

Sandra Buckley

Michael Hardt

Brian Massumi

THEORY OUT OF BOUNDS

- 20 **Means without End: Notes on Politics** — Giorgio Agamben
- 19 **The Invention of Modern Science** — Isabelle Stengers
- 18 **Methodology of the Oppressed** — Chela Sandoval
- 17 **Proust and Signs: The Complete Text** — Gilles Deleuze
- 16 **Deleuze: The Clamor of Being** — Alain Badiou
- 15 **Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern State** — Antonio Negri
- 14 **When Pain Strikes** — Bill Burns, Cathy Busby, and Kim Sawchuk, editors
- 13 **Critical Environments: Postmodern Theory and the Pragmatics of the "Outside"** — Cary Wolfe
- 12 **Metamorphoses of the Body** — José Gil
- 11 **The New Spinoza** — Warren Montag and Ted Stolze, editors
- 10 **Power and Invention: Situating Science** — Isabelle Stengers
- 9 **Arrow of Chaos: Romanticism and Postmodernity** — Ira Livingston
- 8 **Becoming-Woman** — Camilla Griggers
- 7 **A Potential Politics: Radical Thought in Italy**
Paolo Virno and Michael Hardt, editors
- 6 **Capital Times: Tales from the Conquest of Time** — Éric Alliez
- 5 **The Year of Passages** — Réda Bensmaïa
- 4 **Labor of Dionysus:
A Critique of the State-Form** — Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri
- 3 **Bad Aboriginal Art: Tradition,
Media, and Technological Horizons** — Eric Michaels
- 2 **The Cinematic Body** — Steven Shaviro
- 1 **The Coming Community** — Giorgio Agamben

**Means without End
Notes on Politics**

Giorgio Agamben

Translated by Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino

Theory out of Bounds — Volume 20



University of Minnesota Press

Minneapolis • London

Guy Debord
in memoriam

Copyright 2000 by the Regents of the University of Minnesota

Originally published in Italy as
Mezzi senza fine
copyright 1996 Bollati Boringhieri editore s.r.l.

All rights reserved.
No part of this publication may be
reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,
or transmitted,
in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying,
recording, or otherwise, without
the prior written permission of the publisher.

Published by the University of Minnesota Press
111 Third Avenue South, Suite 290
Minneapolis, MN 55401-2520
<http://www.upress.umn.edu>

Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA

Agamben, Giorgio, 1942-

[*Mezzi senza fine*. English]

Means without end : notes on politics / Giorgio Agamben ;
translated by Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino.

p. cm. — [Theory out of bounds ; v. 20]

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-8166-3035-6 (hc : alk. paper) — ISBN 0-8166-3036-4 (pb :
alk. paper)

I. Political science—Philosophy. I. Title. II. Series.

JA71.J37 2000

320'.01—dc21

00-008712

The University of Minnesota is an equal-opportunity educator and employer.

11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01 00 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents

Preface ix

PART I

Form-of-Life 3

Beyond Human Rights 15

What Is a People? 29

What Is a Camp? 37

PART II

Notes on Gesture 49

Languages and Peoples 63

**Marginal Notes on *Commentaries on the Society of
the Spectacle*** 73

The Face 91

PART III

Sovereign Police 103

Notes on Politics 109

In This Exile (Italian Diary, 1992-94) 121

Translators' Notes 143

Index 147

F O U R

What Is a Camp?

WHAT HAPPENED in the camps exceeds the juridical concept of crime to such an extent that the specific political-juridical structure within which those events took place has often been left simply unexamined. The camp is the place in which the most absolute *conditio inhumana* ever to appear on Earth was realized: this is ultimately all that counts for the victims as well as for posterity. Here I will deliberately set out in the opposite direction. Rather than deducing the definition of camp from the events that took place there, I will ask instead: *What is a camp? What is its political-juridical structure? How could such events have taken place there?* This will lead us to look at the camp not as a historical fact and an anomaly that—though admittedly still with us—belongs nonetheless to the past, but rather in some sense as the hidden matrix and *nomos* of the political space in which we still live.

