ÐÑÏ
Chapter 17
Immigration and
Multiculturalism
Han Entzinger
The prevailing self-image of the Dutch has always been one of a strong international
orientation and an open mind towards influences from abroad: an
open society with open borders. The Dutch prided themselves on their tolerance
for other cultures and religions, and they were believed to welcome immigrants
and refugees from all over the world. In the late twentieth century
the Netherlands had become one of the countries in Europe with the largest
share of foreign-born residents. Its generous and respectful policies of multiculturalism
served as a shining example for other immigration societies. Since
the turn of the millennium, however, the Dutch mind appears to have been
closing at an unprecedented speed. Immigration is now seen as a major
problem, as a threat to social stability and to Dutch culture. The murders of
politician Pim Fortuyn (ÐØØÐ) and film director Theo van Gogh (ÐØØÒ), both
of them outspoken antagonists of immigration, in particular from Muslim
countries, shocked the nation. In the ÐØØ× European elections Geert Wilders’s
anti-immigration and anti-Islam Freedom Party (PVV) became the second
largest party of the country, only three percentage points behind the Christian
Democrats (CDA).
Why this sudden change? Is immigration really undermining the country’s
stability and culture, as certain antagonists claim? Is it really challenging
the country’s identity, or would that identity have changed anyway,
even without migration? What are the main arguments used in the current
debate on immigration and how valid are they? These are some of the questions
to be dealt with in this chapter. Before analyzing the current debate,
however, an overview of the highlights of Dutch immigration history, with an
emphasis on the past half a century will be presented.
A Brief History of Immigration
Already in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Republic was a safe
haven for Protestants and Jews persecuted elsewhere in Europe.Ï
Particularly
welcome were those who brought along entrepreneurial skills and money.
Without immigration, the Dutch “Golden Age” would have been much less
prosperous. Over many years, tens of thousands of migrant workers from
neighboring countries came to work in agriculture, industry or shipping.
Many of them settled for good. Numerous family names that now seem
utterly Dutch, in fact have French or German roots. In the year ÏÕØØ, for
ÐÑÐ ÐÑÑ
example, forty percent of the population of Amsterdam were foreign-born.
The role of the Dutch in international trade and in colonizing other parts of
the world could never have been a success without an ability to adapt to
highly different conditions and cultures. Even the tulip, the ultimate national
symbol, was, in fact, imported from Turkey in the fifteenth century.
Much of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were characterized
by an emigration surplus. Many Dutch left the country for one of the
colonies – above all for the Dutch East Indies – or they emigrated to the “New
World.” After the Second World War this pattern reversed once more. Since
then, immigrants have been arriving from former colonies, from labor recruitment
countries around the Mediterranean Sea, from other countries in
Europe, and, increasingly, from all over the world. The recent history of
immigration to the Netherlands and the immigrant presence in the country
are not drastically different from those in nearby West European countries.
Currently, about eleven percent of the Dutch population of ÏÔĮÓ million people
are foreign-born and for that reason can be qualified as immigrants. If one
includes the so-called second generation (that is to say their Dutch-born
children), the percentage goes up to twenty.
Thus, one in five persons living in the Netherlands is either an immigrant
or a child of an immigrant. These figures include people with a background
in other EU-countries, in Western countries outside the European Union as
well as in pre-independent Indonesia. The number of residents with “nonWestern
origins,” as official Dutch statistics call them, stands at around ÏĮÖ
million, just over one-tenth of the population. Among these “visible minorities”
three communities stand out in size: Turks, Surinamese and Moroccans,
each numbering between ÑØØĮØØØ and ÒØØĮØØØ.
