6 Eastemenlargement
Risk, rationality and role-compliance1
Ulrich Sedelmeier
Introduction
The poliey of the European Union (EU) towards the Central and Eastern European
countries (CEECs) displays the complex relationship between these four
themes of risk, reform, resistanee and reviva!. The 1989 revolutions presented for
the EU and its member states not only new opportunities, but also the risk of
politieal instability if the transformation proeesses should fai!. The aeademie
literature of the time broadly agreed that the best way to avert this potential risk
was to integrate the CEECs with the EU and ultimately, to allow for eastern
enlargement. In turn, eastern enlargement required the EU to undertake farreaehing
internal rf(fimns (see; e.g., Mayhew 1998; Grabbe and Hughes 1998;
Avery and Cameron 1998).
In an optimistie seenario, eastern enlargement may thus lead to revival and a new
dynamism, as it presents a window of opportunity to address aeeumulated
eontradietions of the integration model and earry out long-overdue reforms. In a
pessimistie seenario, although enlargement might serve the EU's eolleetive longterm
interest, it might fail beeause the resistance from negatively affeeted aetors
might lead to a Joint deeision trap' (Seharpf 1988). Sinee enlargement as well as the
neeessary reforms needed to be endorsed by all member governments, individual
governments that eonsidered themselves better off under the status quo (for
example, in terms of reeeipts from the EU budget through agricultural and struetural
polieies, national inlluenee, effieieney of colleetive deeision-making, future
prospeets for 'deep integration', etc.) ean prevent decisions that would allow the
EU to avert a common risk.
In this sense, the EU's poliey in the 1990s towards the CEECs eould be
interpreted as a (test) ease of eolleetive foreign poliey-making (see, e.g., Niblett
1995; Torreblanea 1997; Smith 1998; Zielonka 1998). From this perspeetive, the
deeision of the Luxembourg European Couneil (December 1997) to open
aeeession negotiations with a first group of CEECs in Mareh 1998 was striking. It
seemed to provide an unexpeeted but welcome proof of the EU's ability to
overcome lowest-common-denominator bargaining and of colleetive problemsolving.
Agreement on an eastern enlargement thus seemed an expression of the
EU's eapaeity as a strategie aetor in international polities.
1
Eastern enlargement 121
However, the strategie eoherenee of the deeision for eastern enlargement is far
more ambiguous than this interpretation suggests: the deeision to start aeeession
negotiations was taken without any prior agreement on internal reforms. It was
taken more than a year before the debate about poliey reform undertaken by the
Berlin European Couneil in Mareh 1999, and despite the still fresh impression of
the manifest failure to agree on institutional reform at the 1996-7 intergovernmental
couneil (IGC).2 More broadly, agreement was reaehed in the absenee of
any thorough debate on the shape of an enlarged EU.
Of course the EU had a traek reeord of delivering eleventh-hour agreements
and a strong aversion to difficult compromises as long as there is still scope for
postponement. Nonetheless, the reforms that relate to enlargement were piecemeal
and involved incremental tinkering, rather than thorough anticipatory
adaptation. The adequaey of the poliey reforms and finaneial perspeetive crafted at
Berlin have been doubted (see, e.g., Begg 1999). The limited tidying-up IGC in
2000, resulting in the Treaty of Niee, relleeted no ambition for institutional
reformo Thus, rather than being a strategie colleetive response to a eommon risk,
the EU's deeision to enlarge seems to ereate its own risks for the integration project
in the future.
The EU's deeision to enlarge thus presents a number of puzzles. Why did the
member governments agree on enlargement without prior agreement on reform,
despite the risks and future costs that makeshift compromises ereate for all of them
collectively? Why did theygive the go-ahead, despite the uneertainty about the
final shape of a deal on internal reforms? More generally, why do those member
governments for which it is clear that the negative consequenees of enlargement
will outweigh possible benefits, agree at all? For example, while their geographieal
position means that Ireland, Portu gal or Spain are not partieularly vulnerable to
politieal instability in the CEECs and are not best plaeed to exploit the eeonomie
opportunities of enlargement, internal poliey reforms entail for them the risk of
losing substantial reeeipts from the EU budget. Thus, at the empirieal level, the
fundamental puzzle is why the EU eommitted itself to enlargement, despite the
eosts that arise for individual member governments whieh all have veto power.
At the theoretieal level, this puzzle pertains to the eontemporary debate in
international relations (IR) between rationalist and more soeiologieal approaehes.
It ehallenges the explanatory power of materialist rationalist approaehes that
exogenize interests and assume that aetors maximize material self-interest in
strategie bargaining. This ehapter thus sketehes how an approaeh that takes
aeeount of non-material faetors - namely the role of colleetive identity that the EU
has ereated for itself in its relations with the CEECs and the regulative norms that
this identity entails - ean improve our understanding of the evolution of the EU's
poliey towards the CEECs.
I argue that the EU's colleetive identity towards the CEECs includes the notion
of a 'speeial responsibility' of the EU towards the CEECs. It proscribes purely selfinterested
behaviour by poliey-makers acting on behalf of the EU, and wescribes a
degree of accommodation of the CEECs' preferences in EU policy. This component
of the EU's collective identity does not determine policy outcomes. Yet it
122 U7ruh Sedebneur
limits the range of available policy options, by precluding certain options as
inappropriate, and by reinforcing the legitimacy of others. In this way, it created a
certain scope for a group of policy advocates, located primarily inside the Commission,
to obtain approval for a number of policy initiatives that incrementally,
but firmly, set the EU on the path towards enlargement. However, while
compliance with the EU's professed role made it difficult for policy-makers to
oppose such initiatives, it did not extend to forging consensus on a strategic
approach to reform and on a collective sharing of the adjustment burdens.
The chapter proceeds in three main parts. The first section traces the origins,
and identifies the content, of the EU's collective identity towards the CEECs. The
second section presents the analytical concepts that help to understand how EU
identity towards the CEECs has an impact on policy outcomes. The third section
contains the empirical analysis. It focuses in particular on how agreement was
reached on the formal endorsement of the CEECs' eventual accession and on the
agreement's significance for subsequent policy developments.
