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DiplomacyDiplomacy in Eastin East AsiaAsia
Jan Polišenský, MSc., Ph.D.
Spring 2019
JapaneseJapanese PublicPublic DiplomacyDiplomacy ((contcont
fromfrom lastlast lecturelecture))
Sport DiplomacySport Diplomacy,, InformalInformal
DiplomacyDiplomacy and Pandaand Panda DiplomacyDiplomacy
Jan Polišenský, MSc., Ph.D.
Spring 2019
Final TestFinal Test -- QuestionsQuestions
• Define and discuss the terms: Foreign Policy and Diplomacy
• Diplomacy and Foreign policy making & leadership in East Asia
• Discuss the Public Diplomacy and provide examples
• Discuss the Cultural Diplomacy and provide examples
• Discuss the Coercive Diplomacy and provide examples
• Discuss the Economic Diplomacy and provide examples
• Discuss the Sport Diplomacy and provide examples
Final TestFinal Test -- QuestionsQuestions
• Discuss the soft and hard tools of Coercive diplomacy
• Discuss the role of diplomats in diplomacy
• Discuss the role of culture in diplomacy
The Trajectory Of Japan’s PublicThe Trajectory Of Japan’s Public
Diplomacy In Three PhasesDiplomacy In Three Phases
• Phase I: 1945-1950s
• Right after the World War II, Japan faced the challenge of transforming its image
as a militaristic aggressor into that of a democratic, peace-loving nation. Japan’s
public diplomacy avoided material likely to arouse associations with the way of
the samurai and with other elements of Japan’s feudal past. Instead, it highlighted
benign facets of Japanese culture, such as the tea ceremony and ikebana flower
arranging. Ikebana has remained to this day an emphasis in Japan’s diplomatic PR,
as seen in photographic calendars published and distributed annually. The
government provided comparatively little support for overseas Japanese-language
education until recent years. That was in deference to bad memories of imperial
Japan’s imposition of its language on its colonies. Also, Japan in the early postwar
years lacked much latitude for the exercise of public diplomacy. Two obvious
constraints in the era, which coincided with the Allied occupation, were Japan’s
shaky political foundation and a general shortage of resources.
• Phase II: 1960s-80s
• The U.S.-Japan trade imbalance had become a contentious issue by the early 1960s, and the U.S.
government had clamped limits on imports of Japanese textiles. U.S.-Japanese relations would suffer
another blow in 1971 in the form of a series of “Nixon shocks.” Then- president Richard Nixon,
without consulting his foreign counterparts, ended the convertibility between the dollar and gold and,
also without prior consultation with the United States’ allies, announced plans to visit China. In 1972,
Japan’s parliament passed the bill that provided for establishing the Japan Foundation in the name of
promoting mutual understanding. It was also during this period that Japan’s economic inroads in
Southeast Asia had exacerbated latent ill will. People had come to regard Japanese as “economic
animals.” A popular epithet was “banana:” yellow (Asian) on the outside but white (Western) on the
inside. The animosity had boiled over into a vitriolic boycott of Japanese goods in Thailand in 1972.
Southeast Asia also became a focus of Japanese public diplomacy in the late 1970s on par with the
United States. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs even published a condensed version in English of Chie
Nakane’s “Tateshakai no Ningenkankei” (human relations in vertical society) and distributed it in the
United States, Southeast Asia and elsewhere. Japan’s public diplomacy became more assertive but thus
remained reactive in its nature
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• Phase III: 1990s-present
• Calls arose in the United States and Europe in the 1980s for Japan to shoulder more responsibility as a member of the global
community. Pressure mounted for Japan to provide support for multilateral peacekeeping operations and similar undertakings
and to expand its government development assistance and other economic assistance for developing nations. Japan’s burgeoning
trade surplus with the United States had become an especially vexing problem. The nations’ mutual-security arrangements,
meanwhile, had long been a nagging source of mutual discontent. And that discontent had worsened amid U.S. dissatisfaction
with Japan’s contribution to the United Nations–authorized military action in the Gulf War. In 1991, the Japanese government
invested 50 billion in establishing the Center for Global Partnership (CGP) inside the Japan Foundation. Its founding mandate
was to promote U.S.- Japanese cooperation in policy initiatives aimed at addressing global issues of mutual concern; for example,
supporting democratization in developing nations, addressing threats to the environment, and combating contagious diseases.
Unsurprisingly, some in the United States viewed the Center warily as a vehicle for Japanese lobbying. The Japanese defused that
cynicism, however, by placing the Center under the supervision of a council that comprised American and Japanese members
and by investing the Center with a full and convincing measure of autonomy inside the Japan Foundation. The establishment of
CGP was a turning point in the history of Japanese public diplomacy. Establishing the Center was, to be sure, a reactive, rather
than proactive, measure. Japan was, as always, scrambling to quell foreign criticism and to dampen bilateral frictions. But the
Center attained an importance that transcended its initial purpose of dealing with issues that had arisen in the U.S.-Japan
relationship. Its approach was a refreshing departure from Japan’s all-too-familiar reliance on hackneyed pleas for understanding
of the nation’s “special circumstances.” The Center marked a new departure in tackling global issues of multinational concern
through a genuinely bilateral and sometimes multilateral approach
• RECENT FOCUSES
• Cool Japan
• Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry embarked on a national branding
campaign in 2011 to promote Japanese “content industries” internationally under the
moniker “Cool Japan.” That presumably reflects a sense of crisis about the long-term
decline in Japanese manufacturing and a determination to offset the economic impact of
that decline by promoting creative, post-manufacturing industries. But it also reflects
informed perceptions of a genuine basis—a cultural commonality among East Asia,
North America, and other regions—for chic national branding. What’s cool about “Cool
Japan,” in other words, rests on a foundation of regionally and even globally shared culture.
From a public diplomacy perspective, “Cool Japan” is valuable as a “gateway” to Japan,
especially for the young generations of foreign countries. Some of them might choose to
study Japanese language and culture, visit Japan, or even pursue Japan-related careers. They
tend to have a more nuanced and contextual understanding of Japan, instead of being
susceptible to soundbites, even at the time when the bilateral relations get sour
• Human Security and Life Infrastructure
• In recent years, Japan’s public diplomacy has addressed the
international public interest in the spirit of “human security.” And
Japan’s increasingly proactive stance in public diplomacy will benefit
from the nation’s history of creative and effective responses to
adverse circumstances and events. That history and its legacy are just
as valuable as pop culture and content industries in asserting an
identity as
• “Cool Japan:” innovation in energy conservation and material recycling as a
nation blessed with little in the way of energy resources and other natural
resources; an extensive, systematic commitment to preserving environmental
quality and maintaining healthful public sanitation as a nation that has
experienced serious pollution; miraculous reconstruction efforts and a deeprooted
commitment to peace as a nation that has suffered calamitous natural
disasters and devastating war. All of these and other challenges present a
confluence of national interests and international interests. Japan’s growing
emphasis in public diplomacy on shared experience is part of a broader shift
to proactive approaches in that realm.
• Liberal International Order Japan’s diplomacy priority, including public
diplomacy, is to preserve, protect and defend the “liberal international
order” based on democracy, the rule of law, human rights, free trade,
et al. This is especially so when anti-liberal phenomena such as the
spread of terrorism, the rise of authoritarian states, the unilateral
change of status quo by force, and the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, et al. have become conspicuous.
• Bilateral Public Diplomacy One of the highlights of the bilateral
public diplomacy events in recent years was President Barack
Obama’s visit to Hiroshima and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to
Pearl Harbor. Although the case of France-Germany relations is
often referred to as a role model of post-war reconciliation, the case
of the United States and Japan is no less dramatic and historic,
particularly when cultural differences and geographic distance are
taken into account. To date, the bilateral relation remains stable and
strong, at least far better than many in Japan
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• had feared at the inauguration of President Donald Trump. I would say,
facing the common threat of nuclear North Korea, the alliance has never
been more resilient. Bear in mind here that Japan retains high priority in U.S.
public diplomacy. Interesting evidence of that priority is the number of
American Centers in Japan. American Centers are public affairs outlets run
by the U.S. State Department in nations worldwide. Japan is home to fully
five Centers, in Sapporo, Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, and Fukuoka. That is an
unusually large number for an industrialized nation, because the United
States, like other Western nations, is shifting its public affairs resources to
developing nations in the Middle East, Africa, and other parts of Asia.
• Japan and the United States nonetheless have different concerns: From the U.S.
side Apprehension about Japan’s relationship with South Korea, especially over
the “comfort women” issue, continues. So many emotions are embedded in this
issue at grass-root levels, but we need at least a “political” solution, at the intergovernmental
level, to keep the bilateral relations viable before the threat of
North Korea. The 2015 Accord was significant in this respect. While the real
intention of President Moon Jae-in’s recent statement on the Accord (January
10, 2018) remains to be clarified, Japan holds that Accord should be duly fulfilled
by both sides. Otherwise, any accord gets meaningless in the future, and the
Japanese public will lose confidence in South Korea, which makes it more
difficult for good-minded Japanese politicians and diplomats to take positive
move towards South Korea. According to a most recent Yomiuri poll (January
10-12, 2018), 86 percent of Japanese respondents refused to take any new
measurements to the Accord.
• There is also a persistent notion of Prime Minister Abe as being a nationalist. If the term “nationalist”
implies “racist” (as in Europe), he is clearly not. I would consider him to be more a realist than an
ideologue, and more a globalist than an isolationist. He has decided to cut a deal with South Korea
over the comfort women issue in 2015 and to attend the Opening Ceremony of the Pyeongchang
Winter Olympics in 2018 despite vehement oppositions from one of his key constituencies who are
very conservative and (proudly) nationalistic. Another concern is the perception of Japan as still
engaging in an unfair, “non-reciprocal” trade with the United States. This rhetoric was repeated by
President Trump during his presidential campaign in 2016, but he still clings to it if not frequently. In
fact, he could continue to embrace it towards the mid-term elections in autumn 2018 to shore up
supports from his core constituencies. To the Japan side, Trump’s claim is outdated and mostly
baseless, yet there is every reason to suspect that Japan’s past record on direct investment in the United
States has been underestimated or misunderstood for the past few years. From the Japanese side The
Trump administration’s policy towards North Korea is the biggest concern while acknowledging the
merits of “strategic ambiguity.” If the United States ever cuts a surprise deal with North Korea
without prior consultation with Japan, it would make a major blow to the alliance management. The
U.S.- DPRK summit meeting, alleged to take place by May 2018, needs close scrutiny in this regard and
could be a game changer in the U.S.-Japan relations. The Armitage-Nye Report in 2012 posed, “Does
Japan desire to continue to be a tier-one nation, or is she content to drift into tier-two
• status?” 3 While Prime Minister Abe set to become Japan’s longest
serving leader in 2018, many experts in Japan’s diplomatic circle are
apprehensive if President Trump’s “America First” doctrine is
synonymous with “America Alone,” and ultimately, if the United
States is building a wall between the liberal international order.
Certainly, American retrenchment is not welcome, as it creates a
serious vacuum of power in world politics including East Asia. In
addition to this anxiety is a perception that the U.S. domestic politics
is too divided to lead the world effectively, even if there is a bipartisan
support for the U.S.-Japan relations in particular.
JapeseJapese Soft PowerSoft Power
• Japan still has an image problem in East Asia today-sometimes as a
country lacking in remorse for its past militarism and other times as a
predatory and protectionist “economic animal”.
• On the one hand, East Asians especially Chinese and Koreans view
negatively Japanese war atrocities, Prime Minister’s visits to Yasukuni
Shrine
• On the other, East Asian consumers have embraced things Japanese
such as sushi, karaoke, rock garden, zen-inspired architecture, J-pop
(popular music), J-fashion, electronic gizmos and games (Sony
PlayStation 3 and Nintendo), television dramas, manga (comics) and
anime (cartoons).
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• Japan is burnishing its international image through the popular medium of
manga and anime. These cultural products appear to have the best of both
worlds: distinctively Japanese in style and yet have universal appeal among the
young.1 Tokyo’s Diplomatic Bluebook 2006 noted: “Japanese culture is
currently attracting attention around the world as ‘Cool Japan’. In order to
increase interest in Japan and further heighten the image of Japan, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) is working with the private sector through
overseas diplomatic establishments and the Japan Foundation to promote
cultural exchanges while taking into consideration the characteristics of each
foreign country”.
