RUSSIA’S NUCLEAR ENERGY EXPORTS:
STATUS, PROSPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS
névine schepers
No. 61 February 2019
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Papers
SUMMARY
Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy corporation,
Rosatom, has become the world’s leading supplier of
nuclear reactors through a combination of flexible business
models, attractive financial packages and diplomatic tools.
Their long-term nature and crucial role in a country’s
economy as an electricity provider make nuclear power
plants strategic assets. The prospect of a global surge in
Russian-made nuclear reactors has raised concerns among
Western observers who equate the rise of Rosatom with an
increase in Russian geopolitical power and potentially a
weakening of nuclear governance standards.
This paper discusses these claims by asking whether
Russia’s increased role in the nuclear export market has
adversely affected global nuclear governance norms and
whether Russian nuclear power plant projects overseas can
be considered effective foreign policy tools for the Russian
Government. It also assesses the instruments used by the
European Union to address concerns, linked to nuclear
governance and energy security, about the rise of Russian
nuclear exports.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Névine Schepers (Belgium) is a Research Associate with
the Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Policy Programme at
the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in
London. She manages a project on the geopolitics of nuclear
energy and contributes to the programme’s work on Iran
and North Korea. Before joining the IISS, she worked at
VERTIC on nuclear verification issues and at IB
Consultancy on Chemical Biological Radiological and
Nuclear (CBRN) preparedness and response.
EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium
Promoting the European network of independent
non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks
I. INTRODUCTION
Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear corporation has
become the world’s leading supplier of nuclear reactors.
After signing a $30 billion contract in December 2017
for the construction of four reactor units at the El
Daaba nuclear power plant (NPP) in Egypt, Russia
signed a contract for four such units with China in June
2018 and a contract in September for a two-unit NPP
in Uzbekistan.1 Construction began in Turkey at the
Akkuyu NPP in April and in Bangladesh on the second
unit of the Rooppur NPP in July.2 Domestically, two
reactors were connected to the grid in 2018 and the
world’s first floating nuclear power plant, the Akademik
Lomonosov, commenced fuel loading operations.3
Rosatom is increasingly seeking to market its wares
in countries that are new to nuclear energy. These
states, such as Bangladesh and Turkey, are embarking
on a nuclear power programme and choosing to do
so with Rosatom. The prospect of a global surge in
Russian-made reactors has raised concerns among
some Western observers who equate the rise of
Rosatom with a potential weakening of nuclear
governance standards and, due to the political support
it receives from the Russian state, an increase in
Russian geopolitical power.
This paper discusses this claim by investigating
whether Russia’s increased role in the nuclear
export market has adversely affected global nuclear
governance norms and whether Russian NPP projects
overseas can be considered effective foreign policy
tools for the Russian Government. Section II provides
1  World Nuclear Association, ‘Nuclear power in Russia’, Updated Oct.
2018.
2  Reuters, ‘Erdogan, Putin mark formal start of work on Turkey’s
first nuclear power plant’, 3 Apr. 2018; and World Nuclear News,
‘Construction starts on second Bangladeshi reactor’, 16 July 2018.
3  World Nuclear Association (note 1).
2	 eu non-proliferation and disarmament consortium
an overview of Russia’s position in the global nuclear
market and of the main elements of its successful
export strategy. Section III discusses the standards and
conditions on supply set by Russia when conducting
nuclear trade. Section IV assesses the rationale for
and limits on Russia’s use of nuclear energy projects as
geopolitical tools. Section V examines the instruments
used by the European Union (EU) in the area of nuclear
governance and energy security to address concerns
related to the increase in Russian nuclear exports.
Section VI draws some conclusions.
II. RUSSIA’S POSITION IN THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR
MARKET
Between 1992 and 2004, Russia’s nuclear energy
industry was under the control of the Ministry for
Atomic Energy. It was then transformed into the
Federal Agency on Atomic Energy, Rosatom, before
becoming a state corporation in 2007.4 Rosatom is
responsible for the country’s nuclear power industry,
nuclear weapons division, nuclear-powered icebreaker
fleet and nuclear research institutions, as well as
ensuring nuclear and radiation safety.5 Rosatom
remains entirely under the control of the Russian
state. The President of Russia sets Rosatom’s strategic
objectives, and appoints its director and the members
of its supervisory board. Rosatom manages more than
300 companies and organizations involved in all stages
of the nuclear weapon and power production chain.
This includes front-end nuclear fuel cycle activities
such as uranium mining, conversion, enrichment and
fuel fabrication, activities related to the construction,
operation and decommissioning of NPPs and back-end
cycle activities such as spent nuclear fuel reprocessing
and radioactive waste management.6
In recent years, Rosatom has strengthened its
presence overseas and dominated the construction of
new NPPs. According to Rosatom’s 2017 annual report,
the corporation’s international revenue amounted
to $6.1 billion, of which $2.5 billion came from NPP
construction, and it has a portfolio of overseas orders
worth $133 billion.7 In 2018, Rosatom stated that it was
4  Cesnakas, G. and Juozaitis, J., ‘Nuclear geopolitics in the Baltic Sea
region’, Atlantic Council Issue Brief, July 2017, p. 2.
5  Rosatom, Performance of State Atomic Energy Corporation in 2016:
Public Annual Report (Rosatom: Moscow, 2017).
6  Rosatom (note 5).
7  Rosatom, ‘Rosatom issues 2017 Annual Report’, Press release, 13
Aug. 2018.
currently implementing projects on the construction
of 36 units in 12 countries.8 The number of units
under construction varies according to sources, as
construction is deemed to have begun only after the
first concrete has been poured.9 For instance, the
World Nuclear Association considers that seven units
are under construction: one in China, two in Belarus,
two in India, one in Bangladesh—where construction
on a second unit has also started—and one in Turkey.
In addition, 12 further units have been contracted
for and 11 have been ordered.10 Preliminary work
is at an advanced stage on contracts in Finland and
Hungary.11Additional NPP construction agreements
have been signed with Armenia, China, Egypt, India,
Iran, and Uzbekistan.12
Intergovernmental agreements, also known as
‘framework’ agreements, that provide a legal basis
for negotiations and identify specific areas for
bilateral cooperation have been signed with Algeria,
Bolivia, Cambodia, Cuba, Ghana, Nigeria, Paraguay,
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Tunisia, the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) and Zambia.13 Many more
countries have signed an Interagency Memorandum
of Understanding, usually between Rosatom and
local atomic energy agencies or ministries for
energy, education or foreign affairs. These serve as a
declaration of interest in cooperation but do not have
any legal status. Some lead to a framework agreement,
or contracts on the construction of NPPs or a Nuclear
Science and Technology Centre, as was the case in
Bolivia and Zambia, or specific contracts related to
training, education or capacity building.14 Contracts
can take several years, even decades, to negotiate and in
some cases do not result in anything concrete.