Historians debate whether the first appearance of camps ought to be identified with the *campos de concentraciones* that were created in 1896 by the Spaniards in Cuba in order to repress the insurrection of that colony's population, or rather with the *concentration camps* into which the English herded the Boers at the beginning of the twentieth century. What matters here is that in both cases one is dealing with the extension to an entire civilian population of a state of exception linked to a colonial war. The camps, in other words, were not born out of ordinary law, and even less were they the product—as one might have believed—of a transformation and a development of prison law; rather, they were born out of the state of exception and martial law. This is even more evident in the case of the Nazi *Lager*, whose origin and juridical regime is well documented. It is well known that the juridical foundation of internment was not ordinary law but rather the *Schutzhaft* (literally, protective custody), which was a juridical institution of Prussian derivation that Nazi jurists sometimes considered a measure of preventive policing inasmuch as it enabled the “taking into custody” of individuals regardless of any relevant criminal behavior and exclusively in order to avoid threats to the security of the state. The origin of the *Schutzhaft*, however, resides in the Prussian law on the state of siege that was passed on June 4, 1851, and that was extended to the whole of Germany (with the exception of Bavaria) in 1871, as well as in the earlier Prussian law on the “protection of personal freedom”

(*Schutz der persönlichen Freiheit*) that was passed on February 12, 1850. Both these laws were applied widely during World War I.

One cannot overestimate the importance of this constitutive nexus between state of exception and concentration camp for a correct understanding of the nature of the camp. Ironically, the “protection” of freedom that is in question in the *Schutzhaft* is a protection against the suspension of the law that characterizes the state of emergency. What is new here is that this institution is dissolved by the state of exception on which it was founded and is allowed to continue to be in force under normal circumstances. *The camp is the space that opens up when the state of exception starts to become the rule.* In it, the state of exception, which was essentially a temporal suspension of the state of law, acquires a permanent spatial arrangement that, as such, remains constantly outside the normal state of law. When Himmler decided, in March 1933, on the occasion of the celebrations of Hitler's election to the chancellorship of the Reich, to create a “concentration camp for political prisoners” at Dachau, this camp was immediately entrusted to the SS and, thanks to the *Schutzhaft*, was placed outside the jurisdiction of criminal law as well as prison law, with which it neither then nor later ever had anything to do. Dachau, as well as the other camps that were soon added to it (Sachsenhausen, Buchenwald, Lichtenberg), remained virtually always operative: the number of inmates varied and during certain periods (in particular, be-

tween 1935 and 1937, before the deportation of the Jews began) it decreased to 7,500 people; the camp as such, however, had become a permanent reality in Germany.

One ought to reflect on the paradoxical status of the camp as space of exception: the camp is a piece of territory that is placed outside the normal juridical order; for all that, however, it is not simply an external space. According to the etymological meaning of the term *exception* (*ex-capere*), what is being excluded in the camp is *captured outside*, that is, it is included by virtue of its very exclusion. Thus, what is being captured under the rule of law is first of all the very state of exception. In other words, if sovereign power is founded on the ability to decide on the state of exception, the camp is the structure in which the state of exception is permanently realized. Hannah Arendt observed once that what comes to light in the camps is the principle that supports totalitarian domination and that common sense stubbornly refuses to admit to, namely, the principle according to which anything is possible. It is only because the camps constitute a space of exception—a space in which the law is completely suspended—that everything is truly possible in them. If one does not understand this particular political-juridical structure of the camps, whose vocation is precisely to realize permanently the exception, the incredible events that took place in them remain entirely unintelligible. The people who entered the camp moved about in a zone of indistinction between the outside and the inside, the exception and the rule, the licit

and the illicit, in which every juridical protection had disappeared; moreover, if they were Jews, they had already been deprived of citizenship rights by the Nuremberg Laws and were later completely denationalized at the moment of the “final solution.” *Inasmuch as its inhabitants have been stripped of every political status and reduced completely to naked life, the camp is also the most absolute biopolitical space that has ever been realized—a space in which power confronts nothing other than pure biological life without any mediation.* The camp is the paradigm itself of political space at the point in which politics becomes biopolitics and the *homo sacer* becomes indistinguishable from the citizen. The correct question regarding the horrors committed in the camps, therefore, is not the question that asks hypocritically how it could have been possible to commit such atrocious horrors against other human beings; it would be more honest, and above all more useful, to investigate carefully how—that is, thanks to what juridical procedures and political devices—human beings could have been so completely deprived of their rights and prerogatives to the point that committing any act toward them would no longer appear as a crime (at this point, in fact, truly anything had become possible).