• The Japanese State: Embracing Pop Culture In April 2006, Foreign
Minister Aso Taro proposed that manga and anime could be the way
to China’s heart. Addressing students at the University of Digital
Content in Tokyo’s Akihabara district (the Mecca of Japan’s electronic
gadgetries), Aso noted: “If you take a peek in any of the shops in
China catering to the young otaku (nerdy)- type manga and anime fans,
you will find the shops’ walls lined with any and every sort of Japanese
anime figurine you can imagine. ....We have a grasp on the hearts of
the young people in many countries, not the least of which being
China”.
• Aso continued: “What is the image that pops into someone’s mind when they hear the name ‘Japan’? Is it a bright and positive
image? Warm? Cool? The more these kinds of positive images pop up in a person’s mind, the easier it becomes for Japan to get its
views across over the long term. In other words, Japanese diplomacy is able to keep edging forward, bit by bit, and bring about
better and better outcomes as a result”.4 In November 2006, the Council on the Movement of People across Borders, an advisory
council to Foreign Minister Aso, proposed that Japan should tap on the rising popularity of manga and anime especially among
the young abroad.5 Headed by Cho Fujio, the chairman of Toyota Motor Corporation, the Council suggested the awarding of a
“Japan Manga Grand Prize” to target foreign artists, and also appoint cultural ambassadors of anime to promote Japanese pop
culture overseas.6 Subsequently, Aso, in his policy speech to the Diet (parliament) in January 2007, adopted Japanese pop culture
as a diplomatic tool. He said: “What is important is to be able to induce other countries to listen to Japan. If the use of pop
culture or various sub-cultures can be useful in this process, we certainly should make the most of them”.7 Ironically, being
“cool”, “fun” and “hip” have now become serious business for the Japanese state. The appeal of Japanese cultural products in
Asia and beyond is not a recent phenomenon. Long before the present wave of Doraemon (the robot cat), Hello Kitty (the cute
and ubiquitous cat) and Pokemon (pocket monster) captured the hearts and minds of many kids of this generation, Astro Boy,
Ultraman and Godzilla had already done so in the previous generation.8 The creativity and non-conformity of Japanese artists and
market forces have given rise to the success of these cultural products; the catalyst was not the Japanese state. However, the
Japanese state today is trying to bandwagon on these products and harness them for its “soft power” even though that was not the
original intent of the producers of manga and anime.
• Motivations for Japanese “Soft Power” It is perhaps no coincidence that Japan’s new emphasis on its
cultural products as a vehicle for its “soft power” is also made against the backdrop of a rising China
and the establishment of its Confucian Institutes globally. It appears that the two great East Asian
powers are locked in a rivalry for the number one spot in the region and the mutual pursuit of “soft
power” is merely an extension of politics by other means.13 Yoshizaki Tatsuhiko proposed that Japan
should market the Japanese brand and enhance its international image while facing China’s challenge. He
noted: “The challenge thrown down by China, however, has made Japanese diplomacy realize the
necessity of making appeals for what it has to offer today. In the post-Cold War world, the opportunity
to deploy real military or economic power has decreased, and the roles played by instruments of soft
power such as culture and image have grown larger. Many of the confrontations in this era will take
place through the interchange of words and ideas. It will be an era when the battles among countries are
virtual ones. ... It is necessary to employ as many different routes as possible to create a broad base of
Japan fans”.14 However, the China factor in Tokyo’s quest for “soft power” should not be exaggerated.
With or without China as a consideration, Japan, like other big powers, has been pursuing cultural
diplomacy long before Nye popularized the term “soft power” and the hype over China’s rise. What is
new is the latest incarnation of Japanese cultural diplomacy: the use of manga and anime as novel
instruments of global outreach and appeal.
• As early as 1923, Tokyo adopted cultural diplomacy when the Diet created a Special Account, based largely on the country’s share of the Boxer indemnityto
fund cultural activities related to China.15 In the same year, the Diet passed further legislation to establish the China Cultural Affairs Bureau within the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, Japan’s cultural diplomacytoward China was unraveled in the 1930s after its occupation of Manchuria and the Marco
Polo Bridge Incident which triggered war between the two Asian countries. Followingits Second World War defeat, Tokyo concentrated on economic
reconstruction and reentry into the internationalcommunityby addressingissues of reparations and normalizingdiplomaticties. After settling some of these
legacy issues, and becoming an economic superpowerby the early 1970s, Tokyo was able to channel more resources and attention to cultural diplomacy
such as establishingthe Japan Foundation for global outreach. From the 1970s, Tokyo has placed emphasis on cultural diplomacytoward the US and
ASEAN(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) - the former because the USJapan Alliance is the cornerstoneof Japanese foreign policy and the latter
because of markets and energy security - most Japanese oil tankers go through Southeast Asian waters and anti-Japanese sentiments have to be addressed in
the region. Shocked by violent anti-Japaneseriots in Bangkok and Jakarta against then Prime MinisterTanaka Kakuei’s 1974 visit to the region, Tokyo
became more conscious of maintaininga good internationalimage. Subsequently, Japan codified the Fukuda Doctrine with the pledge to foster “heart to
heart relations”with Southeast Asia and also maintained Japan Foundation offices in Bangkok, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur and Manila to pursue cultural
diplomacy. Post-war Japan cannot exercise hard military power to coerce other states. Shackled by constitutionalrestrictions (the no-war clause of Article 9)
and mass pacifism after the nation’s catastrophicdefeat in war, Tokyo has to adopt a soft approach like foreign aid and cultural diplomacyin its foreign
relations. In this regard, Japan today is different from other great powers which wield both “hard” and “soft” power - it lacks the will and capability to
exercise “hard power”.16 Cartoons also helped to make the Self Defense Force (SDF) in US-occupied Iraq appear non-threateningand friendly to the
locals. Japan’s 600 non-combat troops in Iraq painted a popular soccer cartoon (Captain Tsubasa in Japanese and Captain Majed in Arab countries) on their
water trucks.17 Apparently, softeningits military’s image in Iraq via cute cartoons mitigates potential backlash from the public in the Arab world against
Japan. A Japanese diplomat who promoted Captain Tsubasa in Iraq noted: “Captain Tsubasa is famous throughout Iraq and the MiddleEast. The Iraqi
peopledidn’t know he was Japanese - they thought Tsubasa was Saudi Arabian. But I was sure that Tsubasa would cheer up Iraqi kids when they see his
logo in the streets ... Tsubasa became the symbol of our goodwill”.18 Conceivably, the new emphasis on cultural products may also mask the nationalistic
and rightwing agenda of the Abe Administration. Prime MinisterAbe has upgraded the DefenseAgency to the Ministry of Defense and hopes to pass
legislation that will permit a national referendum to revise the Constitution and transform the country into a “normal state” which engages in collective
security. If this were to come to pass, Japan will no longer be constitutionallyconstrained to exercise only “soft power”. Tokyo’s new emphasis on cultural
diplomacyis agreeable to most Japanese across the ideologicalspectrum: to the left, a non-militaristicapproach to international
• Instrumentsof Japanese “Soft Power” Long before manga and anime were co-opted by the Japanese state to promote its public diplomacy, it has relied on
the Japan Foundation, The Japan Exchange and Teaching Program, Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteer program and Official Developmental
Assistance. Encouragingforeign students to study in Japan is another approach to invest in a younger generation and hope that they, as beneficiariesof the
Japaneseeducational system, will return home as cultural ambassadors and build friendship bridges between their countries and Japan. Established in 1972,
the Japan Foundation is a key institution to promoteJapanese language education overseas and also art, cultural and intellectual exchanges between the
nation and the world.22 This foundation has a budget of US$146.5 million in fiscal year 2005-6. With 19 overseas offices in 18 countries, the Japan
Foundation is represented in Asia, Oceania, the Americas, Europe, Middles East and Africa. Hitherto, the Japan Foundation has often promoted traditional
art forms like the austere Noh theater, Ikebana (stylized flower arrangement),ukiyo-e (woodblock prints) and the Zen-inspired tea ceremony - exquisite,
refined and quaint but of limited mass appeal. However, the Foundation is likely to move in tandem with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to promotepop
culture like manga and anime for greater internationaloutreach. In May 2007, Tokyo established the International Manga Award and the First International
Manga Award Executive to honor manga artists who contributeto the promotion of manga abroad. The Committee comprises the Ministerof Foreign
Affairs, the Presidentof the Japan Foundation, and the members of the special committeefor pop culture of the Council on the Movement of People
Across Borders.23 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also roped in the Japan Cartoonists Association to send renowned manga artists to the Selection
Committeeof this award. The International Manga Award attracted 146 entries from 26 countries and regions globally. Interestingly, the largest number of
entries came from the Chinese speakingworld - 24 from China (including Hong Kong) and 11 from Taiwan. Ethnic Chinese also captured the top prize in
June 2007: Lee Chi Ching (best work) from Hong Kong; Kai (runner up) also from Hong Kong and Benny Wong Thong Hou (runner up) from
Malaysia.24 The Japan Foundation then invited the winners to Japan for a ten-day visit that included the award presentation ceremony, meetings with
Japanesemanga artists, and visits to related organizations. Conceivably, ethnic Chinese may win the International Manga Award in the next few years
because of the huge base of ethnic Chinese manga artists and fans but it remains to be seen whether the allure of manga can melt the hearts of the Chinese
peopletoward Japan given the lack of historical reconciliation. The Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Program is another important arm of its cultural
diplomacy(see Appendix 1). In 2005, JET invited 5,853 youths from 44 countries to teach in Japanese schools, and foster internationalunderstandingand
goodwill.25 By that year, JET has cumulatively sponsored more than 43,000 participants in this youth exchange program (see Appendix 2). Tokyo also has
an equivalent to the US Peace Corps known as the Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteer (JOCV) program comprisingvolunteers between the ages of 20
and 39 to assist the socio-economicdevelopment of local communities. Since its establishmentin 1965, the JOCV has dispatched more than 22,000
volunteers to third world countries.26Another pillar of Japanese “soft power” is Official DevelopmentalAssistance(ODA) (US$6.24 billion in 2007)
extended to win the goodwill of developingcountries. In lieu of military power, Tokyo, more than any other great powers, relies on ODA as carrots to
“purchase”power.27
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• Accepting foreign students to study in Japan and promoting a network of
friendly alumni is another means to enhance goodwill toward the host
country. The numbers of foreign students studying in Japan have climbed
from slightly over 40,000 in 1990 to 121,812 in 2005.28 Promoting the study
of the Japanese language abroad is another way to enhance an understanding
and appreciation of Japan. Interestingly, the number of foreign students
studying the Japanese language in 1990 (just before the bubble economy
burst) was 981,407 but climbed to 2,356,745 in 2003 despite the so-called
“lost decade”.29 Apparently, many students from the bubble years studied the
Japanese language for economic reasons but more students today are studying
the language because of their fascination and love for manga and anime. In so
doing, they may end up with a better understanding of Japan.
