Grand Strategy
MVZ248 Week3


Definitions
Traditional idea of strategy and builds upon it in 3 ways.
Includes diplomatic, economic, informational means
Instruments of internal policies and external forces/variables
Includes periods of peacetime and wartime
Murray, et.al The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War. Cambridge University Press, pp.1-23
bridge University Press. pp. 1–23.

Grand strategy expands on the traditional idea of strategy in three ways:^[3]
1. Murray; et al. (1994). The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War. Cambridge University
Press. pp. 1–23.

Terminology
Academia
Yale and Duke and Herzliya
Collection of plans and policies of a nation state.
Grand strategy is reconciling ends and means.
Purposeful action
What leaders think and want
Constraints and limitations (internal and external)

Grand strategy is a term of art from academia, and refers to the collection
of plans and policies that comprise the state’s deliberate effort to harness
political, military, diplomatic, and economic tools together to advance that
state’s national interest. Grand strategy is the art of reconciling ends
and means. It involves purposive action — what leaders think and want. Such
action is constrained by factors leaders explicitly recognize (for instance,
budget constraints and the limitations inherent in the tools of statecraft)
and by those they might only implicitly feel (cultural or cognitive screens
that shape worldviews).

Thought-process
Theory
Leader’s theories about how the world works and what is role of their nation-state
Policy and Practice
Government action and reaction in response to real (perceived) threats and opportunities.
U.S.A = Iraq
Israel = Iran

Grand Strategy begins with theory: leaders’ theories about how the world works and what is or ought
to be their states’ roles in that world. Yet it is embodied inpolicy and practice: government
action and reaction in response to real (or perceived) threats and opportunities.

Blending
Disciplines of history, political science, public policy, and economics
What happened and why; underlying patterns; how did it work/better; national resources produced and
protected?
Improvement of understanding in key areas
History is more relevant; Pol.Sci is more concrete, public policy is contextualized, and economics
is security-oriented.

Grand strategy blends the disciplines of history (what happened and why?), political science (what
underlying patterns and causal mechanisms are at work?), public policy (how well did it work and
how could it be done better?), and economics (how are national resources produced and protected?).
Students are especially drawn to grand strategy because it makes history more relevant, political
science more concrete, public policy more broadly contextualized, and economics more
security-oriented.

Issues
Primary versus secondary theaters, distribution of resources, international alliances best fit for
national goals.
Grand strategy overlaps with foreign policy.
Political leadership directs grand strategy with input from military and policy officials.
NSC/ Pentagon or Chief of General Staff (Israeli Defense Staff)
Grand strategy develops over years, perhaps multiple generations
Israel (Cabinet/politicians)
USA (Kennan) = ??

Views
Neo-isolationism
Selective engagement
US (Middle East) Israel (Sinai) (Lebanon)
Cooperative security
Primacy
(Arms)
Posen & Ross (Winter 1996-1997) “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy”  International
Security. 21 (3). 5-53.

In a 1997 piece for International Security entitled "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,"
Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross outlined four major grand strategies applicable to U.S. foreign
policy in the post-Cold War world:^[7]
1.neo-isolationism
2.selective engagement
3.cooperative security
4.primacy
Posen, Ross, Barry R., Andrew L. (Winter 1996–1997). "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy"
(PDF). International Security. 21 (3): 5–53.

Neo-Isolationism
No active participation in international politics to maintain national security.
No threats to American homeland, no need to intervene abroad
Nuclear weapons assure political sovereignty and territorial integrity of U.S.; while proliferation
prevents emergence of competing hegemon.
This follows strictly speaking a defensive realist understanding of international politics.

from a defensive realist understanding of international politics, what the authors call
"neo-isolationism" advocates the United States remove itself from active participation in
international politics in order to maintain its national security. It holds that because there are
no threats to the American homeland, the United States does not need to intervene abroad. Stressing
a particular understanding of nuclear weapons, the authors describe how proponents believe the
destructive power of nuclear weapons and retaliatory potential of the United States assure the
political sovereignty and territorial integrity of the United States, while the proliferation of
such weapons to countries like Britain, France, China and Russia prevents the emergence of any
competing hegemon on the Eurasian landmass.

Selective Engagement
Focus is on powers with significant industrial and military to prevent war.
Europe, Asia and the Middle East matter most to the United States
Europe and Asia = great powers, economic impact on IP
Middle East primary source of oil.
Prevents nuclear proliferation with strong nuclear deterrent.
At issue: differentiate necessary versus unnecessary engagement & whether strategy represents a
shift?

