




Introduction to Hungarian Foreign Policy

History of Hungarian foreign policy; instructor: András Schweitzer

1. About me... and about you



ELTE, Faculty of Social Sciences



Corvinus University



Kórházbiztosítás – drágán
Rendőrségi internetfigyelő
A Lehel piac végorái
Oroszország választások előtt
Zürs manökenvilág
Lássunk mikrochippel?



Viktor Orbán

Sevilla: újabb EU-csatlakozási ígéret 11. oldal
Lefejezett Illyés Közalapítvány 87. oldal
Magyartalanított pénzmosási feketelista 105. oldal
„Műsorváltozás” előtt az Operaház 107. oldal
A Volkswagen látványmanufaktúrája 35. oldal
Melléklet a hétköznapi környezetvédelemről 53. oldal



Péter Medgyessy



Lőrinc Mészáros



Ferenc Gyurcsány

About the course

- Subject matter: History of Hungarian foreign policy
- Methodological approach: foreign policy analysis related to the history of Hungarian political history (with comparative approach applied here and there)
- Foreign policy as connected to internal power politics, culture and identity politics...
- Foreign policy as formed by rational choice, group interests, (mis)perceptions, ideology, culture...
- Intro + 5 blocs/10 sessions + exam; assigned texts (obligatory) and recommended literature
- Active participation (think, ask, debate, compare!)
- Evaluation (pass/fail) based on a written exam of short essay questions referring to the required literature and the lectures

Requests to the audience

Please **participate** actively:

- ask questions
- add insights
- give your opinion!

This will make the course more interactive, more instructive, more interesting, and more fun.

Blocs and sessions

Bloc I. General ideas of Hungarian identity and the beginnings of Hungarian foreign policy (-1920)

1. What (and since when) is “Hungarian” foreign politics? The idea of Hungarian uniqueness, of the eternal westward travel, of being pagan, of being Turkic vs Finno-Ugric, of being Christian-European. The idea of the “1000 years kingdom”. The twin-ideas of wars of independence and compromise.

Required reading: István Deák. The revolutionary tradition in Hungary and the lessons of the 1956 struggle for independence. *Hungarian Studies*, Vol. 20 (2006), No. 1.

2. The Károlyi-government and the pacifist option. The Hungarian Soviet Republic and the idea of global Socialist revolution.

Required reading: Peter Pastor. Major trends in Hungarian foreign policy from the collapse of the monarchy to the peace treaty of Trianon. *Hungarian Studies*, Vol. 17. (2003), No. 1.

Blocs and sessions

Block II. Trianon-trauma, Conservatism, Fascism Hungarian style (1920-1945)

3. The Trianon-trauma in Hungarian national consciousness. Horthy-era: (Alternatives to) alliance with Germany.

Required reading: Pál Pritz. Hungarian foreign policy in the interwar period. *Hungarian Studies*, Vol. 17. (2003), No. 1.

4. The “swing-politics” of the Kállay government, and the (non-)option for “quitting”. Szálasi and the idea of “persistence”.

Required reading: Nándor Dreisziger. The long shadow of Trianon: Hungarian alliance policies during world war II. *Hungarian Studies*, Vol. 17. (2003), No. 1.

Blocs and sessions

Block III. Sovietization, Stalinism, revolution (1945-1956)

5. Soviet liberation or occupation? Foreign policy considerations in times of limited sovereignty.

Required reading: László Borhi. Hungary in the Soviet empire 1945-1956. *Hungarian Studies*, Vol. 20 (2006), No. 1.

6. Foreign policy implications of the 1956 revolution, the vision of a neutral Hungary.

Required reading: Csaba Békés. The 1956 Hungarian revolution and the superpowers. *Hungarian Studies*, Vol. 17 (2003), No. 1.

Blocks and sessions

Block IV. Goulash communism in the happiest barrack. Annus mirabilis and the euroatlantic integration (1956-1989)

7. János Kádár and gulash communism. Economic reform (the “happiest barrack”) and military intervention (“the reluctant ally) in 1968

Required reading: Andrew Felkay. Hungarian foreign policy in the Kádár era. *Hungarian Studies*, Vol. 17. (2003), No. 1.

8. System change, orientation change, the triple foreign policy priority, fundamental treaties, NATO- and EU-accession

Required reading: András Simonyi. Hungarian foreign policy on the threshold of the new millennium. *Hungarian Studies*, Vol. 17. (2003), No. 1.

Blocks and sessions

Block V. (April 24.) the Hungarian return of history (2010-)

9. System of National Cooperation, “eastern opening”, “Stop Brussels”, and the “peacock dance”

Required reading: András Bozóki & Dániel Hegedűs: An externally constrained hybrid regime: Hungary in the European Union. *Democratization*, Vol. 25 (2018), No. 7.

10. Summary, the problem of path dependency, future prospects for the region and Hungary.



Introduction to Hungarian Foreign Policy

Contents of Session 1

1. What is Hungarian foreign policy? What is Hungarian? What is foreign policy?
2. Pre-1918 Hungarian history
3. Since when can we talk of Hungarian foreign policy
4. Fundamental dilemmas of the Hungarian identity and foreign policy: western vs eastern; pagan vs Christian; 10 years, 100 years, 1000 years, 10000 years?
5. Recurring theme: (lost) revolutions and (false) compromises
6. István Deák: The revolutionary tradition (a comparative theory)
7. Another possible comparative narrative: the reluctant ally


Hungarian history basics



1. What is Hungarian foreign policy? What is Hungarian? What is foreign policy?



HUNGARY IN THE 11TH CENTURY



<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Land of the Duchies Gyepű / Buffer zone Boleslaw controlled land (1014-1017) Croatian lands attached by Ladislaus I of Hungary Diocesan boundaries Main trade/pilgrimage routes Orthodox monastery King's manor 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I Esztergom II Győr III Veszprém IV Pécs V Vác VI Eger VII Kalocsa-Bács VIII Csanád IX Bihar X Transylvania
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1001 Year of foundation
● Pagan rebellions

