II.1.
Universalistic Thinking in Christian
Legal Philosophy - Bartolome de las
Casas and Francisco de Vitoria
I. Prolegomena
This chapter will discuss a new epoch of universalisms in international
jjoiitical thought, namely, sixteenth-century legal philosophy as it developed
in Spain during the reign of King Charles V and his successors, Kings
Phillip II of Spain and Ferdinand I. This epoch is especially fascinating in
the context of our discussions because it was not only highly influential
for the development of a legal framework for the conduct of 'international'
relations for the centuries to come, but it also faced a yet unknown confrontation
between different, that is, European and non-European, cultures
in the context of the Spanish overseas expansions into Central and South
America. In the wake of respective experiences, questions arose regarding
not only the legitimacy of those expansions and about just war and warfare,
but also whether, or not, Indian natives are to be regarded as human beings.
These questions were perceived as all but self-evident, and the legacies of
Aristotelian, Augustinian, and Thomist philosophy were not regarded as providing
sufficient and satisfactory answers. Fierce debates evolved between
defenders of the Spanish conquests and their critics. Interestingly, the main
criticism was pronounced by representatives of the Catholic Church while
Catholicism was, on the other hand, used to legitimize the expansion by
those who were in favour of the conquests. The main critical voices from
within the Catholic Church came from Bartolome de las Casas, Francisco de
"Vitoria, Francisco Suarez, Domingo de Soto, and Luis de Molina (for more on
this body of political thought, see Hamilton, 1963).
This body of critical literature as it developed in sixteenth century Spain
is sharply distinguished from Northern European political thought, which
emerged under the influences of the Reformation, in that Spain did not
break with the natural law tradition. 'The Thomist version of natural law
theory, which was strongly attacked in all northern universities during
75
7
76 A History ofInternational Political Theory
I
the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and largely\ettisoned in Protestant
countries, continued unbroken in Spain, and had, indeed, a new flowering
during the sixteenth "golden" century... In all cases... the Thomist hierarchv
of laws, and in particular natural law, forms the framework for their discussion
of politics and the political community' (Hamilton, 1963, p. 11). This
tradition and its critical discussion indeed provided the intellectual framework
for what became the main achievements of international political
thought as it developed in sixteenth-century Spain, namely, first, the framing
of universal human rights, their extension beyond Christian Europe,
and their application to Indian indigenous cultures in the Americas; and
second, the development of universal legal standards and jurisdiction as a
guarantor for peaceable relations among political communities. Here, also
he idea of the sovereignty of political communities under the condition of
their mutual recognition as sovereign was born under the intellectual auspices
of natural law. This idea - which prepared the soil for legal thinking
in international political thought as it developed in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries - is very different from the modern idea of sovereignty
and recognition as it emerged in the nineteenth century with regard to the
transcendental structure which is perceived (and believed) to provide and
guarantee recognition. Whereas it was universal natural or divine law (and
'God', respectively) and/or anthropological universalism which imposed
legal and ethical principles of recognition up into Enlightenment philosophy,
it became individual and particularized rationality (as it politicallv
manifested in the coming nation state and the inside/outside logic of modern
sovereignty) which underpinned the modern concept of recognition.
This rationality is tangible and shared only - and indeed has over and over
again been not shared - on the basis of individualized appreciation, toleration,
and morality, however, not as a demand on the basis of something
'natural' and 'normal'. As Bernice Hamilton explains, 'Natural law has the
twofold sense of something which is reasonable and at the same time is generally
accepted...The natural was...the normal' (Hamilton, 1963, p. 11).
Against this background of the innovation of universal legal standards in
sixteenth-century Spanish philosophy, including European overseas expansion
and conquest, the Spanish authors of the sixteenth century belong to
the main body of international political thought in their own right ana
are not only to be seen as predecessors of Hugo Grotius or successors of
Thomist thought. Richard Hartigan emphasizes with regard to de Vitoria
that his work was 'no simple reiteration of St Thomas' thought; ratlier, it is
a thoroughly contemporary, sixteenth-century exposition, lucidly phrased,
of the morality of war' (Hartigan, 1973, p. 82); the same can be said of las
Casas. And looking ahead in the centuries to come, a thorough study of las
Casas and de Vitoria suggests that Grotius strictly follows the legacies ol
the former, rather than being the 'founder' of international law. Thomas A.
Walker notes that '(again) and again the reader of the pages of Grotius, who
shall have made the acquaintance of the lights of moral and legal learning
mm
Bail
Universalistic Thinking in Christian Legal Philosophy 77
of the sixteenth century, will catch the echo of their opinions and their very
phrases' (1899, p. 333).59
The following discussions will therefore emphasize
las Casas and de Vitoria and link to other Spanish authors of the sixteenth
century where it seems appropriate to highlight general patterns of
sixteenth-century thought on universal human rights and international
jurisdiction.
With Bartolomé de las Casas (1484-1566) and Francisco de Vitoria
'1485 [?]-1546) we thus encounter the foundation of one of the most important
tools for organizing international politics. Although the relevance of
international legal arrangements, treaty systems, and a distinct legal ethics
has been emphasized in the history of international political thought
prior to las Casas and de Vitoria (as in Thucydides, Cicero, Augustine,
and Aquinas), the legal theorists of the sixteenth century developed these
thoughts into a more coherent and formalized corpus of theories. While they
drew, though critically, upon legacies stemming from Greek and Roman as
well as Christian political thought, arguing on the basis of universal views
(>n divine and natural law, they faced historically different and novel political
situations and were situated in advanced secularized social and political
contexts which influenced their theorizing. There are not only the rationallredversions
of Christian humanism (founded by Augustine and Aquinas,
as seen in the previous chapter) and the tremendously influential impacts
uf humanistic political culture of the Italian renaissance on political and
social thought (see more on that in the next chapter on Machiavelli), but
also the philosophical movements of scholasticism in general and nominalism
in particular. Political thought, already rationalized in Augustine
and Aquinas, developed more and more autonomy from, even if still liaised
with, religious thinking. The sphere of natural and especially human law
increasingly gained autonomy from divine law. Authors such as Anselm of
Canterbury, Maimonides, Roger Bacon, Johannes Duns Scotus, William of
Ockham, and, of course, Thomas Hobbes (see the next chapter) represent
these philosophical moves. Nevertheless, divine law, or universal reason (in
which men as rational beings participate), was still perceived as the guarantee
of the existence and operationability of human law. And their belief
in the order of creation 'backed up' the order of the political, domestically
and internationally. Thus, the old universalism of international political
thought and corresponding ethical teachings lost their substantial identity
with principles being perceived as divine and sacral; however, a strong
notion of common ethical and natural bonds among peoples and humankind
survived.
Las Casas and de Vitoria are both linked with Latin American history
and the effort to defend the indigenous peoples of Latin and South America
against Spanish conquest and exploitation. Both did so by extending human
rights to Indians and by introducing a body of legal restrictions and guidelines
in international politics. The writings of both men established a strong
legacy of modern legal thought, which then had a tremendous impact on
78 A History of International Political Theory Universalistic Thinking in Christian Legal Philosophy 79
Hugo Grotius, for example, who massively drew upon traditions of Roman
and Christian political and legal thought. Some commentators describe de
Vitoria as the 'eminent precursor of Grotius... Not that he alone is the author
of modern [international law], but it is hard to envision the category in its
present form without his contribution' (Hartigan, 1973, p. 80). Also Joachim
von Elbe writes with regard to the problem of just war that Grotius would
adopt 'more or less unchanged from his predecessors', the Spanish theologians
of the sixteenth century (von Elbe, 1939, p. 678). Anthony Padgen
goes even further and notes that 'Vitoria's claim that all humans have a
right grounded in nature of free (and peaceful) access to all parts of the
world draws upon a long ancient and humanist tradition, which is, like the
natural law, itself Stoic in origin... All of them, together with Vitoria's own
formulation of the argument, were employed by Grotius in what was perhaps
his most widely read work, De mare liberum of 1607, a tract whose initial
purpose was to deny that the Portuguese had any right over trade in the
Indian Ocean' (Padgen, 2003, pp. 186-7). Padgen's view is supported when
we read in de Vitoria the following passage, which strongly foreshadows
Grotius's argument on the freedom of the sea or natural resources in general,
respectively:
Therefore it appears that friendship among men exists by natural law and
it is against nature to shun the society of harmless folk... By natural law
running water and the sea are common to all, so are rivers and harbors,
and by the law of nations ships from all parts may be moored here; and
on the same principle they are public things... it is an apparent rule of the
jus gentium that foreigners may carry on trade, provided they do no harm
to citizens, (de Vitoria, 1917, p. 152)
Las Casas witnessed Spanish conquest in the Caribbean, foremost in
Cuba, when he was a priest, the first Bishop of Chiapas, and later in his life
when he became a Dominican monk. Apart from scholarly work, he became
an advocate acting on behalf of the native population, protesting against
Spanish genocidal attacks in the West Indies and travelling back and forth
across the Atlantic, the most famous of his journeys leading him to the royal
court for the important debate with Juan Gines de Sepulveda (more on that
below). Consequently, most of his scholarly work is a defence of Indians'
human rights and against the emerging slave trade between the Caribbean
and Europe. His conceptualization of human rights, explicitly including the
Indians and applying to mankind as an universal reference, as well as of
the equality of relations among humans and 'nations' is derived from an
Augustinián and Thomist version of human reason and united mankind
created in the image of God. On this basis, las Casas founded and represented
a new type of critical political and legal thought at the time when
European powers were going overseas in an unprecedented way and starting
to colonize the new world. Paradoxically, however, he did this according to
the legacies of (rationalized) Christian thought, hence, following the same
pattern in whose name the devastation of indigenous cultures took place, a
devastation that some politically defended (or at least tried to defend).
Contrary to las Casas, we know very little of the life of de Vitoria; even his
date of birth is uncertain. Like las Casas, he was later in his life a Dominican
monk and then priest. It is recorded that he became a university teacher in
Paris in 1512 where he stayed until 1523 when he received the title of a doctor
of theology. Between 1523 and 1526, he taught theology in Valladolid
at the Colego de San Gregorio before he was appointed catedra de prima (the
most important chair of theology) at the renowned university of Salamanca
where he worked until his death in 1546. De Vitoria's most important writings
are De potestate civili and De jure belli in which he elaborated a theory
of state power and juridical foundation of international law. His most
famous theological writing is a commentary on Aquinas's Summa theologica
in which he primarily discusses Aquinas's views on justice. In his De Indis
et de Jure Belli Relectiones, which will be discussed here as his most practical
treatise, de Vitoria describes the motivation and background for his discussions
as follows:
The whole of this controversy and discussion was started on account of
the aborigines of the New World, commonly called Indians, who came
forty years ago into the power of the Spaniards, not having been previously
known to our world. This present disputation about them will
fall into three parts. In the first part we shall inquire by what right
these Indian natives came under Spanish rule. In the second part, what
rights the Spanish sovereigns obtained over them in temporal and
spiritual matters. In the third part, what rights these sovereigns or the
Church obtained over them in matters spiritual and touching religion,
(de Vitoria, 1917, p. 116)
Both las Casas and de Vitoria do not belong to the canon of political
theorists in IR although they are, as we will see, much more original and
foundational for modern international law than Grotius. Indeed, de Vitoria
established the major part of the theoretical body of modern international
law, arguing for equal state relations protected by legal arrangements on
the ethical basis of just war and the legal basis of mutual recognition and
territorial integrity. Las Casas was more concerned with human rights and
their extension to the native peoples of the Americas (discovered and yet
undiscovered).
It is interesting to note that both las Casas and de Vitoria formulated their
thoughts in a critical discussion of Christian thinking while, at the same
time disassociating from Christian orthodoxy. It has to be asked, therefore,
how far critical Christian thought, that is, critical towards the Augustinian
80 A History ofInternational Political Theory
and Thomist orthodoxy, provided the intellectual framework for the development
of modern international political theory, mainly of the; axioms of
legal equality among states and the mutual recognition of sovereign rights.
I argue that indeed major theorems of modern international political and
IR theory are critically considered and partly secularized, nevertheless,
Christian concepts while a strong theological background is alive until
at least the eighteenth century, however, abandoned thereafter (see also
Becker, 2003). In this regard Padgen argues that the modern 'concept of
human rights [for example] is a development of the older [Christian] notion
of natural rights and that the modern understanding of natural rights
evolved in the context of the European struggle to legitimate its overseas
empires' (Padgen, 2003, p. 171), or, what should be added, to delegitimize
respective conquests, as in the case of las Casas and de Vitoria. This legacy
might be the reason why Christian thinkers never found serious reception
in IR, which started to perceive itself, especially during the second half of
the twentieth century, as a rationalist, not to mention thoroughly secularized
and antinormative, 'science'; this perception took hold, however, at the
cost of ignoring its origins and neglecting the wide range of international
political thought and corresponding notions of ethical deliberation.
2. Universalistic human rights and their
extension beyond Europe
When the Spanish Empire started to conquer the Americas at the end of
the fifteenth century and to subjugate its peoples, one might argue that
neither Spain nor any other European nation was prepared for both the
material and philosophical challenges of overseas expansion (see Donavan,
1965). Nevertheless, this is a retrospective assessment only, while the majority
of contemporaries believed in the hierarchy of cultures with Europeans
at the top and all other nations following on a declining ladder of (what was
defined as) 'barbarism' (very instructive on this are Bitterli, 1991; Greenblatt,
1991; Ryan, 1981; Seed, 1992). The philosophical legacies, which were cited
to support those prevailing forms of Eurocentrism and racism, followed by
systematic politics of annihilation of indigenous people and cultures as well
as by individual atrocities,60
were taken from Aristotle's idea of a natural
distinction of mankind in masters and slaves and from a Christian tradition
of a civilizing mission stemming from Augustine and Aquinas (see above;
and more on that in relation to las Casas below; for thoughts on./6therness'
in antiquity see the excellent monograph by Dihle, 1994). I will not discuss
whether, or not, and how far these understandings seem to do justice
to Aristotle; I will, however, come back to the chapter on Augustine and
Aquinas since we find some references to possible misunderstanding in the
previous interpretation which are also flagged and discussed by las Casas.
The key questions, which arose with Spain's overseas expeditions and related
Universalistic Thinking in Christian Legal Philosophy 81
experience and which las Casas addresses61
while being personally involved
in the Spanish conquests and becoming more and more critical towards
the Spanish tyranny and economic exploitation in the Americas,62
were
whether the Indians should have the same rights as Europeans; whether
they possessed intrinsic rights to their land and culture; and whether they
were to be perceived as human beings at all.6 3
The enduring relevance of
las Casas's main writing, In Defense of the Indians (1992a), lies, first, in its
presentation of universal human rights, extending their validity beyond
Europe, and his philosophical criticism of European traditions of thought
which have been used to justify the Spanish conquests and the disregard of
Indians as human beings; second, las Casas develops a system of jurisdiction
which he perceived as the guaranteeing framework for the existence
and observance of human rights and for relations among peoples based on
equal rights and mutual recognition. The first aspect will be discussed now,
the second in the following section.
Two epochal events occurred during the lifetime of las Casas - the bull
SublimusDei promulgated by Pope Paul III on May 29,1537, and the so-called
Valladolid debate in 1550 - which signalled a new course for the Catholic
Church and for the King of Spain and Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire,
Charles V, towards the European overseas expeditions. In both events, las
Casas is either directly involved (the Valladolid debate) or at least his arguments
have been echoed and recognized by the pope. In Sublimits Dei, Pope
Paul III, some years before the Valladolid debate, recognized Indians as 'truly
men' and condemned any deprivation of their life, possessions, and liberty.
This meant a revolutionary new 'policy' for the Vatican, emphasizing at the
same time a new humanism and the Catholic Church's claim for universal
reign of mankind. The bull states that the Catholic Church considers
Indians are truly men and that they are not only capable of understanding
the Catholic Faith, but, according to our information, they desire
exceedingly to receive it...that, notwithstanding whatever may have
been or may have said to the contrary, the said Indians and all other
people who may later be discovered by Christians, are by no means to be
deprived of their liberty or the possession of their property, even though
they be outside the faith of Jesus Christ; and that they may and should,
freely and legitimately, enjoy their liberty and the possession of their
property; not should they be in any way enslaved; should the contrary
happen, it shall be null and have no effect.64
We clearly see that, on the one hand, the relations of European powers
towards the Indians and towards 'all other people who may be discovered
by Christians' shall be conducted in an equal and respectful way regarding
and preserving their life, liberty, and possessions; that, on the other hand,
however, the fundament for this recognition is the Christian faith itself.
82 A History ofInternational Political Theory Universalistic Thinking in Christian Legal Philosophy 83
The criteria, even, to define Indians as human beings is their capability
to understand and finally receive Catholic faith. Taking this paradox which
David Campbell rightfully criticizes as a 'persistent [Eurocentric,
phonological, ontological, and epistemological] logocentrism' (Campbell,
1992, p. 118) - into consideration as the weak part of traditional universalistic
thinking, which can think about 'otherness' only in terms of
self-definition,65
one nevertheless has to concede the revolutionary accomplishment
by Sublimus Dei defining ihtercultural and international relations
on the basis of the principal equality and recognizing beliefs other than
the Christian as legitimate. The same paradox of 'logocentrism' on the one
hand and the demand of human and religious equality on the other also
applies to de Vitoria. In the 'First Relectio' of his De Indis et de Jure Belli
Relectiones, he argues that the Indians would be true possessors of their land
and dominion and the Spaniards had no right to deprive them of what
naturally belongs to them. This is certainly a considerable accomplishment
in terms of the recognition of their way of living and of different forms of
rationality, emphasized by his notion that 'they also have a kind of religion'.
The rationale for this recognition is twofold: it stems from natural
law as well as from the circumstance that the organization of their societies
and politics is reasonable according to European standards. In this second
rationale, the paradox reveals. De Vitoria writes:
The Indian aborigines are not barred on this ground from the exercise of
true dominion. This is proved from the fact that the true state of the case
is that they are not of unsound mind, but have, according to their own
kind, the use of reason. This is clear, because there is a certain method in
their affairs, for they have polities which are orderly arranged and they
have definite marriage and magistrates, overlords, laws, and workshops,
and a system of exchange, all of which call for the use of reason; they also
have a kind of religion, (de Vitoria, 1917, p. 127)
The,universal extension of human rights and subsequently the recognition
of different peoples and their cultures as politically equalwas effectively
translated into the official position of King Charles V and the Spanish court
when the emperor ordered las Casas and Juan Gines de Sepulveda, one
of Spain's leading intellectuals of the sixteenth century who had massive
influence at court and who tried to defend the Spanish conquerors and the
system of 'encomienda', together with other jurists and theologians to the
'Council of the Indies' at Valladolid for a debate on the merits of just wars
and Aristotelian logic in order to determine 'how conquests may be conducted
justly and with security of conscience' (quoted in Hanke, 1959, p. 36).
