

PART I

FOUNDATIONS



## The Origins of Peacebuilding

As the Cold War was coming to a close in 1989, the United Nations launched its first major peacebuilding mission in Namibia, following the negotiation of a peace settlement in that country's decades-long civil war. At that time, few observers predicted that postconflict peacebuilding would become an international growth industry, but over the next decade, operations were deployed to no fewer than thirteen other territories that were just emerging from internal conflicts.

Ostensibly, these missions provided "technical assistance" to local actors in war-torn countries – assistance aimed at preventing the recurrence of violence and establishing a stable and lasting peace. In practice, however, these operations were more than merely technical (or ideologically neutral) exercises in conflict management. As we shall see, they all promoted a particular model of political and economic organization: liberal market democracy. Why did peacebuilders embrace democratization and marketization as strategies for preventing renewed violence? And why did this brand of peacebuilding proliferate so rapidly in the 1990s? Answers to both of these questions can be found in the peculiar political and ideological conditions that prevailed at the end of the Cold War, when peacebuilding came into being.

### The Cold War's End and the Rise of Peacebuilding

During the Cold War, the UN's main security activity was "peacekeeping," which typically involved the deployment of a lightly armed military force to monitor a cease-fire or patrol neutral buffer zones between former combatants.<sup>1</sup> The first major peacekeeping operation was deployed to Egypt in 1956, following the invasion of that country by Britain, France, and Israel. With the agreement of all of the parties, including Egypt and the

<sup>1</sup> See the Appendix of this chapter for a glossary of key terms, including "peacekeeping" and "peacebuilding."

invading countries, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) oversaw the departure of foreign forces from Egyptian territory, and then took up positions along the Egypt-Israel border. UNEF was prohibited from using force (except in self-defense) and from interfering in the domestic politics of Egypt. The mission's mandate clearly stated that UNEF should "refrain from any activity of a political character in a Host State" and in no way "influence the military balance in the present conflict and, thereby, the political balance affecting efforts to settle the conflict."<sup>2</sup> An "after action" report written two years later by then-UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld reiterated the importance of these principles to the mission's success: Any future peacekeeping operations, he argued, "must be separate and distinct from activities by national authorities," and must limit their role to addressing the "external [that is, international] aspects of the political situation," or else "United Nations units might run the risk of getting involved in differences with local authorities or [the] public or in internal conflicts which would be highly detrimental to the effectiveness of the operation."<sup>3</sup>

The principles that guided UNEF in Egypt provided a template for future peacekeeping operations conducted during the Cold War, including missions in Cyprus and Lebanon and on the India-Pakistan border. Most of these operations involved lightly armed contingents deployed to monitor cease-fires and prohibited from intruding in the domestic affairs of the host states. The mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), for instance, stated bluntly that "UNIFIL, like any other United Nations peacekeeping operation, cannot and must not take on responsibilities which fall under the Government of the country in which it is operating."<sup>4</sup>

Before 1989, only two UN operations deviated from these "traditional" principles of peacekeeping. The first was an ill-fated mission to the former Belgian Congo in the early 1960s, which set out to provide the government of the newly independent Republic of Congo with limited security assistance, but got caught in a power struggle between the president and prime minister, and ultimately took over many of the functions of the Congolese government, including the task of forcibly suppressing a revolt in one of the country's provinces. The second was the United Nations Security Force

<sup>2</sup> "Regulations for the United Nations Emergency Force" (February 20, 1957) and "Second and Final Report of the Secretary-General on the Plan for an Emergency International United Nations Force," November 6, 1956 (UN doc. A/3302), reprinted in Siekmann 1989, pp. 40 and 4.

<sup>3</sup> "Report of the Secretary General: Summary Study of the Experience Derived from the Establishment and Operation of the Force," October 9, 1958 (UN doc. A/3943), reprinted in Siekmann 1989, p. 52.