• Limits to Japanese “Soft Power” While Foreign Minister Aso is flattered that many foreigners are mesmerized by manga, the reality is often just the opposite. The Chinese
media has noted that certain manga promote anti-China sentiments.30 Indeed, notorious rightwing artists, especially Kobayashi Yoshinori, have sold millions of copies of
manga which portrays Imperial Japan as fighting a righteous war to liberate Asia from Western colonialism. While manga and anime do beguile some foreigners, their
attraction may be exaggerated especially for Asian countries with more conservative values and religion. They would consider certain adult manga and anime - often licentious
and violent - to be anathema to the good morality of their societies. Japan’s “soft power” has its limits. Without a historical reconciliation with China and South Korea, Japan
is unlikely to truly win the hearts and minds of the Chinese and Korean people, notwithstanding the allure of its comics and cartoons. “Soft power”, assiduously cultivated
over the years, can easily be undermined by the insensitive statements and clumsy behavior of a new generation of nationalistic leaders over politically sensitive issues
pertaining to Japan’s past militarism. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo initially remarked that there was no evidence of coercion by Japan’s wartime government in using Asian
women as sex slaves but then apologized to the “comfort women” to preempt a non-binding resolution at the US House of Representatives calling on Abe to formally
apologize for Tokyo’s role in the “comfort women” issue. To make matters worse, a group of Japanese right wing politicians (from both the LDP and the main opposition,
the Democratic Party of Japan [DPJ]), academics, journalists and commentators took a full page advertisement in the Washington Post in June 2007 and indignantly
denounced the “comfort women” issue as a gross distortion. This act of denial and petulance not only stiffened the resolve of many US politicians to support the resolution
but also damaged the international image of Japan as a country lacking remorse and sincerity over its wartime aggression and atrocities. The comment of the Asahi Shimbun is
apt: “It takes months, even years, to build up the respect that gives soft power - and all that is gained can be lost in a moment. When the Prime Minister or leading politicians
make provocative remarks that stir mistrust or anger, for instance, Japan quickly loses its ‘attractiveness’ to other countries”.31 Other limits to Japan’s “soft power” include
the lack of a CNN or BBC-like institution to project its voice globally, the reluctance of its universities to hire foreign faculty members beyond language teachers, the
relatively closed nature of its society to foreign immigrants to maintain ethnic homogeneity and social order, and the fact that Japanese is not a global language. The best
students in Asia would head toward the American Ivy League and Britain’s Oxbridge but not necessarily the Universities of Tokyo, Waseda and Keio. Its unique sumo
wrestling, while popular at home, has no large international audience unlike the soccer leagues of Western Europe. To be sure, sumo and Japanese martial arts such as judo,
karate, kendo, jujitsu and aikido do appeal enormously to small circles of non-Japanese. Though judo and karate are sports featured in the Olympic Games they pale in global
popularity in comparison to soccer and basketball. In contrast, the English Premier League, the Spanish Lega and the Italian Serie A matches are telecasted live into the living
rooms of East Asia.32 Similarly, while Japan has succeeded in exporting small numbers of baseball players to the US and a few footballers to Europe, its domestic baseball
and soccer leagues lack global appeal. Moreover, Japan does not represent any universal values and ideals while certain Western nations, especially the US, champion human
rights and democracy. Even though Tokyo recently adopted the rhetoric of democracy and human rights, other Asians do not necessarily view Japan as the paragon of these
values given its poor treatment of ethnic minorities (Japan-born Koreans and the Burakumins) and memories of wartime atrocities among the Chinese and Koreans. In
November 2006, Foreign Minister Aso advocated a “value-oriented diplomacy” based on the “universal” values of democracy, freedom, human rights, rule of law, and
market economy. A critic noted: “For Japan to be perceived as a legitimate proponent of democracy and human rights in Southeast Asia it must clearly and irrevocably cut its
ties to its imperial past”.33 Unfortunately, many politicians from the ruling LDP and the main opposition DPJ have failed to do so. Moreover, if the Abe Administration were
to stridently champion democracy to forge an alignment based on shared values with the US, Australia and India, this strategy may backfire because it may exclude and
alienate Asian countries especially China which do not subscribe to liberal democracy.
• Conceivably, Japan’s domestic experiences in environmental protection and role in the Kyoto Protocol (which sets targets for
countries to reduce carbon dioxide emission and global warming) can conjure an attractive image of an environmentally friendly
nation. However, the Kyoto Protocol will expire in 2012. To ensure that Japan will lead in environmental protection in the years
ahead, Prime Minister Abe has advocated the cutting of global greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 and would seek to forge an antiglobal
warming framework when Japan hosts the G-8 summit in Toyakocho, Hokkaido in July 2008. But Tokyo has stubbornly
insisted on whaling for “scientific research” despite condemnation from international conservationists that Japanese whaling fleets
are pushing some species to the brink of extinction. Being one of the few countries in the world that seeks to overturn the ban on
commercial whaling gives Japan a bad international image in the environmental domain.34 The commercial value of Japanese
cultural products in the world was estimated at US$12.5 billion in 2002.35 Harder to assess is the efficacy of Japanese “soft
power”. Can Japanese ODA and cultural diplomacy sway the Asian countries to do what Japan wants? The answer is contextual. It
really depends on what Japan wants and whether such desires and messages are acceptable to these Asian countries. Having large
budgets for ODA, the Japan Foundation, JET and JOCV programs are no guarantee that others will do Tokyo’s bidding.
Aficionados of Japanese cuisine will view it as refined, tasty and healthy but it is a fallacy to assume that most sushi lovers will
support Japan’s quest for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council or the Prime Minister’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine.
Japanese state and society should not be conflated together. Indeed, a liking for Japanese society and culture is not easily translated
into support for the Japanese state and its foreign policy goals. Public opinion polls in the US and Asia toward Japan can reveal the
efficacy of its cultural diplomacy. If the American and Asian public were to think poorly of Japan, it is doubtful that the latter has
indeed conducted a successful cultural diplomacy. The 2006 Image of Japan Study shows that 91 percent of American public
opinion leaders and 69 percent of the general public view Japan as a dependent ally.36 According to various surveys, public
opinion in Southeast Asia tends to view Japan very favorably while those in China and South Korea do not (see Appendix 3).37 It
appears that Japan lacks “soft power” toward China and South
• Korea due to historical problems and territorial disputes, notwithstandingthe appeal of Japanese cultural products. While Koreans, like the Southeast
Asians, also have an appreciation for manga and anime, these cultural products are necessary but not sufficientfor Japan to establish an appealing image in
Korea (see Appendix 4). Beyond Japanese “soft power” The utility of manga and anime for Japanese foreign relations is likely to be quite limited. For every
Asian enamored and entertained by these cultural products, there is probably another who find such things to be rather infantileand frivolous and therefore
unappealing. Moreover, in a globalized world, the Asian consumer is also bombarded with multiple images and cultural products from China, South Korea,
India and the West and is unlikely to be attracted to only things Nippon. It would be naïve to exaggerate the influence of Japanese cultural products if Tokyo
were to pursue policies deemed by its neighbors to be against their interest. Indeed, all the cultural ambassadors and manga prizes from Japan would not be
able to soothe the Chinese and Koreans if a Japanese Prime Ministerwere to visit YasukuniShrine again. A difficult challenge for Japan and East Asia in the
21st century is to transcend parochial nationalism and jointly produce “East Asian” cultural products which can appeal to the West and the rest. If transnationalcollaboration
were to take place in movies, TV serials, music and theater performances among East Asian countries in the next few decades, it may
not only reap a handsomeprofit but also pave the way for a nascent East Asian Communityin which common cultural underpinnings are indispensable.
Cultural products including manga and anime then will not merely be markers of a unique Japanese identity and pride but emblems of a greater East Asia entertaining,
appealingand profitablebeyond its shores. If that scenario were to come to fruition, it will be more meaningful to talk about the “soft power”
of East Asia and not merely that of China or Japan. In March 2007, Japan and Singapore agreed to establish a Japan Center to disseminateJapanese popular
culture in Southeast Asia. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs recorded: “Prime Minister Abe stated that the establishmentof the ‘Japan Center’ (note:
a proposalby Singapore to establish a base in Singapore to disseminateinformation about Japan, especially on cultural information) was of significance ...
Prime MinisterLee (Hsien Loong) on his part stated that the ‘Japan center’ could serve as the foundation for Japan to exert its soft power in Southeast Asia,
and proposed that the two countries jointly produce television programs that showcased information on Japanese culture and lifestyles for broadcasting
throughout Southeast Asia and that the two countries collaborate in interactive media industry”.38Perhaps the Japan-Singapore model of cultural
collaboration can be tried out in Japan’s relations with other Southeast Asian countries, and China and South Korea in the next decade. Rather than just a
one-way street in which Tokyo seeks to
• promote its culture and “soft power” in East Asia, it should also
explore joint ventures to encourage Southeast Asia, China and South
Korea to establish their cultural centers in Japan. An acceptance and
appreciation of the contemporary cultures of other East Asian
countries by Japan will probably make them even more receptive to
Japanese “soft power”. And if Japan can settle the history issue with its
neighbors, Japanese “soft power” will be further enhanced in the
region.
Taiwan Informal DiplomacyTaiwan Informal Diplomacy
• In 1996, the Republic of China on Taiwan enjoyed formal diplomatic
relations with 32 other states.
• By April 1998, the number had fallen to 28
• In 2019 – 17 countries recognizes ROC
6.5.2019
6
Recognition of TaiwanRecognition of Taiwan
Africa – 1 Eswatini
Europe – 1 Holy See
Oceania – 6 Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau
Solomon Islands, Tuvalu
Caribbean – 4 Haiti, Saint Kitts and Navis, Saint Lucia,
Saint Vincent and the Genadines
Central America – 4 Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua
South America – 1 Paraguay
Taiwan Informal DiplomacyTaiwan Informal Diplomacy
• The largest and most important was South Africa which had always
maintained consular relations with Taipei, and upgraded its
representation to ambassadorial level in 1976.
• There was never any reason to suspect that the situation might change.
President Nelson Mandela had said on several occasions that his
government would not switch diplomatic recognition to Beijing at the
expense of Taiwan
Taiwan Informal DiplomacyTaiwan Informal Diplomacy
• 31 December 1997, Pretoria recognized the Communist government
of the People’s Republic of China and severed all formal links with
Taiwan.
• o mark the occasion Beijing and Pretoria issued a joint communiqué,
declaring that:
– ‘The government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal
government representing the whole of China’, and stated that South
Africa ‘recognizes China’s position that Taiwan is an inalienable part
of China’
Taiwan Informal DiplomacyTaiwan Informal Diplomacy
• The development of informal diplomatic relations with South Africa is
particularly illuminating.
• In 1996, the ROC was South Africa’s sixth largest trading partner,
while South Africa was the ROC’s biggest trading partner in Africa.
• South Africa was the main market for consumer goods that were
produced in Taiwan, while Taiwan bought coal and uranium from
South Africa.
• Depending on which source one consults, Taiwan interests owned
anything between 120 and over 285 factories in South Africa
Taiwan Informal DiplomacyTaiwan Informal Diplomacy
• There are also reports of cooperation in military intelligence and
nuclear research.
• As the President of the ROC, Lee Tenghui, said upon his return from
a visit to Singapore in July 1988:
– ‘When a country wishes to have diplomatic relations with Peking, it
does not necessarily mean that the ROC has to sever its contact with
that country. Peking’s diplomatic gains, in other words, need not be
interpreted as the ROC’s total loss as it has been.
Pragmatic DiplomacyPragmatic Diplomacy
• Following Pretoria’s announcement that it would sever relations at the
end of 1997, Taipei decided to cancel 36 mostly bilateral economic
agreements with South Africa.
• This was a most revealing development; among the projects
abandoned was investment in a petrochemical plant by a Taiwanese
consortium of private and public companies.
– Otherwise straightforward commercial deal was cancelled by a political
decision taken in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
– Evidence suggests that this may be a characteristic of the structure of
informal diplomacy
6.5.2019
7
Pragmatic DiplomacyPragmatic Diplomacy
• The opening of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office (formerly
the Far Eastern Trading Company, which, commented Senator William
O’Chee, ‘sounds like a couple of guys selling noodles’) in
Canberra, Australia, in 1991 was tempered by caution:
– the Australian Foreign Minister announced that this ‘did not imply any
departure from Australia’s strict adherence to the one China policy’
Pragmatic DiplomacyPragmatic Diplomacy
• By 1996, the ROC had three representative offices in Toronto,
Vancouver and Ottawa, all of which are called the Taipei Economic
and Cultural Office.
• Meanwhile, in 1995, a Taipei Economic and Cultural Centre was
opened in New Delhi, paving the way for a reciprocal move by the
Indian government (opening the India-Taipei Association) in the ROC.
• Understandably, the ROC celebrated a 1992 fisheries pact with Russia,
but its significance was downplayed by the Russians themselves.