Las Casas was given three days for his speech before the court in which he
lectured from the manuscript of his In Defense of the Indians. Before discussing
las Casas's arguments in detail, which refute Sepulveda step by step, it
is worth mentioning that we find the same logocentric paradox in las Casas
that was communicated in Pope Paul's bull. This logocentrism has been
summarized by Bill Donovan as follows:
Las Casas indicted individuals for the New World's problems. Although
he saw the encomienda system as inherently wicked, it was till colonists not
the king, Spain, or Christian Europe - whom he found responsible
for the evil committed under its guise. The suggestion never arises, for
example, that Indians just left be alone. Christian responsibility, for las
Casas, meant exposing native people to Grace. Indeed, Indians could not
be left alone: they were, to use, his phrase, good enough to be Christians
and to be integrated into Christian society. Yet, what did it mean to be
a Christian? Las Casas implies that that was unclear to Spaniards living
in the Americas, but it was clear to him: he was a Christian opposed to
Christianity as it existed in the New World. (Donovan, 1965, p. 21)
Las Casas begins his defence of the Indian populations by a juxtaposition
of the Indians and the Spaniards as the most peaceful and peace-loving,
obedient, and friendly people on the one side and, on the other side, the
Spanish conquerors 'who immediately behaved like ravening wild beasts,
wolves, tigers, or lions that had been starved for many days' (las Casas,
1992a, p. 29). This juxtaposition, which traces through all his writings,
results in the historical narrative that 'only after the Spaniards had used violence
against them, killing, robbing, torturing, did the Indians ever rise up
against them' (las Casas, 1992a, p. 32). Besides the fact that this assessment
leads to a clear judgement about the unrestricted guilt of the Spaniards,
las Casas argues that, from a Christian point of view, this treatment most
heavily violates every appropriate way to 'have the Indians been brought to
embrace the [Christian] Faith and to swear obedience to the kings of Castile'
(las Casas, 1992a, p. 48). As he explains in detail in his work On the only
Way of AttractingAll Peoples to the True Faith (1992b) it is love, teaching, and
preaching, not the sword, which have the power and which are described
by the holy sacraments as the only rightful way to spread Christianity and
to convert 'unbelievers'. In the Indies, however, peoples were told that 'they
must embrace Christian Faith immediately, without hearing any sermon
preached and without indoctrination.' They were told 'to subject themselves
to a King they have never heard or nor seen... by the King's messengers who
are such despicable and cruel tyrants that deprive them of their liberty, their
possessions, their wives and children' (las Casas, 1992a, p. 48).
The Spaniards' behaviour would thus contradict the commandments of
Christ Jesus, and the Indians eventually had no other choice than to resist.
Las Casas asks, 'What will these people think of Christ...when they see
Christians venting their rage against them with so many massacres?' (las
Casas, 1992a, p. 27). However, las Casas's condemnation of the Spanish
84 A History of International Political Theory Universalistic Thinking in Christian Legal Philosophy 85
conquerors relates not only to the violation of the holy sacraments and of
Jesus's teachings, but also to an utmost disregard of the Indians as human
beings. This argument seems from an international politics perspective
more relevant because it finally results in the recognition of other nations
on the basis of equal mutuality; it deflects, as Hayward R. Alker emphasizes,
'a process of mutual recognition, respect, and toleration' (Alker, 1992,
p. 362). Evolving the argument that Indians are to be regarded as 'true
men' and belong to one (and the same) mankind as Europeans leads las
Casas to discuss critically the arguments Sepulveda brought forward in the
Valladolid debate. Sepulveda referred to an Aristotelian legacy of differentiating
peoples into 'barbarian' and 'civilized' and applied this differentiation
to the Spanish as civilized and the Indians as barbarian. He concluded
from this differentiation some natural hierarchy between master and slave
in order to justify the Spanish conquerors and their use of violence to dominate
indigenous peoples. Las Casas criticizes Sepulveda's argument and
emphasis on Aristotle's definition of barbarism as those forms of life which
would not know any form of government, political institutions, and order.
Las Casas writes that these 'are barbarians in the absolute and strict sense
of the word...they lack reasoning and way of life suited to human beings
and those things which all men habitually accept' (las Casas, 1992a, p. 30)
Aristotle would indeed write about those peoples as barbarians calling them
slaves by nature; however, contrary to Sepulveda's interpretation and application
of this distinction, Aristotle would note that this form of life is 'rareh
found in any part of the world and [is] few in number compared with the
rest of mankind' (las Casas, 1992a, pp. 33-4).66
Consequently, las Casas argues that this definition cannot be applied to
the Indians who, in addition to the fact of the rareness of such a kind of
barbarism in general, did develop highly sophisticated systems of government,
would know legal bodies to regulate their social and political life, and
had accomplished many cultural achievements (of which las Casas most
admired their architecture). Therefore, they would not be barbarians, and
Sepulveda's understanding and application of Aristotle's distinction would
be wrong. Las Casas notes:
They [the Indians] are not ignorant, inhuman or bestial. Rather, long
before they had heard the word Spaniard they had properly organized
states, wisely ordered by excellent laws, religion and custom. They cultivated
friendship and, bound together in common fellowship, lived in
populous cities in which they wisely administered the affairs of both
peace and war justly and equitably, truly governed by laws, (las Casas,
1992a, pp. 42-3)
It is less important here whether, or not, las Casas's assessments of
Indian life, culture, and politics communicates an historically true image
m
ft
and conveys a proper description, rather than that he critically discusses
philosophical traditions which seemed to be set in stone and appeared all
too easy to apply (by Sepulveda and the Spaniards) to the justification of
Spanish conquests and mass murder. By his critical discussion, las Casas
opens the intellectual and (as seen by the Valladolid debate) political horizon
of sixteenth-century international politics, facing overseas expansions
and experiencing different forms of human life which provoked philosophical
reflection. Just as Machiavelli notes in the Preface of his Discourses that
political philosophy has to break with traditions and metaphorically requests
that it set out for new shores (see more on that below), las Casas is actually
realizing such a program in the philosophical and most practical sense,
being motivated by the factual historical realities of overseas expansion and
novel intercultural encounters. Leaning towards John G. A. Pocock's (1975)
metaphor of a 'Machiavellian moment' in Renaissance political theory and
its influences, Alker speaks of a 'las Casas moment in Renaissance humanist
thought' (Alker, 1992, p. 363).
What, according to las Casas, enabled the Indians to accomplish the
cultural and political achievements that allowed them to be seen as 'true'
human beings and as civilized? Las Casas's answer to this question lies in
his belief in God's order of creation and subsequently in the endowment of
universal mankind with reason. It is the rational nature of their being with
which God gifted all men, by which all men are made perfect 'in no other
way than by his intellect', and by which all men are finally distinguished
from animals: 'For since God's love of mankind is so great and it is his will
to save all men, it is in accord with his wisdom that in the whole universe,
which is perfect in all its parts, his supreme wisdom should shine more and
more in the most perfect thing: rational nature' (las Casas, 1992a, pp. 35-6).
According to this universal belief, las Casas concludes that a 'natural light'
has been imparted in all human beings which requires mutual respect and
humanist recognition for all forms of human life, even if they might be
(very) different in their conduct of every life and in terms of religion, customs,
and politics. Las Casas's ethical backbone derived from this universal
humanism can be found in the Christian (and later on philosophical; see
below with regard to Kant) doctrine 'See that you do not do to another what
you would not have done to you by another' or '(Always) treat others as you
would like them to treat you' (las Casas, 1992a, p. 27). This ethical principle,
las Casas argues, would be known, and has to be respected, by all men
according to their natural reason.
With regard to philosophical and Christian traditions, las Casas enters
not only into critical debates with Aristotle, but also with Augustine
and Aquinas. This becomes obvious when he radicalizes the elements
of Augustine's and Aquinas's rationalist construction of God even more,
arguing for some form of religious relativism. This does not mean that he
leaves the common ground of perceiving Christianity as the only true faith,
86 A History ofInternational Political Theory Vniversalistic Thinking in Christian Legal Philosophy 87
however, he admits freedom of religion and equal status to religious beliefs
at least before Christianity was taught in the rightful way and made known
to the yet 'unbelievers'. Men, gifted with natural reason, would also be
enlightened with some form of spirituality. However, las Casas denies that
this would necessarily lead to one form of religious beliefs and practices, and
states, rather, that a multitude of worshipping habitudes would legitimately
exist among mankind. This multitude is to be respected by every true and
honourable Christian, and that is why, '(if) they [the unbelievers] refuse
to listen, we must go to other places, until we find friendly listeners' (las
Casas, 1992a, p. 178). Las Casas argues for an anthropological constitution
shared by all men which imparts spirituality or some form of 'a common
knowledge of God', which is, however, 'very vague and universal and shows
only that there is someone who puts order in things that we see functioning
according to some order' (las Casas, 1992a, p. 131); this does not, however,
refer necessarily and only to the Christian God.
Las Casas here radicalizes Augustine's and Aquinas's rationalist principle
of God that perceives God as a cognitive construction, admitting that men,
by their constitution, depend on some form of spirituality due to the intellectual
'limitations in themselves' (las Casas, 1992a, p. 132). Due to this
limitation, men were simply not capable of having logical explanations for
the natural order of things. They therefore try to 'reconcile' their experience
and such incomprehensibilities through religion and forms of worshipping;
and 'if someone objects that worshipping stones as god is contrary to natural
reason and thus forbidden ...we answer that the ordinary and ultimate
intention of those who worship idols is not to worship stones but to worship,
through certain manifestations of divine power, the planner of the
world, whoever it may be' (ibid., pp. 132-3; emphasis mine).
This recognition of a multitude of forms of worship as equally religious
practices and beliefs is really revolutionary and places different religions at
the same level with Christianity; not with regard to their final truthfulness,
but in terms of their acknowledgement and deserved respect. Although they
do not,worship the true God, the Indians can, however, not be made responsible
until Christianity has been preached and taught to them in a proper
way. Before this might have been successfully, but peacefully, achieved, one
religion is as true as any other and deserves full respect. For the humanist
ethics of the respectful treatment of other cultures and religions, it is
important to recall las Casas's argument that the Gospel should not be
spread among nations by the power of weapons and conquest/but must be
taught in a peaceful and brotherly way. Only love for your neighbour and
for all mankind would correspond with the ethics of the Sermon of the
Mount (see particularly In Defense of the Indians, chapter XI).
We can summarize that las Casas's universalism consists of the extension
of the definition of humanity to all mankind because all men, by the
power of natural reason, bear the natural and unalienable right of their
liberty, regardless of differences in cultural, habitual, and political matters;
or, as Alker puts it, las Casas's universalism consists of 'the cognition of and
respect for universally/naturally grounded, species-wide, creative capacities,
together with the recognition of the intrinsic worth of different, voluntarily
accepted, cultural expressions of these capacities' (Alker, 1992, p. 363). In
addition to this, the exercise of different religions is perceived as a human
right itself, which has to be equally respected, and whose violation is a sin
against the teachings of the holy sacraments.
The previous discussions of human rights and the question whether, or
not, they apply beyond Europe to the indigenous peoples of the Americas
also included the question of the Indians' right to possession. The conquest
of the Spanish and the seizure and devastation of the Indian's land brought
up this question, and it is de Vitoria who devotes large parts of his De Indis
et de Ivre Belli Relectiones to discussing it. De Vitoria develops his very clear
outlook on this issue - stating uncompromisingly that the Indians have full
rights to possession and dominion and that neither the Spanish King (the
'Emperor') nor the Pope has any legitimization to deprive the Indians of this
right - on the basis of natural law. Hamilton argues that de Vitoria formed a
theory of human dignity based on natural law, which would bridge the differences
between peoples and cultures and demand mutual responsibility
'extending far beyond the bounds of one country' (Hamilton, 1963, p. 105).
De Vitoria writes: 'I ask first whether the aborigines in question were true
owners in both private and public law before the arrival of the Spaniards',
and he concludes 'that the people in question were in peaceable possession
of their goods, both publicly and privately. Therefore, unless the contrary
is shown, they must be treated as owners and not be disturbed in their possession
unless cause be shown' (de Vitoria, 1917, p. 120). This right of true
possession, according to natural law, applies to all mankind, regardless of
their differences in race, culture, and religion. Indeed, de Vitoria explicitly
states that
The foundation of the law is in fact that no matter how many diverse
peoples and kingdoms the human race may be divided into, it always has
a certain unity, not merely as a species but even a sort of political and
moral unit, which is indicated by the natural precept of mutual love and
mercy which extends to everyone, even to foreigners of any nation, (de
Vitoria quoted in Hamilton, 1963, pp. 108-9)
The unity of mankind of which de Vitoria speaks is created by natural
law and does not suffer any harm from differences in religion. The abovementioned
recognition of different rationalities, as it communicates from de
Vitoria(andalsofromlasCasas), revealsalsoherewithregardtothe rightofpossession.
And even ifde Vitoria isbound to term the Indians' religion 'unbelief,
he nevertheless contests the idea that 'unbelief would prevent 'anyone from
88 A History of International Political Theory
being a true owner' (de Vitoria, 1917, p. 123) since natural law establishes 'a
bond of relationship between all men', which is why 'it is contrary to natural
law for one man to disassociate himself from another without good reason'
(de Vitoria, 1917, p. 153). Thus, according to Vitoria, the right to possession
is guaranteed by natural law, and as an unalienable right cannot be taken
away from anyone on the basis of human law whatsoever this law might
suggest. He thus declares the Spanish conquests and their seizure of Indian
land and goods as illegitimate. As did las Casas, Vitoria assumes that natural
law, tangible by all men, exists among all peoples, whether Christians or
not, as a system which provides human dignity and an ethical bond among
all men and which stands on its own regardless of individual attributes.
How this universalism of reason and human rights translates into teachings
for legal relations among nations will be discussed in the next section.
3. Jurisdiction as landmark and guarantor for
universal human rights and just war
In the Preface of his In Defense of the Indians, las Casas outlines the course of
his arguments against Sepulveda. First, he says, he shall refute his argument
that war against the Indians would be justified assuming that they are barbarous
and uncivilized. This argument and las Casas's anthropological universalism
of human rights was discussed in the previous section. I will now
discuss his second, third, and fourth argument of the Valladolid debate,
which focus on the question of just war in general (his second and third
argument) and on the question whether, or not, the Indians were subject of
both the King of Spain and the Catholic Church and would thus fall under
their authority and jurisdiction (his fourth argument; for this argument
also de Vitoria is very relevant; see below). It is with regard to this argument
and the question of jurisdiction and boundaries of jurisdiction, respectively,
that las Casas and de Vitoria developed a new standard for the conduct of
state relations. This standard puts the same legal restrictions on each state,
requires mutual recognition among states, and protects each of them on an
equal basis against hostile aspirations of other states and unjust war. The
reference for this international jurisdiction stems, on the one hand, from
their universalism of human rights, and, on the other hand, from a universal
notion of natural and divine law.
Although we have reviewed discussions of universal legal standards to
regulate state relations from Thucydides and Cicero, arid of divine law
from Augustine and Aquinas, thus prior to las Casas and de Vitoria, there
is nevertheless a new momentum in both. This originality is to be seen
in the equality of nations being protected from each others' claims of any
nature and subsequently in the recognition of diverse cultural, political, and
social patterns of life, whereas prior legal principles were either quite vague
(Thucydides), even if their notion existed, or drafted in favour of imperial
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Universalistic Thinking in Christian Legal Philosophy 89
power (Cicero) and superior truth (Augustine and Aquinas), not, however,
on the basis of nations' equality and guaranteed protection by mutual recognition.
Equality and recognition in las Casas and de Vitoria are based upon
the notion of spheres of jurisdiction and are as such supposed to not only
protect each nation from other nations' political aspirations, but, in case
war should break out and seems inevitable, also to provide standards for just
war and warfare.67
When las Casas prepares his defence and approaches the development
of his second, third, and fourth arguments, he again critically refers to
Augustine, Aquinas, and the official position of the Catholic Church prior to
Sublimus Dei (1537) and breaks with previously well-established traditions traditions
which have been emphasized by Sepulveda and which las Casas
set out to refute successfully. His critique goes to the heart of Christian selfperception
and politics, tackling the question of the righteousness of mission
and appropriate respective political means. He argues that Sepulveda concludes
from Christian authorities, namely, Augustine, Aquinas, and previous
papal bulls,6 8
that it would be 'totally just, as well as most beneficial to these
barbarians [the Indians], that they be conquered and brought under the rule
of the Spaniards' since this might be the easiest way for them to embrace
the Christian religion (las Casas, 1992a, p. 15). He then explicitly criticizes
Augustine and Aquinas for having stated that 'if someone is unwilling to
do what is good for himself and he is obliged to act for his own welfare, it
is just to force him to do even he is unwilling and resists' (las Casas, 1992a,
p. 12). Las Casas puts Christian superiority in spiritual and political matters
into question and refutes the perception that the Indians themselves were
responsible for being forced to be subjugated to the Spaniards and Christian
rule because they did not recognize and even denied what might be good for
them. This perception sounds absurd to us, and so it does to las Casas (see
also Donavan, 1965, p. 15).69
Before evolving his arguments regarding just war, las Casas summarizes
Sepulveda's view that the armed expeditions against the Indians were justified
as long as they corresponded with the rule(s) under the authority of
the King of Spain as the legitimate sovereign. It might thus be sufficient to
expect the Indians to immediately subjugate themselves to this rule and to
embrace Christian belief without any negotiation. If this does not happen,
then waging war against them would be just according to civil law (set up by
the sovereignty of the Spanish king) and natural law: according to natural
law, the Indians' status is to be perceived as uncivilized and barbarous, and
consequently it would be justified that the civilized (Spain) should govern
them. Las Casas's critique of that outlook applies to the just war problematic
in that he radically alters this definition and declares all wars that the
Spaniards fought against the Indians were 'unjust wars' and all wars that the
Indians fought against the Spanish conquerors were 'justifiable' (las Casas,
1992a, pp. 41-8).