2. Pre-1918 Hungarian history



„Historical Hungary” in three parts


Austria-Hungary, 1867-1918

2. Pre-1918 Hungarian history



3. Since when can we talk of Hungarian foreign policy

Mihály Károlyi,
1875-1955



Matthias Corvinus,
1443-1490



Ferenc Rákóczi II.,
1676-1735




Lajos Kossuth,
1802-1894

5. Fundamental dilemmas of the Hungarian identity
and foreign policy: Hungarians... alone in the
World ☹️


A KÁRPÁTOKTUL LE AZ AL-DUNAIG
EGY BŐSZ ÜVÖLTÉS, EGY VAD ZIVATARI
SZÉTSZÖRT HAJÁVAL, VÉRES HOMLOKÁVAL
ÁLL A VIHARBAN MAGA A MAGYAR.



4. Fundamental dilemmas of the Hungarian identity and foreign policy: pagan vs Christian; revolutionary or 1000ys tradition



5. Recurring theme: (lost) revolutions and (false) compromises



Aladár Mód: „400 years struggle for independent Hungary”

Austria-Hungary, 1867-1918



Budapest, 1st May, 1957



6. István Deák: The revolutionary tradition... (his concept)

Hungarian revolutions (1703-1711, 1848-1849, 1918-1919, 1956)

- Grievances of the social elite (against foreign rule, for social change = national cause combined with social justice)
- Starts as a movement for reform
- Movement hijacked by people outside the social elite
- Elite begins to yearn for law and order
- Order restored by the same foreign power


7. Another narrative: The reluctant ally

- Austria-Hungary (1867-1918)
- Hungary in East-Central Europe dominated by Nazi Germany (1933-1945)
- Hungary in the Soviet orbit (1945-1989)
- Hungary in the European Union (2004-



Thank you for your attention! 😊

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
Introduction to Hungarian Foreign Policy

Contents of Session 2

1. The case for participation in the Great War
2. (How) could Austria-Hungary have been saved?
3. The Károlyi-government and the pacifist option
4. The Hungarian Soviet Republic and the idea of global Socialist revolution


1. The case for participation in the Great War

„I had a hard time deciding to recommend the war, but now I am firmly convinced of its need”



István Tisza (1861-1918) vs
Mihály Károlyi (1875-1955)

1. The case for participation in the Great War



István Tisza
(prime minister:
1903-1905,
1913-1917




Mihály
Károlyi
(prime
minister:
1918,
president:
1919



2. (How) Could (Austria-)Hungary have been saved?



The „Red Map” of Pál Teleki based on the 1910 census






Die „Vereinigten Staaten von Groß-Österreich“
nach einem Vorschlag von Aurel Popovici, 1906

● Staaten ● autonome Enklaven (größtenteils deutsch)

Archduke
Franz
Ferdinand,
Aurel
Popovici,
1906

Oszkár Jászi
(1875-1957)



Danubean United States
European United States
1918-

3. The Károlyi-government and the pacifist option

- 1918 Oct 17th. István Tisza: „We have lost this war”
- **Nov 3rd. Padua armisice agreement by Austria-Hungary**
- National Councils are formed (Slovak, Romanian, etc. Wilsonovo mesto declares independence)
- Oct 24th. **Hungarian National Council** (Independence and 48 Party (or Károlyi Party), Citoyen Radical Party, Hungarian Social Democratic Party)
- Oct. 31st. **Mihály Károlyi is prime minister**, István Tisza is assassinated

Aster or Chrysanthemum Revolution



- Nov 7th. French general Franchet d'Esperey and the Belgrade armistice (with Hungary): Hungarian civic administration to remain
- Nov. 8th. Czech(oslovak) army moves into Nagyszombat (Trnava) and Trencsény (Trenčín)
- Nov. 11th. New minister of defense (Albert Bartha instead of Béla Linder), preparations for a new Hungarian army
- Nov. 13th. Charles the IV. suspends royal powers => Nov 16th Hungarian National Council declares independent Hungarian Peoples' Republic
- Dec. 6th Albert Bartha – Milan Hodža temporary demarcation line
- Jan. 11th Mihály Károlyi is first president of Hungary (Dénes Berinkey PM)



← Az antantcsapatok hadműveletei

■ A Vix-jegyzékben
(1919. III. 20.)
kijelölt semleges
övezet

--- Antant demarkációs vonal 1918. X. 21.

— Antant demarkációs vonal 1918. XI. 13.

..... Antant demarkációs vonal 1918. XII. 23.

- - - - - A román hadsereg arcvonala 1919. I. 20-IV. 16.



..... Bartha és Hodža
megállapodásában
kijelölt demarkációs
vonal 1918. XII. 6.

Fundamental political priorities of Mihály Károlyi

- **Pacifism:** Hungary is not a successor state, not willingly at war with the entente powers, ready to make peace based on the 14 points of Wilson (point 10: self-determination of nationalities within Austria-Hungary)
- **Territorial integrity** of Hungary (ready to recognize Ukraine, Poland, Czechia, South Slav state, Austria)
- Granting minority right to nationalities, **federalization** of Hungary
- **Democracy** (electoral reform) and **social reform** (distribution of land to the peasants)

Failure of Mihály Károlyi's policies

- Pacifism of the Entente turns out to be illusory at best, 14 points does not matter much
- Entente does not recognize the new Hungarian state and its government. Supports independence movements of the neighbours and nationalities
- Territorial integrity of Hungary is violated (including the Belgrade and the Bartha- Hodža agreement). Serb, Romanian and Czech armies are moving in
- Nationalities are not content with the federalization of Hungary, want to break away (no referendums but apparent the majority)

Károlyi resigns and gives the power to the Social Democrats who join the Communist government of Béla Kun