– One official described it merely as ‘a low-scale commercial deal’
Informal DiplomacyInformal Diplomacy
• The ROC no longer wishes to force other governments to choose
between the ROC and PRC. Pragmatism allows previously hesitant
governments to inch closer to Taipei while continuing formal relations
with Beijing.22 As Byron S. J. Weng wrote in 1984, Taiwan ‘is a unique
international entity to which substantive, if less than full diplomatic
recognition is given in a semi-formal manner’
• Linjun Wu, informal relations help Taiwan ‘at a minimum, to uphold
the political status quo, to maintain economic prosperity and to avoid
being further politically isolated’
HowHow doesdoes informalinformal diplomacydiplomacy workwork??
• Taiwan’s contacts with other states have been regular and close, and these
have been facilitated by the large number of representative offices that are
found in those countries that do not recognize the ROC
• Unlike the so-called ‘diplomatic fronts’, which are representative
organizations having genuine ‘cover’ functions (for example trade),
representative offices are openly diplomatic in purpose and method.
• They have a larger staff and more resources to devote to diplomacy than the
diplomatic fronts.
• These offices are all forced by the international political climate to use the
word ‘Taipei’ in their title; ‘Taiwan’ suggests acceptance of a two-China
policy, whereas ‘Republic of China’ is offensive to Beijing
Informal DiplomacyInformal Diplomacy
• Through this diplomacy, the ROC influences the policy choices of other
states, cooperating and resolving its differences with them.
• In all but name and formal structure, Taiwan’s informal diplomacy is little
different from the kind of diplomacy pursued by so-called ‘legitimate’ and
recognized international political actors.
• Indeed the high number of formal agreements reached between Taipei and
Washington during the Clinton administration, covering everything from
trade to immigration, arms sales to education, postage and technical
cooperation, and including a series of unofficial visits of high-ranking
personnel between the two countries (including reciprocal visits by leaders of
both governments), suggest that formal nonrecognition is simply a hindrance
rather than an obstacle to effective diplomatic relations
• One member of Clinton’s administration has observed that this unofficial
relationship ‘is closer and more productive than the official diplomatic ties we
have with many countries’
Informal DiplomacyInformal Diplomacy
• The growing number of high-level reciprocal visits between the ROC
and New Zealand were defined as ‘unofficial’ but this did not prevent
speculation that the delegations had discussed matters of great
importance to both sides
• G. R. Berridge has observed that non-recognition can make even
informal diplomacy difficult, especially if the nation, state or
government concerned is not a member of the United Nations.
6.5.2019
8
Informal DiplomacyInformal Diplomacy
• It is then unable to take full advantage of informal meetings which take place,
for example in the corridors of the UN or at working funerals.
• The only heads of state or government to attend Chiang Kai-shek’s memorial
service in 1975 were Premier Kim Jong Pil of South Korea, and the Prime
Minister of the Central African Republic, Elizabeth Domitien.
• The American delegation was led by Vice President Rockefeller, though the
first choice was Earl Butz, the US Secretary of State for Agriculture.
• His absence was a slight for the ROC and a reflection of deteriorating
relations between the two governments.
• Similarly, the only foreign leaders to attend Chiang Ching-kuo’s funeral in
1988 were Premier Kim Chung Yul of South Korea, and President Clarence
Segnoret of the Dominican Republic.
Sport DiplomacySport Diplomacy
• For millennia, there has been a close relationship between politics,
diplomacy, and sport. During the Ancient Olympiad, for example, the
Truce was an aspirational ideal that aimed to offer travelling fans and
competitors’ protection during the Games. The “Greek word (for
truce) ekecheiria, ‘a staying of the hand’” conferred on the Games a
sanctity, an immunity from attack during the tournament
Sport DiplomacySport Diplomacy
• Like music or art, sport is a universal language that can transcend
acrimonious diplomatic relationships, offer high profile pathways for
dialogue beyond the negotiating table and, idealistically, unite disparate
nations and their publics through a mutual affection for physical
exercise, competition and games.
• As Nelson Mandela (2000) noted
– sport has the power to change the world. It has the power to inspire.
It has the power to unite people in a way that little else does. Sport can
awaken hope where there was previously only despair. Sport speaks to
people in a language they can understand.
Sport DiplomacySport Diplomacy
• If, for instance, a government wins the rights to host a megaevent such
as the World Cup, billions of foreign perceptions about the host
country can be enhanced over a period of weeks.
• In the pluralistic, modern diplomatic environment sport can positively
attract ‘others’ to the attributes of the host country and in this sense it
is a potent soft power tool.
– However, for cynics and sceptics, sports diplomacy is amorphous,
idealised, often exploited by politicians or rogue actors and nothing
more than a parody of international relations;
Sport DiplomacySport Diplomacy
• When thinking of traditions in sports diplomacy, its most obvious
form is as a tool that governments consciously and sporadically
employ to achieve foreign policy goals. Sport, in other words, is a
diplomatic means to foreign policy ends
• Jackson and Haigh (2008: 354) argue that when this happens, sport is
‘coopted by politics.’ Well aware of the power of sport to mediate,
sublimate or, in more egregious cases, increase separation, states of all
kinds have long been drawn to sport and sporting competitions.
Sport DiplomacySport Diplomacy
• Athletes at the Olympic Games form a type of Olympic diplomatic
corps. East German officials used to advise their
• departing competitors, ‘you are sports-diplomats in track suits’. Of
course, such messages as these from the
• GDR and other governments were (p. 715) frowned upon by the IOC
as ‘politicizing’ the Games (in this case with
• Marxist–Leninist ideology), but the mission of Olympism is actually
strikingly similar.
6.5.2019
9
Olympics GamesOlympics Games
• On the surface and for the few weeks that they occur, these are great festivals
of sport; however, they also afford states tremendous diplomatic
opportunities.
• Obviously they provide a shop window for host nations to show off, be it
their athletic prowess, organisational capacities, culture, values or ideology.
• The right to host such an event can also be seen as a reward for good
international citizenship and one that creates significant avenues for public
diplomacy. As Grix and Lee (2013) suggest, the politically savvy governments
of China (2008 Olympic Games), South Africa (2010 World Cup) and Brazil
(2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics)
Olympics GamesOlympics Games
• coveted megaevents as ‘relatively cheap means of improving’ their
‘image, credibility, stature, economic competitiveness and (they hope)
ability to exercise agency on the international stage.’
• Over the course of the tournament, billions of people tune in, and if
the diplomatic posture, brand and message are thoughtfully crafted,
foreign publics can be engaged and influenced, not to mention the
trade opportunities that arise or the financial gains that host nations
can enjoy.
MegaeventsMegaevents
• Megaevents can also be used to reduce tensions, consolidate political
relationships or bring old enemies together, as was the intent behind
the 2002 World Cup, co-hosted by Japan and South Korea.
• However, disdain for a host nation can also be expressed via
megaevents or if so inclined a nation can boycott and say, simply, we’re
not playing. During the Euro 2012 football tournament, for example,
the British, Germans, Swedes and the European Union (EU)
boycotted any matches played in Ukraine because of the host nation’s
selective justice in the case of the jailed Ukrainian opposition leader
Yulia Tymoshenko
• Viviane Reading, the EU Justice Commissioner, pointed out that ‘you
cannot close your eyes on human rights, even during a great sporting
celebration’
• In more extreme cases, a nation can withdraw altogether, as was the
case when the US boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympics in response
to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a gesture reciprocated by the
Soviet Union and thirteen satellite states four years later at the 1984
Los Angeles Games. In the build-up to megaevents, there is usually an
equal focus on the politics of the host nation as there is on the sport.
• Traditional sports diplomacy is also a versatile tool within bilateral
relationships.
• For one, international sporting competition can allow states to test
possible policy shifts and bring leaders together.
• The best known example of this is Ping-Pong diplomacy, which
occurred after a warm, chance and wellpublicised meeting between
American player Glenn Cowan and the then Chinese World Champion
Zhuang Zedong at the World Table Tennis Championship in Nagoya,
Japan, in March 1971.
• More often than not sporting contests generate ad-hoc summits for high
profile politicians or leaders to meet informally.
• Various leaders of bitter rivals India and Pakistan, for instance, have
repeatedly met on the sidelines of cricket matches between their national
teams.
• These cricket diplomacy meetings have occurred since the early 1980s as a
way of decreasing tensions over nuclear ambitions, Kashmir, terrorism or any
number of other disputes.
• Similarly, the presidents of long-time adversaries Turkey and Armenia met
during two historic World Cup qualifying matches between their national
teams in 2008 and 2009, a gesture that helped the eventual diplomatic
reconciliation between the two countries
6.5.2019
10
• Dilma Rousseff, Angela Merkel, Vladimir Putin and Jacob Zuma all
enjoyed a chat in the VVIP room before, during and after the half-time
break of the 2014 World Cup Final.
• On such occasions, international sport generates productive and
informal opportunities for leaders of states to come together.
• The Americans perhaps best embody this practice, first employing the famed
sprinter Jesse Owens as a goodwill ambassador to nations with questionable
attitudes toward racial integration in the 1960s.
• More recently, the State Department has employed dozens of sports envoys.
Two openly gay athletes – Billie Jean King (a retired tennis player) and Caitlin
Cahow (a hockey player) – figured prominently in the US delegation for the
opening and closing ceremonies of the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics.
• Their inclusion was both a response and challenge to Russia’s draconian antiLesbian,
Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) policies.
• China has also used specialist sports emissaries. Before the 2008 Olympic
Games, the giant basketball player Yao Ming was able to attract millions of
Chinese fans to the National Basketball Association (NBA) and, vice-versa,
expose millions of Americans to the ‘new’ China.
• Perhaps because most Americans love innovation and sports, as well as their
pioneering spirit, the American State Department was the first player to
experiment with a more sustainable, amateur and inclusive form of sports
diplomacy.
• A proactive 2.0 form emerged at the turn of the last century when America
sought to boost its public diplomacy profile abroad and complement other
soft power tools (such as Voice of America or the Fulbright scholar program)
with exchanges built around sport.
• The State Department’s flagship initiative is SportsUnited, which aims ‘to build
ever-strengthening relations between the United States and other nations
[and] which uses the universal passion for sports as a way to transcend
linguistic and sociocultural differences’ (Sports Diplomacy, n.d.).
• Remarking on the initiative, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
(2011)
– noted that: … our sports exchanges are the most popular exchanges
we do. When I go to other countries and we talk about what kind of
exchanges that people are looking for, very often a leader will say, how
about a sports exchange?
• On the other side of the Atlantic, the British Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (FCO) provides a second, richer example of
sports diplomacy 2.0.
• States, CSOs, foreign publics, players, coaches, etc., have formed a
network bound and driven by a common interest in sport and the right
to play.
• Seeking to capitalise on the London 2012 Olympic Games, the FCO
coordinated a network – the British Council, UNICEF, UK Sport, Comic
Relief, Laureus Sport for Good Foundation, the Youth Sport Trust, and
individual donors – which designed and implemented a sports legacy
programme called International Inspiration (II).
• At heart, the programme sought to ‘enrich the lives of children and young
people of all abilities, in schools and communities across the world,
particularly in developing countries, through the power of high quality and
inclusive physical education (PE), sport and play’ (International Inspiration,
2014).
• In other words, II hoped to get more children playing sport by educating,
funding and helping schools and governments develop sustainable
programmes built around games and exercise.
• According to Ecorys (2014), an external consultancy firm hired to
evaluate the success of the initiative, the programme exceeded all initial
key performance indicators.
• The programme ran for seven years (2007–2014) and during this time
‘over 25 million children and young people were enriched; 55 national
policies, strategies and legislative changes were influenced and over
250,000 practitioners (teachers, coaches and leaders) trained in over 21
countries’
6.5.2019
11
• By sheer volume II was a success and, in the sports diplomacy 2.0
context, the FCO successfully managed and coordinated a network of
actors, created a favourable impression amongst millions of people
overseas and learned ‘important lessons for the future of other sport
and development programmes’ (Ecorys, 2014: 11).
• Moreover, the programme shied away from using high profile
politicians and professional sports people preferring amateurs such as
teachers, coaches and children.
• China has a long history of old and new sports diplomacy.
• Likewise, Japan invests heavily in domestic and international football in
order to overcome imperial stereotypes and better reflect ‘a level
worthy of its economic power and overall achievements after 40 years
of postwar peace and prosperity’ (Manzenreiter, 2008: 417).
