THE LIMITS OF COERCIVE
DIPLOMACY: THE 1979 SINOVIETNAMESE
BORDER WAR
James Muivenon
In 1979, China waged a brief but bloody war with Vietnam, with
the hopes of punishing Hanoi for its invasion and occupation of
Cambodia the previous year. Beijing's attempt at coercive diplomacy
was an embarrassing failure, however, resulting in tens of
thousands of casualties for both sides. This article, using
Alexander George's models of coercive diplomacy and crisis
management, examines the reasons for China's failed coercion
and confirms that the most important variable was the omnipresent
military threat from the Soviet Union, which prevented China
from successfully escalating the crisis to its advantage.
Nations have often used threats and other forms of coercive
diplomacy against their adversaries with the hopes of achieving specific deterrence
or compellence objectives. Why do nations sometimes fail despite
overwhelming military superiority? To answer this question and others,
Alexander George and William Simons attempted to systematize the concept
of "coercive diplomacy" by compiling structured, focused case studies of past
U.S. policy successes and failures/ One of their main goals was to derive
empirical generalizations from these cases and then operationalize a robust
theory that would be applicable for government policymakers. The authors,
however, did not examine any cases of coercive diplomacy by countries other
than the United States.
An excellent "plausibility probe" of non-U.S, coercive diplomacy is the
1979 Sino-Vietnamese border war, in which China unsuccessfully attempted
to compel Vietnam into abandoning its recent invasion of Cambodia.2 This
conflict qualifies as a case of coercive diplomacy under George's definition
because: (1) one party tried to force another party to stop and reverse an
action; (2) it was a "limited" military action (i.e., not aimed at the adversary's
total surrender); and (3) there was no zero-sum conflict between the two
combatants (i.e., fighting over a common border). It is my argument that
careful examination of Chinese policies shows that George and Simons's
model is sufficiently flexible to analyze non-U.S, cases, and that the model's
ability to explain the success or failure of coercive diplomacy across countries
allows it to claim a much broader relevance.
With regard to the specific case, Chinese efforts to apply coercive diploJames
Mulvenon is a Ph.D. student at the University of California, Los Angeles and a consultant to the
RAND Corporation.
MULVENON 69
macy to Vietnam, despite an overwhelming superiority in numbers and material,
ultimately failed to achieve Beijing's two primary objectives: withdrawal
of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia and restoration of the status quo antebellum.
I argue that numerous factors contributed to the failure, including
tactical blunders by the Chinese leadership that squandered their initial strategic
advantages; a clear asymmetry of motivation during the conflict itself that
worked to the advantage of Vietnam; China's unclear signaling of its objectives
and the terms of compliance; China's simultaneous use of the contradictory
principles of crisis management and coercive diplomacy; and as external
constraints (Vietnam's military and political alliance with the Soviet Union)
upon Chinese escalation of the crisis. Of these, I shall argue that the threat
from Moscow was the most significant factor, for the Russians' looming
presence in the war reduced the credibility of Chinese threats of escalation,
undermining a key pillar of successful coercive diplomacy.
China's failure to coerce Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia establishes
the robustness of George's model for explaining the success or failure of
coercive diplomatic strategies in non-U.S, cases. It also confirms George's
assertion that the requirements and goals of coercive diplomacy and crisis
management, respectively, are often at cross-purposes.3 In particular, crisis
management's ambiguous signaling and pauses blur the clarity necessary for
successful coercive diplomacy, and its emphasis on "limited" military action
reduces the credibility of escalatory threats. With regard to the case study, I
argue that the interaction of Chinese crisis management and attempts at coercive
diplomacy had the effect of muting and sometimes directly contradicting
their compellence goals. First, Chinese fears of provoking a Soviet response
caused them to avoid actions that signaled future escalation to large-scale
warfare and occupation, reducing the credibility of Chinese threats. Second,
the strategic pauses that marked Chinese statements before and during the
invasion relieved the diplomatic pressure on Hanoi and allowed the latter to
regroup its forces. Third, movements of Chinese forces and threats of force
intended to signal Beijing's limited objectives were lost amongst other diplomatic
"noise" about Vietnamese border incursions and "self-defense counterattacks."
Finally, Beijing did not select diplomatic positions and military
moves that provided Vietnam with a face-saving exit, thus backing Vietnam
into a corner from which it ostensibly had no choice but to resist Chinese
coercion.
GEORGE AND SIMONS'S MODEL OF COERCIVE DIPLOMACY
The central logic of George and Simons's model is that pressure, correctly
applied, can force an adversary to comply with one's demands. Success itself
depends on a number of factors, including the magnitude of the demand,
matching the strategy to the situation, and effectively implementing that strat-
70 JOURNAL OF NORTHEASTASIAN STUDIES / FALL 1995
egy. Misapplication will lead most of the time to failure, as will misidentification
of the situation. In order to avoid these pitfalls, the authors draw
some preliminary conclusions from their case studies, identifying eight conditions
that favor the use of coercive diplomacy: clarity of the objective,
strength of motivation, asymmetry of motivation, sense of urgency, strong
leadership, adequate domestic and international support, unacceptability of
threatened escalation, and clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement
of the crisis. While none of these are unimportant, four (asymmetry of motivation,
sense of urgency, unacceptability of threatened escalation, and clarity
concerning the precise terms of settlement) appear to have the most significant
impact upon the outcome.
At this point, brief definitions of these four conditions are necessary. The
first, "asymmetry of motivation," follows from the authors' belief that a
coercive strategy is "more likely to be successful if the side employing it is
more highly motivated than its opponent" and that the adversary perceives
this as weU.4 While the authors argue that in some cases asymmetry is determined
solely by circumstance, they also assert that a player can create an
asymmetry in one of two ways: by demanding of the opponent only what is
essential to protect its own vital interests and not making demands that engage
the vital interests of its adversary; and by offering a carrot that reduces
the adversary's motivation to resist the demands.5 "Sense of urgency," like
asymmetry of motivation, has both an objective and a subjective component.