90 A History of International Political Theory Universalistic Thinking in Christian Legal Philosophy 91
The main criterion for this turn is a redefinition of natural law from an
ostensible natural master-slave hierarchy to the natural right of peoples
to defend their liberty. Rhetorically, he introduces an historical analogy
asking Sepulveda (as well as the jurists, theologians, and representatives of
the Spanish court at the Valladolid debate) what he thinks of the Spanish
wars against the Roman Empire and whether they were just or unjust,
then applying this analogy to the rebellions of the Indians against the
Spanish conquerors. 'Did the Spanish wage an unjust war when they vigorously
defended themselves against them [the Romans]?' (las Casas, 1992a,
p. 43). Las Casas's answer is they did not, and he denounces such an argument
as 'absurd'. This does not mean, on the other side, that he renounces
all claims of spreading Christianity and preaching the gospel to other,
non-Christian peoples because las Casas - despite all of his arguments on
behalf of equality and recognition - remains convinced that it belongs to
the church to teach the 'truth'. But, as was argued above and as he lays
down in The Only Way (1992b), this has to occur by means of brotherly
love and peaceful means, not by war, violence, and coercion. If, however,
someone actively opposes the Catholic Church preaching the gospel, then
it becomes just to wage war against those 'unbelievers', when and under
the condition that this happens within the jurisdiction of the church. He
writes:
Therefore the Church, to which belongs the care of peoples throughput
the world as regards to preaching the truth, can justly wage war upon
those who prevent the gospel from being preached within their jurisdiction
...It should be noted that...war against unbelievers can be just only
when the rulers or kings maliciously prevent the spread or preaching of
the gospel ...But if both the rulers and all their peoples...out of love for
and devotion to their religion, refuse to hear or admit Christian preaching,
then, under no circumstances, can they be forced by war to let them
come in. (las Casas, 1992a, pp. 170, 172; also ibid., p. 107)
We find here a clear insinuation towards the relevance of jurisdiction;
before I discuss this matter explicitly below, I shall further reconstruct las
Casas's argument for the justification and legitimization of self-defence. His
first argument can be summarized by the dictum that when the Catholic
faith is or has been lectured in a proper Christian way, everyone is obliged
to accept and to follow. This, he argues, would be a consequence of riatural
law since no one can, or should, resist the truth; in this regard, las Casas
subscribes to orthodox Christian beliefs. If, however, someone is forced to
accept Christianity and coercively baptized (or tried to be baptized), resistance
would be legitimate since violent conversion would not only contradict
Christian values, but also natural law. Las Casas develops here an individualistic
voluntarism which goes hand in hand with his universal anthropology
of reason and virtue, writing that 'men are obliged by the natural law to do
many things they cannot be forced to do against their will' (las Casas, 1992a,
p. 46). Individual voluntarism and reason, which make men equal, count
higher than the ambitions of missionary work and (the pretence of) superior
wisdom; they thus represent eternal law.70
This individualistic notion, both
with regard to the individual human being and an individual nation, is
las Casas's strongest argument against, and at the same time represents his
philosophical dissociation from, Aristotelian legacies and Christian orthodox
doctrine handed down from Augustine and Aquinas.71
He concludes
that 'every nation, no matter how barbaric, has the right to defend itself
against a more civilized one that wants to conquer it and take away its freedom'
(las Casas, 1992a, p. 47).72
De Vitoria shares these views, and in his practical way of thinking, being
sometimes more like a lawyer than a philosopher, he lists three reasons
which could never justify war and hence always initiate unjust war. In his
'Second Relectio' of his De Indis et Jure Belli Relectiones, he posits that 'difference
of religion is not a cause for just war',73
that 'extension of empire is not
a just cause of war', and that neither would 'the personal glory of the prince
nor any other advantage to him [be] a just cause of war' (de Vitoria, 1917,
p. 170).74
The last aspect would not only characterize just or unjust war, but
in addition to this also mark the difference between a lawful king and a
tyrant in that the latter would seek his own advantage in war, a lawful king,
however, would wage war only for the common good or avoid war when it
would not be necessary for realizing the common good. The perspective
that war declared for the glory of the king is always an unjust war, and the
related idea questioning whether the belief of the king that a certain war
would be just can actually make a war just, are important for de Vitoria.
Here, the experience with the reign of Charles V and the absolutist declaration
of the empire's expansion might have been the impetus for de Vitoria
to further argue that a 'king is not by himself capable of examining into the
causes of a war and the possibility of a mistake on his part is not unlikely
and such a mistake would bring great evil and ruin multitudes...war ought
not to be made on the sole judgment of the king, nor, indeed, on the judgment
of a few, but on that of many, and they be wise and upright men' (de
Vitoria, 1917, p. 174).
A circumstance in which war can be just exists, de Vitoria argues, only
when and under the circumstance that a 'wrong has been received' and that
this circumstance is scrutinized carefully (de Vitoria, 1917, p. 170). The definition
'when a wrong has been received' results in the argument, similar to
las Casas (as well as to what we know from Cicero, Augustine, and Aquinas),
that only wars of defence could be declared just wars because '(not) every
kind and degree of wrong can suffice for commencing a war' (de Vitoria,
1917, p. 172). He concludes, therefore, that the Spanish conquests would be
profoundly unjust - indeed they would be waged for reasons of 'expansion
92 A History ofInternational Political Theory
of empire' and attempted to be justified by 'difference of religion' and the
necessity to spread Christianity. We read:
The Indians in question are not bound... to believe it [the Christian faith],
in such way that they commit mortal sin by not believing it, merely
because it has been declared and announced to them that Christianity is
the true religion and that Christ is the Saviour and Redeemer of the world,
without miracle or any other proof of persuasion... Therefore, where there
are no such signs nor anything else of persuasive force, the aborigines are
not bound to believe...which of the two is the truer religion, unless a
greater weight of probability be apparent on one side...From this proposition
it follows that, if the faith be presented to the Indians in the way
named only and they do not receive it, the Spaniards can not make this
a reason for waging war on them or for proceeding against them under
the law of war. This is manifest, because they are innocent in this respect
and have done no wrong to the Spaniards...Where, then, no wrong has
previously been committed by the Indians, there is no cause of just war.
(de Vitoria, 1917, p. 143)
From this treatment, the following arguments on just war and warfare can
be concluded which then lead to de Vitoria's outlook on the final purpose of
war itself. He introduces a basic notion which is thoroughly innovative for
the discussion of just war against the views of the Spanish colonialists and
those who support them. De Vitoria puts stress not on an enemy's subjective
or subjectively perceived guilt, but on objective acts and their assessment as
just or unjust according to their status as combatants or non-combatants.
'No longer must there be a rather vague identification of the enemy as a
mass of wrong-willed individuals whose subjective guilt must be certified
or supposed, according to which criterion a determination of the innocent
is almost impossible' (Hartigan, 1973, p. 89). From this is derived a norm of
noncombatant immunity, which is a universal norm that must be observed
by everyone, including the emperor and the Spanish conquerors. Hartigan
argues that de Vitoria thereby established 'real life' for an abstract moral
principle: the 'innocence' was not a tangible reality. The spirit of innocence
could now have concrete form as the 'uninvolved' (Hartigan, 1973, p. 89).
When this norm is combined with de Vitoria's determination of unjust
causes of war, the final purpose of war, if it is necessary at all, is revealed.
This final purpose is found in the realization of peace, security, and the
common good not only for one political community, but also for mankind
and the world as a whole. De Vitoria writes, 'there would be no condition
of happiness for the world, nay, its condition would be one of utter misery,
if oppressors and robbers and plunderers could with impunity commit
their crimes and oppress the good and innocent, and these latter could not
in turn retaliate on them' (de Vitoria, 1917, p. 167). The question which
Universalistic Thinking in Christian Legal Philosophy 93
arises now is this: who are the oppressors, robbers, and plunderers, and
why? Here, de Vitoria relates to a thoroughly Aristotelian (and Augustinian
and Thomist) definition in that he shares the idea that a perfect political
community 'is one which is complete in itself, that is, which is not part of
another community, but has its own laws and its own council and its own
magistrates (de Vitoria, 1917, p. 169). What does this mean for the question
of the legitimacy of Spanish colonialism in the Americas?
Here, the question of jurisdiction and sovereignty develops its full meaning.
For if a community is only a perfect one under the condition of sovereignty
('not being part of another community'), if war is unjust for reasons
of a prince's glory as well as because of mere expansion, and if different
religion(s) is (are) not a just cause of war, however, self-defence is a just
reason of war, it then follows that the Spanish have no right whatsoever to
subjugate the Indians. In addition to this, the primary obligation of each
king and prince, who acts lawfully, is to recognize the above conditions;
de Vitoria argues:
Now, in point of human law, it is manifest that the Emperor is not lord
of the world, because either this would be by the sole authority of some
law, and there is none such; or, if there were, it would be void of effect,
inasmuch as law presupposes jurisdiction. If, then, the Emperor had no
jurisdiction over the world before the law, the law could not bind one
who was not previously subject to it. Nor, on the other hand, had the
Emperor this position by lawful succession or by gift or by exchange or
by purchase or by just war or by election or by any other legal title, as is
admitted. Therefore, the Emperor never was the lord of the whole world.
Second conclusion: Granted that the Emperor were the lord of the world,
still that would not entitle him to seize the provinces of the Indian aborigines
and erect new lords there and put down the former ones or take
taxes. The proof is herein, namely, that even those who attribute lordship
over the world to the Emperor do not claim that he is the lord of ownership,
but only in jurisdiction, and this latter right does not go so far as to
warrant him in converting provinces to his own use or in giving towns
or even estates away at his pleasure. This, then, shows that the Spaniards
can not justify on this ground their seizure of the provinces in question,
(de Vitoria, 1917, p. 134)
And some pages later in the same paragraph of this treatise he repeats
'that at the time of the Spaniards' first voyages to America they took with
them no right to occupy the lands of the indigenous population' (de Vitoria,
1917, p. 138).
The next question, which arises for de Vitoria is this: Can the pope be said
to have jurisdiction over the Indians due to his religious and spiritual authority?
In order to investigate this question, de Vitoria distinguishes between
94 A History ofInternational Political Theory
temporal power, civil power, and spiritual jurisdiction. In this regard, de
Vitoria is certain that the pope has no temporal or civil power, because
not even Christ wielded this kind of power, and the pope is nothing but
'Christ's vicar'; so how could he have this type of power? (de Vitoria, 1917,
p. 135). What about his spiritual power and his religious authority over the
Indians? In his answer, de Vitoria refers to the New Testament (St. John)
and the narrative about inner-world temporality as it is expressed by the
metaphor of 'one flock and one shepherd'. This metaphor clearly suggests
that there will be only 'one flock and one shepherd' at the end of ages, that
is, when Christ descends from heaven. As long as this has not happened,
the world is divided into different peoples and religions. From this reality
of the peoples of the world being differentiated into a multitude of religions
and organized in diverse political communities, de Vitoria regards it as evident
that the pope also has no spiritual power over the Indians or any nonChristian
people. He concludes:
The Pope has no temporal power over the Indian aborigines or over
other unbelievers... For he has no temporal power save such as subserves
spiritual matters. But he has no spiritual power over them ...Therefore
he has no temporal power either. The corollary follows that even if the
barbarians refuse to recognize any lordship of the Pope, that furnishes
no ground for making war on them and seizing their property...even if
the barbarians refuse to accept Christ as their lord, this does not justify
making war on them or doing them any hurt ...Therefore they cannot be
compelled to recognize this lordship, (de Vitoria, 1917, p. 138)
It also would be false to assume 'that the Pope has jurisdiction over the
Indian aborigines' (de Vitoria, 1917, p. 146).
From las Casas's and de Vitoria's conceptions of jurisdiction and sovereign
spheres of jurisdiction follows a triangular relation between natural law, the
right to defend one's freedom, and the right to repel force by force (see, for
example, in las Casas, Defense of the Indians, chapter XXVII). Consequently,
war against the Indians in order to convert them to Christianity is unlawful
and their 'rebellion' and eventual war against the Spanish conquerors is just.
In addition to this, there is still another argument that waging war against
non-Christian peoples is unlawful and unjust. This argument embodies
another important pillar of their juridical framework, pointing to the circumstance
of innocence and the conclusion that killing innocent people can
under no circumstances be lawful. This fully applies to the'Indians (and
other native peoples to be 'discovered' in the future) because they had no
chance to hear of the Christian God, thus, they are not responsible for their
'unbelief. Punishing them for this 'unbelief or, put differently, for worshipping
their own gods consequently would be unjust and evil. It will be
important to come back to this aspect of innocence. First, however, I shall
Universalistic Thinking in Christian Legal Philosophy 95
discuss how this emphasis on innocence provides important criteria not
only for just or unjust war, but also for laws of war and warfare.
Las Casas explores the problem of laws of warfare in two chapters
ot .his Defense (chapters XXVIII and XXX). In doing so, he develops an
anti-utilitarian, universal ethics. His arguments again are directed against
Supulveda and his argument that, in order to successfully subjugate the
Indians to Spanish (and Christian) rule, not only war itself would be justified,
but also each means of warfare which would make them obedient, such
as means of killing, massacres, public punishing to terrify others, retaliation,
and so on. Las Casas condemns such behaviour as sinful not only
according to Christian morality, but also on grounds of an ethical position
that means can never cure or justify the (possible) ends. He writes:
From this arises the rule that when evil and good [the prospect of conversion
to Christianity as such] are so conjoined that, from the good I wish
to do, evil would necessarily or almost always result, if the evil is greater
than the good I seek to accomplish, the good (action) must always be
omitted lest the evil should result, (las Casas, 1992a, p. 202)
From this ethical position, he claims that not only innocent people, but
also obviously harmless persons such as children, women, and the elderly
must be spared. Las Casas illustrates this claim and his respective ethics by
the question whether, or not, and under which circumstances to attack a
cit y or fortress. With this example/5
he makes the same important argument
which we know from Cicero and Augustine, namely, that a just war - that
is, a war which was begun and waged with just reasons - can turn into an
unjust war simply by using methods of unjust warfare. Therefore, he first
condemns the argument that when once a city has been taken in a just war,
all its inhabitants are presumed to be enemies as well and consequently
have to be killed; and second, he states that when some military action is
not necessary 'for the favorable outcome of the whole war' (1992a, p. 200),
Mich as the attack of a fortress and its complete annihilation, it would be
unjust to undertake this attack. The reason behind these repudiations is
tlidt in every city or fortress, in each community, there are innocent people
(such as children, women, and the elderly, but also 'farmers, workmen, merchants,
and pilgrims'; ibid.), and to attack or kill such people would be a
mortal sin. His notion of just war is therefore bound to certain methods of
warfare to both ensure that a just war remains just and, given an unjust war,
to avoid at least the worst outcome of a war which in itself, is an evil deed.
Those methods require restriction of warfare to those who are supposed to
tight the war and who are professional soldiers and to spare the innocent
and civilians.
The following question has to be asked: how are las Casas's and de Vitoria's
normative determinations of the recognition of universal human rights,
96 A History of International Political Theory
religious freedom, and just war and warfare to be guaranteed in practical
political life? The following elaboration of this question reveals their original
principles of international jurisdiction. These principles revolutionized
the medieval notion of one (Christian) empire and introduced the early
modern concept of a world divided into different 'nations' with individual
systems of law and authority. According to las Casas, and as seen above in
de Vitoria, in such a world different 'nations' can exist concurrently and
are granted mutually recognized sovereignty, however, only on the basis
of an universal conceptualization of equality and equal rights to freedom,
property, and religion.
Kenneth Pennington acknowledges that las Casas's principles 'were preliminary
to a nascent international law' (1970, p. 160). Las Casas's international
legal principles are established on, and depend upon, his anthropological
and ethical universalism. Further than that, only this universalism allows
him to recognize and acknowledge differences as equally legitimate articulations
and manifestations of one and the same substance of which the human
and political world is made, namely, universal human and divine reason,
ethics, and finally universal humanity. Similar to Pennington, Hamilton
argues that 'for sixteenth century Spaniards the jus gentium was in one sense
normative, a reflection of the natural law, in another sense customary and
improving slowly', and he concludes that, when considering these foundations
of international law, 'we are forced back on the hypothesis that morality,
and not our selfish interests or those of our state, may prove the best
policy in our relations with all mankind' (Hamilton, 1963, p. 167).
The framework which politically warrants, or is supposed to warrant, the
mutual recognition and acknowledgement of difference is delivered by rights
and obligations of 'international' jurisdiction. In developing this framework,
las Casas and de Vitoria refer to their argument against the claim, which
the Spaniards upheld, namely, of superior wisdom which would legitimize
conquest (see above). Contrary to such a claim, las Casas argued that the
Indians' war of defence against the Spaniards is by all means to be perceived
as the legitimate form of violence in all confrontations which take place in
the 'New World'. '(No) free person, and much less a free people, is bound to
submit to anyone, whether king or nation, no matter how much better the
latter may be and no matter how advantageous he may think it will be to
himself (las Casas, 1992a, p. 47). Following this argument, he consequently
declines to term the Indians' resistance a 'rebellion' and the Indians themselves
'rebels' because, as he notes, 'no one can be called a rebel if... he is not
a subject of the King' (las Casas, 1992a, p. 65). This definition goes immediately
to the heart of the body of the universalistic thinking in Christian
legal philosophy in the sixteenth century which is based upon the conviction
that the legitimate use of authority and power stems from legalized
relations between those who exert authority and those who are subject to
this authority, domestically and internationally.
Universalistic Thinking in Christian Legal Philosophy 97
All these arguments were developed against those who supported the
Spanish conquests, most prominently Sepulveda, and the conviction that
the Spaniards would rightfully conquer the Americas and could punish
the Indians for 'idolatry' and 'disbelief. 'The ancient concept of jus gentium
received new life in Spain through the discovery and conquest of the
Americas ...But their consciousness of living in an expanding world made
them [the respective critical theologians] more aware of the unity of mankind
and more anxious to assert it' (Hamilton, 1963, p. 98). In chapter VI of
In Defense of the Indians, in which las Casas attacks Sepulveda on the ground
of his legal theory, he is more explicit on his definition of jurisdiction. 'In
this chapter...we shall prove that unbelievers who have never embraced
the faith of Christ and who are not Christian subjects cannot be punished
by Christians, or even by the Church, for any crime at all, no matter how
atrocious it may be' (las Casas, 1992a, p. 55).76
Jurisdiction, and then the
definition of being subject to one's authority, or not, and of legitimately, or
illegitimately, exerting political power, is determined by territorial spheres.
Only within the territory of his own nation is a sovereign entitled to wield
his authority. He has no legitimate power outside the borders of his body
politic.
Those living outside, as the Indians with regard to the Spanish Empire,
are therefore neither subject of the Spanish Empire nor of the authority
and power of the King of Spain who 'has no jurisdiction in this area' (las
Casas, 1992a, p. 55, here similar to de Vitoria; see above), regardless of the
possible seriousness of 'crimes': 'Therefore, in this case, the emperor, the
prince, or the king has no jurisdiction but is the same as a private citizen,
and whatever he does has no force' (ibid.). Beyond the territorial definition
of political power, authority, and jurisdiction, we see that certain
terms and concepts become political and accomplish political character
only by the possibility of their legal definition, such as 'rebellion', 'rebel',
and 'crime', which become definable only under the condition that they
apply and can be applied in a juridical context. The limitation of political
authority through a territorially defined body politic and the recognition
of the political sovereignty and independence of other 'nations' relates,
however, not only to matters of resistance and punishment, but also to
religious or spiritual matters. Also here, the power to convert people ends
at one's own kingdom's borders, hand in hand with the request to recognize
other peoples' right of religious freedom. Las Casas notes in the same
tone as de Vitoria:
(As) regards to religion or spiritual matters, no matter whether they be
Jews, Mohammedans, or idolaters they are in no way subject to the Church
nor to her members, that is, Christian rulers. And therefore when they
celebrate and observe rites they cannot be punished by Christian rulers,
for [they] lack jurisdiction in this area, (las Casas, 1992a, pp. 54-5)
98 A History ofInternational Political Theory
This form of 'relativism', or as termed above with regard to de Vitoria, 'recognition
of different rationalities' is more strongly developed in las Casas
than in de Vitoria, and therefore he shall be discussed in further detail.
Pursuing this 'relativism', las Casas extends the determination of the territorial
limits of jurisdiction and subsequently the assignment of who is, or
is not, subject to a distinct authority beyond the relation between Spain
and the Indians to, first, the Catholic Church and the pope and, second, to
each kind of relations among states: Regarding the Catholic Church and the
authority of the pope, las Casas differentiates between 'actual' (or 'factual')
and 'potential' power. Actual power relates to those who are indeed subject
to the Catholic Church by embracing the Catholic faith and by being baptized,
that is, believers and heretics or sinners who break from the church,
but are under the jurisdiction of the church. They belong, as las Casas states
in reference to Augustine, to the City of God, and hence the church and the
pope may exert power over them. In contrast, persons who never embraced
the Christian faith and did not subject themselves to Christ's jurisdiction
are therefore outside the church and Christian law. Although the 'Eternal
Father', as las Casas says, 'gave Christ power over all nations, believing and
unbelieving in heaven and on earth' (1992a, pp. 55-6), those who are not
baptized and did not willingly submit themselves are only potentially, or
'habitually' (ibid., p. 57) subject.