The Turkish and the Moroccan communities are legacies of the so-called
“guest worker” policies in the late Ï×ÔØs and early Ï×ÕØs, which were followed
by a rather generous program of settlement and family reunion. Most migrants
from Surinam arrived in the Ï×ÕØs, when this former Dutch colony
acquired political independence. Since the late Ï×ÖØs the origins of immigration
have become much more diverse. The end of the Cold War led to a
significant growth of East European migrants and of asylum seekers, some of
whom later acquired refugee status. Besides, growing numbers of Dutch and
foreign residents find their spouses in other countries. In recent years, the
number of highly skilled migrant workers has also increased, although many
of them do not settle permanently. Meanwhile, follow-up migration among
the three largest “non-Western” communities, the Turks, the Surinamese and
the Moroccans, is continuing, albeit at a much slower pace than before.
Foreign citizens constitute only a minority of all people of immigrant
descent. In fact, only ÒĮÓ percent of the population of the Netherlands do not
hold a Dutch passport, less than in most nearby countries. This is largely an
effect of a generous naturalization policy in the past and the fact that nearly
all (post-)colonial migrants hold Dutch passports anyway. Yet, unlike many
other immigration countries in Europe, citizenship is not generally considered
as the primary distinguishing factor between migrants and the native population.
Rather, ethnic origin tends to be more relevant in the public perception
as a means of differentiating between them and us. The Dutch have even
coined a term for this: the Greek-based word allochtoon (non-indigenous)
refers to someone whose ethnic roots lie outside the Netherlands and who,
for that reason, can be differentiated from autochtoon (indigenous), the
native Dutch. An interesting, but unresolved question, of course, is whether
an allochtoon can ever become autochtoon and, if so, at what stage in the
integration process or even after how many generations.
Settlement patterns of people with an immigrant background, irrespective
of where one places the defining boundary between allochtoon and
autochtoon, are quite unbalanced. As in most other countries in Europe,
migrants tend to be overrepresented in the larger cities and underrepresented
in the countryside. Initially, most migrants came to the cities, where employment
and educational opportunities were best. Once migrant communities
had settled there, follow-up migrants tended to join them, taking advantage
of the increasing social and geographic mobility of the original population,
who had left the least attractive housing to the new arrivals. The largest four
cities in the country (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht) house
only thirteen percent of the total population of the Netherlands, but they
accommodate over thirty percent of all immigrants. In Amsterdam and
Rotterdam almost half the population has an immigrant background (first
and second generation), as do two-thirds of the school-aged children and
youth in these cities. In certain neighborhoods only a small autochtone
population of students and pensioners has stayed behind.
Indonesian Rijsttafel: Sharing the Table
Classical integration theory argues that immigrants preserve their
food habits long after they have become assimilated into their new
surroundings. Many tend to abandon their language, culture and
music more readily than their food. It may take up to several generations
before the immigrant offspring have taken on the same diet as
their native peers. This is certainly true for many newcomers in the
Netherlands. Admittedly, the relatively unsophisticated traditional
Dutch cuisine may not have been too appetizing to them anyway.
What is often overlooked, however, is that newcomers may also
influence local cuisine. This is how Americans – and the world – got
their pizzas, how chicken tikka masala became a standard dish in the
United Kingdom, and why the French have taken on couscous. The
Dutch have their own version of this culinary creolization: Indonesian
rijsttafel (or “rice table”). Rijsttafel, now a favorite in numerous Indonesian
restaurants around the country, was unknown until after the
Second World War. In fact, it is an invention of the Dutch colonial
elite in the Netherlands East Indies, who were the only ones able to
afford serving up to some fifteen or even twenty local dishes all at
the same time in one meal – each of them in a little bowl, along with
some rice. The Indonesians themselves were far more modest, limiting
themselves to just one or two of these dishes, or even just a bowl
of fried rice.
