Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2815682
1215. SLOVAKIA: IN SEARCH OF LIMITS
5
SLOVAKIA: IN SEARCH OF LIMITS
PETER SPÁČ
Historical traditions of the role of president
Slovak politics experienced a relatively turbulent period of development
prior to the introduction of the communist regime in 1948. At
this time the Slovak territory was located in various states, all with
rather divergent characteristics. e tradition of a presidential post
began with the creation of the First Czechoslovak Republic in 1918
and continues to this day. As the character and nature of the political
societies of which Slovakia was a part during the twentieth century
changed, so also did the role of the president.
e First Czechoslovak Republic originally envisaged a fairly weak
formal role for its president.is notion stemmed from a negative view
regarding the concentration of power in one pair of hands, a view that
was informed by the direct experience of the Austro-Hungarian empire
and which characterised political opinion at the time. e republic was
conceived of as parliamentary with the head of state serving a symbolic
function rather than that of a crucial political actor (Balík et al.2003: 61).
However; the reality was significantly removed from the theory,
largely due to the personality of the first president, T. G. Masaryk.
Not only did he gain stronger competencies over other bodies of
state power shortly aer his election1
, he also overstepped the formal
framework and regularly put himself into the role of a very active head
of state. An informal network of individuals allied with Masaryk, the
so-called‘Castle’(Hrad),was the clearest expression of this tendency.In
the first years of the new republic in particular, the ‘Castle’ established
1 Examples include his suspensive veto against parliament, and his power to appoint
as well as dismiss government members (see the Czechoslovak Constitution of 1920
(Ústava ČSR z roku 1920)).
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2815682
PRESIDENTS ABOVE PARTIES?122 1235. SLOVAKIA: IN SEARCH OF LIMITS
itself as something of a counterbalance to the relevant parliamentary
political parties. Masaryk’s halo of ‘President-Liberator’, widely recognised
by the public, assisted him significantly in this transformation of
the role of the president from the weak one originally intended. e
specificity of Masaryk’s position is illustrated by the fact that the constitutional
limitation stipulating that no one may hold the presidential
office for longer than two subsequent terms was not applied to him.
Indeed, Masaryk held the post four times (1918–1935), occupying it
throughout almost the entire duration of the First Republic (Heimann
2009: 67–68; Balík et al. 2003: 61–65).
e so-called Second Republic of 1938–1939 is largely irrelevant
to this chapter, as at that time Slovakia was already autonomous and,
within a few months it gained independence. e same cannot be said
of subsequent developments, however.What has been described as the
Wartime Slovak State (1939–1945) introduced an entirely different
concept of the president’s role. is was a non-democratic regime with
a firmly established leading position associated with the only permitted
party: Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party (Hlinkova slovenská ľudová
strana, HSĽS). e president (the office was occupied by J. Tiso for the
duration of the state) was also HSĽS leader, thus embodying the role of
central political actor,both in formal and real terms.e regime gradually
transformed itself and, following an initial period, an attempt was
made to shi it towards totalitarianism. is further underlined Tiso’s
role,as reflected in the fact that he was officially entitled Führer (Vodca)
from October 1942 onwards (Kopeček 2006: 92)2
. In domestic politics,
he faced no equal opponent, but this must be put into context, as the
Slovak State fully conformed to the ideas of Nazi Germany.
When World War II ended Czechoslovakia was restored as the socalled
ird Republic (1945–1948).Although formally this represented
a continuation of pre-war developments, its realities were entirely dif-
ferent3
. e presidential office was occupied by E. Beneš, whose mandate
was viewed as a continuation of his term during the First Republic
and his time in exile. ere was then something of a parallel between
his position and that of T. G. Masaryk, and it was widely perceived
2 e description of the Slovak state as ‘Tiso’s regime’ testifies to the key role Tiso
played as its president (Cf. Heimann 2009: 115).
3 Legal acts following the Munich Agreement were declared null and void.
as such: both were personalities whose contributions to the establishment
and renewal of the republic respectively were undeniable. Both
approached their constitutional roles in an activist fashion. Beneš had
the power to rule by decree and used this fairly extensively in political
and, especially, economic spheres.As president, Beneš was a key political
actor in 1945, but in later years the balance of power shied to the
gradually strengthening communist party (Balík 2002).
In summary, Slovak politics in the twentieth century was mostly
marked by strong presidencies, whether the formal framework granted
them wide competencies or not. e influence of these historical legacies
is highly problematic, however. e non-democratic, and at times
even totalitarian, nature of the wartime Slovak State precluded the
possibility of this state serving as a consensually accepted model for
contemporary politics. Although part of today’s polity is somewhat
sympathetic to this model generally speaking it is contradictory and
divisive (Bútorová – Gyárfášová 2008: 246–247). Similar objections
apply to the short post-1945 period, during which democracy was also
strongly violated.
