LIPSKY, M.: Street-level Bureaucracy.Dilemmas of
the Indiviudal in Public Services.
str. 140-156 .
STREET-LEVEL
BUREAUCRACY / ' I
Dilemmas of the Individual
in Public Services
M I C H A E L L I P S K Y
Russell Sage Foundation
NEW YORK
*C H A P T E R 10
The Client-Processing
Mentality
The drill sergeant who irlsists that soldiers stand tall, keep their eyes
straight, and march in precision achieves results without knowing the state
of mind, predispositions, or previous military experience of the recruits. I-Ie
is untroubled by the needs of individuals and is at ease with mass processing.
Street-level bureaucrats are not so favored. Their work involves the built-in
contradiction that, while expected to exercise discretion in response to individuals
and individual cases, in practice they must process people in terms of
routine:, stereotypes, and other ~nechanismsthat facilitate work tasks..Workers
defend these patterns psychologically. They regard their adaptations
to the job not only as mechanisms to cope with resource limitations,
but dso as functional requirements of doing the job in the first place. Thus
what to critics seem to be co~np~oniisesolutions to resource constraints may,
from the worliers' pe~spectives,be desirable and necessary compo~ientsof
the work eiivironn~ent.To attack the routine is to appear to attack the structure.
Clients who cliallerige bureaucratic routines are taught this lesson
when administrators act to control them or respond defensively to questions
about agency procedures.
However, this does not entirely explain how workers cope or exhaust the
types of psycl~ologicaladaptations apparently required by these jobs. For
one thing, it does not explain how street-level bureaucrats rationalize the
'
discrepancy between service ideals and service provision. At Ieast two additional
perspectives on the psychology of street-level work must be considered
in accounting for street-level bureaucrats' persistence and relative job
satisfaction.
Iiilst, stl-eel-level burc:tiicra(s nioclil) tlieir objectives to m:~tcll better
their ability to perform. Second, they mentally discount tfieir clientele so as
to reduce the tension resulting from their inability to deal with citizens according
to ideal service models. In short, street-level bureaucrats develop .
conceptions of their jobs, and of clients, that reduce the strain bebeen ,
capabilities and goals, thereby making their jobs psychologically easigr to
manage.'
I
I
This is particularly significant because street-level bureaucrats' views of
their work, arld of clients, are matters of great public concern. Street-level
bureaucrats are ofien accused of being biased against particular racial or ethnic
groups or they are thought to be particularly cynical or unreliable in fillfillingobligations
toward pa~ticularsocial groups. The proposal that workers'
attitudes in large part are formed in response to their work setting contradicts
some popular views. Popular wisdom often identifies the source of
workers' attitudes toward clients and their jobs in prejudices acquired in upbringing
and social background. Such perspectives lead to recommendations
to hire better educated personnel or provide further education and training
in public and human relations.
All too often such perspectives fail to take account of-the influence of
street-level bureaucrats' work 011 their attitudes. It is apparent that streetlevel
bureaucrats change their attitudes from the time they are recruited to
the time when they begin to experience work problems. Differences in the
class backgrounds of recruits tend to disappear in training and trainee socialization.=
Furthermore, there is evidence that educational background, which
is closely related to class, is not an in~portantpredictor of the attitudes of
workers tvho experience extreme job stresses. In this connection, sociologist
Eliot Freidson has ~eviewedstudies relating doctors' educational background
lo perfol-mance and concludes: "There is some very persuasive evidence
that 'socidizalion' does not explain sorrle imp01tant elements of professional
performance half so well as does the organization of the immediate
work environ~nent.~
This is not to say that biases toward clients do not intrude in street-level
work. However, focusing on the social backgrounds or experiences of workers
will not yield a persuasive theory of bias in street-level bureaucracy.
Such a theory should account for the development and persistence of attitudes
as well as their direction.
Taking a different view, the origins of bias in st]-eet-level br~reaucracies
may be sought in the structure ofwork that requires coping responses to job
stress. Attitudiinal developments that redefine the nature o l the job, or the
nature of the clientele to be served, function in this way. Considering the
w
, , ' I\ I\\. I 1 " "
tile contellt ofcoping responses niay well lelfect the ltrevailing
biases of the society. TIre need fbr bi:ises may be I-00ted in tlre work structure,
but the expression of this need may take difrel-en1forms. Stereotyping
illus 11iay be tllouglit of as aforrrl of si~r~plificcttion.While sin~plificationsare
ni~entalshortcuts (of ~nanydifferent kinds) that summarize and come to stand
for more complex pl~el-romer~a,stereotypes are simplifications in whose validity
people strongly believe, and yet they are prejudicial and inaccurate
as summary characteristics for groups of people with nominally similar
attributes.
This aplx-oath to analyzing the client-processing mentality detaches the
existence of attitudes toward clients and jobs from the content of those attitudes.
