STUD LA T-TISTORICA SIOVACA XXI
A Concise History
of S LOVAKIA
Edited hj El ena Mannova
Bratislava 2000 Historicity ustav SAV
A COSiUSF HISTORY OF SLOVAKIA
Slovakia in the 20th century
1.   Slovakia between the Wars 7.7. The Struggle for Slovakia
The declaration of the Slovak National Council on 30th October 1918 was an expression of will to separate from the old Kingdom of Hungary and create a common state with the Czechs. However, the implementation of this decision was not simple. The Slovak National Council did not have military units; Slovak national councils and armed militias formed in towns and villages struggled for power with officials, military units and policemen, who obeyed only the Budapest government. After the revolution of 1st November 1918 in Budapest, Hungarian national councils, loyal to Karolyi's government, were also formed in the territory of Slovakia.
In some parts of Slovakia, like in many parts of the disintegrating Monarchy, anarchy prevailed. Armed soldiers, returning from the front, supported spontaneous uprisings,
Oath of the Czechoslovak Army in Bratislava, 4th February 1919
A CONCIÍL HISTORY OF SLOVAKIA
: in villages, and snull lovvns. Violence and looting were directed against the hated slate
' administrators, notaries and policemen, as representatives of the injustices of the years
of war, but also against shopkeepers, innkeepers and the propertied classes.
Karolyi's government tried to keep Slovakia within the framework of Hungary with I a promise of autonomy, but the Prague government acted energetically. Slovak members
(' were cooptcd into the newly formed National Assembly in Prague in November 191S,
and the first provisional government of Slovakia began its activity in western Slovakia ; oil 6th November. On 7th December, Vávro Sroba'r was appointed minister with full
1 power to administer Slovakia, with his seat in Žilina. After the occupation of Bratislava
i by the Czechoslovak Army on 31st December 1918, Srobar's government moved there.
1 Slovakia had its capital city for the first time in history.
! By 20th January 1919, after brief battles, the Czechoslovak Army, strengthened by
t legionaries from France and Italy and by volunteers, pushed the Hungarian units to the
south, beyond the demarcation line, determined in December 1918 by die Entente. A new administration was established in the liberated territory. Srobar's ministry, an extended organ of the Prague government, quickly liquidated all competing power centres and
I authorities. The revolutionary councils, militias and their central authority, the Slovak
National Council, were dissolved. Its liquidation was enabled by the fact, that it was too weak to enforce the power of the new state against Budapest, since only the central
■ government in Prague had the most important instrument of power at the time - an
army. The dissolution of the Slovak National Council symbolized the direction of tire building of the new Czecho-Slovak state in a centralist form and the reladve strengths of the Czech and Slovak political elites.
I Czechoslovak power in the territory of Slovakia came into crisis only once, in the
spring of 1919. After the communist coup in Budapest on 21st March 1919, conflict broke out between the Czechoslovak Army and the Hungarian Red Army, which occupied a significant part of Slovakia in June. In hard, bloody battles, involving artillery, aircraft
I . and armoured trains, the progress of the Red Army was stopped, and after an ultimatum
from the Entente, the territory of Slovakia was cleared by the end of June. With the
j departure of die Hungarian Army, the short-lived Slovak Republic of Councils (Soviets),
) declared at Prešov on 19Hi June 1919, also disappeared.
j Up to 1918 Slovakia was not a separate administrative unit, and so did not have
;■ precisely defined frontiers. In the north and west, there were the historic frontiers of the
Kingdom of Hungary with the Austrian provinces of the Empire; in the east an ( :. adrninistrative boundary was defined in 1919, between Slovakia and Subčarpathian
Ruthenia (Podkarpatská Rus), which had been joined to Czechoslovakia. The frontier with Hungary tD the south was confirmed only after prolonged negotiations at the Paris i Peace Conference, by die Treaty of Trianon, signed on 4th June 1920. The frontier was
I determined with the use of ettinic, economic and military-strategic elements. The
Í Hungarian Parliament ratified die treaty, but no more significant political force in Hungary
j- was reconciled to die break up of die old Hungarian state and the union of large parts of
' its territory with Yugoslavia, Austria, Rumania and Czechoslovakia. Hungarian
revisionism and the defensive anti-revisionism of the Successor States became an important part of politics in the Danubian region in the following decades. In die nordi, Poland enforced the transfer of 25 communities in 1920. This impeded mutual relations ; during the inter-war period.
24-1 A CONCISE HISTORY OF SLOVAKIA
1.2.  The Political System
Slovakia within the frontiers fixed in 1920 had an area of 49,006 knr and 2,99S,244 inhabitants. It formed 35% of the area of Czechoslovakia and contained 22% of the population. Agriculture and forestry involved 60.6% of the population; in die Czech Lands only 31.6%. In the industrialized western parts of the state, 39,6% of die population worked in construction, banking and industry; in Slovakia 17.4%. There were alsct important differences in die levels of urbanization and education, but above all in the level and intensity of political and social organization and mobilization. Up to 1918, Czech society had a better possibility to develop than the Slovaks in the Kingdom of Hungary. As a result, the Czechs entered the new state with well organized political parties, voluntary associations, managing elites, a complete Czech education system up to university level and a tradition of Czech statehood. The majority of Czech members of the Constitutional Assembly already had years of experience in the Vienna Parliament or in the provincial councils. Among the 54 Slovak members, only 6 had such experience and mostly only very briefly. Apart from experienced political and economic elites, Slovakia also lacked integrating personalities. General Milan Rastislav Štefánik, who could have played an important role, based on his position as a leading figure in the liberation struggle abroad, was killed in an air crash in May 1919, when returning to his homeland.
It can be said that, while the well developed Czech society already lacked only the superstructure and crown of its own statehood, the Slovaks found in the new state above all the possibility to rapidly achieve diat which Magyarization and the undemocratic regime in the Kingdom of Hungary had not allowed them to develop. The origin of Czechoslovakia undoubtedly accelerated the development of Slovak society. In particular, the democratic system created favourable conditions for this.
The 1920 constitution constituted Czechoslovakia as a republic with a bicameral parliament - the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. The head of state was a president elected by parliament for 7 years. From 1918 to 1935, Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk was president, and from 1935 Edvard Beneš. Tlie elections to parliament, in 1920,1925,1929 and 1935, as well as to local government bodies - community, district, county and provincial councils - were held on the basis of a very progressive election law with universal, direct, equal and secret voting, including for women. Compared to Hungarian elections, this was a striking difference, and the whole system of civil rights in the republic was also very progressive by the European standards of the time.
Universal suffrage and extensive possibilities for organization enabled the development of a system of political parties on pre-war foundations. The parties influenced the whole of public life to an unprecedented degree. They were organized on three principles, which overlapped and combined in various ways: the first was national, the second social class and the tirád confessional.
The nationality question had several levels in the inter-war period. The first was the existence and position of national minorities in Slovakia. In 1930,17.8% of the inhabitants of Slovakia declared Hungarian nationality, 4.6% German, 2.2% Jewish and 2.9% East Slavonic nationality. However, die proportion and influence of Hungarians and Germans in the social elites was much higher. From one day to the next, the Hungarians, entirely unexpectedly, changed from members of die nation controlling the state into a minority. They regarded the republic as a temporary phenomenon, the product of a certain
VII. ŠI.OVAI-.IA IN TUIL 20TH CF:CTUI>) 245
international situation, which could rapidly change. The majority of voters of Hungarian 1 nationality voted for the Hungarian Christian Social Party or the Hungarian National
Party, which united in the 1935 elections. Some Hungarians voted for the Social Democrats, while agricultural workers on large estates in southern Slovakia could support the Communist Party.
, Before 1918, the Germans, like the Slovaks, were subjected to Magyarization, and in
Czechoslovakia they enjoyed a sort of national renaissance. However, they were divided
■.. between several isolated areas of settlement in western, central and eastern Slovakia,
which established contacts only after 1918, Their political, economic and cultural organizations were strongly influenced by the German organizations in the Czech Lands. At first this helped, but later, in the second half of die thirties, it proved to be a step towards future tragedy.
i\ The East Slavonic population of north-eastern Slovakia was politically and culturally
weakened by quarrels between three different national orientations: Rusyns - supporters of a separate East Slavonic nation, Ukrainian and finally Russian. This division was reflected in the weakness of their political parties and cultural associations. The situation was further complicated by membership of two competing churches - Orthodox and Uniate.
Members of the Jewish religion formed 4.1% of the population. Half declared Jewish nationality, one third Czechoslovak and the rest Hungarian or German.
The position and activities of the Czechs had a specific character. After 1918, they came to Slovakia as officials, teachers, soldiers, policemen, railway workers, post office workers, but also as entrepreneurs and tradesmen. In 1930, 120,926 of diem already lived in Slovakia. Although diey were only 3.7% of the population, their influence on social, cultural and economic life was much greater. They were an important part of the basic pillar of the nationality question in die inter-war period: Slovak-Czech relations and the problem of die position of Slovakia in the state.
In 1918, die Slovaks became, according to the terminology of the time, a "state forming nation". After the revolution, it was found that the intellectual and political potential of the Slovaks was higher than it had appeared to be in die deformed situation of the Kingdom of Hungary. Many superficially Magyarized Slovaks returned to their original nationality, and the revolution brought numerous new personalities to the surface. However, just as the Slovak farces were not sufficient to achieve liberation during the disintegration of the Kingdom of Hungary, post-revolution Slovakia depended on Czech help in the functioning of the state administration, post service, railways, security forces, but also basic schools and secondary schools. The importance of Czech help in the revolutionary period and during die consolidation of die regime in Slovakia, was obvious and so generally recognized, but it became a problem, when it proved to be also an instrument for the imposition of the conception of a unitary, centralized state.
Prague centralism was partly a heritage from the Monarchy, but also a product of the situation in the new state. The social storms after the revolution supported the wish for a "firm hand". Experience of the opposition of the German and Hungarian minorities to die new state, at the time of its formation, did not promote confidence in efforts to achieve territory autonomy on die ethnic principle. The ideas of Prague about the form of the state were to a large extent determined by the existence of a German minority of more than three million in the western parts of the republic. Without the Slovaks, the Czechs farmed only 49% of the total papulation. Precisely die Czech-German relationship
A lVi.Vl/S/: HISTORY OF SLOVAKIA
VII. SLOVAKIA IN THE 21ITH CENTURY
strongly influenced the tenacious persistence of the Czech political elite with the conception of a "Czechoslovak nation". It had a certain function, during the promotion of the future Czechoslovak state with the Entente politicians during the First World War, but it did not correspond to history or to die real situation, and above all it was in conflict with the feelings and convictions of the majority of Slovaks. Unexpectedly liberated from Hungary, and often widi a fresh, and so sensitive national consciousness, they unambiguously wanted diat, which was previously denied to them: the opportunity to-be Slovaks. They saw this as one of the main benefits of the republic. The adherents of ethnic Czechoslovakism, who understood the Czechs and Slovaks as one nation, historically only temporarily divided, and destined to reunite, included only a handful of people in Slovakia, although they were political influential. The idea of a political Czechoslovak nation remained a minority view, aldiough it was the official ideology of several powerful parries, especially die Agrarians and Social Democrats.
Ethnic Czechoslovakism was also anchored in the preamble of the 1920 constitution ("We the Czechoslovak nation") and in die language laws, which spoke of a "Czechoslovak language". Real life and Slovak opposition rapidly forced a modification of the decrees about the use of this non-existent language. In official proceedings, it was supposed to be used in two variants: the "Slovak variant" and the "Czech variant". In Slovakia, where the development and preservation of the Slovak language had played a great role, not only in the national revival, but also in tire following struggles up to the First World War, this was a very sensitive issue and an instrument of political mobilization.
The weakness of the Slovak political elite in the period of die formation of the state, the economic and cultural dominance of the Czech Lands and Prague, the centre of the state, led to a situation in which legislation, the organization of die state, the prevailing ideas and style of politics were dictated by the situation outside the territory of Slovakia, and so not always corresponding to its traditions and real economic and political situation. At first, the Slovak Club attempted to promote the ideas and needs of Slovakia in parliament, but after die strengthening of political parties, it dissolved. The powers of die Ministry with Full Power to Administer Slovakia were gradually reduced, until it was abolished in 1927. The idea of creating a union of all the Slovak counties, to represent the whole of Slovakia in Prague, did not succeed. Instead, the counties, which did not correspond to the Czech tradition, were abolished. In 1928, following die examples of Bohemia and Moravia, a Slovak Provincial Office (Krajinský úrad) and elected Provincial Assembly were created, but they had only limited legal powers. Thus, the problem of real autonomy for Slovakia remained open until 1938.
The question of Slovak autonomy already appeared at die time of the origin of the state, at die session of the Slovak National Council in Martin, but in the first years, the basic dividing lines in the Slovak political spectrum were different, mainly social problems. Supply difficulties, unemployment, requisitioning of livestock and grain in the villages, impatience and radicalism accumulated during the war led to a complete change in the pre-war political structure. In the first general and secret parliamentary elections in 1920, the Social Democrats won with 3S.17Ú, and together with the German and Hungarian Social Democrats 46%. However, the power of the left was undermined in 1921, by the splitting away of die Communist Party. The Communists in Slovakia, part of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, received twice as many votes as the reformist socialist parties in 1925, but from 1929 the latter achieved a moderate predominance, and maintained it during die Uiirties, in spite of die long years of economic crisis.
Milan Hodžů, first Slovak prime minister of Czechoslovakia
Ideas, formed in die post-revolutionary national euphoria, of creating a united Slovak civic party, proved to be unrealistic. The trend of die pre-war years towards party crystallization continued. The pre-war national and conservative, the so-called Martin andHodza's agrarian orientadon, took part in the 1920 elections jointly, but then formed a strong Slovak branch of the Czech Agrarian Party. This Republican Party of Agricultural and Small Farming People never received the most votes in Slovakia, but it was the most influential in filling places in the state administration, in the granting of state subsidies to farmers, it had the best supported press, network of societies and a strong agricultural base in die well-developed co-operative movement. The Agrarian Party also provided Prague with die largest number of Slovak ministers and high officials, and in 1935 its leader Milan Hodza became die first Slovak to hold the position of prime minister in die Czechoslovak government.
From the middle of the twenties, most votes went to the Slovak People's Party, which continued the pre-war tradition of the Slovak People's Party and other Catholic or Christian social movements. In 1925, it was renamed according to the name of its leader Andrej HIinka, as Hlinka's Slovak People's Party (HSLS). After die revolution, disturbed by the secularizing trends, especially in the western part of die state, it emphasized defence of Catholic education and church property threatened by land reform. However, this brought it only 17% of the votes in 1920. After separation from the Czech Catholic party in 1921, it already emphasized the nationality question, as well as confessional problems. In 1922, the HStS submitted to parliament the first proposal for the autonomy
248 .-l CONCISE HISTORY OF SLCHHKM
of Slovakia. This demand, introduced in the Pittsburgh Agreement of May 1918, which promised autonomy to Slovakia, was the constant, core and most successful instrument of agitation of the People's Party up to 1938. It interpreted autonomy as the most effective instrument for solving the social problems of Slovakia, because it would pay more attention to Slovakia's special needs and interests. It would be an effective barrier against the penetration of secularism, atheism and socialism from the western part of the state, a shield for traditional values.
The autonomism of the People's Party moved within the framework of the Czechoslovak state. Groups, which wanted to use the autonomy of Slovakia only as a stepping stone to the revival of the old Hungarian state, were marginal among the Slovaks, and underestimated the intensity and speed of the raising of national consciousness after 1918. In tire conditions of the democratic state, authoritarian tendencies and imitation of Mussolini were also unsuccessful. The most numerous of them Rodobrnna (Home Defenders), part of die People's Party, openly declared support for Italian Fascism. After its leader Voj tech Tuka was convicted in 1929 of spying for the Hungarian Home Defenders, it was dissolved, but was revived on the eve of the Second World War.
The majority of political parties were handicapped in advance by limited electoral bases, either confessionally, as in the cases of the Jewish Party and the clearly defined National Party, which was mostly Protestant or by social class, as in the case of tire Tradesmen's Party. All die large and successful parties were mainly parties of the villages and countryside, even the Communist Party had its most faithful support on the large estates. Compared to die pre-war years, the ethnic element, but also confessionalism were more significant factors in political mobilization. The continuing strength of confessionalism is shown by the high number of priests in parliament, the leadership of parties and editorial offices, but also by the inability of Catholic and Protestant autonomists to coordinate their policies, except for a brief period in the years 1932-1935.
A significant feature of die inter-war Slovak political elite was its opposition to the government. With die exception of the first post-war years and the period 1927-1929, when the HSUS was part of a right-wing coalition government, the proportion of opposition voters reached 60-70%. This also reduced die willingness of the parties in die ruling coalition to seriously consider die political autonomy of Slovakia in die framework of die Czechoslovak Republic.
1.3. Economic Problems and the Social Consequences
Throughout the inter-war period, political life was strongly marked by tile unfavourable economic situation. Apart from the normal economic cycles, which produced the crises of 1921-1923 and 1930-1934, die Slovak economy was effected for a long time by die effects of the war and the break up of Austria-Hungary. The chronic structural weaknesses of the Slovak economy, especially die shortage of capital, continued.
Direct war damage to the economy was not very extensive, but the death of breadwinners of families, the disabling of thousands of soldiers, the killing of heavy livestock, the abandonment and removal of capital from businesses had longer term effects. The effects of the war were worsened by die fact that they had to be overcome in a complicated environment.
vil. inihi- 2nih u:w/Wi
The determining factor was the disintegration of tire economic space of the Monarchy, that is the loss of the established market for Slovak industry, forestry and agriculture. The new states surrounded themselves with customs barriers, and in the first years there were also immense transport and currency obstacles. The Slovak economy had to adapt to the changed conditions, while faced with strong competition from its-much stronger Czech partner. In the thirties, when statistics already enable a more precise comparison, Slovakia had 36% of the agricultural land, but only 23% of the agricultural production of the whole of Czechoslovakia, less than S% of the industrial production, and the banks in Slovakia administered only 7% of die state's total capital. Only a few companies were financed by capital from the territory of Slovakia. The pre-war pattern of control by Budapest and Vienna banks partially continued, and was partly replaced by banks with their headquarters in Prague. The set of various factors; disintegration of the market of the Monarchy, capital shifts, the state's preference for the Prague centre and banks close to Czech companies, led to the mass liquidation of industrial companies, especially iron works, glass works, wood processing and textile factories and mines. Contemporaries gave this phenomenon the name "elimination of industry", and it became an important element in criticism of die economic and social policy of the now state. The newly constructed factories were not enough to replace these losses. The liquidation of companies also continued during the great crisis of 1930-1934. A change came with the boom in arms production after Hitler came to power in Germany.