Various countries have also signed specific contracts
with Rosatom or one of its subsidiaries for front-end
services. In 2017, Rosatom held 36 per cent of the global
market in enrichment services and 17.7 per cent of the
global nuclear fuel market.15 TVEL Fuel Company
8  Rosatom, ‘Projects’, [n.d.].
9  Schneider, M. and Froggatt, A., The World Nuclear Industry: Status
Report 2018 (Mycle Schneider Consulting: Paris and London, Sep. 2018),
p. 38.
10  World Nuclear Association (note 1).
11  Schneider and Froggatt (note 9), pp. 228, 244–45
12  Schneider and Froggatt (note 9), p. 254; World Nuclear Association
(note 1); and ‘Russia, Uzbekistan hail $11 billion nuclear plant project
during Putin visit’, Euractiv, 22 Oct. 2018.
13  Rosatom, ‘Homepage’, [n.d.].
14  World Nuclear Association, ‘Emerging nuclear energy countries’,
Updated Oct. 2018.
15  Rosatom, ‘Fuel and enrichment’, [n.d.].
russia’s nuclear energy exports 3
carries out uranium enrichment and conversion
services, which Techsnabexport (TENEX) provides
alongside the export of nuclear fuel assemblies.
Rosatom subsidiaries supply nuclear fuel to 78 reactors
around the world. These are mainly Russian-designed
reactors such as the VVER-440 and the VVER-1000
(or in future the VVER-1200), but also a small number
of research reactors.16 Many Western and Asian states
with an established nuclear energy industry, such
as the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium,
France, Japan and South Korea, have contracts with
TENEX for enrichment services.17
Nuclear export strategy
By covering the entire nuclear fuel cycle with its
integrated national supply chain, Rosatom can
effectively cater both to ‘nuclear newcomers’, which
wish to embark on a nuclear programme from the
ground up, and to established nuclear countries that
require specific services. For the newcomers, the
‘one stop nuclear shop’ concept is very appealing.
Rosatom has managed to position itself as the
only supplier providing an ‘all-inclusive’ package,
which can also include flexible financing options,
training opportunities and support with developing
nuclear infrastructures related to safety, security,
non-proliferation and export control requirements.
By addressing many of the challenges posed by the
complex and expensive nature of an NPP project,
Rosatom has been able to penetrate new markets that
other suppliers have been reluctant to move into.
Spent-fuel take-back
In addition, Rosatom is the only supplier that can
take spent nuclear fuel back from overseas clients.
It brings it back to Russia for temporary storage and
reprocessing before returning the radioactive waste
to the country of origin and keeping the separated
plutonium.18 The legal basis for the current policy has
existed since 2001, when legislation was passed to
allow for the temporary storage and reprocessing of
foreign spent nuclear fuel and to establish a mechanism
16  Rosatom (note 15).
17  Rosatom/TENEX, ‘History: Company history’, [n.d.].
18  Pomper, M., The Russian Nuclear Industry: Status and Prospects
(Centre for International Governance Innovation: Nuclear Energy
Futures Papers: Ontario, Canada, Jan. 2009), pp. 28–29.
to regulate such imports.19 This is an added incentive
for newcomer states that do not possess the necessary
nuclear fuel cycle infrastructure to deal with spent
fuel, as it limits the type and number of facilities
needed to just those required to deal with high-level
waste.20 According to Russian researchers, Russia is
increasingly pushing for the inclusion of take-back
provisions in agreements with nuclear newcomers that
lack the necessary infrastructure.21 There is a clause
on spent fuel take-back in the contract signed with
Bangladesh.22
In the case of Akkuyu however, it was Turkey that
insisted on a spent fuel take-back provision at the
time of negotiations, but this provision is yet to be
completed.23 Since arrangements for these reactors are
yet to be finalized, whether the take-back will actually
take place remains to be seen. In the case of Iran, the
take-back clause also seeks to avoid the proliferation
risks associated with recovering plutonium from
spent nuclear fuel so that it cannot be used by Iran
for a nuclear weapon programme.24 The Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) establishes
a 15-year restriction on Iran’s reprocessing activities
from January 2016.
Competition
Rosatom’s Western competition has dwindled in
recent years. Established nuclear suppliers such as
Westinghouse in the USA and Framatome (formerly
Areva NP, now owned by EDF Energy) in France
have suffered numerous setbacks. Bankruptcies,
construction delays and cost overruns have
plagued their construction plans domestically and
internationally.25 At a time when nuclear suppliers
depend on overseas exports, Westinghouse has not
signed a new contract since 2007 and Framatome
19  Feiveson, H. et al., Managing Spent Fuel from Nuclear Power
Reactors: Experience and Lessons from Around the World (International
Panel on Fissile Materials: Princeton, NJ, Sep. 20110, pp. 74–75.
20  OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), The Economics of the Back
End Fuel Cycle (OECD NEA: Paris, 2013), p. 57.
21  ‘The geopolitics of nuclear energy: new dynamics of supply and
demand’, IISS Workshop Report, 19 Dec. 2018, p. 7.
22  Embassy of the Russian Federation in the People’s Republic of
Bangladesh, ‘Russia and Bangladesh sign an agreement on spent nuclear
fuel’, Press release, 30 Apr. 2017.
23  Stein, A. ‘Turkey’s nuclear program: Challenges and
opportunities,’ Atlantic Council, Issue brief (Dec. 2016), p.8.
24  Kerr, P., ‘Iran, Russia reach nuclear agreement’ Arms Control
Today, 1 Apr. 2005.
25  ‘The world relies on Russia to build its nuclear power plants’, The
Economist, 2 Aug. 2018.
4	 eu non-proliferation and disarmament consortium
be used again in the near future.29 Rosatom’s reluctance
to commit to any further BOO contracts might be the
reason behind Jordan’s change of plans. It now intends
to build a Small Modular Reactor instead of the $10
billion two-unit NPP for which it signed a contract with
Rosatom in 2015.30
Financing schemes
Rosatom has been able to provide generous loans
backed by government subsidies. Most of these loans
come from Russia’s Wealth Funds, which support
the national pension system. In Bangladesh, Russia is
covering 90 per cent of the costs of the Rooppur NPP
by providing $11.85 billion in credit out of the total cost
of $12.65 billion.31 In Hungary, Russia even suggested
that it could fund 100 per cent of the estimated $12
billion investment before settling on a $10 billion loan,
which is to be repaid by 2026 regardless of whether
the project is online by that time.32 In Egypt, the total
cost of El Daaba is estimated to be $60 billion, $30
billion of which is for reactor construction. Russia has
agreed to supply a loan of $25 billion, to be paid back
over 22 years starting in 2029.33 In Bangladesh, the loan
provided by Russia represents about half the country’s
total outstanding external debt.34
Diplomatic support
Rosatom’s nuclear exports benefit from the full
backing of the Russian Government. Such support
can be channelled during overseas visits by President
Vladimir Putin and senior members of government,
and when welcoming foreign delegations to Russia.
