Atlantic)
• e.g. cooling in Central
and Northern
Europe, in North
America (USA)
• Countries and people
in Northern
Europe, benefiting
from Gulf Stream
• livelihood
• survival
• agriculture
• habitat
• people
• human life & animals,
property
• forced migration of
people
Geophysical hazards
• earthquakes,
• volcanic eruptions
• tsunamis
Hazard prone areas
• regional and local
affected areas
• coastal areas (in
Indian Ocean)
• habitat,
• technical & economic
infrastructure
• people
• poor living in hazard
prone areas and in
vulnerable housing
• poor people with little
resilience & disas-
terpreparedness,no
insurance
Soil erosion, desertification,
drought
• water scarcity
• agriculture
• habitats
• food security
• human livelihood
(forced migration)
• livelihoods
• rural areas
• specific crops
• people & livestock
in rural areas
• people in slums
101
Spring/Brauch 2005; Verduzco/de Lozano 2010;
chap. 26 by Brauch and chap. 47 by Brauch/Oswald
Spring).
2.6.6 Proactive Security Response Strategies
Addressing the environmental dangers to security (table
2.2) requires a complex combination of strategic
instruments and policies to reduce the vulnerability to
natural hazards and the related risks for human beings
and affected societal groups. Thus a dual strategy is
needed for dealing with: short-term situational impacts
of extreme weather events and natural hazards;
and longer-term structural impacts of global environmental
change. While the global environmental
change, the climate change and the hazard research
communities have used different concepts of environmental,
social and economic vulnerabilities and risks,
a conceptual and a policy-oriented mainstreaming is
needed to address both impacts. Three groups of vulnerability
and risk indicators are needed: for both climate
change and hydro-meteorological hazards; for
specific hazards (storms, floods, drought), and for
temperature increase and sea-level rise.
Thus, effective climate policies with legally binding
obligations may be the most cost-effective solutions
to counter the projected increase in extreme
weather events. To respond to these complex and
manifold environmental security threats, challenges,
vulnerabilities, and risks as well as to those posed by
manifold hazards, it is primarily proactive non-military
policies and measures (table 2.3) which are
needed. More conceptual work on the linkages between
‘environmental’ and ‘human’ security is necessary,
but also between economic production and ecosystems
(N. Georgescu-Roegen 1971). Mainstreaming
efforts are required on the scientific and political
tracks with regard to the environmental dimension of
human security (conceptualization in the scientific
community); and a ‘paradigm shift’ in the UN system
from ‘national’ towards ‘human security’ perspectives.
With regard to the work of international organizations,
a dual mainstreaming may be needed:
• to incorporate a ‘human security perspective’ into
environmental security initiatives, such as
ENVSEC of OSCE, UNEP, UNDP26
and NATO
(Cheterian 2009) into the green diplomacy of the
European Union launched at the European Council
in Thessaloniki in June 2003; and
• to include an ‘environmental security dimension’
into the work of the Human Security Network
Deforestation • Landscape, cities,
habitat
• water availability • landslides • informal housing
(slums)
Water scarcity and
degradation
• Agriculture, food
security, people
• econ. behaviour
• human health
• poor in slums • oldpeople,children,
poor
Forced Migration • Resident population,
clash on water
and food
• overgrazing on marginal
soils,
• environment
• fragile ecosystems
• people on the move
• migrants and their
animals
a) Lenton, Held, Kriegler, Hall, Lucht, Ramsdorf, and Schellnhuber (2008: 1186) argued that the term ‘tipping point’ has
been used in discussions of global change “to describe a variety of phenomena, including the appearance of a positive
feedback, reversible phase transitions, phase transitions with hysteresis effects, and bifurcations where the transition is
smooth but the future path of the system depends on the noise at a critical point”. They offered “a formal definition,
introducing the term ‘tipping element’ to describe subsystems of the Earth system that are at least subcontinental in
scale and can be switched – under certain circumstances – into a qualitatively different state by small perturbations.