Slovakia was still an agrarian country with islands of industry. Agriculture had very differentiated forms. On one side, large estates prospered, and found markets in the Czech industrial agglomerations, while on the other small scale agriculture eked out a living, often in unfavourable mountain conditions. The 88% of farms with up to 10 ha' had 30.9% of the soil, while die 0.6% of farms with over 100 ha had 35.2%. Therefore, the majority of farmers placed great hope in land reform, die foundations of which were already laid by laws from 1918 and 1919. The reform enabled the sale to farmers of 21% of agricultural land. Although finally implemented to a lesser extent, it was a strong instrument for die Agrarian Party, which controlled die reform. The sale of 291,000 ha of land to small farmers did not significandy change the structure of agriculture, but it permanently anchored the slogan "The soil belongs to those who work it", in the consciousness of die village, and diis was abundantly used in die political struggle, especially during the struggle for power by die communists after 1945.
Social tension continued in die villages. The southern frontier widi Hungary prevented die traditional annual migration for seasonal work by agricultural labourers and small farmers from the mountain areas, and the flow was only gradually reoriented towards die Czech Lands, Austria, Germany and France. Emigration to the USA, an important outlet for population pressure in the villages before the war, was limited by the introduction of immigration quotas in 1921. The new targets for emigration - Canada and Argentina - did not fully compensate for tiiis.
The agricultural population consumed the majority of its own production; the market production of the whole of agriculture was only 30%. This was one of the main causes of the low level of capital formation, a long term problem of die Slovak economy. The natural resources of Slovakia, with a few exceptions such as wood and magnesite, were not very attractive to foreign investors, and die position of die country on die edge of industrialized Europe disadvantaged Slovakia on Western markets. The hope tiiat the Slovak economy
250 A CONCISE HISTORY OF SLOVAKIA
A Imditwnal market
would orient itself towards the south-east was not fulfilled. The name of the newly established trade fair in Bratislava indicated this. At first it was the Oriental, later the Danubian Trade Fair. The agrarian states to the south east - Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria - were poor, and they gave priority to building up and defending the simpler branches of industry, that is, those which also existed in Slovakia. Economic contacts with Hungary were also restricted for political reasons.
Economic integration of the Czech and Slovak economy proceeded slowly. Many serious problems, which burdened the Slovak economy, such as lack of unity in railway tariffs, which disadvantaged production in Slovakia, continued for many years. In fact, some unifying measures required extensive investment and a longer time, for example redirection of the main rail links. From the originally prevailing north-south direction (to Budapest), new east-west routes had to be constructed, connecting Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia with the Czech Lands.
Extensive restructuring of die economy after 1918 was associated widi large-scale social upheavals and the decline of whole regions distant from the new economic centres. Chronic unemployment and rural poverty were probably not significantly greater than before the war, but in tine new conditions, die possibilities for social mobilization and protest were increased. The number of trade union organizations and their members multiplied, as did die number and intensity of strikes, especially on large estates, in extractive industries and timber processing. In the radical post-war atmosphere, employees benefited from a whole series of social laws, which had long been in die programmes of die socialist parties in the old Kingdom of Hungary, but were only very
ľ/í, >! OVM1A f-1 '/"Hť -MTH O-'.V/I/Hi
distant possibilities. An eight hour working day, unemployment bene!it, health insurance and collective bargaining with employers were introduced. The democratic regime raised the self-confidence of workers, which led to a weakening of many traditional humiliating practices in the employer - employee relationship, and the post-feudal lord - dependent relationship typical of the former Kingdom of Hungary.
Contemporaries also regarded the economy as the weak point of the new state, but the general cultural development was usually considered to be a positive aspect, and die greater part of historiography agrees with this. It was partly a matter of modernization trends from before the war, but especially die removal of edinic oppression and the general democratization of social and public life were new and accelerating elements.
Immediately after the revolution, official business in "Czechoslovak" was introduced, diat is in practice, in the Czech and Slovak languages. The language act no.122 from 1920 also enabled the use of minority languages in areas where more than 20% of the population belonged to a minority. Teaching at basic and secondary schools was in Slovak, Hungarian, German and East Slavonic languages, for the first dme after decades of Magyarization. Teaching in die mother tongues helped to improve teaching and facilitate access to higher education also for children from the less propertied classes. An act from 1922 extended compulsory education from 6 to 8 years. The number of secondary and vocational schools was increased. Elizabeth University, founded in Bratislava in the last years of the old Kingdom of Hungary, was closed when its professors refused to accept the origin of the Czechoslovak Republic, and Comenius University was established in its place, widi faculties of Law, Philosophy and Medicine. Students from Slovakia also attended the University in Prague and the Technical University in Brno. A technical university was established in Košice only in 193S after many struggles. Education was the subject of sharp political disputes, especially concerning radical secularization or' die maintenance of the influence of the Church in education.
Democracy also accelerated die construction of a modern civil society. Alongside the political parties, but often also in Uieir framework, trade union, employers', tradesmen's and farmers' association, numerous co-operatives, sports, gymnastic, charitable, social, educational and cultural associations arose, with various political and national colourings. Alongside die secular and Czechoslovak oriented Sokol gymnastic organization, die Cadiolic Owl and socialist oriented gymnastic organizations also functioned. Apart from communist, social democrat and agrarian trade unions, tíiere were also Ľudák (HSLS) trade unions. Along side the Cadiolic cultural Society of Saint Vojtech were the Protestant Tranoscius, Hungarian Uránia and German Kulhirverband cultural societies. There were state, Czechoslovak oriented scouts, but also Catholic and Jewish scouts. Many sports competitions and hiking unions were also organized on an ethnic or political basis. Mutual relations in such an ethnically, confessionally and socially structured cosmos of associations and societies were varied, from rejection and strong competition, to close co-operation or at least coexistence.
The activity of societies was not entirely new after 1918, but it flourished to an unprecedented degree. It was also an area where the Slovaks, formerly limited, but politically placed in die position of the majority nation by the revolution of 1918, had die possibility to apply their new status, and really form tiieir self-confidence and national consciousness. Activities in the framework of the structures of a civil society partially balanced the low representation of Slovaks in die social elites, where Hungarians, Germans and Jews still predominated, supplemented after 1918 by Czechs.
252 A CONCISE HISTORY OF SLOVAKIA
Cmuatius University in Bratislnun
The creation of new or full recognition of older national symbols also contributed to shaping the civil and national self-confidence of the Slovaks. For the first time, Slovakia had its own capital city, with its name officially changed front German Pressburg, Hungarian Pozsany and Slovak Prdporok to Bratislava. The Slovak patriotic sang Nad Tatrou sa blýska (There is lightning on the Tatras) became part of the Czechoslovak national anthem, the blue stripe from the Slovak tricolour became part of the Czechoslovak flag in the form of a triangle, and the Slovak cross with two pairs of arms placed on three hills became part of the Czechoslovak state shield, together with the Czech lion. The national cultural institution Matica Slovenská, dissolved by die Hungarian authorities in 1875, was revived. A Slovak Nation Theatre, Slovak national educational, economic and sporting organizations and centres, administrative and financial offices were gradually built up. Their activity, although they often had only limited authority, created, stabilized and made ever more obvious the fact of the existence of Slovakia a separate entity. This was something the Hungarian political elite had constantly denied before 1918, and part of the Czech political elite cast doubt on it after 1918. This fixing of Slovakia in tlie consciousness of the Slovaks, and partially also in that of the neighbours, is one of tlie important and long-term results of the inter-war period.
After a brief post-war wave of radicalism, the general trend of die internal-political development of Slovakia tended towards the gradual evolutionary use of the possibilities provided by the parliamentary democratic system. This was manifested in the stabilization
ľ/í. SLOVA! I,\ iN THE201H 0enIVľ:
of die extreme left in the form of the Communist Party, at a level of around 10% of the electorate, and in the growth of reformist socialism, the failure of attempts to create radical workers' movements, but above all in the shifts within the civil parties towards die centre, to more moderate and longer term programmes and demands. This trend continued into the thirties, but was modified by two factors: the great economic crisis and substantial changes in the international position of Czechoslovakia.
An agrarian crisis started in Slovakia in 1928, the majority of branches of industry were effected in 1930, and die greatest depdi was reached in 1933. The statistical records do not enable us to precisely calculate the decline of Slovak industrial production, but there was a decline of about 40% in the whole of Czechoslovakia, diat is more dian the world average. The crisis affected branches with markets outside the territory of Slovakia, such as mining, cellulose production, the textile and leadier industries, and branches
[ with production mainly for home consumption, such as the food industry and the
production of building materials. The crisis stimulated a new wave of liquidations of industrial enterprises, especially in metal production and processing, textiles, glass production and paper making.
, The crisis in wood processing, sharpened by the stopping of exporting of wood to
Hungary, in retaliation for limitation of the importing of agricultural products to Czechoslovakia. By the end of 1930, 80% of sawmills were not working, and the number of workers was reduced by 50%. Work extracting and transporting timber in the mountain areas was also lost, and this had often also been a vital source of income for small farmers. Social tension was also increased by the loss of additional income from seasonal agricultural work. The number of hired seasonal workers in Slovakia fell by a third, the number of jobs for them in the Czech Lands, Austria and France fell, while Germany rejected them completely. Agricultural workers, both permanent and seasonal, formed the main part of die unemployed, 130,937 of whom were registered in 1933, which is not the whole number, because during the crisis, the basis of tire social net in the form of
p mediated work was only being constructed. The majority of the unemployed did not
fulfil the demanding conditions for regular support, and were dependent on charity, the distribution of food vouchers by officials, or irregular aid activities.
The Czechoslovak economy was highly dependent on foreign markets, but in 1933 exports fell to 28% of the pre-crisis level. As a result, die possible anti-crisis measures from the government were limited. To solve die crisis and its results, parliament gave tile government special powers. The creation of a grain monopoly in 1934 was the most
j,; important of die numerous state interventions. In spite of state support and devaluations
of the crown in 1934 and 1936, which reduced its gold content by a third, Czechoslovak exports in 1937 reached only 80% of their pre-crisis level in terms of physical quantity, and 40% in terms of value. Thus lack of money in state and local government treasuries hindered extensive development of investment activities, which could have revived the economy, as well as locally reducing unemployment.
A change in the trend of development of the economy came only from 1934, but it is
! difficult to be sure how far diis was caused by die natural development of die economic
cycle, and how far by the basic change in the international position of the state after Hitler came to power in neighbouring Germany. However, in Slovakia, die strengthening of defence and armaments from the middle of the thirties, were clearly a significant stimulus of revival.
93
254
A CONCISE HISTORY Of SLOV'/U.'ÍA
1
Frontier forlificntians, 193S
1.4. The International and Interna! Crisis of the Thirties
The strategic conception for the defence of Czechoslovakia, regarded the territory of Slovakia as an area where the Czechoslovak forces would retreat after defensive battles with the German army. Thus it would create die possibility of military intervention by allies, above all France and die Soviet Union. Strengtliening the defendability of Slovakia would paralyse the efforts of Hungary, which perceived the possibility of revision of the Treaty of Trianon witli the rise of a revisionist Germany. The construction of armaments factories began, with the existing armaments companies in the western part of the state building so-called "shadow works", which would replace their production in die event of war with Germany. The foundations of the armaments complex, which formed the backbone of Slovak industry until 1989, were laid precisely in these years. The construction of east-west roads and railways was accelerated, while iron and concrete fortifications were built on the frontiers with Austria and Hungary. The relocation of some regiments and higher commands to Slovakia required the construction of barracks, housing, airfields and stores. The extensive construction activity revived the building industry, production of cement and building materials. In 1937, the number employed in heavy industry exceeded the pre-crisis level by 17%, but 105,000 remained unemployed, and Slovakia was still a mainly agrarian country.
From the beginning of the crisis, the limited pussi bili ties Ui absorb the surplus rural 1 population, intensified the considerations and disputes about the economic future of
; Slovakia. The conception, which regarded an agrarian Slovakia as a natural supplement
\    , to the industrial Czech Lands, was never very popular among Slovak politicians and
economists. Slovak agriculture certainly had great reserves, and with reform it could ', have become one of the resources for the accumulation of capital, but it had no chance to
j; adequately revive the country on its own. The starting point could only be
v industrialization, the development of industry as the motor of social and cultural
í development as well. This idea was most strongly formulated by the communists. In
i 1937, in an attempt to create the political basis for the creation of an anti-fascist front,
i they collected into one document various proposals and projects of the non-communist
Slovak parties, for the development of investment, land reform, support for small i businesses, building up of vocational education and social reforms. The other parties
ignored the project, but in the following decades, it was an effective argument from the communists, that they had grasped the key problems of the country early,
The economic crisis led to sharp social conflicts, storms, strikes and demonstra-■■ tions, which were often suppressed in very brutal and bloody ways. In the thirties, the
gendarmerie shot people in Holíč, Telga'rt, Pohorela, Košu ty, Polomka, Čierny Balog and other places. Their actions provoked protests and questions in parliament. But the 1 crisis had relatively little influence on the regime. Some laws were passed, which weak-
ened the freedom of the press and the activities of local government in comparison with the past, and the possibility of stopping the activities of political parties was introduced, but the key law from 1933, which empowered the government to act be-I fore a law was approved by parliament, was limited in time, and only applied to purely
economic matters. Thus, the system of parliamentary democracy was preserved in" Czechoslovakia, in contrast to all the neighbouring countries.
The political consequences of the destruction caused by die great economic crisis k\ appeared most significantly in the sharpening of die national quarrels in the state. The
sharpening of die situation in the German areas of the Czech Lands was of key and fateful importance for the state. The former system of political parties completely collapsed ' there. The Sudctcndeutsche Heimntfroitt, led by Konrad Henlein, won most votes among
the Germans in the 1935 parliamentary elections. This party gradually became an instrument of Hitler. The activation of nationalism was also manifested among the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, where the Hungarian National Party and Hungarian I Christian Social Party merged in 1936. There was not very much change among the
voters for the Slovak political parties, but the national question played an ever more important role.
Hlinka's Slovak People's Party was part of the ruling coalition in 1927-1929, but after going into opposition, it submitted a new proposal for Slovak autonomy to parliament in 1930. Effective public demonstrations, such as that held in August 1933 to celebrate the !; 1100th anniversary Df the foundation of the first known Christian church at Nitra, co-
).. operation with the autonomist, mostly Protestant, Slovak National Party, enabled the
party to renew its position, weakened by participation in the Prague government. In die 1935 parliamentary elections, it gained 30.12% of die votes, together with the Slovak National Party and small Rusyn and Polish parties. The party still relied on its charismatic leader Andrej Hlinka, but the post-revolutionary political generation, represented by
COr.i.'r,/: HISTOID OF SLOVAKIA
Jozef Tlso, Karol Sidor and an even younger group, especially of fresh graduates of already Czechoslovak schools, had already come into the foreground. They demanded the federalization of the state. In the radicalized environment, the authoritarian features of the ideology of the HSLS, demonstrated in the slogan "One God, one nation, one party" at the 1936 conference, and in the party's traditional anti-semitism, were increasingly apparent. The anti-Czech agitation, pointing to the occupation of places in the state administration, army, railways, post office and schools by Czechs to the disadvantage of Slovaks, the insensitivity of the central authorities to the needs of the Slovak economy, and the language question, were effective and attractive.
The Slovak representatives and organizations of the coalition of Czechoslovak state parties - the Agrarians, Social Democrats and others - were in a disadvantageous position in relation to the nationalist offensive. They condemned many doubtful actions of the central authorities themselves, but their criticism was ambiguous and either had no success, or succeeded only in the long term, so that they had little political effect at tire given moment. From the historical point of view, it is clear that the policy of evolutionary balancing of the differences in the state, between its western and eastern parts was successful, that Slovak society was becoming modernized and Slovakized very rapidly, but this was happening at such a rate and with such long term horizons, that it required many decades: that is a time limit, which was not granted to the democratic Czechoslovak Republic. Many Slovaks, especially the younger members of the Czechoslovak state parties realized this, and in the mid thirties, they began to form a sort of "democratic autonomism" as a counterweight to that of the Ludaks, but tiiis happened hesitantly and ineffectively.
Hitler coming to power in 1933 substantially worsened the prospects of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak security system relied on the post-war peace treaties from die suburbs of Paris, very active participation in the work of the League of Nations, treaties witii France from 1924 and 1925, and treaties widi the states of the Little Entente -Rumania and Yugoslavia. The Little Entente was united mainly by fear of Hungarian revisionism. After an alliance was concluded between France and the Soviet Union in 1935, Czechoslovakia also made an alliance with Moscow. From the middle of die thirties, the state prepared for defence very intensively. The Iengtii of military service was extended, the army was enlarged, extensive rearmament and the construction of frontier fortifications began.
The orientation towards defence of die state was supported by die majority of the population, in Slovakia especially as a result of fear of Hungarian revisionism. However, die People's Party rejected the alliance system of the republic, together widi the whole coalition policy, which it considered too leftist. It designated Czechoslovakia, France widi its popular front government and the Soviet Union, the "Bolshevik Trefoil". The sympathy of die Ludaks for the autiioritarian dictatorships and definitely anti-socialist regimes did not have a very significant influence on state policy at the time, but it was fully expressed in the crisis of the state in 1938.