This is done by including cooperation on the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy on the agenda during such
visits, mentioning it in public speeches or signing
a Memorandum of Understanding on the issue. In
October 2018, for example, during a visit to Russia
by the President of Egypt, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi,
implementation of the NPP contract was a natural
topic for discussion.35 When cooperation is already at
an advanced stage, President Putin or a senior member
of the government will attend official ceremonies
29  IISS (note 21), p. 3.
30  Digges, C., ‘Jordan turns down a Rosatom plant, but dangles
possible small reactor collaboration with Russia’, Bellona, 14 June 2018.
31  Schneider and Froggatt (note 9), p. 153.
32  Schneider and Froggatt (note 9), p. 245.
33  Schneider and Froggatt (note 9), p. 161.
34  Schneider and Froggatt (note 9), p. 153.
35  ‘Putin, Egyptian leader sign “strategic” partnership treaty’, Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 17 Oct. 2018.
has just one contract, for two European Pressurized
Reactors to be built at Hinkley Point C in the UK,
once it finishes projects well underway in Finland and
China.
South Korean and Chinese suppliers have been
gaining some ground. South Korea’s KEPCO submitted
the successful tender for the construction of four units
at Barakah in the UAE, the first of which is scheduled
to start operations in 2019, and is well placed to win
a contract in Saudi Arabia, despite moves to phase
out nuclear energy at home.26 While Chinese nuclear
exports benefit from strong political and economic
support, China’s main export reactor, the Hualong-1,
is not a tried and tested technology, which deters
potential buyers.27 Rosatom therefore currently leads
the way with its proven technology, flexible business
models, attractive financial packages and diplomatic
tools.
Business models
Rosatom’s flexible business models form part of its
appeal to interested countries. The Engineering
Procurement Construction model, also known as the
turnkey model, is the most common. Under a turnkey
contract, the supplier designs and builds the reactors
following regulatory requirements before effectively
‘turning over the key’ to the utility company. This
model is used in Iran and Bangladesh and will be
implemented in the projects in Finland and Hungary.
In dealings with established nuclear countries such as
India and China, the client country takes on additional
tasks. In the case of the Tianwan NPP in China,
Jiangsu Nuclear Power Corporation took on the civil
construction and installation elements of units 1 and 2.
Rosatom is currently implementing the Build-OwnOperate
(BOO) contractual model at Akkuyu in Turkey.
Under this model, Russia maintains ownership of the
plant and expects to make a guaranteed profit by selling
electricity to the utility company. Since the supplier
provides everything, a BOO contract removes many of
the obstacles posed by the complexity of introducing
nuclear energy. Such contracts are expensive for
Russia: Akkuyu is costing at least $22 billion.28 Russian
experts have expressed doubts that the BOO model will
26  Gilinski, V. and Sokolski, H., ‘Facing reality in the US–Saudi
nuclear agreement: South Korea’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 10
Apr. 2018.
27  Wubbeke, J. and Ting, G., ‘China’s nuclear industry goes global’,
The Diplomat, 11 Feb. 2016.
28  Schneider and Froggatt (note 9), p. 158.
russia’s nuclear energy exports 5
Conditions of supply
Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines and International
Atomic Energy Agency safeguards
All the framework agreements signed between Russia
and the states that it works with include provisions
related to compliance with export controls and
non-proliferation obligations, in accordance with
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines.40 The
NSG brings together states with significant nuclear
technology and expertise in order to develop and
implement best practices related to the trade in
nuclear energy and technology and to preventing
proliferation. It establishes guidelines that suppliers
of nuclear technology agree to abide by as a condition
of supply before proceeding with transfers. The NSG
is an informal and non-legally binding structure, but
its members commit to implement its guidelines on a
national basis by developing domestic export control
regulations and enforcement mechanisms. Such
guidelines include guarantees that recipient states
must provide to ensure that the technology will not be
used for nuclear weapon purposes, will be physically
protected and will be used in ways that comply
with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
safeguards standards.
Since 2011, Russian framework agreements have
also reflected the updated NSG guidelines, which were
strengthened by including further controls on transfers
of nuclear enrichment and reprocessing (ENR)
facilities, material and technologies. ENR technologies
pose proliferation risks since they can be used both
for peaceful energy purposes and in the production
of nuclear weapons. The USA attempted to further
restrict nuclear exports during NSG negotiations by
preventing the sale of ENR equipment and technologies
to states that do not already have ENR facilities and
by making ratification of an IAEA Additional Protocol
a condition of supply.41 An Additional Protocol
as an addition to existing safeguards agreements
significantly strengthens the IAEA’s ability to detect
undeclared nuclear activities and signifies a reinforced
40  International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Communication
received from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the
International Atomic Energy Agency regarding Certain Member
States’ Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and
Technology, Nuclear Suppliers Group, INFCIR/254/Rev.13/Part 1 NSG
Part 1 Guidelines, 8 Nov. 2016.
41  Viski, A., ‘The revised Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines: A
European Union perspective’, Non-Proliferation Papers, no. 15 (May
2012), p.7.
celebrating certain landmarks in the construction of
an NPP or invite their counterparts to Moscow. In
April 2018, Putin joined the President of Turkey, Recep
Tayyip Erdogan, to watch a ceremony marking the
formal start of construction at Akkuyu by video link
from Ankara.36
III. NUCLEAR GOVERNANCE AND EXPECTED
STANDARDS
Global nuclear governance encompasses national
and international treaties, laws, bodies, conventions
and codes of conduct that address nuclear nonproliferation,
safeguards, safety, security and export
controls. These instruments serve to ensure the safe,
secure and peaceful use of nuclear energy, which is
a right enshrined in Article IV of the 1968 Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NonProliferation
Treaty, NPT), the cornerstone of the
international nuclear governance regime.37
The USA has played a leading role in the development
and export of nuclear technology, which has enabled it
to shape the construction of global nuclear governance
frameworks and push for further non-proliferation
conditions on exports in bilateral agreements on
nuclear energy cooperation.38 Some Western observers
therefore equate the USA’s decline as an exporter with
a weakening of nuclear governance norms. They do
not believe that certain suppliers, in particular Russia,
hold their clients to the same stringent standards as the
USA.39 This section discusses the claim that Russia’s
rise in the nuclear export market will adversely affect
global nuclear governance norms and examines issues
of nuclear governance related to Russia’s increasing
influence in the global market for nuclear energy and
technology.
36  Reuters (note 2).
37  United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 1 July 1968, Text of
the treaty.
38  Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Restoring
US leadership in Nuclear Energy: A National Security Imperative, CSIS
Commission on Nuclear Energy Policy in the United States (CSIS:
Washington, DC, June 2013).
39  Saha, S., ‘Russia’s nuclear diplomacy’, Foreign Affairs, 2 Apr. 2017.
6	 eu non-proliferation and disarmament consortium
it an interesting case. Both Russia and the USA have
engaged with India on peaceful nuclear cooperation.