ÐÑÒ ÐÑÓ
First Steps Towards Integration
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the beginning of large-scale immigration
and the emergence of the welfare state more or less coincided in
time.Ð
No wonder that, in the Ï×ÓØs, it was mainly through a number of wellchosen
social policy measures that some ÑØØįØØØ so-called “repatriates” from
Indonesia were encouraged to assimilate into Dutch society, with which most
already had a certain familiarity. Later, in the Ï×ÔØs and Ï×ÕØs, social policy
again played a crucial role in the reception and guidance of newly arriving
immigrants, low skilled “guest workers” from Southern Europe, Turkey, and
Morocco, as well as people from Surinam. A major difference, however, was
that these migrants’ residence was seen as temporary, both by the Dutch
authorities and by most migrants themselves. As a consequence, no efforts
were made this time to promote integration. On the contrary, migrants were
encouraged to retain their cultural identity. The official justification was that
this would help them reintegrate upon their return to their countries of
origin. One of the most outspoken expressions of this approach was the introduction
of mother tongue teaching for migrant children in Dutch primary
schools as early as Ï×ÕÒ. The authorities also facilitated migrants in setting up
their own associations and consultative bodies.
This approach of creating separate facilities based on community identities
was not new to the Dutch. Under the segregated system known as pillarization
(verzuiling) various religious and ideological communities had long
had their own institutional arrangements, such as schools, hospitals, social
assistance agencies, newspapers, trade unions, political parties, and even
broadcasting corporations. Within the limits of the law, each community was
free to create its own arrangements. This enabled them to preserve their specific
identity and to “emancipate” their members in their own way.Ñ
Since the
late Ï×ÔØs, however, pillarization has lost ground. Yet, it was generally believed
that what did not work anymore for the population as a whole might be
good for the migrants who, after all, were perceived as fundamentally different
from the Dutch and as people in need of emancipation. Until about Ï×ÖØ the
promotion of institutional separation could easily be justified with an appeal
to the migrants’ presumed temporary residence. However, this institutional
separation persisted even after the Dutch government finally acknowledged
that most migrants would stay and should be encouraged to integrate.
The path that was envisaged for integration was remarkably similar to
the one that had worked in the past for the religious and ideological “pillars.”
It was a combination of combating social deprivation through selected support
measures provided by the then still generous welfare state, promoting
equal treatment, and encouraging “emancipation,” while aiming at the preservation
of the communities’ cultural identity. To this end the migrants were
labeled ethnic minorities, and the policy on their behalf became known as
Minorities’ Policy. Interestingly, a country with remarkable ethnic homogeneity
now introduced the notion of ethnicity as a basis for differential
policymaking. The authorities and a vast majority of the population were
convinced that this was the best way to promote the “emancipation” of
migrants. It was this policy of deliberate separation that drew worldwide
attention from protagonists of multiculturalism.
After Indonesia’s independence, over three hundred thousand “repatriates”
– made up of the Dutch colonial elite as well as Indonesian
Dutch of mixed origin (Indische Nederlanders) – came to the Netherlands.
They brought rijsttafel with them, and introduced it into Dutch
cuisine. Surprisingly, given the fact that most dishes are very spicy,
rijsttafel quickly became rooted in its new surroundings. Some Dutch
restaurants abroad even feature Indonesian rijsttafel as their most
typical Dutch dish. Since people have begun to travel the world more,
cooking in the Netherlands has become more international, as in
many other countries. However, good old rijsttafel remains an interesting
example of how migration may affect eating habits in two
directions.
Over half a century has passed since the large scale immigration
from Indonesia. A third generation has come of age and, sadly, the
typical colonial Indische culture in the Netherlands has almost disappeared.
“Indisch” has become a remnant of the past – or tempo
doeloe, Malay for “the old times.” The fact that about three out of four
people with a background in Indonesia have married a native Dutch
person may have contributed to this. However, every Dutchman
knows what nasi goreng, babi panggang, gado gado, sambal goreng
boontjes and saté means and many do like it a lot. Who would have
predicted that three hundred and fifty years of colonial heritage once
would pass through the stomach?
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However, doubts were voiced about the effectiveness of this minority policy.Ò
Some critics claimed that stressing ethnic differences would risk perpetuating
them and would therefore become an obstacle to the migrants’ fuller social
participation, a phenomenon known as ethnicization or minorization. This
was all the more worrying, since the economic downturn in the early Ï×ÖØs
had left large numbers of low skilled workers – often of immigrant origin –
without a job. By Ï××Ø, more than one third of all Turkish and Moroccan men
in the Netherlands were unemployed; unemployment rates for women were
even higher. Most of the Dutch considered it inappropriate to encourage
these immigrants to return, since the Dutch economy owed so much to them.