It suggests that attitudinal dispositiolts will be rigid or flexible in large
nieasule according to the degree tliey help workers cope with job stresses.
On the other Iiand, it suggests that workers' attitudes and resulting betlavior
may be challenged and helped to change if: incentives and sanctions within
the structure of the job encourage change; the structure of the job is altered
to reduce workers' needs for coping mechanisms; it can be
shown that workers can cope successfully with job stresses without depending
upon undesirable simplifications; efforts are made to make simplifications
conform to actual job requirements rather than to unrelated biases.
These general guidelines al-egrounded in recognition that the persistence of
inappropriate attitudes is related to the work experience, and they can best
be helped to change by focusing attention on the requirements of work.
The following sections treat in greater detail the tendency of street-level
bureaucrats to cope withjob stresses by modifying their conceptions of work
and their conceptions of the clientele to be served. At the same time they
show the relationship between attitudinal coping responses and the patterns
of practice thal the attitudes support.
Mod~catio~tsof Conceptions of Work
TENSIONS BETWEEN CAPABILITIES AND OBJECTIVES
Withdrawal from work is one way that people respond to job stress. They
may withdraw in fact, or they may withdraw psychologically. At the extreme,
the tension between capabilities and objectives may be resolved by
242 8
cl~~iltirig.Or, i~r;rr~licil):ttio~~ol'tltis tclrsiort, ~~coldcInny rlt~clinclo apply Ibr
pul~lice ~ r r p l o y t ~ ~ e ~ ~ tin (11efirst place. ltleelistic yourig tencllers quit because
they cannot tolernle the pettiness of their sr~pervisorsor their inability to
teach as they woulrl like or were trained to teach. Zealous young attorneys
leave jobs as public lawyers ill despair over making an improvement in the
lives of their poor clients. In some ways tltese idealists are potentially the
most dedicated public employees. In other respects they are least suited to
do the work. In any event public agencies are left with a work force least
bothered by the discrepancies between what they are supposed to do'and
what they actually do. I
They and others who withdraw from the work force mute the extent to
which withdrawal behaviors are evident in street-level bureaucracies. Thus,
adaptive attitudes developed may be more moderate than would be the case
if those least able to cope had remained on the job.
Those who do not actually withdraw from the work force may withdraw
psychologically without actually quitting, rejecting persol~alresponsibility
for agency performance. The outward manifestation of these withdrawal orientations
we familiar to managers and people attentive to labor-management
relations: absenteeism, high turnover, goldbricking, slowdowns, and general
withdrawal from involvement. These reactions are all outward signs of attitudinal
responses to the sometimes ovenvhelming and insuperable difficulties
of gaining gratification in task processes-and achievement. At base are
psycl~ologicaldevelopments that function to help workers maintain a distance
from their failure or inability to realize the symbiotic goals of persond
gratification and task reali~ation.~
The problems of actual or psychol~gicaIwithdrawal from work are complicated
in street-level bureaucracies by several considerations. There are numerous
incentives outside the job context itself that operate to reduce :he
extent to which workers leave public service. Civil service systems protect
against arbitrary management decisions, but they also increase the costs of
firing workers or taking actions against them. In addition, workers accrue
rights by virtue of their tenure in public employment, providing powerful
incentives to remain in jobs despite low or declining job satisfaction. For example,
the light to retire after twenty ~ e a r iservice, or pension rights that
increase with tenure, encourage street-level bureaucrats to remain in jobs
despite the inherent p r e s s ~ r e s . ~
I Indeed, it is ~ossibleto argue that these and other conditions of public
employment, when combined with the dificulty of measuring job perfor!
mance, are powerful enough to reduce workers' contributions to agency
objectives to an absolute minimum once a degree of seniority lias been
i
t
143
acllieved. 'l'lte cy~tic:ilvicw is that l,r~l)licworkers Ii;~vt:vc:~-ylittlc i~rcc~~tivc
to perform. Iio\vever, while some street-level 1)ureaucratslnay retire on the
job, the vast xnajority continue to be reaso~lablydedicated to occupatioiial
objectives as tiley come to define
In addition to tlie usual material and psychological incentives opel-atiugon
the job, street-level bureaucrats often enter public service witli sonie interest
in client-oriented work, embrace professional orientations that call for altruistic
behavior toward clients, and continually interact with clieots, thus
regularly confronting client characteristics and concerns. Mgreover, streetlevel
bureaucrats do not abandon agency objectives entirely because the
discretionary nature of their jobs arid the organizational milieu in which they
work encourage them to develop private conceptions of the agency's objectives.
They strive to realize these n~oditiedobjectives and measure their dayto-day
achievements in terms of them. They rationalize ambiguities and contradictions
in objectives by developi~igtheir ow11conceptions of the puldic
service (wliicl~they Inay share witli otl~erworkers). 'Taking liliiitations in tlie
work as a fixed reality ratllei- than a problem with which to grapple, streetlevel
bnreaucl-ats forge a way to obtain job satisfaction and consistency between
aspirations and perceived capability.