In Book IX of In Defence of the Indians, las Casas describes the holy sacraments
as the borders of the City of God and baptism as the gate to this
city. Here again we see the importance, as it has been in his discussion of
just war and warfare, of innocence and, as has been seen in his debate on
human rights, the powerful aspect of voluntarism, which overrides philosophical
and orthodox Christian traditions claiming some form of natural
communitarism. Innocence applies here to the 'pagan' who has never heard
of Christ nor received faith and hence cannot be an actual subject to the
church and the pope; the pagan cannot be made guilty of not embracing
Christian faith because he or she never learned about Christ and the sacraments.
In addition, las Casas stresses the voluntary character of receiving
faith and why, in religious matters, no one can be made a subject against his
or her free will. Regarding the aspect of innocence in relation to jurisdiction
and the power of the church and the Vatican, see especially chapter XVIII
(las Casks, 1992, pp. 127-9).
To summarize this point, the pope has no authority to judge those who
are outside, 'he has no actual jurisdiction over these... unbelievers who are
completely outside the Church [and] are not subject to the'Church, nor do
they belong to its territory or competence' (ibid., p. 62). He is 'actual king
within the Church and potential king outside the Church' (ibid., p. 144),
and as such has theoretically no greater political power than any secular
ruler. Indeed, their power is both limited and granted by the spheres of their
actual jurisdiction; in case of a secular ruler, this limitation is territorial
4 K
4.
-XUniversalistic
Thinking in Christian Legal Philosophy 99
because 'jurisdiction is said to be implanted in a locality or territory' (ibid.,
p. 83); in the case of the pope, this limitation is symbolized by individuals
who^are, in terms of their belief and spirituality, outside the Christian faith
and who must not forcefully be converted against their will.
This principle of recognition applies generally to the relations among all
'nations' and peoples. Every ruler and sovereign is thus restricted in the
exercise of his power to the territory of his polity and has to respect the sovereign
jurisdiction of other polities. Power and authority for all sovereigns
end with the borders of their own body politic. This principle has to be
acknowledged by everyone as a divine law which 'forbids anyone to violate
or transgress another's territory or jurisdiction' (las Casas, 1992a, p. 84).
Las Casas employs this principle to the international relationship between
France and Spain and states that neither have authority outside the borders
of their empire, nor would the 'king of France pronounce sentence in Spain
[or] the king of Spain dictate laws for France' (ibid., p. 83); and borders were
called so because they 'limit, determine, or restrict the property, power, or
jurisdiction of someone' (ibid., p. 80).
It is important to see that this new principle of international jurisdiction
and territorial integrity breaks with Roman law according to which possession
was perceived as legitimate by physical presence and the factual hold of
territories. Las Casas replaces this traditional notion with the principles of
territorial jurisdiction (see also Seed, 1992). It is also worth pointing to the
explicitness with which the principle of political territoriality in relation to
jurisdiction and political power has been introduced, while there is a clear
hierarchy between politics and jurisdiction. As seen above, politics and political
terms, respectively, attain meaning only in a legal framework which
defines relations of legitimate authority. The triangular interlink between
politics, territoriality, and jurisdiction and the claim of mutual recognition
of territorial integrity characterizes the Spanish theologians as major
thinkers of the early modern state system, which was established about one
hundred years later in Europe as the so-called Westphalian state system.
Lewis Hanke even goes so far as to declare that las Casas prefigures the
United Nations' Declaration of Human Rights (Hanke, 1970, p. 116). Even if
this might appear to be an overstatement because there is a clear difference
between modern international law and the jus gentium of, and leading up to,
the sixteenth century not only with regard to the notion that the jusgentium
is solely customary and unwritten law, but also in relation to their philosophical
and epistemological frameworks regarding their universalism, it
can nevertheless be stated that a practically significant (in its own times)
and relevant (for the centuries to come) universalistic ethical and legal normative
philosophy emerged based 'not on the habits and conduct of one
people or another, but of the whole world ...in harmony with the unity of
mankind' (Suarez, quoted in Hamilton, 1963, p. 108).
Universalistic Frameworks 101
TT 9
Universalistic Frameworks in Early
Modern Political Theory
1. Niccolo Machiavelli
Any interpretation of Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), which intends to
portray him as a nontotalitarian, or even republican thinker in the tradition
of ancient Greek and Roman thought has to fight against deeply rooted
mainstream perceptions of so-called Machiavellism. These perceptions construe
Machiavelli as a reckless and brutal defender of power politics as long
as such politics serve the power-increase of a political leader and the stability
of the political system. The ethics underlying Machiavelli are said to be
functional because the ends would legitimate the means, thus, all means
would be acceptable to accomplish the growth and stability of a political
leader's power. Machiavellism is widely applied to domestic and international
politics, and this perception was introduced by Elizabethan writers
in England and strongly promoted and popularized by the Prussian king
Frederick II and his work V anti Machiavel, ou, Essai de critique sur le Prince de
Machiavel (1958).77
It is interesting, however, that those who promote this perception of
Machiavellism appear to base their interpretation exclusively on one work
of Machiavelli, namely, The Prince (written in 1513), thereby ignoring
Machiavelli's main work, The Discourses, which was finalized some years
later (around 1518). (Both works were published posthumously; copies of The
Prince, however, were circulated during Machiavelli's lifetime.) This neglect
is especially the case in International Politics/IR, leading to an interesting
question: why was The Prince, and not The Discourses, received by posterity
as the main piece on which interpretations of Machiavelli were based? Or, to
put it differently: why did posterity choose Machiavelli's small piece and not
his more comprehensive volume? Perhaps The Prince was chosen because it
is shorter; perhaps because it is more bellicose and less reflective and thus
makes a better fit with the prevailing perception of Machiavellism. Perhaps
interpreters chose this work because it better suits their own ideological
interests in two ways, that is, they can use Machiavelli as a political 'realist',
who veryvividly described politics, both domestic and international, with
a clear viev*\for reality, or they can blame him for a political tradition and
attitude of rigid and amoral power ambitions. Whatever the answer, the
ignorance of his Discourses is striking, and Bernard Crick ironically paraphrases
'What do you know of Machiavelli who only The Prince have read?',
suggesting that it is probably the brevity of The Prince which made this piece
'famous' (Crick, 2003, p. 19).
There is, however, another tradition in the interpretation of Machiavelli,
which promoted a kind of rehabilitated reading of Machiavelli as a republican
in the tradition of Aristotle and Cicero78
and understanding his Prince
as one of the first works in what we would call today 'political sociology'
and 'totalitarianism studies'. This tradition starts with Alberico Gentili
in the second half of the sixteenth century and comprises, for instance,
James Harrington, Francis Bacon, David Hume, Baruch Spinoza, Charles de
Montesquieu, and Jean Jacques Rousseau who wrote, 'While appearing to
instruct kings he has done much to educate the people. Machiavelli's Prince
is the book of Republicans' (quoted in Viroli, 2005, p. xix).7 9
With regard to the discipline of International Politics/IR, only a few works
explicitly discuss The Discourses while many (pretend to) know The Prince,
raising their voices in accordance with the orthodox interpretation of
Machiavellism and contributing to the solidification of this one-sided perception.
At the same time, Machiavellism became a keyword in International
Politics/IR while Machiavelli is (mis)used by 'realists' and neo-realists as a
kind of founding figure (together with Thucydides and Hobbes) of their own
patterns of international thought. Machiavelli also is (mis)used by internationalists,
who cast him as the villain who established selfishness and
brutality in international politics and created the basis for others, mostly
dictators, to legitimize their politics (see Russett, 1974, 1993), and members
of the school of democratic peace, who usually juxtapose Machiavelli as the
villain and Kant as the upright politician.80
I do not intend discussing Machiavelli to provide the right interpretation.
Nor do I want to try to understand Machiavelli solely on the basis of his
Discourses, an approach that would commit the same error as the many
interpreters from our discipline who focus only on The Prince, only the other
way around. Nor do I want to turn Machiavelli into a peace-loving 'good
guy' and mitigate his statements from The Prince while arguing that the real
Machiavelli can be found in The Discourses. I rather want to point to three
circumstances which highlight the relevance of interpreting Machiavelli
for our present-day understanding of international/inter-national politics.
First, The Discourses also comprises important thoughts on international
politics, and this work should not be ignored in interpretations of
Machiavelli's outlook on international politics. Second, to get the 'whole
story', it does not suffice, therefore, to quote again and again only from
The Prince; those who do generate suspicions that they are less interested in
102 A History ofInternational Political Theory Universalistic Frameworks 103
Machiavelli and more interested in promoting their own politically motivated
interests. And finally, we get a different picture of Machiavelli when
we broaden the basis for our understanding and interpretation; thus, including
both The Prince and The Discourses suggests some revisions of orthodox
beliefs in International Politics/IR. That we should consider both of his writings
is last but not least suggested by Machiavelli himself when he explicitly
advises his audience in the first book of The Prince to read the Discourses,
too, because he notes that The Prince deals with principalities only and not
with republics (which, as he says, he had treated 'elsewhere' at great length).
This is a clear statement very early in the text saying that The Prince does not
provide Machiavelli's complete outlook on the political world but a partial
one focusing solely on one form of government ('De principatibus'). Those
who ignore The Discourses hence appear not to have read ThePrince from the
beginning, or they have not taken Machiavelli's advice seriously.
The different picture we get when we consider both The Prince and The
Discourses and inquire his conceptualizations of international politics consists
of the following: Machiavelli's main interest tends to be in domestic
politics, and above all in the well-being of the city-republic of Florence.
Nevertheless, he is fully aware that a republic's welfare also depends on its
foreign politics. He therefore perceives the international realm divided up
into competing republics, city-states, and empires which are all interested
in their own political and economic well-being. Machiavelli has no principal
complaint about this situation and does not construct a metaphysically
or ethically inspired counter-picture of the international world against this
reality. He rather conceptualizes political order and political action within
this given context and accepts conflict and competition as patterns of polit- I
ical reality. However - and the mainstream interpretation in our discipline
repeatedly ignores this - Machiavelli has a notion of universalistic principles
which are common to all political bodies and affect all politics, and
he envisions the creation of principles to construct international order in
this reality. These are the vital forces of republican politics and virtue. These
principles have an impact on political fortune and qualify the fate of single
political bodies. State leaders must be aware of these principles and must not
only develop instruments of political, sometimes despotic power, but also
virtue, confidence, and morality. Finally, these principles constitute common
guidelines of politics in general and foreign politics in particular and
affect the conduct of each state's foreign politics with the same ordering
principles. Consequently, they integrate 'international' politics in frameworks
common to all political communities. From this perspective, it is not
only and not always a thirst for power and power maximization which prevails
over international politics, but also aspirations of harmonic conduct
of 'state-to-state' relations, diplomacy, and international negotiation. At the
same time, diplomacy and negotiation not only generate common norms
and values among republics and city-states, but they also are backed by, and
y -
'S
£
based- upon, common norms and values - under the condition that state
leaders have developed certain capacities of virtue and morality.
If we read Machiavelli this way - and this picture will be elaborated
throughout the following paragraphs - against the mainstream interpretation
of Machiavelli as an all-out 'realist', we learn to conceive of him as
an intermediate figure. He is not universal like Augustine and Aquinas (see
above) or universalistic like las Casas and de Vitoria (see above) or Kant (see
below), and he differs from Thucydides (see above) in the decisiveness of
excoriating war atrocities and requesting legal norms. We learn, however,
that he also refers to universalistically valid principles, which impinge on
international politics and apply to all political units, bridge potential disintegration
of the 'international', and provide eventual ethical standards for
the conduct of foreign politics.
'Two Machiavellis': Political sociology and republican
ethics, or the 'analytical' and the 'normative'
We know statements from Machiavelli such as 'A wise ruler ...cannot and
should not keep his word when such an observance would be to his disadvantage,
and when the reasons that caused him to make a promise are
removed' (The Prince, chapter VXIII), or 'A Prince...must not have any
other object nor any other thought, nor must he adopt anything as his
art but war, its institutions, and its discipline' (The Prince, chapter XIV).
These and similar statements have been used by scholars and politicians
alike to form the interpretations of Machiavellism. However, we also find
other statements such as 'But let us come to the second instance, when a
private citizen becomes prince of his native city not through wickedness
or any other intolerable violence, but with the favour of his fellow citizens'
(from The Prince, chapter IX, 'Of the civil principality'; my emphasis). We
also read about his admiration of 'Ecclesiastical Principalities' because of
their realization of what can be called good and humane government (The
Prince, chapter XI); we encounter the statement 'For there is such a distance
between how one lives and how one ought to live, that anyone who abandons
what is done for what ought to be done achieves his downfall rather
than his preservation' (The Prince, chapter XV); and we find Machiavelli
writing 'How praiseworthy it is for a prince to keep his word and to live with
integrity ...everybody knows' (The Prince, chapter XVIII).
The purpose of these quotations81
is to illustrate an ambivalence in
Machiavelli, which opened his writings to one-sided interpretations that
either exploit him as a supporter of brutal power politics and reckless selfishness,
if opportune, or construe him as a republican thinker. Both ways
of understanding are, to my point of view, insufficient because both have a
strong tendency to neglect one or the other side of his writings and to pick
out single sentences and paragraphs without trying to read them in combination
with, and with regard to, the architecture of both The Prince and
104 A History ofInternational Political Theory Universalistic Frameworks 105
The Discourses. We have to ask the following questions: Why this ambivalence?
How can it be explained? What consequently is this architecture
of his political thoughts? By trying to find an answer to these questions, I *
intend to demonstrate that Machiavelli is much more complex than assign- %
ing him for now and ever to be a republican or a totalitarian. Or to put it WL
differently, I believe that we have 'two Machiavellis' and that we have to WL
understand his two sides in combination in order to solve the seeming
ambivalences. - w
However, I would like to suggest that the two sides of Machiavelli
are not represented in either The Prince (a despotic Machiavelli) or The
Discourses (a republican Machiavelli), but rather alongside the distinction g r
of a Machiavellian historic-analytical political sociology (of principalities
and republics) and a Machiavellian ethically oriented political thought. '•
Machiavelli knows very well the importance of distinguishing between
the analytical (i.e., his political-sociology approach) and the normative in £
the study of politics (i.e., his judging and evaluating comments). In most %
parts of both writings, Machiavelli is a political sociologist. He analyzes ttpolitics
in principalities and in republics, more or less descriptively, focus- Jfing
on the mechanisms and 'logic' of power. Thus, he asks questions evidently
using a different political terminology, but one that is similar W
to modern political sociology - concerning political leadership, political
friendship, the role of political elites, the function of religion and the role .v.
of the church, political power, the significance of political mores, 'social m
capital,' and so on.8 2
The discussion of such questions, in combination
with Machiavelli's quite unsparing treatments of political power, appears ||
to be responsible for his reputation as a supporter of reckless power politics Jj|
and political deceit and for interpretations of Machiavellism as if he sub- y
scribed normatively to these mechanisms, instead of having them (just) Jt
analyzed.
However, to assume that a scholar of totalitarianism would be a totalitarian
thinker is absurd, and indeed most of them during the twentieth
century - for example, Hannah Arendt, Carl Joachim Friedrich, Eric :
Voegelin, and many others - have been themselves victims of European w
totalitarian politics and staunch republican thinkers. But Machiavelli was
not a great methodologist and he provides just some hints about what he
is doing and heading for, namely in the 'Preface' of The Discourses when *
he writes:
Although owing to the envy inherent in man's nature it has always been m
no less dangerous to discover new ways and methods than to set off in
search of new seas and unknown lands because most men are much more t
ready to belittle than to praise another's actions, none the less, impelled
by the natural desire I have always had to labour, regardless of anything,
on that which I believe to be for the common benefit of all, I have decided
to enter upon a new way, as yet untrodden by anyone else. (1983, p. 97)
This introductory paragraph can be understood in two ways: as the invention
of a historical method comparing the current situation in sixteenth
century Italy and primarily Florence with examples from Greek and Roman
antiquity and especially with the Roman Republic (what would not be really
a new method); or as the invention of an analytical method to describe the
mechanisms and structures of government and practices of power, both in
principalities and republics (what would indeed be a new method). He notes
in the Dedicatory Letter and the second chapter of The Prince:
t have neither decorated nor filled this work with elaborate sentences,
with rich and magnificent words, or with any other form of rhetorical or
unnecessary ornamentation that many writers normally use in describing
and enriching their subject-matter, for I wished that nothing should
set my work apart or make it pleasing except the variety of its material
and the gravity of its contents... I shall aside any discussions of republics,
because I have treated them elsewhere. I shall consider solely the principality
... and I shall discuss how these principalities can be [not ought to
be] governed and maintained. (2005, pp. 3, 7; emphasis mine)
We here learn that Machiavelli intends to restrict himself in order to be
analytical and that he refrains from presenting his analysis normatively. As
with the navigator and explorers of his time who sailed across the oceans
to discover new land, Machiavelli wants to invent a new 'way' (methodos)
of political study. This new way should be without 'ornamentation' and
'rhetoric', but straightforwardly heading for an 'objective' ('objective' in
his sense of drawing lessons from historical comparison by refraining from
personal comments) and analytical description of state leaders' successful
conduct of politics. I hence ask if we tend to suppose George Orwell had an
interest in defending and legitimizing the totalitarian government of pigs in
his Animal Farm or, much worse, to advise dictators in their government? My
guess is that we well understand that Orwell's intention was to describe and
illustrate (and, of course, to criticize) the mechanisms of totalitarian government
in order to teach people how such governments come into being and
how they operate. So why do we assume then that Machiavelli supports rude
and selfish government, without taking seriously enough into account his
statements from the Preface of the Discourses and the Dedicatory Letter and
the second chapter of The Prince (as quoted above) about his real interest? And
why are we instead seduced in our understanding by misled assumptions
either about 'his' normative support of egoistic and opportune government,
or about a Machiavellian tendency to seperate politics from morality?83
106 A History ofInternational Political Theory
Instead of being trapped in such misleading assumptions, a different
view is suggested here, namely, to understand Machiavelli's analytical
focus as, in modern terms, a 'political sociology' perspective. On this
aspect, Alker's notion is instructive when he writes about 'Machiavelli,
Renaissance Humanism, and Modernity' and reveals an analytical dimension
in Machiavelli which he deems being 'reflectively modern'. 'With a
keen eye and ear for provocative formulations, he built an imperfect but
prescient, proto-scientific... grammar of emerging... modern power relations'
(Alker, 1992, p. 358; emphasis mine).84
In order to further investigate
Machiavelli's analytical and normative dimension, I suggest that we carefully
read Machiavelli's comments on 'good' and 'evil' behaviour, 'just' and
'fair' government, and a cooperative and peaceful conduct of international
politics in the short paragraphs he interspersed throughout the main text
despite his stated intention to omit 'rhetoric' and 'unnecessary ornamentation'.