Consequently, however, immigration became a growing burden for welfare
and social policy regimes. Yet it was widely considered to be politically
incorrect, if not racist, to discuss this in public.
Nevertheless, dissatisfaction grew under the surface. In Ï××Ï, the leader
of the conservative Liberal Party (VVD), Frits Bolkestein, triggered a first
public debate about immigration, which focused on the presumed incompatibility
of Islam and “Western values.” His remarks were influenced by the
Rushdie affair in the United Kingdom and by recurrent disputes in France
about the wearing of headscarves in public schools. Concerns grew in the
Netherlands that the strong cultural relativism which had inspired the Minorities’
Policy tended to perpetuate the immigrants’ marginal situation rather
than foster integration.
After the Ï××Ò parliamentary elections the Christian Democrats (CDA)
remained outside the government for the first time in almost a century. Traditionally,
they had been the heralds of pillarization. This explains why the
new coalition of three non-religious parties, headed by Labor Party (PvdA)
leader Wim Kok, was now able to shift the policy focus from respecting cultural
diversity to promoting the immigrants’ social and economic participation.
Significantly, the Minorities’ Policy was renamed Integration Policy. From that
moment on, culture was largely seen as a private affair; providing jobs to immigrants
had become the main policy objective. Mother tongue teaching was
removed from the core curriculum and later disappeared from the schools
altogether. Besides, it was recognized that the migrants’ lack of integration
was also due to their insufficient familiarity with the Dutch language and
society. A program of mandatory Dutch language and inburgering (“civic
integration”) courses was launched, which every newly arriving migrant
from outside the European Union would be obliged to attend.
The ambition to improve the migrants’ position in employment, education,
housing, and other significant spheres of society proved to be quite
successful. Registered unemployment among allochtonen dropped dramatically,
though it still remained substantially above the national average. It
was generally assumed, however, that it was the prospering economy rather
than targeted government policies that had led to this improvement. Also in
education the position of allochtonen, particularly of the second generation,
improved significantly during the later Ï××Øs. Although they were still overrepresented
in lower forms of secondary education, their participation in
higher education went up rapidly and their school dropout rate declined. The
housing situation of immigrants no longer differed significantly from that
of the native population of similar income levels. In other words, immigrant
integration, measured by the traditional standards, advanced. The Dutch
believed they were on the right track.
Problematizing the Issue
Nevertheless, certain problems related to immigration proved to be more persistent.
The still rather amateurish integration courses failed to meet the rising
expectations about the Dutch language proficiency of immigrants. Growing
segregation led to a decrease in inter-ethnic contacts both at schools and in
immigrant concentration districts. The still pillarized school system reinforced
existing patterns of segregation and facilitated Muslims in establishing Islamic
primary schools, some of which failed to meet Dutch standard quality norms.
Even more worrying were the high delinquency rates among certain immigrant
communities, which, at first, were mainly seen as a result of the lack of opportunities
and of discriminatory practices. Later, the inability of immigrant
parents to raise their children in a Western environment and, increasingly,
their unfamiliarity, if not disagreement with Western values such as equality
and tolerance were blamed for faltering integration and high crime rates.
Finally, concerns were growing, though seldom expressed, about the relatively
strong reliance on various social policy provisions among ethnic minorities.
At the start of the new millennium, two contradictory narratives began
to emerge in the Dutch public debate on integration. The “official” one expressed
that considerable progress had been achieved in all major indicators,
such as participation in employment, in education and housing. Overall, the
second generation was doing significantly better than their parents, particularly
among the Surinamese. The continuing identification among Turks
and Moroccans with their countries of origin and with Islam was taken as a
sign of a successful multiculturalism: institutional integration could indeed
go hand in hand with preservation of the original cultural identity. The sharp
rise in naturalizations during the Ï××Øs was yet another sign that growing
numbers of immigrants saw a future for themselves in the Netherlands.
