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Updated
Timeline
Date
18.2. Institutions
25.2. Institutions II
4.3. Classical Institutionalism and New Institutional Economics
11.3. Property rights and resource regimes, Commons
18.3. Doughnot Economics: From Planetary Boundaries to thinking how an
economy can be regenerative by design (Claudio Cattaneo)
25.3. Application of the doughnut at the city scale with Barcelona as an
example (Claudio Cattaneo)
1.4. Ecological Resource Economics
8.4. Applications: water, forests, fisheries
15.4. <Great Friday>
22.4. Canceled
29.4. System Dynamics
6.5. The Water–Energy–Food Nexus in India
13.5. Presentations I
20.5. Presentations II, Debate, Open Space, Experiment
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Østart writing early
Øwrite to/for yourself
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Dynamical systems: population growth
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https://6a13c5b2fc59e0f5cc2d-504d68e748ee944d3fccba00fd5e2fd4.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/Logistic/index.html
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Dynamical systems: Lotka-Volterra (Pred-Prey)
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http://715049d7e26a0358afde-504d68e748ee944d3fccba00fd5e2fd4.r16.cf1.rackcdn.com/Lotka_demo/index.html
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Dynamical systems: Agent-based Predator-Prey
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https://6a13c5b2fc59e0f5cc2d-504d68e748ee944d3fccba00fd5e2fd4.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/Predpreygrass/index.html
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NetLogo: Agent-based models
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http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/models/WolfSheepPredation
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Dynamical systems: Predator-Prey
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https://doi.org/10.1111/ele.13979
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Dynamical systems: Prudent predation?
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https://theconversation.com/animals-have-evolved-to-avoid-overexploiting-their-resources-can-humans-do-the-
same-176092
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Dynamical systems: Agent-based SIR model
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https://6a13c5b2fc59e0f5cc2d-504d68e748ee944d3fccba00fd5e2fd4.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/AgentSIR/index.html
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A common-pool resource
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Theory
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1. Renewable resource economics (bioeconomics)
(e.g. Gordon 1954, Schaefer 1957)
2. Dynamic (differential) game theory
(Clemhout and Wan 1979, Clark 1980, Levhari and Mirman 1980, Dutta and
Sundaram 1993, Dockner and Sorger 1996)
3. Ecological economic theory
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A renewable resource model
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Logistic growth function, Schaefer (1957) model:
0"
20"
40"
60"
80"
100"
0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100" 110"
Resource
size (in %)
Time (years)
Carrying capacity
Ø Key parameters:
Carrying capacity (K)
resource growth rate (g)
Ø fisheries,
forests,
grasslands,
groundwater,
climate
(e.g. Brander and
Taylor 1998, 2009,
Clark 2010)
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Simulation: Two options, two users
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Defection:
Maximize
Profit?
Cooperation:
Half of the
Maximum
Sustainable Yield?
!1000$
!500$
0$
500$
1000$
1500$
2000$
2500$
0$ 5$ 10$ 15$ 20$ 25$
Revenues$ Costs$ Profit$
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0"
20"
40"
60"
80"
100"
0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"
0"
20"
40"
60"
80"
100"
0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"
0"
20"
40"
60"
80"
100"
0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"
DD: both defect
Simulation: Three scenarios
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CC: both cooperate
CD/DC: one defects
(model parameter values: α = 0.5, β= 1/0, q = 0.03, p = 10, c = 1, S0 = 80%)
Development of the used resource over time:
Time (years)
Resource
size (in %)
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Results: Dynamic game payoffs
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Net Present Value (NPV) for each strategy pair:
0"
100"
200"
300"
400"
500"
600"
700"
0.0%" 2.0%" 4.0%" 6.0%" 8.0%" 10.0%"
CC"
DC"
CD"
DD"
NPV (€)
iDiscount rate:
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Results: Dynamic game payoffs
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Net Present Value (NPV) for each strategy pair:
0"
100"
200"
300"
400"
500"
600"
700"
0.0%" 2.0%" 4.0%" 6.0%" 8.0%" 10.0%"
CC"
DC"
CD"
DD"
NPV (€)
AP PD Mutual defection / Resource dilemma
i
Ø Forest harvest model (β= 0): DD destroys the resource after
few years but dominant strategy with i > 4%!
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