In these paragraphs, Machiavelli discloses his normative ideas, apart
from his analytical outlook. We hence have to understand Machiavelli as an
author who sharply distinguishes the analytical from the normative level
and who consequently focuses on two separate units of his study.85
The
empirical-analytical outlook in Machiavelli is thereby based on his historical
studies of Roman and Greek antiquity, especially the Roman Republic,
whereas his normative views are derived from political principles and ethics
of republicanism and self-government. This applies, as I will try to demonstrate,
both to domestic and international politics.
No argument, however, can be made that Machiavelli would derive his
normative outlook from his analysis of the 'real' world. He does not derive
normative 'ought' obligations from his analyses, but only 'must' maxims
about what a prince or republican leader had to do in order to stabilize his
power (the reification problem, which we observe in neo-realism, thus does
not apply to Machiavelli and appears to be a distinct problem of scientific
epistemology; see below, IV.2.2). Thereby, Machiavelli tries to uncover the
mechanisms of despotic and republican government; however, he never
states *hat principalities or bellicose empires would represent ideal political
orders and one should, normatively speaking, realize them. There might be
times and certain circumstances when a principal government is necessaryto
guarantee stability and to overcome crisis. This does not imply Machiavelli's
normative outlook, however, but merely his concession towards the might
of 'necessity' (necessita), that is, to do the right thing in the right moment.
(The gauge to judge what is 'right' is political stability and the question of
what can bring about stability.)86
When a situation arises in which necessity
requires certain actions, and they might imply war and dictatorial leadership,
it then is, according to Machiavelli, crucially important to know what
to do and how to act.87
But again, this is not a normative 'ought' obligation but a 'must' maxim
due to political analysis and born out of necessity, that is, the requirement
Universalistic Frameworks 107
to act successfully in order to stabilize the community. Only from the viewpoint
of a contemporary political-science orthodoxy - which lost its normative
orientation - and of an International Politics/IR - which is dominated
by the epistemological naivety of neo-realism and identifies the normative
with the analytical - can Machiavelli be understood as someone who takes
political reality (or what he thinks it is) at face value to derive general 'ought'
~£ obligations from it.8 8
Coming back to the question of international politics in Machiavelli:
much is here about war and warfare and the leader's capability and knowledge
of how to wage war successfully. Machiavelli also writes about colonies
and how empires expanded and why they declined. He also covers the
question of how military discipline can be created and how important it is
• that troops are well trained and reliable to their leader and home country,
and how a country and its society that have been defeated can successfully
be ruled. The criteria and the standard for success are provided by the realization
of stability. As Crick notes, Machiavelli attaches an 'extraordinarily
high value to political stability' (Crick, 2003, p. 24). This concern stems
from his belief in the periodic and inevitable rise and fall of political orders
4s- which would cause each political unit to decline eventually, regardless how
huge and powerful it once was. Thus, stability can at least enable a political
unit to last, although it cannot prevent its final decline. In this regard,
Machiavelli stands in the tradition of the Greek-Roman historian Polybius,
and, as he writes in The Discourses, there is a 'cycle through which all governments
pass' (1983, p. 109). It therefore is the greatest challenge for a
political community, whether it is a principality, an empire, or a republic, to
resist its decline as long as possible. One guarantor for stability, according to
Machiavelli, is expansion, if necessitated by war. Thus, war and statesmen's
necessary capabilities and expertise as war leaders are permanent motives
in The Discourses and The Prince. His thoughts on that topic can, in a summarized
form, also be found in The Art of War, which 'repeats and assumes
^ every essential proposition of both The Prince and The Discourses - for the art
of war is an extension of the whole condition of society' (Crick, 2003, p. 37;
also Machiavelli, 2003). I do not want to discuss this further because this
discussion would distract from my main concern, which aims to address
the question whether, or not, there is something in Machiavelli pointing to
an international order in the sense of some common principles shared by
single states.
Regional republican order
Asking whether, or not, there is some principle in Machiavelli constituting
an in-between among states, and whether Machiavelli's thought does,
or does not, reach beyond the interests of single political units, it might be
surprising that we find in his writings the idea of a regional republican
order. This idea relates to the normative, not to the analytical, side of his
108 A History of International Political Theory Universalistic Frameworks 109
writings and therefore may be not part of the main attention his studies have
received. This is, however, astonishing because it is as early as in Book 1.1 of
The Discourses when Machiavelli talks about the very reason for the foundation
of cities, and he refers to international politics to explain this reason.
We thus can conclude that, for Machiavelli, international politics lies at the
very heart of each city (and politics), and the foundation of a city is the first
occasion when dispersed small communities join, and that is for the better
enjoyment of their security. 'Hence...either of their own accord or at the
suggestion of someone of greater authority among them, such communities
undertake living together in some place they have chosen in order to live
more conveniently and the more easily to defend themselves' (Machiavelli,
1983, pp. 100-1). What Machiavelli describes here is nothing else but the
creation of a security community in which cities, because of their individual
smallness, unite together for the better realization of their commonly
shared interest in security. Machiavelli construes such a unification of small
communities into a greater (and stronger) association as the most fundamental
motor in, and the first motive for, the creation of politics, and both
relate to international politics. This motor and motif are understood by
Machiavelli as historical conditions and, as such, as an analytical description
of 'The Origins of Cities in General and of Rome in Particular' (Book
1.1, The Discourses).
It seems crucially important to relate any understanding and interpretation
of Machiavelli with regard to international politics to the paragraphs
mentioned above. He herein not only esteems international politics as
the fundamental grounding of politics, he also describes how, and why,
individual communities form an association of a greater community. In
Machiavelli, we do not find the image of only particularized and singularized
interests 'out there' in international politics, but of unifying common
principles and shared values guiding states' (foreign) politics. According to
our present-day terminology, Machiavelli here notes the beginnings and
foundation of an 'international society'. And even if such a society breaks
apart from time to time because of the natural rise and decline of states and
empires and due to their eventually selfish, bellicose, and power-seeking
behaviour, common interests and the shared value of security operate as the
founding principles of international politics. Shared norms and values hence
do exist in international politics and operate in the international realm as
ordering standards. As I argued above, this picture is to be comprehended as
historical and analytical, not (yet) normative. Much about security depends
on the military organization of a community and the state-leader's capacity
as general of his army. In The Discourses, 1.4, we read that 'where the military
organization is good there must be good order' (p. 113).
We now have to turn to Machiavelli's normative thinking, because the
term good order is elusive at first. When further inquiring into the meaning
of good order, we have to consider two aspects: both relate to the domestic
it?
M l
$
I
§
t
I
order of cities, and both reach out into the international sphere. Thus, there
is a link between domestic order and international politics in Machiavelli,
not only in terms of negative impacts because of bellicose and imperialistic
politics of states, but also in a positive, normative sense. One of these
aspects concerns Machiavelli's preference for small republics. His argument
does not, however, foreshadow Rousseau's (domestically oriented) argument
stating that small cities are better suited for ('democratic') republics, but
is, on the contrary, borrowed fully from an international perspective. He
writes:
I am firmly convinced...that to set up a republic which is to last a long
time, the way to set about it is to constitute it as Sparta and Venice
were constituted: ...not to make it so large as to appear formidable to its
neighbours... if it be content with its own territory, and it becomes clear
by experience that it has no ambitions, it will never occur that someone
may make war through fear for himself, especially if by its constitution or
by its laws expansion is prohibited. Nor have I the least doubt that, if this
balance could be maintained, there would be a genuine political life and
real tranquility in such a city. (Machiavelli, 1983, pp. 122-3)89
It is the domestic organization of a city as a small city which has a
pacifying effect on the international sphere. No other state, Machiavelli
argues, has to fear a small city. If the peaceful conduct of its foreign politics
were additionally determined by its constitution and laws, this would
produce an even better and more preferable situation. Machiavelli well
realizes analytically that states may be driven by ambitions to increase
their influence, power, and glory; however, normatively he envisions a
different, and more peaceful, international order, one which is made up
of small states unified by their common interest in increasing, and their
value for, their quality of life.9 0
Towards the end of this quotation, we
notice that Machiavelli talks about 'genuine political life' and 'real tranquility'
that stipulates a deeper inquiry into the second aspect of (and link
between) domestic order and international politics. The second aspect
touches upon good 'order'.
There should be no doubt that Machiavelli prefers republics to all other
forms of government, such as principalities, empires, and, of course, dictatorships
- 'if you can get them', as Crick formulates (Crick, 2003, p. 24). A
paragraph from The Discourses should leave no doubt about this position:
It is not the well-being of individuals that makes cities great, but the
well-being of the community; and it is beyond question that it is only
in republics that the common good is looked to properly in that all
that promotes it is carried out ...The opposite happens where there is a
prince. (II.l)
110 A History of International Political Theory
We can add now that he prefers small republics to large ones due to
their pacifying effect on international politics. Machiavelli explicitly discusses
the question of a confederation of republics in Book 1.59 of The
Discourses under the topic 'What Confederations or Leagues can be trusted
most; those made with a Republic or those made with a Prince' (p. 257).
His answer to this question is very clear. He comments that confederations
made by republics are much more; reliable. And '(instances) might be
cited of treaties broken by princes for a very small advantage, and of treaties
which have not been broken by a republic for a very great advantage'
(p. 259). We hence learn that republics would be more reliable because
they 'abide by their agreements far better than do princes' (p. 259). Again,
the 'normative Machiavelli' not only highly esteems associations of republics
(what he calls 'confederations' or 'leagues') based on their common
norm and value of security, but he also measures the preference of republics
over principalities by their far better fulfilment of treaty obligations
(see also Gaubatz, 1996, pp. 109-23). We here touch upon an aspect which
seems constantly neglected in International Politics/IR when it comes to
Machiavelli, namely his normative esteem (and factual analysis) of international
treaties.
It should be clear by now that we have to revise the common picture
of Machiavelli as an uncompromising realist, who is nowhere speaking of
'anarchy' in 'international' politics, and who qualifies power politics by normative
principles. His normative notion of 'international' politics is based
on a twofold notion of common norms and shared values between states:
stability and international law.
In this regard it is interesting to look closer at his argument why republics
are more reliable. Although his argument is hidden in one sentence
only and Machiavelli lacks a modern political science terminology, we can
nevertheless learn that his preference for republics is very much due to
(what we would call today) a system of checks and balances which operates in
republics, but not in principalities. His argument is about time, and he notes
that^republics 'are slower to act and take more time than princes in arriving
at a decision' (1983, p. 259). In more current terminology, this argument is
well known from the Federalist Papers when James Madison argues for the
advantages of republican orders in opposite to kingdoms and refers to the
idea of time in the decision-making process of republics. The momentum of
a slower pace in the decision-making process of republics would guarantee
a more reflective, moderate, and thus less emotional and sounder political
outcome. The mechanism, according to Madison, for preventing decisions
being made too promptly is the system of checks and balances between the
executive, the legislative, and eventually the juridical branch. That is, in
terms of time, a system of negotiation, vetoes, co-operation, and votes operates
in republics. When it comes to defence issues and military questions,
however, Madison finds his counter-argument in the Federa/ist-articles of
Universalistic Frameworks 111
Alexander Hamilton who argued that in wartime decisions have to be made
immediately and without delay. Therefore, a strong executive, equipped
with military command, would be required.91
As to Machiavelli, he views
the slow pace of decisions made in republics as beneficial for international
politics because it increases the reliability of such governments with regard
to their treaty obligations.
Thus, we have to realize two links which universally operate between
the domestic order of cities and the international sphere. On the one hand,
(small) republics are less frightening and are of a more peaceful character
towards their neighbours; on the other hand, the quality of domestic
decision-making endows republics with a greater reliability in the international
environment. Both characteristics are conducive for less conflictive
and more cooperative international relations; this again provides not only
international, but also domestic stability. In The Discourses, II.4, Machiavelli
consequently projects a regional order of free republics, a projection, which
is based on his normative outlook as well as on historical examples of peaceful
and flourishing state relations. We read:
I do not want to overstretch my interpretation of Machiavelli, either in
terms of a modern political science terminology nor by turning him into a
peace-loving universalist. However, I would argue that his normative picture
for an international order made up by republics strongly resembles models
which are in our days discussed as regional security orders, or 'regional security
complexes' (Buzan and Waever, 2003). No convincing argument exists,
however, for seizing Machiavelli as a 'realist', who would argue in favour of
power politics and a leadership of foreign policy elites (a 'prince' and his
cronies), independent from their society, and who would furthermore base
his analysis and international outlook on assumptions of 'anarchy' and a
intransigent promotion of 'national interest'. On the contrary, we could see
that reliability, treaty obligations, cooperation, and the internationalization
4~
W- T n e
student of ancient histories will find that there are three ways in
which republics have expanded. The first was that which the Tuscans of
old adopted, namely, that of forming a league consisting of several republies
in which no one of them had preference, authority or rank above the
others; and in which, when other cities were acquired, they made them
constituent members in the same way as the Swiss act in our times, and
as in Greece the Achaeans and the Aetolians acted in olden times...The
method of leagues ...does not readily involve you in wars ...Twelve or
fourteen communities join together, and beyond that they do not seek to
go... Hence, when they have reached the number which appears to promise
them security, they devote themselves to...the protection of those
who apply for it, and by this means get from all around money which can
easily be distributed among them. (1983, pp. 285-7)92
112 A History ofInternational Political Theory Universalistic Frameworks 113
of republicanism rank high in his thoughts. Further to this, he perceives no
dualism between domestic ('inside') and international ('outside') order, with
two aspects of the domestic order (of republicanism) reaching into the international.
The belief to expose Machiavelli as a realist must hence be understood
as one (further) misreading of present-day International Politics/IR.
This misreading seems due to the lack of a differentiation between, and
the equation of, a normative and an analytical level of studying the international
as well as due to the solidification of an 'inside'-'outside'-dualism
in post-nineteenth century inter-national theory, which appears to operate
as an a-historical, ontological lens, even when looking at pre-nineteerith
century international politics.
The purpose of this chapter, to say it again, is not to show the right and
the one and only possible Machiavelli. Rather, I intend to show him in a
different light, contrary to how he is usually portrayed in our discipline,
and thereby to broaden the perspective of understanding him as an international
theorist. Finally, we must realize that he does not fit into the modern
dualism of thinking the domestic here and the international there, that he
thinks beyond the welfare and interest of a single (his) state only, and that
his thoughts are well informed by international principles which are valid,
if not always empirically, then normatively, for all states. There remains one
aspect to discuss which is important for domestic and international politics
likewise: conflict. Machiavelli is aware of the (potentially and factually)
conflictive behaviour of states, and it is in order of their stability, not for
some power maximization (or expansion, or glory) per se that states have to
deal and to cope successfully with political conflicts.93
However, Machiavelli
accepts the reality of political conflict and does not try to project an order
in which conflicts are eliminated. On the contrary, he perceives conflict
as a stimulating and 'creative momentum' of politics (Crick, 2003, p. 36).
He thus does not believe in any eternal or divine harmonic order of the
world and its political and social affairs (as, for instance, in Augustine and
Aquinas). He discharges medieval political metaphysics in the most sustainable
way. He formulates a concept which displays conflict not as some
decline and disassociation from order, but as a genuine pattern of the world
and within the sociopolitical order. Conflict is nothing bad which has to be
overcome. It is a pattern with which politics has to deal and which has to be
civilized, ciannot be abolished, and, after all, should not be abolished. This
is true for domestic and international politics, and in international politics,
it is the projection of a regional republican order which would best suit the
challenge to civilize conflict.
A further aspect, fundamental to Machiavelli's conception of politics,
comes into play when we consider why conflict should not be abolished.
Recapitulating Machiavelli's idea of a republican international order in
combination with his perception of political conflict, we see that such an
international order best suits the challenge to civilize international conflict
and therefore is the order which provides the most stability. Consequently,
a successful conduct of international politics requires distinct capabilities
from statesmen as much as the conduct of domestic politics does. We can
hence apply Machiavelli's concept of virtu to international politics. From a
theory of action-perspective, virtti represents for Machiavelli a guideline and
normative requirement for a league (or confederation) made up of republics
as the best international order possible.
But what is the meaning of virtu? To put it simply, a basic meaning of virtu
is the capacity 'to do the job well'. It can be compared with Aristotle's techne
(art; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1139b, 5-17), which has a practical goal
beyond mere knowledge. There is a medical art, which aims at healing the
patient; there is the art of an architect to build a house; there is the art of a
musician to play the flute; there is the art of a carpenter to construct chairs
and tables and so on. In this meaning, 'art' combines knowledge with practical
wisdom aiming at a certain goal (telos). Pursuing the art of one's profession
with great excellence and realizing the goal of the related action (e.g.,
the doctor heals the patient, the musician plays the flute well, the carpenter
constructs a nice chair) entitles the person who acts with virtue. There is a
virtue of a doctor, a carpenter, a musician, and so on. The highest form of
art in Aristotle is the techne politica, the art of politics (Nicomachean Ethics,
1094a, 21-24), which aims at the realization of the 'good life' for individuals
and tranquillity for the political community (eudamonia as the virtue of
politics; 1097b, 12-34).
Construing Machiavelli's virtit from this perspective, we can concretize
his talk about the virtu of a general, for instance, who successfully controls
his troops and achieves glory for his country through successful battles
(see, e.g., The Discourses, 111.12, 18); or about the virtu of a doctor (one of
Machiavelli's favourite examples) who heals his patients and contributes to
their well-being. What does this imply for a republic and for international
politics pursued in a republican international confederation? In political
terms, virtue means a 'civic spirit' (Crick, 2003, p. 46), which is necessary
because a republic's good order and tranquillity depend on citizens'
readiness to subordinate their own interests to that of the common good.
Machiavelli says, both in The Discourses and the Prince, a city which rests
upon the virtu of its citizens is the most difficult to seize by a foreign army,
and its stability enables it to resist domestic disorder and decline.
But how to create virtu in a city and in a republican international confederation?
At this point, Machiavelli's esteem of political conflict has to be
reconsidered. In his architecture of the political, conflict is the momentum
which keeps politics alive, it is the immediate matter of politics, and it prevents
stagnation. Finally, conflict is the rationale behind the 'come and go'
of cities, empires, and leagues. Because conflict is, however, the very nature
of politics, the art of politics and political virtue develop through dealing
with conflicts and trying to civilize them. This is a radical discharge of
114 A History of International Political Theory Universalistic Frameworks 115
the ancient and medieval imagination that political virtue becomes manifest
in acting in accordance with harmony and a divine order of concord.
Machiavelli topples that picture upside-down, saying that it is exactly the
opposite, namely, the management and civilization of conflict which create
and generate political virtue, and the capability of doing so characterizes a
great politician and a tranquil political community. And because conflict is
permanent, this kind of political virtue isalways required. If, so we can conclude,
conflict would be eliminated (which is, moreover, impossible), then
the development of virtu would stagnate, a community would become complacent,
and the attitude of political leaders would degenerate into hubris.