On the one hand, it is incumbent upon the coercing nation to create a time
pressure in the conflict such that the opponent feels increasingly motivated to
accede to the demands. Equally important, however, is the adversary's perception
of the sense of urgency, which must be well communicated and
believable. If there is no sense of urgency communicated by the coercing
nation or the adversary does not correctly perceive the signals of the coercer,
then all time limits set on compliance become less credible. The third condition,
"unacceptability of threatened escalation," centers on the belief that the
impact of coercive diplomacy is enhanced if the initial actions and communications
directed against the adversary arouse his fear of an escalation to
circumstances less acceptable than those promised by accession to the coercing
power's demands. Finally, "clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement
of the crisis" is important in two respects: first, it "assists policymakers
in selecting from among several available response options;" and second,
clear signaling of one's limited objectives helps convince the adversary of
one's "strength of purpose.''6 It must also be noted, however, that clear communication
of one's objectives and demands may not be sufficient for successful
resolution. In many cases, it may also be necessary to signal an exit
strategy to the enemy, so that he does not erase all the gains of the coercing
nation through an irrational reaction.
In the remainder of this article, I shall focus on the chosen case study, the
Chinese failure to coerce Vietnam in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border war.
MUL VENON 71
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The historical relationship of China and Vietnam, generally marked by
mutual distrust and enmity, also had a remarkably symbiotic character. For
nearly one thousand years China claimed a sphere of influence in the northern
Tonkin region of modern Vietnam, and the latter imported many elements
of China's cultural and political system. After its independence in the tenth
century, Vietnam continued to maintain a "tributary" relationship with its
large northern neighbor and the Vietnamese ruling elite drew legitimacy from
the Chinese Confucian/imperial system. During the colonial period, both
countries suffered at the hands of the imperialist powers, and their nascent
communist parties were closely linked in the struggle for independence. With
the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, SinoViet
Mirth relations reached their peak, as the PRC recognized the embattled
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and initiated substantial military aid
to Ho Chi Minh's forces.
The 1954 Geneva Conference marked the beginning of a rapid deterioration
in cooperation between the two revolutionary parties, as a newly unified
and powerful China sought to reassert its traditional sphere of influence in
Southeast Asia. This growing split was exacerbated by the Sino-Soviet rift of
the late 1950s, in which Vietnam quickly became a pawn in a struggle for
influence between two increasingly hostile would-be benefactors. In the end,
the Soviet Union's offer of material assistance for Vietnam's war against the
United States proved more valuable than China's empty-handed moral exhortation
of "self-reliance," pushing Ho's regime into the "revisionist/social imperialist"
camp of the USSR.7
Despite this seemingly irreconcilable split, however, China's rapprochement
with the United States in 1972 came as a great shock to the Vietnamese
government, which perceived the Nixon visit as an act of fathomless betrayal
and final proof of a much more insidious agenda on the part of Mao Zedong
and the Chinese leadership. As William Duiker argues, "Vietnamese leaders
[after 1972] had apparently become convinced that China's Vietnam policy
was rooted in a desire to maintain the division of Vietnam in order to facilitate
postwar domination of Southeast Asia.''8 This ostensible change in policy
contrasted sharply with Vietnam's world view, which still saw global politics
in stark Manichean terms. China, on the other hand, had come to perceive a
much more complicated global balance of power, with China as a vertex of
an increasingly Quid strategic triangle with the Soviet Union and the United
States.
This pattern of mistrust and hostility alone, however, was not sufficient to
provoke military conflict between China and Vietnam in 1979. Therefore, it
is necessary to examine the events directly preceding the border conflict to
ascertain its direct and indirect causes. Observers have offered a number of
72 JOURNAL OF NORTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES / FALL 1995
theories, including explanations that point to the aforementioned "ancient
enmities,''9 Vietnam's relationship with the Soviet Union,1° China's obsession
with the sanctity of its borders,11or Vietnamese treatment of its expatriate
Chinese population.12 These issues are excellently discussed by Bruce
Burton, and I fully agree with his conclusion that the real cause of the March
1979 border war was Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in Christmas 1978, an
act that greatly provoked the Chinese and drove them to employ a much more
aggressive diplomatic strategy.13He contends that the strategic imperatives of
China and Vietnam in Indochina and the entanglements of the Sino-Soviet
split combined to make Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia a flashpoint between
the two countries. This conclusion is verified by a number of factors,
including the fact that Chinese troop movements began only after Vietnam's
military campaign was underway.14
Casus Belli
Here, some brief historical background on the role of Cambodia in SinoVietnamese
relations is necessary. Beginning in 1954 at Geneva, China had
sought to weaken Vietnam's regional control over Indochina by refusing to
permit Cambodia and Laos to attend the conference as full members35 In the
late 1960s, China heavily supported Cambodia's neutral leader, Prince
Sihanouk, who had turned a blind eye to Vietnamese excursions in his
country's eastern provinces. After Lon Nol overthrew Sihanouk in 1971,
China granted the latter asylum in Beijing, while simultaneously stepping up
aid to the anti-Lon Nol Khmer Rouge, whose Maoist inclinations had long
since soured their relations with the Soviet-oriented communists in Vietnam.
The Chinese continued to aid the Khmer Rouge after their victory over Lon
Nol's forces in 1975, and they encouraged their new Maoist allies to resist
Vietnamese attempts at hegemonism in the region. These agitations increased
in intensity throughout the mid-1970s, as Pol Pot's regime escalated its aggressive
and often unpredictable behavior on the Vietnamese border.
At first, China and Vietnam held back from direct confrontation over
Cambodia. After Beijing signed a military aid pact with Pol Pot in September
1977, however, the latter evidently felt he had the unconditional support of
the Chinese regime and intensified the skirmishes on the border with Vietnam.
Talks between China and Vietnam in November 1977 did not defuse the
crisis, but instead drove the Chinese to demand that the Vietnamese completely
withdraw their troops from eastern Cambodia. 16 By the spring of
1978, escalating rhetoric across the border ignited a massive refugee crisis, as
thousands of ethnic Chinese streamed into southern China. The refugee exodus
inflamed emotions on both sides, leading the Chinese to brand the Vietnamese
as racist and the Vietnamese to accuse the Chinese of large-scale
espionage within their borders.