If this is the case, if the essence of the camp consists in the materialization of the state of exception and in the consequent creation of a space for naked life as such, we will then have to admit to be facing a camp virtually every time that such a structure is created, regardless of the nature of the crimes committed in it and

regardless of the denomination and specific topography it might have. The soccer stadium in Bari in which the Italian police temporarily herded Albanian illegal immigrants in 1991 before sending them back to their country, the cycle-racing track in which the Vichy authorities rounded up the Jews before handing them over to the Germans, the refugee camp near the Spanish border where Antonio Machado died in 1939, as well as the *zones d'attente* in French international airports in which foreigners requesting refugee status are detained will all have to be considered camps. In all these cases, an apparently anodyne place (such as the Hotel Arcade near the Paris airport) delimits instead a space in which, for all intents and purposes, the normal rule of law is suspended and in which the fact that atrocities may or may not be committed does not depend on the law but rather on the civility and ethical sense of the police that act temporarily as sovereign. This is the case, for example, during the four days foreigners may be kept in the *zone d'attente* before the intervention of French judicial authorities. In this sense, even certain outskirts of the great postindustrial cities as well as the gated communities of the United States are beginning today to look like camps, in which naked life and political life, at least in determinate moments, enter a zone of absolute indeterminacy.

From this perspective, the birth of the camp in our time appears to be an event that marks in a decisive way the political space itself of modernity. This birth takes place when the political system of the modern nation-state —

founded on the functional nexus between a determinate localization (territory) and a determinate order (the state), which was mediated by automatic regulations for the inscription of life (birth or nation) — enters a period of permanent crisis and the state decides to undertake the management of the biological life of the nation directly as its own task. In other words, if the structure of the nation-state is defined by three elements — *territory*, *order*, and *birth* — the rupture of the old *nomos* does not take place in the two aspects that, according to Carl Schmitt, used to constitute it (that is, localization, *Ortung*, and order, *Ordnung*), but rather at the site in which naked life is inscribed in them (that is, there where inscription turns *birth* into *nation*). There is something that no longer functions in the traditional mechanisms that used to regulate this inscription, and the camp is the new hidden regulator of the inscription of life in the order — or, rather, it is the sign of the system's inability to function without transforming itself into a lethal machine. It is important to note that the camps appeared at the same time that the new laws on citizenship and on the denationalization of citizens were issued (not only the Nuremberg Laws on citizenship in the Reich but also the laws on the denationalization of citizens that were issued by almost all the European states, including France, between 1915 and 1933). The state of exception, which used to be essentially a temporary suspension of the order, becomes now a new and stable spatial arrangement inhabited by that naked life that increasingly cannot be inscribed into the order. *The increasingly widen-*

ing gap between birth (naked life) and nation-state is the new fact of the politics of our time and what we are calling "camp" is this disparity. To an order without localization (that is, the state of exception during which the law is suspended) corresponds now a localization without order (that is, the camp as permanent space of exception). The political system no longer orders forms of life and juridical norms in a determinate space; rather, it contains within itself a *dislocating localization* that exceeds it and in which virtually every form of life and every norm can be captured. The camp intended as a dislocating localization is the hidden matrix of the politics in which we still live, and we must learn to recognize it in all of its metamorphoses. The camp is the fourth and inseparable element that has been added to and has broken up the old trinity of nation (birth), state, and territory.

It is from this perspective that we need to see the reappearance of camps in a form that is, in a certain sense, even more extreme in the territories of the former Yugoslavia. What is happening there is not at all, as some interested observers rushed to declare, a redefinition of the old political system according to new ethnic and territorial arrangements, that is, a simple repetition of the processes that culminated in the constitution of the European nation-states. Rather, we note there an irreparable rupture of the old *nomos* as well as a dislocation of populations and human lives according to entirely new lines of flight. That is why the camps of ethnic rape are so crucially important. If the Nazis never thought of carrying out the "final solution" by impregnating Jewish

women, that is because the principle of birth, which ensured the inscription of life in the order of the nation-state, was in some way still functioning, even though it was profoundly transformed. This principle is now adrift: it has entered a process of dislocation in which its functioning is becoming patently impossible and in which we can expect not only new camps but also always new and more delirious normative definitions of the inscription of life in the city. The camp, which is now firmly settled inside it, is the new biopolitical *nomos* of the planet.

(1994)

be undertaken without becoming a historical task, or, in other words, the way in which politics might be nothing other than the exposition of humankind's absence of work as well as the exposition of humankind's creative semi-indifference to any task, and might only in this sense remain integrally assigned to happiness.