The NSG was originally created in 1978 in response
to the first Indian nuclear explosive test in order to
provide guidelines beyond the NPT on nuclear trade.47
The guidelines were updated in 1992 to include a
requirement on end-user states to adopt full-scope
IAEA safeguards. Even so, Russia proceeded with its
export plans to India, claiming that the deal had been
finalized before 1992 and was therefore allowed under
a ‘grandfathering’ clause—a claim that was strongly
contested by the USA.48 Driven by a commercial
desire to export nuclear technology to India, the USA
started negotiating a Section 123 agreement with
India in 2005 and applied diplomatic pressure in the
NSG for an official exemption for India. In contrast
to other agreements, the Section 123 agreement with
India allows the reprocessing of transferred nuclear
materials. India’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA
also differs from the norm, limiting the number of
facilities available for inspection by the IAEA. Russia
and the USA, as well as other major suppliers such as
France, Japan and South Korea, have since supported
India’s application for membership of the NSG. To
a certain extent, these actions by major suppliers
question whether the initial vision for the NSG—to go
beyond the NPT and ensure strict export controls—has
been overtaken by the commercial interests of a
handful of suppliers.49 The development of Saudi
Arabia’s nuclear plans could be another litmus test
for major suppliers in terms of balancing competing
commercial interests with strict non-proliferation
norms.
Expected standards
Nuclear safety and security
Nuclear safety and security are at the core of the global
nuclear governance regime. Nuclear safety norms are
mostly outlined in the Convention on Nuclear Safety
(CNS).50 States join the CNS voluntarily but become
legally bound once they have ratified it. The Joint
Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management
and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management
47  Hibbs, M., The Future of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace: Washington, DC, 2011).
48  Hibbs, M., ‘A more geopoliticized Nuclear Suppliers Group’,
Strategic Trade Review, 14 Dec. 2017.
49  Hibbs (see note 47), p. 8.
50  Convention on Nuclear Safety, 17 June 1994.
commitment to non-proliferation by a member state.42
The NSG did not adopt either of these restrictions
but the USA has implemented them unilaterally in a
bilateral agreement signed with the UAE.43
In contrast to other nuclear suppliers, US law
requires the signing of a nuclear cooperation
agreement—known as a Section 123 agreement after
the section of the US Atomic Energy Act—with third
countries before any nuclear trade can take place.
France, Japan, Russia and South Korea often sign
nuclear cooperation agreements with third countries,
but they are not a legal requirement.44 Section 123
agreements are subject to Congressional review, which
gives the US Congress a window of opportunity to hold
hearings on the agreement and even reject it, in which
case nuclear trade cannot take place.45
The US–UAE Section 123 agreement requires the
UAE to have an Additional Protocol in place in order
to import US nuclear technology.46 The UAE has also
agreed to forgo ENR technologies. This is referred to
as the ‘gold standard’. Neither are requirements of US
law but many advocates in the USA believe that the
gold standard should be the norm in all future nuclear
cooperation agreements. The stress test for whether
the USA will continue to pursue this restriction,
or instead insist on customer states adopting an
Additional Protocol, will be any nuclear agreement it
signs with Saudi Arabia. The restrictions featured in
the agreement with the UAE are, thus far, an exception
rather than the rule among suppliers. Russia has not
required an Additional Protocol from either Iran or
Egypt, although Iran has been implementing one
provisionally since 2015 under the terms of the JCPOA.
India is a nuclear possessor state outside the NPT
regime but received an NSG exemption on the full
scope safeguards requirement in 2008, which makes
42  IAEA, ‘Additional Protocol’.
43  NSG guidelines require instead recipient states to either bring
into force an Additional Protocol or to be ‘implementing appropriate
safeguards agreements in cooperation with the IAEA, including a
regional accounting and control arrangement for nuclear materials, as
approved by the IAEA Board of Governors’ (IAEA note 40, p. 3).
44  Glasgow, J., Teplinsky, E. and Markus, S., ‘Nuclear export controls:
A comparative analysis of national regimes for the control of nuclear
materials, components and technology’, Pillsbury Winthrop, Shaw
Pittman LP, Washington, DC, Oct. 2012, p. 49.
45  Kerr, P. and Niktin, M. B. D, Nuclear Cooperation with Other
Countries: A Primer, RS22937 (Congressional Research Service:
Washington, DC, 3 April 2018), pp. 3–4.
46  Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the United Arab
Emirates Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, 21 May 2009.
russia’s nuclear energy exports 7
Among Russia’s main clients, India, Bangladesh
and Turkey have ratified all but the Joint Convention
and Belarus all but the amendment to the CPPNM.
Iran and Egypt have signed few conventions and
have not ratified any of the above-mentioned. Other
countries that have a framework agreement in place
with Russia have mixed records. Uzbekistan is not a
party to the CNS and Sudan has not yet ratified any of
the conventions. Prospective newcomers Nigeria and
Ghana have been proactive in joining these conventions
as well as undergoing an IAEA-led Integrated
Nuclear Infrastructure Review, which carries out an
assessment of the infrastructure required to initiate
a nuclear energy programme, including legal and
regulatory frameworks.
Other factors
While Rosatom claims to uphold strict nuclear
governance norms and urges the countries it does
business with to do the same, some elements are
beyond its control. In the case of nuclear newcomers
in particular, when determining whether they are
equipped to handle the infrastructure required to
produce nuclear energy and ensure the safety and
security of nuclear material, other elements must
be taken into consideration. These include domestic
factors, such as export control implementation, level
of corruption and political stability, and external
threats. For instance, according to the Peddling Peril
Index, which evaluates the robustness of a country’s
strategic export controls, Egypt, Sudan and Iran,
which is no longer a newcomer, are classified as having
non-existent or severely deficient legislation.55 Some
countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Zambia, are
assessed as having serious deficiencies in their export
control legislation. Moreover, threats from non-state
actors are more severe in geographical areas where
conflicts are ongoing, such as Nigeria or Sudan, and in
countries close to conflict areas, such as Saudi Arabia
or Turkey. Nuclear reactors can be prime targets for
terrorist attacks. The Houthis might not have struck
the Barakah NPP in the UAE as they claimed to have
done in December 2017, but the falseness of the claim
does not preclude the possibility that they might try
to do so at a later date.56 These domestic factors and
external threats could pose serious proliferation risks
55  Albright, D. et al. ‘The Peddling Peril Index (PPI), 2017’, Institute
for Science and International Security, 31 Jan. 2018.
56  ‘Yemen’s Houthis claim to fire missile toward unfinished Abu
Dhabi nuclear reactor’, Japan Times, 3 Dec. 2017.
(Joint Convention) contains further provisions on the
safe storage and transport of nuclear waste.51
International nuclear security norms, which focus on
preventing the theft of nuclear material, insider threats
and nuclear terrorism, are outlined in the Convention
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
(CPPNM), its 2005 amendment and the International
Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism (ICSANT).52 The international nuclear
security conventions rely on voluntary implementation
and do not include any mandatory assessments or
reviews. Russia, along with all the major international
suppliers (the USA, France, China, Japan and South
Korea) is a signatory to all the nuclear safety and
security conventions and encourages its clients to do
the same. Russia’s record in terms of adherence to
international norms, however, is not always sufficient
to persuade its customers to follow its lead.