The tipping point is the corresponding critical point – in forcing and a feature of the system – at which the future state
of the system is qualitatively altered”. They pointed to the melting of the Arctic sea-ice, rapid changes in the Greenland
and in the West Antarctic ice sheet, a shutoff of the Gulf Stream (Atlantic Thermohaline Circulation), changes in the El
Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO), in the Indian summer monsoon, in the Sahara/Sahel and West African monsoon, a
drying of the Amazon basin and changes in boreal forests. The potential political and security consequences of these
non-linear or chaotic perturbations in the climate system once unknown thresholds have been crossed have not yet
been analysed and may only be discussed in the context of worst-case impact scenarios.
Table 2.2: Compilation of environmental threats, challenges, vulnerabilities, and risks. Source: Compiled by the author.
26 See the joint initiative of OSCE, UNEP and UNDP on:
An Environment Agenda for Security and Cooperation
in South Eastern Europe and Central Asia; at: <http://
www.iisd.org/natres/security/envsec/>; <www.osce.org/
documents/sg/2003/01/324_en.pdf>; and at: <http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/3/33687392.pdf>.
Concepts of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks
102 Hans Günter Brauch
(HSN) focusing primarily on ‘freedom from fear’,
elaborating it further also in the context of the report
of the Commission on Human Security
(CHS 2003) focusing on ‘freedom from want’ by
adding a new pillar of ‘freedom from hazard impact’
(Brauch 2009b; Fuentes Julio/Brauch 2009);
• to launch a Mediterranean Environmental and
Human Security Initiative (MEH-SEC) within the
Union for the Mediterranean (Brauch 2010).
Including vulnerability concerns into the human security
concept and in their environmental management
plans requires the active involvement of other UN
agencies and programmes.
2.7 Human Security Threats,
Challenges, Vulnerabilities, and
Risks
Parallel to the academic debate on environmental
security that influenced the policy agenda of several
international organizations, the human security concept
used by UNDP (1994) triggered a global and
ongoing political and scientific debate. UN SecretaryGeneral
Kofi Annan (2001) has referred to the need
for a human-centred approach to security that must
encompass “economic development, social justice,
environmental protection, democratization, disarmament,
and respect for human rights and the rule of
law”.
UNESCO (1997, 1998, 1998a, 2001, 2001a, 2003)
has been instrumental for initiating and supporting
the scientific debate on ‘human security’ especially in
developing countries, by organizing regional conferences
in all parts of the world (UNESCO 2008;
Goucha/Crowley 2008). These regional conceptual
efforts have linked the debate with pertinent security
concerns. An intensive debate is continuing in OECD
countries and there is a growing debate in developing
countries focusing on specific ‘human security’ (HS)
threats, challenges vulnerabilities, and risks (Brauch
2009b).
2.7.1 Towards a Human-centred
Environmental Security Concept
What poses a threat, challenge, vulnerability or risk to
human security, both to the individual human being
Table 2.3: Human security policies and measures for coping with environmental threats, challenges, vulnerabilities, and
risks for ecosystems and sustainability. Source: Compiled by the author.
Strategies and means
for coping with
Threats of Challenges for Vulnerabilities of Risks of
Environmental Security for
Sustainable development
policy goals
• Air (climate), soil,
water
• agriculture and food
security
• vulnerable people (old, children, women,
indigenous groups)
Environment policy
(implementation of
environmental treaties,
regimes)
• Climate change,
• soil erosion,
• water scarcity and
degradation
• economy
• agriculture
• tourism
• health
• rural livelihood
• urban habitat
• transport & econo•
mic infrastructure
• reducing exposure
of people with low
resilience
Early recognition (research,
education, training,
agenda-setting)
• Extreme weather
events (storm, flood,
drought)
• agriculture (shift in
crops)
• city planning
• building standards
• enhancing knowledge
of these peo-
ple
Early warning of
hazards and disasters
• Hydro-meteorological
(storms, floods,
drought) and geophysical
(earthquake,
volcano, tsunami)
hazards
• agriculture (specific
crops)
• public health
• vulnerability mapping
of hazard
prone areas and
housing
• enhancing training
of these people
Effective disaster preparedness
and rapid
disaster response
• (inter)national
organizations and
resources
• vulnerability mapping
of hazard
prone areas and
housing
• enhancing protection
of these people
Humanitarian aid • Hazards and con-
flicts
• access to affected
areas
• environment
• food supply
• spread of infectious
disease
• reducing low recog-
nition
Refugee assistance • Distress migration • refugees (in times of
conflict)
• old, weak and poor
103
or to humankind, depends on whether a ‘wide’ or a
‘narrow’ HS concept is chosen focusing on ‘freedom
from want’ (Japanese concept, CHS 2003), ‘freedom
from fear’ (Norwegian and Canadian concept), ‘freedom
to live in dignity’ (Annan 2005) or ‘freedom from
hazard impact’ (Bogardi/Brauch 2005). GECHS
(1999) argued that the following types of environmental
change affect human security: a) natural disasters,
b) cumulative changes or slow-onset changes, c) accidental
disruptions or industrial accidents, d) development
projects, and e) conflict and warfare.