E. M. Forster relates how during one of his conversations with C. P. Cavafy in Alexandria, the poet told him: "You English cannot understand us: we Greeks went bankrupt a long time ago." I believe that one of the few things that can be declared with certainty is that, since then, all the peoples of Europe (and, perhaps, all the peoples of the Earth) have gone bankrupt. *We live after the failure of peoples*, just as Apollinaire would say of himself: "I lived in the time when the kings would die." Every people has had its particular way of going bankrupt, and certainly it does make a difference that for the Germans it meant Hitler and Auschwitz, for the Spanish it meant a civil war, for the French it meant Vichy, for other people, instead, it meant the quiet and atrocious 1950s, and for the Serbs it meant the rapes of Omarska; in the end, what is crucial for us is only the new task that such a failure has bequeathed us. Perhaps it is not even accurate to define it as a task, because there is no longer a people to undertake it. As the Alexandrian poet might say today with a smile: "Now, at last, we can understand one another, because you too have gone bankrupt."

(1995)

Translators' Notes

Preface

1. The term *naked life* translates the Italian *nuda vita*. This term appears also in the subtitle of Giorgio Agamben's *Homo Sacer: il potere sovrano e la nuda vita*, as well as throughout that work. We have decided not to follow Daniel Heller-Roazen's translation of *nuda vita* as "bare life" — see *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998), trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen — and to retain the earlier translation of *nuda vita* as "naked life" to be found in Cesare Casarino's translation of Agamben's essay "Forma-di-vita" (see "Form-of-Life" in the collection edited by Paolo Virno and Michael Hardt, *A Potential Politics: Radical Thought in Italy* [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996], pp. 151–56).

Form-of-Life

1. The English term *power* corresponds to two distinct terms in Italian, *potenza* and *potere* (which roughly correspond to the

French *puissance* and *pouvoir*, the German *Macht* and *Vermögen*, and the Latin *potentia* and *potestas*, respectively). *Potenza* can often resonate with implications of potentiality as well as with decentralized or mass conceptions of force and strength. *Potere*, on the other hand, refers to the might or authority of an already structured and centralized capacity, often an institutional apparatus such as the state.

2. Marsilius of Padua, *The Defensor of Peace*, trans. Alan Gewirth (New York: Harper and Row, 1956), p. 15; translation modified.

3. See Yan Thomas, "L'ita necisque potestas: Le père, la cité, la mort," in *Du châtiment dans la cité: Supplices corporels et peine de mort dans le monde antique* (Rome: L'École française de Rome, 1984).

4. Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," in *Illuminations*, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1989), p. 257. In the Italian

translation of Benjamin's passage, "state of emergency" is translated as "state of exception," which is the phrase Agamben uses in the preceding section of this essay and which will be a crucial refrain in several of the other essays included in this volume.

5. "Experimental life" is in English in the original.

6. See, for example, Peter Medawar and Jean Medawar, *Aristotle to Zoos* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 66–67.

7. The terminology in the original is the same as that used for bank transactions (and thus "naked life" becomes here the cash reserve contained in accounts such as the "forms of life").

8. Aristotle, *On the Soul*, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol. 1, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 682–83.

9. Dante Alighieri, *On World-Government*, trans. Herbert W. Schneider (Indianapolis: Liberal Arts, 1957), pp. 6–7; translation modified.

10. In English in the original. This term is taken from a single reference by Marx, in which he uses the English term. See Karl Marx, *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy*, trans. Martin Nicolaus (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 706.

Beyond Human Rights

1. Hannah Arendt, "We Refugees," *Menorah Journal*, no. 1 (1943): 77.

2. Hannah Arendt, *Imperialism*, Part II of *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1951), pp. 266–98.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 290–95.

4. Tomas Hammar, *Democracy and the Nation State: Aliens, Denizens, and Citizens in a World of International Migration* (Brookfield, Vt.: Gower, 1990).

What Is a People?

1. Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (New York: Viking Press, 1963), p. 70.

Notes on Gesture

1. Gilles de la Tourette, *Études cliniques et physiologiques sur la marche* (Paris: Bureaux de progrès, 1886).

2. Jean-Martin Charcot, *Charcot, the Clinician: The Tuesday Lessons* (New York: Raven Press, 1987).

3. See Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986).

4. Varro, *On the Latin Language*, trans. Roland G. Kent (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 245.

5. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Martin Ostwald (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1983), p. 153.

Languages and Peoples

1. François De Vaux de Foletier, *Les Tsiganes dans l'ancienne France*; cited in Alice Becker-Ho, *Les princes du jargon: Un facteur négligé aux origines de l'argot des classes dangereuses: Édition augmentée* (Paris: Gallimard, 1993), pp. 22–23.

2. The reference is to Alice Becker-Ho, *Les princes du jargon: Un facteur négligé aux origines de l'argot des classes dangereuses* (Paris: Gérard Lebovici, 1990).

