Radical responsibility for nonhuman others
Abstract
The human–animal relation is a complex one; it involves a collective and individual
object and subject as well as synchronic and diachronic responsibility. Due to the range of
dimensions that are included into this relation, there is a need for a form of responsibility that
covers all forms of it: this is radical responsibility. This form of responsibility claims that we
are responsible for what we do and the beneficial actions that others do for us. Moreover we
are responsible for the unintended and unconsidered consequences of our actions and for not
taking action when we could prevent something wrong from happening. This radical form of
responsibility fully covers the entire range of complex human–animal relations and allows a
moral agent to see the wide-ranging moral consequences of his/her actions.
As La Follette notices, “we are (...) part of a culture which rather cavalierly uses animals
for food, clothes, for research in the development of new drugs, and to determine the safety of
household products. And many of these uses require inflicting a great deal of pain on animals”
(1989: 80). In my opinion, these cruel practices could be stopped if we employed the virtue of
radical responsibility. In this mini review, I claim that the concept of radical responsibility that
is presented by Nigel Dower is the kind of responsibility that should be employed in our
relations with nonhuman animals. Radical responsibility applies to the entire range of animal
uses and enables us to employ a wide range of responses to complex human–animal relations.
In this paper, I outline the general view on moral responsibility in ethics (1), focusing
on the aspects of responsibility that apply to human–animal relations (3). I also present the
concept of moral responsibility from the perspective of environmental ethics, the ethical
subdiscipline that focuses on the natural world as the object of moral consideration (2). After
introducing crucial information about moral responsibility, I outline the concept of radical
responsibility as a proper approach to dealing with human–animal relations.
1. Moral responsibility in ethics
Responsibility for one’s actions is one of the most important concepts in ethics; it is
strictly associated with the issue of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness. Moral responsibility
has the following formula: “subject S is morally responsible (i.e. blameworthy or praiseworthy)
to degree d for object O” (Khoury, 2017: 2). Historically, many philosophers focused on
individual responsibility, but after World War II some philosophers raised the issue of
responsibility as a constructive answer or explanation to what had happened (Levinas, 1978;
Jonas 1978). Others focused on the collective context of responsibility (Feinberg 1970; Arendt
1987, Lewis 1948). The idea of some sort of a group moral agent in terms of responsibility
might be a controversial concept. Most critics doubt the fairness of ascribing collective
responsibility to individuals who do not cause harm directly. As Sverdlik noticed, “it would be
unfair, whether we are considering a result produced by more than one person’s action or by a
single person, to blame a person for a result that he or she did not intend to produce” (1987, p.
68). However, this concept is highly applicable to analysing a wide range of animal exploitation
because most cases are examples of actions performed in an organized system that allows these
uses.
As stated above, responsibility may be collective as well as individual. According to
Peter French (1976: 443–444), the object of responsibility can be individual or collective
actions, i.e. an action can be brought about individually or collectively. In terms of animals,
this distinction also applies. Many examples of animal exploitation come in the form of very
well-organized enterprises and many actions within this area need the cooperation of many
moral agents.
Apart from the two aforementioned distinctions, Khoury (2017:3) also introduces a
temporal distinction in the concept of responsibility: synchronic responsibility and diachronic
responsibility. “More precisely, synchronic responsibility concerns the extent to which an agent
at time t1 is responsible for an action that occurs at t1. Diachronic responsibility concerns the
extent to which an agent at some later time t2 is responsible for an action that occurred at t1.
Synchronic responsibility involves the responsibility of an agent at the time of action, while
diachronic responsibility involves the responsibility of an agent at some time after the action
occurs” (ibid.). Both of these temporal forms of responsibility also apply to animals, especially
in the context of climate change and meat production as a factor that contributes to it
significantly, as is explained in more detail below (see IPCC, 2019).
2. Moral responsibility in environmental ethics
In most of the history of western ethics, moral responsibility applied to interpersonal
relations. However, as we enlarge the moral consideranda (Birch, 1983), namely the group of
those with moral standing, we notice that human’s moral obligations are not only limited to
human beings. Since the beginning of environmental ethics in the 1960s, philosophers have
been discussing the arguments for including ecosystems (Leopold 1949) and all living beings
in our moral consideration (Taylor 1986). Due to the intrinsic value of the natural environment,
our moral obligations should not be limited to human beings only, and this also applies to the
virtue of responsibility. The concept of responsibility for any living organisms and the natural
world appeared in Georg Picht’s publication (1969) and was popularized by Hans Jonas (1979,
1982, 1984).
The concept that is the most well known in environmental ethics as an expression of
responsibility for nature is Hans Jonas’ principle of responsibility. “Strictly speaking, what we
habitually call environmental ethics, Hans Jonas transforms into human responsibility ethics”
(Mantatov, Mantatova, 2015: 1056). Since his works were published, it is quite common among
environmental philosophers to acknowledge that a moral agent is responsible for his/her
actions. This would be a formal responsibility, but Jonas added another kind of responsibility,
namely a substantive one. The latter is the responsibility for something (Jonas, 1984: 92). It is
analogous to the archetypical form of responsibility, namely the one that a parent has for his
child: no matter what happens, the parent bears responsibility for his offspring; a parent is
responsible for his/her child all the time. According to Jonas, our responsibility for nature
should be of this kind: it should be accompany us all the time; whatever action we are taking,
we should think about environment. Moreover “Hans Jonas considers all nature as an object of
human responsibility. It is a colossal object in whose shadow all other objects of human
responsibility are very small values” (Mantatov, Mantatova, 2015: 1057). His concept of
responsibility applies also to animals, but it does not cover all forms of complex human–animal
relations. In this paper I push the concept of responsibility and add its radical form, which I
present below.