We hence can conclude that virtu always implies political ethics. This is an
ethics which is not gained from imaginations of acting according to some
eternal 'good order' or harmonic cosmic or divine law, but rather an ethics
which stems from the idea that political conflicts have to be dealt with and
civilized. It is thus an inner-worldly ethics,94
arising from the practical and
purely political knowledge of what to do strategically in the right moment
in order to cope with conflictive circumstances. However, the goal of acting
ethically in this sense is not glory or power or something similar per
se, but - and here again we encounter 'the normative' in Machiavelli - the
realization of republican order. And a republican order is one in which the
civic spirit is most developed and which, due to the existence of civic spirit,
is most difficult to destroy; it best resists instabilities as well as the cycle of
rise and decline. We can conclude that there exists a genuine fourfold relation
in Machiavelli between the art of politics, virtu (or civic spirit), republican
order, and stability. When we apply this picture to the international
sphere, we learn that virtue in international politics never exists in a policy
which tries to eliminate conflict by oppressing others directly because this
would represent a 'useless method' {The Discourses, II.4; pp. 283-5). It is also
difficult to form hegemonic and imperial alliances 'in which you reserve
to yourself the headship, the seat in which the central authority resides,
and the right of initiative' (p. 284), a method which the Romans applied
but which appears historically unique. From this point of view, a league of
republics consequently appears to be the best and most appropriate method
because it is governed by 'a council', which has to arrive 'at any common
decision'(p. 286) and which symbolizes the institutional body for dealing
with and' managing conflicts among its members. Again, conflict is being
seen as a positive motivator which requires a certain virtue.
According to Machiavelli, probably the most important 'art of civilizing
conflict' in international politics is diplomacy. The conduct of diplomatic
relations contributes to the creation of trust and confidence among states,
and it is the most effective means of moderating conflict through direct and
personal political communication. Machiavelli is regarded the 'founder of
modern diplomacy' because he invented the idea and practice of continuing
diplomatic relations with neighbour states by permanent ambassadors and
embassies, a practice which replaced the then-usual practice of individual and
temporary delegations when required for immediate conflict settlement.
It may overinterpret this picture arguing that Machiavelli perceives such
a league of republics as a means for peace in international politics. However,
we see that Machiavelli has a (normative) outlook on international politics
which is based on the idea of cooperation and an inner-worldly ethics oriented
towards the stabilization of a republican regional order. The rationale
behind such a mode of cooperation is a notion of conflict, which is a
constant in politics and cannot be abolished but has to be dealt with and
to be civilized. Conflict, however, as history teaches, is also played out
from time to time through war. In wartime, yet another virtu is required,
namely, the virtue of a general and perhaps a prince, so that the state might
last through the politics of hardship and not perish too quickly before the
historical cycle of decline and fortune (fortuna) will eventually extinguish
even a successful and powerful state. However, a state based upon 'wellordered'
virtue will last longer because fortune, like a river, 'turns her impetus
towards where she knows no dikes and dams have been constructed
to hold her in' (for this metaphor see The Prince, chapter XXV; here p. 84).
Furthermore, the perception of a cycle of the rise and fall of powers teaches
not only prudence, but also 'moderation' as a matter of political virtue
and as a 'moral lesson' in foreign politics. According to this teaching, even
a powerful and successful state should act with 'responsible moderation'
and not challenge the mighty powers of fortuna (see Mansfield, 1981). We
have seen that construing Machiavelli as a 'realist' whose thinking would
lack normative perspectives on cooperative international politics and who
would not know about common ethical principles bridging states and enabling
them to consider jointly their common matters appears to be not
only incorrect, but also an instrumentalization of his notion of conflict as
if he would promote and approve of bellicose, malicious politics. We thus
can learn about a very different Machiavelli compared to the image we are
used to understand as Machiavellism.
2. Thomas Hobbes
The references in International Politics/IR to Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679)
as a 'realist' are endless.95
And indeed, it is very difficult and challenging
to argue against this image and to demonstrate arguments which allude
to a political, if not ethical, self-constraint in Hobbes. The 'realist' picture
consolidated in our discipline performs predominantly as 'the liberal' script
of modern political thinking. And of course, we all know paragraphs which
seem to leave no room for interpretation, such as the following:
I show that... the condition of men outside civil society (the condition
one may call the state of nature) is no other than a war of all men against
116 A History of International Political Theory Universalistic Frameworks 117
all men; and in that war all men have right to all things...All men, by
necessity of their nature, want to get out of that miserable and hateful
state, as soon as they recognize its misery. But they can only do so by
entering into agreements to give up their right to all things. (Hobbes,
1968, pp. 11-12)
Applied to the sphere of international politics,96
this paragraph seems
to serve the projection of anarchy perfectly, although Hobbes's statement
does not refer to the international realm, rather to the state of human life
before individual men enter into a social contract. In the Leviathan (Part II,
chapter 30) we read:
Concerning the Offices of one Soveraign to another, which are comprehended
in that Law, which is commonly called the Law of Nations, I need
not say any thing in this place; because the Law of Nations, and the Law
of Nature, is the same thing. And every Soveraign hath the same Right,
in procuring the savety of his People, that any particular man can have,
in procuring the savety of his own Body. And the same Law, that dictateth
to men that have no Civil Government, what they ought to do, and
what to avoyd in regard of one another, dictateth the same to Commonwealths,
that is to the Consciences of Soveraign Princes, and Soveraign
Assemblies; there is no Court of Natural Justice, but in the Conscience ?
only; where not Man, but God raigneth. (Hobbes, 1968, p. 394)
Following these statements, two options appear to exist for international
order only. One option seems to be the natural state where all states fight
each other, and anarchy would prevail due to the lack of international
law (or Law of Nations, as Hobbes says). The other option would be the
erection of a world-state Leviathan which would, on the basis of his sovereignty
superior to single nations, govern the single states like the 'domestic'
Leviathan is supposed to govern its people: namely, with strict laws, ;
according to his definition of 'justice' and 'injustice', with the power of the <
sword, and the submission of the individual units.97
The benefit for single
nations - comparable to individuals in the state - would be the provision of
'safety' by which 'is not meant a bare Preservation [of life], but also all other ;
Contentments of life, which every man by lawfull Industry, without danger,
or hurt to the Commonwealth, shall acquire to himselfe (Leviathan, Part II,
chapter 30; p. 376). However, as Hobbes posits very concisely in A Dialogue
between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England, 'there is
no Common Power in this World to punish injustice: mutual fear may keep
them [states] apart for a time, but upon every visible advantage they will
invade one another' (1971, p. 57). It is probably due to these paragraphs that
Hobbes is univocally called a 'realist' and his approach is called an 'empirical
realism' (e.g., Boucher, 1998).
jBT,
However, we have to ask whether these views do justice to Hobbes's philosophical
outlook and what conclusion we can draw from Hobbes for international
politics. Can we find indications for a third and, compared to the
well-established views in International Politics/IR, more appropriate option
for interpreting Hobbes based on a deeper philosophical understanding of
his writings?
The following interpretations assume that the central points for understanding
Hobbesian international politics can be seen neither in the 'problem'
whether, or not, the notion of individual behaviour applies to state
behaviour nor, if we suppose it does apply, in the understanding whether,
or not, international politics would be characterized by permanent war, due
the lack of an international sovereign.98
1 rather argue that, for understanding
Hobbes, the question whether states act like individuals and the question
of a world-state Leviathan are completely irrelevant. They are irrelevant
because, although an international sovereign obviously does not exist, a
mechanism operates in international politics which functions totally independent
both from (the erection of) international sovereignty and from a
possible analogy between individuals and states. This mechanism relates
to Hobbes's construction of a relation between sovereignty, legitimacy, and
security which powerfully reaches from domestic politics into the international
realm and which establishes a common (and, apart from defensive
wars, pacifying) regulative reference for all sovereigns in their conduct of
foreign policy.
The difficulty with Hobbes's outlook on international politics is to be
found in the circumstance that he seems to be primarily interested not in
international but in domestic politics. We thus find just a few paragraphs
in his oeuvre where he is explicitly considering interstate relations. There is
nothing, however, that prevents us from investigating Hobbes's contribution
to international politics further or, as David Gauthier puts it: 'The elements
of my presentation are all to be found in Hobbes, but what I shall present
is the theory he never gave' (Gauthier, 1979, p. 548). Such investigation
into the consequences and deeper meaning of his thoughts has to analyze
the notions of conscience, rationality, fear, legitimacy, and law of nature,
and will reveal that the legitimacy of the sovereign is not unconditioned.
It rather rests on his fulfilment of the mutual obligations derived from the
social contract which is conceptualized as an equally binding agreement
between the people and the sovereign himself. Hence, he can loose his
legitimacy - a contingency which has far-reaching impact on international
politics and foreign policy.
The triangular relationship between conscience,
political rationality, and fear
Prior to the analysis of the relation between sovereignty, legitimacy, and
security, we have to consider Hobbes's outlook on international politiosn'aT-"-
118 A History ofInternational Political Theory
much wider context than relying on his direct statements on international
politics only. We therefore have to take into consideration his references
to conscience, political rationality, and fear. This triangular relationship
enables us to see Hobbes's thought on international politics in a different
way. Against the common understanding, Hobbes's theory is informed by a
counterbalance to unrestricted sovereignty of the Leviathan, which, at least
normatively, is mighty enough to discipline and regulate states' behaviour so
that the prevailing picture of international politics in Hobbes is not anarchy
and permanent war, but a political and ethical norm of self-constraint. This
counterbalance is not just an accidental aspect of his politico-philosophical
worldview, but lies very much at the heart of his system. We have to ask three
basic questions in relation to the function of conscience, political rationality,
and fear in his philosophical system in order to understand this counterbalance,
which qualifies the familiar statement and image of anarchy.
First, how do people or states, which are said to fight each other constantly
because they are being driven by their passions, achieve reasonable
judgment when they begin to understand that only the rendering of their
individual natural rights to a common sovereign power could overcome
their bellicose natural state? Second, where 'in man' is his ability for reasonable
judgment located? Is it a mere functional consequence of 'fear', is
it political rationality, or is it a capacity endowed by 'God'? And third, is
there a relation between domestic and international politics in Hobbes: If
yes, how does it affect the foreign policy of sovereigns? In discussing these
questions, I try to demonstrate that we find a political and ethical counterbalance
against the state of 'anarchy' and permanent war in Hobbesian
international politics. Consequently, we have to rethink the understanding
of Hobbes as a 'realist' and should renounce the perception of a 'realist' tradition
in international political thought which would last from Thucydides
over Machiavelli to Hobbes.
Conscience
In order to answer the first question, we have to examine the reason for
conflict. It seems to be a popular assumption in International Politics/IR
that fear, implanted naturally in human beings, is the reason for conflict
and war. However, not fear seems to be the real reason for the 'war of all
men against all men',99
but fear is only the psychological dimension accompanying,
and itself being caused by, the fight over conflicts. The reasons of
conflicts in politics are to be found foremost in religious and metaphysical
worldviews solidified into ideologies. Hobbes himself experienced such conflicts
in his lifetime, encountering the religious and civil wars in England (a
period which can be dated from 1580 to 1680), which prompted him to flee
England for France and back again. In relation to traditional metaphysics,
Hobbes has mainly the political philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero
in mind, which would be based on speculations instead of reason and logic
Universalistic Frameworks 119
and thus seduce the people. Traditions of 'naturall Philosophy' and religious
ideologists would be responsible for revolution, war, and conflict:
To conclude, there is nothing so absurd, that the old Philosophers (as
Cicero saith, who is one of them) have not some of them maintained.
And I believe that scarce any thing can be more absurdly said in naturall
Philosophy, than that which now is called Aristotle's Metaphysics; nor
more repugnant to Government, than much of that hee hath said in
his Politiques; nor more ignorantly, than a great part of his Ethiques...If
such Metaphysiques, and Physique as this, be not Vain Philosophy, there was
never any. (Leviathan, chapter 46; here, 1968, pp. 686-7, 696)
In the first dialogue of the Behemoth (written between 1665 and 1668),
Hobbes identifies the seduction of metaphysics and religion, combined with
human passion, as the evil of contemporary politics. He especially refers to
the unrest in the period between the 'Long Parliament' and the reestablishment
of the Stuart monarchy under Charles II (1660 to 1680). The most
important reasons of conflict are listed below:
The seducers were of divers sorts. One sort were ministers; ministers, as
they called themselves, of Christ; and sometimes, in their sermons to the
people, God's ambassadors; pretending to have a right from God to govern
every one his parish and their assembly the whole nation. Secondly,
there were a great number ...which notwithstanding that the Pope's
power in England... had been by Act of Parliament abolished, still retain a
belief that we ought to be governed by the Pope... Fourthly, there were an
exceeding great number of men of better sort, that had been so educated,
as that in their youth having read the books written by famous men of
the ancient Grecian and Roman commonwealths concerning their polity
and great actions; in which books the popular government was extolled
by the glorious name of liberty, and monarchy disgraced by the name of
tyranny ...Sixthly, there were a very great number that had either wasted
their fortunes, or thought them too mean for the good parts which they
thought were in themselves; and more there were, that had able bodies,
but saw no means how honestly to get their bread... These longed for war.
(Hobbes, 1969, pp. 2, 3)
I quoted this paragraph because it makes very clear that, in Hobbes's analysis
of unrest and (civil) war, fear plays a minor role and is not - neither
is human nature - said to be the reason of conflict. Instead, Hobbes offers
a range of politically and socially grounded reasons for civil conflicts. As
we know from the Leviathan and much more from De Cive, men are also
perceived as passion-driven and are instilled with an existential fear of violent
death ('metus mortis violentiae'). But as we learn from the above quoted
120 A History ofInternational Political Theory Universalistic Frameworks 121
paragraph, fear itself is caused by the possibility of being killed, by civil
unrest, and permanent insecurity. It is though far from being the genuine
cause of conflict. One element, which operates as an additional driving
force behind conflictive human behaviour is, however, passion. But passions
not only have a conflictive nature, they also perform as pacifying
forces, namely, they are 'that incline men to Peace' because of his 'Feare of
Death' and 'Desire... to commodious living' (Leviathan, chapter 13; p. 188).
However, there is no automatism, which translates fear (and passion) into
(reasonable) judgment of individuals when they eventually transfer their
rights to a sovereign power in order to achieve an ending of conflict, peace,
and political order. Passions and fear form initiating and energetic, but not
causal, forces. Such a force, to bring about a decisive turning point, is yet
required when men proceed from the state of natural conflict and war to the
institutionalization of a common sovereign as conceptualized in Hobbes by
the social contract.
In regard to the reason of conflict in Hobbes, the discussions of Richard
Ashcraft are very informative: 'Hobbes'... explanation of the civil war establishes
a relationship between class interests and ideology, or, in his terms,
the economic, political and religious meanings of faction' (1978, p. 44).
Ashcraft further argues that Hobbes's explanation of the English Revolution
offers the basic parameters within which his political philosophy - foremost
his analysis of conflict, its reasons, and means to overcome conflict - has
to be understood. Consequently, Ashcraft argues that Hobbes's Behemoth
(where Hobbes analyzes political conflict historically) and Leviathan (where
he develops his theory to discipline and overcome conflict) form a unit,
and the one could not be understood properly without the other. He quotes
from a letter which Hobbes wrote in August 1641 in which he maintains
that 'the cause of civil war in all places of Christendom' is traceable to religious
controversies which undermine the exercise of civil power (quoted in
Ashcraft, 1978, p. 33). The same point results from the debate between C. B.
Macpherson and D. J. C. Carmichael - initiated by Macpherson's book The
Political Theory about Possessive Individualism (1962) - about the influence
of class interests and bourgeois capitalism on social conflict. Although the
mutual criticism is quite harsh, there is nevertheless on common point in
Macpherson's and Carmichael's arguments, namely, that neither fear nor
human nature are the reasons of conflict, but conflicts are social and political
in nature (see Carmichael, 1983; Macpherson, 1983).
Thus, there must be something that finally enables men to dease engaging
in conflict and to progress to rational action and reasonable judgment. This
'something' must furthermore instil social trust and confidence into the
individuals and make them believe that the sovereign power to be erected
is of different character than anything else and all the other institutions
men are familiar with and that previously 'seduced' them. The sovereign
power to be established must be thought of - different from what people
mm
know from their 'state of nature' - as an institution which does not act for
its own profit and well-being but for the good of the people. (In De Homine,
chapter 11, Hobbes calls this good a 'common good' that all human beings
want and can share; here Hobbes, 1972.) The yet missing link is what Hobbes
calls 'reason' perceived as a kind of rational calculation and 'counting' (see
the quotes below as well Leviathan, chapter 5; pp. 110-18). But where does
this ability come from?
Political rationality
This 'missing link' is provided by the human ability to use reason and
to conclude reasonable judgment. Since reason is, according to Hobbes,
counting, subtraction, and addition, we have to ask what do men subtract
and add and consequently conclude to accomplish reasonable judgment?
Hobbes writes in the Leviathan (chapter 3), 'Prudence is a Praesumtion of the
Future, contracted from the Experience of the Past: So there is a Praesumtion
of things Past taken from other things (not future but) past also' (p. 98).
We therefore can determine that reasonable judgment is experienced-based,
and each conclusion by men is founded on the evidence of his past and
of what he knows from the past. But to what experience and logical operation
of the mind does Hobbes refer - especially under the paradox that this
experience is, on the one hand, the ground of people's judgment and, on
the other hand, the constituents of the same experience which must be left
behind in order to establish something completely new (namely, political
order and the Leviathan)?
Hobbes is referring to the addition of one distinct logical operation
grounded in experience-based evidences, evidences, which yet taught
nothing but fear, ruin, chaos, and men making war. Evidence-based judgment
is hence grounded in politically and socially taught (bad) experience.
But abstract reasoning, by 'addition' and 'subtraction', attaches the decisive
added value by one intellectual operation, which asks the following question:
if there is (and was) a predominant cause for substantial fear in the
past (namely, conflict and war), what has to be logically 'added' to this
experience in order to abolish the reason of fear? That is, what has to be
added to the experience of the past and 'links the past with the present'
(Ashcraft, 1978, p. 38) is - so reason teaches - another logical step (a kind of
'subtotal'100
), namely, the 'entering into agreements' by which people 'give
up their right to all things' (from the Preface of On the citizen). They thus
become disciplined for the future, renouncing their passion-driven aspirations
(of the past) to possess the belongings of, and to govern the lives of,
others while at the same time trusting the newly erected sovereign power and
finally trusting the operations and results of mathematical reason.101
In
so far, reasoning means, even if 'taken from past', a leap in being of human
life by becoming political, although reasoning has no insinuation about
the quality of the future besides the promises of logical reasoning itself.
122 A History of International Political Theory
This understanding of reason points to Hobbes's methodology of, and his
political confidence in, more geometricus. Walker thematizes this leap under
the rubrics of change and 'the historicity of the contract' (Walker, 1987,
p. 74). Perhaps Walker's argument that Hobbes intends to abandon time
entirely is overdone - because we could see the paramount relevanc e of
'experience' in Hobbes; nevertheless, he realizes very clearly that the 'geometrical
method, the appeal to reason, the artifice based on reason', and
finally 'his concern with order' (ibid.) constitute a completely new political
situation after the social contract has been agreed. This new situation
causes us to revise the Hobbesian outlook on international politics and 1o
finally realize that the analogy between the individuals' 'state of nature which
relates to the time before the social contract - and the principles
operating in international politics does not lead us any further. On the' L se
and End of Reason' Hobbes writes:
m
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rs-
111
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v
Universalistic Frameworks 123
contract and its erection of the sovereign body. Consequently, sovereignty
is fundamentally based on the sovereign's guarantee to prevent citizens
from further exposure to political conflict, fear of violent death, and insecurity.