4. The Hungarian Soviet Republic and the idea of global Socialist revolution



Fundamental political ideas of Béla Kun and the Hungarian Soviet Republic

- Hungary is not a successor state, a completely new Communist social system and government form is implemented:
- Hungary is ready to defend itself against the entente and bourgeois powers, but also ready to make peace or accept a temporary cease-fire
- There will be a world revolution, in the end the world will consist of (Communist) Soviet Republic
- Hungary's territory should be based on ethnic not historical lines
- Temporary dictatorship is needed until the social change is complete, social reform should consist of expropriation (collectivization) of latifundia and factories

Social change, with some initial support



International situation and „foreign policy”



- Red Army (should it be National Army?)
- Advance in the North...
- But the proletar dictatorship is getting more and more unpopular

Failure of the Hungarian Soviet Republic


- Military advance to the north (against the Czechoslovak army), hesitant withdrawal
- the Romanian Army is stronger, marches on toward Budapest
- No outside recognition of the Hungarian government
- No help from Soviet Russia (Lenin sends a supportive telegram to the Hungarian workers)
- Loss of internal support





Thank you for your attention! 😊

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Introduction to Hungarian Foreign Policy

Contents of Session 3.


1. The Trianon-treaty and the new Hungarian state
2. The Trianon-trauma in Hungarian national consciousness
3. (Alternatives to) alliance with Germany
4. Horthy-era revisionism: limited successes

1. The Trianon-treaty and the new Hungarian state


After the pro-Entente Mihály Károlyi and the government of the Hungarian Soviet Republic... the proudly counter-revolutionary Horthy regime was recognized by the Entente




Le Grand Trianon



June 4, 1920



2. The Trianon-trauma in Hungarian national consciousness



Trianon
quartet
16th
Jan,
1921



by
Zsigmond
Kisfaludi
Strobl



2. The Trianon-trauma in Hungarian national consciousness




Contemporary plan for the centennial



How about the „others”?

Az első világháborúban vesztes államok területi változásai



A limited victory (Burgenland)




Do not trust the flattering songs!
Vote German!



I will not leave you Western Hungary.

A limited victory



3. (Alternatives to) alliance with Germany

German territorial ambitions against Czechoslovakia (from 1933)

Lukewarm **British**
opposition to
excessive French
demands

Little Entente with
French support



Soviet territorial
ambitions against
Romania... but
ideological
constraints

Italian territorial ambitions against Yugoslavia
(the first friendship treaty with a former opponent in 1927),
„First visits” to Rome (1932-1941), 1942- to Berlin

Foreign policy ideas of governer Horthy

Stereotype way of thinking :

- Czechoslovakia is a cancer
- Romanians steel, cheat, and lie
- Croats are good ordinary sailers (matróz)
- Serbians are the best warriors of the Little Entente

Two principles:

- Anti-bolsevism
- Revisionism




Conservative governments, increasingly violent nationalism, increasingly pro-German Position (as German power rises)

National-conservative governments

Pál Teleki (1920), István Bethlen (1921-1931): „**pro-British**”, aim: „armed neutrality” (being prepared whatever the outcome of the war)

Gyula Gömbös (1932-1936), Kálmán Darányi (1936-1938), Béla Imrédi (1938-1939), ... , László Bárdossy (1941-1942): „**pro-German**” expecting gratefulness of Berlin



István Bethlen



László Bárdossy

→ Hungarian foreign policy steps (1932-1938)

1932 Gyula Gömbös prime minister – first official visit to Rome (becomes a tradition till 1942). Common topics with Italy: cooperation with independent Austria; weakening Yugoslavia by supporting Croatian (Ustasha) separatism

1933 June Gömbös to Berlin – the first official visit of a European head of gov to Hitler

1934 Diplomatic relations established with the Soviet Union (but still Hungarian coldness towards Moscow)

1936-1940 Imrédi, Darányi, Teleki governments (all tries to moderate German-orientation, but ends up going even further: cooperation with Germany, anti-Jewish legislations, etc.)

1938 Anschluss – Hungary is the first to officially congratulate

World War II timeline (Hungarian perspective)

1935 General conscription in Germany (violation of the Versailles Treaty)

1936

March: Re-militarization of Rhein-land (*Rheinlandbesetzung*; still no French, British reaction)

October: Berlin-Rome Axis formed

1938 Anschluss, München Agreement, First Vienna Award

1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, attack on Poland, refugees to Hungary

1941 Soviet Union, United States enters the war

1941 summer: Invasion of Soviet Union (and Kamenets-Podolsk)


1942 summer: the Hungarian 2nd Army goes to the front

1943 jan. Catastrophy at the Don (Voronez)

4. Horthy-era revisionism: limited successes



Horthy entering Komárom, 6 November 1938
(Photograph in Public Domain)



„Trianon” of the neighbours





First Vienna Award (1938):
South Slovakia

Hungarian initiative (1939):
Carpatho-Ukraine (from CS)



Hungarian initiative (1941):
Northern part of Voivodina
(from Serbia)

Second Vienna Award (1940):
Northern Transylvania
(from Romania)

Pál Pritz: Hungarian foreign policy in the interwar period

Aim: restoration of Saint Stephen's Hungary

Preconditions necessary:

- 1.) A relevant political force in the country
- 2.) Conducive international situation
- 3.) Former national minorities be willing to return into Saint Stephen's empire


In sum: Inevitable failure... plus foreign policy mistakes because of serious miscalculations and ideological constraints:

- not understanding the essence of fascism: raw expansionism
- not being open for cooperating with Moscow



Thank you for your attention! 😊

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Introduction to Hungarian Foreign Policy


Contents of Session 4.