MULVENON 73
The final blow to possible Sino-Vietnamese reconciliation was Vietnam's
invasion of Cambodia on Christmas Day 1978. This act angered the Chinese
for a number of reasons. First, it displayed serious determination on the part
of the Vietnamese to assert hegemony over Southeast Asia, which China
regarded as within its own traditional sphere of influence. Second, it involved
an attack against one of China's few remaining ideological allies by a client
state of its greatest enemy, the Soviet Union. Therefore, by extension, the
conflict was more than just an issue of regional balance of power. From this
perspective, all of China's other grievances (i.e., border disagreements, treatment
of expatriate Chinese, etc.) appear to be minor issues that would never
have led to large-scale conflict. 17
On February 17, 1979, China invaded Vietnam with a force of more than
100,000 men and 190,000 in reserve, pitted against 60,000 to 80,000 regular
Vietnamese troops and similar numbers of local militia forces. Despite some
Western reportage to the contrary, it appears that the Chinese military assault
was never meant to be a full-scale invasion. When one considers the size of
the Chinese army and its choice of tactics in the conflict, it is easy to see the
difference. At the time of the conflict, China's army totaled more than 4
million men in uniform, including twenty-nine divisions of main and local
force troops stationed in the two military regions bordering Vietnam. ~s If they
had been so inclined, the Chinese could have thrown a much larger force at
the Vietnamese, completely overwhelming their border defense. Also, the
visible Chinese strategy was congruent not with conquering, but with signaling.
If the Chinese had intended to capture Hanoi, they would not have
attacked at many places along the border as they did, but instead would have
chosen one or two key entry points and driven hard to the capital, as dictated
by contemporary military strategy. ~9Deng himself confirmed the limited nature
of the attack on February 26 in statements to the international press:
Our objective is a limited one--that is, to teach them they could not run about as
much as they desired.2°
In addition, Deng announced a few days later that Chinese forces had no
intention of capturing Hanoi.21 Both of these signals were undoubtedly aimed
at Moscow, which had signed a mutual defense treaty (some would say
military alliance) with Vietnam only the year before.
We now turn to an analysis of China's coercive strategy over the months
leading up to the invasion.
CHINA 'S POLICY TOWARD VIETNAM
China's tangible attempts at coercive diplomacy began after the Vietnamese
invasion of Cambodia on Christmas Day 1978. As mentioned in the
74 JOURNAL OF NORTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES / FALL 1995
introduction, China's principal objective was to convince the Vietnamese to
withdraw from Cambodia (in essence, restore the status quo antebellum), or
what George would consider a classic Type B strategy. More specifically, it
resembled the variant of coercive diplomacy described by the authors as the
"try and see approach," because the Chinese did not link their demand to a
time limit; thus, they did not create a strong sense of urgency.22Instead, they
carried out a limited military action and then waited to see if it was sufficient
to persuade the Vietnamese to retreat from Cambodia.
Our remaining discussion of Chinese policy towards Vietnam centers on
four variables from the George and Simons coercive diplomacy model (clarity
concerning the precise terms of settlement, asymmetry of motivation,
sense of urgency, and unacceptability of escalation). This analysis is further
buttressed by a closing discussion of crisis management's often contradictory
effects upon attempts at coercive diplomacy.
Muddled Objectivesand Unclear Terms of Compliance
China's main coercive goal in 1979 was to force Vietnam to withdraw its
troops from Cambodia and restore the status quo antebellum. Beijing's communication
of this desire, however, was often lost in mixed signals. In November
of 1978 at a Bangkok press conference, Deng Xiaoping discussed the
measures that China would take in dealing with Vietnam's regional
hegemonism and stated that the scale of their efforts would depend on the
level of Vietnamese aggression against Cambodia.23 Two days after the fall
of Phnom Penh on January 7, an article by a "commentator" in People's
Daily warned that "the capture of Phnom Penh by Vietnam does not mean the
end but the beginning of war.''24 At the end of January, Deng Xiaoping made
a well-publicized trip to the United States, where he spoke publicly of the
need to punish the "Cubans of the Orient" and said that "If you don't teach
them some necessary lessons, it just won't do.''25
The common thread running through these statements is that China's main
concern was Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia. In tone and timing,
these messages were strikingly reminiscent of Chinese strategies before entry
into the Korean War in 1950 and their border clashes with India in 1959 and
1962. Despite these precedents, however, the Chinese objective was not clear
to the Vietnamese, since the warnings about Cambodia were issued among
other, equally strident notes dealing with ancillary issues such as border
incursions and refugees.26 For example, beginning in the summer of t978,
China began issuing stern notes to Hanoi concerning "unscrupulous provocations"
along their common border. On November 7, 1978, the Chinese Foreign
Ministry strongly protested an alleged border incursion by Vietnam on
November 1 that left twelve Chinese civilians dead or wounded.27 The second
serious protest was issued on December 13, warning Vietnam's leaders
MUL VENON 75
that they "should understand there is a limit to China's forbearance" and if
they "should persist in their course and continue to encroach upon Chinese
territory and sovereignty they must be held responsible for the consequences.''2s
This warning was repeated again in notes issued on December
24. Finally, on January 18, February 12, and February 16, Beijing issued its
strongest protests against Vietnamese border incursions and hinted at impending
hostilities.29
Even on the day of the Chinese invasion, February 17, Beijing's official
explanation declared that the Chinese were "forced to rise in self-defensive
counter-attack" because of Vietnam's "incessant armed provocations and
hostile activities" along their border.3° Additionally, they announced that the
"objective" of their punitive attack was to secure a "peaceful and stable
border.''31 The official statement did not mention Vietnam's invasion of
Cambodia at all, nor did it establish conditions for Chinese retreat from
Vietnam, such as immediate cease-fire in Cambodia and phased pull-out of
Vietnamese regulars. Herbert Yee has argued that China's note gave the
Vietnamese a chance to withdraw troops from Cambodia without losing face
and denied the Soviets an excuse to intervene on Hanoi's behalf.32 It could
also be asserted that labeling the assault a "counterattack" also helped bolster
domestic support and morale in the Chinese People's Liberation Army, since
it was understandably difficult to explain to the populace why China's former
"fraternal socialist brother" was now a military adversary. Even if these assertions
are true, however, signal ambiguity on this scale is not conducive to
the success of coercive diplomacy, especially given the magnitude of the
objective Beijing sought from Hanoi.33 The statement gave the Vietnamese
no clear indication of China's intentions, nor did it clearly establish the terms
of compliance.34 Even the later statement made in the UN Security Council
by China's representative Chen Chu that China "will retreat only after meting
out punishment" did not explicitly set out any terms of compliance.35 For
coercive diplomacy to have been successful, the Chinese should have carefully
communicated their precise desires to Hanoi, as well as interim and
unilateral acts of good faith the Vietnamese government could have undertaken
to express their willingness to comply with the demands (full retreat of
100,000 men cannot happen overnight).