Although the First Republic also had its deficiencies, in comparison
with what followed it can be considered a fully-fledged democratic
system. Contemporary Slovak politics draws almost no inspiration
from it. e idea of Czechoslovakism and the artificial creation of the
Czechoslovak nation not only did not lead to the proclaimed unity of
the common state, in fact it had almost the reverse effect. roughout
the First Republic, the Slovak polity kept its distance from the centre
in Prague; it featured an independent party subsystem and gradually
stepped up its demands for autonomy. Reservations about the First Republic
were transferred into post-1989 Slovak politics; indeed, there is
no mention whatsoever of this tradition in the preamble of the Slovak
constitution4
. Symbolically, this is apparent from the lukewarm remembrances
of the First Republic on its anniversaries. us, while it is
true that although the period preceding the communist regime (which
itself lasted for more than forty years) did provide sufficient political
4 Whereas the preamble of the Czech constitution refers to the Czechoslovak tradition,
in the Slovak constitution such reference is entirely omitted, though the document
alludes to a more distant past.See the Czech and Slovak constitutions (Ústava ČR and
Ústava SR).
PRESIDENTS ABOVE PARTIES?124 1255. SLOVAKIA: IN SEARCH OF LIMITS
traditions that could have determined the role of the Slovak president,
its actual influence and legacy have been fairly negligible.
The formal position of the Slovak president
e transition to a democratic regime in post-1989 Czechoslovakia
meant profound changes to the country’s political system. Many of the
mechanisms that had been employed under the communist leadership
were not established to support real competition and could only operate
because all power was executed using a top down approach5
. As
such, the political framework in place was incompatible with the democratic
system, and various changes had to be made to support the formalising
and democratisation of politics, including the removal of the
clause concerning the Communist Party’s leading role in society from
the constitution. ese changes resulted in Czechoslovakia’s adoption
of a parliamentary model of governance, which was preserved by both
successor states when the federation was dismantled6
.
e fundamentals of the contemporary political system in Slovakia
are as follows: Legislative power is vested in the proportionally elected
unicameral National Council of the Slovak Republic consisting of
150 MPs. Executive power is divided between the president and the
government,and the latter clearly has the upper hand.With his competencies,
the Slovak head of state is among the weaker presidents in the
world. Although his role is not limited to ceremonial and representative
functions,he is not a key political actor.Specific points of his remit
have only gradually been enshrined in the constitution.
5 e so-called zákaz majorizácie is a typical example. is was a parliamentary
mechanism that prevented the adoption of certain measures unless agreement was
reached from both Czech and Slovak MPs in sufficient numbers.
6 As Karen Henderson (2002) implies, several of these mechanisms from the communist
era played a supportive role in the process of division of Czechoslovakia. e
above mentioned zákaz majorizácie proved its incompatibility with the post 1989
period very shortly as it led to the so called hyphen war where Czechs and Slovaks
argued about the new official name of the federation. Apart from that, Henderson
points out that similar negative consequences were connected with the differing perceptions
of the role of national councils by both nations or by the fact that Czechs
did not fully understand the need of Slovaks to stress their otherness. According to
her, these problems contributed to the final collapse of the federation.
e Slovak president is elected for a five year term which is about
the European average. Although he has various powers, what matters
here in terms of the political sciences are his relationships with other
branches of state power. In his relationship with the government he
is limited to only matters related to personnel: he appoints the prime
minister and removes him from office, and, on his suggestion, also
appoints other members of the government. Originally the president
was not bound by the prime minister’s proposals (see below for more
details), but since constitutional changes were made in 1999 he has
simply become an executor of the prime minister’s will in this regard.
He cannot therefore significantly affect the workings of the government,
although he can attend its meetings7
. His position vis-à-vis the
parliament is similarly weak. He is not among the bodies which can
propose new laws; he does, however, have a suspensive veto, which the
National Council can override if it has an absolute majority of all MPs.
He can likewise appear in parliament with an address evaluating the
running of the state. Moreover, the president can dissolve the National
Council; although this only applies under strictly limited conditions.
His main competency towards the judiciary consists in appointing
judges (see Ústava SR).
e manner in which the Slovak president is elected is important.
Originally he was elected indirectly by the National Council, and
a constitutional majority of 90 MPs was needed.is mechanism failed
in practice, as significant polarisation of the party spectrum in the second
half of the 1990s made it impossible to elect the head of state in
parliament8
. e parliamentary opposition responded by proposing
a constitutional law, and when that failed, initiated a referendum on
the issue of the direct election of the president; this was subsequently
foiled (Michalič 1997).Circumstances only changed following the 1998
election. Having achieved a constitutional majority, the government
7 Real developments have revealed shortcomings of the Slovak constitution in this
respect. e document did not envisage the possibility that an already established
government would not be given confidence by the National Council, which is precisely
what happened to Radičová’s cabinet in 2011. An ad hoc solution was adopted
whereby the president obtained a certain supervisory power over such a cabinet. See
below for more details.
8 For over a year, beginning in March 1998, Slovakia was without an elected head of
state.
PRESIDENTS ABOVE PARTIES?126 1275. SLOVAKIA: IN SEARCH OF LIMITS
coalition was able to push for direct election through parliament.
Today the Slovak president is elected by the citizens in a two round
system combining absolute and simple majorities. If no candidate obtains
an absolute majority of votes in the first round9
,a second round is
held in which the two most successful candidates from the first round
compete. e candidate who wins the most votes in the second round
becomes the president.