The origin and content ofthe EU's collective identity towards
the CEECs
This section seeks to trace the EU's collective identity towards the CEECs - in the
sense of the role that EU policy-makers collectively define for themselves in their
relations with the CEECs - and to identify the norms that characterize it. This
section therefore analyses the discourse of EU policy-makers on the EU's role
towards the CEECs. I argue that, throughout the Cold War and in response to the
dramatic changes in the late 1980s, EU policy-makers discursively constructed a
specific role of the EU towards the CEECs. This role implies a 'responsibility' of
the EU towards the CEECs, in particular to support the politi cal and economic
reforms and their integration with the EU.
Broader aspects ~ EU identity
There are certain more general norms that define the EU's identity more broadly
and that could be expected to resonate particularly in its policy towards the
CEECs. These include the norms embedded in the domestic structures of the
member states. Liberal theories stress the importance of the identity of states
defined by liberal (social) democratic norms for their international policies (see,
e.g., Lumsdaine 1993), especially if they interact in an international institution that
is committed to these norms (see, e.g., Risse-Kappen 1995). Along those lines,
Schimmelfennig (1998, 1999, chs 7, 8 this volume) argues that the EU, as an
international community of (European) states characterized by shared valu es and
norms of liberal democracy, enlarges to include states that share these values.
Other norms that characterize the EU's identity more generally were generated
at the EU level. This includes the notion of the EU's broader European vocation
which is expressed in the commitment to enlarge in the EEC treaty. In the
r
Eastern enlargement 123
preamble, the signatories state their determination 'to lay the foundations of an
ever closer union among the peoples of Europe', rather than just the founding
states, and explicitly call for 'the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to
join their efforts.' Article 237 EEC Treaty/Article O TEU stipulates that any
(democratic) European state may apply to become a member of the EU. Fierke
and Wiener (ch. 5 this volume), for example, emphasize the importance of this
commitment for the EU's enlargement policy.
Finally, it could be argued that the notion of a broader European vocation as
part of the EU's self-image is not confined to an obligation to remain open
Previous enlargements have set a precedent for a special EU role in supporting
democratic consolidation and market economic reforms. In part, this was implied
in the original integration project (Wallace 1996: 19), and it was particularly
obvious in the enlargements to Greece, Spain and Portu gal. Such a role should
resonate particularly in policy towards the CEECs. Friis (1998) argues, for
example, that an important factor in the differentiation between the accession
candidates was the ability of certain policy-makers to frame this decision as one
concerning the stabilization of Central Europe.
However, while these broader norms are important, the empirical evidence of
earlier membership applications, as well as from the EU's policy towards the
CEECs, shows clearly that they are in themselves insufficient to prompt a decision
by the EU to enlarge. In the cases of the British, Spanish, or Maltese applications,
the member states were not reluctant either openly to veto or to block enlargement.
The empirical part of this chapter shows that, in the case of the CEECs.
the EU's explicit acceptance of the principle to enlarge and its decision to start
accession negotiations was very reluctant and incremental. These norms that
relate to the EU's identity more broadly might thus be important contributing
factors to a more specific role of the EU towards the CEECs. But they alone seem
insufficient to have triggered enlargement.
In order to understand the particular case of EU policy towards the CEECs, we
need to focus on the construction of the specific identity, role or self-image that EU
policy-makers have collectively created for the EU in its relation to the CEECs.
and on the behavioural norms that such an identity contains.
Discursive creation ~ a specific EU identity towards the CEECs
The formation of the EU's identity towards the CEECs began with the origins of
the EEC and continued throughout the Cold War. Statements by policy-makers
from both EU institutions and member governments deplored the involuntary
exclusion of the CEEC societies from the integration project, and asserted that.
without them, this project remained incomplete. For example, Walter Hallstein
claimed that the EU did 'share one wish above all others which is to overcome
the division of Europe' (Reinicke 1992: 5), and Mitterrand stated in 1980 that
'[w]hat we term Europe is a second-best op tion which alone cannot represent all
European history, geography and culture' (Haywood 1993: 275). In 1985, the
124 Ulrich Sedelmeier
Dooge Comlllittee' s report daillled that the EU had 'not lost sight of the fact that it
represents only a part of Europe' and that 'any progress in building the
Community is in keeping with the interests of Europe as a whole' (CounciI1985).
This discourse lllight have been genuine, or it might have been Cold War
rhetoric, but when overcollling the division of Europe suddenly becallle a real
possibility, it provided the script for EU policy-makers to assert a specific role for
the EU in post-Cold War Europe and towards the CEECs in particular. Rather
than a backtracking in the face of dramatically changed conditions, there was
continuity in the discourse about its role towards the CEECs which reaffirmed the
EU' s cOlllmitment.
EU policy-makers, individually and collectively at successive European Council
meetings, couched pledges of support for the CEECs in strong nonnative
language. At Rhodes in December 1988, the European Council reaffirmed the
EU's 'determination to act with renewed hope to overcome the division of the
continent (Council 1988) and dedared a year later, in Strasbourg: 'The Community
and its Member States are fully conscious of the common responsibility
which devolves on them in this decisive phase in the history of Europe ... The
availability and willingness to cooperate are essential elements of the Community's
policy' (Council 1989). At the beginning of 1990, Prime Minister
Haughey affinned on behalf of the Irish Council presidency that '[t]he EC can and
must do more than anyone else ... [It] has an enormous load of ·responsibility
towards East Europe' (Torreblanca 1997: 114); the Rome European Council in
December pronounced itself 'conscious of its special responsibility towards the
Central and Eastern European Countries' (CounciI1990).
The EU's own discourse was endorsed and perpetuated from outside sources.