1. „Hinta-politika” or „Kállay kettős” (“swing-politics”)
2. German occupation (?) / friendly assistance?
3. The (non-)option for “jumping out” (quitting)
4. Ferenc Szálasi and the idea of “persistence”
5. Soviet liberation or occupation


1. „Hinta-politika” or „Kállay kettős” (“swing-politics”)



The European war theater in 1942




Miklós Kállay (1887-1967)



Kállay kettős (of Nagykálló)

1942: Allies securing North Africa
1943: Stalingrad, Allied landing in Sicily, Italy (Pietro Badoglio government), Teheran conference



2. German occupation – no effective resistance



- March 18th, 1944 - Horthy visits the Führer in Klessheim. Hitler tells him that German troops are ready to move into Hungary as „a precautionary measure”
- Verbal resistance by Horthy... in the end gives order as governor and leader of the national army not to resist the German invasion...
- Edmund Veessenmayer , envoy of the Third Reich with full powers arrives to Budapest
- New government of Döme Sztójay appointed by Horthy („so that evil Hitler should not put the far-right Arrow Cross party to power)

2. German occupation – no effective resistance




German soldiers at the Buda Castle

„How long will it take for the German army to take Hungary?

- If there will be no resistance then it can be done in 24 hours.*
- If there will be resistance then it will only take 12 hours because then there will be no welcome speeches.”*

Victims of
„German
occupation”?



German invasion, Eichmann to
Budapest (March, 1944)
Gettoisation, deportations from
the countryside (May-June-July,
1944)



...Numerus clausus (1920), Anti-Jewish laws (1938, 1939, 1941...),
Novi Sad, Kamenets-Podolsk (1941), Jaross-lists (1944), ...”

3. The (non-)option for “quitting” – Conspiracy of the Allies?

„Secret” negotiations with the Allies (the Americans and the British) in neutral capitals: Stockholm, Bern, Lisbon, Istanbul (German plans for Operation Margarethe I is for long time ready)

László Borhi: The allies intentionally brought about German occupation of Hungary by conducting „secret” negotiations with Hungary and providing false hopes for a separate peace without any care given to the fact that the occupation of Hungary would put hundreds of thousands of Jews in mortal danger

Ferenc Laczo: Falsely blaming the Americans and the British for something that happened later and was not inevitable

Krisztián Ungváry: German occupation was the result of Soviet troops approaching the Hungarian border, not of negotiations

Miklós Horthy and the „kiugrás” (jump out)

Oct. 15th, 1944. Horthy's order and announcement: Hungary is no longer fighting against the allies. Asks cease-fire from Moscow. Only a part of the army acts on the order, the Nazis put Ferenc Szálasi in power, which Horthy sanctifies. New Arrow Cross government



Ferenc Szálasi



Béla Miklós (Dálnoki)

4. Ferenc Szálasi and the idea of “persistence”



October, 1944-
Apr, 1945

Dr. Aurel Bakody, psychiatrist, neurologist about Szálasi in 1939:

On the basis of his writings Szálasi is mentally ill, a "neophrasic" (a person constantly producing new words) who is particularly prone to presenting insignificant „wisdoms” with pathos...

He is characterized by schizoid mysticism....

He is autistic, schizophrenic, who completely excludes reality from his thoughts.

Szálasi in 1943-44 (believing in victory till April, 1945:

Germany, even if is withdrawing its forces, is completely in control of the situation and will soon give a lethal blow to the Soviet Union.

German army will be transported to Britain with the use of 1000 Gigant carrier airplanes.

„We cannot win this war, since we have already won it. The German military leadership has completed all that is necessary to crush the enemy.”

The „Shoe Memorial”, Budapest



Map of the
Budapest Ghetto



5. Soviet liberation/occupation



The 100 days'
siege




Statue of liberty, Gellért Hill, Budapest



- „Malenkiy robot”,
- davai guitar,
- promise of a new society




Liberation monument, Liberty Square, Budapest



Thank you for your attention! 😊

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Introduction to Hungarian Foreign Policy

Contents of Session 5.

1. Occupation and sovietization of East-Central Europe
2. The era of (very) limited sovereignty
3. Paris Peace Treaty and the territorial issues
4. Official narratives of Hungary's identity

1. Consequences of the pre-1945 period on post-1945 Soviet policy toward „Eastern Europe”*

- 1.) Soviet claim: East-Central Europe should be a security zone to be a counterweight of future German militarism, to counter any attack from the West
- 2.) The Soviet Union became politically and military-wise powerful enough to spread its power to East-Central Europe
- 3.) East-Central European states are weakened, fractioned (power vacuum)
- 4.) Actions of the USA and Britain hint to Moscow that it has a free hand in the region and can treat it as its sphere of interest (Warsaw uprising, percentages, Roosevelt in Yalta on the need to withdraw US forces from Europe, Berlin és Prague to be occupied by the Soviet Union)
- 5.) Gratitude (mostly Czechs and Bulgarians), need of protection (CzSl, Poland)
- 6.) Bitterness, reluctance and fears (Poland, HU and Rom, the „involuntary allies”)
- 7.) Substantially different political culture, negligible support for Communists
- 8.) For geographic and historical reasons primary attention of Moscow is on East-Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia
- 9.) „Balkanization” ends, territorial-historical conflicts are swept under the carpet with Soviet occupation (there is a new political agenda)

*Mark Kramer: Stalin, Soviet Policy and the Consolidation of a Communist Bloc in Eastern Europe, 1944-53. In: Vladimir Tismaneanu (ed.): Stalinism Revisited. The Establishment of Communist Regimes in East-Central Europe. Budapest-New York: CEU Press. 2009. pp. 59-71.