Together with the transition to the direct election, the procedure for
removing a president from office was also altered. It is now possible to
do so by popular vote which is set in motion by a parliamentary resolution
passed by the votes of at least 90 MPs. If the absolute majority of
eligible voters favour removing the president from office in the popular
vote, his term ends; otherwise, he dissolves the National Council and
his term starts anew. is in fact means that the Slovak constitution
considers a president who has withstood his attempted removal from
office by popular vote to be essentially re-elected. is is problematic,
as Slovak referenda have shown that majority turnout is very unlikely
except for parliamentary and local elections10
. Just as the president is
limited in his abilities to dissolve parliament, so there are also strong
obstacles to his removal from office.
Although direct election is more typical of semi-presidential and
presidential systems, its introduction in Slovakia was not followed by
a substantial strengthening of the president’s competencies. Indeed,
precisely the opposite happened: his remit as set out in the constitution
was narrowed in some areas. e original constitution did not require
the countersignature of any documents, and so multiple authorities,
such as the appointment of diplomats or the office of commander-inchief
of the army, were placed fully in the hands of the president. e
amended constitution from 1999 significantly altered this, and many
actions of the president now require countersignature of a government
minister. In this way, responsibility for the implementation of
his actions was shied onto the cabinet. On the other hand, in 2001
the president obtained the power to appoint various positions, both
judges at various levels and the Attorney General. In these areas his
obligation to follow the will of the bodies which propose the individuals
for these positions is less strict than when appointing government
ministers11
.
Another important indicator of the position enjoyed by the head
of state is the fact that he cannot directly address citizens by initiating
referenda.Although it is true that he is the only authority who can call
a plebiscite, a vote in parliament or a popular petition is first required.
e president’s role is limited to evaluating whether the motion fulfils
the legal requirements and deciding whether the referendum will be
called or not (Spáč 2010: 187–189). e constitution therefore does not
provide the president with a direct link to society that would ‘circumvent’
other state authorities.
In summary, the institutional standing of the Slovak head of state
has undergone some development since 1993. Following the introduction
of the direct presidential election, his position was altered
in several respects, but there is no clear tendency towards either the
strengthening or weakening of his position. Generally speaking, the
present legislation puts the holder of the highest state office in the position
of a non-partisan authority, and does not explicitly consider him
a primary political actor at the same level as the government or the
National Council. However, following substantial amendments around
the year 2000, the constitution now contains multiple vague formulations,
especially concerning powers to appoint, which potentially provide
the holders of the presidential office with space in which to realise9 e unclear definition of ‘absolute majority’ (nadpolovičná väčšina) makes evaluation
of the first round somewhat problematic. e constitution requires ‘an absolute
majority of valid votes [cast] by those eligible to vote’ (nadpolovičnú väčšinu platných
hlasov oprávnených voličov; Article 101 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic).
On the one hand, this refers to ‘valid votes’, i.e. actual votes cast by citizens who participated
in the election; on the other, the expression ‘those eligible to vote’ focuses
our attention on all individuals who can participate in the election.
10 e only valid referendum to date was that on acceding to the EU in 2003 (cf. Sedlár
2005). e head of state can also be removed from office by the decision of the Slovak
Constitutional Court if he intentionally violates the constitution or commits high
treason. is possibility is hypothetical rather than realistic.
11 e 1999 amendment shied the wording concerning the appointment of ministers
to the imperative: on the prime minister’s suggestion, the president ‘will appoint and
dismiss’ (vymenuje a odvolá) these individuals (and does not have any choice in this
regard). e original wording ‘appoints and dismisses’ (vymenuváva a odvoláva) was
much subtler and allowed the president the choice not to appoint. It remains in the
constitution for most of the president’s other powers to appoint individuals to office,
including the Constitutional Court and the Attorney General (Cf.Constitutional Law
No. 9/1999 (ústavný zákon 9/1999 Z.z.)).
PRESIDENTS ABOVE PARTIES?128 1295. SLOVAKIA: IN SEARCH OF LIMITS
their personal ambitions. Moreover, actual developments have indeed
shown that they do not hesitate to do so.
Informal position of the Slovak president
Since the establishment of independent Slovakia, the country has had
three presidents. In 1993 Michal Kováč was elected to the post – this
was done indirectly as was the practice at that time. When his term
concluded, Slovakia was without a president for more than a year
as polarisation of the party spectrum blocked the National Council.
When the direct election system was adopted, Rudolf Schuster was
elected in 1999, having beaten the HZDS12
chairman Vladimír Mečiar
in the second round. In the next election he was replaced by Ivan
Gašparovič, the only president so far to secure re-election. Today
(2012), Gašparovič is in the third year of his mandate and, due to constitutional
constraints, he cannot stand in the next election. All three
presidents have displayed some activist tendencies vis-à-vis the Slovak
political scene.
M. Kováč stood for election as a member and a nominee of HZDS.
is party was dominant at the time and its parliamentary group
consisted of 74 MPs, which effectively precluded the possibility of
a president being elected against its will. Kováč was also supported by
other parties, namely the Slovak National Party (Slovenská národná
strana, SNS) and the Party of Democratic Le (Strana demokratickej
ľavice, SDĽ). Having successfully campaigned to win the support of
other parliamentary parties, Kováč obtained 106 votes and became
Slovakia’s first head of state (cf. Horváth 2005: 3–4).