The competing view was much less optimistic. Paul Scheffer, a publicist
and a prominent member of the Labor Party, was among the first to voice this
view openly. In a much-debated article called The Multicultural Tragedy he
stated that Dutch multiculturalism had failed.Ó
Instead, he argued, a new ethnic
underclass was emerging of immigrants who did not identify sufficiently
with Dutch culture and society, and who were unwilling and unable to integrate.
Scheffer voiced the concern that many Dutch people felt – but did not
express – about continuing immigration, stagnant integration, increased
segregation and a rapidly growing Muslim population. Scheffer argued that
this would eventually undermine social cohesion and the functioning of the
liberal democratic state, particularly because of the supposedly illiberal ideas
of the Muslims. He accused the Dutch elite of having remained largely
indifferent to these developments. Their cultural relativism had allegedly
prevented them from demanding the newcomers to adapt. Respect for cultural
difference had prevailed over understanding the needs of the less
privileged members of the native population.
In this climate of increased sensitivity regarding immigration in general
and Islam in particular, the terrorist attacks of September ÏÏ, ÐØØÏ, in the United
ÐÑÖ ÐÑ×
States reinforced the impression that a “clash of civilizations” was imminent.Ô
Around that same time the star of Pim Fortuyn suddenly began to rise on the
Dutch political stage. Fortuyn was not really against immigrants as such, but
his primary concern was the assault on democratic liberties that might result
from the presence of so many people unfamiliar with Western values, particularly
Muslims. Further immigration, he argued, would only exacerbate
these problems. Fortuyn was killed by an animal rights activist nine days
before the parliamentary elections of May ÐØØÐ. His newly established party,
however, came in second in these elections and became a partner in the new
government coalition. This coalition proved to be very unstable, and was
soon replaced by a more stable coalition that embarked on a tough antiimmigration
agenda, which included the curtailing of family migration and
the promotion of returns. Soon thereafter, immigration to the Netherlands
dropped significantly. Between ÐØØÒ and ÐØØÕ the country’s migration
balance was negative, for the first time in four decades. In that period, Poland
and Lithuania were the only two other EU-countries where emigrants outnumbered
immigrants.
Integration policy also took a more assimilative direction. The dominant
view became that migrants were to blame for their slow integration and
should take the initiative to step up this process. Some lip service was paid to
the idea that integration should be two-sided and that the established
population should also leave some space to the newcomers, but only a few
concrete policy measures pointed in that direction. Acquiring Dutch citizenship,
for example, was made much more difficult and expensive, which provoked
a plunge in naturalizations. At the request of the city of Rotterdam, the
stronghold of Pim Fortuyn, a new law was passed which enabled local authorities
to prevent people with low incomes (that is to say immigrants) from
settling in certain neighborhoods. Enrollment in mandatory integration courses
was enforced, even for allochtonen who had already been living in the country
for decades. Passing the integration exam became compulsory, and failing to
do so now led to a fine and to denial of permanent settlement rights. Most of
the new measures left little or no room for a public recognition of the migrants’
cultural identity. This led to the paradox that the same migrants who had been
encouraged to preserve their own identity in the days of multiculturalism,
were now blamed for their lack of identification with Dutch culture.
The emphasis in the integration debate has shifted quite clearly from
promoting a fuller social participation for immigrants towards requesting
newcomers to assimilate to Dutch culture and to assume a “Dutch identity.”Õ
Understandably, this has provoked fierce discussions on the nature and
contents of that identity. The most outspoken feature of this “culturalization”
of the immigration debate has been the growing emphasis on Islam as a
major cause of many integration problems. Although less than half of all nonWestern
allochtonen in the Netherlands are Muslims, many autochtonen now
consider Islam and its perceived expansiveness and oppressiveness as the
root of all evil. They see the growing presence of Islam as a threat to the Dutch
liberal and permissive attitudes on issues such as sexuality, equal rights,
freedom of religion, and freedom of expression. In fact, Theo van Gogh was
murdered in ÐØØÒ by a Dutch-born Muslim fundamentalist of Moroccan
background who felt the film director had insulted Islam. This murder
provoked strong reactions among large segments of the native population,
who tended to be blind to the fact that the vast majority of Muslims in the
Netherlands also strongly disagreed with the killing.