• Cuba’s public diplomacy continues to focus on sports as a ‘vitally
important mechanism for furthering the causes of the Cuban
revolution and garnering international admiration and respect’
• Sport is used by governments as a vehicle to proselytise the values that certain
nations often champion.
• For example, Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s new
sports diplomacy programme focusses on participation, gender equality,
discipline and teamwork.
• Instead of being geared around elite-to-elite theatre, version 2.0 targets and
embraces the amateur levels of sport, not just the megaevents and superstars.
• The attraction for governments is partly practical. Sports diplomacy 2.0 is
relatively ‘low-risk, low-cost and high profile’ (Keech and Houlihan, 1999:
112).
• Moreover, by engaging with new methods, the culture of a state’s
diplomacy can be less aloof, hermetic and ‘dead’ and more innovative,
effective, public and even fun (Ramsay, 2006: 273). Perhaps the most
significant lesson to be drawn from the above examples is that
traditional diplomatic institutions are but one actor among a cast of
others. In the British case, the FCO participated, coordinated and
facilitated; but it did not direct.
• further understand the concept of sports diplomacy, regimes, clubs and
individuals can be thought of as diplomatic actors.
• A postpositivist theory – one that ‘encompasses a broader range of actors
and processes’ than a state-centric, rationalist understanding of diplomacy –
facilitates such an exercise (Pigman, 2013: 78).
• Seen through this lens, powerful non-state actors such as the International
Olympic Committee (IOC), multinational corporations, security, television
and media outlets, teams and prominent sporting heroes, national sports
associations and CSOs all continuously and diplomatically interact to make
international sport possible in the first place (Pigman, 2013: 78).
• The actors that constitute these vast sporting networks have been
briefly studied. Murray and Pigman (2013), for example, argue that
powerful administrative institutions such as the International Olympic
Committee (IOC) and the Fédération Internationale de Football
Association (FIFA) can be thought of as para-diplomatic actors. They
practise core diplomatic functions such as negotiation,
6.5.2019
12
• communication and representation; they have interests and agendas to pursue; they have charters,
constitutions,presidents and mission statements which define their objectives and guide their
interactions; and they have institutional structures, rules, norms and flags, which they use in ‘a highly
selfconscious effort to brand themselves and their sport’ (Murray and Pigman, 2013: 14). Considering
the benefits a megaevent can generate for host nations – anything from new infrastructure to public
diplomacy opportunities – these international sporting regimes are immensely powerful, and states will
go to great lengths to secure certain tournaments. Paying exorbitant amounts of money just to bid for
the tournament, states covet the Olympics or World Cup just as athletes and national teams would a
medal or trophy. Little wonder that senior representatives from the IOC or FIFA presidents are given
the red carpet treatment wherever they go. The same can be said of the role certain superstar athletes
play in international relations, off the pitch, court or running track. Borrowing from Cooper’s work on
celebrity diplomacy, Roger Federer, Usain Bolt or Leo Messi can be considered as celebrity sporting
diplomats, people who ‘[use] the attention they receive to focus the cameras on international issues’
(Cooper, 2008: 7). Messi, for instance, acts as a Goodwill Sports Ambassador at Team UNICEF, using
his profile to raise awareness of children’s rights, health, education and sport all over the world. In a
postpositivist view, even clubs such as Messi’s F.C. Barcelona, the New York Yankees or Manchester
United (with its 650 million fans) can also be considered as ‘significant diplomatic actors in
contemporary international affairs’ according to Rofe (2014: 1136).
• The list of actors in international sport is a long one – non-profit CSOs such
as the Beyond Sport Foundation, the MNCs that sponsor sport on a global
scale and the television companies that screen events are also notable
diplomatic players. This acceptance illustrates several vital points for those
interested in sports diplomacy 2.0: the international sporting system is
extremely complex, much more than simply megaevent tournaments or a
superstar basketballer touring Africa under the auspices of the UN in the offseason.
Sports diplomacy can be thought of a series of domestic and
international networks that continuously interact and often overlap in order to
make sport possible in the first place. To boost public diplomacy efforts,
governments are increasingly tapping into these networks.
THE LIMITATIONS OF SPORTSTHE LIMITATIONS OF SPORTS
DIPLOMACYDIPLOMACY
• Compared to some of the major issues in twenty-first-century international relations – terrorism, poverty and climate change, to
name but a few – sports diplomacy is a generally positive phenomenon. Granted, many states will continue to use sport to further
self-serving national interests and foreign policy goals. However, it is important to remember the core, diplomatic components of
sports diplomacy: to overcome separation between disparate peoples, nations and states and to reduce misunderstandings between
‘them’ and ‘us’ by demonstrating that strangers speak a shared, universal language of sport. For the most part, sports diplomacy
aims to foster peace and unity, not conflict and (more) separation. For sports diplomacy to realise its potential, however, a frank
appraisal of its limitations is important. This is not to support its detractors but to encourage thinking, collaboration and
scholarship on ways to overcome or at least negate certain received truisms about sport, international relations and diplomacy.
Below, six limitations are presented (although the list is by no means exhaustive). First, the rhetoric this chapter began with – that
‘sport has the power to change the world’ – could suggest that sport is some magical remedy that has hitherto been neglected or
ignored by theorists and practitioners. This is quite incorrect. It is self-evident that sport alone cannot eliminate poverty in Africa,
encourage gender equality, women’s rights or the right to play in traditional, fundamentalist societies. These types of sportdevelopment
or sport-for-peace projects have been going on for decades with limited or mixed results.2 Such projects will
continue but they are increasingly being subsumed under broader sports diplomacy strategies orchestrated by diplomats. As a
result, the capacity for sport to contribute, in part, to alleviating some of the major problems of our time will improve. Second,
sport and politics do mix, like it or loathe it. For idealists, sport has a ‘spiritual power’ (Redeker, 2008: 499) and exists in a hallowed
realm ‘above’ (Allison, 1993: 5) government, untainted by the divisiveness of politics. The reality of the relationship between
sport, diplomacy and politics suggests otherwise. In the lead up to the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, for example, Russia was
accused by many states of graft,3 illegal dumping of construction waste, forced evictions, bizarre anti-LGBT policies and disputes
with Circassian nationalists demanding Russia apologise for its genocidal policies of the nineteenth century. All the while,
however, Russia insisted that sport and politics should not mix (just as the Chinese government claimed during the lead up to the
2008
• Beijing Olympics) and that concerned leaders, states and members of the global public should focus on the sport. Such rhetoric is
problematic. Sport and politics have always mixed and always will. In the pluralistic, twenty-first century the ‘mixing’ of sport
should be considered as a given. Russia’s typical behaviour also alludes to a third limitation of sports diplomacy: the temporal
reality of megaevents. These huge tournaments are a unique feature of international relations. No other event has the ability to
unify and rally states, CSOs, global publics and media, who often use the tournament as a vehicle to express dissatisfaction with
the host nation. However, any political and diplomatic opportunities occur before the event. When the actual games begin, sport
takes over and concerns over shoddy human rights records, corruption, the plight of the oppressed and so on are immediately
forgotten. For example, the pressure on Russia before the Sochi Winter Olympics evaporated as soon as the first starter’s pistol
was fired. Positive, diplomatic messages and pressure were lost to sport during and after the tournament. Just weeks after the 2014
Sochi Winter Olympics closing ceremony, Russia began meddling in Ukrainian politics (just as they did in Georgia after the 2008
Olympics) and it played a vital role in the annexation of Crimea and the war waged by so-called separatist rebels in Eastern
Ukraine. In a matter of weeks, the megaevent is over, concerns are forgotten, the global public begins salivating over the next
glamorous festival of sport and the host nation is left to behave as it did before the event. The challenge for those interested in
further developing sports diplomacy is to overcome the temporal nature of megaevents and build real, lasting diplomatic legacies
during and after significant tournaments. A fourth limitation of sports diplomacy is that just as sport can bring people and nations
together it can also drive them apart. It can increase estrangement, in other words. In international sport, the anthems, flags and
sense of tribe all heighten feelings of
• nationalism, sometimes in a manner unbefitting of diplomacy. During the 2004 Asian Cup hosted by China, for
example, the Japanese team was hounded everywhere they played. Chinese spectators heckled the players, sang
‘anti-Japanese songs from the war of liberation and displayed banners reading “Look into history and apologize
to the Asian People”, or “Return the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands!”’ (Manzenreiter, 2008: 423). In this case, sport
contradicted a core diplomatic function: the minimisation of friction in international affairs. In addition, sport
and violence are sometimes inextricably linked. In the past, terrorists have used sport as a way of spreading
anti-diplomatic messages to vast, global audiences. Jackson and Haigh (2008: 351) note that, between 1972 and
2005, ‘171 sport-related terrorist attacks have been logged’. The most egregious example was the 1972 Munich
Games tragedy when eleven Israeli athletes were kidnapped and eventually murdered by Black September, a
radical Palestinian organization. A week after the incident the group issued the following statement: A bomb in
the White House, a mine in the Vatican, the death of Mao-Tse-tung, an earthquake in Paris could not have
echoed through the consciousness of every man in the world like the operation at Munich … the choice of the
Olympics, from a purely propagandistic viewpoint was 100 percent successful. It was like painting the name of
Palestine on a mountain that can be seen from the four corners of the earth. (In Toohey, 2008: 434) Just as
sports can disseminate and represent positive values about unity, fair play and harmony, there has sometimes
been an undeniable association between sport and terrorism, war, violence and separation. Fifth, this occasional
disconnect between sporting idealism and reality is given further credence by briefly discussing the diplomatic
qualities of sporting administrators and their behemoth organisations. In the formal world of diplomacy, Satow
(2009:
• attaches great importance to dignity, self-control, empathy (‘to listen and not to talk’), calmness, fairness,
humility, virtue and so on. Professional diplomats are also accountable to both the sending and receiving state
and are legally bound to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the 1963 Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations. Conversely, international sporting organisations and their staff are not
bound by any such rules or norms. As such, large, influential sporting organisations such as FIFA, the IOC or
the International Cricket Council (ICC) often make headlines for behaviour, customs and practices that are
hardly diplomatic (at least in terms of how Satow and others have imagined it). The Salt Lake City ‘bribery
scandal’, where six IOC officials who accepted gifts and ‘hundreds of thousands of dollars’ from local officials
were sacked, serves a historic case in point (The Guardian, 1999). More recently, FIFA’s behaviour has come
under intense scrutiny from the BBC, the Sunday Times newspaper and the Swiss Government (FIFA’s HQ is
in Zurich). As one, they have accused FIFA of ticket scandals, vote-rigging during presidential elections
(incumbent President, Joseph ‘Sepp’ Blatter, was the only candidate in the last election) and bribery and
negligence, particularly over the award of the 2022 World Cup to Qatar, a tiny desert nation of two million
people with a dreadful human rights record and summer temperatures that exceed 50°C. The FIFA President
and his all-powerful Executive Committee engage in one-way communication with the public, any negotiation
with states that bid for the World Cup is rather one-sided and who or what does FIFA actually represent?
Indeed, can FIFA, the IOC or the ICC be considered diplomatic at all? As noted earlier, further research is
required to answer such questions. Such questions relate to the sixth and final limitation: the diplomatic calibre
of the sports diplomats themselves. As Murray and Pigman (2013: 8) note, there seems to be:
6.5.2019
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• [a] disconnect between competitors used as national representatives and the bulk of their fellow sportsmen and
women. Those chosen to become sports envoys embody the aspirational version of sport that governments
imagine and are thus unrepresentative of real sport. Success in sport does not equate to success in diplomacy.