The focus, therefore, lies on those powers with significant industrial and military potential and
the prevention of war amongst those states. Most proponents of this strategy believe Europe, Asia
and the Middle East matter most to the United States. Europe and Asia contain the great powers,
which have the greatest military and economic impact on international politics, and the Middle East
is a primary source of oil for much of the developed world. In addition to these more particular
concerns, selective engagement also focuses on preventing nuclear proliferation and any conflict
that could lead to a great power war, but provides no clear guidelines for humanitarian
interventions.
The authors envision that a strategy of selective engagement would involve a strong nuclear
deterrent with a force structure capable of fighting two regional wars, each through some
combination of ground, air and sea forces complemented with forces from a regional ally. They
question, however, whether such a policy could garner sustained support from a liberal democracy
experienced with a moralistic approach to international relations, whether the United States could
successfully differentiate necessary versus unnecessary engagement and whether a strategy that
focuses on Europe, Asia and the Middle East actually represents a shift from current engagement.

Collective Security (CS)
Is inspired by liberalism NOT realism in approach to IR.
CS considers nuclear proliferation, regional conflicts and humanitarian crisis to be major
interests of the United States
Grand strategy involves support for international institutions, agreements, use of force for
humanitarian purposes.
Overcome security dilemma and deter interstate conflict.
However, collective action problems such as international institutions, public opinion, limitations
of arms control are ALL criticisms.

The authors^[13] write "the most important distinguishing of cooperative security is the
proposition that peace is effectively indivisible."^[14] Unlike the other three alternatives,
cooperative security draws upon liberalism rather than realism^[^citation needed^] in its approach
to international relations. Stressing the importance of world peace and international cooperation,
the view supposes the growth in democratic governance and the use of international institutions
will hopefully overcome the security dilemma and deter interstate conflict.^[^citation needed^]
They^[13] propose that collective action is the most effective means of preventing potential state
and non-state aggressors from threatening other states. Cooperative security considers nuclear
proliferation, regional conflicts and humanitarian crises to be major interests of the United
States.
The authors imagine that such a grand strategy would involve stronger support for international
institutions, agreements, and the frequent use of force for humanitarian purposes. Were
international institutions to ultimately entail the deployment of a multinational force, the
authors suppose the United States' contribution would emphasize command, control, communications
and intelligence, defense suppression, and precision-guided munitions-what they considered at the
time to be the United States' comparative advantage in aerospace power.^[14] Collective action
problems, the problems of the effective formation of international institutions, the vacillating
feelings of democratic populations, and the limitations of arms control are all offered by the
authors as noted criticisms of collective security.

Hegemon--USA
Preponderance of power ensures peace i.e. U.S.A
Pursue hegemony and dominate international system
U.S. foreign policy focus on maintaining U.S. power and prevent other powers from becoming serious
challengers.
Only intervene when direct impact on national security occurs.
Military forces at similar levels as during Cold War
Undermines valuable multilateral institutions, the feasibility of preventing war and imperial
overstretch

'Primacy holds that only a preponderance of U.S. power ensures peace.'^[15] As a result, it
advocates that the United States pursue ultimate hegemony and dominate the international system
economically, politically and militarily, rejecting any return to bipolarity or multipolarity and
preventing the emergence of any peer competitor. Therefore, its proponents argue that U.S. foreign
policy should focus on maintaining U.S. power and preventing any other power from becoming a
serious challenger to the United States. With this in mind, some supporters of this strategy argue
that the U.S. should work to contain China and other competitors rather than engage them. In
regards to humanitarian crises and regional conflicts, primacy holds that the U.S. should only
intervene when they directly impact national security, more along the lines of selective engagement
than collective security. It does, however, advocate for the active prevention of nuclear
proliferation at a level similar to collective security.
Implementation of such a strategy would entail military forces at similar levels to those during
the Cold War, with emphasis on military modernization and research and development. They note,
however, that "the quest for primacy is likely to prove futile for five reasons": the diffusion of
economic and technological capabilities, interstate balancing against the United States, the danger
that hegemonic leadership will fatally undermine valuable multilateral institutions, the
feasibility of preventive war and the dangers of imperial overstretch.^[16]
Daniel Drezner, professor of international politics at Tufts University, outlines three arguments
offered by primacy enthusiasts contending that military preeminence generates positive economic
externalities.^[17] "One argument, which I label 'geoeconomic favoritism,' hypothesizes that the
military hegemon will attract private capital because it provides the greatest security and safety
to investors. A second argument posits that the benefits from military primacy flow from
geopolitical favoritism: that sovereign states, in return for living under the security umbrella of
the military superpower, voluntarily transfer resources to help subsidize the cost of the economy.
The third argument postulates that states are most likely to enjoy global public goods under a
unipolar distribution of military power, accelerating global economic growth and reducing security
tensions. These public goods benefit the hegemon as much, if not more, than they do other
actors."^[17] Drezner maintains the empirical evidence supporting the third argument is the
strongest, though with some qualifiers. "Although the precise causal mechanism remain disputed,
hegemonic eras are nevertheless strongly correlated with lower trade barriers and greater levels of
globalization."^[18] However, Drezner highlights a caveat: The cost of maintaining global public
goods catches up to the superpower providing them. "Other countries free-ride off of the hegemon,
allowing them to grow faster. Technologies diffuse from the hegemonic power to the rest of the
world, facilitating catch-up. Chinese analysts have posited that these phenomena, occurring right
now, are allowing China to outgrow the United States."^[19]