Accepting liinitations as fixed rather than as problematic is significant for
two reasons. First, it discourages innovation and encoui-agesmediocrity. It is
one thing to say that resources are limited, another to say that tlie practices
arising from t~yingto cope with limited resources are optimal. Yet the teridency
to equate what exists witli what is best is strong when patterns of practice
must be defeiided psychologically to avoid confro~ltationswith work fail-
ures.
Second, as I ]lave argued, organizational patterns of practice in streetlevel
bureaucracies are the policies of the organization. Thus, workers' private
redefinition of agency ends result directly in accepting the means as
ends. Means may become elads in other organizations, but lower-level workers
rarely have as I T I U C ~influence on the drift in goals as in street-level bu-
reaucracies.
PFUVATE GOAL DEFINITIONS
As we have seen, individual workers develop procedures to allocate resources
efficiently. Some of these practices are approved or indulged by
their organizations, others are unsanctioned. Parallel developments occur in
conceptions of the work to be done. Just as organizations confronted with difficulties
in achieving objectives may retreat on objectives in order to obtain a
bcllcr fit I)ctwcen tllcil- cnp$tililies ar~t!g(~:rls,~so loo wor kcrs can ar~ddo
modify their conceptions of the job in order to close the psycliological gap
between capabilities and objectives. Thus judges may be oriented toward
punislilnent arid deterrence or corrections and rehabilitation. Teachers may
be oriented toward classroom control or toward cognitive and personality
development. Police officers drift toward concerns with order maintenance
or law enforceixlent.8 Possessing a simpler concept of the job than the obe
theoretically prevailing in reality, street-level bureaucrats are able to faslhon
an apparently more consistent approach to their work.
Street-level bureaucrats also impose personal conceptions of their jobs
when they make superior efforts for some clients, conceding that they cannot
extend themselves for all. At times this perspective results in favoritism
toward certain social groups, but it may also apply without group bias. A case
in point is the public defender who must select only a few cases to push to
trial, settling the others as best he or she can.gTeachers similarly rationalize
tlieir inability to pay close attention to all children by drawing special satisfaction
fiom the progress of children who do receive particular notice.
In these cases efficiency is still the norm and effective triage is again the
ideal. But the benefits gained from modifying goals to make them consistent
with serving a few, when not all can be served well, are not public benefits.
On the contrary they are enjoyed mostly by the workers (and presumably by
the clients who receive special attention). hforeover, tiley are not open to
popular judgment or normally available for policy analysis. The individual
street-level bureaucrat is not, in a sense, free to abandoll private conceptions
of the job without taking on still more of the tensions that go with it. Because
these personal conceptions are adaptive responses they tend to be helcl
rigidly and are not open for discussion.
The patterns of practice developed by individual workers often only make
sense in tlle private conception of the job held by the worker, while supervisors
and the public still expect allegiance to a more complex set of goals.
For example, a police officer who fails to make an arrest upon observing an
unlawful incident may strike an observer as negligent. But if the officer privately
understands his or her job to be one of maintaining order and corn~nunity
harmony, with law enforcement in the neighborhood a secondary matter,
this behavior may be acceptable accordillg to the officer's private
definition.
In the same way, a teacher who spends a great deal of time with a few
students will not consider fair any criticisln of this practice if he or she
defines the job as, at best, the provision of suficient attenti011to a select
group. 11 is d i l ~ ~ ~ l tto investigate conceptions of the job and trace their relationsIlip
to pel-foor-lilallce.Yet this r ~ ~ a ybe necessary if one would try to
reorielit street-level bureauclats in their work.
Private collceptions of tlie job have tlieir counterparts in olEcial policy. In
some cases agencies themselves solve workers' problerrls by inlposing a particular
orientation on the work. At other times, the adaptive defensive attitudes
of street-level bureaucrats toward their jobs are incorporated in the
service orientation of tlieir agencies although still ofTicially unsanctioned.
Thus the st311of some schools develop collective perspectives on their work
and some police departments develop a shared view of patrol practices, contrary
to the preferences of supervisors. Recruitment of like-minded people
to the service contributes to collective adaptation to bureaucratic stresses by
excluding staff members who would challenge work-force goal consensus.1°
SPECIALIZATION
Specialization of function in bureaucracy is usually treated as fostering efficiency,
permitting workers to cievelop skills and expertise and concentrate
attention on their work. For some analysts specialization is synonymous with
mod en^ bureaucracy." Specialization is frequently and increasingly characteristic
of street-level bureaucraclas. Welfare departments separate social
services froin eligibility determinations. Legal services agencies separate individual
client servicing from law reform units. Scl~oolsbreed educational
specialties.