As Hobbes very clearly states, the sovereign's legitimacy to exert
power over its citizens depends totally on its success guaranteeing safety
for its citizens. This guarantee constitutes the whole purpose of the social
contract. We read:
The Office of the Soveraign, (be it a Monarch, or an Assembly) consisteth
in the end, for which he was trusted with the Soveraign
Power, namely the procuration of the safety of the people. (Leviathan,
chapter 30; p. 376)
Or:
The Use and End of Reason, is not the finding of the summe, and truth ol
one, or a few consequences, remote from the first definitions, and settled
significations of names; but to begin at these; and proceed from one consequence
to another. For there can be no certainty of the last Conclusion,
without any certainty of all those Affirmations and Negations, on which
it was grounded. (Leviathan, chapter V; 1968, p. 112)
Passion seems to be excluded from this logic of 'Addition of parcels'
and 'Substraction of one summe from another' (ibid., p. 110) and appears
to be irrelevant in this kind of mathematically guided intellectual operation.
Applied to politics, the experience on which political judgment is
based is summed up and aggregated by what man 'hath seen by what
courses and degrees, a flourishing State hath first come into civil warre,
and then to ruine; upon the sights of the mine of any other State, will
guesse, the like warre, and the like courses have been there also' (ibid.,
p. 98). The experience of such ruin, chaos, and battle, and the addition
of such experience might trigger in men the fear to encounter the same
destiny, to suffer physical violence, and to be in permanent danger ot a
violent death. Experience, accompanied by fear, might convince men
eventually to use their capability of prudence and reasonable judgment
by adding these experiences and 'conceiving of the consequences' (ibid.,
p. 110). However, fear is far from being the causal reason of prudence
and judgment (as well as of conflict), rather it is a trigger, and judgment
is grounded in experience and made by an experience-based, logical
conclusion.
Experience of social conflict and war, evaluated by logical reasoning (or
prudence), and only accompanied by fear and passion, leads individuals
to political judgment in order to relinquish insecurity, ruin, and chaos.
This complex relationship is at the foundation of the Hobbesian social
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The Obligation, and Liberty of the Subject, is to be derived... from the End
of the Institution of Soveraingty; namely, the Peace of the Subjects within
themselves, and their Defence against a common enemy. (Leviathan,
chapter 21; p. 268)
We can therefore conclude a vital interdependency among sovereignty,
the legitimacy of the sovereign's power, and the provision of safety.
Fear
Security is the rationale of sovereignty and of the legitimacy of the sovereign's
power, institutionalized due to individuals' political (rational) judgment.
We have to understand security as a protection from domestic and
external threats and violence. Before entering into the agreement to erect a
common sovereign body, the social contract, men were living in permanent
fear and insecurity, but free. Now, under the conditions of the social contract,
men renounce their 'rights to everything' and are subordinate to the
sovereign. However, security, which is the initial rationale for the social
contract, also remains its lasting rationale. This means that
The Obligation of Subjects to the Sovereign, is understood to last as long,
and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect
them. For the right men have by Nature to protect themselves, when
none else can protect them, can by no Covenant be relinquished. The
Soveraignty is the Soule of the Common-wealth; which once departed
from the Body, the members doe no more receive their motion from it.
The end of Obedience is Protection. (Leviathan, chapter 21; 1968, p. 272)
Accordingly, the individuals regain their full right of nature under the
condition that the sovereign does not, or is not able to, guarantee their
124 A History ofInternational Political Theory Universalistic Frameworks 125
security any more. They then fall back into their original state of nature,
and every person is fully responsible and entitled to care for his or her
own life. The sovereign's legitimacy to exercise power then consequenth
comes to an end, too. The social contract and even the political itself dissolve
because the mutual obligation of the contract between the sovereign I
and the individuals depends on obedience as the people's contribution, f
on the one side, and on the sovereign's obligation to ensure their security,
on the other side. As Peter Steinberger notes, 'For Hobbes, the bonds ot 1
the commonwealth dissolve when it fails to achieve the ends for which
is was created...When the state fails to do what it was designed to do - I
when it threatens, rather than protects, the interests of the citizens - then I
the social contract, i.e., the original agreement...is annulled' (Steinberger,
2002, pp. 858-59). This mechanism is based on the unalienable 'Right of f
Nature' (ius naturale) which |
Is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe,
for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life,
and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own Judgement, and
Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto. (Leviatha.fi.
chapter 12; p. 189)
This 'Right of Nature' - that is, liberty - results in a 'Law of Nature' (lex
naturalis) - two categories which, according to D. J. C. Carmichael, are the |
'twin pillars of Hobbes' jurisprudence' (1990, p. 4) - which remains valid 1
even under the condition of the social contract.102
And if the sovereign |
breaks his obligation to ensure security for his subjects, and the lives of the f
individuals are threatened (again), the law of nature - derived from natu-f
ral, unalienable liberty to do everything to preserve one's own security - |
prevails over the political, sovereign law established by the social contract. 1
or, as Morton Kaplan notes, the 'laws of nature and the rights of nature \
apply to the actions of men, even after formation of the commonwealth...A 1
higher law does limit the sovereign' (Kaplan, 1956, pp. 390-1).103
Men then \
do not have to abide by the political law any more and can refer in their f
decisions and acts to the permanent validity of the law and right of nature \
And, even more, they are not only allowed to return to the presocietal and \
prepolitical state of nature, according to Hobbes, they are even prohibited \
(by the law of nature) to do anything which could harm one's life or contradicts
its conservation. This prohibition includes the observation of orders I
of the sovereign in the case that he risks his subjects' lives. It then appears I
to be an obligation by the law of nature to resist those orders; at least, the
subjects have a right to resist.
A Law of Nature... is a Precept, or generell Rule, found out by Reason, by
which man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or
f
taketh away means of preserving the same; and to omit, that, which he
thinketh it may be best preserved. (Leviathan, chapter 12; p. 189)
The subjects must abide, however, by the sovereign's orders when these
orders aim at, and do serve, their security. Hobbes qualifies the conditions
of the right for self-protection, on the one hand, and the duty to obedience,
on the other hand, quite clearly in chapter 21 of the Leviathan. He here
discusses, from an individual's point of view, both righteous conditions of
desertion and the duty to perform the obligations of a military draft (in the
case that they aim to, and are appropriate to, defend the people's security).
Hobbes trusts the individual to competently decide and judge whether, or
not, a policy enacted by the sovereign is appropriate to produce and to
preserve security.104
If an individual feels that a sovereign's policy or order
does not lead to security and endangers his personal life, Hobbes concedes
this individual a right to desert or to lay down his arms. Another case in
which surrender is legitimate is simply fear. The background, however, is
trie same: to secure one's security and prevent violent death.
No man is bound by the words themselves, either to kill himselfe, or any
other man; And consequently, that the Obligation a man may sometimes
have, upon the Command of the Sovereign to execute any dangerous, or
dishonourable Office, dependeth not on the word of our Submission; but
on the Intention; which is to be understood by the End thereof. When
therefore our refusall to obey, frustrates the End for which Soveraignty was
ordained; then there is no Liberty to refuse: otherwise there is... Upon this
ground, a man that is commanded as a soldier to fight against the enemy,
though his Soveraign have Right enough to punish his refusall with death,
may nevertheless in many cases refuse, without Injustice...And there is
allowance to be made for naturall timorousnesse...When armies fight,
there is one side, or both, a running away; yet when they did it not out of
trechery, but fear, they are not esteemed to do it unjustly, but dishonourably.
For the same reason, to avoid battell, is not Injustice, but Cowardise.
But ...when the Defence of the Common-wealth, requireth at once the
help of all that are able to bear Arms, every one is obliged; because otherwise
the Institution of the Common-wealth, which they have not the
purpose, or the courage to preserve, was in vain. (pp. 269-70)
A revised interpretation of Hobbesian international politics
What can we conclude from these arguments? My argument is that the
mechanism of sovereignty, legitimacy, and security also applies to, and operates
in, international politics. I am not alone with this proposition. In the
wide field of interpreting Hobbes's outlook on international politics, it is to
my knowledge, however, only Michael C. Williams who relates Hobbesian
international politics to the question of, and interconnectedness between,
126 A History of International Political Theory Universalistic Frameworks 127
sovereignty and legitimacy and endorses the argument of a 'relationship
between (the sovereign's) external relations and relations with its own citizens'
(Williams, 1996, p. 232).
Although Williams develops his argument differently- reading, to my view,
Hobbes too much as a 'constructivist' and neglecting, or at least relativizing,
thereby the fundamental and universal roles of reason and of the law(s) and
right(s) of nature - this circumstance does not detract from the coincidence
of our finding. To put it in Williams's words: 'While the sovereign ...has in
principle the right to act in any way it chooses, Hobbes argues that a correct \
understanding of politics will lead not only to obedient citizens but also to
prudential self-limitation of activity by a rational sovereign. The sovereign
will avoid actions that too obviously threaten the interests of the citizens
for fear that will lose their acceptance of its authority ...This places consider- ?
able limits...on state action both domestically and internationally. Since the
sovereign's authority...depends upon its ability to retain legitimacy in the
eyes of its citizens, the sovereign should always weigh the implications of its
actions on the lives and opinions of its citizens... In its external relations, the
same logic applies' (Williams, 1996, pp. 221-2).
My argument consists of three parts. Its first part stems from Hobbes's
universalistic outlooks, which are rooted in the nature of the social contract
itself. This construction claims validity not only for the contemporary
politics which Hobbes witnessed, but also for all political bodies and all ?
men. Second, the 'mechanism' of the social contract consequently applies i
to all sovereigns internationally and thus represents a regulative function
of foreign policy conduct, qualifying conditions and constraints of political i
legitimacy. And third, from this qualification we learn a Hobbesian univer- I
salistic norm for the conduct of (each sovereign's) foreign policies which i
contradicts 'realist' interpretations on three levels: There is a fundamental
relation between domestic and international politics which contradicts the
(neo-)realist notion of the state as an unitary actor (on this point, see also !
Williams, 1996, p. 223). There is also a self-constraining element in foreign ;
and international politics which sees the 'national interest' of a state in rela- \
tive terms. Finally, there is a notion which forbids offensive, preventive, and/
or hegemonic war, which is fought in order to create alliances or to amount>
the nation's security targeting potential threats, however, actually risks people's
life. The only war, which can be judged as a legitimate (just) war is
a war to defend the political 'commonwealth' from an immediate external
threat when otherwise the people's security could not be guaranteed. And
even here, if an enemy's army is overwhelmingly stronger, surrender and
submission to another sovereign for the purpose of saving one's life are
deemed by Hobbes not as illegitimate behaviour, but just as cowardice (see
the quotation above).
In general terms, we can determine that the mechanism of sovereignty,
legitimacy, and security constrains a sovereign from leading a war in which
he endangers his people's lives and security (besides a defensive war; see more
below). If the sovereign risks his people's lives unnecessarily, he is losing
his (domestically obtained) legitimacy. And because this risk and endangerment
are present in each war, and because this mechanism operates in each
state, we have a powerful norm in international politics which universally
regulates foreign politics. This Hobbesian norm should not be mistaken for
the conceptualization of an international sovereign who rules international
politics and governs over single states, but as a norm for interstate conduct.
This norm does not stem from international politics itself, but is derived
from the realm of domestic politics. Nevertheless, we clearly see that there
is no anarchy 'out there', no haphazardous state, and no unbridgeable dualism
between 'inside' and 'outside'. Rather, the domestic norm of legitimacy
reaches into the international sphere and teaches each sovereign to avoid
war on behalf of safeguarding his citizen's security. The only exception to
this general rule is a war of defence, which must necessarily be commanded
and fought so that the citizens will not be victims of a foreign army and be
violently killed due to another sovereign's orders.
The arguments developed by Hobbes resemble the definition of 'just' and
'unjust' war from Hugo Grotius (see Tooke, 1965): the only just war is a war
of defence, and the aim of war always must be peace. However, the threat
must be immediate, and a war which is waged preventively, anticipating
a future possible threat, or due to hegemonic aspirations, even if such a
war aims at finally pacifying state relations, is unconditionally unjust and
evil.1 0 5
Hobbes considers - in a passage in chapter 14 of the Leviathan which
is mostly ignored in interpreting his outlook - peace to be the general aim of
politics, which would correspond with the fundamental law of nature and
the general rule of reason. This rule of reason can legitimately be suspended
only in a case of defence when all means of warfare were allowed. We read:
And consequently it is a precept, or generell rule of Reason, That every
man, ought to endeavour Peace, as fane as he has hope of obtaining it; and
when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages
of Wane. The first branch of which Rule, containeth the first, and
Fundamentall Law of Nature; which is, to seek Peace, and follow it. The
second, the summe of the Right of Nature; which is, By all means we can,
defend our selves. (1968, p. 190; emphasis in the original)
We thus find two universalistic elements in Hobbes's thoughts on international
politics. First, the mechanism of sovereignty, security, and legitimacy
applies to all commonwealths and is an unconditioned, general
element of each political order (and social contract). Second, this mechanism,
which fundamentally qualifies war and warfare, is based on universal
reason with which all men are endowed and from which we can assume - as
we know from no restriction in Hobbes due to culture, development, or
128 A History ofInternational Political Theory Universalislic Frameworks 129
'civilization' - that it operates in every state. On the ground of both universalities,
we can further conclude a regulative momentum in international
politics. Although there is no sovereign beyond states, there exists a mechanism
in international politics which applies to all states. This mechanism
operates in interstate relations and ties together sovereigns' foreign policy
decisions by dictating, with the power of universal reason and the law of
nature, the same principle of an interdependent mechanism between sovereignty
and legitimacy upon them.
There is, however, one condition to make this mechanism work effectively,
namely, that all states have to be commonwealths based on the
identical principle of legitimacy. Additionally, all states must recognize the
permanent validity of the basic fundamental right of nature (which remains
valid even under the social contract) as well as of the general rule of reason.
The fundamental right of nature and universal reason guarantees two
things: first, that men have an unalienable right to protect and preserve
their life and second, that men and sovereigns should seek peace. In short,
all commonwealths have to be political bodies organized and operating
according to Hobbes's construction of the social contract so that the norm
of not waging wars, which unnecessarily puts citizens' lives at risk, can perform
internationally.
As mentioned above, the only wars, which do not expose men to inconsequential
risks and endanger their lives unnecessarily are wars to defend
one's commonwealth facing an immediate threat. These are likewise the
only wars which can be perceived as 'just' wars, because destruction and
occupation of the commonwealth by another sovereign would render
worthless the entire reason and rationale for why it has been erected,
namely, to provide security. It is not my intention to over-interpret Hobbes.
But because this interpretation causes us to revise our familiar picture of
Hobbes, one further consideration seems worthwhile: namely, answering
the questions whether the Hobbesian mechanism of sovereignty, legitimacy,
and security and the deriving norms of avoiding war (apart from
wars of defence) and seeking peace constitute two basic principles of what
we today call 'international society'? Although I do not want to elaborate
on this question, I think it is worth conceding that this mechanism creates
a political principle which can be common to all (or at least a group of)
states. This principle unifies states on the basis of their common acknowledgement
of each state's 'right of nature' (i.e., to procure for its security)
and the 'law of nature' (or 'general rule of reason', i.e., to seek peace). It creates
a shared norm of conducting peaceful relations in the primary sense
of avoiding war and in a subsequent meaning of producing cooperation,
concordance, and international institution building. 'Hobbes suggests', so
confirms Donald W. Hanson, 'that the true sovereign would recognize the
imprudence of an adventurous foreign policy' (Hanson, 1984, p. 349).
From this perspective, which supports the 'emphasis on rules and norms
in the constitution of "international society"' (Williams, 1996, p. 215),
Hobbes's principles can be understood as a precaution against international
despotism, hegemony, and the arbitrariness of sovereigns' foreign
policy; they create a 'pacifying dynamic' (Williams, 1996, p. 232) must,
however, be understood and seems to be endorsed, if not enabled, politically
by the verdicts of the Peace of Augsburg (1555) and the Treaties of
Westphalia (1648), the latter being agreed three years before the first publication
of Hobbes's Leviathan. Hobbes himself lifts these principles to
ethical standards and adds a second 'Law of Nature' to the first - which
stated that men must (and should) seek peace. His second law of nature
claims a mutual policy of concession, which reminds us of Kant's 'categorical
imperative' and the Gospel's 'golden rule', respectively. From the viewpoint
of international politics/lR orthodoxy, the assertion of an ethical
dimension in Hobbes might be the most controversial conclusion of my
interpretation. However, the consequences of the 'First and Second Law
of Nature' make clear statements which should not be ignored. 'The laws
of nature', Gauthier endorses, 'are the grounds at [which] point morality
enters Hobbes's account...Peace is a common instrumental good, since
it is a necessary means to each man's chief good, his own preservation.
Reason is instrumental, but the laws of nature, which prescribe the means
of peace, are addressed equally to each man's reason, and so are rational
for all' (1979, pp. 551, 553).
An ethical interpretation on these 'laws of nature' is also presented by
Jean Hampton who concludes the assertion of a norm of 'cooperative forms
of behaviour [which] effect peace and peace in turn helps to effect longer
life' (Hampton, 1992, p. 337). It thus seems consequent that Hobbes, in the
Leviathan, chapter 15, writes that 'all men agree on this, that Peace is Good,
and therefore also the way, or means of Peace, which (as I have shewed
before) are Justice, Gratitude, Modesty, Equity, Mercy, & the rest of the Laws of
Nature' (Hobbes, 1968, p. 216; emphasis in the original).106
Finally Hobbes
notes:
From (the) Fundamentall Law of Nature, by which men are commanded
to endeavour Peace, is derived this second Law; That a man be willing,
when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, and defence...himselfe
he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented
with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men
against himselfe...For as long as every man holdeth this Right, of doing
any thing he liketh; so long are all men in the condition of Warre... This
is that Law of the Gospell; Whatsoever you require that others should do to
you, that do ye to them. (Leviathan, chapter 14; p. 190; emphasis in the
original)
130 A History of International Political Theory Universalistic Frameworks 131
3. Immanuel Kant
In this chapter, I will focus on Immanuel Kant's On Perpetual Peace, which
will be identified as the last work in the history of political thought which
adheres to, and at the same time enables, universal/universalistic thinking of
an international order. Its appearance in 1795107
sharply marks the shift from
universalism to particularism, which evolved around the end of the eighteenth
century to the beginning of the nineteenth century. Just two decades
later, particularism found a seminally important originator of nationalized
and particularized inter-national thought in Hegel (see Chapter III.l). Kant is
writing explicitly about peace, and thus there is a twofold coincidence of his
On Perpetual Peace according to the interpretations undertaken here. On the
one side, we learn about his ideas on peace and how he thinks international
peace can be possible: it is not just 'some' peace, but an eternal peace. On the
other hand, it is exactly this work which best reveals his ideas on political
universalism in a practical sense. Kant's definition of peace already points to
his universalistic concept of an international order insofar as this determination
is so fundamental that it necessarily requires some general grounding.