7.5. /Autonomy for Slovakia and the Origin of the Slovak Republic
The Anschluss of Austria on 12th March 1938 substantially worsened die strategic position of Czechoslovakia. The German frontier was shifted to the suburbs of Bratislava, and
the inactivity of the great powers was a bad sign. In the Anschluss ol Austria, Hitler used his Nazi agency there, in Czechoslovakia, Hcnlcin's Sudeten German party played a similar role, it deliberately made continual increases in its demands. In September 1938, Henlein's units, armed from Germany, attempted a putsch. The attempt was frustrated, and on 23rd September the government replied to threats from Hitler, with general mobilization of the army and occupation of the frontier fortifications. Butin the end Czechoslovakia capitulated before the pressure of the great powers. Britain and France did not want to risk war for the sake of a small Central European country. A bad assessment of die real aims of Hitler's aggression led them to sign the Munich Agreement on 29th September 193S. Germany, Italy, Great Britain and France, without the participation of Czechoslovak representatives, dictated Czechoslovakia's new frontiers wifli Germany, which made die state defenceless against Hitier. At die same time, they dictated a deadline for Czechoslovakia to agree new frontiers with Poland and Hungary. The Munich dictate was an important step towards die outbreak of die Second World War, and in circumstances favourable to die aggressor. Its acceptance by die Czechoslovak government and by President Beneš politically and morally marked Czech and Slovak society for decades.
Slovakia did not play a primary role in the Munich crisis. Although, the People's Party had carried on intensive agitation from the beginning of 193S, neither communal elections in the spring, nor numerous political assembles and activities indicated that the HSLS could succeed by itself. In the summer of 193S, it worked out a new proposal for autonomy, and intensively discussed it with the government and President Beneš. The government was already willing to make extensive concessions, but the decision was delayed and postponed with regard to the talks with Henlein. The "Slovak question" was ever more the hostage of the "German question".
Munich dramatically changed the political map of the state; old alliances disintegrated, die Western democracies lost credibility, while adherents of the autiioritarian, vigorous and, at die time, successful regimes came into the foreground. The People's Party promptly used the crisis of die regime. On 6th October 1938, die executive committee of the HSLS declared die autonomy of Slovakia in Žilina, with die support of representatives of five other parties. The central government in Prague accepted the declaration of autonomy, and appointed a Slovak government headed by Dr. Jozef Tiso. On 22nd November 1938, die national assembly passed a law on die autonomy of Slovakia.
The first serious problems, widi which die autonomous government was confronted, were die territorial demands of Poland and Hungary, resulting from die resolutions of die Munich Conference. In an effort to avoid a more serious conflict, die Czechoslovak government ceded parts of Silesia and northern Slovakia to Poland in November. The talks widi Hungary, which was endeavouring to acquire the whole of Slovakia, were unsuccessful. On 2nd November, in die Vienna Arbitration, Germany and Italy decided on die new frontiers of Slovakia, Hungary was awarded 10,390 km2 of territory widi 854,217inhabitants, more tíian 270,000 of diem of Slovak nationality. The signatories of Munich, France and Britain already did not participate in die decision in Vienna. The hegemony of Germany in this region was clear.
Munich meant the end of system of parliamentary democracy in the whole state, which was already officially called the Czecho-Slovak Republic. The name used for the period from Munich to March 1939 - the "Second Republic" - expresses not only the reduced area of the state, die autonomy of Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia, but
25S
,-l CONCISE HISTORY OF SLOVAKIA
25"
The Vienna Arbilrnlbn
also the change of regime in an authoritarian direction. The Bratislava government constructed its own version of dictatorship. The leftist political parties were liquidated, die civil parties eidier dissolved or pressurized into voluntarily merging with the HSĽS in die united party HSĽS - Party of Slovak 'National Unity. Numerous societies were dissolved, the trade unions were forcibly united, and the regime dissolved inconvenient local government organs. The elections to die autonomous parliament were held on 18 th December 1938 by the plebiscite method and using a united list of candidates. Among 63 members of parliament, 47 were Ľudáks, die rest defectors from other parties and representatives of the German and Hungarian minorities. The coercive forces of the party, the Hlinka Guard, received a great role in public life. It was die driving force and implementor of die first anti-Jewish measures of die autonomous government.
In foreign policy, the Bratislava government, like its partner and opponent in Prague, was oriented towards Germany. At die time of Munich, Slovakia had still not appeared in Nazi conceptions, but diis changed in October-November 1938. In Ms plan to liquidate die remnant of Czechoslovakia, Hitler gave Slovakia a role similar to tíiat of the Nazis in Austria and Henlein's supporters in Czechoslovakia, diat is of a detonator, Justifying aggression and occupation as a result of "internal disintegration". At numerous discussions and negotiations between Ľudák representatives and Nazi politicians, die latter indicated diat diey would support Slovakia, but only if it became independent. This strengfliened die originally weak current in die People's Party, which aimed at full independence. The leadership of die party attempted to build independence gradually, step by step, by occupying positions in the administration the army and police. Such a long term development did not suit Germany. The intervention of die Prague central government in Slovakia on 9tii March 1939 facilitated the radical denouement for die Nazis.
The central government was disturbed bv reports on the discussions of Slovak, government figures in Berlin. President Hacha dismissed the prime minister of the autonomous government Jozef Tiso, introduced a military dictatorship in Slovakia, and die Ludak Karol Sidor became die new prime minister. The Nazis used die unclear situation, and energetically pressed die Ludaks to break away from Prague. Hitler ended several days of uncertainty in a radical way, by inviting Tiso to Berlin. He was already received on 13 th March as ahead of state. In discussions, Hitler gave Tiso and unambiguous choice: an immediate declaration of independence, or die prospect of die division of Slovakia between Germany, Poland and Hungary. On die next day, 14th March, Tiso presented a report on his talks in Berlin to a hurriedly summoned Parliament, and die Parliament declared the origin of an independent state. On die same day, Hider repeated his direats and pressure on die Czecho-Slovak President Emil Hacha, who finally signed a document accepting a German protectorate over die remainder of Czecho-Slovakia. At diat time, German army units were already heading for Prague.
The inter-war republic was a brief, only twenty year section of Slovak history. However, it was the only period before 1989, when a full-blooded parliamentary democracy functioned in Slovakia. Society was rapidly modernized, not only technically, but also from the point of view of structure. The following regimes and dictatorships took an officially critical attitude to this period, but in many ways they lived and drew on it. The disintegration of the First Republic, the relationship of long term and historically accidental elements, die relationship of external and internal aspects, the ethical questions around the Munich capitulations are permanent, constantly answered but unanswered questions of Slovak and Czech historiography.
2.   The Slovak Republic 1939-1945
2.1. The International Position of the Slovak Republic and its Political System
The Slovak Republic had an area of 38,004 km2 and a population of 2,655,053. In the west, and after die defeat of Poland in September 1939, also in the north its neighbours were die German Reich and territories occupied by it. In the soutii and east it had frontiers with Hungary. It had all the institutions and symbols of an independent state: a parliament, government, president, national anthem, state shield, flag, currency (die Slovak crown) and representatives abroad. It was recognized by 27 states, including all die great powers except die USA. However, die existence of die state was in the balance from die beginning. In April 1939, Hider already offered Slovakia, or part of it to Poland as compensation for concessions in Gdansk and die corridor to Prussia, After diis was rejected, die Germany army used Slovakia as one of its assembly areas against Poland in September 1939.
In die years of die war, die Slovak Republic had die function of a sort of show case in Nazi policy. It was intended to demonstrate, especially to die nations of south- east Europe, diat Hitler not only occupied countries, but also "liberated" nations. Slovakia was also an area for experiments, for example in building the position of the German
260
A CONCISE HISTORY OT SLOVAKIA
VII. SLOVAKIA IN THE 20TH CBJTUK)
261
minorities in south-east Europe, or the so-called solution of the Jewish question. In the role of 'model state", and thanks to its position, the Slovak Republic was about half way between an occupied country or protectorate, such as Bohemia and Moravia, and a sovereign state under German influence, such as Hungary, Rumania or Bulgaria.
The position of Slovakia in the German sphere of influence was determined by die Treaty of Protection, signed on 18th - 23rd March 1939. According to this treaty: "The German Reich will protect die political independence of the Slovak State and die integrity of its territory" (§1). In exchange Slovakia committed itself to conduct its foreign, policy in "close agreement widi die German government", and to construct its army "in close agreement with the German armed forces." A Protected Zone was created along the western boundary of die state, in which die German Army had sovereign rights. Further treaties and protocols secured German influence in die use of natural resources and industrial enterprises important to the war effort. The taking over of the positions of especially Czech and Austrian capital in banks and industry by German concerns, especially die Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and die Hermann Goring Werke armaments company, also secured control of die economy. The share of German capital in industrial joint stock companies grew from 4% in 1938 to 51.6% in 1942.
The foreign policy dependence on Germany was crushing, but also uncertain. Immediately after die origin of the state, it was found to be ineffective, when die Hungarian Army occupied Subcarpadiian Rudienia in March 1939, and began to advance into the territory of Slovakia. After several days of conflict, with the use of aircraft and tanks, the Slovak Republic had to surrender to Hungary a further 1,697 Ion2 of territory with a population of 69,639. The minister of foreign affairs Ferdinand Durcansky attempted to balance the unfavourable geopolitical position of the state, by establishing contacts in die West, but after die defeat of France in 1940, the Germans energetically put a stop to such efforts. At talks on 2Sth July 1940 in Salzburg, Hitler forced President Tiso to reorganize die government and dismiss Durcansky. His place was taken by die prime minister, die Nazi oriented Vojtech Tuka, while die radical commander of die Hlinka Guard Alexander Mach became minister of die interior. Slovakia had good economic and cultural contacts with die Soviet Union, but tiiey were limited by ideology, and especially by die fact tiiat die Soviet Union regarded Slovakia as part of the German sphere.
The government had two main aims in foreign policy. The first was preservation of die existence of die state and its strengtiiening within die German controlled sphere. The acceptance of Slovakia as a member of die alliance between German, Italy and Japan on 24di November 1940 was considered an important step. Paradoxically, diis also made die Slovak Republic formally an ally of Hungary, However, precisely die confrontation widi die southern neighbour was die second main component of die foreign policy of die Slovak government. It attempted to create more bearable conditions for die Slovaks in tire territory occupied by Hungary, but above all to achieve revision of the Vienna Arbitration from November 1938. In die context of the hegemony of Germany in the Danubian region, both basic aims of foreign policy led to efforts to present Slovakia as a reliable ally of Germany, in botii external and internal matters. In foreign policy, this was expressed in die participation of Slovak units in die campaign against Poland in September 1939 and in the war against the Soviet Union from June 1941, as well in die declarations of war against die USA and Great Britain in December 1941. In relation to Hungary, this effort did not bring short term results. The Nazis delayed solution of die
Dr. Jozc/Tiso visiting Hitkr's military headquarters
Slovak-Hungarian dispute until "after die war". However, die foreign policy activity closely associated the state widi die fate of Nazi Germany, and internal policy had a similar effect.
The independent state enabled die People's Party to implement its conception of die organization of Slovak society. The war time conditions partly complicated tiiis, but also facilitated it in many ways. In the end, the origin of die state was only enabled by fundamental power shifts in Central Europe. The war facilitated radical interventions in political and public life, corresponding to die audioritarian and quasi-fascist components in Ľudák ideology and politics.
The development after Munich already showed die contours of the regime. The constitution adopted by Parliament on 21st July 1939, stated in §58 tiiat "the Slovak nation participates in state power by means of Hlinka's Slovak People's Party (the Party of Slovak National Unity)." The constitution still formally preserved some features of die pre-Munich constitution - an elected president and elected parliament - but die regime gradually developed towards tiiestrengdieningand deepening of dictatorship. Parliament was gradually excluded from decision making, and die right of die government to rule by decree was strengdiened. The president received the right to supplement parliament widi appointed members. The development of the regime culminated in 1942 with the act on Hlinka's Slovak People's Party. The president received the title "Vodca" (Leader), and the personal connection of the functionaries of party and state, from village level,
.-i CONCISE lilSTOPA OF SLOVAKIA
through the districts and counties to the highest state organs, was secured. The leader principle also derived from the corporate system of Catholic social teaching, which was supposed to be one of die pillars of the political system. The corporations replaced die suppressed trade unions. They obligatorily associated employees and employers, and were under the direct control of the party. The "Leader" system, taken over from the Nazis, was also consistently applied in the organization of the ruling "state-party", the HSLS.
Two conceptions met in the shaping of the regime, reflecting die currents within die People's Party or movement, but also die attraction and influence of die tiien so successful German Nazism. The group represented by Jozef Tiso, from October 1939 president and from 1942 also "Leader", wanted to build a dictatorship, using the traditional structures of die party, widi pragmatic inclusion of non-Ludak colleagues and defectors. In ideology and everyday politics it made maximum use of traditional clericalism and conservatism, in economic policy of Catholic social teaching. A second group, around Professor Vojtech Tuka, who replaced Tiso as prime minister in October 1939, supported more radical methods and more consistent following of Nazi examples. Tuka, in die twenties leader of die fascist Rodobrmm (Home Defence), propagated "Slovak national socialism", against Tiso's "people's Slovakia". In contrast to the effort to use tradition, he emphasized "permanent revolution". Tuka's main support was die Hlinka Guard, headed by Alexander Mach. It was organized according to die model of die German SA, and demanded a more significant share in state power.
In die controversy about die form of die dictatorship in Slovakia, Tiso relied especially on die party, which had about 300,000 members in 1944, and he also had the support of die Catholic Church. Priests were strongly represented among the functionaries of the party, in parliament and the state council. Tiso himself was a Catholic priest. The Church supported the social, cultural and educational policies of the government, the audioritarian and paternalist elements of die political system also suited it, but it was not willing to support die consistent copying of die Nazi model. Tiso's and Tuka's groups intensively competed for German support. Each side had its patrons, die guardist wing especially in SS circles. However, Hitler, as the most important and decisive figure, gave priority to Tiso, who was a better guarantee of stability in conditions of spreading war, Aran die noisy, but weakly rooted groups of "Slovak national socialists". But Hitler did not allow Tiso to consistently liquidate his opponents, Tuka remained in office, and die SS trained selected groups of Hlinka Guards in Germany. The radicals were a sort of reserve and a means of pressure.
The organization of die German minority also fulfilled a pressure and control function in favour of die Nazis. After Munich, die Carpatiiian German Party led by Franz Karmasin changed itself into die Deutsche Partci (DP), which obtained from die government, a monopoly on organizing and representing die whole German minority. The DP created a dense organizational network, a parallel organization to die Hlinka Guard (die Frciwilligc Schutzstaffrl), youtii, women's, trade union and sports organizations, and its own administration of schools. The wish of some Germans in Slovakia in 1938-1939 to join Germany was not supported by Berlin, which promoted die conception that during die war, die role of die minority was to be a guarantee of German interests in Slovakia, and a model of the position of a minority in soutii-east Europe. The Germans had special units in the framework of die Slovak Army, from 1942 there was mass recruitment to the SS, and from spring 1944 obligatory service in die SS.
The attempts at an exclusive position in the state, die arrogant behaviour oJ the Deutsche Partei as representative ol the will of the "protecting power" led to a previously almost unknown estrangement and finally to open Slovak-German antagonism. Among Slovak supporters of the regime, the claims of official representatives of the minority led by Franz Karmasin offended against their freshly acquired idea and illusion of sovereignty and independence. To opponents of the regime, the activities and public behaviour of the minority organizations recalled Nazism, Hitler, violence, anti-Semitism and aggression. The islands of anti-fascism, especially of a socialist or communist character, among the Germans in Slovakia, continued until the end of the war, but could not overcome diis estrangement growing into hatred.
Nationalism, one of die basic pillars of die Ľudák regime, brought confrontation witii all die minorities. After the Vienna Arbitration, about 60,000 Hungarians remained in Slovakia. The regime allowed die Hungarian Party in Slovakia, led by member of parliament Jánoš Eszterházy, to represent diem politically. The Hungarians in die territory of Slovakia were to a large extent hostages to die policy of die Budapest government towards the Slovak minority in the occupied territories. Article 95 of the Slovak constitution gave ethnic minorities the same rights as Slovaks had in the territory of the minority's "mother country". In practice, this led to permanent disputes between Bratislava and Budapest about approval of minority schools, cultural societies, newspapers, sports clubs, and mutual reciprocal harassment and persecution. The Slovak and Hungarian governments constantly complained and denounced each other in Berlin, where diey tried to moderate the disputes, but without lasting results.
The Rusyn minority was also represented in parliament, although it did not have its own political organization like die Germans and Hungarians. The state supported the Rusyn orientation against die Ukrainian, and in ecclesiastical policy, the Uniate Church. The Rusyn problem was not in the foreground of the government's interest, and the Rusyn elites did not seriously compete witii die Slovak elites. The radical nationalism of die regime was presented especially in relation to the Czechs and Jews.
In die period of autonomy, die Bratislava government already insisted in Prague on die transfer 9,000 state employees to die Czech Lands. After March 1939, more soldiers, railway and post office workers, administrators, teachers, judges, technicians and doctors followed. By 1940, die number of Czech state employees fell to 2,205. Irreplaceable experts, husbands of Slovak women and similar cases retained dieir positions. The enforced exodus had less effect on die employees of private companies and on businessmen. The overall number of Czechs is estimated at one diird compared to 1930. As a result of fear of resetdement in die Protectorate, where livingcondidons were much more unfavourable, some Czechs already declared Slovak or German nationality. The Czechs were a constant subject of attacks from die radicals, who saw diem as a fifth column, agents of the Czechoslovak government in exile in London, and periodically demanded die "complete cleansing" of Slovakia. The expulsion of die majority of Czechs, aldiougli without brutal excesses, nourished in Czech society, a feeling of having been "betrayed" by the Slovaks, of dieir unreliability in state affairs, was significandy manifested in die controversies and considerations about die position of Slovakia in die renewed republic during die war and after it, widi reverberations until 1992.
The dictatorship and aggressive atmosphere, created by Nazi Germany through war, supported die change of die traditional Ľudák anti-Semitism into a brutal, systematic and state directed form, which finally led to die killing of the majority of Slovak citizens of the Jewish religion.
2<>! A CONCISE HISTORY OF SLOVAKIA
In 1939, aboul 90,000 Jews lived in the territory of the Slovak Republic, including thousands of refugees from Germany and Austria and citizens of foreign states. Forcible deportation and other actions already affected the immigrants under the autonomous government. Propaganda accused tire Jews of causing die Vienna Arbitration, A newspaper and leaflet campaign prepared the ground for the actions developed after-March 1939.