Barnett (2001: 127) considered a “human-centred
environmental security concept” as justified on moral
and pragmatic grounds “because addressing the welfare
of the most disadvantaged means addressing
many of the future sources of environmental degradation”
by protecting the rights of the most vulnerable
members of society and by enhancing “welfare, peace
and justice” on which legitimate institutions should be
built which are required “for human and environmental
security” (Conca 1994, 1994a). Najam (2003: 1–24)
proposed an environment and security discussion
around two sources of insecurity (violent conflict and
social eruption), and to focus the analysis on state
centred and society centred activities. This leads him
to four outcomes: 1) interstate war (state centred violent
conflict); 2) civil strife (society centred violent
conflict); 3) institutional failure (state centred social
disruption); and 4) human insecurity (as a society
centred social disruption).
Barnett, Matthew and O’Brien (2008) and Matthew,
Barnett, Mc Donald and O’Brien (2010, 2010a)
offered a glimpse on the work the Global Environmental
Change and Human Security (GECHS)
project within the International Human Dimensions
Programme (IHDP) that has been pursued from 1996
to June 2009 when the project ended with a synthesis
conference. Barnett, Matthew and O’Brien (2010: 4)
argued that “global environmental change poses new
and in some cases unprecedented threats to human
security … that transcend the North-South binary and
the ‘rich-poor’ dichotomy” and they discussed “how a
human security orientation to environmental change
can contribute to initiatives such as the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs)”. In contrast to national
or state security, human security “securitizes …what
individuals themselves see as their paramount concerns,
and so pluralizes the meaning of security and
opens up space for alternative security practices. It
adds to the concept of human development … by focusing
on immediate concerns such as basic needs
and peace, and by directing attention toward the most
vulnerable (Gasper/Truong 2005)” (Barnett/Matthew/O’Brien
2010: 9). They concluded that “global
environmental change is adding impetus to the realization
that traditional understandings of security are
limited and are an inadequate basis for making policy”
and that GEC “is raising new and unavoidable question
to equity and sustainability, which already underlie
every aspect of human security”. Finally they called
“for greater integration of the security, development,
and sustainable development research and policy
communities, which have for too long been too dis-
tinct”.
2.7.2 Human Security Threats, Challenges,
Vulnerability, and Risks
From a human security perspective many threats, challenges,
vulnerabilities, and risks exist for the major
referent: the individual human being or humankind in
contrast to the state in prevailing national security
concepts. From a human security perspective all five
security dimensions and also sectoral security concepts
may be analysed. Human security is infringed by
underdevelopment (‘want’), conflicts and human
rights violations (‘fear’), by hazards and disasters (‘hazard
impact’) and by the violation of human rights (‘to
live in dignity’). These four pillars of human insecurity
pose threats, challenges, vulnerabilities, and risks to
different aspects of human security and call for three
different but interrelated strategies for coping and
overcoming human insecurity for which different national
and international organizations and means are
needed.
All four pillars of human insecurity (want, fear,
hazard impact, indignity) also impact on health insecurity.
Chen and Narasimhan (2003: 3–12) in their
human security agenda for global health argued that
three factors: 1) conflicts and humanitarian emergencies;
2) infectious crisis (HIV/AIDS); and 3) impoverishment
impact on illness, injury, disability, death posing
critical pervasive threats to the vital core of human
security: human survival and flourishing; livelihood;
and dignity. For Leaning, Arie, Holleufer and Bruderlein
(2003: 13–30) measuring human security focuses
on the fulfilment of basic needs, and home, community
and future.