The first paragraph of the First Section of On Perpetual Peace contains Kant's
preliminary articles of a perpetual peace as well as his statement that 'no
conclusion of Peace shall be held to be valid as such, when it has been made
with the secret reservation of the material for a future War'.1 0 8
Kant thus specifies peace as a true peace which, in the first instance, is
different and has to be distinguished from a mere truce or 'suspension of
hostilities'. As he further explains in this paragraph, he deems this qualification
necessary because of his ambitious aim to talk about an eternal, or perpetual,
peace, and hence he would be remiss not to distinguish the objective
of such an undertaking from minor forms of 'peace' like a cease-fire, for
example. In practical concerns, such a peace would have to be characterized
by an entire abolishment of all standing armies, both because war will
always threaten as long as states maintain armies and because the expenses
for the maintenance of standing armies become 'in the long run even more
oppressive than a short war' (On Perpetual Peace, First Section, Third Article).
Such a peace furthermore includes real chances for the reconciliation of two
previously warring parties, what could best be accomplished by avoiding,
or having avoided, any 'dishonourable stratagems' during past wars. These
three major characteristics of an eternal peace - the definition of peace as
more than just a truce, but as something more fundamental; the idea that
armies must be abolished; and finally that war atrocities, or dishonourable
behaviour, must be avoided - are, according to Kant, 'valid without distinction
of circumstance' (On Perpetual Peace, First Section, Third Article). In this
absoluteness, they represent a 'right of humanity' (ibid.).
These short introductory notes on some of Kant's main practical imperatives
on peace reveal much about his conceptual approach to international
political order and indicate the trajectories of his further argument. His further
argument will be about universalistic determinations of rights, which
should govern the international relations between states, as well as about
the normative and ontological unit - which is mankind and cosmopolitan
society - at which international politics aims or should aim. Kant's principles
of right encompass humanity as a whole, and his vision of peace
hypothetically and normatively aims at an universal community of mankind,
governed, as we will see at the end of this chapter, by cosmopolitan
laws. This reference to an universally construed ontological unit not only
communicates from Kant's On Perpetual Peace, but can further be seen by
his addition of a fourth philosophical main question - 'What is man?' - in
his Anthropology (1974), supplementary to the three questions from his first
Critique (1982; see also Kant, 2004; 'What can I know?' 'What ought I do?'
'What may I hope?').109
The creation of peace: universal republican, legal, and ethical order
Both law as well as a universal foundation of international society are
necessary conditions for Kant's normative conception of peace to built
upon because peace 'is not the natural state' of the international order,
as Kant notes (On Perpetual Peace, Second Section, Introduction). This normative
conception should not be confused with what we usually tend to
understand as idealistic. Peace, Kant says, 'has to be established' (ibid.). It
is thus a creation of men, and Kant's intention is to demonstrate that an
eternal peace is possible. He also wants to elaborate on the conditions of
its possibility (Bedingung der Möglichkeit) as practical guidelines for international
politics. In other words, Kant's doctrine 'sets forth ...those obligations
which are the conditions of the achievement of peace among nations'
(Sacksteder, 1954, p. 853).
Because the establishment of a peaceful international order (in the 'true'
sense) is for Kant a moral obligation of politics and mankind, the question
is for the guiding principle on which such an establishment must, and can,
be based. The answer to that question points to Kant's essential reference to
law and to the elemental significance of internationally shared legal standards
among states. For that reason of mandatory provision, Kant titles the
section in which he states this credo 'The definite articles of a perpetual
peace between states', and he notes that only under conditions 'which are
regulated by Law' could peaceful state relations flourish (On Perpetual Peace,
Second Section, Introduction).
Such law, which is to guide and regulate the creation of peaceful international
order, has two sides: one domestic, and one international. Strictly
speaking, Kant discusses the domestic relation of international law only in
the First Definitive Article of the Second Section. To my mind, however, the
Second Definitive Article, in which Kant elaborates his famous idea about
an international federation, belongs to the domestic side of his treatment
132 A History ofInternational Political Theory &-
I
of law. Because such a 'federation of states' develops from, and only under «ftthe
condition of, a certain domestic order which is present in all states par- J;
ticipating in this federation, the federation itself incrementally depends on
the domestic side of law in each participating state. The international side of ^
law is then the issue of the Third Definitive Article, in which Kant posits a '*
cosmopolitan law of international hospitality. •*
Both sides and aspects of law are understood by Kant as universal (univer- £
salistic) concepts which promote the creation of an eternal peace. According
to Kant's philosophical differentiation between the concrete possibility (the •••
occurrence) of something and the condition of the possibility of something
(and of its occurrence, respectively; Bedingung der Möglichkeit), law, both its
domestic and its international side, does not create peace automatically. The %
application of laws does not automatically lead to peace; laws are, however,
the necessary and indispensable conditions for peace insofar as they make •{
an eternal peace principally possible at all. They provide, to take up Kant's ^
distinction again, not the concrete possibility of eternal peace but the condition
of the possibility of eternal peace. As such, laws symbolize Kant's refer- 7
ence to transcendental metaphysics, which is, theoretically speaking, to be ft
found as the Bedingung der Möglichkeit, and, practically speaking, manifests
in a certain pattern of domestic and international rule of law for conceptu- ^
alizing and potentially accomplishing international peace. (The ontological ^
unit of international politics for Kant is mankind; see below). p
The domestic side of law posits that 'the civil constitution in every State
shall be a republic' (On Perpetual Peace, Second Section, First Definitive a Article).
Kant writes that a republican order in all states 'includes the pro- |
spect of realizing the desired object: perpetual peace among the nations' &
(ibid.). In addition to this, he conceives republicanism - which would be the J §
only rightful fashion of domestic rule of law according to the imperatives £
of (pure) reason (see more on this below) - not only as the realization of the .>'.
universal principle in the realm of domestic politics, but also as universally
possible in all nations worldwide. The internationalization of republican- Jfism
is, to anticipate his next argument, the necessary condition on which |an
International Federation of Peoples can be based. A federation of this
kind would eventually make eternal peace possible. However, we have to #
delve into Kant's idea of republicanism in more detail, mainly because the £
equation of Kant's republicanism with democracy, as has became common #
in present-day IR, buries another misconception in our discipline (amongst
others, see Bruce Russet's writings on the idea of 'democratic peace'; Russett, >.
1974, 1993; see critically Williams, 1992). ?
In the First Definitive Article of the Second Section, Kant notes that
'the Republican Constitution is not to be confounded with the Democratic
Constitution' (italics in the original version). As this were 'commonly done, S
the following remarks must be made in order to guard against this con- %
fusion' (ibid.). Kant's distinction between republicanism and democracy
Universalistic Frameworks 133
relates democracy, as it was usually decried in his time, to an immediate,
nonrepresentative form of people's government. He also distinguishes a
republican form of government from a despotic form of government. The
decisive difference is then that in a republican form of government the
executive power is separate from the legislative power, whereas in a despotic
form of government both powers are represented in one institutional body.
Only a separation of powers that is both personal and institutional would,
according to Kant, guarantee the realization of the 'public will' (as distinct
from the 'private will'). So Kant avoids the term democracy completely as an
indication of preferred form of government because he associates this form
of government with despotism. Democracy would not be a representative
form of government, but the 'lawgiver in one and the same person may, at
the same time, be the executive administrator of his own Will' (On Perpetual
Peace, Second Section, First Definitive Article).
By this definition it becomes clear that Kant's understanding ofdemocracy
inherits the traditional way of thinking about republicanism and democracy,
which associated democracy with an unleashed public will and which
favoured, in order to conceptualize a free form of government 'based on
the consent of the governed' (the famous definition of James Madison in
FederalistPaper No. 10), the idea of republicanism. On the other hand, republicanism
understood this way was perceived as a form of government which
was realizable universally, without obstacles stemming from cultural and
religious contexts or differences.110
International Pacific Federation
This universal conceptualization becomes clear in the Second Definitive
Article, where Kant argues in favour of an 'international federation of the
people', based on republican national governments and assembling, at its
best, all republican nations worldwide ('would at last embrace all the Nations
on Earth'). Such a federation would enthrone 'reason' as the 'highest moral
law-giving power' and would condemn 'War as a mode of Right, and, on the
contrary, makes the state of Peace an immediate duty'. The international
federation of the people may also be called a 'Pacific Federation', which is
to be distinguished from a 'mere treaty or Compact of Peace in the latter
merely puts an end to one war whereas the former would seek to put an
end to all wars forever' (On Perpetual Peace, Second Section, First Definitive
Article).
In short, the universalism of the republican principle would bring and
guarantee peace not just in the form of a 'suspension of hostilities', but as an
'end of all hostilities' (we remember Kant's basic definition of peace from his
First Section, First Article). It is important to note that this federation is not
a world government or world state. Kant explicitly stresses that each nation
in this federation remains sovereign and free from external regulation of its
domestic affairs. A. C. Armstrong notes on this point that 'the federation
134 A History ofInternational Political Theory
does not seek any of the powers of a state' (1931, p. 203). Towards the end of
the Second Definitive Article, Kant clearly juxtaposes the idea of a 'Universal
Republic' and his idea of a 'Federation of the States'. A 'Federation', opposite
to an 'Universal Republic', will found in men a higher moral capacity based
on reason and free will and will operate as a universal legal power, which
is supposed to be based upon international treaties and international law
between states that retain their sovereignty and individual political and
legal personality. Kant writes:
This Federation will not aim at the acquisition of any of the political
powers of a State, but merely at the preservation and guarantee for itself,
and likewise for the other confederated States, of the liberty that is proper
to a State; and this would not require these States to subject themselves
for this purpose...to public laws and to coercion under them. The practicability
and objective realization of this idea of Federalism, inasmuch
as it has to spread itself over all States and thereby lead to Perpetual
Peace, may be easily shewn. (On Perpetual Peace, Second Section, Second
Definitive Article)
Both the universalism of a worldwide federation of republics and the idea
of the universal practicability of republicanism are interrelated with three
more universal principles which are normative prerequisites and necessary
conditions for a working peace system a la Kant: first, with universal reason,
which provides and imparts to men the capability of overcoming the distinction
of peoples into autonomous and divided nations (On Perpetual Peace,
First Supplement); second, with a universal commercial spirit, which drives
men to peaceful cooperation across their states in order to trade (ibid.); and
third, with men's natural right claiming universal and cosmopolitan hospitality
(On Perpetual Peace, Second Section, Third Definitive Article).
Possibly the most important underlying condition of Kant's 'Federation of
States' is the assumption of what Kant calls a 'pure practical reason'111
which
would be common to all human beings as an 'objective reality'. Therefore,
Kant posits that it can be 'realized in fact' (On Perpetual Peace, Appendix).
This reason operates not only as a moral lawgiver, but also provides a system
of 'unconditionally authoritative laws [in a legal sense] ...in accordance
with which we ought to act' (ibid.). This system of authoritative law prominently
manifests in the formal moral principle, which is known as Kant's
'categorical imperative': 'Act so that thou canst will that thy maxim shall
become a universal Law whatever may be its end' (ibid.). Applied to the
idea of a perpetual peace, this principle reads as follows: 'Seek ye first the
Kingdom of pure Practical Reason and itsrighteousness,and then will your
object, the benefit of Perpetual Peace, be added unto you' (ibid.). Williams
concludes from this that '(in) Kant's view, we must always ask the question
"What would the world be like if everyone acted this way?'" (Williams,
Universalistic Frameworks 135
1992, p. 108). The categorical imperative, as the foundation of Kant's moral
philosophy, thus is essential for his understanding of international politics.
What a difference this is to the maxim of international politics, which follows
Kant, immediately in Hegel, and which is guided and determined by
what can be termed the 'national interest'! This maxim in opposition to
Kant could be formulated alike: Act always and without restriction so that
it benefits the well-being of your own state and its people and measure your
means and strategies by that end (for further discussion, see Part III and
onwards). A further quotation from Kant might be useful to emphasize this
difference even more strongly: Perpetual peace and the rightful conduct of
international politics, he says,
Requires above all, an internal political constitution, arranged according
to pure principles of right [that is republicanism], and further, the union
of it with neighbouring or distant States, so as to attain a legal settlement
of their disputes by a constitution that would be analogous to a universal
State. This proposition just means that political maxims must not start
from the prosperity and happiness that are to be expected in each State
from following them, nor from the end which each of them makes the
object of its will as the highest empirical principle of politics; but they
must proceed from pure conception of the duty of Right or Justice, as an
obligatory principle given a priori"[this means as the condition of the possibility
of peace ('Bedingung der Möglichkeit')] by pure reason. And this
has to be held, whatever may be the physical consequences which follow
from adopting these political principles. (On Perpetual Peace, Appendix)
The second transcendental formula grounds Kant's conception of a perpetual
peace, based on an international federation of sovereign republics,
is the idea of an universal commercial spirit that is deeply embedded in
human nature and that is indispensable for a successful conduct of politics.
This spirit is, according to Kant, a power strong enough to prevent war insofar
as commercial interests and trade would be harmed by war and hence
would impact international politics in a pacifying way. War would destroy
the realization of commercial interests, and 'the power of money is the most
reliable', Kant writes, 'and thus the States find themselves dTiven to further
the noble interest of peace' (On Perpetual Peace, First Supplement). And last,
but not least, there is the concept of universal hospitality, which is an unconditioned
political necessity to make the concept of perpetual peace work.
Kant discusses the concept of universal hospitality in the Second Section,
Third Definitive Article. So at a very early stage in On Perpetual Peace he is
indicating the importance of this concept within his whole treatise.
Kant's concept of universal hospitality is being used in the debates about
global citizenship, which has become a frequent and popular topic in contemporary
global studies.112
However, it is not only the idea of universal
136 A History of International Political Theory Universalistic Frameworks 137
hospitality itself, which should be seen as topical, but also the founding idea
which stands behind it. Kant notes that a peaceful conduct of international
politics strongly depends on 'means for social intercourse' among the states
(On Perpetual Peace, Third Definitive Article). In current terms, this idea of a
social intercourse among states corresponds to what Raymond Aron called
'transnational society' (Aron, 1966). The similarity of both concepts can be
seen when Kant notes, that the
Social relations between the various Peoples of the world...have now
advanced everywhere so far that a violation of Right on one place of the
earth, is felt all over it. Hence the idea of a Cosmo-political Right of the
whole Human Race, is no phantastic or overstrained mode of representing
Right, but is a necessary completion of the unwritten Code which
carries national and international Right to a consummation in the Public
Right of Mankind. (On Perpetual Peace, Third Definitive Article)113
According to this conception, the surface of the earth would not belong
to a particular state or people, but to populate the earth is a right of nature
to all men. Therefore, Kant concludes, a universal hospitality should indiscriminately
grant a right of entering and visiting another state's territory.
This is not meant to be a guarantee for some form of permanent residence.
However, by itself, the right to visit would promote peaceful relations among
states and its peoples who would enter into mutual social bonds and communication
by mutual contacts. Together with the driving force of commercial
spirit and free trade among states, the cosmopolitical right of free
entry into another state would propel societal international relations which
in the long run would contribute to the abolishment of the danger that
states, being interlinked by trade and transnational social ties, would wage
war against each other.
Kant's conceptualization of universal hospitality, of the federation of
states, and of the moral duty to act in accordance with universal law (the
'categorical imperative') emphasizes the paramount relevance of his thinking
in constitutional and judicial terms. Consequently, just and peaceful
international politics depends upon a legal regulation (Verrechtlichung) of
states' and men's behaviour. Even if Kant endows men with the capability of
reason1
through which they are enabled to overcome the distinction of the
earth in different nations and peoples by conceiving and politically realizing
the imperatives of pure and practical reason, he does not completely
trust the good morality of men, but finally deems it necessary to refer back
to law as guarantors for peace and well-being in the international realm.
The 'Federation of States' will finally operate as an international treaty
system. Consequently, he notes towards the end of his treatise: 'Now, in
fact, both philanthropy and respect for the rights of men, are obligatory as
duties. But the former is only a conditional duty, the latter is unconditioned
and absolutely imperative' (On Perpetual Peace, Appendix; emphasis in the
original).
Kant's vision of international politics, which is still framed within the
j£. traditions of natural law and unalienable natural rights of the individual,
clearly marks the end of universal/universalistic thinking in international
political thought. 'The Kantian vision of a cosmopolitan world...sank
beneath the rising tide of nationalism, much of which, of course, was
driven onward by precisely the kind of imperial ambitions Kant himself
hoped would finally come to an end' (Padgen, 2003, p. 188). In order to
better understand this 'hope', we should briefly contrast Kant's On Perpetual
Peace with his Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View
(1784 [1963]). Although On Perpetual Peace is the more famous piece, we
nevertheless should take a look at his Idea for a Universal History because we
will note some interesting ambivalence with regard to his idea of cosmo"
politanism and humanity. This ambivalence relates to the question of how
^ best to prevent war and belligerent relations among states and whether a
A 'Federation of States' best promotes the conditions for the possibilities of
accomplishing (eternal) peace (as outlined in On Perpetual Peace) or if peace
were best guaranteed by a new authoritarian kind of world government
(as argued in the Idea for a Universal History). This ambivalence demonstrates
Kant's struggle to recognize the diversity and plurality of sovereign
states while, at the same time, he attempts to envision and to outline the
conditions of the possibilities for international pacification through the
integration of states in some common legal, political, and societal frameW
w
oxk based on universality. A closer look at this ambivalence may even
reveal some uncertainty and scepticism in Kant about the most appropri-
1
*1- ate and promising political, that is, practical, means for the realization of
cosmopolitanism (for further discussion on this, see Franke, 2001; Hoffe,
* 2006). He thus remains a true philosopher, one might say, in that he tries
to imagine and to elaborate the conditions of the possibilities - which per
definitionem are and have to be universal in character - which men can
have to create peace. His focus on, and elaboration of, the conditions of the
possibilities of (eternal) peace seems to be the reason why he titled his writing
on peace not just Perpetual Peace (Ewiger Friede), but ON Perpetual Peace
(Zum Ewigen Friederi) - and why the translation of the title as just 'Perpetual
Peace' is deficient in this sense.114
Consequently, he 'does not', as Barry
Hindness observes, 'present his universal history as an exercise in empirical
composition'; Kant would consequently not make an 'attempt to synthesise
what is known about the past and present conditions of the diverse sections
of humanity and to extrapolate the results into the future' (Hindness, The
< Very Idea of a Universal History, p. 3). His universalism and cosmopolitanism
are therefore not to be seen and simplified as a straightforward template
for some kind of liberal inter-national institutionalism (a la democratic
peace theory), but rather as a last example of a philosophical draft on the
138 A History of International Political Theory 4
conditions of the possibility of peaceful relations among mankind before
the advent of the nineteenth century and its oncoming force of nationalism.
Kant still tried to think of the international as integrated into some
common telos of universal mankind and humanity, and understanding his
attempt as a study of the conditions of the possibilities of such teleology
strictly forbids stigmatizing Kant as an 'idealist' or his On Perpetual Peace
as a work of 'idealism' in international political theory, opening up a dualism
between (such kind of) 'idealism' and 'realism'. The narratives in IR.
which construct this kind of opposition and dualism, appear to ignore or to
not understand the philosophically ambivalent character Kant's writings
on international politics, which acknowledge and even affirm the international
system of sovereign states. At the same time, they seek to establish
universal/universalistic ontological and epistemological principles and
linkages across states - a worldview and interest that Kant has in common
with all the authors discussed so far. However, this worldview comes to
an end and becomes lost with the advent of the authors and schools of
thought in International Political Theory/IR which we will discuss in the
remainder of this book.
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Part III
The Emergence of Particularism
in the Nineteenth and Twentieth
Centuries
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