Like other contributors to efficiency, specialization solves problems for
workers as well as for their organizations. In particular, specialization permits
street-level bureaucrats to reduce the strain that would otherwise complicate
tlieir work situation. A lawyer in a law reform unit need not balance
the demands of incessant case-load pressures, while his or her colleague who
has Iiigli case-load assignments is relieved from considering the larger issues
that clients' cases present. The social worker concerned with eligibility is relieved
of concerns for clients' social integration, while the income maintenance
worker need not worry whether clients receive undeserved support.
It is undot~btedlyappropriate for some workers to be trained in areas that
others are not trained in. Not every teacher, for example, need know French
or Hebrew or Chinese for schools to provide training in languages other than
English. But some specialization relieves other workers from developing
skills they should have. As I have suggested, community relations specialists
relieve others of responsibility for concern with treatment of minorities.
Special community advocates may function to relieve others of responsibility
for being advocates themselves. Even the case of iangu e specialization is
Q
not so obvious as it might first appear. For S I ~ O L I I ~not all teachers in some
city scllools k~lowSpanish to be able to converse with a large proportion of
their students? Why should the Spanish teachers and the teachers of Hispanic
background have responsibility for cornrnunicating with Spanishspeaking
stuclents? Specialization in this case relieves the other teachers of
an important complication in tlieir work lives.
t
Specialization permits street-level bureaucrats to avoid seeing their work
as a whole. Once specialized they are expected, and expect themselves::, to
,
pursue an agenda that calls for the deployment of a restricted set of(perh;ps
highly developed) skills toward the achievement of a result defined by those
sklls. Specialists tend to perceive the client and his or her prpble~nsin terms
of the nlethodologies and previously established processi&g categories that
their training dictates.12 Rare is the specialist who retains a comprehensive
conception of the client and the alternatives available for processing. In
some fields, such as special education, critics have advocated the trainillg of
general specialists capable of working with children with any lear~lingdisability
or physical or psychological behavior. (This confir~nsthe obvious:
teachers should be well trained for the job, and the base of practice and
theory from which they should operate has expanded significantly.)
Public institutions generally liave conflicting or an~biguotlsgoals for good
reason. They embrace ambiguity, contradictioas, and complexity because
tlle society is unable and unwilling to abandon certain fundamental aspirations
and expectations in providing public services. specialists nndoubtedly
bring important skills and orientations to organizations that cannot develop
them in their staff as a whole. Yet ~~ecializatio~iand task specificity should
be analyzed to discover those circumstances in which the costs of relieving
street-level bureaucrats from contradictions and ambiguities may be higher
than the benefits.
IDEOLOGY AND MILIEU
A ~ ~ o t h e rdimension of goal co~~solidationis provided by the occupational
or professional ideology that governs street-level burea~~cracies.Ideology
provides a framework in terms of which disparate bits of inlormatior1 are
stored, coml?rehended, and retrieved.13 In street-level bureaucracies
ideology also can serve as a way of disciplining god orientations when many
goals compete. When a school becomes an open clsssroo~nschool or reverts
to a traditional model the directors are saying so~netltingabout their
goals as well as their methods. The same is true in the case of correctional
facilities that assert the primacy of custody over tl-eat~nent .l4 By stressing
some objectives over others, admi~~irtrators solve the problem of
0 147
what kind of institution tiley will run. Thus hiring beco~riestliore ratiorlal I
because objectives are clearer, a i d e~rlployeeshave a clearer se~lseof w11at
they are expected to achieve.
In recent years considerable attention 11as been devoted to the trerid
towards "medicalization" of social problems. Advanced by physicians and
supported by a public anxious to think that there are "solutions" to behavioral
"problems," the medical mode1 has intruded into the worlds of education
and corrections, and other environments in wliicli human development
is at issue. This trend has been correctly understood as undermining the political
and social status of individuals, who, labeled "diseased" or "sick," are
expected by the society to accept others' definitions of their circunistances
and means for recovery. The significance for social control is substantial.
What in other times miglit be urrderstood as rebellious behavior may now be
processed as mere sickness, implying no indictment and certainly no cul-
I
pability on the part of social iristitutions tliat may have contributed to the
genesis of tlie behavior.
Why has the ~nedicalorientation become so promillent? The ir~fluenceof
Iphysicians and the high regard in which most people hold them surely pro-
;
vides part of the answer. But this does not fully explain the attraction of the
medical orientatio~~to say, educators, who in some respects have competing
professional perspectives.
IIA substantial addition to understanding tlie attraction of the medical mi- filieu in education, corrections, and other fields may be gained by recognizing
1the ways in whidi the introduction of a therapeutic milieu contributes to
simplifying the goal orientations of public service workers. It provides a
defense against personal responsibility of the worker by resting I-esponsi- !