3. Becker-Ho, *Les princes du jargon: Édition augmentée*, p. 51.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

5. Gershom Scholem, "Une lettre inédite de Gershom Scholem à Franz Rosenzweig: À propos de notre langue. Une confession," trans. from German into French by Stefan Moses, *Archives des Sciences Sociales des Religions et Archives de Sociologie des Religions* 60:1 (Paris, 1985): 83–84.

Marginal Notes on Commentaries on the Society of the Spectacle

1. Karl von Clausewitz, cited in Guy Debord, *Préface à la quatrième édition italienne de "La Société du Spectacle"* (Paris: Éditions Champ Libre, 1979), pp. 15–16.

2. We have translated this passage from the Italian as we could not find the original reference.

3. Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), p. 165.

4. Louis Althusser, "Preface to *Capital* Volume One," in *Lenin and Philosophy*, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), p. 95; but see the whole essay, and especially pp. 81 and 88.

5. Karl Kraus, "In These Great Times," in *In These Great Times*, trans. Harry Zohn (Montreal: Engendra Press, 1976), p. 70.

6. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), pp. 273–74.

The Face

1. Franz Rosenzweig, *The Star of Redemption*, trans. William W. Hallo (New York:

Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), pp. 422–23.

Sovereign Police

1. Walter Benjamin, "Critique of Violence," in *Reflections*, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Schocken Books, 1986), p. 287.

Notes on Politics

1. Walter Benjamin, "Theologico-Political Fragment," in *Reflections*, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Schocken Books, 1986), p. 312.

In This Exile (Italian Diary, 1992–94)

1. Ayrton Senna — Brazilian race-car driver and charismatic public icon — died in Italy during the San Marino Grand Prix at the age of thirty-four. His death was a highly publicized media event.

2. Bettino Craxi was head of the PSI (Italian Socialist Party) from 1976 to 1987, as well as Italian prime minister from 1983 to 1986. In the early 1990s, he was at the center of the *Tangentopoli* scandal, was accused of corruption, and fled Italy for Tunisia, where he died in early 2000.

3. Giovanni Botero, *The Reason of State*, trans. P. J. and D. P. Waley (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956), p. 3.

4. Here Agamben is referring to the controversial phenomenon of *pentitismo*, which ignited public opinion in Italy throughout the 1990s. *Pentiti* — "turncoats," or, literally, "the ones who have repented" — are former members of organized crime or of left-wing or right-wing political organizations who decide to disavow their beliefs publicly and to name other members of their organizations during police

investigations or trials in exchange for immunity or reduced prison terms.

5. Karl Marx, *The Letters of Karl Marx*, trans. Saul K. Padover (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1979), p. 24.

6. The term *establishment* is in English in the original.

7. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, book 1, trans. Martin Ostwald (Indianapolis: Liberal Arts Press, 1962), p. 16.

Index

- Abel, Karl, 31
 Abelard, Peter, 129
 act/activity, 79, 80, 98
 Adam, 83
 advertising, 94, 98, 137
 alienation, 82, 85, 96
 Althusser, Louis, 76, 145n
 ancien régime, 110, 125, 128
 Andropov, Yuri, 86
Anerkennung (recognition), 112
 animals, 3, 93
 Apollinaire, Guillaume, 142
 appearance, 91, 95; tragicomedy of, 94
 appropriation, 91, 117
archè, 112
 Arendt, Hannah, 15, 19, 25, 40, 144n
argia, *argos*, 141
argot, 64–67, 69
 Aristotle, 57, 141, 144n, 146n
 Armenians, 67
 art, 80, 92
 ataxia, 52
 Auschwitz, 80, 82, 121, 122, 142
 Averroism, 10, 114, 141
 awakening, 56
 Babel, 69
 bad conscience, 137
 Badiou, Alain, 87, 109
 Balzac, Honoré de, 49, 50
 ban, 112, 113
 bankruptcy, 142
 Basques, 67, 68
 Bataille, Georges, 7
 Becker-Ho, Alice, 64–65, 144n, 145n
 Beckett, Samuel, 56
 Benjamin, Walter, 6, 10, 54, 64, 65, 70, 104, 114, 143–44n, 145n
 bioethics, 7
 biology, 3, 7
 biopolitics, ix, 7, 32–35, 41, 45, 114
bios, 3, 20, 43, 138, 139; *bios theoreticos*, 10.
See also life; naked life; *zoè*
 birth, 21, 24–25, 43–45