Sovietization 1945-1948

In the occupied enemy countries:
Allied Control Commission with
Soviet leadership

Salami tactics (Mátyás Rákosi):
ousting, arresting deporting,
political adversaries; dividing and
gradually eliminating the opposition

1948 February: Putsch in
Czechoslovakia – „Popular
democracies” everywhere



Into the Soviet orbit 1945-1948

1947 July: Hungary rejects participation in the Paris conference (Marshall plan)

1947 September: Kominform (which had been planned prior to the Marshall plan)

1948 June: Yugoslav Communist Party expelled from Kominform



2. The era of very limited sovereignty

Sovereignty of Hungary:

From March 19th, 1944 (German occupation): politically limited, legally full

From January, 1945 (Soviet occupation): politically limited, legally very limited

From February 10th 1947: politically very limited, legally full



1947

2. The era of very limited sovereignty*

- Empire by coercion, hegemonic exploitation of preponderance: Hungary was a country to be conquered, not liberated (war trophy, USSR had been a victim of Hungarian aggression)
- Closed zone from the beginning. Voroshilov: „This is our zone of occupation and we are going to ask information on every person that comes in”
- „It would be easier for the US to get landing rights in the USSR itself”
- Hungary part of the Soviet military space = unrestricted maneuvering on Hungarian territory (by armistice agreement of January 20, 1945, then bilateral military treaties from 1948)
- Little attention to the projection of soft-power (ideology, culture)

EGY BŐSZ UVÓLTES, EGY VAD ZIVARR,
SZETSZORT HAJÁVAL VERES HOMLOKAVAL
ALL A VIHARBAN MAGA A MAGYAR.

2. The era of very limited sovereignty*

- Hungarian budget financed Soviet occupation (511 million forints = 50 million dollars)
- („formerly German owned”) 400 companies to Soviet ownership. Soviet control of natural resources (aluminium, bauxite, later: uranium as a strategic assets), mining, air traffic, Danube shipping...
- Reparation and other payments altogether amounts to close to a third of national income
- Result: worst hyperinflation in history




*László Borhi: Hungary in the Soviet Empire 1945-1956. *Hungarian Studies*, Vol. 20 (2006), No. 1.

3. Paris Peace Treaty and the territorial issues

- 1945, July, Potsdam: USA brings up for the last time the revision of the Czechoslovak-Hungarian and the Yugoslav-Hungarian pre-1938 borders based on the ethnic principle
- 1945, September, Council of Foreign Ministers: USA-UK: revision of the Romanian-Hungarian border ⇔ SU: pre-1940
- 1946, April, meeting of deputy foreign ministers: USA: revision of the Romanian-Hungarian border based on direct talks ⇔ SU: pre-1940
- 1946, May: Secretary of State James F. Byrnes to Ferenc Nagy: If the Soviets bring up the question of Transylvania the USA will support Hungarian demands
- 1946, Aug, Paris Peace Conference: János Gyöngyösi, Hungarian FM demands first 22'000 sq km-s then 4000 with less than half million inhabitants

3. Paris Peace Treaty and the territorial issues




The only modification: 3 vilages to Czehoslovakia

4. Official narratives of Hungary's identity




By Zsigmond Kisfaludi Strobl



Narratives of the downfall of the Hungarian Soviet Republic

- **Erzsébet Andics (1945):** *“Against the over-excessive demands of the Entente-powers (...) **Hungarian workers** took power in their hands and organized national resistance (...) The question was whether Hungary would become a **democratic country** and keep a significant portion of its territories (...) or (...) would lose the majority of its territories and the reaction would sit back to its throne and Hungary again be the country of the thousand acres. Hungarian reactionaries decided for the latter without hesitation. Their counter-revolutionary activities had a decisive role in the downfall of the **armed resistance** (...), and that the Romanians robbed through the country and came Trianon.”*
- **László Zsigmond (1953):** *„The executioner of the **Hungarian Soviet Republic** of 1919 was the American, English and French imperialism that endeavored to save Hungarian large estates and big capital. (...) they did not want to tolerate that the power could stay in the hands of the **Hungarian workers and working peasants**. (...) the attempt at the Hungarian Soviet Republic was part of the robbery raid, which aimed the annihilation of the centre of the revolution, i.e. **Soviet-Russia**.”*
- **Dezső Nemes (1956):** *„In Austria Social-Democrats sharpened the deadly dagger of the Austrian bourgeoisie with the aim of helping to overthrow the **Hungarian Soviet Republic** and grabbing away Burgenland from Hungary.”*



Introduction to Hungarian Foreign Policy

Contents of Session 6.

1. Developments leading to the 1956 revolution
2. The international context
3. The revolution
4. The neutrality attempt of prime minister Imre Nagy

1. Developments leading to the 1956 revolution



60, Andrassy avenue, Budapest

Power struggles within Hungary



Imre Nagy

(relatively moderate,
„revisionist” Communist)
Prime minister (1953—1955)

Mátyás Rákosi

(„Stalin’s best Hungarian
student”)
General Secretary of the
Hungarian Working People's
Party (1948—1956)
Prime minister (1952-1953)

„Match of the Century” (Wembley, 1953)

„Hungary's 6-3 victory at Wembley 60 years ago resonates like no other in the history of English football. It wasn't just that this was a first home defeat to non-British or Irish opposition, the magnitude of the scoreline or the brilliance of the Hungarian display: it was the sense of shock.”

(The Guardian, Nov 25th, 2013)



Nandor Hidegkuti scores Hungary's final goal in their 6-3 win against England at Wembley on 25 November 1953.

Photograph: Popperfoto


“Das Wunder von Bern” (The Miracle of Bern, 1954)

„From 1950-1956 the Hungarians would play 50 games... - 42 wins, 7 draws and only a single defeat. The match they lost? The 1954 World Cup Final to West Germany”



„The global reaction was that of disbelief, The Mighty Magyars had been defeated. The victors were the World's enemy West Germany. A wave of euphoria captured the West German states - not only for the victory but for what it would mean for its future. (...) The final in Bern was the first time the German anthem was played since the War, symbolizing the turning of the tide for Germany”

The international context: Austrian State Treaty (15, May, 1955)



From occupied state to
neutral state!