On 18 th April 1939, the government issued a decree, defining the term "Jew" on a religious basis. The group of citizens defined like this, was subjected tr> constantly increasing discrimination. They were excluded from some professions and from education higher than basic, dieir businesses, land and shops were gradually "Arianized" in favour of interested Slovaks and Germans, who supported the regime. The Jews were gradually deprived of their civil rights, degraded to inhabitants of a lower level, The various anti-Jewish measures were collected on 9th September 1941 into the 270 articles of government decree no.198, the so-called Jewish Code, which defined the term Jew on the racial principle, as in the German Nuremberg Laws. The jews had to wear a five pointed yellow star, their letters had to be marked with it, tiieir right to travel was limited, diey could not own means of transport, radios or cameras, they had limited access to parks, cinemas, swimming pools, cafes and restaurants. The had limited hours for shopping and free movement in towns. They had to leave their homes in some streets, they were exposed to systematic hate propaganda and physical attacks from the Hlinka Guard and Freiwillige Schutzstaffel.
The most effective defence against the anti-Semitic wave was emigration, but many countries were not willing to accept Jewish immigrants. At die beginning of the war some transports to Palestine were stopped on the way. Jewish organizations and opponents of anti-Semitism could only moderate its results by creating work opportunities for Jews in special labour camps, granting exceptions on grounds of "economic necessity", and baptism.
By die end of 1941, die state began to see the Jews, deprived of property and work, and pushed to the periphery of society, as a burden. The establishment of ghettos was prepared, but met with opposition from local figures in die chosen towns, At diis time, an offer came from the Nazis, to take the Slovak Jews "for work" in the German occupied territories. On 3rd March 1942, die first transport of tiiousands of young women and girls left Poprad. The next day diey were already subjected to selection on die ramp of the camp at Auschwitz. From 25th March to 20th October 1942, 57, 628 Jews were delivered to the Nazi camps. A special law deprived diem of the remnants of dieir property and their citizenship. The Slovak government also committed itself to paying Germany a "resettlement fee" of 500 marks for each Jew. Only a few hundred people survived from die first wave of deported Jews.
A second wave of deportations occurred from die end of September 1944 to March 1945, when about 13,500 people were deported and about 10,000 of them died. After March 1944, die flames of the Holocaust also affected the Jews who lived in the territories occupied by Hungary. They included many who had fled diere in 1942 to escape the transports from the territory of die Slovak Republic.
The Holocaust practically liquidated the Slovak Jewish community and had deep and long term influence on die whole society. It revealed radical, fascist groups, but also die willingness of courageous people to help the persecuted, witiiout regard for die risk of being labelled "white Jews". If a significant part of society accepted the regime as a "lesser evil" compared to direct Nazi occupation, die anti-Jewish actions, like participation
I'M. SLOVAKIA IN THE HUH CWWRi 265
The Hlinka Guard assembling jews from Michalovce for dcporlalion to a concentration camp
in the war, documented die transformation of die "lesser evil" into a position of pure evil. It also pointed to the limitation and inconsistency of some important social audiorities. The Cadiolic Church, just as it supported die authoritarian regime but stopped short of its Nazificatlon, did not definitely condemn the whole anti-Jewish action from die beginning. It only criticized action against baptized Jews, and more definitely when die racial principle was introduced in September 1941. The protests of die Vatican to the Bratislava government and President Tiso, against die race law, were not successful, but Vatican criticism of die deportations was one of die elements, which got diem temporarily stopped in October 1942.
The "solution of die Jewish question" became a huge burden on the regime and state. Arianization of property led to corrosion of the Ludak elite by corruption, racism strengtiiened die radical groups dependent on die Nazis. The appeal by Slovak Jews addressed to President Tiso, already at the time of preparation of die deportations, stating diat deportation meant their destruction, was gradually confirmed. Participation in die Holocaust became one of the ties binding the regime to die fate of Nazi Germany until the end of die war.
The Romany, who numbered almost 100 tiiousand in pre-war Slovakia, also suffered from discrimination. The legislation of the Slovak state also copied diat of die Third Reich in the case of die Romany. They were deprived of die possibility to serve in die armed forces. Instead, together with die Jews, they had to perform alternative labour service. The anti-Romany measures included a ban on travelling, use of public transport, access to villages and towns outside certain days and hours. They were obliged to remove
A U WCNK HISTORY Of SLOVAKIA
n ;,i i :>v: iŕ-   í .vmi: ai'uí ou-niu-
Ihcir dwellings horn proximity to public roads. "Labour units for asocials" lo which mainly Romany men were assigned, existed in various Slovak towns. After the suppression of the Slovak National Uprising, SS units carried out mass killing of Romany in central Slovakia. Romany from the areas annexed to Hungary were deported to German concentration camps, especially Dachau.
2.2.  The Anti-Fascist Struggle
The dictatorship of the People's Party met with criticism and opposition from the beginning. Disagreement widi the regime was politically motivated, only to a lesser extent and in the first years by tire economic situation. Strikes and demonstrations against high prices and poor provisions in the first years after the revolution, were unpleasant for tine government. A strike by miners at Handlova in 1940 finally had to be suppressed by military intervention. However, the situation was gradually consolidated. Unemployment was liquidated by the recruitment of workers to work in die Reich, and there was a rapid increase in the number employed in armaments factories in Slovakia, which produced cannons, munitions, parts of weapons and machines for Germany. Consumer industries also boomed. They were freed from competition from Czech factories, which had been converted to military production. Employment in industry in the whole territory of Slovakia, including the occupied territory increased from about 105,000 in 1937 to 174,019 in 1944. Agriculture drew on die fact drat Hungary occupied the most productive areas, so demand for produce from areas in and near the mountains increased. Many people worked on tire construction of communications and armaments factories, but also civilian structures, because business men, learning from experience in the First World War, attempted to secure their war time profits in immovable form. Until 1944, inflation was low for a war situation, and supplies were satisfactory after the first two years. Therefore, the economic motives for protest diminished, but the intensity of political impulses increased.
Some of the discontented were driven into opposition and resistance by disagreement with the liquidation of democracy, die dissolution of societies and institutions, tiiey had built over many years, but now their property was confiscated by the Eudaks and the hated Hlinka Guard. Parliamentary democracy was more deeply rooted than it had appeared to be during the Munich marazma. A significant proportion of die activists of die non-Ludak parties did not accept forcible merger witivtiie Ludaks or understand it as an unavoidable and temporary evil. The Protestants, who had a strong position in die economy, culture and administration, were pushed into opposition and resistance. In the definitely Catiiolic state, tiiey felt undervalued and marginalized. The supporters of the regime considered this justified, as a result of their advantaged position in Czechoslovakia. Many Czechs and their relations, who remained in Slovakia, maintained contacts wiUi the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, and some with resistance circles diere. The liberally oriented part of die intelligentsia was also alienated from die regime by its political clericalism. The left formed a large segment of the part of the discontented, which progressed to the level of organized resistance.
From 1939, civil resistance groups already assisted die escape of soldiers through Hungary and Yugoslavia to die West, tiiey sent reports on die political situation and on
the military movements of the Germans. The civil groups also had collaborators and agents among the high state functionaries. Some formed small cells, others were quite numerous, as in the cases of the Demec. Obrana národa and Flora groups. The civil groups had links with the Czechoslovak resistance in Paris and then in London.
The communists were the best prepared for illegality by their previous activity. They were in contact with die leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in Moscow, which still controlled the party after the recognition of the Slovak Republic by die Soviet Union and the creation of a separate Communist Party of Slovakia in autumn 1939. The communists built up an illegal hierarchically controlled network throughout Slovakia, although it was constantly disturbed by die arrest and imprisonment of functionaries. Up to 1943, four illegal leaderships of the party alternated. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union, and die sending of Slovak units to the eastern front to widen their existing activities of spreading leaflets, illegal printing and intelligence, to include sabotage. From 1942, they also attempted to create partisan units. However, Slovakia, was still far from having die political or psychological conditions for this form of struggle.
For a long time the civil, communist and social democrat illegal groups existed along side each other. They did not come into open conflict, as happened in Poland or Yugoslavia, but they did not co-operate eidier. Different views on the future of the political system and state divided them. They rejected the Ľudák dictatorship, but the communists very vehemently propagated the installation of a Slovak soviet regime, while the civil groups supported die renewal of parliamentary democracy. The communists saw their ideal in a Slovak Republic, which would be part of a wider Soviet federation, or actually of die Soviet Union. The non-communist resistance supported the renewal of Czechoslovakia, but gradually asserted rejection of its centralized pre-Munich form. The relationship between Czechs and Slovaks was formulated as "equal with equal", that is some form of federation.-The destiny and development of tiiese ideas about die future was connected with the course of die war, and especially with die origin of the anti-fascist coalition.
From die first day of the war, Slovaks participated on botii sides. The Slovak Army invaded Poland along side the Germans, and was rewarded with the return of territory taken in 1920 and 1938. However, Slovaks also joined die first Czechoslovak unit, organized in Poland in die summer of 1939. Some Slovak pilots flew to Poland, and open rebellions occurred in garrisons mobilized for war. Slovaks fought in Czechoslovak units in France, in the Near East, in North Africa, in the Batde of Britain, and after 1941 in Czechoslovak units organized in the Soviet Union. The organization of these military units helped Edvard Beneš, who went into exile after Munich, to create first in Paris, dien in London, a centre of Czechoslovak resistance, later a government in exile, and achieve its recognition by the Allies.
Slovaks were also represented in die London leadership. The attempts of some Slovak politicians around the former prime minister Milan Hodža, to create a purely Slovak political centre in exile were unsuccessful. The Allies placed the renewal of Czechoslovakia among dieir war aims, and Moscow muffled the agitation for a "Soviet Slovakia", in die interests of the anti-Hitler coalition, of vital importance for its survival. Therefore, by 1941, the post-war position of Slovakia was clearly crystallized: in the event of Allied victory, the renewal of Czecho-Slovakia, with a still unclear internal arrangement; in the event of German victory, a fate outlined by die policy of the Nazis towards other Slavonic nations.
A CONCISE HISTORY OF SLOVAKIA
Bomber with Czechoslovak cmo in Great Britain
2.3. The Slovak National Uprising
The turning point for the regime and the resistance movement came in 1943. Intoxication with having dieir own state evaporated, die regime was weakened by internal struggles, compromised by Arianization, but especially by its inability to give the populadon clear post-war prospects. While the governments of Hungary and Rumania could seek a way out of Germany's approaching defeat by "jumping" out of the war, the fate of the Slovak Republic was indissolubly bound to the fate of Hitler's Reich. The fellow-travellers of die regime began to distance themselves from it, and die activists were ever more isolated. The Slovak Army on the eastern front was also disintegradng. The Germans finally relocated die safety division from Bielorus and Ukraine to Italy as a construction unit, because of unreliability and desertion to the partisans. The elite Fast Division, which reached die Caucasus in 1942, lost so many deserters during retreating batdes in Ukraine, that a separate parachutist brigade was formed from them as part of the Czechoslovak Army in the USSR.
At tile end of 1943, the communists and some of the civil groups concluded die so-called Christmas Agreement. They created a Slovak National Council as a joint resistance autiiority. The communists were represented in die Slovak National Council by Karol Smidke, Gustav Husák and Ladislav Novomeský, the civil block by Jozef Lettrich, Ján Ursíny and Matej Josko. Later representatives of other resistance groups were added to
VII. SLOVAKIA IN ÍHli. -JUTH CF.NTl.iir, 2t>9
the Council. The Slovak National Council had to coordinate the acHvitv of the civil groups and resistance supporters in the Slovak Army, The main aim was to prepare an uprising to help the Allied front.
The plan of the uprising started from the advance of the Soviet forces to the Carpatiiians. At the right moment, the Slovak Army would open the front and enable the Soviet Army to advance rapidly through Slovakia to the gates of Vienna. The military uprising was prepared by an illegal Military Headquarters, which co-operated with die Slovak National Council, but was also authorized by President Beneš in London. The Military Headquarters was headed by Colonel Ján Goíián, commander of the staff of die ground forces in Banská Bystrica. The minister of national defence of die Slovak Republic General Catloš also worked out a similar plan independentiy.
A condition for success of die uprising was coordination with the Soviet leadership. A delegation from the Slovak National Council, transported by air to Moscow, endeavoured to achieve diis in die summer of 1944. However, events in Slovakia went ahead of die strategic planning. In 1944, die Soviet leadership sent numerous parachutists into Slovakia, with die task of starting a partisan war. In the excited atmosphere, hundreds and thousands of civilians and soldiers joined them. The partisan units grew, and apart from diversionary and terrorist actions against collaborators and Germans, they began to occupy whole villages and valleys. The Bratislava government was powerless against diem. Its power apparatus, army and police force failed. On 29tíi August, German units began to occupy Slovakia with the agreement of President Tiso. The illegal Military Headquarters ordered commanders involved in preparations for die uprising to resist the Germans. This was the beginning of a two month struggle, which went down in Slovak history as die Slovak National Uprising.
The uprising units succeeded in stopping die German advance to die extent that diey controlled a compact territory in central Slovakia, centred on Banská Bystrica. The Slovak National Council took power here, and die First Czechoslovak Army in Slovakia was formed. By die end of September its size reached about 60,000 men. The partisan units, which operated partly in die territory of the uprising and partly in die German rear, had about 18,000 fighters. The majority of die partisans were Slovaks, but many were members of die nations of die Soviet Union, Czechs, French, Jews, Bulgarians, but also Hungarians, Germans or otiiers. In die course of die fighting, die uprising forces were strengdiened by die Second Czechoslovak Parachute Brigade, transported by air from die Soviet Union. The First Czechoslovak Fighter Squadron from die Soviet Union also operated from uprising airfields. The failure of two of die best equipped divisions in eastern Slovakia was a great loss at the beginning of die uprising. The Germans took them by surprise and quickly disarmed diem. Shortages of some weapons, especially anti-tank weapons were relieved by an air bridge provided by the Soviet Airforce. American aeroplanes from southern Italy also brought weapons.
At first, die Germans could oppose die uprising only with rapidly improvised forces of about 15,000 men, because after die successful coup in Rumania on 23rd August, tiiey were direatened witii die collapse of die whole soudi-east. From 8di September, a rapidly organized offensive by Soviet and Czechoslovak forces, through die Carpatiiians into eastern Slovakia, also engaged significant German forces. The defensive struggle of die uprising, using artillery, aeroplanes and armoured trains, resisted the German advance for six weeks. The turningpoint came on 17th October, when the German forces grew to 30-40,000 men. Banská Bystrica fell on 27th October. Part of the army went home, while
270
CONCISE HISTORY OF SLOVAKIA
VII. SLOVAKIA IN TUF 20TI-1 CENTU It]
271
Dicing of an nnli-iank ditch during the Slovak National Uprising
part went into captivity, including die commanders, Generals Ján Golián and Rudolf Viest, who were executed in Germany. Individual soldiers and units joined die partisans, or created their own partisan units. By the beginning of 1945, about 13,500 partisans were operating in Slovakia in die German rear.
The uprising meant the complete polarization of Slovak politics. In the territory of the uprising, the Slovak National Council and its executive organ the Board of Commissioners (Zbor povereníkov) directed life. The sovereignty of the Czechoslovak Republic was renewed, Hlinka's Slovak People's Party and its offshoots were banned, and racist legislation was abolished. The Slovak National Council declared its support for die anti-fascist coalition, and the Allies recognized die army of die uprising as an allied force. A new political structure in die form of die communist party, which merged widi die social democrats, and die Democratic Party, uniting die civil elements, began to form in die territory of die uprising. The Slovak National Council acted self-consciously as a state organ, and die government in exile in London, headed by President Beneš, had to recognize dlis, aldiough reluctantly. The uprising was a real fact, which made it difficult to return to any form of die pre-war centralism.
New political elites, formed in die uprising, played an important part in post-war development. German intervention formally protected die Ľudák representatives for a time, but also seriously compromised diem. The security apparatus, die Hlinka Guard and die organizations of die local Germans closely co-operated with occupying units, in die struggle against the uprising, and Uien for six mondis in defence of die German rear. In die batties
The Slovak' National Uprising. Figliling in the mountains
and "cleansing actions", many villages were burnt, while partisans and Jews hiding from die renewed deportations, were often executed on the spot. The Bratislava government also attempted to revive die army, but after several attempts to place it at die front, it remained mostiy unarmed. The Bratislava government and President Tiso, entirely dependent on die Germans, were finally evacuated to Austria and Bavaria at die beginning of April 1945.
2.4. The Regions Occupied by Germany, Poland and Hungary
At that time, die last communities in die parts of Slovakia, directly occupied by Germany and Hungary during die war, were liberated. In 193S, Germany occupied the suburbs of Bratislava on die right bank of the Danube, which made it easier to control Slovakia. It created die curious situation, in which die prime minister and minister of foreign affairs of die Slovak Republic looked directly out of tiieir windows into die territory of die "protecting power". It was especially difficult for Slovak society to tolerate the German occupation of Devin, at die confluence of die Danube and Morava, since it had great symbolic importance for Slovak historical consciousness.
The communities in northern Slovakia, taken by Poland after Munich, were returned to Slovakia after the defeat of Poland in 1939 as a reward for the participation of Slovak units in die invasion. Territory ceded to Poland in 1920 also became part of the Slovak Republic. After the war, in 1945, the frontier returned to its pre-Munich state.
272 a concish history of slovakia
17! ;;| OlMIA IN THF-I'HI i.T.Vff//v-.
A quarter of the inhabitants of Slovakia experienced the war in terrilorie.s occupied by Hungary. The occup.ltion of Ihese territories was a great trauma for the majority of Slovaks, since 1918 used to Slovakia "from the Tatras to the Danube". It was worsened by the fact that the denationalizing policy from before 1918 was renewed in the occupied territory. The 1941 census found only 86,716 Slovaks here, according to the 1930 census there were three times as many. A large number of Slovak schools were closed, and more than 900 teachers were driven across the frontier, as were thousands of farmers, who had received land here in the land reform. Slovak libraries, societies and the press were liquidated and destroyed. Expressions of national life were brutally suppressed by policemen and officials. The principle of reciprocity, harshly applied by the Bratislava government, and fears for the fate of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia forced the Budapest government to make some concessions. Some societies and two gymnasia were allowed, and from 1942 also a political party, the Party of Slovak National Unity. Its newspaper Slovenská jednota (Slovak Unity) also linked die Slovaks in southern Slovakia with those in other parts of Hungary, especially with the strong Slovak community in the part of Yugoslavia occupied by Hungary from 1941.