Hegemon--Israel
Arms
Conventional
Nuclear
Territory
Buffer-zones by war and peace
Alliances
Arab and Western

Primacy + Selective Engagement--USA
Primacy ensures peace (US power as primacy ensures peace)
Dominate the international system; reject bipolar or multipolar world.
Foreign policy focus is on maintenance of power and prevention of competitor
Contain rivals rather than engage them.
China and Russia
Only intervene when national security (selective engagement) is directly impacted
R2P; regional conflicts

'Primacy holds that only a preponderance of U.S. power ensures peace.'^[15] As a result, it
advocates that the United States pursue ultimate hegemony and dominate the international system
economically, politically and militarily, rejecting any return to bipolarity or multipolarity and
preventing the emergence of any peer competitor. Therefore, its proponents argue that U.S. foreign
policy should focus on maintaining U.S. power and preventing any other power from becoming a
serious challenger to the United States. With this in mind, some supporters of this strategy argue
that the U.S. should work to contain China and other competitors rather than engage them. In
regards to humanitarian crises and regional conflicts, primacy holds that the U.S. should only
intervene when they directly impact national security, more along the lines of selective engagement
than collective security. It does, however, advocate for the active prevention of nuclear
proliferation at a level similar to collective security.
Implementation of such a strategy would entail military forces at similar levels to those during
the Cold War, with emphasis on military modernization and research and development. They note,
however, that "the quest for primacy is likely to prove futile for five reasons": the diffusion of
economic and technological capabilities, interstate balancing against the United States, the danger
that hegemonic leadership will fatally undermine valuable multilateral institutions, the
feasibility of preventive war and the dangers of imperial overstretch.^[16]
Daniel Drezner, professor of international politics at Tufts University, outlines three arguments
offered by primacy enthusiasts contending that military preeminence generates positive economic
externalities.^[17] "One argument, which I label 'geoeconomic favoritism,' hypothesizes that the
military hegemon will attract private capital because it provides the greatest security and safety
to investors. A second argument posits that the benefits from military primacy flow from
geopolitical favoritism: that sovereign states, in return for living under the security umbrella of
the military superpower, voluntarily transfer resources to help subsidize the cost of the economy.
The third argument postulates that states are most likely to enjoy global public goods under a
unipolar distribution of military power, accelerating global economic growth and reducing security
tensions. These public goods benefit the hegemon as much, if not more, than they do other
actors."^[17] Drezner maintains the empirical evidence supporting the third argument is the
strongest, though with some qualifiers. "Although the precise causal mechanism remain disputed,
hegemonic eras are nevertheless strongly correlated with lower trade barriers and greater levels of
globalization."^[18] However, Drezner highlights a caveat: The cost of maintaining global public
goods catches up to the superpower providing them. "Other countries free-ride off of the hegemon,
allowing them to grow faster. Technologies diffuse from the hegemonic power to the rest of the
world, facilitating catch-up. Chinese analysts have posited that these phenomena, occurring right
now, are allowing China to outgrow the United States."^[19]

Primacy + Selective Engagement--Israel
Egypt and Jordan
Gaza
Territory under control from 1967-2005
Terrorism + buffer-zone
Lebanon
Terrorism (1982; 2006) + Buffer zone
Regional stability (1982)

Post 2010
Barry Posen advocates US abandon hegemonic strategy. Replace with restraint.
Focus on security challenges: powerful rival(s); terrorism;limiting nuclear proliferation
Don’t shape world to U.S. values, instead advocate vital national interests
Obama administration arguably exercised this view
Large troop contingents downsized in peaceful regions (Europe)
Preserve country’s prosperity and security.