Russian framework agreements do not require
purchaser countries to be a signatory to any treaty or
convention beyond the NPT (with the exception of
India). They must have a Comprehensive Safeguards
Agreement with the IAEA. However, few other
suppliers officially call for purchasing countries to
sign or ratify any further agreements. NSG guidelines
explicitly call for commitments to IAEA safety
standards and adherence to ‘accepted international
safety conventions’, but only specifically mention the
CNS in the context of ENR transfers (Article 6, a, vi).53
On nuclear security, the guidelines only state under
Article 13 that: ‘Suppliers should promote broadest
adherence to the respective international instruments,
inter alia, to the Convention on the Physical Protection
of Nuclear Material, as well as implementation
of INFCIRC/225, as amended from time to time’.
Requiring further commitments can be politically
difficult when many ‘nuclear have-nots’ are already
dissatisfied with the pace of nuclear disarmament
on the part of the nuclear weapon states, which
also happen to be the main suppliers of civil nuclear
technology. When calls were made for the CNS to be
made mandatory, suppliers were the ones that pushed
back.54
51  Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on
the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, 24 Dec. 1997.
52  Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, May
1980; Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material, 9 May 2016; and International Convention for the
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 2005.
53  IAEA (note 40).
54  IISS (note 21), p. 5.
8	 eu non-proliferation and disarmament consortium
elements of the NPP’s life cycle are taken into account,
which range from design and construction to operation
and decommissioning, this establishes a relationship
between supplier and buyer that can last for almost
a century. This will vary in length depending on the
type of contract, whether fuel supplies are also part
of the deal and the loan conditions. In most cases, the
relationship will be 30–40 years at the very least, and
help cement ongoing bilateral relations throughout that
time.
In many cases, as has been the case in China, India
and Iran, a successfully completed contract for a
certain number of reactor units can lead the way
to new contracts, further lengthening the bilateral
relationship. The need for new contracts—with
returning customers but especially with new ones—
makes it difficult to use NPPs in foreign countries for
geopolitical leverage. The export of nuclear reactors
and services is a key part of Russia’s export strategy
and generates substantial tax revenues.58 It provides
a stable source of income for an economy highly
dependent on the export of hydrocarbons that are
subject to price fluctuations. Russia’s domestic nuclear
industry and overall economy benefit from the sale of
reactors abroad and this in turn ensures that Rosatom
can continue to develop its economies of scale, thereby
improving its offer and competitiveness in the global
market. Russia would greatly disadvantage its own
industry, credibility and reputation if it were to use
Rosatom and its overseas projects as geopolitical tools.
Given their long-term and expensive nature, NPP
projects can provide a basis for further cooperation
on similarly sensitive and costly projects. While it is
difficult to determine whether the existence of NPP
projects has served to facilitate other trade deals to
a significant degree, arms agreements with Turkey
and Bangladesh have been signed in parallel with the
implementation of a Russian NPP project. In December
2017, Turkey signed an agreement with Russia worth
an estimated $2.5 billion on the purchase of S-400
surface-to-air missile batteries.59 Russia is not one of
Turkey’s major arms suppliers—the USA, Spain and
Italy usually supply more.60 Bangladesh, which buys
58  Minin, N. and Vlcek, T., ‘Determinants and considerations of
Rosatom’s external strategy’, Energy Strategy Reviews, vol. 17 (Sep.
2017), p. 38.
59  Gumruku, C. and Toksabay, E., ‘Turkey, Russia sign deal on supply
of S-400 missiles’, Reuters, 29 Dec. 2017.
60  Wezeman P. D. et al. ‘Trends in international arms transfers, 2017’,
SIPRI Fact Sheet (Mar. 2018), p. 6.
that should not be underestimated when evaluating
a country’s readiness to initiate a nuclear power
programme.
Singling out Russia as a supplier on the basis that it
does business with countries that do not yet adhere to
certain nuclear governance standards is disingenuous
given that other suppliers engage with most of these
countries, with the notable exception of Sudan. The
USA has a nuclear cooperation agreement in place with
India and Egypt, and is actively seeking to do business
with Saudi Arabia. Claims that Russian nuclear export
activities will lead to a weakening of global nuclear
standards appear thus far to be unfounded. However,
some of the countries with which Russia has engaged
on nuclear cooperation more substantially than
other suppliers present a worrying profile in terms of
adherence to nuclear safety and security norms. The
responsibility for ensuring that any nuclear trade with
such countries is established in the fullest compliance
with nuclear governance standards rests with the
nuclear suppliers, who will need to address these issues
in a practical way within the wider framework of the
non-proliferation regime.
IV. GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF RUSSIAN
NUCLEAR EXPORTS
Western observers often associate Rosatom’s nuclear
exports with a wider Russian geopolitical agenda.
Russian nuclear power projects have been described
as attempts ‘to build spheres of energy dependence’, or
‘to influence and bind countries around the world to its
irredentist and revanchist aims’.57 While the strategic
aspects of nuclear energy should not be downplayed,
assessments of Russian intentions have at times been
alarmist, and are often connected to ongoing tensions
between the West and Russia on other strategic issues.
This section examines the rationale for and limits
to using nuclear energy as a geopolitical tool, before
assessing how and to what extent Russia has been able
to use NPP projects in this way.
The perception that NPPs can be geopolitical assets
is based on the longevity of an NPP project and the
degree of control it might provide over a critical
element of a country’s economy. NPPs generally have
a planned operating cycle of 60 years. When other
57  Freeman, M., ‘How Russia, China use nuclear reactors to win
global influence’, Defense One, 13 July 2018; and Saha, S., ‘Russia’s
nuclear diplomacy’, Foreign Affairs, 2 Apr. 2017.
russia’s nuclear energy exports 9
cut off supplies from one day to the next in the same
way as it can with the gas pipeline infrastructure.
At a time of heightened tensions between Russia and
Ukraine in 2014, a senior Russian official threatened
to cut off nuclear fuel supplies to Ukraine.65 All
15 operational nuclear reactors in Ukraine are Soviet/
Russian-made. They generate 55 per cent of Ukraine’s
electricity. It is notable, however, that the threat was
never carried out. For countries that have signed fuel
supply contracts with a single supplier for the entire
lifespan of their NPPs, diversification of the nuclear
fuel market now offers alternative solutions. Rosatom’s
TVEL and Westinghouse have both invested in the
manufacture of fuel for each other’s reactors. TVEL
signed a contract with Sweden’s Vattenfall in 2016.66
Westinghouse has been working on alternatives to
TVEL-made fuel for VVER-type reactors. In Ukraine,
Westinghouse has been working since 2001 to develop
fuel assemblies for the country’s VVER-1000 reactors.
Ukraine has not fully replaced Russian-made fuel
but a VVER-1000 unit was loaded with fuel entirely
produced by Westinghouse for the first time in 2018.67
V. CONSOLIDATING NUCLEAR GOVERNANCE: EU
INSTRUMENTS
In response to Russia’s increasing dominance of
the nuclear export market, US commentators have
highlighted actions the USA should take to energize
its own nuclear industry both at home and abroad.