No Way Out:Asymmetry of Motivation
In order to determine which side was favored by George and Simons's
asymmetry of motivation, it is necessary to gauge three factors: the coercer's
motivation to fight, the magnitude of its demand, and the target's will to
resist. In the author's edited case studies, the analysis of these general factors
has been unavoidably influenced by the outcome of the conflict itself. Here,
too, it is recognized that some of the assertions that follow are colored by
76 JOURNAL OF NORTHEASTASIAN STUDIES / FALL 1995
hindsight, bias, and the propaganda issued by both sides; but an attempt has
been made to offer aggregated preferences distilled from the actions and
comments of the two participants.
According to George and Simons's criteria for asymmetry of motivation,
China did not possess an advantage in the conflict with Vietnam. First,
Beijing's motivation was weakened by the fact that it could not view the
issue in life-or-death terms, primarily because it did not involve a zero-sum
dilemma between itself and Vietnam (despite propaganda to the contrary,
they were fighting over disputed territory not on their border but on that of a
third party). On the other hand, Beijing seemed to perceive (incorrectly) that
the Vietnamese would be easy to coerce. Statements by Chinese leaders
reveal their deep confidence in the striking power of the People's Liberation
Army and the expected minimal resistance of the opposing Vietnamese
forces.36
Although an argument could be sustained that Vietnam's costly war in
Cambodia reduced their ability to fight a war on two fronts, the brimming
confidence of China's military leadership had little basis in fact. True, China
had fought in a number of conflicts since their "victory" in Korea, including
some skirmishes against the Russians, but they had not carried out a full-scale
military operation against a competent foe in over thirty years. Their equipment
was outdated, their tactics were not suited to modem combined-arms
assault, and the majority of the PLA's regimental commanders had never
seen battle.37Furthermore, the optimism of China's leaders ignored the seemingly
obvious fact that Vietnam had just finished waging a victorious thirtyfive-year
guerrilla war against some of the world's most advanced technology.
It should have come as no surprise, therefore, when initial success
quickly gave way to stalemate, while casualties began to mount for the Chinese
army.
Vietnam, on the other hand, had no shortage of motivation in the crisis,
despite the logistical nightmare of running a war on two fronts. First, their
sunk costs (investment in men and material) involved in the Cambodian
operation made it nearly impossible for the Vietnamese to withdraw quickly,
and effectively bolstered their resistance to Chinese coercion. In addition,
Vietnam's leaders had reasons to assume that China lacked the will to fight.
First of all, they were confident that China would act cautiously, lest Beijing
elicit a militant response from Moscow. They may have also assumed that the
elderly Chinese leadership was preoccupied with the country's nascent modernization
drive, given the enormous attention it was receiving in the Chinese
domestic press around the time of the Cambodian invasion. Finally, they may
have (correctly) concluded that the Chinese army was ill-equipped and
undertrained for such an assault and could be repelled by Vietnamese militia
and frontier forces.
These internal factors aside, during the crisis itself China did not imple-
MULVENON 77
ment policies that would alter the asymmetry to its advantage, such as demanding
only what was essential to their interests or offering carrots to the
Vietnamese. Instead, China made demands that went far beyond what was
"essential" to their interests, requiring Vietnam to make an expensive retreat
from Cambodia, which would have resulted in an unacceptable loss of face
and reputation in the world community.38 Furthermore, Beijing never publicly
offered Hanoi any economic or political incentive to withdraw from
Cambodia peacefully, nor did they signal what mid-level steps Hanoi could
take to show their desire for peaceful crisis resolution.39 They didn't even
offer a flexible timetable for withdrawal, which would seem reasonable given
the magnitude of the demand. All of these mistakes and omissions prevented
China from enjoying a favorable asymmetry of motivation, or at the very
least, reducing Vietnam's asymmetry.
From this evidence, it may be concluded that the asymmetry of motivation
favored the Vietnamese in the crisis and that this imbalance had two significant
consequences. It effectively lowered the probability of Chinese military
success despite overwhelming numerical superiority; and, more importantly,
it weakened China's hopes for successful coercive diplomacy.
Unacceptability of ChineseEscalation
Looming over the crisis between Vietnam and China was the specter of
the Soviet Union, which had signed a mutual defense treaty with Hanoi
shortly before the invasion of Cambodia. It was clearly not in China's interests
to have its heavily armed northern neighbor join the conflict, for nearly
forty-three Soviet motorized rifle divisions were poised in a high state of
readiness on the Chinese border, not to mention the Soviet Union's overwhelming
nuclear superiority.