Given Kováč’s party affiliation, a degree of loyalty towards his
mother party could be expected. is did not occur, however, and only
a few months into his term Kováč’s relations with Mečiar worsened
significantly, and matters only became further aggravated in later
years. is resulted from Kováč’s disagreement with HZDS’s principles
of semi-democratic governance; between 1993–1994 and 1998, it
overshadowed all other existing animosities and, to use Mesežnikov’s
(1997: 19) fitting expression,‘had become a constant of Slovak politics at
the time’. In the initial years of the new political system, a foundation
was thus laid for institutional conflict between the president and the
government, whereby the real power held by both components of the
executive could be demonstrated.
Kováč became the main target of the attacks mounted by Mečiar’s
governments, especially by the third Mečiar cabinet (in office
1994–1998). e head of state was gradually stripped of the powers
granted to him by law (not by the constitution) and repeatedly had the
budget of his office reduced. Several measures clearly overstepped the
boundaries of liberal democracy13
. As HZDS and its partners did not
have a constitutional majority at their disposal, they were unable to
remove Kováč from office. In 1995, the National Council passed a vote
of no confidence in the president. is was a somewhat absurd measure,
as the parliament had no authority in the constitution to do so,
and therefore this act was without any legal consequence whatsoever
(Leško 1996: 200–201).
What is significant here is how the president responded to the
conflict. e problematic nature of HZDS governance, which was difficult
to reconcile with democracy, propelled him from the position
of a neutral actor, and Kováč became a powerful critic of the Mečiar
set. His activism covered two areas in particular. Firstly, he made good
use of his right to present reports in the National Council evaluating
the country’s situation. His spring 1994 address, in which he subjected
the second, now minority, Mečiar government to scathing criticism
proved especially important14
. Kováč’s speech was instrumental in the
parliamentary opposition’s subsequent motion of no confidence in the
government, which ended the latter’s term (Kopeček 2007: 152–153).
When HZDS was re-elected to government, Kováč repeatedly made
use of this competency, but given the distribution of power in the parliament
at the time, its effect was limited.
13 One might mention here the repeated accusations made by HZDS that the president
had links with the criminal underground or that he had committed high treason. e
most severe case of intimidation was the kidnapping of the president’s son, allegedly
committed by the Slovak secret services controlled by the government (Mesežnikov
1997; Hloušek and Kopeček 2003).
14 Several MPs gradually le HZDS aer the 1992 election. is also affected Mečiar’s
later coalition partner, SNS (Kopeček 2006: 177–178).
12 HZDS is the abbreviation of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (Hnutie za
demokratické Slovensko).
PRESIDENTS ABOVE PARTIES?130 1315. SLOVAKIA: IN SEARCH OF LIMITS
e president’s approach to personal matters displayed intervention
in real politics of an altogether different kind. As described above, the
constitution originally did not oblige the president to respect the suggestions
of the prime minister in terms of appointing government ministers,and
the president’s proposals of individuals to occupy diplomatic
posts did not require countersigning. In theory, the president could
intervene in the composition of government, according to his own
will, thus potentially obtaining significant control over its function.
Despite the strongly adversarial environment, Kováč only used this
option sporadically. In 1993, for instance, he refused to appoint Ivan
Lexa to the position of minister for privatisation (Lexa was later made
the head of the secret service, and during his term the service was
at its most problematic). Similarly, in 1996 he repeatedly blocked the
appointment of HZDS vice-chairwoman, Oľga Keltošová, the country’s
Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Mesežnikov
1997: 19). It is true that in doing this, President Kováč overstepped
his role as simple executor of the prime minister’s will, and directly
interfered with the latter’s idea of who should be in the government,
how it should operate,and what the wider scope of its functions should
be. But the extent of these interventions was in fact minimal, and the
prime minister retained overall control over the make-up of the
executive.
Despite claims made by government politicians15
, the head of state
was not creating an alternative centre of power to act as a counterweight
to Mečiar’s governments. A counter-argument could be made
by pointing towards the so-called letters which Kováč regularly published
in countrywide and regional media in which he was critical of
the executive (Mesežnikov 1998: 23–24).Whilst it might seem that this
was an attempt to circumvent the established institutions and create
a direct link with the public,the true rationale for Kováč’s actions lay in
the problematic, but at the time essentially normal, situation, in which
the public media controlled by the government largely ignored the
president, who used the private media to compensate for this.
In summary: Kováč’s term was strongly marked by the conflict that
flared up between himself and the HZDS chairman and prime min-
15 Keltošová herself described Kováč’s discharge of duty as monarchist and absolutist
(Cf. Mesežnikov 1997: 19).
ister, Mečiar. Among other things, their dispute was a test of Slovak
democracy and its institutional framework. Whereas the government
used almost every opportunity to weaken the head of state and exerted
pressure in an attempt to make him stand down, he, in contrast,
acted with considerable restraint.Although the constitution at the time
would in fact have allowed the president to strengthen his position to
some degree, Michal Kováč did not make use of these opportunities.