They see these steps as key to ensuring US leadership
in setting norms on and standards for nuclear
governance as well as an opportunity to compete on the
international market again.68 Experts have variously
recommended investing in nuclear innovation,
streamlining the administrative process for negotiating
nuclear cooperation agreements and providing new
funding opportunities through the US Export-Import
Bank.69 These recommendations see a strong nuclear
industry as necessary to ensure high standards of
governance. There are, however, opportunities for
actors other than major suppliers to consolidate
65  ‘South Ukraine 3 fully loaded with Westinghouse fuel’, World
Nuclear News, 20 July 2018.
66  ‘Russia enters Sweden’s nuclear fuel market’, Nuclear Engineering
International, 20 Dec. 2016.
67  World Nuclear News (note 65).
68  Centre for Strategic and International Studies (note 38).
69  Holgate, L. S. H. and Saha, S., ‘America must lead on nuclear
energy to maintain national security’, Washington Quarterly (Summer
2018), pp. 18–19.
most of its arms from China, has purchased various
systems from Russia, such as Yak-130 training and
light attack aircraft, R-77 BVR missiles and Mi-17
helicopters.61 Some of these purchases were financed
through a $1 billion loan that was granted alongside
an initial $500 million loan for the construction of the
Rooppur NPP in 2013.62
Concerns about Russia’s possible use of overseas
NPP projects as geopolitical tools also stem from the
BOO business model, which Rosatom is implementing
in Turkey. In contrast to turnkey projects, under a
BOO model ownership of the plant remains with
the operator, which is Russian-owned. Two US
nuclear specialists recently wrote that this is an
attempt to build ‘valuable Russian assets on foreign
soil, creating defensible grounds for the Kremlin
to introduce a physical troop presence in regions of
strategic interest’.63 The importance of Akkuyu to
Russian–Turkish relations was demonstrated when the
Turkish Air Force shot down a Russian jet in November
2015. Preparations were put on hold but the project’s
commercial and political value played a role in avoiding
an escalation in tensions. Akkuyu is the only Russian
NPP project to be implemented using such a model.
While other countries have expressed an interest,
Rosatom is unlikely to implement further BOO projects
in the near future due to the significant financial strain
they would put on the organization.
Russia’s past use of other energy resources as
leverage is a major source of concern that feeds into
the view of nuclear reactors as geopolitical assets.
Russia has cut off gas supplies to Ukraine on several
occasions, in 2006, 2008–2009 and 2014. This has
raised concerns that in countries where the electricity
sector depends, or will depend, to a large extent on
Russian nuclear fuel imports, Russia might exert its
power in a similar fashion. There are factors inherent
to the case of nuclear energy that make it less likely that
NPPs could be used as political or economic leverage in
the same way as gas. In terms of nuclear fuel, one-third
of an NPP’s fuel assemblies are replaced every 18–24
months.64 This means that Russia would not be able to
61  Bin Mushtaq, S., ‘Bangladesh’s ambitious military modernization
drive’, The Diplomat, 9 Jan. 2018.
62  ‘Russia grants Bangladesh $1 billion loan for weapons: Putin’,
Reuters, 15 Jan. 2013; and Bin Mushtaq (note 61).
63  Gallucci, N. and Shellenberger, M., ‘Will the west let Russia
dominate the nuclear market?’, Foreign Affairs, 3 Aug. 2017.
64  Nuclear Energy Institute, ‘Nuclear Fuel’.
10	 eu non-proliferation and disarmament consortium
the Additional Protocol’. EU member states make up
more than half the 48-member NSG and the European
Commission also participates as a permanent observer.
Given their diverging positions on nuclear energy
and trade, however, finding consensus among the EU
member states can be difficult. As the NSG continues
to discuss the prospects for India’s membership,
the EU and its member states have a role to play in
ensuring that strict non-proliferation goals are upheld,
especially with regard to ENR technologies, and in
working to maintain the legitimacy of the export
control regime. This is also in the interests of other
suppliers, including Russia, with which the EU should
seek to cooperate in order to bridge capacity gaps
particularly in terms of strategic trade controls relating
to dual-use technologies. Within the NSG, the EU
should also continue to highlight the importance of the
international legal non-proliferation regime, which
includes IAEA safeguards and conventions with the
NPT at its core.
While its member states retain sovereignty over
their choice of energy sources, the EU has worked to
establish common approaches to non-proliferation,
nuclear safety and nuclear security, the latter to a lesser
extent as it remains a national competence. The EU has
called for the promotion of common approaches in the
various communications that frame its external energy
policies, such as the 2007 ‘An Energy Policy for Europe’
and the 2010 ‘EU Energy Policy 2020’.72 The latter calls
on the EU to continue to be a world leader in developing
systems for safe nuclear power by ‘promoting legally
binding nuclear-safety, security and non-proliferation
standards worldwide’ through European Commission
initiatives aimed at ‘encouraging partner states to
make international nuclear safety, security and nonproliferation
standards and procedures legally binding
and effectively implemented around the globe’.
Nuclear security and non-proliferation
The EU WMD strategy highlights similar initiatives
in the field of nuclear security by supporting
international initiatives that aim to identify, control
and intercept illegally trafficked WMD as well as
related technologies and materials. In 2010, the EU
launched its Chemical, Biological, Radiological and
Nuclear Centres of Excellence (CBRN COE) to engage
72  European Commission, ‘An energy policy for Europe’, 10 Jan. 2007;
and European Commission, ‘Energy 2020: A strategy for competitive,
sustainable and secure energy’, 2010, COM/2010/0639final.
existing nuclear governance norms and ensure the safe,
secure and proliferation-resistant use of nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes.
The EU is one such actor. In the past two decades, the
EU has sought increasingly to address issues of nonproliferation
through its institutional structures and
budget instruments, and has developed a reputation
as a global non-proliferation actor.70 Energy choices,
nuclear or otherwise, remain within the purview
of individual member states. In the field of nuclear
governance, however, the EU has developed a set of
instruments for improving nuclear safety and security,
and strengthening non-proliferation standards.
These instruments can serve to address the risks
associated with civil nuclear energy projects and the
channels through which they are implemented can
be used to improve cooperation on these issues with
Russia, especially in the absence of a political basis for
enhanced collaboration. This section outlines some
of the tools used by the EU to address the inherent
problems posed by an increase in the number of nuclear
newcomers, most of which are recipients of Russian
technology, and, to a lesser extent, issues related to
energy security. The objectives of these instruments
are to improve nuclear governance norms, serve as
a facilitator for dialogue on issues related to nonproliferation
and promote energy security objectives.