The new CEEC governments dedared it their ambition to 'return to Europe' by
joining the EU, and the US administration stated that the CEECs were largely
'Europe's responsibility' (Baker 1989). The continuity in the collective discourse
of EU policy-makers and the validation from outside sources reinforced the EU's
self-prodaimed role and endowed it with more concrete substance: it had a 'special
responsibility' towards the CEECs to use this 'historical opportunity' to overcome
the division of the continent. The EU had actively to support the transformations
in the CEECs and their integration with the EU. The discourse implied an EU
commitment which, for those in charge of EU policy towards the CEECs, had
become dosely associated with the EU's self-image. The discourse of a collective
EU identity towards the CEECs that was characterized by a 'responsibility'
became a central aspect of EU policy.
Policy impact and the uneven effect of the EU's collective
identity towards the CEECs
Through the centrality of the notion of 'responsibility' in the policy discourse, EU
policy-makers thus discursively constructed a specific role for the EU, or the EU's
collective identity, towards the CEECs. However, merely to establish the existence
of such a collective identity is not sufficient to infer a causal effect on policy.
Eastern enlarge1l1ent 125
This section therefore seeks to darify the mechanisms through which EU identity
has a policy impact.
This is not only in itself a central concern of the social constructivist research
agenda (see, e.g., Risse-Kappen 1994; Checkel 1998); it seems particularly
necessary to understand the effect of identity on policy towards the CEECs. There
was strong opposition inside the EU to acknowledge even the principle of enlargement
in the Europe Agreements (EAs), and incrementalism characterized the
subsequent evolution of the EU's commitment to eastern enlargement. This contrasts
with the virtually automatic effect on appropriate behaviour that is usually
associated with constructivist approaches.3 The discursive existence of a collective
EU identity centred on the notion of 'responsibility' was thus not, as such, sufflcient
to generate policy outcomes that accommodated the CEECs' preferences.
This chapter argues that a crucial aspect of the effect of the EU's identity on its
policy towards the CEECs was that it was Zlneven across the policy-makers
involved, i.e., both the way in which and the extent to which it affected their
behaviour varied. In order to understand its policy impact, we thus need to
consider four related concepts, namely (1) the difference between shared and
collective identities; (2) the distinction between constitutive and regulative effects
of norms and identity; (3) the difference between internalization of norms and
norm-conform behaviour resulting !Tom rationalist calculations of reputational
and social costs of deviation; and, as a consequence of these, (4) the illlportance of
the agency by policy advocates.
Certain norms or a specific identity may be shared by all members of a gTOUp.
But even if they are not commonly held, they might nonetheless characterize
the group collectively, if they have become either a prominent feature of the
public discourse of the group, or formally institutionalized as COlllmon
property.
Uepperson et al. 1996: 54)
The latter seems the case for the EU's identity towards the CEECs. Some
member governments that feared the consequences of eastern enlargement might
not have shared equally a desire to integrate the CEECs in the near future. BUL
they had been implicated in the creation of a discourse that implied a responsibility
to support their integration. The key question is then to what extent and why
those that did not individually share the goals illlplied in the collective discourse
might have felt bound by it. To the extent that they did, it might have been due
to a regulative effect of norms and identity. It is precisely this regulative effect
that pushes the boundary between 'thinner' social constructivist approaches
that emphasize the role of strategic action, and more sophisticated rationalisl
approaches that also indude non-material factors. Rather than assuming an either/
or approach to social construction and rational choice, this focuses on the link
between rationality and norm-compliance (see, e.g., Finnemore and Sikkink 1998;
March and Olsen 1998).
Identity and the norms that define it can have constitutive or regulative effects on
126 Ulrích Sedelmeier
actors, or both. The effects ot identity and norms are most far-reaching if they have
a constitutive effect. This is the case if actors internalize certain norms or identities.
if a given identity torms a large part ot their multiple social identities, and if they
have an ettect on their preterence-tormation and interest-definition (see, e.g.,
Jepperson et al. 1996). This does not mean that regulative norms do not play a role
in this case. They specity standards tor appropriate behaviour through which a
given identity is enacted in varying circumstances.
Yet nonns and identity might also have a purely regulative effect. In this case,
the effect is merely on behaviour, not on underlying interests. They regulate
behaviour by prescribing or proscribing appropriate ways of acting for a given
role. This is different from the quasi-material constraints on strategies that many
neo-liberal institutionalist accounts emphasize. However, more sophisticated
rationalist approaches take account of the fact that actors might include in their
cost-benefit calculations reputational concerns and the social costs arising from
behaviour that does not comply with social norms (see, e.g., Johnston 1999).4
Thus in order to understand how the uneven effect of identity inlluences EU
policy towards the CEECs, we need to identify the constitutive effects and
regulative norms that the EU's collective identity towards the CEECs implies. To
the extent that policy is evaluated with regard to its compatibility with the role
professed in official statements, the somewhat diffuse notion of an 'EU responsibility
towards the CEECs' is a rather vague guide. Nonetheless, as opposed to
questions of specific policy detail, the prescriptions that it entailed on the general
principle of eastern enlargement are fairly clear.5 The EU needs to contribute
actively towards making enlargement a reality. At a minimum, enlargement could
not be refused simply for the reason that it might compromise certain vested
interests of the incumbents, as it presented a legitimate aim of the CEECs.
In this case, the regulative effect of identity thus operates primarily through a
prohibitive normo Since its evaluative standard is clearer for the behaviour that it
proscribes, rather than what it prescribes, the role of policy advocates is crucial. To
have a positive effect on policy outcomes, it requires certain actors to advocate
policy options with which others then conform because they feel they cannot
refuse to do so, although they might have chosen otherwise had they not been
forced to justify non-compliant behaviour. In turn, in order for a credible group of
policy advocates to emerge, identity has to have a constitutive effect on certain
policy-makers. This chapter argues that a group of policy advocates emerged
around the Commission's Directorate General for External Relations (DG I) and
successive commissioners for external relations and their persona! staff in their
cabinets. These policy-makers identified most strongly with the EU's role towards
the CEECs and thus largely internalized the EU's identity towards the CEECs.