On the contrary, he publicly supported parliamentarianism and its
central mechanisms16
.
e era of Kováč’s presidency could be framed in a wider process of
destabilization of horizontal accountability in Slovakia under the rule
of HZDS in the 90s. e party of Vladimír Mečiar made a great effort
to minimalize all potential mechanisms which could control or limit
the governments which it formed. is trend became stronger aer
the 1994 general elections and it was symbolically boosted during the
infamous parliamentary night in November 1994 when the coalition
of HZDS, SNS and ZRS occupied a sum of positions ranging from
public broadcasting to parliamentary commissions. As the coalition
had no power to remove Kováč from his post, it aimed at weakening
him even by using unlawful methods until his last days in office (cf.
Deegan-Krause 2000).
e second Slovak president, Rudolf Schuster, was directly elected
in 1999, and was the candidate of most parties in Dzurinda’s government.
He was the leader of the Party of Civic Understanding (Strana
občianskeho porozumenia, SOP), which he established before the 1998
parliamentary elections. Although the main proclaimed aim of this
project was to bridge the divide in the then polarized Slovak party
system,further development proved that Schuster used SOP mainly for
his own purposes to become the head of the state. is became quite
clear aer his election, as SOP lost its original purpose and started to
fade and disintegrate. In the 2002 general elections, the party did not
16 It cannot be said, however, that the space afforded to the president in the original
wording of the constitution would allow him to introduce semi-presidentialism.
Other elements would be needed for the emergence of this system, including public
tolerance of such a model of governance. Kováč never questioned parliamentarism,
and in evaluting the problematic state of democracy in 1990s Slovakia, he proposed
a parliamentary election as the only solution. He did not entertain the idea of changing
the position of the head of state (Cf. Mesežnikov 1997: 21).
PRESIDENTS ABOVE PARTIES?132 1335. SLOVAKIA: IN SEARCH OF LIMITS
cross the threshold17
and in 2003 it ceased to exist by merging into the
Smer party (Kopeček 2007: 272–279).
When Schuster took office, some presidential competencies were
already weakened by the amendment described above18
. In particular,
this concerned his relationships with the government and the prime
minister. On the other hand, the direct election endowed Schuster with
a stronger legitimacy, and one that was essentially independent of the
government.As subsequent events were to show, the new head of state
was well aware of this fact19
.
e pivotal moment of the Schuster presidency was his attempt to
devise a doctrine of state that would overcome the existing polarisation
of the party spectrum. Schuster’s intention was to hold roundtable
talks with the leaders of the parliamentary parties (Mesežnikov
2000: 28–29). One might wonder how successful this endeavour would
be in creating an alternative arena – effectively a substitute for the
parliament under the patronage of the president – but it is doubtful
that it could play a major role. Indeed, the president’s initiative was
not endorsed by the political parties and Schuster had no means of
making them submit to his will. e president’s attempt to become
a mediator was thus substantially relative and, objectively speaking,
can be deemed unsuccessful.
Rudolf Schuster’s somewhat activist approach was also apparent in
his relationship with his contemporary government, or rather, governments,
which were all led by Mikuláš Dzurinda during Schuster’s term.
Given that this was the environment from which Schuster himself
arose, he initially maintained a positive stance towards it, gradually
emancipating himself from the cabinet. He used multiple measures
to this end, of which the most important was his suspensive veto. Although
the constitution does not set any specific limits on its use, under
the logic of parliamentarianism it is arguably a correction mechanism
allowing the head of state to respond to significant shortcoming
in the legislative process20
. Whilst Michal Kováč acted in accordance
with this view (even when faced with conflict, he used this option only
sparingly), Schuster grasped the possibilities afforded by his right to
suspensive veto, using it widely as a way of opposing the government21
.
In 1999, he returned only three laws to the parliament, although the
number increased significantly in later years,reaching up to twenty per
year. is trend continued aer the 2002 parliamentary election when
the new Dzurinda government, now made up of only the centre-right
parties, began a large scale economic reform, oen at odds with the
stance of the head of state. In addition to the veto, Schuster frequently
appeared in parliament presenting evaluative reports which, generally,
were strongly critical of the government.
e 1999 amendment to the constitution prevented the president’s
interference in the personal make-up of the government, leaving only
one avenue open for his influence during the formation of the government.
Over and above the legal framework, a practice was established
in which, before appointing the prime minister proper, the president
entrusted a specific politician with a mandate to form the government.
is mandate has no legal standing, however. e head of state can
thus enter into the process of government formation and, to a certain
degree, complicate the position of parties whom (s)he views unfavourably.
e 2002 election provided Rudolf Schuster with such an opportunity.
Although the president let it be known in advance that in making
his choice he would favour an individual able to secure a majority
in the National Council, he broke his promise and the mandate went to
the victorious, yet isolated, HZDS (Mesežnikov 2002: 32–33). e tradition
of granting the mandate to form the government to the victor,
which was later preserved by Ivan Gašparovič can, it is true, delay the
formation of a government. But this step also exhausts the president’s
possibilities, since if he were to assert his will any further he would be
ignoring the results of the parliamentary election – an absurd consequence,
most certainly. ere is no doubt that Schuster was aware
20 According to Petr Kresák, one of the authors of the substantial amendment to the
constitution,the intention was not to involve the president significantly in the legislative
process (SME 2002).
21 During his tenure, Kováč returned 38 laws to the parliament, while Schuster returned
103 (Horváth 2005: 20).
17 SOP did not compete in the election as an independent subject, but nominated its
candidates on the list of SDĽ. is common list got only 1.36 percent votes.