Initiatives to improve nuclear governance
The 2003 EU Strategy against Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) still defines
the core tenets of EU policymaking in the field of
non-proliferation. In its ‘living action plan’, it details
several measures directly and indirectly related to
improving nuclear governance.71 Action number
four highlights the need to strengthen export
control policies and practices, and supplier regimes
by, among other things, ‘setting up a programme of
assistance to States in need of technical knowledge
in the field of export control’ and ‘working to ensure
that the Nuclear Suppliers Group make the export
of controlled nuclear and nuclear related items and
technology conditional on ratifying and implementing
70  For an in-depth review of the implementation of non-proliferation
objectives by EU actors see Grip, L., ‘Mapping the European Union’s
institutional actors related to WMD non-proliferation’, EU NonProliferation
Papers no. 1 (May 2011).
71  Council of the European Union, ‘EU strategy against proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction’, 15708/03, Brussels, 10 Dec. 2003, p. 11.
russia’s nuclear energy exports 11
specific programmes aimed at newcomer countries.
Compared to direct cooperation, the IAEA can provide
a more neutral framework in which the EU and Russia
could work together.
Nuclear safety
The EU is also continually striving to promote high
nuclear safety standards both internally and abroad.
The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)
has led and funded initiatives to improve nuclear
safety overseas, notably through the Instrument
for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) which was
created in 2007. The INSC expanded the geographical
scope of previous instruments used for nuclear safety
cooperation, which was limited to countries in the EU’s
immediate neighbourhood. It was created to address
the likely emergence of newcomer countries that lack
adequate nuclear infrastructure and nuclear safety
cultures.78 In 2007–2013, the first iteration of INSC,
INSC I, had a budget of €524 million ($594.5 million) to
support activities that sought to improve nuclear safety,
radiation protection, radioactive waste management,
nuclear safeguards and emergency preparedness.79
Under INSC I, the EU led projects in Eastern Europe,
Central Asia, South America, and East and South
East Asia. More than half the budget was spent on
projects in Ukraine, however, since proximity to the EU
remained an important criterion.80 INSC II, the new
iteration of the programme for the period 2014 to 2020,
has a budget of €225.32 million ($255.67 million) and
similar aims. These projects ensure that countries that
wish to embark on the path to nuclear energy can do so
safely.
Recent projects have supported nuclear regulators
and capacity building through training in Egypt,
Jordan and Morocco, all of which are countries that
have expressed varying levels of interest in moving
forward with nuclear energy plans with Russian
assistance.81 While INSC projects can only play a
and Technical cooperation financed during the current Multiannual
Financial Framework 2007–2013’, Fact sheet, 25 Jan. 2013.
78  Parry, M., ‘Instrument for nuclear safety cooperation’, European
Parliamentary Research Service, July 2017.
79  European Commission, Joint Research Centre, ‘INSC’, Updated 12
Dec. 2018.
80  Vrijen, J. et al. ‘Accompanying document to the report from
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the
evaluation of the implementation of the Council Regulation (Euratom)
n°300/2007 (Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation) in the period
2007–2013’, Italtrend, Mar. 2014, p. 12.
81  European Commission, Building Nuclear Safety Together:
The Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) (European
partner countries in mitigating the risks related to
CBRN materials.73 The CBRN COE have worked
with 59 partner countries on 65 different projects to
provide training and technical support in CBRN threat
response and strengthen export controls, among other
things. The EU P2P Export Control Programme is one
of the largest projects in the CBRN COE programme.
It oversees a capacity-building programme on control
of the export of dual-use goods.74 The programme
benefits from a network of experts across the EU that
provides technical expertise on activities that support
the drafting of export control legislation, the training
of customs and licensing officials and the exchange
of good practices. Such projects address some of the
common governance issues found in certain countries
noted in section II. Some CBRN COE projects, such as
projects 28 and 60, have had a nuclear security focus
while others have included nuclear security capacitybuilding
skills among their objectives. Project 60,
which supports the strengthening of nuclear security
in East and Central African countries, is particularly
notable as it involves countries actively engaged in
talks with Russia, such as Ghana, Zambia and Uganda,
and seeks to provide support with implementing
international safeguards and conventions.75 This
project would benefit from direct cooperation with
Russia and Rosatom, which is not currently envisaged.
Furthermore, the European Nuclear Security
Training Centre (EUSECTRA), which aims to improve
EU member states’ nuclear security capabilities,
occasionally provides training for non-member states.76
The EU also supports nuclear security and other nonproliferation
projects through the IAEA, separate from
individual member state contributions. Between 2007
and 2013, the EU provided €34.5 million ($39.1 million)
to the IAEA for nuclear security and €24.3 million
($27.6 million) for technical cooperation, which was
mainly to repatriate spent fuel from Vinca in Serbia to
Russia and for the subsequent decommissioning of the
facility. This was an important example of successful
collaboration between Russia, the USA and the IAEA
on reducing radioactive and proliferation risks.77 By
providing funding to the IAEA, the EU could target
73  EU P2P export control programmes, CBRN Centres of Excellence.
74  EU P2P Export Control Programme for Dual Use Goods [n.d.].
75  EU CBRN Center of Excellence of Eastern and Central Africa (EU
CBRN ECA), ‘The Project 60’ [n.d.].
76  ‘The European Nuclear Security Training Centre (EUSECTRA),’
EU Science Hub, Updated 25 Jan. 2019.
77  ‘Overview of EU support to the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) in the field of nuclear safety, safeguards, security
12	 eu non-proliferation and disarmament consortium
years. In 2015, Euratom provided €2 million ($2.2
million) to a consortium of European industries,
consultancies and research institutes under the
ESSANUF project. Coordinated by Westinghouse
Sweden, the project developed an alternative source
of nuclear fuel for Russian-designed VVER-440
reactors and aims to make the licensing process for this
alternative fuel cheaper and easier than it is currently.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Rosatom’s global rise in the nuclear technology
and energy market has been based on a concerted
export strategy reinforced by past projects and a
tailored approach that is particularly inviting to
nuclear newcomers. While Russia’s nuclear energy
relationships can, to a certain extent, be used to make
political gains or as economic leverage, Rosatom—and
by extension Russia—have strong incentives not to use
the nuclear trade for such purposes. There is currently
little evidence that Russia has used nuclear energy for
geopolitical purposes in the same concerted way as it
has used gas supplies. While there are some concerns
about the nature of BOO contracts, the prospects for an
increase in the number of new nuclear builds, nearly
all with Russian support, pose more immediate risks in
terms of nuclear governance as these are taking place
in countries that are new to nuclear energy. Some of
these countries do not have an Additional Protocol in
place, are not adhering to international conventions
on nuclear safety or security and have important
knowledge and capability gaps in terms of the nuclear
infrastructure or regulatory oversight needed to
manage a nuclear power programme. All suppliers
have a vested interest in ensuring that NPP projects
are implemented in a safe, secure and proliferation
risk-free manner.
While the EU cannot and should not replace the
role of a nuclear supplier or that of the IAEA, it has
proved itself adept at using soft power to address
the proliferation, safety and security risks posed by
nuclear energy in its immediate neighbourhood and
beyond. Non-proliferation objectives are emphasized
throughout the EU’s external communications.