!bility for clients in tlieir physical or psychological development. It provides a
theory of client beliavior to hell) explain the con~plexworld of the street- !
level bureaucrat. And it provides a clear statement of clients' problems in .
terms of wl~icliresponses can be formulated. The hegemony of the medical
model may be explained not only by the influence of physicians but also by
I
the way it helps street-level bureaucrats solve problems of goal cornl~Iexity.
iI
This is not to say that goal clarification and reconstructior~of work objec- :
tives have no value. Scliools tliat assert that reading is pri~naiymay be able i
to achieve results tliat elude schools with more diffuse goals. There are undoubtedly
physiological dimensions to devia~ltbehavior in some instances, \
although the pliarniacological cure is someti~nesworse tltari the disease. The i
:question is whether or not public institutions make their objectives and ori- 1
entations manifest and the costs of their choices clear, and whether or not it 1
is'appropriate to abaridon some goals or concentrate more 011 otllel-s. i
- - 1
-eet-levelbureaucrats so ope with their jobs by modirying
the scope of their authority. Ilnposing restrictions on the scope of
tl~cit.gowcrs frecs strcct-lcvcl l)ureaucr:its from pcrccivcd responsil~ilit>7for
outcornes arid reduces tile stlain between tcsoulces arrd obj-'ctivcs. -< -"..-,.
F-aW,, :"L-
13eliylngdiscretion is a common way to limit responsibility: 1Voikcrs seek " e i
to deny that they have-infiuence, are free to make decisions, or offer seavice , 3
alternatives. Strict adherence to rules, ancl refusals to make exceptior~s;rvllcn
exceptions might be made, provide workers with defenses against thc possibility
that they ,,might.' be able to act more as clicrits would wish. "Tllat's tltc
way things are, It's the law," and similar I-ationalizationsnot only protect
workers from client pressures, but also protect them from confronting their
own sliortcornings as participants in public service work.15 At (imps tliese asscltioi~sare
best understood as st~atcgicsto tlcllcct clients' clui~its.13ut at
other tin~esthey are best understood as rigidly held attitudes tliat partially
Ilave their origins in, and are bolsrercd by, distress over the gap Letwe
pectations and capability.
Agencies often impose rigidities on their workers. For exanlple, in the latc
19Gos, when tlie welfare rights movement begart to pressure welfal e wor k ~ r s
to make discretionary grants to large num1,ers of recipients, welfare dcpalt~nentsthroughout
the country eliminated discretionary special-grant awards
for furniture and other items. Tlius the departments removed from worker-.;
a discretionaly option. This circumscri11ed their power but also eliniii~aiccl
the tension between the workel-s' desires to help clients and tlieir need to
control disbursements.
Another way in which agencies help solve employees' role tc~lsionsis by
extensively promulgating rules specifying oficial procedures. F ~ o mihc
point of view of reducing role tensions it is less important tl~atrules an' nnt
necessarily followed tllan that they ale a\l:tilal)lc as autl~o~itati\icnlatcritrl5
witli which street-level bureaucrats ran iel~ovatejob conceptions to 1)cttrr fit
work realities. l.lius rules not only oltlcl wo~lcbut also fi~rtctionlo ttftlcr
workel-s' role co~tceptions.'~
Earlier diapters have focused attention ail sheet-lcvcl l,~rrcnucl:lls'cle\,e!opnient
ofwork routines to process clients anti O ~ ~ I P I T T I ~ F CI I ( ~ R ~tflrir 1-esl)onsibilities.
These I-outinesoften represertf morr t11;ln mere instruntcrits of ei,"**v*-r.----.
52 -r ficiency.
~tl-eet4~~&'.t1iitgafi~r-j.t'~itso- tleveiop ittachment~-to,rn~da~of.
prrtEtike. They appeal- to feel tliat theiril.-jqbsr e g ~ ~ i r etl?e xautines. In sotlle
street-level bureaucracies, loutitlcs of pr;lctice 1,ecornc SO (l0111ilt:lnt t!:itt
workers seek to negotiate the routines rntlier tI1:11110 oI>t:~il~tllv o l d ~ c l i v ~
wltich ~outineswere presurnal>lpclcvclopcc1.
-- - - ---- --- +.-- F11 - r; -
Legd services lawyers, for example, have been observed to discourage
clients fl-o~nraising questions and penalizirlg those who refuse to follow the
pererred procedures. similarly, weIfare workers have been observed to disfavor
clients who do not permit them to conduct interviews according to
stalldai-d forrnats.1" These and other examples of rigid adherence to procedure
suggest the significance for workers of pursuing means instead of
ends.
DEFENSES AGAINST BUREAUCRACY
Earlier chapters have also stressed the tenacity of street-level bureaucrats
in resisting efforts to limit their discretion. They may assert discretionary
dimensions of their job to a greater degree than called for in tlteoy in order
to salvage a semblance of proper client treatment as they define it. Typically,
they develop conceptions of their job that focus on good treatment of some
rather tIi<aninadequate treatment of all.