The Slovak minority was at first oriented towards union with the Slovak Republic, but from 1941, when the Allies recognized the Czechoslovak government in exile, the orientation to the renewal of Czechoslovakia also grew. This was the core of the dispute with the numerically prevailing Hungarian population of the region. After their initial euphoria over "national liberation", the local Hungarians had many objections and complaints against Harthy's dictatorship. Since they were used to Czechoslovak democracy, they found it difficult to tolerate the limitation of civil freedoms and the preference for incomers from the "mother country". The more backward social and economic situation had an unfavourable effect on them, and die standard of living fell perceptibly. However, Horthy's regime celebrated triumphs. It occupied, or in its terminology "reunited" parts of Slovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia. Participation in the war against the Soviet Union was a furdier promise of die complete revision of Trianon and the renewal of Greater Hungary. Such ideas and illusions muffled opposition, and where this was not enough, die regime applied pressure. There had been enough time since 1919 for building a dictatorship. When the military situation changed in 1943, precisely this burden of occupied territory was a hindrance to the efforts of die Budapest government to detach itself from Hitler.
The radical excesses during the occupation of 1938, violence, expulsion, murder, as well as different views on die present situation and hopes for die post-war settlement, undoubtedly contributed to polarization in die relationship between the Slovaks and Hungarians in die occupied territory. The only real inter-edinic bond was die communists, who had quite a strong position here. In 1940-1942, the whole illegal organization of die communist party, decimated by a long terror, paid for it. Many communists were executed or died in prison.
On 19th March 1944, German troops occupied the country, because of fears that Hungary would follow die example of Italy. Extreme nadonalist and fascist groups came to power. The terror of the Gestapo and "Arrow Cross" organizations aimed to keep the country in die war. The Jews were deported to Nazi concentration camps. This also caused die deadis of thousands of Jews from Slovakia, who had soughtrefuge in Hungary before the deportations from Siovalda in 1942. Arrests, executions and forcible mobilizations among Slovaks and Hungarians, were widespread until the last moments of the war. The unsuccessful attempts of Hungary to "jump out of the war" like Finland or Rumania, led to Hungarian units fighting on the side of Germany until the last days of the war.
a colh'.isi utsroio or Slovakia
Post-War Slovakia
There was fighting in Slovakia for eight months. In September 1944, Soviet forces crossed the Carpathians, and on 6th October the first soldier of the Czechoslovak Army Corps in the USSR stepped onto Slovak soil. The battles for the Dukla Pass were the bloodiest engagements of the Czecho-Slovak units abroad during the war. Nortiiern Slovakia was liberated by Soviet and Czechoslovak forces, central and western Slovakia by Soviet and Rumanian units. By May 1945, the First Czechoslovak Army Corps grew to 97,299 men, of whom 72,400 were Slovak. Although the main strategic aims were north of Slovakia towards Berlin and south towards Vienna, the intensity of die battles is shown by die losses. 50,659 soldiers of die Red Army, 10,435 of die Rumanian Army and 1,736 members of die First Czechoslovak Army Corps are buried in die territory of Slovakia.
The capital city, Bratislava was liberated on 4tíi April 1945, and die last larger town Žilina on 30tii April. The country was devastated and paralysed. Apart from aerial bombardment and battles, great damage was caused by deliberate destruction by retreating German units. A third of the railway track was destroyed, and more than half the bridges. From 655 locomotives only 22 were usable. 93,000 houses were damaged or destroyed. The retreating army evacuated to Germany equipment from power stations and factories, as well as cattle and horses. Extensive areas were mined. The damage amounted to three times die annual national income of Slovakia.
Tens of diousands of men were in the army. Evacuees, prisoners from concentration camps, refugees from the regions occupied by Hungary during die war, returned home. Soviet security forces took diousands of people from east Slovakia to camps in the USSR. Many of diem died, and some returned home only in the mid fifties. On the other hand, diousands of active supporters of the wartime regime went into exile with the retreating German Army.
The London government in exile returned to die homeland via Moscow, where it agreed die programme of die new Czechoslovak government widi die communists. It was declared on 5th May 1945 at Košice in eastern Slovakia. The government of die National Front would hold power, and on die lower level national committees. In foreign policy, co-operation with the Soviet Union was emphasized. The Košice government programme proclaimed die confiscation of die property of Germans, Hungarians and collaborators, land reform, control of key industries, banks and natural resources by the state. Germans and Hungarians widi die exception of anti-fascists would be deprived of citizenship. The programme was a compromise, but still retaining die basic principles of parliamentary democracy, although already significantly limited. The struggle over die interpretation and implementation of individual points of the Košice government programme formed die content of political struggles up to 1948. This also concerned die position of Slovakia in die new state.
In Moscow, on 23rd - 29th March 1945, during talks between representatives of die London exiles and die communist leader Gottwald, representatives of the Slovak National Council demanded an organization of die state equivalent to a federation. However, they gained only recognition of die Slovak nation and a promise Uiat die position of die Slovaks in die renewed state would be solved on the basis of die principle of "equal widi equal".
The internal political struggle in Slovakia, as well as the unwillingness of die Czech side contributed to the failure to implement the uprising ideas of the consistent federalization of die state in the post-war years. The core of the struggle was the fateful
question Lit whether the state wuuld develop as a democracy or head towards a dictatorship of the Soviet type.
In Slovakia, the starting points for both solutions were about evenly balanced. In the Slovak National Council of the uprising, the ruling authorities in die liberated territories and the National Committees administering communities, towns and regions, die communists united widi the social democrats had equal representation widi die civil bloc, which represented die Democratic Party, The communists had greater influence in the united trade unions, in the influential organization of partisans, and especially in the security forces. The communists had a better organization and the ability to bring the discontented into the street. The Democratic Party had greater influence among the farmers, the largest group in society, and among the urban middle class. The active radius of the Democratic Party sub-stantiallyincreasedin April 1946, shortly
before the elections, when its mainly Protestant leadership concluded an agreement widi Catholic political circles.
There were sharp clashes between die communists and democrats over economic policy, when the communists, after confiscating die large companies, also demanded the nationalization of smaller factories, farms larger than 50 hectares and limitation of small business. The political quarrel was about die maintenance of legality, but also overcoming die past. In die trials of activists in die wartime regime before special people's courts and in political purges, die democrats promoted a more moderate approach, which would enable some of the fellow-travellers of die defeated regime to participate in society. The greatest dispute concerned die fate of former President Tiso, handed over to Czechoslovakia by die Allies, widi other members of his government. Tiso was condemned to deadi by the National Court. In spite of die efforts of the Democratic Party, die government did not support his request for clemency, and he was executed in April 1947.
In contrast to die situation in 1920, when die left gained a great electoral victory from post-war radicalization, die Democratic Party won die elections in May 1946. It received 62% of die votes and die communists 30%, widi the remainder going to the revived social democrats and the Catholic Freedom Party. In die hundred member Slovak National Council, the Democratic Party had 63 seats and die Communist Party had 31 seats, while the Freedom Party and Labour Party had a combined total of 6. The chairman of the Democratic Party Jozef Lettrich became the chairman of the Slovak National Council, while die communist Gustav Husak became chairman of its executive body, the Board of Commissioners.
The Firs! Czechoslovak Aran/ Corps roaches the frontier of Slovakia at Ditkla on 6th October 1944
The results ofS months offighting in Slovakia, 1944-1945
Apart from people prosecuted by die people's courts, Germans and Hungarians, who had been deprived of their citizenship, did not participate in die elections. The majority of Germans already left before die front arrived. After the war, diose who remained or returned were concentrated in camps. By die end of October 1946, 32,450 of diem were transported to Germany. The Hungarians who came to the territory occupied by Hungary after 193S were immediately expelled. On the basis of a 1946 agreement with Hungary on exchange of population, 73,000 Slovaks moved from Hungary to Slovakia and 74,000 Hungarians moved from Slovakia to Hungary. 44,000 Hungarians were forcibly resettled in die Czech frontier regions to replace the German labour force there. In die strained atmosphere of revenge, and entirely against die sense of die long struggle of Slovaks for recognition of their national identity, 326,697 Hungarians were "re-Slovakized". In exchange for declaring tiiemselves to be Slovaks, they received civil rights and the possibility of employment. After 1948, when rights of citizenship, schools in their own language, a press and cultural societies were returned to die Hungarians, die majority of the "re-Slovakized" people returned to their real nationality.
If it appeared soon after die war tiiat die position of Slovakia in die state would be substantially different from the pre-war centralism, the situation quickly changed. In die drree so-called Prague agreements of 1945-1946, the powers of die Slovak authorities, die Slovak National Council and its executive organ the Board of Commissioners, were substantially limited in favour of Prague institutions. The Slovak communists also became
HI. "'I OVAIJA IN THI:. dim I CLNIUTA 277
an instrument of the renewal of centralism. They preserved from the years of tile war and the uprising, a formally independent party, the Communist Party of Slovakia, which enabled the communists to occupy more places in the Prague government, and to use nationalism at home instead of the unpopular internationalism. However, die crushing defeat in die 1946 elections made the Slovak communists dependant on help from Prague in the struggle for power. In die Czech Lands, the left won the elections in May 1946. The Communist Party and the Social Democrats, already strongly infiltrated by the communists received a total of 55.75% of the votes. The communist Klement Gottwald was prime minister in die Czechoslovak government, the communists held die important Ministry of die Interior, drey controlled security and die strong and militant united trade unions.
In 1947, the end of die post-war compromises, die regime of "people's democracy" was already clearly outlined. Hither a return to full-blooded democracy, or development into communist dictatorship was inevitable. The international situation, with definition of die "Cold War" division also pointed towards the political denouement. The firm intervention by Moscow against die contemplated entry of Czechoslovakia into the Marshall Plan was an eloquent warning signal in July 1947.
Slovakia became a sort of experimental field in this struggle for power in die whole of Czechoslovakia. Irregularities in supply, the dissatisfaction of partisans and leftists with the "purge" and die rate of nationalization, the discontent of farmers with die slowness of die land reform and other factors created an explosive situation. Control of die trade unions, of some agricultural and resistance organizations, but above all of security, by the communists, enabled the use of tiiis social tension against die Democratic Party. In the course of 1947, die security service uncovered several illegal groups, connected widi Cudaks in exile. Further groups were provoked or entirely invented. The invented connectiorVof these anti-state groups with the highest circles in the Democratic Party, togetiier witii social disturbances, enabled Gottwald, helped by the Slovak communists, to force such a reconstruction of the Board of Commissioners on 20th November 1947, that the Democratic Party lost its majority, in conflict with die 1946 elections.
The combination tested in Slovakia, of pressure "from below" by various communist controlled organisations, witii ruthless, but also adroit use of positions of power in die government, parliament, security service, state apparatus and army, was applied by die communists in die whole of Czechoslovakia in February 194S. The resignation of 12 non-communist ministers in die Prague government on 20di February, in protest against violent actions of die security service, gave die communists a convenient startingpoint for a political change. On 24th February, tiiey organized a general strike. On die next day. President Benes accepted die resignation of die government, and appointed a new one, again headed by Klement Gottwald. They left several places in it for non-communists, but the hegemony of die communists was already complete, as die subsequent development showed.
Development in Slovakia was a reflection of die situation and scenario in Prague. The Democratic Party rejected die resignation of its representatives in die Board of Commissioners, but the Prague coup also enabled die Slovak communists to complete die power changes begun during die autumn political crisis of 1947. On 26tii February, the chairman of die Slovak National Council Jozef Lettrich gave up his functions and soon went into exile. The communist Karol Smidke became chairman of the Slovak National Council, while the communists occupied 11 out of 15 seats in the Board of Commissioners. The supporters of democracy were squeezed and paralyzed. In all social
27S
.1 COWC/St HISTORY OF SLOVAKIA
tlic elections of April 1946
organizations, local government organs, offices of the state administration, radio and editorial offices, even in die non-communist parties, "action committees" were formed, which dismissed inconvenient people, and appointed communists or tiieir adherents. February 1948 opened die way to more than forty one years of dictatorship.
4.   The Communist Dictatorship in Slovakia 4.1. The Political System
The consolidation of die political power of die Communist Party in die whole state was done according to a unified scenario. Like die Prague parliament, tiiey also "purged" the Slovak National Council. Some of die inconvenient members of parliament were expelled, some were already in prison, some emigrated, some were simply too afraid to attend sessions. The limited Slovak National Council elected a new chairman, die communist Karol Smidke, and declared a programme to "definitively secure the people's democratic regime in Slovakia and prevent revival of the subversive activity of the reactionaries."
'Action committees'" in offices and statu institutions, societies, trade unions, schools and the local administration carried out energetic "purges". Local and district National Committees, in which the communists did not have majorities, were dissolved, so that elected local government organs remained in only a third of communities and in only 6 out of 79 districts. Workers' councils purged enterprises. In February, they began to organize an armed People's Militia in enterprises, for use as the strike force of the Communist Party. The illegal usurpation of all the positions of power in the state was regulated by a law of 21st July 1948, which legalized the post-February changes, although tiiey were in conflict with the valid laws. On 29th April, die state court in Bratislava already sentenced the first politicians of the Democratic Party to long terms in prison. Political trials of real or supposed opponents of die regime became a constant instrument in the functioning of the regime.
On 9th May 1948, the National Assembly adopted a new constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic, prepared over several years. After February die Communist Party of Czechoslovakia added to it a furdier limitation of private property, alfliough it still allowed small and middle sized private businesses. The constitution applied until 1960, but was only a formal framework, which the dictatorship continually stepped over and ignored.
The political system was a version of the Soviet dictatorship, witii the preservation of some historically and socio-oconomically justified differences. The state was still headed by a president, after the resignation of Edvard Benes, Klement Gottwald was elected president in June 1948. This started the tradition of combining die functions of head of the Communist Party and of the state. The National Assembly had legislative power, while the government had executive power. On die lower level, local, district and regional National Committees combined executive power with the functions of the state administration and elected local government. The Communist Party's monopoly of political power was not included in legislative norms until 1960, but it was consistently applied. Proposal of any list of candidates was in tiie hands of die party. Lists of candidates were generally "united", elections were held by the plebiscite metiiod. On 30th May 1948, die first parliamentary elections held according to Uie new constitution still enabled die casting of a neutral white ballot paper. This was done by 10.7% of the voters in the whole state, and by 14.1% in Slovakia. Later elections did not allow even this possibility. They were held by the standard mediod for modern dictatorships, with the participation of 99% of tiie electorate, and die same percentage of support.
The core of die dictatorship was die communist party. From February to July "1948, die number of party members in Slovakia doubled to 407,170, tiiat is 19.3% of die adult population. Screening later reduced tiiis figure to some extent, but die Communist Party of Slovakia remained a mass party until die fall of die regime at die end of die eighties. After die communists came to power and more significant social advancement became associated witii party membership, the party permanendy lost its working class character. Up to February 1948, 70% of party members were workers, but in 1949 only 41.7%.
In June 1948, die Communist Party of Slovakia merged with die Czech Communist Party, and continued to function only as a regional organization, with progressively more limited autonomy. The party achieved political mobilization, togedier witii control, by means of mass organizations, with die umbrella organization of the National Front. These mass organizations were also officially designated as "transmission levers" of the Communist Party. They replaced elements of the civil society, formed from die end of
■i l i <:■:<'i-<l ihstouy of Slovakia
VII. SFOVAkIA IN THE 20777 CEN'FUR', 28 1
/vlnrc/i (i/i/jc Communis! People's Militin, Bratislava, 1949
die 19tli century, and strongly developed in die inter-war period. It was destroyed by the Ludak dictatorship, but began to re-emerge after 1945.
The National Front also included the insignificant Freedom Party and Renewal Party, which arose instead of die liquidated Democratic Party. The social democrats, who participated in die 1946 elections as the Labour Party, were forced to dissolve themselves. Politicians and die public did not take the non-communist political parties seriously. Their declarations of unreserved support for die communist programme discredited diem in advance as real political parties. Other components of the National Front had real functions in die system. The Revolutionary Trade Union Movement included practically all employees. By means of works committees, they had some influence on questions of pay, working conditions, social policy and die provision of flats, recreation and sport. That is, diey were involved in everyday life. Like the trade unions, otiier organizations -the Czechoslovak Union of Youth, die organizations for women, gymnastics and cultural facilities, die associations of writers, artists, musicians, and even philatelists, gardeners, fishermen and bee-keepers - were united and received monopoly positions in theirs spheres of activity.
Widening die monopoly of the state in die economy was also a key factor in the communist dictatorship. After the first post-war wave of nationalization in 1945, which brought large companies, banks and foreign trade into the hands of the state, smaller companies, crafts and trades followed after February 1948. In 1948, small businesses still employed 150,000 people, by 1953 only 7,500. After the nationalization of the
28 2
A CONCISE HISTORY OF SLOVAKIA
The Iron Curtain
wholesale trade, small shopkeepers had to "voluntarily" give up tiieir businesses to collective centres or networks of state shops, craftsmen to communal or state enterprises. Private practice by doctors, dentists, and advocates' offices and practically all free professions, was suppressed. Houses witii apartments for rent remained formally in die hands of their owners, but the state controlled them. Thus, in die course of 2-3 years, the independent urban middle class was liquidated. Part of it found existence in state enterprises, but tiiere was a clear effort to replace it with new elites loyal to die regime. "Worker directors" were appointed to head enterprises. Workers loyai to die regime were trained as judges and secondary school teachers in courses lasdng a few mondis. Rapidly trained offices gained positions in tile army, while die security service was "strengdiened" widi reliable party members. The education of a new intelligentsia was supposed to solve the conflict between loyalty to die regime and expertise. Students from politically reliable families were given priority in higher education. To accelerate die process of "cadre renewal", special courses for workers, enabled them to acquire a shortened education.
Property changes, purges, screening, degradation and ostracism affected hundreds Df diousands of people. Even after decades, tiieir children still had limited access to education and qualified work. A characteristic expression of die will of die regime to break the urban business and middle class was Action "B", by which thousands of families were transferred from Bratislava to die countryside, without die decision of a court, but only by administrative decision. There were also similar actions in smaller towns.