To prevent this escalation, Beijing took a number of crucial steps. First, as
Yee has argued, the phrasing of the note to Vietnam on February 17 was
carefully crafted so as not to "give Moscow an otherwise similar excuse to
intervene on Hanoi's behalf.''4° By mentioning only trivial border issues, the
Chinese made it clear that they had no intention of full-scale war against
Vietnam. If, on the other hand, China had declared its intent to invade and
occupy the nation of Vietnam, the USSR would have been compelled to enter
the crisis, probably attacking China proper. Second, the Chinese action remained
relatively "limited" in scope. As noted earlier, only 100,000 troops
were used in the invasion (out of a total force of 4.3 million) and the tactics
used were not those associated with conquering. Deng himself, asked
whether he thought Moscow would intervene, replied: "We estimate that the
Soviet Union will not take too big an action. I think our action is limited, and
it will not give rise to a very big event.''41 As a prudent countermeasure,
however, China reportedly evacuated thousands of residents from villages
78 JOURNAL OF NORTHEASTASIAN STUDIES / FALL 1995
near the Sino-Soviet border in the weeks preceding its attack on Vietnam,
placed the entire Northern Front military region on maximum alert, and began
discussing contingency plans for evacuating foreigners from Beijing.42
A third important element in China's strategy to keep the Soviet Union out
of the war was their subtle application of the "U.S. card." On January 1,
1979, one week after Vietnam invaded Cambodia, the United States and
China concluded the process of diplomatic normalization. At a banquet following
the signing of the agreements, Hua Guofeng was frank about the
value of improved Sino-U.S. ties:
I believe that the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the
United States is a historic event in our bilateral relations, which not only accords
with the fundamental interests of the Chinese and American peoples, but will exert
a favorable influence on the international situation. 43 (Emphasis added.)
The next day, during a reception with Vice President Walter Mondale, Chinese
Liaison Office Chief Chai Zemin was even more specific:
The normalization of Sino-U.S. relations is not only in conformity with the aspirations
and interests of the Chinese and American peoples, but also will certainly
play a role in combating the expansion and aggression of hegemonism.44(Emphasis
added.)
The hegemon in question was clearly the Soviet Union.
As if to underscore this theme, Deng Xiaoping undertook a highly publicized
visit to the United States, where he railed against Soviet hegemonism
and publicly promised to "teach Vietnam a lesson."45 Even though the Carter
administration's statements after the fact clearly suggest that they had not
explicitly approved China's invasion during Deng's trip, they were still
trapped in a Chinese finger puzzle, since public criticism of Beijing would
quickly sour their newly established and strategically important relations with
the Chinese leadership. While stopping short of direct support, the convenient
presence of the American aircraft carrier Constellation in international waters
off Vietnam and the omnipresent American nuclear umbrella helped ensure
that the Soviets did not up the ante.46
China was also extremely careful not to provoke Soviet intervention
through its conduct of the war itself. After the initial hostilities had begun,
Beijing assured Moscow that conquering Vietnam was not their objective:
"We do not want a single inch of Vietnamese territory.... After counterattacking
the Vietnamese aggressors as they deserve, the Chinese frontier
troops will strictly keep to defending the border of their own country.''47
Similarly, Deng Xiaoping in a public statement the next day sought to convince
the Soviet Union and the world that the conflict would be limited in
nature, not unlike their war with India in 1962, which lasted only a month:
MULVENON 79
"This action will be a limited one, an action reacting to provocation that will
be circumspect to take care of the situation, and it will not be extended or
expanded in any way.''48
China's pledges of limited non-escalation were also borne out in the tactics
that the PLA employed in the field. First, the Chinese army did not use its
air force to support forward combat units, even though it had clear numerical
superiority.49 Second, a respected and well-informed military analyst reports
that the Chinese forces were under orders not to advance more than fifty
kilometers into Vietnamese territory.5° Third, Chinese political and military
leaders vehemently denied that the objective of PLA forces was the heavily
populated Red River Valley or Hanoi, since threatening the latter would
certainly provoke Soviet intervention in the conflict.51
While these attempts at crisis management saved China from a much
larger conflagration with its Russian neighbor, it spelled the doom of PRC
coercive diplomacy against Vietnam. Without the implied threat of escalation,
Vietnam could leave its invasion force in Cambodia and fight the Chinese
with regional militia and frontier troops. Furthermore, Beijing's overriding
concern with preventing Soviet armed intervention inevitably limited its
own options, such as strategic strikes deep into Vietnam's flatlands, which
would have cut off supplies for forward units.52 If the PLA could have expanded
the war without fear of Russian reprisal, then the Vietnamese would
have been forced to transfer troops from the Cambodian theater to their
northern border, thus easing the pressure on the native Khmer Rouge insurgency
and perhaps even raising the costs of continued occupation to the point
where the Vietnamese would have complied with Chinese demands and withdrawn
completely from Cambodia.
Conflict Between Crisis Management and Coercive Diplomacy
In the final analysis, it seems that China's attempts at crisis management
during the invasion actually weakened their attempt at coercive diplomacy by
muting and sometimes contradicting their compellence strategies in four respects.
First, the Chinese avoided actions that signaled future escalation to
large-scale warfare and occupation. This had the unintended consequence of
weakening their coercive strategy, which required the Vietnamese to perceive
that escalation was a serious and viable option. With a credible threat of
escalation, the Vietnamese might have lost their asymmetry of motivation
and considered some sort of negotiated settlement. Instead, they evidently felt
secure in challenging the Chinese army on the battlefield and waiting for
events to swing in their favor.
Second, the strategic pauses that marked Chinese statements before and
during the invasion often had the unintended consequence of relieving the
diplomatic pressure on Hanoi and allowed the latter to regroup its forces. If
80 JOURNAL OF NORTHEASTASIAN STUDIES / FALL 1995
China had instead employed a "gradual turning of the screw" policy, such as
that used by the United States during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnamese
might have had a clearer idea of China's goals and the terms for compliance.
For example, if Chinese threats had slowly escalated in tone, coupled
with tangible increases in military readiness, then perhaps the Vietnamese
would have preempted China's invasion with opening concessions. As it was,
ambiguous Chinese signaling forced Vietnam to concentrate on the military
aspects of the crisis and settle the dispute on the battlefield.