Most of the time escapes from bureaucracy tend to favor some kinds of
clients over others. (This teridency is discussed later in the treatment of
modifications of conceptions of clients.) Sometimes the escape from bureaucracy
appears simply as a refusal to accept the decision-making fornlulas of
the work. f l ~ esocial workers who started making home visits rather than
doing intake, because they felt that additional clients could not be well
served by the agency, illustrate this inclination.18
Another di~nensionof the escape from bureaucracy is suggested by streetlevel
bureaucrats who in client processing redefine their jobs by taking into
account the infbrn-ralbut likely consequences of their actions. Judges and
prosecutors, for example, often make charging and sentencing decisions
based on their expectations of the consequences of subjecting defendants to
the results of sentencing, although formally they are not supposed to consider
the quality ofcorrectional institutions in their deliberations. These tendencies
have earned solne judicial personnel considerable criticism for the
resulting leniency of tlieir approaches.lg Similar reconceptualizations of the
job were evident alnong the public housing personnel who, contrary to official
agency policy, took into account the consequences of placing some
favored applicants in undesirable housing projects, as previously discussed.
Is escape from bureaucracy desirable? Does it represent a tendency toward
responsiveness whose absence is too often deplored? Certainly to the
beneficiaries of these orientations it represents responsiveness. However,
the dilemmas of street-level bureaucracy remain unresolved. Workers who
ulidennine intake practices by favoring some clients deny minimal services
to those who fail to get entered on the agency rolls. Public housing appliI
<O e
o:illts wllo {lo 1101 t<:cri\r: t~c;it~i~c.l~l:u(. rlia:trlv;i~it;~~ctlI)~.c:tr~scIC.\Y~.I I)l;rcc-,
are avail;tble in tlie better projects. JutIges and prosecutors who rlevelop
private conceptions of proper considerations in charging and sentencing contribute
to defendarits' welfare as best they can, but they also skew the population
of the correctional institutions in ways responsive to their private conceptions
of appropriate sentencing. And to judge by the proliferation of
niandato~ysentencing legislation, they force the develbpment of inflexible policy
to restore the formal order. I-lowever one might sympathize with
coirr-tpersonnel who take discretionary actions in clients' interests, one can- ,
not conclude that they substantially resolve the dilemmas of confinjng the
scope of discretion and negating the consequences of rule-bound bureau-
cracy.
Modifications of Conceptions of C,lierits
Street-level bureaucrars are expected to treat all people in common circurnstances
alike. Paradoxically, many factors operate to make favoritism and unequal
treatment characteristic of modem bureaucracies. These factors include
the inherent subjectivity of required judgments, the difficulty of
assessing street-level bureaucrats' work, the inadequacy of feedback as an influence
on behavior, and ideological considerations that justify client differentiation.
These concerns have been treated in the previous three
chapters focusing on patterns of practice developecl to make jobs easier to
manage.
However, a discussion of the importance of practices resulting in client
differentiation would be incomplete without reference to the psychological
importance of client differentiations as a coping strategy. Client differentiation
is a significant aspect of street-level bureaucrats' rationalization of the
contradictio~lsin their work. It is not simply that street-level workers prefer
some clients over others. These preferences also make it possible to perform
flexibly and responsively with a limited segment of the clientele. Thus workers
do for some what they are unable to do for all. The street-level bureaucrat
salvagesfor a portion of the clientele a conceptio~~of his or her performance
relatively consistent with ideal conceptions of the job. Thus as the
work is experienced there is no dissonance between the job as it should be
done and the job as it is donefor a portion of the clientele. The worker knows
in a private sense that he or she is capable of doing the job well and can bet-
ter defend ag:ii~~stthe assnrtlts to t l ~ eego wllicl~tile structt~reof street-level
work normally delivers. Tlie teacher's pet is not ol~lyan obedient child but
also one wl~vcor~fi~nisto the t e a c l ~ e ~the teacher's own capability.
There is another important reason to consider street-level bureaucrats'
conceptual modificatioris of the clientele. Just as differentiation of clients
supports rationing and other practices of organizing work, it also supports
private ~nodificationsof conceptions of work. Conceptioris of the job imply
conceptions of the clie~itele.One cannot practice witliout an implicit model
of the people on who~none is practicing. An open classroo~ndemands a conception
of cliildre~~as requiring relatively greater freedom and flexibility
than are available in a traditional classroom. A psychiatrically oriented drug
center is founded on a different model of human motivatio~ltl~aria center
organized arou~ldpeer interaction and self-help.
Stl-eet-levcl bureaucrats wlio are unable to provide all clie~itswit11 their
best effol-ts develop conceptual ~necllanismsto divide up the client population
and rationalize the division. The diflkrentiation of clients discussed in
previous chapters tlius not only provides a rationale for allocating scarce
resources, but it also serves to help street-level bu1-eaucratsjustify their jobs
to themselves. 'Tlie frequency with u~liichstreet-level bureaucrats are observed
to divide u p tlie client world conceptually suggests the importance of
this dimension of work in sustaining street-level practice.