283
I he .subjugation by the regime of the most numerous group in population, the larmers, was a more complex and longer term process than in the case of the urban middle class. In 1947, they formed 47.45% of the population. During die struggle for power, the Communist Party of Slovakia vehemently denied the intention of creating collective farms (kolchozy) of the Soviet type. Instead, it promised distribution to die small farmers of land from farms with over 50 hectares. After February 1948, die reform really began, but from 1949, the "socialization of die village" by die creation of united agricultural co-operatives. In comparison with the "socialization" of otiier areas, the collectivization of agriculture proceeded slowly. By 1953, die co-operatives cultivated 35.8% of dle EoiL B>' 1958' co" operative and state property reached 66.6%. Private farming still continued for some time, aldiough only in mountainous and less productive areas.
The formation of co-operatives and liquidation of private farms was achieved only witii constant pressure. The state monopoly deprived farmers of opportunities to freely buy machinery and fertilizer, or to sell their produce. The system oi forced deliveries to the state of prescribed quantities of produce ("contingents") enabled the state to impose unraifiilable obligations on die farmers, and tiien label them "kulaks" and "saboteurs". The "village rich" were removed from tiieir villages, fined, sent to forced labour camps, but die terror affected all farmers. In 1951 alone, more thnn6n,000 farmers were punished for nonfulfillment of contingents and other methods of "threatening the construction of socialism". About 70% of farmers were dependent on additional incomes from work in construction, forestry, industry or railways. These were given an ultimatum, to place their land in co-operatives or lose their jobs. Threats not to accept tiieir children for study at secondary school or university were also an effective instrument of pressure.
The breaking of the resistance of the farmers retained its open terrorist aspect very actively, even after the first phase of installation of die regime. Another, comparable • factor was the exclusion of church influence from public life.
In 1950, 76.20% of die population was Cadiolic, 6.55% Greek Cadiolic, 12.88% Lutheran and 3.25% Calvinist. At first, die regime tried to organize a schism in the Cadiolic Church by creating a collaborating church subject to die state, by misusing the so-called Catholic Action. After failure among die priests and faitiifu], die Church, like all otiier inconvenient organizations, was brutally subjugated. In 1949, laws on die position of die churches changed die existing supervision of die churches in tiieir subordination to die state. After die confiscation of property, the activity of die churches was dependent on grants and pay from die state, die performance of die priestly vocation was bound to state employment, and die activity of the churches controlled by the Slovak Office for Ecclesiastical Affairs. The press, religious societies and charity were limited. At Easter 1950, die security service and People's Militia raided die monasteries, interning 728 members of religious orders, and a further 281 in die following weeks. In August, die security service also liquidated die women's monasteries, and concentrated 1962 nuns from 24 different orders. In January 1951, Bishop Jan Vojtassak was sentenced to 24 years in prison and Bishops Michal Buzalka and Pavol Gojdic were sentenced to life imprisonment, in a show trial in Bratislava. Out of 2056 Cadiolic and Greek Cadiolic priests, 302 were imprisoned in die fifties. In 1950, die Greek Catholic Church was liquidated and the faithful forcibly transferred to the Ortiiodox Church, since it seemed less dangerous to the regime, because of its independence from Rome. The Protestant churches were also subjected to state control, and many Protestant clergy were imprisoned.
A CONCISl history of slovakia
internal nuns on their way 1» farced labour, 1955
The steps against the Church were accompanied by resistance from the faithful, local insurrections, attempts to forcibly liberate imprisoned priests and religious. They were suppressed by the security service, People's Militia and army, widi injuries and deatiis as a result. 717 opponents of Catholic Action were arrested in the first half of 1949 alone. The state gradually paralysed the most active centres of resistance, but die very existence of the Church, disturbing the communist monopoly on ideology, world view and influence on public affairs was a problem of varying intensity for the regime until the end.
4.2. The Communist Model of industrialization and Modernization
The destruction of traditional structures, purposefully applied terror, and economic monopoly of the state were interpreted by the ruling party as the condition and inevitable price for the achievement of dieir final aim - first of a socialist, then of a communist society. In Slovak conditions, this aim, embodied in five year plans and die resolutions or directives of party congresses, had the form of radical modernization, with accelerated development of the infrastructure, economy, culture, education and urbanization. The greatest intervention in the structure of society, die liquidation of the private farmers was also justified by the creation of more effective, modern agricultural units. Industrialization was defined as the key, the "red thread" of all the changes.
The rate of construction of industry was rapid, with the number of employees growing from 216,884 in 1948, to 409,933 in 1960, 504,844 in 1965, and continuing in the following decades, until it surpassed 800,000 in the eighties. Czechoslovakia, together with East Germany, was die most developed country in the Soviet Bloc, which was developed as
a closed, .self-sufficient economic apace, in the framework of the Council fur Mutual Economic Aid (COMECON) (1949). Traditional Czech enterprises such as Škoda were fully exploited, and they moved simpler production to Slovakia. The geopolitical position of Slovakia also determined the content of industrialization. The armaments industry was placed here, because of the greater distance from the frontier with the NATO countries. The position on the frontier with the Soviet Union and the adequate labour force also evoked the construction of factories producing consumer goods, shoes, textiles and furniture for the Soviet market in exchange for ore, gas and oil. The largest Slovak enterprise, die East Slovakia Ironworks in Košice, as well as the huge transhipment centre at the transition from die European to Soviet gauge railvvay at the frontier crossing point to the Soviet Union at Cierna nad Tisou, arose on the east-west transport axis. Many enterprises for the production of non-ferrous metals or chemicals arose as a result of die Western embargo on strategic products, but there was little demand for cost and effectiveness. Such a one-sided orientation of the Slovak economy was risky, but it worked for decades. It enabled modernization without excessive and prolonged drawing of resources from agriculture, as happened in the mother country of communism, the Soviet Union.
After the first difficult decade, when members of co-operatives worked on united agricultural co-operatives almost for nothing and lived from small plots of land at home and secondary incomes, life in the village began to stabilize. Thanks lo state subsidies, some co-operatives also prospered, while industrialization increased the possibility of an income outside agriculture. The numerous traditional class of seasonal labourers disappeared, work in factories and services meant social advancement and security. In the sixties, the village ceased to be a risk to the regime.
From the end of the fifties, extensive construction of flats, health and cultural facilities . and schools was developed in villages and towns. The number of pupils at gymnasium and especially at vocational schools grew rapidly. In 1945, Bratislava had the only university in Slovakia. Others were gradually established in Košice, Trnava, Nitra, Zvolen, Žilina, Banská Bystrica, Prešov, Martin and Liptovský Mikuláš. The network of professional theatres, musical bodies, galleries, museums, scientific and research institutions was extended. Slovak drama films were made. Just as industrializadon moved a large part of society into more modern employment, and so gave them a feeling of social advancement, this "founding period" of many cultural activities employed a large part of the intelligentsia and for some rime covered the frustration from the destruction of the post-February period.
The limits of the effect of "directed modernization" of the communist type appeared in die economy in the sixties, and significantly also in the nationality question. One of the declared aims of the industrialization of Slovakia was its economic, social and cultural equalization widi the Czech part of the state. The differences, which already existed at the time of the origin of die state in 191S were really gradually diminished to a significant extent, but without die political results expected from this. In the spirit of pre-war Czechoslovakism, the Czech communists appropriated die idea of the gradual ethnic merging of the two nations. As a result, die special position of Slovakia appeared to them to be unnecessary, especially since it was in conflict with the endogenous centralism and hierarchical structure of the Communist Party and regime. Therefore, limitation of the powers of the Slovak national authorities continued after February 194S, with the culmination of die process in 1960. The new constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic declared the building of socialism, which was also expressed in the change of the name of
,1 CONCISE HISTORY OF SLOVAKIA
Industrialization. The East Slovakia Ironworks at Košice
the state to the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia is already explicidy defined in article 4 of the constitution as the "leading force in society", and Marxism-Leninism as die basis of culture and education.
The constitution of lldi July 1960 degraded the Slovak National Council into complete insignificance, and subordinated the whole administration direcHy to Prague. Like all previous important political actions, die diminution of Slovak autonomy was accompanied by political trials, intended to intimidate opponents. One of the main creators of die communist dictatorship in Slovakia Gustav Husák was already arrested in 1951, and sentenced to life imprisonment as a "bourgeois nationalist" only after Stalin's death, that is in a period of a certain softening. Before the acceptance of the new constitution in 1960, a series of trials of representatives of die Slovak intelligentsia aimed to paralyse resistance and Slovak "separatism" in advance.
4.3. The Reform Movement of the Sixties. 1968
Discontent with centralism and with attempts lo renew Hie pre-war Czechoslovakism became an important part of die reform movement of die sixties. Signs of die revival of independent thought after die shock of the post-February terror already appeared in the second half of the fifties, encouraged by Khrushchev's criticism of Stalin at die 20th Congress of die Communist Party of die Soviet Union in Moscow. However, they were firmly
suppressed by the regime, alarmed by the revolution in neighbouring Hungary in 1956. At the beginningof the sixties, the communist dictatorship in Czechoslovakia entered a crisis. The economic mode), oriented towards quantitative growth was exhausted. State enterprises shackled by arbitrary plans and the bureaucracy were not able to keep up with developed world technology. The growth of die economy stopped, and limited resources did not enable the grow tli of consumption. The "socialist" constitution from I960 and the rhetoric of representatives of die regime about an early transition from socialism to communism were in sharp conflict with the reality of everyday life in Czechoslovakia and beyond die western frontier of die state. Although die state limited contacts widi die world where possible, in Central Europe, isolation could never be applied as consistently as in die Soviet Union or China. Channels of information were varied, from contact with relations, through commercial and scientific contacts and journeys, Radio Free Europe, die BBC, die Voice of America, Deutsche Welle and Austrian television, to holidays in Yugoslavia. This information undermined two important arguments of the regime: die exclusiveness of development as an achievement only of socialism, and secondly, the need for limitation because of the acute direat to die "socialist camp" from imperialism.
The regime was morally eroded by public revelation of at least some of the crimes committed during its construction, As in the case of Krushschev's criticism of Stalin in the Soviet Union, the stimulus was a power struggle within the party elite, so the revelations were inconsistent, the rehabilitations only partial, and affected mainly communists such as Gustav Husák. Hundreds of political prisoners remained in prisons and in camps at uranium mines, and new prisoners, especially from church circles were added in the sixties. Attitudes to trials and rehabilitations was one of die stimuli to differentiation within the Communist Party into "reformists" and "dogmatists". Further questions were gradually added, above all how to revive the economy - by rigid planning and centralization, or by reform with introduction of some elements of a market economy?
The dictatorship did not enable open formulation of views or association of their adherents, criticism of die regime was mostly through substitute themes and institutes. The weekly Kultúrny život (Cultural Life) excelled as an organ for critical views. It progressed from criticism of simplified "socialist realism" and information about currents of thought in die West, to discussion of unavoidable reform of the economy and die position of die citizen. The route to criticism of die 1960 constitution included discussion of the Slovak National Uprising, which was a denial of unitarism and centralism. A demand to return to die uprising conception of "equal widi equal" and federalization of the state arose from die formally historical discussions.
Reformist drinking and demands also penetrated into die ruling party. Since it had a legal monopoly on politics, hope of success depended on its participation. In die first half of die sixties, leading representatives of die Communist Party of Slovakia - Viliam Široký, Karol Bacílek and others - became victims of the disputes among die communist elite. They represented botii communist ortiiodoxy and Prague centralism. Alexander Dubček, Vasil Bil'ak and odier representatives of the younger generation came to the head of the party in Slovakia. They were less burdened by participation in the terror of the fifties, and formed a more open young generation, already not rapidly trained, but educated in standard schools. They energetically sought positions, influence and the possibility to apply their vision of society, which Alexander Dubček later called "socialism widi a human face". Discontent and calls for reforms, which were perceptible diroughout the state, also received a certain pathos and national dimension in Slovakia from the
■i oinasL history or Slovakia
offensive behaviour of the president and first secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Antonín Novotný in Slovakia. However, events in Prague were the key to solution, because of the centralism of the regime.
In autumn 1967, the reformist current in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia gained such influence, that by using power disputes in the party leadership, it secured the removal of Antonín Novotný and changes in the party leadership. For the first time in its history, a Slovak, Alexander Dubček became first secretary of die Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. He was not the initiator of the reforms, but he enabled diem. He started by preparing an extensive economic reform, relaxing controls on enterprises and agricultural co-operatives. A five day working week was introduced, and die reserves of die economy showed diat, in spite of diis, production grew. Censorship was abolished, newspapers could relatively freely publish different views, die "Iron Curtain" received substantial holes. The foreign press became available, and the jamming of foreign radio broadcasts stopped. After twenty years it was possible to travel to die West, an opportunity used by hundreds of diousands of people, especially students. Pressure on the Church was reduced. For example, believers forcibly included in the Ordiodox Church were allowed to return to the Greek Catholic Church. Rehabilitations of unjustly convicted and punished people were widened to groups for which die regime had obstinately refused this. In the framework of preparations for reform of the political system, preparations for change in the position of Slovakia began, with the Slovak side unambiguously demanding federalization of the state.
The country experienced excitement and euphoria. Revelation of die crimes of the regime and opening of routes to comparison with the developed countries stimulated turbulent demonstrations, discussions and innumerable resolutions. For the first time television proved to be the key medium, with the possibility of immediately presenting various views and positions.
Political activity involved an unexpectedly wide part of Slovak society. A unifying element was die demand for federalization. Views on the necessity, depdi and metiiod of reform of die economic and political systems varied. The reformist group included views of a social democratic type to proposals for only cosmetic changes to die communist dictatorship, that is not socialism, but only "communism with a human face." This difference was still partially concealed by die struggle with die dogmatists. These had a strong position, especially in the party apparatus, but also in die parts of the economic and cultural nomenklatura, which had no qualification apart from die party legitimation. The fourdi, civic current, with a vision entirely outside die framework of die post-February regime, appeared ratiier insignificant outwardly, for example in an attempt to form an organization of people persecuted by communism. It did not have much response. In contrast to die preceding situation, die reforms of 1968 were perceived as a substantial change, and die initiating participation of die communists, gained die communists a level of support diey never had before.
The movement in Czechoslovakia, die prepared reforms, the removal of censorship and opening to the West evoked, from the beginning, discontent in Moscow and in die leaderships of other communist parties in Eastern Europe, which feared that the spark of reform would spread. In the course of the spring and summer of 1968, diey tried to at least slow down die development in talks with die Czechoslovak communist leadership. After talks at the Czechoslovak-Soviet frontier railway station of Čierna nad Tisou, representatives of tile communist parties of Czechoslovakia, die Soviet Union, Poland,
VII. SLOVAKIA IN THE ZfffH CĽN'ľUK) iS9
Alexander Dubček
Hungary and the German Democratic Republic, signed a declaration on 3rd August in Bratislava. It declared that defence of die socialist system is die duty of all socialist countries. This "Brezhnev doctrine" became the Ideological justification for the intervention in Czechoslovakia on 21st August 1968.
In die night of 20th-21st August, the armies of the Warsaw Pact, wiUi die exception of die Rumanian Army, carried out their only military action during the whole history of die alliance (1955-1990), and against a member state. In a combined parachutist and ground operation, the Soviet, Polish, Hungarian and Bulgarian armies occupied the territory of Czechoslovakia, while the East German army blocked die frontier in die nortivwest. About half a million men participated in the operation. From die military point of view, the operation was successful. On orders from its commanders, the Czechoslovak Army did not resist. The army of occupation rapidly took control of communications and military stores, and took control of the frontiers. The action was less successful politically.
According to die original Soviet plan, a "workers' and peasants' government" of Soviet agents should have taken power in Prague. However, at the decisive moment diey did not succeed, and the presidium of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia issued a declaration against the occupation. There were turbulent demonstrations against die intervening armies, with clashes costing die lives of dozens of citizens. The Soviets arrested Alexander Dubček, the chairman of the National Assembly Jozef Smrkovský and the prime minister Oldřich Černík, and took diem to Moscow. After several days of talks
290
.•1 CONCISE HKTORY OF SLOVAKIA
1968. The Soviet occupation farces in Bratislava
in Moscow, in which President Ludvik Svoboda also participated, the Czechoslovak representatives capitulated under pressure. The Moscow protocol of 27tii August 196S was actually die beginning of a process, which continued for several years and received die name "Normalization".
Soviet hegemony was imposed step by step. The army was again entirely subordinated to Soviet command, in die framework of die Warsaw Pact, substantia! changes were made in die leadership of die Communist Party and state, an agreement on the "temporary stay" of Soviet troops in die territory of Czechoslovakia was signed. In April 1969, Dubcek was replaced as leader of die Communist Party of Czechoslovakia by Gustav Husak, who had gained a certain prestige among the reformists before the occupation, but gradually became an obedient Soviet instrument.
After several montiis, it seemed tiiat the reformist course would continue, although in more moderate form. On 27tii October 1968, die National Assembly approved one of die main demands of die reform movement in Slovakia: federalization. On 1st January 1969, die Slovak Socialist Republic and die Czech Socialist Republic were formed, witii dieir own national councils and governments. Togetiier tiiey formed die Czechoslovak Socialist Republic witii a common president, federal government and Federal National Assembly, composed of two chambers, the House of die People and die House of the Nations. The complex construction of voting aimed to prevent the outvoting of the representatives of Slovakia, which had only one tilird of the population of the state.
The population continued to protest against die occupation for a long time, with especially turbulent protests during the first anniversary in August 1969. In reality,
however, nothing could change the reality of the renewal of Soviet hegemony. The whole state and Slovakia passed from the euphoria of the "Dubcek era" to the resignation of Husak's "normalization".
4.4.  The "Normalization" of Dictatorship
The period from 1969 to the 1989 revolution is the only epoch of the communist dictatorship, which has an unambiguous name in historiography and social consciousness. The term "fifties" is associated witii die years of die installation of die dictatorship and die most dramatic phase of die terror, die "sixties" witii a certain "liberalization" of the regime, culminating in 1968. The term "normalization" was derived from the clearly proclaimed efforts of die new leadership of die communist party to distance itself from the reformist efforts, officially designated "rightist opportunism", to return to "normal", that is to die Czechoslovak version of the Soviet dictatorship.