Posen proposes the United States abandon its hegemonic strategy and replace it with one of
restraint. This translates into jettisoning the quest of shaping a world that is satisfactory to
U.S. values and instead advances vital national security interests: The U.S. military would go to
war only when it must. Large troop contingents in unprecedentedly peaceful regions such as Europe
would be significantly downsized, incentivizing NATO members to provide more for their own
security. Under such a scenario, the United States would have more leeway in using resources to
combat the most pressing threats to its security. A strategy of restraint, therefore, would help
preserve the country's prosperity and security more so than a hegemonic strategy. To be sure, Posen
makes clear that he is not advocating isolationism. Rather, the United States should focus on three
pressing security challenges: preventing a powerful rival from upending the global balance of
power, fighting terrorists, and limiting nuclear proliferation

Arguments
Ikenberry, Brooks, and Wohlforth not convinced with Posen.
U.S. has no powerful rivals, no need to balance; U.S. military is prime
U.S. domination of military technology allows for trade of access. Allies agree not to transfer key
military tech. to competitors.
Brooks, Ikenberry, Wohlforth (January-February, 2013). “Lean Forward: In Defense of American
Engagement” Foreign Affairs. 92. (1).

Ikenberry, Brooks, and Wohlforth are not convinced that the current U.S. grand strategy generates
subsequent counterbalancing. Unlike the prior hegemons, the United States is geographically
isolated and faces no contiguous great power rivals interested in balancing it. This means the
United States is far less threatening to great powers that are situated oceans away, the authors
claim. Moreover, any competitor would have a hard time matching U.S. military might. "Not only is
the United States so far ahead militarily in both quantitative and qualitative terms, but its
security guarantees also give it the leverage to prevent allies from giving military technology to
potential U.S. rivals. Because the United States dominates the high-end defense industry, it can
trade access to its defense market for allies' agreement not to transfer key military technologies
to its competitors.
Brooks, Stephen; Ikenberry, John; Wohlforth, William (January–February 2013). "Lean Forward: In
Defense of American Engagement". Foreign Affairs. 92 (1): 130–142, 137

Arguments
Ted Carpenter argues further that major power needs to preserve its strategic insolvency.
Overextension and national exhaustion
Off-loading security responsibility must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
Moral indignation rather than calculated assessment of national interest then murky conflict
involvement will occur.
Carpenter (March-April 2013). “Delusions of Indispensability” (124): 47-55.

It is imperative for a major power that wishes to preserve its strategic insolvency. Otherwise,
overextension and national exhaustion become increasing dangers."^[22] Carpenter thinks that
off-loading U.S. security responsibility must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless,
the United States must refrain from using military might in campaigns that do not directly deal
with U.S. interests. "If a sense of moral indignation, instead of a calculating assessment of the
national interest, governs U.S. foreign policy, the United States will become involved in even more
murky conflicts in which few if any tangible American interests are at stake.
Carpenter, Ted (March–April 2013). "Delusions of Indispensability". The National Interest (124):
47–55.

Analysis
In Israel cycles and status quo
Overextension and national exhaustion (Intifada);(Gaza); (Oslo Accords)
Off-loading security responsibility must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
(Gaza withdrawal in 2005; security fence)
Moral indignation rather than calculated assessment of national interest then murky conflict
involvement will occur.
(Terrorism -kidnapping + public outcry = Lebanon)

Criticism
Difficult to organize resources for effective grand strategy
Tendency to see actions of states as coherent and purposeful...or assume actions and choices are
more decisive.
Fallacy of coherence
Tendency of policymakers to believe they can greater influence events.
Fallacy of control
Richard Betts (2012). American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and Dilemmas in National Security.
Columbia University Press.

the difficulty of organizing resources for effective grand strategy, Betts explores both the
retrospective fallacy of coherence – the tendency to see the actions of states as more coherent and
purposeful than they actually were or to assume particular actions and choices as more decisive in
the outcome of events than they actually were – and the prospective fallacy of control – the
tendency of policymakers to believe they can exert far greater influence over events than they can.
Betts, Richard (2012). American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and Dilemmas in National Security. New
York: Columbia University Press. pp. 232–265

Criticism
Richard Betts details skeptics critiques regarding feasibility and practicability of strategy.
“To skeptics, effective strategy is often an illusion because what happens in the gap between
objectives and war outcomes is too complex and unpredictable to be manipulated to a specific end ”
USA in Iraq (2003-2007)
Israel in Gaza and Lebanon
Israel for Oslo Accords
Betts (Autumn 2000). “Is Strategy an Illusion”. International Security. 25 (2): 5-20

detailed some of the critiques raised by skeptics regarding the feasibility and practicability of
strategy, explaining "[t]o skeptics, effective strategy is often an illusion because what happens
in the gap between policy objectives and war outcomes is too complex and unpredictable to be
manipulated to a specified end."
Betts, Richard K. (Autumn 2000). "Is Strategy an Illusion". International Security. 25 (2): 5–50