Nikita Khrushchchev and the 20th Party Congress (February 14th, 1956)



Stalin's crimes exposed...

Secret 4 hours speech that was leaked and caused global consternation

Political changes in Hungary (1956)

March 27: Speaking at a meeting of regional party activists, Rákosi admits that the 1949 treason trial of László Rajk was a show trial.

July 13: Soviet Presidium member Anastas Mikoyan arrives unexpectedly in Budapest to oversee the dismissal of Rákosi.

July 18: At a Hungarian Workers Party Central Committee meeting, Rákosi, citing his “state of health,” steps down and departs for the Soviet Union. He is replaced by Ernő Gerő.

Reburial of László Rajk (October 6th, 1956)



„Poor Laci... If he was alive, he would surely get us shot” (comment at the demonstration about the unjustified execution of László Rajk)

3.) Revolution: 1956 October 23rd – November 4th



The neutrality attempt of prime minister Imre Nagy



Oct. 25: ÁVH (State Defence Authority) snipers shoot into the crowd at Kossuth tér

Oct. 30: Attack on the Hungarian Workers Party, lynching of the defenders

Oct. 31: Soviet troops complete withdrawal from Budapest


Nov. 1, 1956: Suspension of the Warsaw Treaty, Declaration of neutrality, gov turns to the UN

Nov. 4, 1956: Full-scale invasion by Soviet troops

Popular views in connection with the failure on 1956 (and the reality)




- 1.) The USA did not come to help (as Radio Free Europe suggested it would): presidential elections coming? Sec. of States Dulles to hospital? Austrian neutrality?
- 2.) All because of the Suez Crisis (Oct 29. Israeli invasion begins, Oct 31. French and British bombing, Nov. 5. Paratroopers land near Suez...)
- 3.) UN did not help as it should have (see: Korea! Imre Nagy: „This is not so easy, kids”)
- 4.) Stupid step to announce neutrality by Imre Nagy.
- 5.) First nail in the coffin of Communism and the Soviet (half-)world order



Thank you for your attention! 😊

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Introduction to Hungarian Foreign Policy

Contents of Session 7.

1. János Kádár, his personality
2. General features of „Kádárism”
3. „consolidation”, „megtorlás” (reprisals)
4. Economic reform and goulash communism
5. Military intervention (“the reluctant ally) in 1968
6. Foreign policy re-orientation

1. János Kádár (1912-1989)

General Secretary of the
Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (1956-1988)



Personality of János Kádár (by János Rainer):

A pragmatic, sober, narrow-minded*, but cunning power player.

* „able to express himself only through primitive derivatives of his ideology”

1. János Kádár (1912-1989)

General Secretary of the
Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (1956-1988)



„Kádár goes to retire”. 1972. (age: 60)

- 1968: the fall of Czechoslovak attempts to create a human-faced socialism; forced revision of Hungarian economic reforms
- Citing future constraints on his abilities to serve the nation because of his age...
- Surprise announcement of his request to retire

2. Hungary: From „Salami” to „Goulash” in the „happiest barrack” (i.e. Kádárism)

1.) => Changes mirror those in the Soviet Union

2.) => The main structure (essence of the Soviet-type system) did not change:

- undivided one-party rule
- same institutions with the same functions,
- state ownership of the means of production,
- one ideology,
- Warsaw Pact Alliance
- Bureaucratic redistribution

3.) => Important shifts in detail

- Diminishing role of coercive apparatuses and functions
- Rising importance of (informal) coordination and bargain
- Instead of the ideology of „world revolution” more talk of modernization
- Rationalization of central planning, elements of consumerism

3. Consolidation, reprisals

Nov. 1956 -- early 1960s




Post-1956-
Stalinism is back:
imprisonments,
executions =>
International
isolation

Execution of Imre Nagy in 1958
(despite assurances to the Yugoslavs)

4. Economic reform and goulash communism

Planning + market

- No injustices (as in capitalism)
- No shortages and inefficient production of garbage (when there is only central planning)




„Magyarázom a mechanizmust” by „Dr. Agy”
„Explaining the mechanism”
by Dr. Brain

5. Military intervention (“the reluctant ally) in 1968



Hungarian tanks in the main square of Nové Zámky (Érsekújvár)



Hungarian occupation zone (Northeast town: Nové Mesto nad Váhom)



5. Military intervention (“the reluctant ally) in 1968

- Reluctant participation
- Local opposition



Overturned Hungarian tank on the bank of the Ipoly/Ipel river near Letkés in August, 1968

6. Foreign policy re-orientation: Reconciliation with the USA

Fits in the general tendency of reconciliation with the West. Start: relations to the minimum (on the level of charge d'affaires) because of 1956, of execution of Imre Nagy despite explicit promises to Yugoslavia

- **1962** General amnesty to political prisoners ⇔ removal of the Hungarian question from the agenda of the UN.
- **1968** New Economic Mechanism
- **1971** departure of Cardinal Mindszenty from the US Embassy ⇔ historic crown of St. Stephen returns to Hungary
- **1973** Hungary to GATT, **1982** Hungary to the IMF
- **1983** Vice-President George Bush in Hungary: „We in the United States are heartened by Hungary’s efforts to expand contacts, to foster tolerance, and meet commitments that bind our countries under the Helsinki Final Act” ... US-Hungarian relations „as a model for the rest of the world”.



6. Foreign policy re-orientation

Three waves of western orientation*

- 1.) 1956: uprising and war of independence (neutrality)
- 2.) 1968 economic reform, GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) negotiations - 1973 GATT-membership; 1981 IMF and IBRD (World Bank) membership
- 3.) from 1975 Comecon-EC (European Communities) ties, Hungarian-EC comprehensive economic and trade agreement signed in January, 1989

+

Political manoeuvres toward America
and Western Europe
(e.g.: 1970s)**



*Balázs Péter: Magyarország és Európa. Napvilág Kiadó, 2011.