Compared with the number of senior sportspeople that play and have played, only a few are considered fit for
envoy or ambassadorial work. Many will never be considered at all. Moreover, perhaps many sportspeople
wouldn’t want the job. The case of the boxer Mohammed Ali, who had ‘no quarrel with them Viet Cong’,
comes to mind. Sports envoys such as David Beckham – handsome, charming and instantly recognisable –
seem to be the exception rather than the rule. Former NBA superstar player Dennis Rodman’s odd, alcohol
fuelled 2014 outburst at a CNN reporter who questioned his motives during his third visit to the basketball
loving North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un revealed a stark truth: not every sportsperson can be a sports
diplomat. The six limitations mentioned above help to confirm that there can be a dark side to sport. However,
the same can be said of diplomacy. Like diplomacy, the failures of international sport seem to attract more
interest than its successes. Egregious examples such as the Fascist Games (the 1936 Olympics and 1938 World
Cup, which Mussolini’s ‘black shirts’ won, incidentally) are well known, and perhaps account for the trepidation
many governments recently showed about consciously ‘mixing’ sport and politics. Consequently, and as noted,
the traditional co-option of sport by states has often been rather clumsy, opportunistic, short-lived and centred
at the elite level. Relatively speaking, however, it should be remembered that examples of bad sports diplomacy
are the exception rather than the norm. If an objective perspective is adopted, the observer will realise that
sport often celebrates the best of humanity and generally brings people together.
Benefits of Sport DiplomacyBenefits of Sport Diplomacy
• There are seven reasons why governments are
increasingly attracted to using international sport as a
diplomatic tool.
• First, the post–Cold War diplomatic environment has forced
governments to reform, change, and experiment with the way they
conduct diplomacy. Moving toward new and innovative forms of
diplomacy is one way to counter the irrelevance, obsolescence, and
deliquescence arguments consistently levelled at traditional diplomacy
and its culture. Sports-diplomacy is a proactive, original, and
pioneering form of engagement that illustrates to the public at home
and abroad that a state’s diplomacy is no longer elite, aloof, and out-ofdate
but reforming to maximise the new diplomatic network
opportunities that the twenty-first century offers.
• The second flows from the first. Sport and sporting institutions are increasing
in scope, power, and appeal. Always perceptive to the whims of the public,
post–Cold War governments are keen to coat-tail on the growth in sport and
the relevance of powerful non-state actors such as the Fédération
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) or sporting demi-gods like Yao
Ming. Nobody is opposed to sports: it has global appeal: “who is against
sport? No one, or almost no one. The Inuits are as interested in the World
Cup as the Argentineans, Congolese, and Europeans.”28 Moreover, amongst
the public there appears to be a collective moral myopia when it comes to
sport: if only the public saw politicians and diplomats in the same light.29
Governments hope to tap into some of that sporting magic, and who can
bemoan or criticise them: better sport that nuclear weapons.
• Third, sport as a soft power overture, as a means bringing estranged
peoples, nations, and states closer together or a way of demonstrating
the collegiality of a relationship, is today a far more effective method
of diplomacy than its traditional variant. Diplomatic outreach through
hard power and diplomacy built on the high politics of arms treaties,
border demarcation, or alliances—whilst, obviously, still important—
does not engage or hold the same amount of attention amongst the
public as it once did. In the post-modern information age, sport,
culture, and diplomacy are proving that they are no longer niche or
deliquescent institutions but relevant foreign policy tools.
• Sport, fourthly, is a major part of modern life and driven by an Akirastyle media is
worldwide in its audience. Sporting mega-events like the World Cup and the
Olympic Games can offer host nations significant opportunities to boost
engagement with the foreign public through sport. In 2008, after an often-farcical
build-up to the most expensive Olympics in history, Beijing proselytised an image
of China as a rising, modern economic, and sporting powerhouse aligned with the
gracious values the Olympic movement aspires to embody. The Chinese
Communist Party used the Games to assert its identity at home and abroad and
gained much praise from “the recognition of its technical and organizational
competencies and the ostentatious showcasing of its economic power.”30
Similarly, awarded both the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympics, Brazil
will likely promote itself as a responsible and major player in the international
community, a safe, welcoming, and secure host, and assert itself as a regional
leader in terms of its economy, its society, and its sport.
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14
• The fifth reason that sport and diplomacy are moving closer concerns representation. As an
institution, diplomacy supposedly represents the business of peace and the notion of
international order and stable society amidst international anarchy. Through negotiation,
compromise, and conciliation based on clear and accurate communication, it embodies
noble values and its practitioners are men and women of “truth, accuracy, calm, patience,
good temper, modesty, (and) loyalty” (at least on paper).31 Likewise, sport represents
honourable qualities and values that appeal to governments and their diplomats. The former
United States ambassador to Denmark, Jim Cain, said as much at the Second Hague
Conference in Diplomacy in 2009: Sports can be a powerful medium to reach out and build
relationships . . . across cultural and ethnic divides, with a positive message of shared values:
values such as mutual respect, tolerance, compassion, discipline, equality of opportunity and
the rule of law. In many ways, sports can be a more effective foreign policy resource than
the carrot or the stick.32 Sports-diplomacy exchanges can promote international
understanding and friendship, as well as dispel stereotypes and prejudices. Not to mention,
they are also “low-risk, low-cost and high profile
• Sixth, diplomacy and sport share other loose affiliations amplified by
globalisation. Just as the soldier is no longer a soldier but also an aid worker, a
construction worker, a diplomat, and so on, the same is true of both the
diplomat and the sportsperson. Their roles are changing and public demand
exists for more awareness of social responsibility by both professions. Under
such conditions, sport and diplomacy have naturally gravitated toward one
another: patriots representing their state as a privilege of international duty
staff both institutions and, whether it is the roundtable or the running track,
both sports people and diplomats want to win for their state. Therefore, there
is an obvious symbiosis
• Finally, estranged states can use sport as a way of exploring the normalisation of diplomatic relations.
The best example is, of course, the 1971 case of Ping-Pong diplomacy between Chinese and American
table tennis players. These games paved the way for the normalisation of relations between the Peoples’
Republic and the United States—after 23 years of Cold War animosity—pursued by Henry Kissinger
and, subsequently, effected by President Richard Nixon’s landmark visit to Beijing in February 1972. A
more recent example involves the cricket-diplomacy between Pakistan and India. After years of
acrimony, suspicion, and near war brought on by nuclear brinkmanship, the Kashmir crises, and the
scourge of terror, Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani accepted an invitation from his Indian
counterpart, Manmohan Singh, to attend the Cricket World Cup semi-final match between the South
Asian rivals in March 2011. The occasion constituted “an attempt to use sport to create a feel-good
atmosphere between the two countries at a time when the atmosphere of suspicion and hostility
towards Pakistan in India is very strong.”36 Tapping into the “Mohali Spirit”—the special atmosphere—
Singh and Gilani met again on 10 November 2011 in the Maldives when attending a South Asian
Association for Regional Co-operation meeting and promised to open “a new chapter” in bilateral
relations.37
Trump and Golf DiplomacyTrump and Golf Diplomacy
• Golf diplomacy humanizes world leaders
• Golf diplomacy is the regular practice of country leaders playing golf
together, which can help bolster ties between countries
• Golf in China
– Golf is controversial in China and party officials are essentially banned from
playing.
– Since Mao Zedong called golf a "sport for millionaires," it has occupied a
moral grey area in a Communist country trying to operate a capitalist
economy. And though Xi could probably afford a golf club membership, the
sport remains politically taboo, even for the country's leader.
Trump and Golf DiplomacyTrump and Golf Diplomacy
• Golf diplomacy is popular between leaders because it encompasses
critical aspects of traditional diplomacy — having open
communication and strengthening ties between leaders — in a relaxed,
low-pressure environment.
• Ahead of a game with Abe earlier this year, Trump said "that's the one
thing about golf; you get to know somebody better on a golf course
than you will over lunch."
AbeAbe and Trumpand Trump –– 20172017
6.5.2019
15
‘Golf diplomacy’ under fire as Japanese Prime Minister‘Golf diplomacy’ under fire as Japanese Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe courts US President Donald TrumpShinzo Abe courts US President Donald Trump
• South China Morning Post
• https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/2111846/golf-
diplomacy-under-fire-japanese-prime-minister-shinzo-abe
– Abe was the first foreign leader to meet Trump after his election victory in
November, bearing as a gift a US$3,000 gold-plated golf club
– He returned in February for discussions on trade, security and other bilateral
issues, with Trump inviting him to his Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida where the two
leaders played a 27-hole round of golf over five hours.
– Explaining his philosophy ahead of the game, Trump told reporters: “That’s the
one thing about golf; you get to know somebody better on a golf course than you
will over lunch.”
– Opposition politicians in Tokyo were less impressed with the prime minister’s
plans, with Seiji Mataichi, the head of the Social Democratic Party, telling a news
conference Abe was going to “embarrassing” lengths to curry favour with Trump.
• Abe and Trump – 2017 - at Trump’s resort with the owner of the Super Bowl
Champion New England Patriots
– test in Applied Asian Diplomacy Between the summit with Abe, the North
Korean missile test, and the phone call with Chinese President Xi Jinping, and
he passed.
– Trump affirmed the “One China” policy after saying the United States should
not be bound by it, responded to North Korea’s test with measured tones and
didn’t overreact on Twitter, and reaffirmed the U.S. alliance with Japan after
attacking them on the campaign trail.
– Given Defense Secretary James Mattis’s successful visit to South Korea and
Japan the week before, the Trump administration’s Asia policy appears fairly
conventional and consistent with past U.S. policy.
• Less than two weeks after Trump's January inauguration Abe again visited the
US and played 18 holes with Trump — one of the first times the president
had played since taking office.
• And on Trump's recent visit to Japan, Abe organized for the two to play nine
holes with Japan's Hideki Matsuyama, the world's No. 4 golf player, before
gifting Trump with a golf cap emblazoned with the two leaders' names.
• Abe even described his actions as golf diplomacy during Trump's visit.
• "Yesterday's diplomacy between Donald and me attracted so much attention,
and we actually made everything public, except for the score. When you play
golf with someone not just once, but for two times, the person must be your
favorite guy," said Abe.
• The closeness of the two leaders is also evident in the frequency of
their communications. Aside from the two visits and games of golf,
Abe has spoken to Trump 13 times on the phone — more than he did
with Obama during his second term in office.
XiXi JinpingJinping and Trumpand Trump
• Xi Jinping doesn't play golf. How will he and Trump talk shop at
Mar-a-Lago?
• Trump's golf diplomacy lands in the rough ahead of Xi Jinping
meeting
– Xi Jinping is unlikely to follow the example of Japan’s prime minister,
who joined Trump on the green: China long banned the ‘sport for
millionaires
• 24 – 28 April 2019
• Program:
– 25 April – Celebration of Recognition of PRC by Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic (4 October 1949)
• Soviet Union recognized PRC on 2nd October 1949
– 27 April – Meeting with Ren Zhengfei – founder of Huawei
6.5.2019
16
• Jaromír Jágr is to be the public face of the ice hockey tournament at
Beijing’s Winter Olympic Games in 2022. Jágr thus joins Canadian
legend Wayne Gretzky among the personalities that are helping
prepare and develop Chinese ice hockey
• The announcement came after a meeting between Czech President Miloš
Zeman and the Vice Premier of the Chinese State Council, Sun Chunlan, in
Lány on Monday.
• Jágr is not the only hockey star to become involved in developing hockey in
the Asian superpower. Wayne Gretzky recently announced his involvement as
well.
• Hockey expert Pavel Procházka from the Czech newspaper Deník N, which
broke the story, explains China’s motivation behind the move.
• “They are collecting the most famous players of ice hockey history in order to popularize the
sport in China. Wayne Gretzky has his own hockey school for young players and it seems
likely it will be open to Chinese talent as well.”
6.5.2019
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• t is not the first co-operation announcement between Czech representatives
of the sport and their Chinese counterparts. In 2017 a memorandum between
the Czech Ice Hockey Association and China was signed. It featured pledges
to cooperate in training camps for young players, coach exchanges and
methodology.
• The association’s spokesman, Zdeněk Zikmund, described ongoing activities.
• “It is more of a general document which serves as an umbrella for mutual activities on club
level. Nevertheless, some projects have already taken place.
• “For example, we had a group of Chinese players between the ages of 14-16 attend a week
long training camp. They were trained by Czech coaches. The players were also accompanied
by coaches from China, who received a number of specialised lectures.”
• In 1980, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States led
a boycott of the Moscow Olympics.
• And in 1984, Soviet bloc countries retaliated by boycotting the Los
Angeles Olympics.