Concepts of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks
104 Hans Günter Brauch
2.8 Conclusions for Research and
Policy Suggestions
This survey reviewed the many political and scientific
concepts dealing with four basic dangers undermining
security, namely ‘threats’, ‘challenges’, ‘vulnerabilities’,
and ‘risks’. These concepts have been used in several
scientific disciplines (political science, economics,
psychology, sociology, international law) and research
communities focusing on global environmental
change, sustainable development, climate change as
well as on hazards and disasters both in policy discourses
and declarations.
This survey of scientific concepts has been a part
of a scientific effort to reconceptualize security, its
five dimensions, its levels of analyses since the global
turn of 1989 and 1990 (global security order), since
the terrorist attack on the United States of 11 September
2001 resulting in ‘personal violence’ and wars
(Afghanistan, Iraq) and since the global financial crisis
of 2008 resulting in ‘structural violence’ where millions
of people lost their homes (e.g. in the United
States), their income (rise in global unemployment,
loss of pensions), their right to food (price hikes in
basic food staples with resulting food riots during
2008 and major increase in hunger in the poor countries
and among the poorest people in many countries
since 2008 and 2009).
Due to globalization, trade flows, foreign investments
and the exchange of information based on new
forms of communication have not only increased, but
non-state actors and processes beyond the control of
the nation states and international organizations have
also posed multiple new security threats, challenges,
vulnerabilities, and risks that have resulted in new
forms of ‘invisible’ antipersonnel and structural terrorism.
While the instigators of the antipersonnel terrorism
have become the object of a ‘war on terror’, those
who caused and are responsible for the new ‘structural
terrorism’ that deprived millions of people of
their livelihood, income, economic well-being, and
that threatened the common European currency have
so far remained a part of the system that determined
the rules that made this form of structural terrorism
possible, and it is unclear whether the rules will or can
be changed to permit that they can be brought to justice
for violating national laws.
Since 1990 in many countries a widening of security
has occurred away from the narrow military, political
and economic security of the Cold War towards a
Table 2.4: Compilation of human security threats, challenges, vulnerabilities, and risks. Source: Compiled by the author.
Dangers for Human Security
Posed by
Human Security
Threats to Challenges for Vulnerabilities to Risks for
Underdevelopment
(‘freedom of want’)
• Human well- being,
• human health
• life expectancy
• social safety nets
• human develop-
ment
• food security
• economic crisis
and shocks
• communicable dis-
eases
those most vulnera-
ble
(socially, economically)
and exposed to
underdevelopment,
violence and
hazards:
• peasants,
• poor
• women,
• children,
• old people
• indigenous people
• minorities.
Conflicts and human rights
violations
(‘freedom from fear’)
• Human life and
personal safety
(from wars)
• identity, values
• feeling secure in a
community
• human rights
• democracy
• warlords, criminals
• corrupt regime,
ruler
• human rights
abuses, violations
Hazards and disasters
(‘freedom from hazard
impact’)
• Livelihood
• survival
• settlements,
urban slums
• sustainable devel-
opment
• food security
• exposed popula-
tion
• livelihoods, habitat
• disease (cholera,
dengue, malaria,
etc.)
Violation of basic laws, lack
of good governance
(‘freedom to live in dignity’)
• human dignity,
• human rights,
• basic human needs
• rule of law,
• democratic system
of rule
• peaceful conflict
resolution
• corruption and
organized crime
• rights of the citi-
zens
• human well-being
105
wider scope that has also included societal and environmental
dimensions, but also a temporary return to
a narrow Hobbesian (1651, [1965], 1658) primarily military
security concept. In the 21st
century, with regard
to the thinking on security and sovereignty, three different
contexts have coexisted:
• the pre-modern world where state sovereignty and
the ability to rule the whole state territory has
ceased to exist in so-called ‘failing’, or ‘failed
states’, many of them having fallen victim to internal
conflicts or civil wars where warlords control
part of the country and major resources;
• the modern world where the defence of the Westphalian
state and of its population and territory
against undue outside intervention and intrusion
is a major goal of ‘national security’ policies;
• the postmodern world where a progressive internal
de-borderization (e.g. within the EU) combined
with a tightening of external borders has
occurred and both integration and globalization
processes have reduced the classical domaine
réservé of the nation state.