**see: Andrew Felkay: Hungarian foreign policy in the Kádár era



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Introduction to Hungarian Foreign Policy

Contents of Class no. 8.

1. Characteristics of the political transformation (1989-)
2. Characteristics of the economic transformation (1989-)
3. The new foreign policy orientation (1990), fundamental treaties, NATO- and EU-accession
4. Changing attitudes towards the EU
5. The European Union and Hungary 2004-2010


1. Characteristics of the political transformation



- Hungary: a forerunner in 1989
- Opposition movements from 1988, parties from 1989 (MDF, SZKH-SZDSZ, Fidesz, historical parties)
- Gradual, peaceful, negotiated transition
- Opposition Round Table, National Round Table (the triangular one 😊)
- Political cleavages already before 1989 – revival of the urbánus-népies („urbanist” vs „populist”) cleavage
- Cultural issues dominate politics
- Uni-cameral parliament, weak president, mixed electoral law with strong majoritarian elements


- Successor party of the former Communists remains a significant player (MSZP = Hungarian Socialist Party)
- Fidesz gradually grows to dominate the political scene
- The two major (antagonistic) opposition parties (MDF, SZDSZ) shrink, merge, disappear

SZÍNEIT VÁLTOGATÓ ORSZÁG, 1990-2010



2. Characteristics of the economic transformation (1989-)

1. Burocratic coordination -> market coordination
2. State ownership to be privatized
3. Comecon (Soviet) trade relation -> Western orientation




Methods of privatization


Czechoslovakia: reprivatization and voucher privatization (kuponny)

Hungary: spontaneous privatization, partial compensation, foreign investment

Result:
(distribution
of company
ownership)



Hungarian government expenditure as a percentage of GDP



Data source: Eurostat

Results of the economic transformation

- ✓ Market economy, ratio of state redistribution on an average West-European level
- ✓ Economy dominated by private ownership, high ratio of foreign investments (predominantly Western, specifically German companies: Audi as no. 1.)
- ✓ Open, export-oriented economy, trade-ties mostly towards Western Europe, specifically Germany
- Very high ratio of inactives
- „Premature welfare state”, deficit, debt, reforms + stop-go cycles
- Despite highway constructions East-West, Budapest-countryside gaps remain

3. The new foreign policy priorities (1990)

- The fastest possible accession to „Euro-atlantic” organizations
 - Development of good neighbourly relations
 - Support for Hungarians living outside the state borders
-
- Visegrad initiative: first summit: 15 Feb. 1991 (~1335)
 - Hungary invited to start negotiation about NATO-accession in 1997 (together with Czech Rep. and Poland)
 - 1994 (April 1st 😊) official request for EU-accession, accession talks begin in 1998-2002, membership from 2004 May 1st. (Big bang of 10)
 - Fundamental treaties with Ukraine, Slovakia, Croatia, Romania

4. Changing attitudes towards the EU

Idealistic approach: Back to Europe, back to the west where we belong – join western democratic community where we have always aimed to belong – the good, free side of history

Utilitarian, pragmatic approach: People live better in the West. We want income convergence. How many derogations from the 35 chapters of Acquis communautaire

Euro-scepticism: We are always five years away from accession. There will be losers of accession in certain sectors

Euro-fears: no poppy-seeds, no 1,5% milk, ...

Disillusionment: Teacher-student relationship, „We expected a welcome on red, velvet carpet instead there were body-guards and they asked for our ticket”

5. The European Union and Hungary 2004-2010



- Peaceful foreign relations
- Deepening internal political divisions
- Excessive deficit procedure against Hungary (2004-2013)
- Global financial crisis (2008-2009-), IMF-EU 20 billion euro emergency loan to Hungary

Fidesz (1998-2002, , 2010-.....)

- EU-accession talks (under Fidesz-led gov!)
- EU-accession in 2004 (MSZP-led gov)
- Election defeat of Fidesz in 2006 again
- Financial crisis 2008-2009
- Fidesz comes to power with a two-thirds majority (2010-)





Thank you for your attention! 😊

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Introduction to Hungarian Foreign Policy

Contents of Session 9.

1. System of National Cooperation
2. “peacock dance”, “Eastern opening”, “Stop Brussels”
3. Externally constrained hybrid regime?

1. System of National Cooperation, 2010

Changing priorities



1. System of National Cooperation, 2010-

- Fülkeforradalom („Revolution at the voting booths”)
- 98% tax on severance (dismissal) pays
- New constitution: Fundamental law
- New media law: Media Authority.... („Worst practices”)
- New electoral law: compensating the winner
- Forced retirement of judges
- Revolver journalism

„Kiderült, hogy miért ilyen agresszív a nőverő Juhász Péter” című cikkünkben valótlanul állítottuk Juhász Péterről, hogy megverte, begyógyszerezte, majd a lakásában fogva tartotta előző élettársát, és valótlanul állítottuk, hogy Juhász Péter személyisége agresszívvá torzult.” (2018-02-17 => 2019-02-21; <https://www.origo.hu/itthon/20190221-helyreigazitas.html>)

1. System of National Cooperation, power-politics, economy

Internal power politics

Occupation of the political center; Stop Soros; anti-CEU; legal and economic tools to silence independent media, opposition, NGO-s...; criminalization of homelessness; anti-LGBTQ measures; ...

Macroeconomic reorientation

Centralization: friendly oligarchs getting richer; nationalization of private pensions (cutting the deficit, ending the excessive deficit procedure 2013); buying up subsidiaries of major companies in key industries; ...

Changing attitudes, new friends, 2010-

Foreign policy reorientation

„We are sailing in Western waters, but the wind is blowing from the East”

(Nov. 2010)

Changing attitude to diplomacy

„Peacock dance” (May. 2012)

New friends (and enemies)

Ramil Safarov (inprisoned in Hungary in 2004 for killing a fellow Armenian peace-partnership soldier) allowed to leave prison in 2012 and go home to Azerbaijan, where he received a hero's welcome.