Third, movements of Chinese forces and threats of force intended to signal
resolve were not consistent with Beijing's limited diplomatic objectives. Instead,
the level of "noise," or confusing signals, was extremely high before
and during the crisis. As has been argued earlier, the Chinese statements on
the day of invasion made no mention of Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia,
effectively decoupling it from Chinese aggression. If Beijing had made a
clear connection between their border attacks and a desire for Vietnamese
withdrawal, it would have increased the probability of successful coercive
diplomacy by clarifying the terms of compliance. Instead, Hanoi was left to
decipher Chinese ravings about border sovereignty and the meaning of terms
like "self-defense counter-attack."
Finally, Beijing did not select diplomatic proposals and military moves
that provided Vietnam with a face-saving exit. In many ways, this is a damning
criticism of the entire policy. Beijing's demand that Vietnam abandon its
occupation of Cambodia was clearly too large a goal. For Hanoi to write off
its investment would have entailed enormous financial losses and diplomatic
humiliation. Furthermore, Beijing never communicated any acceptable halfway
positions, such as phased withdrawal or guarantees of Cambodian political
autonomy. Instead, China adamantly maintained the politically and logistically
unrealistic stance that nothing short of immediate withdrawal was
satisfactory.
CONCLUSION
By all accounts, the Chinese invasion of Vietnam was a stunning failure.
While achieving a number of tactical objectives, the main strategic objective
of compelling the Vietnamese to withdraw forces from Cambodia was
thwarted by the resilience of the Vietnamese militia and the ineffectiveness of
the People's Liberation Army. After a month of fighting, the Chinese army
limped back across the border, leaving Vietnam to occupy Cambodia for an
additional twelve years.53 Pro-Beijing elements within the Hanoi government
who favored retreat from Cambodia, such as party veteran Hoang Van Hoan,
were either arrested or forced to defect to China.54 Back at home, Deng
Xiaoping trumpeted the invasion as a success to domestic critics while internally
attacking weaknesses in the PLA's performance (poor coordination of
MUL VENON 81
air and artillery, lack of modern equipment, serious logistical breakdowns)
and implementing a major modernization drive within the armed forces. The
failure also gave Deng enough political capital to purge conservative and
lingering Maoist elements from the PLA and execute a sweeping cut in the
military's defense budgetP5
For our purposes, the failure of China to coerce Vietnam confirms the
robustness of George and Simons's theoretical model in non-U.S, cases. The
factors that contributed most to the failure were a clear asymmetry of motivation
that favored Vietnam; China's unclear signaling of its objectives and the
terms of compliance; the conflict between the demands of crisis management
and those of coercive diplomacy; and the external constraints (Vietnam's
alliance with the Soviet Union) upon Chinese escalation of the crisis. Of
these, I would argue that the threat from Moscow was the most significant
factor, for the Russians' looming presence in the war forced the Chinese to
adopt principles of crisis management, such as strategic pauses and actions
that did not signal large-scale escalation, thus ultimately weakening their
attempts at coercive diplomacy.
In the end, it is possible that the situation itself was not really conducive to
the application of coercive diplomacy, given the extensive "containing" presence
of the Soviet Union. In fact, external constraints doomed it from the
outset. Even if the Chinese army had fought better on the battlefield, they
could not have achieved their ultimate objective, since only a full-scale invasion
of Vietnam would have coerced the Vietnamese to retreat from Cambodia
and such extreme escalation on the part of the Chinese would have pulled
the Russians into the crisis. Thus, it must be concluded that the Chinese both
misidentified the situation and misapplied the principles of coercive diplo-
macy.
Has China learned anything from this crisis? Its most recent projections of
force have occurred in the South China Sea over the oil-rich Spratly Islands,
which are claimed by a host of regional countries, including Vietnam. Again,
the Chinese military has sought to coerce the defending Vietnamese forces,
hoping to drive them from a prestigious conquest. This time the Chinese
forces are much more modernized than they were in 1979, and the omnipresent
spectre of the Soviet Union is gone. Seemingly, the Chinese could have
their way in the crisis, but recent developments tell a familiar tale. ASEAN,
many of whose members have pending claims, has successfully muted Chinese
aggressiveness by enlisting the interest of their close ally, the United
States. Although Subic Bay is closed and the Seventh Fleet is at its lowest
readiness level in decades, the United States could still play a containing role
similar to that of the USSR in 1979. Given the fragile nature of current SinoU.S.
relations, the potential gain of the Spratlys may be too high a price to
bear and may force the Chinese to pursue more cooperative strategies, such
as joint development in oil exploration.
82 JOURNAL OF NORTHEASTASIAN STUDIES / FALL 1995
NOTES
1. Alexander George and William Simons, eds., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1994).
2. "Plausibility probe" is defined by Alexander George as "a case study at the preliminary
stage of inquiry" that "enables the investigator to judge whether the potential validity of
[one's] hypotheses is great enough to warrant a major investment in more thorough, hopefully
more decisive hypothesis-testing studies." See Alexander L. George, "Case Studies
and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison," in Gordon
Lauren, ed., Diplomacy (New York: Free Press, 1979), pp. 43-68.
3. Crisis management is defined here as the science (art?) of international conflict resolution in
the nuclear age and deals with pauses and signaling that are meant to contain crises within
certain limits. Crisis management is often cast in an adversarial relationship to coercive
diplomacy, which seeks to achieve limited diplomatic objectives through the use of threats
and force.
4. George and Simons, p. 281.
5. Ibid., p. 28l.
6. Ibid., p. 280.
7. At this time, Mao was expounding his "Three Worlds" theory, which identified the superpowers
(the United States and USSR) as the First World, the developed countries (both
NATO and the Warsaw Pact) as the Second World, and the developing countries as the
Third World. In his view, the socialist camp, by virtue of the USSR's "revisionism" and
"social imperialism," had ceased to exist.
8. William J. Duiker, China and Vietnam: The Roots of Conflict (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 1986), p. 61.
9. Herbert Yee, "The Sino-Vietnamese Border War: China's Motives, Calculations, and Strategies,"
China Report, January/February 1980, pp. 15-32. Also, see news reporting of Robert
McFadden, New York Times, February 18, 1979, and Bob Oberdorfer, Washington Post,
April 1, 1979.