In sum, the argument that this chapter sketches does not suggest that EU
identity towards the CEECs determined policy outcomes. Nor do es it suggest that
identity only has an effect if actors internalize it. To be sure, material self-interests
and strategic bargaining are an important part of the process. Identity affects policy
by structuring the 'realm of possibilities' for available policy options, which
precludes certain options as inappropriate and reinforces the legitimacy of others
Eastenz enlargement 127
(see, e.g., Price and Tannenwald 1996: 148-9; Klotz 1995: 461-2). It thus created
the necessary scope for policy advocates to obtain agreement on incremental steps
that"advanced policy.
Nor does it contradict the argument if actors whose preference formation is
shaped by the internalization of identity behave strategically to maximize these
preferences. They might even use normative arguments strategically to induce
compliance in others, or they might appeal to actors' self·interest to gain agreement.
Indeed, the policy advocates frequently asserted that an accommodating
policy towards the CEECs served the EU's collective self-interest. Conversely,
some actors might promote similar goals as the policy advocates for purely selfinterested
reasons. They might even try to legitimize their goals with reference to
norms. What matters in this case is why actors - for whom norm-compliance is not
clearly complementary with material-interest maximization - are susceptible to
their arguments. Interesting from a theoretical point of view is the effect on policy af
the interaction between the referenced regulative norms and interests-definition,
and between norm-compliance and rational choice, not an either/or causation. The
regulative norm provided the necessary condition, which, in combination with
strategic behaviour by the policy advocates and the support of some actors
motivated by material self-interests, led EU policy towards eastern enlargement.
Advocacy, incrementalism and norm-compliance in the
EU's policy towards the CEECs
The EU's decision to start accession negotiations was not simply the result of a
'history-making' decision at the Luxembourg European Council in December
1997. Rather, the formal decision was the result of a number of apparently discrete
decisions at different European Council meetings that made the enlargement
proces s increasingly hard to reverse. I argue that the crucial step which started this
expansive and cumulative logic of policy evolution was the formal endorsement of
the CEECs' membership perspective at the Copenhagen Council in June 1993.
Table 6.1 highlights the key junctures in the evolution ofEU policy.
This section sketches how this agreement was reached and its significance for
subsequent policy developments. It emphasizes the continued advocacy and the
strategies of the policy advocates, the incremental nature of policy evolution, and
the importance of the regulative effect of the EU's identity in reducing the scope
for a veto.
The formal endorsement cif the princiPle cif eventual CEEC membershiP
at the Copenhagen European Council
During the negotiations of the Europe Agreements (EAs) with the first three
CEECs in 1991, the latter wanted an acknowledged link between the agreements
and their eventual membership. They were supported by the unit in the Commission's
DG I that was responsible for policy towards the CEECs (DG I-E), and
external relations commissioner Andriessen and his cabinet. These policy-makers
128 Ulách Sedelmeier
Table 6.1 Key dates in the eastern enlargement decision
had continued close contacts with their counterparts in the CEECs and soon acted
as advocates of the CEECs' interests inside the EU and of their integration with
the EU, which they regarded as the EU's responsibility and in line with its role.ti
However, the EU's overall position on the CEECs' membership perspective
was highly restrictive. The member governments, except for the German and
British, and parts of the Commission were strongly opposed to creating a link to
eastern enlargement, or even to engage at this stage in a debate about enlargement
as a longer-term prospect. As a result, the directives for the Commission negotiators
specified that, if the CEECs should raise the issue during the negotiations,
they should simply refer to the general possibility, according to article 237 EEC,
for any European state to apply for membership.7
The conduct of the negotiations and their final outcome on this issue was fairly
close to what rationalist approaches would expect. In the intra-EU debate, the
member governments' positions seemed to rellect the cost-benefit calculations of
the longer-term implications that such an acknowledgement of the CEECs'
eventual membership would entail. In the negotiations, the asymmetries in
bargaining power between the member states and the CEECs constrained the
accommodation of the CEECs' preferences.8 Although the Council agreed to
make the negotiation directives more llexible in order to resolve the negotiation
deadlock resulting from the dissatisfaction of the CEECs, this concerned mainly
the EU's trade concessions. On the membership perspective, the Council agreed to
a formulation in the preamble which acknowledged eventual membership as the
'ultimate objective' of the CEECs. This formulation, however, fell well short of
acknowledging this as a mutual objective shared by the EU, and made clear that
membership would be far from an automatic consequence of association.
Still, the Commission negotiators inserted in the paragraph of the preamble that
'in the view of the parties these agreements will help this objective.' Although this
went beyond the negotiation directives, none of the delegations in the Council
Strategie behaviour and instrumental rationality
An important aspect of the success of the policy advocates was that they rnoved
strategically to achieve their goals: they forged strategic alliances and informal
cooperation with actors that arguably promoted an evolution of policy towards
eastern enlargement for more self.interested reasons. This included support from
Eastern enlargemelli 129
wanted to object formally to it." In this sense, the EA negotiations also showed that
the EU's professed role towards the CEECs created a certain room for manoeuvre
forthe policy advocates inside the Commission.
Although this concession seemed to stretch to its absolute limits what the main
actors on the EU side could accept, a year and a half later the EU agTeed on the
step that the great majority of member governments and parts of the Commission
had opposed rigorously.H' The Copenhagen European Council in June 1993
declared that the CEECs 'that so desire shall become members of the European
Union. Accession will take place as soon as an associated country is able to assume
the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions
required' (Council 1993: .'5). The continued advocacy by DG I-E and the
Andriessen cabinet generated the essential dynamism behind this development of
policy. Almost immediately after the signing of the EAs, these policy advocates
started to work on moving EU policy beyond the association formula. In addition to
more substantiveproposals, the central element of their advocacy was the formal
endorsement of the CEECs' eventua! accession as an objective shared by the EU. 11
The extent of opposition to reopening the debate and the constraints that it
imposed on a more accommodating policy were rellected in the fact that the
Copenhagen declaration itself was the result of an incremental evolution. This
proces s was marked by agTeement on key documents that went increasingly
towards acknowledging the CEECs' membership perspective. While each of the
documents did not in themselves explicitly acknowledge eastern enlargement as a
shared objective, they made it increasingly hard to refuse it ultimately.