1. System of National Cooperation, 2010-



Refugee influx 2015, 2016- „emergency”



Hungary & EU on a collision course



Change of flags...
(identities, values?)



Stop Brussels!
National Consultation, 2017



„For us Hungary comes first”

- Infringement procedures by the European Commission
- Refugee influx 2015, 2016- „emergency”
- Article 7 procedure since 2018
- Coronavirus + Enabling law



„You too have the right to know what Brussels is preparing to do”

2019

„They would dismantle the border barrier together”





„The sanctions of Brussels destroy us!” + the „pro-war opposition”

2022

EGY BOSZ UVOLTES, EGY VAD ZIVARU!
SZÉTSZÓRT HAJÁVAL VERES HOMLOKÁVAL
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„Brussels’ failure of acquiring vaccines” + the „anti-vaccine opposition”



2021

3. Externally constrained hybrid regime?

EU

- System constraining... but also:
- System sustain, support
- System legitimation

EU interventions

- Infringement procedures by the European Commission (new media law, 98% tax on severance pays, retirement of judges, lex-NGO, lex-CEU, refugee-quota, ...)
- Article Seven procedure according to the Constitution Treaty (initiated by the European Parliament)
- EPP-membership of Fidesz – 2019 suspended, 2021 Fidesz leaves EPP

Western confusion:

Hungarians...

- ... get substantial EU support, but constantly rebel against „Brussels”
- ... emigrated to the West but show a solidarity deficit towards refugees
- ... have a great heritage of a democratic revolution (60ys!) and yet keep an illiberal political regime in power.



Political-cultural-national traditions?

Revolutions and wars of independence?

Need for a strong leader?


Being a reluctant ally?

Hungarian national isolation?

Rational choice?


Psychology?

Revolving door?



Thank you for your attention! 😊

schweitzer.andras@tatk.elte.hu



Introduction to Hungarian Foreign Policy

Contents of Session 10.

1. The possible rationale of the foreign policy change and the results
2. Cultural factors of the transformation
3. Future prospects

1. The possible rationale: Structure not agency? Nabucco versus South Stream rivalry (2008-2009)

PLANNED SOUTH STREAM AND NABUCCO GAS PIPELINES



Partial reversal of turning to the West before Orbán!

1.) The possible rationale

3 pillars of the „illiberal” foreign policy change

IDEOLOGICAL: Illiberal state. The decline of the West. The decline of Liberalism

POLITICAL: relations to Putin, Erdogan, Turkic Council, etc. (while maintaining relations to the West)

ECONOMIC: targeting the raise of proportion in trade of Eastern countries from 18% to one-third. Alternative source of financial and political support (countries that don't criticize lack of freedoms).

+1: Suspicions of financial interest (eg. Belgrade-Budapest railway line with Chinese loan = no EU-regulations and oversight: OLAF, European Anti-Fraud Office)

1.) The result: success or failure?

IDEOLOGY and FOREIGN POLICY: „Illiberal” states spread worldwide – 2017: the year of revolution against liberalism? – still in limbo (Matteo Salvini/Lega Nord, Norbert Hofer/FPÖ, AfD, Marine Le Pen/Front national, Rassemblement national...)

FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS: targeting the raise of proportion in trade of Eastern countries from 18% to one-third. Alternative source of financial and political support (countries that don't criticize lack of freedoms) – no real success

Miscalculation? (Károlyi) Ideologically determined? (Horthy) Bandwagoning, balancing according to the changing international power relations? (Kádár)...
... or plain populist attempt to stay on power?


1.) The results: success or failure?

Friendly ties with Russia, China, Israel, Turkey, Azerbaidjan, Turkic Council, etc. (while maintaining relations to the West)... to gain leverage?

„I think we are in a new era in the world and it's an era of great power competition and what we, the US, are seeing is that other great powers are competing for Hungary. All of them want more influence in and relations with Hungary. Previously, the United States wasn't necessarily strengthening the friendship between the two countries and its approach was too critical and judgmental. I think now, in this new era, we have decided that the job of the embassy is to make a friend of Hungary and to keep it close to us. So that means we had to change our approach and be less critical.” (April H. Foley, January 14th, 2019)

<https://hungarytoday.hu/orban-is-a-predictor-interview-with-april-h-foley-former-us-ambassador-to-hungary/?fbclid=IwAR2C6kIXN9n6fC7iPtRXdUVtFN-rZzdkVkcwRYoCqVacuEgQGgHGld7MkQ8>

2. Cultural factors of the transformation



Cultural heritage and foreign policy



Tricks and resourcefulness
The little and poor can strike back
Professionalism at the back-burner

A KÁRPÁTOKTUL LE AZ AL-DUNAIG
EGY BÓSZ UVÓLTES, EGY VAD ZIVATARI
DORT HAJÁVAL VERES HOMLOKAVAL
A VIHARBAN MAGA A MAGYAR.



2. Leaders, images and legitimacy



Regent of Hungary,
1920-1944

Bravely navigating admiral in a
sea of enemies + precisely
calculating cunning Realpolitiker



General Secretary of the Hungarian
Socialist Workers' Party, 1956-1988



Fidesz-leader
Viktor Orbán
1989-2021

3.) Future prospects, possible scenarios

- Article 7 procedure continues (since 2018); Conditionality in the new EU budget 2021-2027; HUXIT?
- Fidesz out of the EPP => European populists (far right) alliance?
- Multiple (two-) speed Europe? Biden 2020 => Republican Senate 2022? => Trump 2024?
- Fudan Uni; Beograd-Budapest railway; Paks II; ...
- Visegrad cooperation (?)
- Further democratic decline... ?
- Putin's war: Ukraine? Moldova? ... escalation?...





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Thank you for your attention!