Since then, immigration and integration have risen to the top of the
political agenda. Attitudes towards these issues have become much tougher,
not only in politics, but also in society at large. Undoubtedly, the frequent
linking of Islam, immigration, and security has had a negative impact on
public opinion among both autochtonen and allochtonen. Surveys indicate a
decline in acceptance of cultural diversity, once considered a trademark of
the Netherlands.Ö
Several members of parliament and celebrities, some of
immigrant origin themselves, have been threatened and are now under
constant security protection. One of them is Geert Wilders, the leader of the
newly established Freedom Party (PVV), which has a strong anti-Islam and
anti-immigrant agenda and which, according to opinion polls in ÐØØ×, is
favored by about one-fifth of the electorate.
Ahmed Aboutaleb: Multicultural Mayor
Just days before the United States elected
Barack Obama as its first non-white president
in November ÐØØÖ, a similar milestone was
reached in the Netherlands. For the first time
in history, a Dutch Moroccan became mayor –
not just of a small village, but of the second
largest city in the country: Rotterdam, with
ÔØØįØØØ inhabitants.
That new mayor was Ahmed Aboutaleb,
born in Ï×ÔÏ in Morocco. At the age of ÏÓ, he
migrated to the Netherlands, where his father
had arrived as a “guest worker” some years
before. He received his training as an engineer
and held several positions in journalism and
in Dutch public administration before becoming
the founding director of Forum, a
publicly financed information and advocacy
agency for multiculturalism. After he acquired
a feel for politics in that position, Aboutaleb
was elected an alderman to the Amsterdam
local government in ÐØØÒ. Only months later, film director Theo van
Gogh was murdered by a radical Muslim of Dutch-Moroccan descent.
In the grim aftermath Ahmed Aboutaleb, together with Amsterdam’s
mayor Job Cohen, was able to defuse tensions, both on the Moroccan
and on the Dutch side. He proved to be a real bridge-builder, not by
talking softly about the need for mutual understanding, but by
demanding that the Moroccans step up their integration efforts and
consider the Netherlands unequivocally as their first home.
ÐÒØ ÐÒÏ
Open Borders, Closing Minds?
Why has this dramatic turnaround occurred? Anti-immigration sentiments
have also been growing elsewhere in Europe, but nowhere has the swing
been as huge as in the country once reputed for its tolerance. Of course, the
economic crisis and the rise of Islam as a political force may serve as explanations.
These, however, are worldwide phenomena and there are no reasons
to believe that these have hit the Netherlands harder than other European
countries. It is more likely, therefore, that the explanation should be found
domestically. In mainstream politics – not just the Freedom Party – the belief
is widespread now that earlier policies of multiculturalism must be held accountable
for the immigrants’ lack of integration. Recognizing and facilitating
their cultural identity has kept immigrants in the margins of Dutch society.
In hindsight, what had worked in the days of “pillarization” for the emancipation
of native religious and ideological minorities should not have been
copied for immigrant ethnic minorities with strong attachments to other
countries and to Islam, a world religion not rooted in the European traditions.
In this view, multiculturalism has perpetuated the immigrants’ marginality
and explains their perceived lack of loyalty as well as the emergence of social
tensions and delinquency.