The Commission's report on enlargement for the Lisbon European Council in
June 1992 acknowledged that while the CEECs were 'not yet in a position to accept
the obligations of membership [they have] political needs which go b~yond the
possibilities of existing agreements' (Commission 1992a: 8, emphasis added).
In the report for the Edinburgh European Council in December 1992, the
Commission proposed that the EU 'should now confirm that it accepts the goal of
eventual membership in the European Union for the [CEECs] when they are able
to satisfy the conditions required' (Commission 1992b: 3). The Edinburgh European
Council was too distracted with other business to discuss the Commission
report in detail, but stated that at its next meeting it would 'reach decisions on the
various components of the Commission's report in order to prepare the associate
countries for accession to the Union' (Council 1992: 37). In the run-up to the
Copenhagen European Council, the discussion in the Council focused mainly
on trade concessions and the institutional framework and no longer seriously
challenged the principle of membership.
Start of negotiations for Europe Ag>'eements(EAs)with the first three
CEECs
First EAs sig>led
Copenhagen European Counci! (endorsement of CEECs' membership
perspective)
Essen European Council (ag>"eementon pre-accession strategy)
Madrid European Council (indicative date for accession negotiations)
Start of the 1996-7 lGC
End ofIGC, Amsterdam Treaty
Commission's 'Agenda 2000' published
Luxembourg European Counci!, decision to start accession negotiations
with five CEECs in March 1998
Start of accession negotiations with five CEECs
Berlin European Council (agreement on budgetalY perspective 2000-06)
Colog>1eEuropean Council (decision to hold short lGC on institutional
reform in 2000)
December 1990
December 1994
December 1995
July 1996
June 1997
July 1997
December 1997
December 1991
June 1993
March 1998
March 1999
June 1999
130 Ulrich Sedelmeier
German policy-makers, but crucially also active coordination with the UK and
Danish Council presidencies in the second half of 1992 and the first half of 1993.
Cooperation concerned both strategy and substance, including the insertion of
policy papers drafted in the Commission as presidency papers into the Council's
discussion.12
Tactieal behaviour seeured the approval in the Commission of the crucial report
for the Edinburgh European Council. Endorsement was obtained not simply
through a proeess of persuasion, but by ealling a vote in the College of Commissioners.
Many commissioners, among them President Delors, were coneerned
that bringing enlargement on the agenda was divisive for the member states and
thus detrimental for progress on the internal agenda. The neeessary majority was
seeured with the inclusion of requirements in the qualitative criteria for CEEC
membership that ealled both for the stability of democratie institutions in the
CEECs and for the EU's eapacity to absorb new members without endangering its
own momentum.13
Finally, an element in the policy advocates' strategy was to persuade the
member governments that the prospect of eastern enlargement would inerease
their material self-interest, or at least not affeet it negatively. For example, on the
one hand they emphasized that the perspective of membership eould counter the
risks that the ehanging political situation in Central and Eastern Europe entailed,
such as the threats to stability from ethnic conflicts and the risks to the reforms
stemming from the increasing popular dissatisfaetion (Commission 1992b, 1993).
On the other hand, the Commission supported research into the effects of further
integration of the CEECs on speeific EU regions and sectors, in order to demonstrate
that the expected negative consequences were greatly overstated (Baldwin
1994; Faini and Portes 1995).
Regulative norms and identity--related arguments about appropriate
behaviour
The building of strategie alliances and instrumental strategies that focused on the
material cost-benefit ealculations of the more reluctant poliey-makers thus played
an important part in the agreement on the Copenhagen declaration. But this is not
the whole story and not sufficient to explain this outcome. A key element of the
policy proeess was that even those EU poliey-makers that were concerned about
the material consequences of enlargement were sensitive to non-material factors
associated with the regulative effeets of the EU's identity towards the CEECs.
The policy advoeates' strategy included presenting the member states'
endorsement of the CEECs' membership perspeetive as a case of appropriate
behaviour by relating it to the EU's identity towards the CEECs. In the interual
debate they repeatedly used sueh normative arguments and pursued an explicit
link in official doeuments between identity and enlargement as an important
objeetive in its own right. For example, the poliey advoeates inserted into the
Commission's Lisbon report a language that explicitly expressed the EU's responsibility
towards the CEECs and the need to act aceordingly:
Eastem tnlargement 131
The integration of [theJ new demoeraeies into the European family presents a
historie opportunity .... The Community has never been a closed club, and
cannot now refuse the historie ehallenge to assume its continental responsibilities
and contribute to the development of a politieal and economie order
for the whole ofEurope .... Enlargement is a challenge which the Community
eannot refuse.
(Commission 1992a: 1-2, 9)
Another example is contained in a draft of the Commission report for Edinburgh,
whieh emphasizes the legitimaey of the CEECs' objeetives and the resulting
need for the EU to endorse it: 'The merits of ... a [clear declaration by the
Community, in whieh it endorses the objeet of fully f1edged membership of these
countries at a later stageJ would be very substantial as it would give: satisfaetion to
the justified aspirations of these countries ... ' (Commission 1992c: 5; emphasis
added).
Likewise, the apparent vulnerability of EU policy-makers to the broadly based
criticism of the EAs by academies and journalists, as well as CEEC policy-makers,
is striking, as it was not linked to any material threats. Academic and media eriticism
was unanimous in denouncing the absence of a clear membership perspective,
the failure to engage in a debate about construetive adaptation of the EU
integration model in order to accommodate the CEECs in the long run,14 and the
limitations of the trade concessions.15 CEEC policy-makers eriticized the EAs both
in individual capacity16 and collectively in two so-called Visegrád memoranda of
September 1992 andJune 1993, issued just before the respective European Councils
with the active encouragement from the policy advocates in the Commission.
This criticism not only focused on the failure of the EU to act decisively in its
own security and economic interest. It had a strong normative dimension which
emphasized the failure of the EU to match its rhetoric with appropriate behaviour,
and to live up to the role it had declared for itself and to the expectations it had
raised. Crucially, although it was not linked to material sanctions and was not
made by actors that had the material capabilities to sanction non-fulfilment of their
demands, such criticism and the strong normative language of the policy advocates
had a clear effect on member governments and the more reluctant parts of the
Commission.