Projects funded through the INSC and the CBRN COE
have targeted potential nuclear newcomers to help
them improve their nuclear safeguards, regulatory
infrastructure and export control legislation. Through
the IAEA, the EU supports projects with similar aims,
to enhance safeguards, safety and security, as well
small part in developing and improving nuclear safety,
safeguards, waste management and the capacity of
independent regulatory bodies, they should continue
to evolve based on states’ expressed interest in nuclear
energy. African states in particular, such as Sudan,
Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana, which are all investigating
developing a nuclear power programme with support
from Rosatom, could benefit from further support. The
EU could do more to tailor assistance to these countries
to enhance existing norms and standards while also
coordinating with Russia on the provision of technical
and legal training and avoiding overlap.
Beyond the INSC, nuclear safety is an area where
the EU can work jointly with the IAEA and Rosatom
to address the specific needs of countries with little
experience of nuclear power. Further dialogue on
nuclear safety between the EU and Russia has taken
place under a 2001 agreement signed between Euratom
and Russia.82 The EU–Russia energy dialogue was
initiated in 2001 but indefinitely paused in 2014
following events in Ukraine. It provided another
platform for discussions on safety issues and, more
importantly, on energy security issues.
Energy security
The EU’s main concern with regard to Russian nuclear
exports has been the issue of dependence on Russian
nuclear fuel supplies. In the EU’s 2014 Energy Security
Strategy, the European Commission stressed the
importance of fuel supply diversification and the need
for new NPPs not to depend solely on Russian fuel.83 A
key European initiative in this regard is the European
Supply of Safe Nuclear Fuel (ESSANUF) project.84 This
is an important EU initiative that seeks to promote the
diversification of fuel sources and reduce reliance on
Russian nuclear fuel. There are 18 Russian-designed
reactors in the EU: 14 VVER-440 and 4 VVER-1000.85
All 18 rely on Russia for their supply of nuclear fuel,
which has to be reloaded approximately every two
Commission: Brussels, Dec. 2013).
82  Agreement for cooperation between the European Atomic Energy
Community and the Government of the Russian Federation in the field
of nuclear safety, signed on 3 Oct. 2001, Official Journal of the European
Communities, L287, 31 Oct. 2001.
83  Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament and the Council, ‘European Energy Security Strategy’, 28
May 2014.
84  ESSANUF, Project page, [n.d.].
85  Westinghouse, ‘Westinghouse-led group wins EU backing to
diversify nuclear fuel supply to VVER reactors’, 29 June 2015.
russia’s nuclear energy exports 13
as technical cooperation. The IAEA also provides
many existing platforms aimed at helping nuclear
newcomers, which the EU could target through
funding contributions. Projects developed by the IAEA,
but also through EU-specific instruments such as the
INSC and the CBRN COE, provide possible avenues
for cooperation with Russia on non-proliferation and
nuclear governance, partly free from the political
constraints that have otherwise made EU–Russia
interactions difficult.
In international non-proliferation forums,
particularly the NSG and the IAEA, the EU should
pursue a concerted dialogue with Russia on
coordinating the promotion and implementation
of effective nuclear governance and adherence to
international conventions—especially in times of
political tension or heightened competition. Given the
increasing pace of the signing of new agreements and
contracts with Rosatom, the EU should provide similar
continuous and direct engagement on issues linked to
nuclear governance for countries that opt for nuclear
energy.
14	 eu non-proliferation and disarmament consortium
ABBREVIATIONS
BOO	Build-Own-Operate
CBRN	 Chemical Biological Radiological and
Nuclear
CBRN COE	 Chemical, Biological, Radiological and
Nuclear Centres of Excellence
CNS	 Convention on Nuclear Safety
CPPNM	 Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material
ENR	 Nuclear Enrichment and Reprocessing
ESSANUF	 European Supply of Safe Nuclear Fuel
Euratom	 European Atomic Energy Community
EUSECTRA	 European Nuclear Security Training
Centre
IAEA	 International Atomic Energy Agency
ICSANT	 International Convention on the
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
INSC	 Instrument for Nuclear Safety
Cooperation
JCPOA	 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
NPP	 Nuclear power plant
NPT	 Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSG	 Nuclear Suppliers Group
TENEX	Techsnabexport
UAE	 United Arab Emirates
WMD	 Weapons of Mass Destruction
russia’s nuclear energy exports 15
LIST OF RECENT NON-PROLIFERATION AND
DISARMAMENT PAPERS
Nuclear forensics as nuclear material analysis for
security purposes
Non-Proliferation Paper no. 60
Vitaly Fedchenko
June 2017
Phosphate fertilizers as proliferation-relevant
source of uranium
Non-Proliferation Paper no. 59
Robert Kelly and Vitaly Fedchenko
May 2017
The European Union and weapons of mass
destruction: a follow-on to the global strategy?
Non-Proliferation Paper no. 58
Lars-Erik Lundin
May 2017
Iran’s ballistic missile programme: Its status and the
way forward
Non-Proliferation Paper no. 57
Paulina Izewicz
April 2017
The next generation(s) of Europeans facing nuclear
weapons: Forgetful, indifferent, but supportive?
Non-Proliferation Paper no. 56
Benoit Pelopidas
March 2017
Is three dimensional (3D) printing a nuclear
proliferation tool?
Non-Proliferation Paper no. 55
Robert Kelly
February 2017
The EU’s CBRN Centres of Excellence Initiative
after 6 Years
Non-Proliferation Paper no. 54
Ralf Trapp
February 2017
© EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium 2019
This document has been produced with the financial
assistance of the EU. The contents are the sole
responsibility of the EU Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament Consortium and can under no circumstances
be regarded as reflecting the position of the EU.
EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium
Promoting the European network of independent
non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks
A EUROPEAN NETWORK
In July 2010 the Council of the European Union decided to
support the creation of a network bringing together
foreign policy institutions and research centers from
across the EU to encourage political and security-related
dialogue and the long-term discussion of measures to
combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) and their delivery systems. The Council of the
European Union entrusted the technical implementation
of this Decision to the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium.
In 2018, in line with the recommendations formulated by
the European Parliament the names and the mandate of the
network and the Consortium have been adjusted to include
the word ‘disarmament’.
STRUCTURE
The EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium
is managed jointly by six institutes: La Fondation pour la
recherche stratégique (FRS), the Peace Research Institute
Frankfurt (HSFK/ PRIF), the International Affairs
Institute in Rome (IAI), the International Institute for
Strategic Studies (IISS), the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Vienna Center
for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP). The
Consortium, originally comprised of four institutes, began
its work in January 2011 and forms the core of a wider
network of European non-proliferation and disarmament
think tanks and research centers which are closely
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MISSION
The main aim of the network of independent nonproliferation
and disarmament think tanks is to encourage
discussion of measures to combat the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems
within civil society, particularly among experts,
researchers and academics in the EU and third countries.
The scope of activities shall also cover issues related to
conventional weapons, including small arms and light
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www.hsfk.de
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE
FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
www.iiss.org
STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE
www.sipri.org
www.nonproliferation.eu