10. John Gittings, "Peking Exacts a High Price for Company Hanoi Keeps," Manchester Guardian
Weekly, February 25, 1979. The same view was expressed by respected China scholar,
Ross TerriU, in the Montreal Star, February 26, 1979.
11. Dennis Duncanson, "China's Vietnam War: New and Old Strategic Imperatives," World
Today XXV (June 1979), pp. 241-48.
12. Michael Yahuda, "Vietnam and China--the Roots of Conflict," China Now, no. 82 (January/February
1979), p. 9.
13. See Bruce Burton, "Contending Explanations of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War," International
Journal, pp. 699-722.
14. See Harlan Jencks, "China's Punitive War Against Vietnam: A Military Assessment," Asian
Survey, vol. XIX, no. 8, August 1979, pp. 801-15; and King Chen, "China's War Against
Vietnam, 1979: A Military Analysis," The Journal of East Asian Affairs, vol. 11I, no. 1,
spring/summer 1983, pp. 232-63.
15. The Vietnamese revolutionary party, by virtue of its financial and ideological support, had a
great deal of influence over the Laotian and Cambodian revolutionary parties, and their
presence would have strengthened the power of the Vietnamese delegation.
16. Geng Biao, "Report on the Situation on the Indochinese Peninsula," Zhonggong Yanjiu
(Studies on Chinese Communism), vol. 14, no. 10 (October 15, 1980), trans, in JPRS
77,074.
17. Although these border disputes and refugee problems were not the main reason for the
Chinese invasion, they were very helpful later in demonizing the Vietnamese as racist and
imperialist.
18. West and Southwest China included the Chengdu and Kunming Military Regions. Together,
these two regions commanded 18 main force divisions (approximately 210,000 men), 8
local force divisions, and 2-3 divisions of border troops. Of course, elite units were transported
to the staging areas from military regions all over the country, making the potential
invasion force much more potent. See The Military Balance 1978-79 (London: The lnterna-
MULVENON 83
tional Institute for Strategic Studies, 1978), pp. 55-57. 68--69. Estimates of Chinese and
Vietnamese forces that appear in this article are averages of the figures published in the
1978-79 issue and the 1979-80 issue, since the conflict occurred halfway between the two
editions.
19. For a discussion of twentieth-century military strategy and the notion of blitzkrieg warfare,
see B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (London: Meridian Books, 1991), pp. 207-361.
20. February 26, 1979, in BBC/SWB/FE/6054/A3/2.
21. New York Times, February 21, 1979 and February 27, 1979.
22. George and Simons, Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, p. 18.
23. Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), November 9, 1978.
24. "People's Daily Says Phnom Penh Capture 'Beginning of War'," Xinhua, in FBIS, January
9, 1979, pp. A19-20.
25. New York Times, January 31, 1979. See also "SRV Needs 'Lessons'," Xinhua (in Washington,
DC), in FBIS, February 1, 1979, pp. A8-9.
26. In the months leading up to the invasion, there were a number of articles in the Chinese
press detailing Vietnamese attacks on the Chinese border. For examples dealing with border
attacks, see "SRV's 'Frenzied Provocations' On the Border Reported," Xinhua, in FBIS,
January 4, 1979, pp. All-13; "Vietnam's 'War' Provocations," People's Daily, in FBIS,
January 10, 1979, p. A22; "SRV Personnel Fire Upon Border Commune, School," Xinhua,
in FB1S, January 12, 1979, p. All; "Numerous SRV Border Incidents, Provocations Reported,"
Xinhua, in FBIS, January 16, 1979, pp. A7-10. For articles concerning refugees,
see "Chinese Foreign Ministry Lodges Strong Protest Against Forcible Expulsion of Inhabitants
of Vietnam into Chinese Territory," Xinhua, in FBIS, January 8, 1979, pp. A5-6;
"The Dirty Business of Exporting Refugees," People's Daily, in FBIS, January 18, 1979,
pp. A17-19; "Beijing Denounces SRV's Callous Policy of Exporting Refugees," Xinhua
Domestic Service, January 18, 1979, pp. A16-17. As further proof, Hua Guofeng's "Report
to the 5th National People's Congress on the Work of Government," issued in late January,
directly mentioned the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia, but joined it to border incursions
and the forced deportation of refugees. See supplemental issue of FBIS, January 25, t979,
Xinhua, pp. 1-32.
27. Renmin Ribao, November 8, 1978.
28. Renmin Ribao, December 14, 1978.
29. "Foreign Ministry Protests SRV Armed Encroachment," Xinhua, in FBIS, January 18, 1979,
pp. A14--15; "Foreign Ministry Delivers Strong Protest to SRV Embassy," Xinhua, in FBIS,
February 12, 1979, pp. A6-7; "Foreign Ministry Protests SRV's Encroachments," Xinhua,
in FBIS, February 16, 1979, pp. A2-3.
30. "Chinese Government Statement on Counterattack Against SRV," Xinhua, in FBIS, February
21, 1979, pp. A5-7.
31. Ibid., p. A6.
32. Yee, p. 17. This could be true only if the Chinese had signaled their "true" intentions to the
Vietnamese through other channels. Vietnamese knowledge of Chinese desires, however,
does not refute my thesis. The magnitude of the demand and the containing presence of the
Soviet Union still thwarted successful coercive diplomacy.
33. It has also been suggested by Richard Baum that the conflicting signals from Beijing may
have been due to elite political/military disagreements in Beijing, but I do not have the data
to refute or confirm that hypothesis.
34. Even nine days after the Chinese invasion, Deng continued to demur, telling U.S. journalists
that "even if there is good reason to link the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the
Chinese operation in Vietnam, China did not make such a link." [Emphasis added.] This is a
classic manifestation of crisis management thwarting the goals of coercive diplomacy.
35. See "UN Security Council Debates Southeast Asian Situation," in FBIS, February 26, 1979,
p. A26.
36. "Yang Dezhi Attends Meeting Of Kunming PLA Cadres," Kunming-Yunnan Provincial
Service, in FBIS, February 16, 1979, p. J2.
37. Yee, p. 17.
38. "Essential" had to be defined by the Chinese themselves through their signaling to Vietnam.