For example, the French government strongly perceived the need to take a
much more positive approach in order to rectify the impression that France was a
main obstructer of a more accommodating policy.'7 The Spanish govermnent fdt
that its tough stance on trade issues was misinterpreted as general hostility to the
eventual accession of the CEECs.'8 Mter a visit by the Polish prime minister,
Suchocka, to Madrid, Prime Minister Gonzáles instmcted the foreign ministry to
support the Commission's proposals.19
Cmcially, after the Commission formally put the proposal to endorse the
membership perspective on the table, none of the delegations in the Council
disputed it openly.20 In the end, reservations existed mainly among the Belgian and
Luxembourg governments, which had strong coneerns about the possible dilution
132 Ulrich Sedel11leier
of future integration, but did not voice them formaIly." The agreernent on the
financial perspective and the solution to theMaastricht ratification crisis at the
Edinburgh European Council had greatly reduced the arguments that could be
presented as legitimate against turning to the question of enlargemenL
In sum, the way in which the Copenhagen European Council's formal endorsernent
of the CEECs' mernbership perspective as a mutual policy goal was achieved
suggests that EU policy did not merely evolve within the parameters of rnaterial
cost-benefit calculations of the rnain actors. The endorsement of the Copenhagen .
declaration might have been facilitated by the consideration that this statement did
not entail any formally binding obligations on the EU and thus aIlowed for later
backtracking. But although it could lead to the debate that the majority of member
governments and parts of the Cornmission had wanted to avoid, EU policymakers
responded to the criticism of their apparent failure to act in accordance to
their professed role rather than taking the stance that the EAs were a take-it-orleave-it
offer.
The regulative effect of identity created the necessary room for manoeuvre for
the policy advocates to press for the formal endorsement of the CEECs' eventual
accession as a mutual goaL EU identity limited the policy options that were
acceptable as appropriate behaviour. It limited the grounds for legitimate
opposition by excluding argument about material self-interests. Even policymakers
in the member governments and the Commission that feared the material
consequences of eastern enlargement felt inhibited to veto this step with reference
to their particular self-interest.
The regulative effect of EU identity towards the CEECs is underlined in thc
irnportance of two non-material factors for the success of the policy advocates,
namely the use of identity-related arguments in official statements and internal
discussions and the normative criticism of the EAs from both the academic
community and the CEECs. However, endorsement of the policy advocates'
proposal was far from automatic and relied heavily on their strategic behaviour.
Even in these instances, in which action seemed to follow more clearly a logic of
appropriate behaviour, it also involved instrumental rationality on the part of the
policy advocates who in part used normative arguments strategicaIly to induce
compliance. Furthermore, although comp1iance was not induced by rnaterial
sanctions and constraints, it did result in part from a strategic calculation of
consequences. CruciaIly, however, the utility function of these actors included the
reputational and social costs entailed by failing to conform with the regulative
norrns implied in the EU's role towards the CEECs.
The expansive logic of tbe formal acknowledgement of tbe
CEECs' eventual membership
The significance rif the Copenhagen declaration
The acknowledgement of eventual CEEC accession as a shared objective presented
a significant achievement, considering the strong initial opposition to such a
Eastem enlarge11lent 133
rnove. However, at the. time the assessrnents of the substance of the Copenhagen
declaration were rather ambiguous. The declaration did not involve any legaIly
enforceable commitment. The absence of a tirnetable, the qualitative formulation
of the conditions for membership,22 and in particular the provision that 'the
Union's capacity to absorb new rnembers, whilemaintaining the momentum of
European integration, is also an important consideration' (Council 1993: 5) which
was entirely beyond the CEECs control - provided ample scope for backtracking.
The Copenhagen declaration might thus be interpreted as a limited,
rnerely rhetorical response to the CEECs' criticism of the EAs.
The limitations of the Copenhagen declaration are on the one hand an
expression of the constraints that strategic bargaining between rnaterial interestmaximizing
actors placed on a more accommodating policy. On the other hand,
both how Copenhagen was achieved and its subsequent significance suggest that
EU policy did not evolve merely within the parameters of material cost-benefit
calculations of themain actors.
The benefit of hindsight allows one to establish that Copenhagen was indeed
highly significant. AII subsequent EU documents on policy towards the CEECs
start by quoting the Copenhagen declaration as the key expression of the EU's
commitment to eastern enlargement. CruciaIly, it had a profound substantive
impact on the subsequent evolution of policy and provided a starting-point for an
expansive logic that made it increasingly difficult to block initiatives aimed at
developing policy further. Despite the strong reluctance among EU policy-makers
to face up to the consequences of eastern enlargernent, it paved the way to open
accession negotiations with the CEECs, which was 'probably the most significant
of the different stages of the accession proces s ... because opening them implies a
willingness to conclude them' (Avery and Cameron 1998: 27).
/ncrementalism, regulative norms, commitment and credibiliry
Central to this evolution were successive agreements on limited, incrernental
developments of policy. The Essen European Council in December 1994 endorsed
the Commission's proposal of a so-called pre-accession strategy to prepare the
CEECs for accession. lts economic core was a Commission White Paper to prepare
the CEECs for their participation in the internal market. FinaIly, the Madrid European
Council in December 1995 approved an indicative date for the start of accession
negotiations - six months after the conclusion of the IGC starting in 1996.23
This incrementalism was in part a result of the constraints on policy; in part it
was a deliberate strategy of the policy advocates.'" As with the Copenhagen
declaration, these incremental steps focused on apparently limited measures and
questions of principle, which to refuse would have been contrary to the EU's
identity towards the CEECs. For example, having accepted the general principle
of the CEECs' eventual accession, it was difficult to refuse the argument that the
EU should present the CEECs with a workable road map that indicated the path
from the general principle to actual accession.25 In turn, having agreed to a work
programme for the CEECs' accession preparations, it was hard to argue against an
134 UlrichSedelmeier
indicative date for the stan of accession negotiations, if the CEECs had by then
made significant progress.