• Air pollution was at least two to three times higher than levels deemed safe by
the World Health Organization
• In 2007 - Beijing committed to remove 60,000 taxis and buses from the roads
• Relocation of 200 local factories, including a prominent steel factory
• In 2008, stricter emergency pollution controls were introduced,
• including suspending production at more factories and coal-fired power
plants, lowering the number of cars on the road and expanding driving
restrictions to nearby Tianjin.
Olympic games and environmentalOlympic games and environmental
issuesissues
• Beijing ordered 40 factories in Tianjin and 300 factories in Tangshan to
begin suspend operations
• In July additional factories were shut down
• license plate restrictions which allowed Beijing motorists to drive on
alternate days only
• air quality in Beijing improved significantly against prior expectations
Olympic games and environmentalOlympic games and environmental
issuesissues
• Senator Hillary Clinton, D-Presidential Candidate: "The president
should not attend the opening ceremonies at the Olympics."
• Senator Barack Obama, D-Presidential Candidate: "I think it's
appropriate for the president to decline the invitation to the opening
ceremonies."
• Senator John Mccain, R-Presidential Candidate: "I would not go
to the opening ceremonies."
• However, President Bush says he will attend the Games. "I don't view
the Olympics as a political event. I view it as a sporting event," he said.
6.5.2019
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• The major state actors in China‟s public diplomacy system are the Office of
the Foreig n Propaganda of the Communist Party of China; State Council
Information Office; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and China‟s national leader
• The Olympic Games are a global multi - sport event that promotes realiza
tion of individual and collective dreams in sportsmanship and enhances
human interaction, friendship and solidarity (Olympic Charter, 2007, p. 1)
• According to Liu Qi, President of the Beijing Organising Committee for the
Olympic Games (BOCOG), 204 Olympic teams competed in 302 events at
37 venues, 12 and broke 38 world and 85 Olympic records (Xinhua, 2008).
• Beijing won its bid to host the 2008 Olympics against Toronto in July 2001
• Being hosted in China for the first time, the largest Games in the Olympic
history had the opening and closing ceremonies at the Beijing National
Stadium also known as the Bird‟s Nest. ,
• Despite China‟s celebration, Verena Harpe, a human rights expert at the
Amnesty International, reportedly remarked that China‟s human rights
situation had actually worsened, not in spite of the Olympics but because of
the Olympics (The Calgary Herald, 2008).
• While hosting the Olympics, and in an effort to be better appreciated, China
displayed its attractive culture in form of performances and entertainment,
art and music, food and dress as well their basic values and spirit to foster
mutual understand ing with the world.
• The Olympic dri ve also provided an opportunity for infrastructure
development, environmental improvements and city transformation leading
to a better reputation supportive of Beijing‟s business and tourism.
• Show to a global audience provides an opportunity for national branding
from the host country‟s corporate story as well as commercial product
branding.
• Besides branding, China used the event to show - case its recent remarkable
economic achievements, portray a successful brand image and promote
business and tourism opportunities, effectively utilising instant
communication, internet and social media.
• However, the foreign media also carried criticism of Chinese politics, Games
- related abuses and organisational m ishaps while some of its sections
manifested cynicism and hostility towards China. The Olympic Torch
routing from Athens to Beijing was blended with political signalling.
• It covered China‟s historical allies like South Korea, Russia and Tanzania; notable neighbours and
competitors like India, Japan and South Korea; and strategic allies and rivals including France, UK and
US.
• The Torch met some hostilities in California, London, New Delhi and Paris; skipped Taipei and delayed
to reach Lhasa as a statement of China‟s domestic and foreign policy challenges especially revolving
around Taiwan, Tibet and Trade ( Mahalo, 2008). Despite the setbacks, the Beijing Games were
successfully staged under three major themes of Green Olympics, High - Tech Olympics and People s
Olympics.
• The opening of the Beijing Olympics at the Bird‟s Nest Stadium, a four - hour dazzling ceremon y on
the auspicious 08/08/08, had 29 foot - print - fireworks; 2,008 drummers and 15,000 musicians staging
acrobatics in meticulous sequences. Centred on major Chinese inventions of gunpowder, compass
porcelain, papermaking, printing and fine arts, the 50 - minu te show overseen Zhang Yimou intricately
incorporated 5000 years of Chinese history.
• The Olympics bolstered China‟s soft power not just through Zhang Yimou‟s striking performance,
attractive culture an d rich national heritage, but also through masterpiece architecture, organisational
prowess and excellent athletic and music stars like Jackie Chan, Lang Lang and Liu Huan (Yang, 2009,
p. 17).
• Technological extravaganza depicted China‟s glorious past, a co nfident
present and a promising future in tandem with modernisation.
• International television networks, internet highways, social and print media
lent themselves to China‟s cause in furtherance of its appeal to the world
despite some criticism and negative images they occasionally transmitted.
• With the Games and opening ceremony variously described by IOC
President as truly exceptional; by Philippines President Gloria Arroyo as the
world‟s most memorable Olympics ; and by George Bush as spectacular and
succe ssful , China effectively used the Olympics as a tool of public
diplomacy.
• the Olympics spotlighted China‟s human rights record, the situation
worsened in March 2008 when government violently cracked down on
Tibetan protesters;
• President Hu Jintao felt the Olympic - pressure when Spielberg and 80
Nobel laureates, politicians and artists wrote to him urging his
leverage to end human suffering in Darfur. As the G ames drew
closer, suspected terrorists linked to East Turkistan Movement killed
16 policemen and injured 16 others in an attack in China‟s Xinjiang
Uygur Autonomous Region on 4 August 2008.
6.5.2019
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• Besides, rumours that terrorists would put a bomb on Air China and crash it
in the National Stadium led to more apprehension and heightened security
measures, and prompted Chinese government security assurances nextday
after opening the Games, an American tourist was stabbed and killed in
Beijing by a Chinese national before jumping to his death; an act that cast
doubt on security assurances
• Intensive tree planting, factory closures and relocations and demobilisation
of 1.3 million vehicles achieved desired air quality just in the nick of time for
the Games to avoid an Olympic embarrassment
• Revelations that the exciting 29 footprint fireworks were not real but a
computer animation attracted strong criticism to the organizers
ControversiesControversies
• Torch Relay
– The torch relay became truly political and caused many protests,
mainly in London, Paris and San Francisco
• Human rights
Chinese political strategies
• Opening ceremony
– the main messages of the opening ceremony were „harmony‟,
„peace‟, „unity‟ and „power and innovation‟
– The Chinese could not omit to present their main inventions given to
the world
• papermaking, movable type printing, the compass and gunpowder.
– The timing of the opening ceremony at 8:08 pm sharp, August 8,
2008 is in perfect symbiosis with Chinese numerology, where the
number 8 symbolizes „prosperity, fortune, happiness, and good luck‟
– presenting 56 Chinese ethnic groups
AnimalAnimal DiplomacyDiplomacy
• Although China’s panda diplomacy is the most well-known, it is far from the
only country using cute animal in order to drive their political agenda.
• In fact, Julie Bishop, the former minister of foreign affairs in Australia
“ranked koala cuddling first among other soft power strategies that help build
a stronger, connected and more prosperous region”.
• The koala diplomacy was on full display during G20 leader’s meeting in 2014
where Obama and Putin were given the animal to cuddle in front of the
world’s media.
• Vietnam sent elephants to Mao Zedong on various occasions during the
1950’s
• Turkmenistan gifted Xi Jinping with a “heavenly horse” back in 2014.
• China being the biggest customer for natural gas from Turkmenistan might
have something to do with the sudden majestic endowment.
6.5.2019
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AnimalAnimal DiplomacyDiplomacy
• Czechs send genetic horse sample to British royal wedding couple
• The Czech government is dispatching a genetic sample from a stallion
presented to William and Kate before the gift is sent
• Panda diplomacy is the common name for the act of China sending
giant pandas to other countries. Because of the popularity of the
animal it usually attracts a lot of attention from both the public and
the press. The even t where the agreement is signed , or when it is
announced that pandas will be sent to another nation , is often very
ceremonial and on a high official level.
• the panda giving can arguably still be regard ed as a diplomatic tool as
not any nation is entrusted with a panda.
• According to Lin (2009) the agreement that another country will
receive pandas are commonly announced during formal meetings
such as state visits.
• The high annual fee of keeping and renti ng a panda further makes
panda diplomacy mostly applicable to developed countries .
• This is the probable reason why pandas are only found in Western
and some Asian countries ’ zoos
• The pandas are seen as a symbol of cooperation between China and
the receiving country.
• Expressing Chin a’s good will (Lin 2009) .
– They are also a tool for increased scientifically and technological co -
operation.
– However, the keeping of the pandas are not the only thing negotiated.
Buckingham , et al . (2013) concluded that pandas are representing a
seal of approval, if a government agrees to take care of the pandas it
shows a long - term commitment to the relationship between the
countries.
Panda DiplomacyPanda Diplomacy
• “panda diplomacy” and it’s thought to have started as early as the Tang
Dynasty in the 7th century when Empress Wu Zeitan sent a pair of
bears (believed to be pandas) to Japan.
• This Chinese policy of sending pandas as diplomat gifts was revived in
1941, on the eve of the United States entering World War II, when
Beijing sent two cuddly black-and-whites to the Bronx Zoo as a “thank
you” gift.
• Chairman Mao frequently engaged in panda diplomacy in the 1950s,
sending bears as gifts to China’s communist allies (such as North
Korea and the Soviet Union).
6.5.2019
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• Using the actual pandas and not just the symbol, there are many ways that
pandas can be seen as a source of soft power.
• The connection between pandas and China is therefore important to
maintain.
• Giving the pandas Chinese names, having the zoos create a Chinese
influenced section where the pandas are, is therefore vital As people who sees
the pandas in the zoo will also connect it with China, much more than other
animals even though they might also be from a very specific part of the
world, they are not connected with that part in the same way.
• here seems to be a connection between panda diplomacy and bilateral
agreements between China and the receiving country (Buckingham et al .
2013) .
• By asking why pandas suddenly were sent to a Scottish zoo, there
seemed to be a link between a newly formed trade agreement
between Scotland and China
• The trade agreement also coincided with the loss of the traded
resource as the relation between the former trading partner Norway,
had deteriorated since the visit from the Dalai Lama and decision to
name a Chinese dissident the Nobel laurate of peace in early 2010.
• All of China’s mayor trading partners (except India) has received
pandas, and there seems to be a co nnection between uranium
exporters, such as Canada, France , and Australia which all have
receiv e d panda s after 2008 .
• Later initiated panda loans seem to follow the same trend with trade
agreements and cooperation in scientific fields be ing the common
connection.
• The trade agreements do not always have a direct connection and are
from time to time signed later than the panda - rental agreement, but
countries which received pandas seem to be more likely to score one
• Two months after Richard Nixon’s landmark trip to China in 1972, which ended
25 years of isolation and tension between the United States and the People’s
Republic, the president and his wife, Pat, greeted the adorable 18-month-old pair
named Hsing-Hsing and Ling-Ling.
• This gift from Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai created a nationwide “PandaMonium,”
causing American zoos from the Bronx to San Diego to fiercely lobby
the White House to become the pandas’ new home.
• In the end the Washington, D.C.’s National Zoo won, and the two celebrities
received over 20,000 visitors on their first day on display.
• The following Sunday, 75,000 people flooded the zoo, waiting in a quarter-milelong
line to see America’s newest sensations, who graced magazine covers and
proved to be an economic boon for producers of toys and stuffed animals.
• In return, the U.S. government sent China a pair of musk oxen
• Pandas have since then been given as gifts to countries wh en
different state s of head s came to visit China , but this practice was
later condemned from international NGOs and environmentalist
disagreeing with the handling of an endangered animal. Since the n the
pandas are now being loan ed to other nations
• This exchange was seen as so successful it inspired British Prime Minister
Edward Heath to ask for a panda loan during his 1974 visit to China. ChiaChia
and Ching-Ching arrived at their new digs, the London Zoo, a few weeks
later.
• The tradition saw a significant shift in 1984, when China amended it’s panda
protocols.
• Moving forward, the animals would only be sent out on 10-year loans, would
require payment of a standard annual fee (for the U.S. it was $1 million) and
decreed that all cubs birthed from loaned pandas were Chinese citizens,
regardless of place of birth.