18 However it has to be noted that this modification was done in a democratic and
peaceful way unlike the changes made by Mečiar’s government before 1998 which
were leading to further destabilization of the system’s horizontal accountability.
19 In 2000, Schuster criticized the public media for not affording him enough space. In
this context, he rejected comparisons with the prime minister and speaker of the parliament,
whom he described as ‘politicians’, but considered himself ‘a directly elected
independent individual’ (Mesežnikov 2000: 32).
PRESIDENTS ABOVE PARTIES?134 1355. SLOVAKIA: IN SEARCH OF LIMITS
of this, as HZDS’s mandate only lasted for five days, aer which the
former prime minister Dzurinda was entrusted with the task.
Schuster’s most noticeable intervention in his country’s politics came
in 2004, towards the end of his term. In that year, the trade unions in
conjunction with the opposition party Smer,led by Robert Fico,sought
to call a referendum to decide whether an early parliamentary election
would be held. A presidential election for which Schuster intended to
stand was also scheduled for the same year.Aer submitting their petition,
the trade unionists asked Schuster to hold both elections on the
same date, which was tantamount to them supporting his candidacy.
e head of state responded positively to this appeal, thus effectively
abandoning his non-partisanship and directly entering into political
affairs. Holding both elections on the same date would be damaging to
the government parties: by mobilising the electorate to vote for their
candidates they might also ensure the validity of a referendum which
for them was undesirable22
. Nevertheless, Schuster’s calculation failed,
as Smer supported another candidate before the election and the trade
unions simply asked the citizens to vote without citing a preference.
Rudolf Schuster eventually failed to defend his post, placing fourth in
the election (Spáč 2010: 235–237).
In comparison with his predecessor, Rudolf Schuster’s legitimacy
was of a different character, and the scope of his competencies was also
different. Schuster ultimately adhered to the formal framework, yet he
also strove to emancipate himself, as was apparent from his attempts
to establish for himself the role of mediator, or even patron, of national
politics. He also sought to influence specific political issues by criticising
the Dzurinda cabinets. As the events of 2004 were to show, these
activities were not intended to strengthen his institutional standing,
but rather to help secure his re-election.
Ivan Gašparovič is the current Slovak president. Supported by
a group of nationalist parties and Smer, he emerged victorious from
the 2004 election. is result was quite surprising because Gašparovič
finished second aer Vladimír Mečiar in the first round, and he
finished just ahead of the main favourite Eduard Kukan. In fact, all
22 In Slovakia a referendum is only valid if more than half of those eligible to vote participate.
If it is held concurrently with an election, this condition is more likely to be
met, as the referendum held on the same date as the 1998 parliamentary election has
demonstrated.
candidates of the centre-right parties, including one independent
candidate of similar ideological background, failed. For their voters,
the run-off represented a tough choice, because if they wanted to prevent
Mečiar from becoming president, they had to support his former
party vice-chairman. As a result, Gašparovič was hugely supported by
centre-right voters including the ethnic Hungarians. is completely
modified the character of his electoral support and helped him to win
(Pink and Spáč 2012: 190–193).Gašparovič managed to defend his post
in 2009 with the support of the then-dominant Smer. Iveta Radičová,
whom he defeated in this election, went on to become prime minister
(Krivý 2009). Gašparovič’s tenure has been the most controversial of
the three presidents.
Gašparovič’s terms have differed from those of his predecessors in
that there have been full government alternations, and this has undoubtedly
influenced him. His affiliation with the centre-le Smer in
particular has been apparent from his highly loyal stance towards the
Fico governments – a loyalty that has sometimes bordered on subordination.
Gašparovič has been much more critical of, and active in his
relationship with, the centre right cabinets. A reliable indicator of this
is the rate at which he has been vetoing laws.With the outgoing minority
Dzurinda government, this tendency was not so marked, but when
comparing Fico’s cabinets with the period when Radičová was prime
minister, it is very noticeable. Whereas during the years 2006–2010
Gašparovič returned approximately five percent of laws to the Smer
government, during Radičová’s tenure the rate was almost three times
higher (see Table 8).
Table 8: President Gašparovič’s use of suspensive veto
Government
(prime minister)
Term Laws passed Returned
by president
Returned
by president (in%)
Fico 2006–2010 530 28 5.28
Radičová 2010–2012 208 29 13.94
Fico 2012– 61 0 0
Source: The National Council of the Slovak Republic.
e president’s different approach has been apparent throughout his
incumbency. During Smer’s government, Gašparovič was passive and
PRESIDENTS ABOVE PARTIES?136 1375. SLOVAKIA: IN SEARCH OF LIMITS
avoided all conflict with the government and prime minister. is was
consistent with the closeness of their programmes; indeed, prior to the
2009 presidential election (SME 2009), the president likened himself to
a Smer member. In exchange for this loyalty, he has received repeated
support from Fico’s party which helped him to secure his re-election.
However, towards the centre-right parties, the head of state has assumed
a much more vigorous stance, actively entering into political
affairs.An instance of this was the liberal party’s Freedom and Solidarity
(Sloboda a solidarita, SaS) attempt to link a referendum initiated by
the party with the 2010 parliamentary election, by which SaS hoped to
improve its electoral chances, among other things. e president made
full use of the manoeuvring space granted to him by the legal framework
and, by using obstructions open to him, he efficiently eliminated
the attempt (Spáč 2010: 245–247).