A crucial factor that reinforced this dynamic was that the Copenhagen
declaration presented a cenain formalization of the EU's commitment to eventual
membership. Agreement to these initiatives could now be clear1y presented as a
test for the credibility of the EU. In this sense, when the Essen European Council
endorsed the pre-accession strategy, it affirmed that '[the EU], in deciding this
strategy, reemphasizes the commitment of the Union to the accession of the associated
countries' (Council1994: 25).
Apparent safeguards and decreasing grounds for legitimate opposition
to enlargement
ln addition, these measures stili contained apparent safety valves that seemed to
keep them limited and to provide scope to stop developments at a later stage. The
Copenhagen declaration was only a declaration of principle and set conditions for
membership, including the ominous provision of the EU's own dynamism. The
choice of regulatory alignment as the economic core of the pre-accession strategy26
could be seen as a safeguard against politically motivated ear1y accessions. By
making the regulatory accession requirements more explicit, it seemed to make the
conditionality harderY Finally, the start of accession negotiations was made
conditional on successful institutional reform at the 1996-7 IGC (Council 1995:
23). However, despite these safeguards, each of those measures had the effect of
reducing further the grounds oflegitimate opposition to enlargement. As the EU's
collective identity proscribed selfish opposition to enlargement, it restricted legiti·
mate arguments to those that focused on the common interest of an enlarged EU.
One such common interest of all participants is the proper functioning of the
internal market. Doubts about the CEECs' ability to implement the EU's regulatory
regimes were thus a legitimate argument against enlargement. However,
since the pre-accession strategy focused precisely on the preparation of the CEECs
for the internal market, such doubts could no longer serve as a general pretext.
Another common interest of current and future members is the sustainability of
the EU's dynamism after enlargement. Initially, member governments could
legitimately decline to address the general question of enlargement before the
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, which was supposed to provide the necessary
deepening. But the solution to the Danish ratification problem at the Edinburgh
European Council made it hard to refuse to take a general position on enlargement.
A further aspect of the EU's dynamism is the effectiveness of decision-making in
an enlarged Union. However, since the Madrid European Council made the start
of accession negotiations conditional on institutional reform at the 1996-7 IGC, it
was difficult to refuse the principle. Furthermore, despite the insufficient results of
the IGC, the logic ofhaving agreed to an indicative starting date was such that the
member governments decided nonetheless to open accession negotiations in
March 1998, while agreeing on another IGC to deal with these issues. To be sure,
some member governments entered into the minutes of the Amsterdam European
Eastem enlargement 135
Council their intent not to endorse any accession if the reforms should not be
agreed (Financial Times, 16 Séptember 1997).
Conclusions
This chapter's argument has both empirical implications for the EU's ability to
respond strategically to a common risk and theoretical implications for the broader
debate in IR theory about the relationship between rationality and norm-conform
behaviour.
Enlargement, Tisk and ratiOTUllity
The central argument of this chapter is that the EU's decision to open accession
negotiations was not the result of a strategic choice in response to the potential
risks of instabilityin the CEECs. The ability to agree on enlargement despite the
veto power of negatively affected member governments is thus not a reflection of
the EU's capacity as a collective strategic actor in international politics. Rather, the
EU's decision to pursue accession negotiations can be attributed largely to the
collective identity that it created for itself and the regulative norms such an identity
entailed.
First, although the EU was able to agree on enlargement, it could not agree more
than minimal reforms to prepare itself for enlargement. Thus, while it was able to
avoid the risks associated with passivity vis-a-vis the changes in the CEECs, its
activism generates its own long-term risks for the sustainability of the integration
project. Second, the proces s through which enlargement was endorsed was very
different from strategic decision-making driven by a common security rationale.
Tbe policy process was far too incremental; every step towards further developments
was strongly contested; and at virtually no point was there a thorough
debate about the EU's interests and appropriate strategies for an enlarged EU.
It is thus difficult to see in the enlargement decision a rational collective decision
by enlightened member governments that prioritize long-term interest, or engage
in collective problem-solving and burden sharing out of solidarity with those
member states that are most directly affected by potential instability in the CEECs.
Neither was it the case that member states with particular interest in enlargement
coerced the others into a decision that might be detrimental to the system as a
whole. Tbis chapter's analysis suggests that, while member governments with
more obvious material interests in enlargement provided significant support for
the policy advocates, they were not the source of the crucial policy initiatives
analysed here.
Moreover, the chapter suggests that looking at EU policy primarily as case of
foreign policy is seriously misleading. By overstating the importance of the security
rationale, it distracts from the distinctiveness of the relationship with the CEECs.
It ignores the fact that EU policy towards the CEECs is as much about the definition
and enactment of its own identity as about a stabilization of its 'new abroad'.
To understand the decision to enlarge requires one to depart from materialist
136 Ulridz Sedelmáer
assumptions of rationality. Identification with, ar the constitutive effects of, the
discursively constructed role of the EU towards the CEECs led a group of policy
advocates inside the Commission continuously to promote moves towards
enlargement. This does not mean that calculations of the material costs and
benefits of enlargement were not an important part of the story. For example, the
perception of risks from possible instability in the CEECs was an important factor
in generating support for enlargement, particularly from the German government.
Conversely, the perception of the risks that enlargement itself could entail for'
future integration in the EU was an important consideration that caused reluctance
in the Belgian and Luxembourg govemments, for example. The maximization of
material interests imposed constraints on policy, which meant that it could evolve
only incrementally. But these could not stop the process altogether. Albeit
incrementally, policy did evolve, and these successive steps made the enlargement
process increasingly irreversible. The necessary scope for such an evolution was
created by regulative constraints on behaviour. The decisions at each stage were
presented as questions of principle. Opposition with open reference to narrow selfinterests
would have entailed conflicts with regulative norms associated with the
EU's collective identity towards the CEECs.
To be sure, agreement at each of these stages included apparent safeguards
which seemed to maintain the possibility of blocking further evolution of policy at
a later stage. To the extent that policy-makers subsequently felt inhibited about
insisting on a strict interpretation of these safeguards, there might have been an
element of unintended consequences that facilitated a certain path-dependence.