In addition, since the early 1990’s, influenced by the
concerns for ‘human development’ (UNDP 1994), a
shift in the referent object of the security concept has
taken place from an exclusive focus on the ‘nation
state’ to ‘human beings and humankind’ or from the
prevailing ‘national security’ to ‘human security’. Since
the late 1990’s two parallel debates have taken place
on ‘environmental security’ and on ‘human security’
both in the social sciences and within international
organizations that have also been stimulated by several
international commissions and high-level expert
panels.
Within the UN system, UNU-EHS has started to
advance the development of the ‘environmental dimension
of human security’ (Bogardi/Brauch 2005;
Brauch 2003, 2005, 2005a, 2008a) trying to bring
both scientific and political communities together,
and to develop the conceptual ideas of those further
(Barnett 2001) who have called for a ‘human centred
environmental security’ concept. Conceptualizing the
‘environmental dimension of human security’ implies
that the victims (human beings and humankind), their
social, economic, environmental and political vulnerabilities
and risks become the central object of analysis
and not only the state, its institutions and governance
structures, strategies, policies, and measures.
Since the early 1990’s, the scientific and conceptual
debate on security concepts has proliferated from
the OECD countries to other regions and to developing
countries that have been major victims of the interaction
between humankind and global environmental
change, and where the need to overcome ‘want’
(development) and ‘fear’ (cooperation, disarmament,
human rights) as well as to reduce the ‘impact of hazards’
is most severe and where the right to live in dignity
and under good governance must still be realized.
This survey of the conceptual thinking on security
threats, challenges, vulnerabilities, and risks has
stressed a dual need for:
• more precise definitions to reach a consensus on
these concepts especially with regard to practical
political measures to achieve the agreed goals; and
• a systematization of the threats, challenges, vulnerabilities,
and risks for military, diplomatic, economic,
societal, environmental as well as human,
food, health, energy, livelihood, and gender security
(Brauch/Oswald Spring/Grin/Mesjasz/KameriMbote/Chadha
Behera/ Chourou/Krummenacher
2009).
However, the latter is influenced by the political
mindset of policy-makers and by the scientific worldview
(chap. 95 by Oswald Spring/Brauch), disciplinary
and theoretical approaches and models, as well as by
the economic status and by the geographic location
of the country concerned but also by the systems of
rule and the level of participation of civil society in
local, provincial and national decision-making.
For the hazard community, the concepts of vulnerability
and risk have been crucial in a wider context
that moves from the purely physical aspects of natural
hazards to an assessment and ranking of vulnerability
through indicators where the environmental (air, soil,
water, ecosystems, natural resources), the economic
(development, resources), the social (coping capacities),
but also the political (governance, participation)
contexts are fully taken into account.
A major conceptual and policy task could be to develop
the new pillar of human security as ‘freedom
from hazard impact’, and to contribute to the implementation
of this goal through capacity-building for
early warning, developing vulnerability indicators
(Birkmann 2006), and vulnerability mapping
(Bankoff/Frerks/Hilhorst 2004). While human-induced
and natural hazards cannot be prevented, the
impact of tragic events, like the Tsunami of 26 December
2004 in the Indian Ocean, Hurricane Katrina
in 2005, or the earthquakes in Haiti and Chile in January
and February 2010, can be reduced primarily by
measures of early warning and better disaster preparedness
that address the ‘social vulnerability’ of those
Concepts of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks
106 Hans Günter Brauch
most exposed to both hydro-meteorological and geophysical
hazards. The fourth pillar of human security
aiming at ‘freedom from hazard impact’ would imply
that people are empowered to mobilize and use their
resources to address sustainable development goals
rather than remain in the vicious cycle of a ‘survival dilemma’
(Brauch 2008b).
Human security as ‘freedom from hazard impact’
is achieved when people who are vulnerable to these
manifold environmental hazards and disasters (floods,
landslides, and drought) often intensified by other associated
societal threats (poverty), challenges (food
insecurity), vulnerabilities and risks (improper housing
in highly vulnerable flood-prone and coastal areas)
are better warned of impending hazards, prepared,
and protected against these impacts and are empowered
to prepare themselves effectively to avoid and to
cope with the ‘survival dilemma’ that often occurs
during conflicts, natural hazards, and in complex
emergencies where both coincide.
http://www.springer.com/978-3-642-17775-0