The psychological ilnportance of private reconceptions of the clientele can
be t~acedin tlie pl-i~rtatydivisions of the client world. For example, unsanctioned
distinctions between worthy arid unworthy clients narrow the range
of clients for who~nstreet-level bureaucrats iriust provide their best efforts.
Street-level bureaucrats often I-espond more favorably to clients who are
helpful or cooperative in their own treatment, or who appear to be particularly
responsive to help. Orienting services toward cooperative clients, or
clients wlio respond to treatment, allows street-level bureaucrats to believe
tliat they are optimizing their use of resources. At the same time these perceptions
help condone service denials (or even routine treatment) by permitting
the private judgment tliat some clients absorb more than their fair
share of resources.
Perhaps the most fa~niliarsyndrorne of private reconceptions of clients
concerns locating responsibility for client difficulties. Assumptions about
who or what is responsible for clients' situations are sig~iificaritconceptual instruments
by which street-level bureaucrats distance then~selvesfrom
clients. For example, tile tendency of helping professionals to b k ~ ~ t l - c - .,
tim, attributing the cause of clients' situatio~~sto the individuals the~nselves
E
~ j t l t o ~ ~ tco~~siderii~gthe role ofsocial arld c~~vironr~te~~talcontexts, locates respo~tsibilityin
a place that absolves the helper fron~
There are many exa~nplesof blanling tlie victim. CI~rot\icaliyuue~n~loyed
men are described as shiftless and unwilling to work when their situations
might be attributed to the structure of employment and previous job avail&
ability. Students' learningdifficultiesare explained by focusingon theirI lack of
motivation rather than on the skills of the teachers and the atmosphere of the
school. Blaming clients for failing to keep appointments protects street-level
bureaucrats from the possibility that prior interviews have discouraged or
alienated them. Instances of teachers beating children who clearly display
signs of mental disturbance provide particularly brutal ~llustratio~lsof the apparent
need of at least some street-level bureaucrats to attribute self-direction
to noncompliant clients.21 If the client is to blame, street-level bureaucrats
are shielded from having to confront their own failures or tlie failures of
the agencies for which they work.
An opposite but functionally equivalent mode of perceiving clients also
serves to absolve street-level bureaucrats from responsibility for service failures.
This is the tendency to take an entirely enviro~lrnental@f nf view
a i d perceive clients exclusively as the products of inadequate background
conriit~niiing.Thus if cjlildren are perceived as primitive, racially inferior, or--..-..- .
c-~z~lived, teachers can hardly fault tliernselves if their charges fail- .
to progress.22 Similarly, job training cou~lselorswho explain tailures by
clients' low motivation stemming from the discouragement experienced by- ghetto
youth can avoid dealing with their own failures to make tile program
nieaningful.
. Undeniably, there are cultural and social factors tliat affect client ~erformance,
just as there is a sense in which people are responsible lor their actions.
However, it is important to note that these explanations fi~nctiorias
cog~iitiveshields, reducing what responsibility and accountability may exist
in the role expectations of street-level bureaucrats. Moreover, because these
explanations of respo~isibilityare illegitilnate in terrns of formal agency policy,
they remain beneath the surface, unstated. Thus when they implicitly
form the basis for decisions about clients they contribute to misunderstanding
and to the resulting lrostility of cliests toward tie agencies acting
upon them.
Given the imbalance in power between clients and their ageocies, not all
clients will respo~ldwit11 hostility to decisions based on these ilnplicit assumptions.
Perhaps more c o ~ o m o ~ l l ~ ,clients accept the i~nplicitassomptio~ls
of responsibility; then these conceptual structc~rescontribute to client com-
l)linnoe with ilgclrcy lJulic)~.Cliel~tsnnily acce1)t re~1)oll~ibiii[y101-tllcir circumstances
witl~or~trefererlce to the enviro~~mentalconditions that they experience.
01-tlley lnay regal-d their situation as hopeless because tlieir
environment is so antagonistic to improvenient. Each attitudinal set works
against persom:~lmovement and g r o w t l ~ . ~ ~
This is not to say that orte can easily strike out for one explanation of responsibility
over anothet-. Strt~cturalexplanations of clients' circumstal~ces
are importa~itin order to direct attention to changing the political, economic,
and social structures that circumscribe and dictate the possibilities of
action. For ifenvironn~entalfactors do not prescribe Iife changes they certainly
structure the range of opportunities.
Similarly, in important respects clients to some degree must be responsible
for themselves. Witlior~tthis assrumption there can be no client growth
within tlie current structure of arrangements and no client contribution to
cllar~gingtltose arrangements, individually or collectively. Erving Coffinan's
insight into tile reintionship of client responsibility to absolving explanations,
developed in his stucly of prisons, mental hospitals, and other "total" iiistitutions,
has generally wider applicability.