In 1970, the programme and ideology of "normalization" were summarized in a document: "Lessons from the crisis development in the party and society after the thirteenth congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia". After criticism of the development in the second half of the sixties, the document defined, for die first time so openly, die "permanent and unchanged values", rejection of which is an anti-socialist and counter-revolutionary act. These pillars are: 1. The Icadingrole of the working class and its avant-garde the Communist Party in society. 2. The socialist state as die instrument of die dictatorship of the proletariat. 3. The Marxist-Leninist ideology and its application by all means of mass activity. 4. Communal ownership of the means of production and planned direction of the national economy. 5. The principles of proletarian internationalism and' dieir consistent application in foreign policy, especially in relation to die Soviet Union. According to die document, precisely die questioning of these principles in 1968-1969 led to disintegration and an "acute danger of counter-revolution". The "international assistance" from allies created for die communists a "firm basis" for die struggle against anti-socialist, counter-revolutionary and rightist forces.
Normalization began with mass purges. In die party organizations, diey formed so-called "healdiy cores", which from top to bottom, from the party leadership to die basic organizations, screened die party members and divided diem into diree categories: screened, expelled for inactivity and finally excluded "rightist opportunists". 21.7% of party members were excluded. They automatically lost management positions in enterprises, diey usually had to leave employment in education, die army, security, state offices, editorial offices, publishers and culture. Some areas of employment were entirely forbidden to diem, dieir children were discriminated against in education, dieir passports were taken away, as were military ranks. In offices, scientific and cultural institutions, non-party members were also screened. Disagreement with die "fraternal assistance" of August 1968 resulted in the same penalties as in the case of die excluded communists. However, the normalization persecution was not as brutal as die terror after February 1948, political trials were rare and the sentences more moderate even for opposition activity after 1968. However, the screening and purges had a sufficiently intimidating effect.
A return to the tested methods of isolation and intimidation also helped to strengthen die regime. The Iron Curtain again functioned like before 1968: travel to the West was
A CONCÍSF HISTORY OF SLOVAKIA
limited, as was the importing of the foreign press, books and films. The jamming of "seditious broadcasts" was renewed. The mass media, which played such an important role in 1968, were normalized with special care. Preliminary censorship was not renewed, but a system of personal responsibility of editors and subsequent harsh penalties were enough. Some reformist magazines, especially Kultúrny život were closed.
Federalization was also restricted very rapidly. The "leading role" of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was preserved, and it was not federalized. The powers of the Slovak National Council and government were gradually limited, exactly according to the pattern of die period after 1945, and some Slovak ministries were abolished. The regime was returned to the centralist form from before 1968, by a series of laws on responsibilities from 1970, although preserving the federal form. The Slovak question remained unsolved, as an important problem in the functioning and existence of the Czech-Slovak state.
The triumph of normalization was outwardly complete. The dissident Milan Šimečka accurately named die following period, the "age of immobility", in contrast to die searching and experimentation of die sixties. However, die occupation of August 1968 was such a shock tiiat nothing, neither society nor the communist party could really return to communist "normality". In contrast to neighbouring Hungary or Poland, tiiere were no Soviet forces on Czechoslovak territory up to August 196S. Soviet hegemony was less obvious, although equally effective. August changed this: Soviet hegemony became visible. The attitude of the West to events in Czechoslovakia, which did not go beyond platonic sympathy, confirmed that die state was an internationally accepted part of die Soviet Bloc, and substantial changes in Czechoslovakia were not possible without changes in the centre. This was more so because the periodic crises of regimes in die Soviet Bloc were asynclironic. At the time of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, the repeated Polish events and in 1968, die Soviets and dieir agents in the satellite countries succeeded in preventing die spread of sparks to neighbouring countries. This knowledge supported resignation, with an orientation more to survival than to active resistance.
Outwardly, die Communist Party overcame die crisis, but its viability and claim to monopoly control of society were already permanently undermined. It was much more clearly and to a larger extent perceived as die servant of a foreign power, and doubly so in Slovakia - firstly of die Soviet patron and secondly of die Prague client. If the padios and elan of die anti-fascist fighters and revolutionaries still had a certain function in die party up to 1968, it was now changed into an association, whose legitimation was an entry ticket to die political, economic, executive and even cultural elites. The purges supported the positions of die communist dogmatists and people widrout qualifications, who now took revenge for tiieir fear of losing tiieir positions. The nommiklnturn system was consistently applied. For every more important position in die administration, economy, army, science and culture, an appropriate party organ was determined, which approved candidates. The higher positions in die party, state, army and security were subject to approval by Moscow. The nomenklatura system supported cynics, or at best pragmadsts. In either case, die illusion of a revolutionary party came to an end.
The ideological problems of the communists in the period of normalization were insurmountable. They already retreated from the original idea of world revolution after the war, at least outwardly. In 1960, diey declared Czechoslovakia a socialist state. According to die doctrines, die building of a communist society had to follow. In 1961,
President Novotny actually declared Irom the platform of a congress in Moscow, that the present generation would live in communism. The opening of windows to the World uncompromisingly pushed the idea of a communist society to the place of its birth: the region of Utopias. After 1968, communism was no longer considered, written or spoken of. The programme documents of Communist Party congresses spokeonly of "building a socialist society", a "developed socialist society" or "real socialism". When formulating aims and the means to achieve diem, there was also the problem that after 196S die normalization regime rejected the concept of "reform" in itself, and allowed only "further perfecting" of the already existing more or less perfect state. This suppressed any substantial movement, or die solution of old problems and die new ones brought by the rapidly changing economic and international situation of the seventies and eighties.
The closed Soviet Bloc with its own system of prices and commercial relations protected Czechoslovakia against the oil shock of die seventies, but also continued die wasting of energy, raw materials and human labour. The most modem areas - electronics, bio-technology and information technology - were neglected as well as being hindered by die Western embargo on die export of the latest technology to the countries of the Soviet Bloc. The industrialization of Slovakia still continued, but mostly by the development of metal production, heavy chemicals, and as in the preceding decades consumer goods with a range and quality intended mainly for the Eastern market. The specialization of production in the framework of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (COMECON) progressed relatively successfully. Mass production of hydraulic equipment, anti-friction bearings, construction machinery, lorries, some types of weapon, especially cannons, munitions, tanks, armoured vehicles and some chemicals was developed.
4.5. The Crisis and Fall of the Communist Dictatorship
In the mid eighties, the number employed in industry in Slovakia exceeded 800,000. By the end of die eighties, international agreements about arms limitation already signalized the weakening of die boom. However, die dynamic of die economy was still sufficient to maintain a satisfactory standard of living by eastern standards, with drawing on reserves and limitation of investment in modernization. In fact die gap in productivity and consumption, compared witii Western Europe, was constantly widening. The basis of die ideology and propaganda of die regime was no longer die social Utopia of communism, but "social security": secure employment, free health care and education, cheap housing and subsidized basic foods. The rising new middle class added to tiiis a car, recreation cottage or garden and holidays by die sea in "socialist countries". Apart from the satisfactions of power, the higher nomenklatura had dieir own recreation and health facilities, die right to buy imported goods in special shops and otiier privileges. A regime structured like this was not capable of more dynamic development, and in die historical conditions of the time, tiiis meant an ever greater backwardness compared to Western Europe, but it was not unbearable enough to stimulate any radical disturbances, such as occurred periodically at tiiis time in die factories and cities of neighbouring Poland.
If we can use the terminology used for the years of the Second World War, disagreement widi die regime took the form of distancing or non-identification. This did not exclude formal participation in the "ceremonies" of die regime, such as May Dav processions, formal membership of mass organizations or even of the Communist Party.
.■1 C<'Wai.7-: ffJSTORV OF sixmm
The regime understood that this attitude did not threaten it. It already did not need enthusiastic support, after the renewal of all the legal power and ideological instruments. However, die camp of "distance", probably including die majority of society, was important at the moment, when die regime lost its stability, and space opened for groups, which unambiguously rejected die regime for various reasons.
In 1968, some of the limitations on die activities of the churches were moderated, and deported members of religious orders returned to Slovakia from die Czech Republic. However, the regime still suppressed free activity of the churches. In the years 1968-1988, more tiian 70 priests and lay people were imprisoned for violation of the restrictions or distributing religious literature. By preventing die appointment of bishops, die state attempted to paralyze die functioning of the Catiiolic Church, the largest in Slovakia. Pilgrimages, in which hundreds of Oiousands of people participated each year, helped die mobilization of the faithful. The structures of the "secret Church" were connected to each oUier and to foreign countries. Cadiolic dissent had die best constructed structure for the publication and distribution of an illegal press. On 25tii March 19SS, it also organized die most important act of resistance of the whole twenty year period: die so-called "candle demonstration" by believers in Bratislava, in support of freedom of die Church.
Civil dissent had the form of circles and groups of like thinking, without a hierarchical form or permanent organization. Discussions and criticism of the regime were reflected in illegal periodicals, such as Kontnkt and Fragment K, in samizdat analyses of the regime, such as the works of Milan Simecka and Miroslav Kusy, in contributions to publications abroad by exiles, or to Radio Free Europe. In the period of Soviet "perestrojka", leftist groups also became active, but tiiere was no substantial movement witiiin die party, similar to die initiatives of 1968. Communism was ideologically dead. A great number and variety of informal groups of young people, artists or "islands of positive deviation" existed. The regime rejected or at least ignored tiiem. Organizations and groups of defenders of nature were active. Their illegal publication Bmtislrtua mthlns (Bratislava Aloud), revealing die catastrophic state of die environment kept secret by die regime, had a great response, not only for its content, but as an appeal for die end of inactivity. Events in neighbouring Poland had great importance for all tiiese movements, including Catholic dissent. The Solidarity movement aroused sympafliy, but its suppression by a military dictatorship again confirmed die limits of reform in die communist power bloc.
Actions against the regime were isolated, unpleasant for die state power, but not dangerous. Until 1988, dissent in Czechoslovakia was mainly of moral importance. The situation began to change in 1988. Large demonstrations in Prague on the twentietii anniversary of the 1968 occupation, tiien in October on die anniversary of the origin of Czechoslovakia, were followed in January 1989 by die so-called Palach Week, a series of demonstrations for die twentietii anniversary of die student Jan Palach burning himself, in protest against die occupation. Especially young people with no experience of the communist regime of die fifties, were not frightened by arrest and intimidation. The fall of die communist dictatorships in neighbouring Poland and Hungary, and the mass flight of citizens of die German Democratic Republic to die West through Czechoslovakia and Hungary, accelerated development. Every week brought new events. A group of Slovak dissidents informed the autiiorides of tileir intention to lay wreatiies in Bratislava, in the places where civilians were shot by Soviet troops in August 1968. They were
immediately arrested. In November Jan Cimogurskv was put on trial, but demonstrations outside the court building were soon replaced bv even larger actions.
On 16th November, the eve of International Students' Dav, students peacefully demonstrated in Bratislava, On the next dav, 17th November, a procession of students in Prague was brutally broken up by police. On the next day, students and actors agreed on a week long protest strike. Students and theatres throughout the state gradually joined it. On 19th November, Civic Forum was formed in Prague, to coordinate activities for a change of regime. A similar centre Veřejnost''-proti násilni (Public Against Violence) was formed in Bratislava at the Artists' Club. Public Against Violence closely co-operated with die Hungarian Independent Initiative. Regular evening assemblies of tens of diousands of people began on squares. They formulated die basic demands: die end of the Communist Party's monopoly of power, free elections.
Weak attempts by die government to paralyse die movement were unsuccessful. Without Soviet support, the communists were puzzled and confused. The successful general strike throughout Czechoslovakia on 27th November was a decisive factor. The government had to begin dialogue with Civic Forum and Public Against Violence and gradually give up positions. Alexander Dubcek was coopted as a member of the National Assembly in Prague and elected its chairman. A federal government of "national understanding" was formed, with a division of power between communists and revolutionaries. Similar changes were also carried out in Bratislava. The compromised Soviet agent Viliam Salgovič was replaced at die head of the Slovak National Council by the more acceptable pragmatic communist Rudolf Schuster, while Milan Cič the communist minister of justice became prime minister. The new Slovak government included 6 communists and 9 non party members. President Gustav Husák, who had lived in powerless isolation after losing the position of first secretary of the party in 19S7, resigned, and on 30tii December the Federal Assembly of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic elected die most significant and internationally known Czechoslovak dissident, the dramatist Václav Havel as president.
In six weeks the whole structure of tile dictatorship, built up and maintained over 41 years, collapsed. It fell without shedding of blood, as a result of peaceful but intensive pressure. Therefore this event received die name "velvet" or "gentle" revolution. The regime gave up die instruments of power it still held. By enabling a transition to new political and economic structures, die communist elites gave up resistance, especially since the main guarantor of their government, die Soviet Union was not willing to help diem effectively. November revealed dieir true character, as governors for a foreign power. That is, the peaceful change of regime was enabled above all by the defeat of die Soviet Union in die Cold War, and its loss of the position of a super-power.
As a result of the overtiirowing of Soviet hegemony, die Czechoslovak Republic and witiiin it Slovakia were on die side of die victors, but as part of die Soviet Bloc, with its deformed economy, social structure and political culture, they were also among the defeated. November 1989 opened a space for overcoming this historical dilemma.
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a concise history of slovakia
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General strike, 27th November 19S9
5.   From Czechoslovakia to the Slovak Republic 5.1. The Three Strategic Transformations after 1989
After 1989, society had to solve three great and urgent tasks: firstly to create a pluralist democratic system in place of die communist dictatorship, secondly to reconstruct die directively planned economy on a market basis, and tliirdly to solve die constitutional position of Slovakia in die republic and its place in Europe. In modified form tiiey also continued after die formation of die Slovak Republic in 1993. Since the first post-revolutionary days, various views, conceptions and interests have been applied to die mediod and speed of solving tiiese problems. In die conditions of an emerging democracy, diey already received institutionalized form, becoming die basis for new political parties. After decades of political immobility, die confrontation of views became part of everyday life.
The international conditions of die nineties were favourable. The defeat of the Soviet Union in die Cold War crippled its possibilities to intervene in developments in Central Europe. The Warsaw Pact disappeared, and in June 1991 the last Soviet units left die territory of Czecho-Slovakia. On 24tii August 1991, Ukraine became independent. Instead of die Soviet Union, with its global geopolitical interests, Slovakia gained a neighbour which is endeavouring to become part of die Central European and European context.
"Return to Europe" was one of the most wide-spread post-revolutionary slogans. Not only the renewal of traditional values, but also inclusion in die integration processes,
which had been developed in Western Europe since the end of the Second World War, was understood by this. Entry to the European Community, after 1992 the European Union, was officially established as the aim of the post-revolutionary Czecho-Slovak or Slovak government, although it was clear tiiat it would require many years of preparation. A second priority aim of foreign policy was entry to the North Atlantic Pact, which was clearly the most reliable guarantee against an attempt to renew Soviet hegemony or other threats to political stability in the region.
After the revolution, great hopes were also placed in the so-called Visegrád Three, named after die place of signing of a co-operation agreement between the presidents of Czecho-Slovakia, Poland and Hungary. However, this group of three, or after the independence of Slovakia, four, fell victim to the lack of interest of its signatories, which gave priority to an individual race into the already established Western European integration structures.
The economic situation was very complicated and unpleasant for the majority of the population. From 1990 to 1993, Slovakia like otíier post-communist countries, underwent a severe economic crisis. At 1990 prices, industrial production fell from 276.1 billion crowns in 1989 to 186.9 billion crowns in 1993. The output of the construction industry declined from 46.9 billion crowns to 22 billion, agricultural production fell by a third, road transport to 1/3 and rail transport to 1/2 of the pre-crisis levels. The gross domestic product fell to 74% of its previous level, household consumption was reduced by a third, and real wages in 1993 reached only 72.S% of their level in 1989. Rapid inflation devalued savings, changes in the structure of prices to the disadvantage of basic foods had an especially bad effect on pensioners, families with children and socially weak groups.
A new and shocking phenomenon, already unknown for several generations, was mass unemployment. In 1990, 39,603 people were registered as unemployed, and in 1993 already ten times as many: 368,095. High unemployment continued, by the end of the nineties approaching 500,000 or 20% of die workforce.
The main cause of die crisis was the disintegration of traditional markets, changes of ownership relations and the transition to die market mechanism, for which conditions were only gradually created. The countries of the former Soviet Union were much more deeply affected by the crisis tiian Czecho-Slovakia and for longer, so many engineering, metallurgical and electro-technical enterprises, and especially producers of textiles, clodies, furniture, glass and food products lost their market. It was possible to partially replace die disintegrating and unreliable post-Soviet markets, by reorientation to markets in countries with developed market economies, but only at die price of great sacrifices. However, this was done relatively quickly, and the income from Western markets made it possible to pay for Russian raw materials and energy.
The opening of die market to foreign imports affected many enterprises. It led to the decline and liquidation of various electro-technical and engineering enterprises. The decline of domestic consumption was reflected in die production of meat, milk, clodies and shoes. The catastrophic fall in construction of flats from 33,437 in 1989 to 3,093 in 1995 was reflected in the production of building materials, machinery, fittings, furniture, building textiles and a halving in the number of construction workers.
The decline of die armaments industry, which employed about a tenth of die industrial work force at the end of the eighties, was an important and for many regions fateful factor in die crisis. The decline in international tension already led to marketing difficulties in the eighties. After the signing of international arms control agreements, production
■\ CONCISE HISTORY Of SLOVAKIA
of weapons already halved bv J 989, and in the following years it: fell to only a fraction of its level during the Cold War. The crisis of the armaments enterprises was further deepened by the disintegration of the market for their non-military products: construction and agricultural machines, transport equipment, hydraulic equipment, cast and forged products, for which it was difficult to find a market in the West.
At the same time as the reorientation of foreign trade, it was necessary to build up a network of modern banks, insurance companies, a stock exchange, to work out dozens of economic laws, liquidate the state monopoly on foreign trade, introduce a new tax system and a convertible currency. However, die most important post-revolutionary reform of all was the renewal of private ownership.
The first step was die restitution of property confiscated or nationalized after February 1948. Houses, companies, businesses, fields and woods were returned to the original owners or dieir heirs, if fliey were Czechoslovak citizens. Restitution effected large factories and estates only to a small extent, since these were mostly taken from dieir original owners in 1945.