Perhaps the most controversial case of the current president’s activism
concerned the choice of the Attorney General during the term of
Radičová’s government. e constitution stipulates that the Attorney
General is appointed by the president on the basis of a proposal passed
through parliament. e parliament initially voted in a secret ballot,
but the centre-right government coalition’s inability to secure the necessary
majority for its common candidate led to the subsequent adoption
of an open ballot. e coalition then managed to get its nominee
elected (Smer’s candidate failed), but Gašparovič remained passive
and, pointing out the problematic procedure of the voting, refused
to appoint the new Attorney General, thus supporting the status quo
convenient to Smer. To some degree, this situation was analogous to
1993, when Michal Kováč did not respond to Prime Minister Mečiar’s
nomination proposal. Gašparovič’s actions (or rather, his passivity)
were contested by the centre-right parties at the Constitutional Court
and the nominee himself also filed a petition. e Court issued a fairly
controversial ruling in October 2012, asking the president to act, but
also allowing him to retain his stance as long as he provided an acceptable
rationale for it (cf. Nález Ústavného súdu PL. ÚS 4/2012-77). Finally,
in January 2013, Gašparovič officially refused to appoint the candidate
selected by the parliament23
. is situation once again pointed
to the lacunae existing in the Slovak constitution, which in a range
of areas allows the head of state to intervene substantially in political
developments.
e motion of no-confidence in I. Radičová’s cabinet in 2011 was
something of a test of the Slovak political system’s institutional set-
ting24
. e constitution did not anticipate this situation and a swi
solution had to be sought. Together with Smer, the government parties
pushed through a constitutional amendment which allowed the
Radičová government to remain in office until the early election, but
only under the president’s patronage, without whose assent no important
step could be taken25
.Although it might seem that in formal terms
the president’s position was substantially strengthened by this, actual
practice did not confirm this assumption.Although,for several months,
Ivan Gašparovič held something of a supervisory position over the
government, aer the 2012 early election which returned Smer’s chairman
Fico to the prime minister’s office, the aforementioned ‘passive’
model of presidential behaviour was restored.
Why not a strong president?
e Slovak presidents thus far have not been limited to discharging
symbolic roles – there are examples of them having directly entered
into real politics.As the preceding section has shown, this activism has
typically manifested itself in the use of presidential suspensive veto as
a tool to block, or at least delay, government policy in parliament. e
occasional personal conflicts provoked by the head of state’s unwillingness
to appoint the ministers and senior civil servants proposed by
the government, and the evaluative reports on the state of the country
the parties which formed the previous government under I. Radičová, huge protests
emerged. e SaS party officially made a proposal to the parliament to accuse the
president of violating the constitution.
24 is was a vote on Slovakia’s accession to the European stability mechanism. e
prime minister connected the voting with a vote of confidence in her government, as
SaS, one of the parties in the coalition, rejected the idea of the Eurozone’s firewall.
25 e government could not negotiate international treaties, or appoint the occupants
of multiple state offices. In the Smer chairman’s description of the situation, the government’s
task until the early election would be limited to ‘keeping the heating and
lights on’ (Constitutional Law No. 356/2011; Webnoviny 2011).
23 President Gašparovič thus waited more than a year and half to make a decision
regarding the whole situation. Aer his refusal to appoint the candidate selected by
PRESIDENTS ABOVE PARTIES?138 1395. SLOVAKIA: IN SEARCH OF LIMITS
in office. Oen involved in party conflicts, they were never in the position
of actor standing against all, but were always standing against
a limited section of the party spectrum. us, disputes of the type
president vs. political parties or president vs. government and parliament
as a whole, envisaged by the model of delegative democracy proposed
by O’Donnell, have never emerged in Slovakia. In other words, the
multiple disputes between president and government that we have recorded
were not primarily conflicts between institutions, but rather involved
concrete office holders at a specific time.Michal Kováč and Ivan
Gašparovič did not argue against the government as a body of state,
but against the policies carried out under the leadership of Vladimír
Mečiar and Iveta Radičová respectively27
.
On this account we must therefore clarify and ask: what were the
real motives for the activism exhibited by Slovak presidents if, as indicated
above, they were not seeking the emancipation of their position?
e political developments thus far indicate that the primary reason
lay in their personal ambitions; namely, in their working towards reelection.
e presidential elections that have been held to date make
it abundantly clear that party support for candidates is crucial, and
the latter are obviously aware of this fact. is explains both the longterm
loyalty of Ivan Gašparovič towards Fico’s Smer, and the steps
Rudolf Schuster took in 2004 to combine the parliamentary election
and the referendum initiated by trade unions on the same date. Such
a rationale does not apply to Michal Kováč, however, and his active
approach can be explained by the strongly problematic governance of
the Mečiar cabinets during the 1990s, which required correction from
Kováč’s side.