Alt110t1gl1there is a psycl~iat~-icview of mental disorder ar~clan environmentalview of
crime and counten-evolr~lionalyactivity, both fi-eeing the ofender from moral resi~o~lsibilityfor
his olFe~~se,total institutionscan little afl'ord this particular kind of determinism.
Inmates n~ustbe caused to self-direct themselves in a manageable way,
and, forthis to be prolnoted, both desired and undesired conduct nu st be defined as
springing from the personal will and character of the individual inmate himself, and
defined as something he Iiimself can do soniethingabor1t.24
These views of social responsibility do not originate with street-level bureaucrats,
of course. But they are adopted and rigidly held by workers faced
wit11 the contradiction that they ought to be able to make a difference in
clients' lives, but commonly cannot. These views explain failure away, and
pernrit workers to develop more comfortable relations with the contradictions
in their work.
Not all street-level bureaucrats develop these attitudinal patterns. Conspicuously,
some public services develop different patterns of attribution of
client responsibilities from otl~ers,and variations can also be found within individual
public services.25 Tlie task of those interested in promoting the
quality of street-level bureaucracy is to help sustain the ambiguity in allocating
responsibility. It is undoubtedly an important measure of street-level bureaucratic
services that some workers find a way to keep in balance their
views of client responsibility and environmental causality and their own pote~ltialfor
intervention.
Stleet-lcvcl I,uscai~c~.ittsI~oldpriv:~teviews Il~i~tall'ect tl~ctlist~iI,t~tiorla ~ t d
quality 01-services, ant1 they Iiold tltese views intensely. 'I'lteil biases, when
tl~eycxist, are dillic~tltto interrupt. Why should tlris be so when street-level
bureaucrats, more than most people, have regular opportunities to disconfirm
stereotypes?
A partial possible explanation has already been suggested. First, segmentation
of the client pop~llationco~nplementswork practices that are themselves
compromises, and it also complements the resulting reconcep;ioris of
work objectives. In other words, patterns of practice, conceptions ofIthe job,' ,
and conceptions of tlie clients must fit together if street-level bureaucrats are ,
to resolve work contradictions successfully. Private coriceptions of the clientele
will be developed in proportion to the need to come to a private resolution
of the contradictioris in the work.
Secortd, conceptual modifications of the clientele tend to accept and build
upon general social attitudes, and thus are reinforced in evelyday life. Favoring
clients who are underdogs or discriminating against clierits considered
socially uriwortliy may partly be explained by the sympathies and antipathies
of the general society. Sociologist Howard Becker reports that
children may be n~orallyunacceptable to teachers in terms of values centered
around health and cleanliness, sex and aggression, ambitio~iand work,
and age-group relations. These considerations are particularly likely to be
salient when class discrepancies between teachers and pupils are significant.26
These responses to childrens' characteristics are not likely to be
unique to teachers. But when teachers do respond to children in these
terms, their responses have implications for public policy.
Other conceptions of clients appear to enhance feelings about job accon~plishmentseven
when they seem to run counter to prevailing social
norms. Consider the case of social service workers who woltld rather be assigned
to child abuse than to child neglect cases. Although child abuse is a
particularly unattractive crime the anomaly appars to be explained by the
greater likelihood that child abuse cases will respond to intervention, while
the typically passive child neglector is less likely to respond to social workers'
a s s i s t a n ~ e . ~ ~It would appear that clientele segmel~tationis usuaIIy consistent
with prevailing social norms, but it is not wholly explained by them.
Third, various aspects of the ways in which street-level bureaucrats receive
information about their work contribute to conceptual modifications of
tlie clientele. Illustrative validation, self-fulfilling rationalizations
that excuse failure, and selective retention of information tend to
confirm rather than disconfirm workers' attitudes about clients.
Finally, street-level bureaucrats work in a milieu in wliich their co-
P A T T E H N S O F P R A C T I C E @
workers have similar needs to segment the client population. Thus attitudes
Pr-ejudicial or Lel1efici:ll to certain clie~itsw e likely to reverler-.L te alllollg,
ratlier than be corltradicted by, other workers.
Street-level bureaucrats have a need to modify their conceptions of clien~s
quite apart fiom but usually consistent with the prejudices of the general society.
And they work in a structure that tends to confirm the validity of their
biases. The general argument of this section, based on observations that
street-level bureaucrats consistently introduce unsanctioned biases into
client processing, suggests that it would be difficult to eliminate client differentiation
without changing the structure of work for which these biases
are functional.
This is not to say that any particular bias is necessary to cope with the
work. No doubt classes of clients may be treated in markedly different ways
if administrators pay enough attention to specific behavior of workers. But
without cha~~gesill the work structure one ought to expect that biases will
soon develop in other areas, ,or that tlie old biases will soon emerge in new
forms in the absence of considerable vigilance.
P A R T IV.
I
J
I
THE FUTURE OF
STREET-LEVEL
BUREAUCRACY