Failure to state precisely what they considered "essential," a principle of crisis management,
was one of the reasons tor their failure to coerce Vietnam.
84 JOURNAL OF NORTHEASTASIAN STUDIES / FALL 1995
39. Of course, given China's own shaky economic situation, they probably had very little to
offer Vietnam that the latter was not already receiving from the Soviet Union; and even if
China had offered aid, Vietnam would probably have refused in order to preserve their
alliance with the Russians.
40. Yee, p. 17.
41. New York Times, February 28, 1979.
42. New York Times, February 12, 1979; see also "New Military Districts Set Up to Strengthen
Defenses Against USSR," Kyoto, February 5, 1979, pp. E5-6; and "AFP Highlights General
Atmosphere in Beijing, Elsewhere," AFP, in FBIS, February 22, 1979, pp. 13-15. On
military mobilizations before the conflict, see Jencks, "China's 'Punitive' War on Vietnam,"
pp. 801-15. Deng also verified the precautions taken against the USSR in a statement to the
Kyoto News Service: "We had considered certain risks in making the decision [to take
military action against Vietnam] and had made sufficient preparations." ]Emphasis added.]
Quoted in "Deng Welcomes UN Call for PRC, SRV Pullouts," Kyoto, in FBIS, February 26,
pp. A5-6.
43. "US-PRC leaders Exchange Greetings on Diplomatic Ties," Xinhua, in FB1S, January 2,
1979, pp. A2-3.
44. "PRC Liaison Office Holds Reception, Mondale Speaks,"Xinhua, in FBIS, January 3, 1979.
p. A3.
45. "SRV Needs 'Lessons'." Xinhua (in Washington, DC), in FBIS, February 1, 1979, pp. A8-
9.
46. As a gesture of goodwill, Chinese negotiators broke the deadlock on a number of long
contested Sino-Soviet border issues shortly after their invasion began, as if to signal the
Soviets that they still desired peaceful relations. The Soviets, for their part, limited their
participation in the conflict to providing airlifted supplies and offshore electronic intelligence
to their ally, the latter of which was generated by the 11 ships of the Soviet Pacific
Fleet patrolling off Haiphong.
47. "Renmin Ribao Urges Expulsion of SRV Intrusion," Xinhua, in FBIS, February 21, 1979, p.
All-12.
48. New York Times, February 20, 1979.
49. New York Times, March 3, 1979. Another plausible explanation of Chinese reticence to use
air power has been offered by military analysts. They assert that the Chinese feared the
potency of Vietnam's smaller but more technologically advanced air force and did not wish
to lose a large number of planes for minimal gain.
50. Jencks, p. 809.
51. Far Eastern Economic Review, March 9, 1979, p. 14.
52. Yee, p. 26.
53. As final proof of the real purpose of the invasion, however, the Chinese press declared to the
domestic populace that SRV forces had been forced to withdraw from positions in Cambodia.
See "SRV Forces Forced to Withdraw From Positions in Cambodia," Xinhua Domestic
Service, in FBIS, February 27, 1979, pp. A17-18.
54. Nayan Chanda, "A Massive Shock for Vietnam," Far Eastern Economic Review CIII (August
10, 1979).
55. See Ellis Joffe, The Chinese Army After Mao (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1987), pp. 149-79.
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88 JOURNALOFNORTHEASTASIANSTUDIES/ FALL1995
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"SRV Provocations Affect Guangxi Agricultural Production." Xinhua, in FBIS, February 16,
1979, p. A4.
"SRV Regards Cambodia As Springboard for Further Aggression." (In Vietnamese to Vietnam.)
In FBIS, January 16, 1979, pp. A20-21.
"SRV's 'Frenzied Provocations' on Border Reported." Xinhua, in FBIS, January 5, 1979, pp.
A11-13.
"SRV War Against Cambodia Beginning of Failure." Xinhua, in FBIS, January 4, 1979, pp.
A14-15.
"State Council Official Comments on PRC Policy Towards SRV." AFP, February 9, 1979 in
FBIS, February 9, 1979, pp. El-2.
"Steps Leading to Fall of Phnom Penh Detailed." Xinhua, in FBIS, January 9, 1979, p. AI7.
"UN Security Council Debates Southeast Asian Situation."Xinhua, in FBIS, February 26, 1979,
pp. A20-29.
"US-PRC Leaders Exchange Greetings on Diplomatic Ties." Xinhua, in FBIS, January 2, 1979,
pp. A2-3.
"US State Department Spokesman Cited on Cambodia." Xinhua, in FBIS, January 5, 1979, p.
A7.
"USSR Veto." Xinhua,in FBIS, January 16, 1979, pp. A3--4.
"Vice-Premier Li Xiannian Says SRV Should Heed Warnings." Xinhua, in FBIS, February 12,
1979, p. A7.
"Vietnamese Forces Seize Fishing Boat 8 January." XinhuaDomesticService, in FBIS, January
10, 1979, p. A13.
"Vietnamese Kill Four Chinese, Wound Five Others in Border Clash." Xinhua, in FBIS, February
8, 1979, pp. A8-9.
"Vietnamese Turn Down Offer To Negotiate With PRC." Xinhua, in FBIS, February 23, 1979, p.
All.
"Vietnam's Aggression Against Kampuchea is Part of the Kremlin's Global Strategy." Xinhua,
in FBIS, January 10, 1979, pp. A19-21.
"Vietnam's 'Political Hoodlums' Features Denounced." BeijingDomesticService, in FBIS, February
14, 1979, pp. All-12.
"Vietnam's War Provocations." People'sDaily,in FBIS, January 10, 1979, p. A22.
"Wanton Aggression Must Be Checked." People'sDaily, in FBIS, January 8, 1979, p. A26.
"Xinhua Views SRV Rejection of Mutual Withdrawal Formula." Xinhua, in FBIS, March 1,
1979, pp. A7-9.
"Yang Dezhi Attends Meeting of Kunming PLA Cadres." Kunming-YunnanProvincialService,
in FBIS, February 16, 1979, p. J2.
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