The privatization of property, which could not be returned to its original owners, started from die assumption that a private entrepreneur is more able to administer property tiian an anonymous "state". Property destined for privatization was concentrated in the National Property Fund. In the so-called first wave of privatization, shops, small businesses, pubs and workshops were sold by auction. In this way, most of die retail trade was already in private hands by 1991-1992. In 1992-1994, die so-called second wave of privatization dealt with property wortii several hundred billion crowns, including factories, estates, wholesale and transport companies and hotels. The majority of property in this wave was privatized by the so-called coupon mctfiod, first applied in Czecho-Slovakia and later used in modified form in otiier post-communist countries. Every adult citizen could buy a coupon book for 1000 Kčs. This en tided him to 20 applications to participate in die privatization of particular companies, or die right to use his coupons by means of privatization investment funds established by banks and private entrepreneurs. The investment funds did not always prove to be responsible administrators of die property diey acquired, as die creators of coupon privatization had assumed. They used a considerable amount of die resources entrusted to diem in speculation, and much was simply stolen. Elements of corruption and mafia practices already appeared during die auctions of smaller businesses, and increased as die amount of privatized property grew. After die independence of Slovakia, precisely die obviously unclean speculation of die investment funds made it easier for die government to stop die already started second round of coupon privatization and replace it with a different method.
For more tiian half a year, up to die elections of Sth-9di June 1990, governments of "national understanding" governed in Czecho-Slovakia and Slovakia. The federal government was headed by a Slovak former communist Marian Calfa, while die premier of die Slovak government was also a representative of die previous regime Milan Cič. The strongest political grouping in die Czech Republic was die broad anti-conmiunist coalition Civic Forum, and in Slovakia, Public Against Violence. New political parties with various views on overcoming die past, on die extent, depth and speed of change, soon began to form within and outside these movements. Traditions, national and confessional interests were also important, as were also purely personal ambitions, which have greater influence on the political scene in transitional periods, than in peaceful times.
In the 1990 elections, seven from the several dozen Slovak parties received the number of votes necessary to win seats in parliament. Public Against Violence (VPN) received 29.3%, the Christian Democrat Movement (KDH) 19.2%» the Slovak National Party (SNS) 13.9%, the coalition of Hungarian parties Coexistence and the Magyar Christian Democrat Movement 8.7%, the Democratic Party (DS) 4.4% and the Green Party 3.5%. These elections were really a sort of plebiscite for or against the preceding regime. The Communist Party of Slovakia received only 13.3% of the votes, in spite of the first steps towards internal changes into a party of social democratic type. Its position was also weakened by die screening act of 1991, which excluded die top rank of the nomenclature of die Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and registered agents of the State Security Service from important functions for five years.
A true image of the new political structure of Slovakia came only with the parliamentary elections of June 1992, when die citizens already had more experience of die democratic system, and die political parties had better constructed structures and a longer time to propagate their views and conceptions, as well as more striking political personalities.
Public Against Violence, the leadership of which was mostly liberally oriented and which did not behave very vigorously over constitutional questions, was not able to transform itself into a full-blooded political party. As the Civic Democratic Union, it received only 4% of the votes, while the similarly oriented Democratic Party got 3.3%. While these parties represented die right, on the left of the political spectrum the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL), the transformed Communist Party of Slovakia, kept its position with 14.7% of die votes. The Christian Democrat Movement (KDH) declined to 8.9% and the Slovak National Party (SNS) to 7.9%. The coalition of Hungarian parties maintained its position, while the Slovak Christian Democrat Movement, which had broken away from KDH failed to get into parliament. The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (H2DS), led by Vladimir Meciar, became the unambiguous winner of the elections witii 37.3% of die votes. Meciar became premier in die Slovak government.
As a member of VPN, Vladimir Meciar had already been premier of die coalition government after die elections in June 1990. After the break up of VPN in March 1991, die leader of KDH Jan Carnogursky became prime minister. HZDS went into opposition, but with tenacious agitation and die support of most of die press, it was able to win die elections in June 1992. The personality of its leader Vladimir Meciar undoubtedly contributed to die victory of HZDS, but the fact diat it was not a profiled party with a clearly defined ideology and conception, but a broad movement with space for die most varied and contradictory conceptions, was also important. It addressed a wide range of citizens, who sought a simple, direct and quick way out of the economic and social crisis. The positions on die constitutional position of Slovakia, which gradually became die key problem of political life were equally varied.
The problem of die organization of die state already appeared at die beginning of 1990, in the controversy about die name and symbol of the state. The Slovak and Czech sides agreed on the need to remove communist symbolism. The word "socialist", introduced to die name of the state in 1960, disappeared. The Slovak demand to restore die traditional symbol of the cross widi two arms on three hills, was also accepted. The Slovak demand for equal depiction of the Czech and Slovak symbols on die state shield and writing of the name of the state with a hyphen - Czecho-Slovakia instead of Czechoslovakia - met with opposition from the Czech side. The controversy was solved
WťW IIISrORY of SLOVAKIA
by compromise, bul the course oi the discussion and the emotions it evoked showed that the Czech and Slovak political elites and societies had different approaches to the organization of the state, and attached different importance to it. While dissatisfaction with the normalization form of federation prevailed in Slovakia and a "broad" federation, confederation of two states or full independence were demanded, in tlieCzeeh Republic the federation tended to be rejected as a product of occupation and views varied from a unitary centralized state to a very limited federation. A conceptionformulated by some Czech politicians avoided the national principle entirely.
In the course of 1990-1992, numerous talks were held between representatives of die Czech and Slovak national councils, die national governments and die federal audiorities, about die organization of die state. President Vaclav Havel also intervened in these talks. The talks to some extent showed a repetition of die situation in 1968, when the Czech side regarded efforts to achieve greater autonomy for Slovakia as a brake on more important tasks or as provincialism, while the Slovak side regarded it as an essential part of die real democratization of the state. The liberally oriented forces in Slovakia also underestimated the strength and unstopability of die emancipation process, so that in the end, the problem entirely escaped from their influence. The situation in inter-war Czechoslovakia was repeated to some extent. While KDH and SDL attempted to widen Slovak autonomy as far as possible in the framework of the common state, in HZDS views shifted from the original federalism to confederation and finally to an independent state, which was originally supported only by SNS and some Christian Democrat politicians. Attempts at agreement on the basis of a confederation of two states similar to Austria-Hungary were unambiguously rejected by die Czech right. Part of the Czech political elite decided on separation. The results of the elections in June 1992 strengtiiened the tendency towards separation. The right wing Civic Democratic Party won in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia HZDS, perceived in die Czech environment as a leftist populist movement.
Long-term tendencies and short-term interests overlapped in die positions of die Czech and Slovak elites. On the Slovak side, Uiere was the undoubted progress of Slovak society since the moment of die origin of the common state in 1918, but which was not sufficiently expressed in tile organization of die state. Czech society did not perceive tiiis, and if it did, it underestimated or rejected it. The short-term factors were different ideas about the method and pace of transformation, formulated by die strong and well organized Czech right, headed by the federal minister of finance Vaclav Klaus. After the 1992 elections, he became prime minister of die Czech Republic. Since, up to this time the Czech political elite had regarded the existence of Czech national organs only as an inconvenient concession to die federation required by die Slovaks, this was a signal of approaching separation.
The Czech right expected from the separation easier and faster transformation of die economy, without the burden of die Slovak armaments factories and excessively eastward oriented industry. It regarded the creation of a barrier against die disturbed Balkans and die disintegrating Soviet Union as an advantage. The problems with the Hungarian minority and the international dispute with Hungary about the Gabcfkovo-Nagymaros water works on the Danube, were also inconvenient. The main Czech geopolitical aim: quick accession to die European Union and NATO, would be easier without Slovakia.
Altiiough the majority of die public in botii republics expressed support for preserving the common state, the endless and untransparent disputes, proposals and counter-
;/ sissva; i \ in the 2dth century
301
Voting for the break ap of Czechoslovakia in the Federal Assembly
proposals evoked weariness and recognition that the positions of the two sides were difficult to reconcile. On 17th July 1992, the Slovak National Council proclaimed die Declaration on the Sovereignty of Slovakia. Work was accelerated on the preparation of a Slovak constitution, which was conceived so that it could become the basic law of an independent state. The constitution was adopted by the Slovak National Council on 1st September 1992 and ceremonially signed in Bratislava Castie. The breakup of die Czechoslovak Federal Republic was already only a technical matter. On 29tii October, die prime' ministers Meciar and Klaus signed an agreement on the future relations between the Slovak Republic and die Czech Republic, die method of division of property was agreed, and finally on 25tii November, die Federal Assembly declared the dissolution of die federation witii a small majority. This opened the way to the peaceful origin of two independent republics. On 31st December 1992, die 74 year existence of the Czechoslovak Republic ended. Both states became its legal successors, the political and ideological heirs of die whole of its history, its successes and failures.
5.2. The Slovak Republic
After die origin of the Slovak Republic, it was necessary to rapidly construct die complete structure of die state administration. The Slovak National Council became a full blooded parliament and was renamed the National Council of the Slovak Republic. The government headed by Vladimír Mečiar, formed as a result of die June 1992 elections, continued its work. The ministries were supplemented, and several new ones established, for example the Ministry of Defence. In February 1993, Michal Kováč was elected president.
The division of the property of Czecho-Slovakia was agreed on the basis of the proportions of die population 2:1, and occurred rapidly, although it was quite complicated in some areas, for example in the division of the property of the army, embassies abroad and the main transport systems. The Czech side had' the advantage tiiat it already
3()2 A CONCISF HISTORY OF SLOVAKIA
The acceptance of the Slovak Republic as a member of the United Nations, 19lh January 1993
controlled die economic centre in Prague, and had prepared for die separation in advance. Some controversial questions, especially bank debts and the problem of Slovak gold deposited in Prague, were solved only in 2000, but they did not create insurmountable barriers for relations between die two states. Separate Slovak and Czech currencies were created, but a customs union facilitated die preservation of a high level of mutual trade.
In comparison with the situation in the territories of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, die metiiod and course of the origin of the two independent republics and their mutual relations, was so very different, that it was accepted widiout problems by the international community. After the "velvet" revolution, die "velvet" separation provided Slovakia, which was little known abroad, with valuable political capital.
The Slovak Republic was immediately recognized by all die neighbouring countries, and die decisive, most influential states. As die successor of Czechoslovakia, the Slovak Republic became widiout problems a member of many international organizations, including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the International Monetary Fund and die World Bank. On 19th January 1993, the Slovak Republic was already accepted as die 180 th state in die UN, and in July 1993, it became a member of die Council of Europe. In October 1993, an agreement was signed on die association of die Slovak Republic widi the European Union, starting from February 1995, and in 1995, Slovakia became a participant in the project Partnership for Peace, which to some extent replaced die still distant accession of some post-communist countries to NATO. Relations with Hungary, burdened by the disputes about die Gabcikovo-Nagymaros water works, which had to be solved by die International Court in die Hague, received a new framework, by the signing of an agreement between the two states in March 1995 in Paris. The international recognition of Slovakia is also illustrated by the participation of a Slovak engineering battalion in peace keeping in die territory of farmer Yugoslavia, already in 1993.
The economic situation was still complicated. The crisis reached its lowest point in 1993. In 1994, gross domestic product grew by 4.9%, and in the following years growth
VII SI!- }YAF!.': 1SI FFIF '0'F'il C! ;■: i I IF ; 3()3
exceeded h"<>, inflation fell from the catastrophic level of 61.2« in 1991, to 21.2% in ' 1993, and by 1997 it stabilized at around 6% each year. However, unemployment
continued to increase. By 199S, gross domestic product approached the level of 1989, but real wages were still far below this level. The bad state of the economy also had a continual influence on the state of the health service, education, culture and science. The results of the transitional period emerged here. The old mechanisms of direction and support of a centralized economy no longer functioned, and the new mechanisms appropriate to a market economy were only beginning to form. Mass unemployment [ and the liquidation of enterprises, which could not adapt to the changed conditions,
[ supported uncertainty in political thinking and culture. The search for a strong
j personality, simple solutions, alternative answers to problems in die form of nationalism
j:; and invented internal or external enemies, marked public diinking much more strongly
dian immediately after the defeat of die communist dictatorship.
At first, Vladimir Meciar's government was supported only by HZDS, and later by SNS. When groups of members of parliament left both parties, Meciar's government lost its majority in parliament and fell in March 1994. The splinter groups from HZDS and SNS formed a new party, the Democratic Union (DU), which proclaimed liberal ideas,
Jozef Moravcfk from the DU became premier in the new coalition government, I formed by representatives of the DU, KDH and SDH, and with the support of the
Hungarian parties. The government declared itself temporary, and although the mandate of parliament ended only in 1996, early elections were held in September i 1994. The HZDS used its brief period in oposition for regeneration, and it was helped
by the fact that the new government left the decisive media in its hands. In the 1994 elections, die HZDS gained 35% of the votes, the KDH 10.1%, DU 8.6%, the Hungarian' Coalition 10.2%, while SNS fell to 5.4%. The Association of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS) also got into parliament witii 7,3% of die votes. It originated as a reaction of leftist radicals to the social democrat policy of the SDL. The SDL in coalition with three other parties got 10.4% of the votes. I After long talks, Meciar succeeded in forming a government with a parliamentary
majority only in December 1994. Meciar's tiiird government was a coalition of die HZDS, SNS and ZRS, but die last party had little influence on die government. The influence of die SNS was more significant, for example, it was able to delay parliamentary ratification of die Slovak-Hungarian treaty for a year. After die origin of die independent state, die SNS directed its national edge against die Hungarian minority, and cast doubt on the Slovak Republic's effort to join the EU and NATO, although this was part of the government's programme. However, die forceful method of government, by which Vladimir Meciar decided to consolidate his position, after twice being dismissed from the position of premier in die middle of die electoral period, was suited to bodi partners of die HZDS. During die assignment of parliamentary posts in November 1994, die representatives of the opposition were placed in unimportant committees, while the coalition kept important positions and supervision of the security services exclusively in its own hands. Extensive personnel changes were made in state organs in favour of adherents of the coalition. The new administrative division of the state into 8 regions and 79 districts, introduced in 1996, was also used to strengthen the position of the government. Privatization was also put exclusively in the hands of die coalition, without any possibility of checks from outside.
-j (M
A COSiCISt. HISTORY OF SLOVAKIA
The new government rejected coupon privatization, and everybody had to be compensated with bonds worth 10,000 Sk, payable after 31.12. 2000. Most property was privatized by direct sales to selected people, who usually hid behind specially created companies. In the case of the privatization of the most lucrative factories, estates or spas, the decisive factor was connection with the government and die banks, which provided credits for the first payments. The majority of companies were sold for much less than their value. This formed a close connection between political and economic power. In the course of several years, a class holding property worth hundreds of millions or even billions of crowns was formed, mostly from the ranks of the management of enterprises and die political elite. The origin of this "class with capital" was part of the proclaimed programme of the HZDS. However, only some of these owners, created artificially on a political basis, were able to appropriately use their property, especially in the complex period of die formation of a new economic system and reorientation towards new markets. In comparison with the surrounding post-communist countries, the chosen method of privatization resulted in a very small influx of foreign capital, which could have brought resources for investment and the know-how necessary to penetrate onto the world market. Some exceptions, for example Volkswagen or Siemens, showed what a developmental element Slovakia lost in diis way.
The unfavourable political climate strengthened the reluctance of foreign investors. The position of die state in international relations worsened and the Slovak Republic came into a certain degree of isolation. The hope of an early solution to the questions of security and long-term economic prosperity with the help of accession to the EU and NATO, was gradually lost. From the end of 1994, the European Union repeatedly criticized Slovakia as an associate member, for short-comings in die application of the democratic principles of the control of state power, especially in parliamentary committees and the Slovak Information Service. Attempts to limit the rights of the Hungarian minority, and non-standard relations with the head of state, when the ruling coalition made systematic efforts, using undignified mediods, to achieve the early removal from office of President Michal Kováč, were also criticized. Non-transparent privatization also aroused fears, when even strategic companies, such as Nafta Gbely, came into unknown hands, for a fraction of dieir real value. The appointment of supporters of SNS to key posts connected with European integration, also cast doubt on die sincerity of the effort to achieve Slovakia's accession to die European structures. Some statements and activities of government representatives built up a suspicion that it had a second "Russian" card in reserve. As a result, in the years 1995-1997, the Slovak Republic, in contrast to neighbouring Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, was gradually excluded from the first group of candidates for accession to NATO and the European Union.
Apart from non-transparent privatization, corruption and political clientelism, the opposition also criticized the government for lack of a properly thought out economic policy, when living on borrowed money was hidden behind favourable macro-economic figures. Slovakia's foreign debt increased from 4.3 billion USD in 1994 to 11.9 billion in September 1998. Only part of the borrowed resources was used productively, mostly for investments with a long period of return, for example motorways. The foreign trade deficit grew rapidly, and the crisis in sensitive areas, such as health and education, deepened.
The political crisis of 1998 was manifested in the repeated failure of parliament to elect a new president, after the mandate of Míchal Kováč came to an end. The coalition attempted to improve its position for die elections, by changing die law on elections to
parliament and local councils, in a ivav which significantly disadvantaged electoral coalitions. The opposition responded by creating the parlv of the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) and the Parly of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK). The new Party of Civil Understanding (SOP), led by Rudolf Schuster, arose as a reaction to the sharpened situation on the political scene.
Six parties won more than the 5% limit in the parliamentary elections of September 1998. The HZDS remained the largest party with 27% of the votes, the SDK got 26.3%,, SDĽ 14.6%, SMK 9.1%, SNS 9% and SOP 8%. Vladimir Močiar did not succeed in forming a government, and in December 1998, Mikuláš Dzurinda's government was formed, it was formed by a coalition of four parties: the SDK, SMK, SDL and SOP. The SDK associated the KDH, DÚ and DS, and the small Social Democrat and Green parties, while the SMK originated from the union of three parties. This really broad coalition had 93 seats in parliament, in contrast to the previous government, this was a large enough majority to change the constitution. This gave it more room for manoeuvre in making decisions. The dominance of the new coalition was also shown in the local government elections in December 199S. In May 1999, Rudolf Schuster was elected president of the republic directly by the citizens.