To what extent do such views reflect reality? There is ample research evidence
that most people of immigrant background living in the Netherlands are
faring quite well.×
An all-party parliamentary committee concluded in ÐØØÒ
that “in most cases immigrants have integrated remarkably well and that this
has occurred in spite of public policies rather than as an effect of these.”ÏØ
Research among Rotterdam youngsters of Turkish and Moroccan descent also
indicates that their integration, as measured by all traditional standards, has
progressed substantially over the past ten years.ÏÏ
Their social situation has
become more similar to that of their autochtone peers, and so have their
ideas, views and expectations on almost everything, except religion and
issues related to it. At the same time, however, both allochtonen and autochtonen
mutually perceive a widening of the cultural distance between them
and an increased discrimination. Turkish and Moroccan youngsters, especially
the more highly educated, are less optimistic about their own future than
Dutch youngsters and also less optimistic than they were ten years ago.
Such findings, confirmed by numerous other research outcomes, may
lead to the conclusion that, in fact, immigrant integration has been quite successful
in most cases, but that the dominant definition of “successful integration”
has changed meanwhile. Undoubtedly, Dutch society has changed
profoundly in the last few decades. Immigration has contributed significantly
to these changes. Large segments of the native Dutch population perceive
this as a threat, and see immigration and Islam as a major scapegoat for
changes that may have gone too fast. Some recent dramatic events have
reinforced thinking in terms of us and them or, for that matter, in terms of
autochtonen versus allochtonen. One should wonder, however, whether the
initial multiculturalist approach must not also be seen in this perspective.
Was it really as genuine and hospitable as most people believed in the earlier
days of large-scale immigration? After all, facilitating immigrants to retain
their own cultural identity may also have served as a ready excuse for not
letting them become part of mainstream society. To the first generation such
a marginal situation may still have been acceptable, but the second generation
that has since come of age tend to claim a fair piece of the pie. It seems
time for the Dutch mind to open up, even more so since closing the borders to
new immigration has proved to be impossible.
After it had supported multiculturalism for many years, the Dutch
Labor Party (PvdA), of which Aboutaleb meanwhile had become a
prominent member, was eager to hear this message from someone
who had been an immigrant. When Labor joined the national government
after the November ÐØØÔ elections, Aboutaleb became the
Deputy Minister for Social Affairs and Employment. His nomination
did not pass without political turmoil, as several parties on the right
saw his dual citizenship as a sign of disloyalty to the Netherlands.
Aboutaleb survived a vote of no confidence in parliament and he was
confirmed in office. In fact, the Moroccan law would have made it
impossible for him to relinquish his Moroccan citizenship, even if he
had wished to do so.
Two years later he became mayor of Rotterdam, by appointment
of the national government upon nomination of the city council, as is
customary in the Netherlands. Local politics in Rotterdam had been
sharply divided since Pim Fortuyn’s party Leefbaar Rotterdam (“Liveable
Rotterdam”) won the local elections of ÐØØÐ, ending ahead of
Labor, which had governed the city since times immemorial. In ÐØØÔ,
Labor had taken the lead again, mainly as a result of a huge turnout
among the Rotterdam immigrant communities. Understandably, “the
Liveables” were seeking revenge. At first, they strongly objected to
Aboutaleb’s nomination, again because of his two passports, but they
soon realized that the new mayor’s rather hard line on integration
came close to theirs. Nevertheless, Aboutaleb does not face an easy
task. Although a Dutch mayor is supposed to stand above all parties,
he often has to maneuver very skillfully. In a socially, ethnically and
politically polarized city like Rotterdam this certainly is a challenge,
even for an immigrant as successful as Ahmed Aboutaleb.
Further Reading
Lucassen, Leo, and Rinus Penninx. Newcomers: Immigrants and Their Descendants in the
Netherlands, ÏÓÓØ-Ï××Ó. Amsterdam: Aksant, ÐØØÐ.
Ederveen, Sjef, et al. Destination Europe: Immigration and Integration in the European Union.
The Hague: CPB/SCP/CBS, ÐØØÒ.
Gijsberts, Mérove. Ethnic Minorities and Integration: Outlook for the Future. The Hague: Social
and Cultural Planning Office (SCP), ÐØØÓ.
Sniderman, Paul M., and Louk Hagendoorn. When Ways of Life Collide: Multiculturalism and
its Discontents in the Netherlands. Princeton: Princeton University Press, ÐØØÕ.