What remains to be considered are the perspectives of the Slovak
presidency. In the past there have been discussions about formally
strengthening the post, but they were without consequence. Ivan
Gašparovič, for instance, proposed to extend the president’s term from
five to seven years, and Rudolf Schuster entertained similar notions
(Mesežnikov 2009: 35). Such discussions have recently (2012) re-arisen
27 As for the conflict between Michal Kováč and Vladimír Mečiar, if we had to label it
from the latter’s point of view, it would have some institutional background, because
HZDS, the ruling party of the 90s, wanted to destabilize the horizontal accountability
of the system in its own favor. is included the weakening of an uncooperative
president.
presented by presidents are similar in this respect.e intensity of these
interventions has varied over time; although the formal framework
laid down by the constitution was never significantly overstepped.
Despite occasional interference by the head of state, the government
keeps its prominent position within the executive branch of power.
A fundamental question is why the basic logic of parliamentary
democracy has not been violated. e most likely explanation is that
none of the Slovak presidents had behind them a strong enough political
party of which he would concurrently be the leader26
. ere was
not a single case in which a political organisation was aligned with the
head of state, providing him with significant political influence. Michal
Kováč and Ivan Gašparovič (in the case of the latter, this was especially
true in 2009) were nominated by parties in which the dominant roles
were played by their chairmen, i.e. Vladimír Mečiar and Robert Fico
respectively. Although Rudolf Schuster was elected as leader of the
SOP, the party was weak and fairly rapidly became marginal. It cannot
be said that Slovak presidents were weak or bland personalities, but
that the most motivated political leaders so far have sought the post of
prime minister and not that of president.
is supposition was also apparent in the activities of the individual
presidents. No president has effectively aimed to create an alternative
locus of power to the government. In fact, the only such attempt
consisted of the proposal of regular round-table talks suggested by
Schuster; an idea that foundered in its infancy as the political parties
rejected it outright. Normally, Slovak presidents have not sought
to act in an overarching position ‘above the parties’, and repeatedly
they have become involved in party competition. ere was a gradual
rapprochement between President Kováč and the anti-Mečiar opposition
at the time he was in office, and Kováč’s successor Schuster took
a similar step, albeit under a different political party constellation.
Ivan Gašparovič was a case in point: his political activities changed
profoundly depending on whether Smer, the party close to him, was in
government or in opposition.
is last point significantly reveals why Slovak heads of state did
not even have the potential to accrue much power during their stays
26 Here we disregard the established tradition of non-partisanship in which the elected
president typically suspends or even formally ends his party membership. Such steps
can be purely declamatory and without real consequence.
PRESIDENTS ABOVE PARTIES?140 1415. SLOVAKIA: IN SEARCH OF LIMITS
in the Smer party, and the information available does not allow us to
rule out the possibility that in 2014 the Smer chairman and current
prime minister Robert Fico will seek the highest office of state. is
is a point of fundamental importance, as Fico’s election would break
with the trend hitherto, in which the presidents were not backed up by
a strong political organisation of which they might be leader.
Currently there is no need to suppose that the combination of these
two issues, the strengthening the competencies of the head of state
and the election of a strong political leader such as Robert Fico into
this office, would lead to the gradual abandonment of the parliamentary
model and a transition towards a (semi-) presidential system.
However, this possibility must be taken into consideration. In order to
realise this model,the individual in question would have to accumulate
the majority of 90 votes in the National Council, which Smer does not
have despite its excellent election result. S/he would also have to deal
with the possible public resistance to the concentration of power into
one pair of hands28
.And it is here that the historical tradition described
at the beginning of this chapter could play a role: the only previous
regime that was not overwhelmingly ignored by Slovak politicians
and the public, and which had a powerful head of state, was fully nondemocratic
in character. And such a legacy hardly serves as a strong
foundation and inspiration for an extensive strengthening of the role
of the Slovak president.
Conclusion
Aer the demise of the Czechoslovak Federation in 1992, the position
of the Slovak president was largely formulated afresh. One of the
reasons for this was that the Slovak polity and public lacked a shared
vision of a steady historic democratic tradition upon which they might
draw.e competencies of the head of state were adjusted several times
following the establishment of independent Slovakia, and this gradu-
28 Although public approval of Smer is currently high (at around 40%) and its chairman
is very popular, such strengthening of his position might be seen as excessive
by the public. ere is no empirical ground for such speculations, however, as there
has been no discussion of (semi-) presidentialism in Slovakia thus far, and to venture
further at this stage would be absurd.
ally defined his position within the political system. As this chapter
has demonstrated, the basic idea of a relatively weak president has
remained a constant, however.
is remains true even when we take the president’s informal position
into account. ree politicians have served in this office thus far. In all
cases there were attempts to overstep the competencies as formally
defined, but this never resulted in a comprehensive strengthening of
the president’s role. e activism displayed by the individual presidents
was not caused by their attempts to seize more power, but was
largely determined by the existing political situation. Ultimately, the
presidents were not arbiters and independent political actors standing
above the parties, but formed part of the existing party rivalry.
e future of the role of Slovak president is not entirely clear. Developments
to date suggest that it will continue to be a comparatively
weak position. But the recently opened discussions regarding the possible
strengthening of his competencies might indicate a potential for
other trends to emerge as well. Ultimately the question remains open,
partly due to the fact that none of the presidents to date have had solid
political party backing. e election of a politician with such backing
might be something of a ‘litmus test’ for identifying the true potential
of the position of highest state representative in Slovakia.