The cumulative logic of policy evolution, and the increasing formalization of an
EU commitment to enlargement, further limited the grounds for legitimate
opposition to enlargement and raised the reputational costs of a veto.
However, as the regulative norm was primarily prohibitive, the consensus it
created was primarily a negative consensus, namely 'not to block enlargement.z8
The EU's identity was not intemalized widely enough to forge a positive
consensus on enlargement as well as on the necessary reforms. The prospect of
continued muddling-through suggests a pessimistic scenario in which enlargement
might lead the EU towards the 'risk' end of the continuum identified by Cowles
and Smith (2000).
A more optimistic interpretation is that the inevitability of enlargement now
condemns policy-makers to agree to the neeessary reforms. EU poliey-makers
might thus have pushed themselves towards the reform and revival seenario. Still,
in this ease, the impetus for reform and revival did not come primarily from a
colleetive strategie deeision, but to a large extent preeisely from the obstacles that
the EU's role towards the CEECs imposes on a 'rational' defenee of individual
member states' narrower material self-interests.
Rationality and nonn-comPliance
These apparent shortcomings of rationalist approaehes to eastern enlargement
highlight the important contribution that more soeiologieal approaehes in IR can
Eastern enlargement 137
make. However, EU policy towards the CEECs also presents a key case to support
the more recent move in the theoretical debate away from either/or arguments
between rationalism and constructivism. lnstead, it underlines the need to focus
on, and to understand better, the link between rationality and norm-confonn
behaviour.
The debate has already clarified that to accept interests as endogenous does not
exclude strategic behaviour to achieve these interests. But eastern enlargement
entails cases that are not easily captured by the elegant solution of such a 'division
of labour' between rationalists and constructivists (Katzenstein et al. 1998). lt thus
identifies two related key areas where further conceptual and methodological
research is necessary. One is the strategic use of normative arguments and what it
tells us about whether the actors that profess these norms use them instrumentally
01' genuinely. The other is how the strategic use of normative arguments works.
The regulative effect of norms generates behavioural constraints and induces
norm-compliance, although there is neither a link to material sanctions nor a
constitutive effect of actors' interest definition.
Notes
1 This chapter was originally published in M. G. Cowles and M. Smith (eds) (2000) The
State rf tlze European Union, vol. 5: Risk, Riform, Resistance and Revival. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 164-85.
2 On the Luxembourg European Council, see, e.g., Friis (1998); on the eventual outcome
of policy reform at the Berlin European Council, see Laffan and Shackelton (2000).
Rieger (2000), Allen (2000); on institutional reform at the 1996-7 IGC, see, e.g.,
Sedelmeier (2000).
3 For a similar point, see Schimmelfennig (1999, ch. 7 this volume).
4 In a similar vein, Schimmelfenning (1999, ch. 7 this volume) emphasizes that arguments
relating to institutional norms strengthened the bargaining power of actors pressing for
eastern enlargement. He maintains, however, that such actors only use these arguments
instrumentally, i.e., they have not intemalized these norms.
5 By contrast, it is not immediately obvious which evaluative standards it implies for an
assessment of the norm-conformity 01' 'appropriateness' of specific EU practices on
issues of policy substance, such as to liberalize trade ar to establish concrete conditions
for accession. These are outside this chapter's narrower focus. But any account that
analyses the effects of identity on policy towards the CEECs cannot be complete unless
it captures the effects on these issues as well (seeSedelmeier 1998).
6 Interviews, Commissioner's cabinet, 2 February 1995; Commission, DG I, 23 October
1995,24 October 1995, 27 October 1995.
7 Interviews, Commission, DG I, 23 October 1995; 24 October 1995.
8 For further detail on the negotiations, see, e.g., Sedelmeier and Wallace (1996); Niblett
(1995); Friis (1997); Torreblanca (1997); Sedelmeier (1998).
9 Interview, Commission, DG I, 23 October 1995.
10 In addition to this dedaration, the European Council endorsed a nnilateral acceleration
of trade liberalization and dosel' institutionallinks between the EU and the CEECs.
These are not, however, the subject of this chapter.
11 lnterviews, Commission, DG I, 24 October 1995.
12 Interviews, UK Permanent Representation, 9July 1993;Commission, DG I, 24 October
1995.
13 Interview in a Commissioner's cabinet, 15 December 1995.
138 Ulrich Sedelmeier
14 See,e.g., Bonvicini et al. (1991);Wallace (1991);Reinicke (1992); Kramer (1993);Smith
and Wallace (1994).
15 See,e.g., Baldwin et al. (1992);Winters (1992);Hindley (1993);Messerlin (1993);Rollo
and Snuth (1993).
16 See,e.g., Suchocka (1992);Saryusz-Wolski (1994).
17 Interviews, French Foreign Ministry, 3July 1996 and 10July 1996.
18 Interviews, Spanish Foreign Ministry, ISJune 1996 and 21June 1996.
19 Interview, Spanish Permanent Representation, 3 February 1995.
20 Interview, UK Permanent Representation, 9July 1993.
21 Interview, Commission DG 1,24 October 1995.
22 The declaration mentions the following conditions:
• stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and
respect for and protection of minorities;
• existence of a functioning market economy, and capacity to cope with competitive
pressure and market forceswithin the Union;
• abi!ityto take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of
political, economic and monetary union.
23 For further detail on this evolution, see, e.g., Sedelmeier and Wallace (1996); Mayhew
(1998);Crabbe and Hughes (1998); Sedelmeier (1998).
24 Interview, Comnussion DG I, 24 October 1995.
25 Interviews, Commission DG I, 24 October 1995; and in a Commissioner's cabinet,
2 February 1995.
26 For a discussion of a pre-accession strategy based on regnlatory alignment, see Smith et
al. (1996);for the follow-up in the accession partnerships, see Grabbe (1999).
27 Interview, French Prime Minister's Office, 10July 1996; French Foreign Ministry, 3July
1996.
28 Interview, German Foreign Ministry, 13 December 1995.
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