3. The radical responsibility for animals
Human–animal relations are marked with a special kind of ambiguity, or as Francione
calls it, “moral schizophrenia” (2000). This attitude denotes double standards that some of us
employ when it comes to animals. Namely, some people declare that they are pro-animal; they
might even take great care of a pet if they have a one, but at the same time they use products
that involve a great amount of animal suffering. One example of these cruel practices is meat
production, which is growing globally due to countries with intensive economic development,
such as China (Kanerva, 2013). Generally, urbanization increases meat consumption (York,
Gossard, 2004). “Such a trend (increased meat consumption) is not true for most countries in
Europe in the recent past” (ibid.). This branch of the economy is characterized by huge
environmental pressure; it also creates a threat to animal welfare, including animal suffering,
and is even a threat to human health (Westhoek et al., 2011, 2012).
Animal exploitation involves two kinds of subject: collective and individual. There are
also cases of individual and collective actions. Processes like meat production or animal testing
involve cooperation between many individuals. A certain number of people must be involved
in order for the meat industry to function. Moreover, some of these practices are examples of
synchronic and diachronic responsibility; for the latter, it is enough just to mention the range
of consequences on global warming of meat production and consumption. There is enough
scientific evidence to recognize that meat production and animal farming contributes
significantly to global climate change (IPCC, 2019). Thus the content of our plate is not only a
matter of satisfying our palate, but it is a matter of responsibility for Earth.
To address the complex nature of human–animal relations, we need a concept of
responsibility that is capable of covering all of the aforementioned dimensions: this is the
concept of radical responsibility. According to this approach, we are responsible “for the
unintended (and often unnoticed) consequences of our actions and our failures to act” (Dower,
1989: 18). Radical responsibility is not only related to our actions, but Dower also introduces
the concept of an indirect footprint that includes responsibility for what others have done for
us. This concept is very relevant for the animal ethics discussion since most of our animal
“usages” are cases of an indirect footprint. One might never have killed an animal or conducted
an experiment on a non-human being, but one may have benefitted indirectly by choosing a
product that was produced in a way which involves the exploitation of animals.
Thus, there is a question of responsibility when we do not perform a deed ourselves but
let things be done for us or do not act to prevent some actions even if they are morally wrong
or dubious. Nigel Dower explored this issue and asked about the so-called logic of omission,
for which he provided a utilitarian explanation. According to him, “there is a difference between
typical cases of killing and typical cases of letting something die. Whereas with killing the death
of someone is what is intended – either as an end result or as a necessary means to an end –
with ‘letting die’ the death of someone is neither what one aims to achieve – one does not want
them to die – nor is it a means to some other end. It is simply an unwanted and often unthought
consequence of pursuing one’s other objectives” (Dower: 1983: 22). However, in terms of the
indirect footprint concept, we are still responsible for what has been done for us; if the unwanted
or unconsidered consequences of our actions are still in the range of our moral responsibility,
we should act to prevent them. Dower claims that “if it is in our power to prevent something
very bad happening without thereby sacrificing anything of moral importance, we ought to do
it” (Dower, 2018). Peter Singer also makes a very clear point about not acting when one can do
something to prevent wrong things from happening. When he claims that members of wealthy
societies are morally obliged to help those less privileged in other parts of the world, he writes
that “passivity, when people are able to act to prevent evil, is morally wrong” (Singer, 1985:
834).
.
Thus, as stated above, morality is not only about deeds we perform ourselves; it is also
about what others do for us and about the unwanted and unconsidered consequences of our
actions. We are morally obliged to minimize any potential harm done to people, animals, or the
environment. The idea of total responsibility sets a very high moral standard. And so another
question arises: are we able to follow this standard? In my opinion, if we approach it from a
virtue perspective, we can successfully apply total responsibility. Moreover, I think that cases
of animal exploitation are either obvious (e.g., animal products usually involve the use of
animals), or in most cases the information is given on product packaging (e.g. animal testing
on cosmetics and drugs). We are easily able to identify which products or services include some
form of animal usage, and we can make informed choices.
In cases in which we cannot know whether a product or service involves animal
exploitation, the virtue approach might be conducive to and supportive of making moral
judgments. First of all, the idea of such a wide-ranging responsibility is an overwhelming one
as a moral agent can doubt their ability to analyse a situation properly and to find all cases that
should be morally responded to. The concept of radical responsibility can be perceived as a
supererogation, which would denote that it is probably too demanding for the average person
to apply. However, ancient wisdom comes with a solution: if we perceived radical responsibility
as a virtue, then we could apply to it the Aristotelian rule of the golden mean. The Stagirite
reminds us that “a master of any art avoids excess and defect, but seeks intermediate and
chooses this” (Aristotle: book 2, chapter 6). Thus if we define radical responsibility as a virtue,
we could then take on a wider spectrum of responsibility (also in cases in which we are not
doers ourselves), but with the reasonable limits of our moral obligations. Radical responsibility
allows passivity in cases that one cannot influence, but on the other hand it helps one to
approach the problem of animal exploitation in the most comprehensive way.
Summary
The human–animal relation is marked with a special kind of ambiguity that allows us to
love some animals but use others. The situation is more complex than it looks at first because
most of our uses of animals are in some sense hidden before us. In most of these cases, we are
not the doers: we might never perform a medical experiment on an animal and yet we might
use cosmetics, medical equipment or drugs that have been tested on a sentient being. We might
never kill an animal, but if we eat meat we support an industry that derives benefits from killing
animals. So, we are partly responsible for things that we have never done or even never intended
to do. This is a special kind of a moral responsibility that recognizes our responsibility for deeds
we never performed ourselves but allowed to happen or derived benefits from. Radical
responsibility addresses our complex relations with animals and allows a moral agent to see the
far-reaching moral consequences of his/her actions.
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