• The U.S., in turn, shifted its acceptance policy in 1998, only allowing a panda
to reside in the States if more than half of its annual fee was given to
conservation efforts for wild pandas and their habitats.
6.5.2019
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• In 2008, a devastating earthquake rippled across China’s Sichuan
province, destroying 67 percent of China’s wild panda habitats.
• With its largest and most prestigious conservation center destroyed,
China needed to find foster homes for all 60 of its surviving residents.
• This natural disaster, combined with what appeared to be another shift
in panda policy (China now said they would only send pandas to
countries for breeding and biological research), caused some to note
that China’s loans seemed to be coinciding with trade deals for valuable
resources and technology.
• Japan received two pandas from China in 2008. On a state visit to
Japan three months before the start of the Beijing Olympic Games,
the former Chinese president, Hu Jintao, was quoted as saying:
– “Giant pandas are very popular among the Japanese, and they are a
symbol of the friendly ties between Japan and China.”
• China uses “panda diplomacy” to emphasise the importance of a given
state in Chinese foreign policy.
– Malaysia, which received pandas in 2014 on the 40th anniversary of
diplomatic ties between the countries.
– Malaysia is one of China’s major allies in Asia and has a large Chinese
minority (about 25% of its population).
– The Malaysian authorities’ disputes with China over territorial claims
in the South China Sea are not high on their agenda.
• Belgium, which received pandas during Xi’s visit to Brussels in 2014.
– Although the animals were sent to a Belgian zoo, Xi’s visit had an EU
aspect—it was the first time a PRC chairman has visited EU
institutions.
– As a follow-up to this visit, China published a new document about
its policy towards the EU.
– In July 2017, during Xi’s visit to Berlin, China handed pandas to
Germany.
– The bears also are loaned to countries with which China has signed
significant economic contracts.
• German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Chines ..
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• in 2008, they couldn’t hold out against the fuzzy power any longer and
Taipei accepted Tuan Tuan and Yuan Yuan.
6.5.2019
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• https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LAMLPXPUE3E
North and South Korea marched together under oneNorth and South Korea marched together under one
flag at the Olympicsflag at the Olympics
• North and South Korea marched under a united flag at the 2018 Winter Olympics opening ceremony in
Pyeongchang on Friday in a symbolic break in tensions between the two nations over North Korea’s
nuclear program.
• Athletes from the two countries entered the Pyeongchang Olympic stadium together, joined hands, and
marched under the Korean Unification flag, which displays the entire Korean peninsula in blue against a
white backdrop.
• It was a rare but not unprecedented spectacle. The two countries first displayed the flag at the 1991
World Table Tennis Championships and most recently at the 2006 Winter Olympics in Italy.
• But this year’s gesture of unity comes at a crucial moment. Tensions between North Korea and South
Korea have skyrocketed as Pyongyang’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs have advanced at an
astonishing pace in the past year, and North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong Un, has persistently demonstrated
a readiness to make use of them.
• During his New Year’s Day speech, Kim reached out to South Korea and raised the idea of starting
high-level talks for the first time in two years to discuss the possibility of North Korea’s participation in
the Olympics.
• South Korea eagerly took him up on the offer, and through negotiations at the border village of
Panmunjom the two countries quickly agreed not only to march under a united flag but also to form a
joint women’s ice hockey team, marking the first time they have contributed athletes to the same team at
the Olympics.
• North Korea then further pressed its charm offensive, sending Kim’s younger sister, Kim Yo Jong, to
the opening ceremony — the first time a member of his immediate family has set foot in South Korea
since the Korean war in the mid-20th century. She shook hands with South Korean President Moon Jaein
at the beginning of the ceremony.
• Kim Yo Jong also sat just feet away from Vice President Mike Pence. But there’s currently no indication
that they exchanged any pleasantries.
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• Kim Yo-jong, the younger sister of Kim Jong-un, North Korea’s
leader, was sitting at the opening ceremony closely behind Vice
President Mike Pence, who led the American delegation. Also present
was the father of Otto Warmbier, the American student who was
jailed in North Korea last year, returned home in a coma and died
shortly afterward.
• The United States warned against a North Korean charm offensive
and announced plans to impose its toughest sanctions yet against
Pyongyang, which staged a military parade featuring ICBMs just a day
before the Games opened.
Ping PongPing Pong DiplomacyDiplomacy
• "Friendship First, Competition Second". During the isolationist years, athletes
were among the few PRC nationals who were allowed to travel overseas.
• In 1963 the Sino-Soviet relations became almost confrontational.
– The situation was obviously unfavourable to both sides, particularly to China
which was falling into isolation.
– As a result, Chinese leaders began to search for a way of open the country to
the international community.
– It maintained close relations with the non-aligned countries, but concerning
its situation, establishing closer ties with the West was a natural, although
risky solution.
Ping PongPing Pong DiplomacyDiplomacy
• Relations with the US were particularly important as China desired to join
United Nations, possibly bring Taiwan back under Beijing’s control and to
some extent – to deter against the Soviet Union
• The strategic position of the US was completely different at the beginning of
the 1970s, but Americans were also interested in establishing closer relations
with communist China, especially after Richard Nixon became the President.
– Nixon even before being elected claimed that the US need to reposition its
policy regarding China.
– As he stated already in 1967, “taking the long view, we simply cannot afford
to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture their
fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbours. There is no place on
this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in
angry isolation”
Ping PongPing Pong DiplomacyDiplomacy
• After becoming the President, Nixon made the issue of China one of his
priorities.
• It was hardly possible to enhance the level of bilateral relations with the use
of traditional diplomatic channels then.
– Admittedly, at the time China distanced itself from the USSR, but the
ideology remained the key issue.
– Another important factor should be associated with the Republic of China
(Taiwan), which government did not accept the existence of the PRC.
Americans were maintaining diplomatic relations with Taiwan and US troops
stationed on the island. Americans had to act very carefully then
Ping PongPing Pong DiplomacyDiplomacy
• Nixon presented a completely new approach to the issue of Taiwan – as he
was reported to have said during a private conversation with Nicolae
Caucescu, “Taiwan was not an international but an internal problem, to be
resolved by the Chinese themselves in a peaceful way”
• at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s there was a will for
political rapprochement expressed both by American and Chinese policymakers,
despite many unfavourable circumstances.
• . After Nixon became the President, he once again tied to employ the earlier
“Sino-US Ambassadorial Talks in Warsaw”, in which US and Chinese
ambassadors to Poland met and talked in Warsaw, but with no effect (Itoh,
2011, pp. 16 – 17). A so called Pakistani channel – contacting via Pakistan’s
diplomats – was more successful
6.5.2019
25
Ping PongPing Pong DiplomacyDiplomacy
• Nixon presented a completely new approach to the issue of Taiwan – as he
was reported to have said during a private conversation with Nicolae
Caucescu, “Taiwan was not an international but an internal problem, to be
resolved by the Chinese themselves in a peaceful way”
• at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s there was a will for
political rapprochement expressed both by American and Chinese policymakers,
despite many unfavourable circumstances.
• . After Nixon became the President, he once again tied to employ the earlier
“Sino-US Ambassadorial Talks in Warsaw”, in which US and Chinese
ambassadors to Poland met and talked in Warsaw, but with no effect (Itoh,
2011, pp. 16 – 17). A so called Pakistani channel – contacting via Pakistan’s
diplomats – was more successful
• At the time, as a consequence of the conflict with Taiwan, the PRC was not a
member of most of international sports federations after it withdrew from
them in 1958
• However, China sustained its membership in International Table Tennis
Federation (ITTF). Despite it did not compete in two previous world
championships, Chinese government was planning to send team in 1971
– It was problematic that Taiwan was a member of Table Tennis Federation
of Asia, while the PRC pursued a policy, according to which it could not be a
member of any international sports organization that Taiwan belonged to
• At the time, as a consequence of the conflict with Taiwan, the PRC was not a
member of most of international sports federations after it withdrew from
them in 1958
• However, China sustained its membership in International Table Tennis
Federation (ITTF). Despite it did not compete in two previous world
championships, Chinese government was planning to send team in 1971
– It was problematic that Taiwan was a member of Table Tennis Federation
of Asia, while the PRC pursued a policy, according to which it could not be a
member of any international sports organization that Taiwan belonged to
• Chinese leadership was not unanimous about the idea of sending
national team to the table tennis world championships. Mao Zedong
and Zhou Enlai were in favour, while opposite views were presented
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and State Physical Culture and
Sport Commission.
– Despite that Mao was determined to use the opportunity that sport
offered and decided that Chinese team should go to Nagoya
• Before departing, a send-off ceremony was organized in the Great Hall of
the People. Prime minister Enlai asked athletes to abide the principle
‘friendship first, than competition’. There was also a number of instructions
issued by the government concerning contacts with Americans. For instance,
Chinese athletes were not allowed to be the first to greet or exchange flags,
while they were allowed to shake hands
• During the event Chinese world champion Zhuang Zedong (Zhuāng
Zédòng) was reported to have talked to a member of American team Glenn
Cowan, who was late for his team bus and got a ride by the Chinese team.
The two man exchanged gifts and the Chinese offered an arrangement of
Chinese-American table tennis meeting
• Chinese support for the idea of inviting American team was not
shared by all political leaders in China. Ministry of Foreign Affairs was
suggesting, that the invita- tion might have an adverse impact on
China. Enlai consulted Mao, who decided that Americans should be
invited (Xia, 2006, p. 153). As a result, a formal invitation to play a
series of matches in China was addressed to the American team on
April 6, 1971
6.5.2019
26
• As a result of the earlier developments, nine American table tennis players with four officials and two
companions crossed the bridge between Hong Kong and mainland China on April 10, 1971. Americans
visited Beijing, Shanghai and Hangzhou and played two exhibition matches Chinese prime minister’s
meeting with Chinese, American and four other teams in the Great Hall of the People on April 14 was
to be a highlight of the visit. At the time Zhou stated: “a new chapter has been opened in the relations
between our two peoples. Your visit to China has opened the door to friendly contacts between our two
countries. We believe that such friendly contacts will be favoured and supported by the majority of the
two peoples”
few hours later Washington lifted the trade embargo on China that was in force for 22 years and
permitted trade of close equivalents goods exchanged with the USSR. Other gestures of the US
encompassed termination of the American currency control in regard to China and visa facilitation for
the Chinese visiting the United States (Xia, 2006, pp. 153 – 154; Pigman, 2010, p. 193). Shortly after
the sports exchange the developments were rapid afterwards. In July 1971 Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger visited China and met with prime minister Zhou Enlai. The visit was secret, but Nixon soon
made it public.
• The first Chinese nuclear test, code-named 596, occurred on 16 October 1964.
• In fall 1969, there was no official channel of communication between China and
the United States.
• The last meeting of Sino-American ambassadorial talks was held in Warsaw in
January 1968.
• July 1969, Nixon wanted to talk to Chinese he had to talk to Pakistani president
Mohammad Yahya Khan and Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu
• Indirect Contacts
• Slow contacts / Slow communications
• Taiwan Issue
• Albania – Criticism of China-US talks
OpeningOpening toto WestWest
• April 1971- 31st World Table Tennis Championship in Nagoya, Japan
• Glenn Cowan, missed his U.S. team bus
• Zhuang Zedong, a three-time World Men's Singles Champion,
presented him with a silk-screen portrait of the famous Huangshan
Mountains
• PRC responded by inviting the American ping pong team to tour
mainland China.
PingPing--PongPong DiplomacyDiplomacy
6.5.2019
27
• In July 1971 Henry Kissinger, while on a trip to Pakistan, feigned
illness and did not appear in public for a day. He was actually on a topsecret
mission to Beijing to open relations with the government of the
PRC. On July 15, 1971, President Richard Nixon revealed the mission
to the world and that he had been invited to visit the PRC and that he
had accepted.
Kissinger's role and his tripKissinger's role and his trip
• China's seat in the United Nations and membership of the United
Nations Security Council has been occupied by the People's Republic
of China (PRC) since October 25, 1971
• Supported by the Third world countries
UnitedUnited NationsNations