<sup>4</sup> "Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 425," March 19, 1978 (UN doc. S/12611), reprinted in Siekmann 1989, p. 216.

in western New Guinea, which governed the territory from October 1962 to April 1963, between the end of Dutch colonial rule and the territory's transfer to Indonesian sovereignty.<sup>5</sup>

Apart from these two exceptions, peacekeepers went to great lengths to stay out of domestic politics, for several reasons. First, the United Nations Charter – the legal basis for UN peacekeeping – expressly prohibited the organization from intervening in matters “essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”<sup>6</sup> Second, expanding the role of peacekeepers beyond the relatively limited task of monitoring a cease-fire would have required a more intrusive role for international personnel than the parties to a conflict were normally willing to accept. Third, the permanent members of the Security Council – including the Cold War enemies, the United States and the Soviet Union – were generally opposed to UN involvement in the domestic affairs of their respective allies and client states. Both the Soviets and Americans were concerned with maintaining the integrity of their own spheres of influence and did so partly by insulating these spheres from outside meddling. Achieving Security Council agreement for the deployment of a new peacekeeping mission was therefore possible only when both veto-wielding “superpowers” believed that their strategic interests were not threatened. In cases where civil unrest endangered the stability of a client state, the superpowers typically preferred to deal with these situations directly, rather than through the United Nations, in order to maintain greater control over the outcome.

Fourth and finally, even if the Soviets and Americans saw little threat to their strategic interests, Cold War ideological differences made it impossible for the United Nations to promote any particular model of domestic governance within the borders of individual states. The United States and most of its allies promoted liberal democracy and market-oriented economics, whereas the Soviet bloc championed a different version of democracy – communist “people’s democracy” – which emphasized public rather than private ownership of the means of production and control of the state by a vanguard communist party on behalf of the working class. Some developing countries espoused their own brand of “guided” or “developmental” democracy, which rejected both the competitiveness of liberal market democracy and the class orientation of communist people’s democracy, and instead advocated single-party rule as a means of carrying out the “general will” and of promoting national unity and economic development. So while support for democracy was nearly universally shared among UN members during the Cold War, there was fundamental and heated disagreement over the

<sup>5</sup> The administrative arm of the operation was known as the Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA).

<sup>6</sup> Article 2(7) of the UN Charter.

meaning of democracy itself, which in practice prevented the organization from promoting any particular model of democracy as the “proper” model and reinforced the tendency of UN officials to distance themselves from questions of domestic politics.

“As a universal organization neutral in big Power struggles over ideology and influence,” wrote Hammarskjöld in 1960, the UN’s impartiality on matters of ideology and domestic governance allows the organization to “render service which can be received without suspicion.”<sup>7</sup> In all of these ways, the political and ideological conditions of the Cold War era helped to restrict the functional scope of peacekeeping to narrowly defined and predominantly military tasks, such as cease-fire observation, and worked to limit the involvement of these operations in domestic affairs.

Many of these conditions changed suddenly when the Cold War ended in the late 1980s and early 1990s. With the decline in East-West tensions, neither the Soviet Union (later Russia) nor the United States was willing to maintain Cold War levels of military and economic assistance to their respective allies, particularly in parts of the world that were now perceived to be strategically inconsequential, such as sub-Saharan Africa. This allowed international organizations, including the UN, to become more directly involved in efforts to bring an end to several long-standing conflicts. The erstwhile rival superpowers, seeking to disengage themselves from costly foreign commitments, were now quite happy to have international agencies assume responsibility for these tasks.

The end of the Cold War not only created new opportunities for mediation in countries that had been proxy battlegrounds for the superpowers; it also sparked new civil conflicts in several other countries. Some regimes, such as those of Zaire and Somalia, had depended on foreign aid in order to monopolize political power in their countries by doling out patronage and ruling with an iron fist. When the flow of external aid diminished, their ability to squelch internal dissent slipped away and long-suppressed resentments came to the fore, sometimes violently. Perhaps the most vivid example of this phenomenon was Somalia, where the government of Said Barre was driven from office by its political enemies, who ultimately fought among themselves in what became an enduring and brutal civil conflict that blurred the boundaries between warfare and criminal violence. Meanwhile, dormant ethnic tensions reasserted themselves and sparked internecine violence across a band of formerly communist states stretching from Yugoslavia through the Caucasus to Central Asia. With Russia and the United States no longer willing to devote the resources and energy that would be needed to rehabilitate these “failed states,” such international organizations as the United Nations were increasingly called upon to take action, particularly when

<sup>7</sup> Quoted in Urquhart 1972, pp. 458–459.

humanitarian crises in these states drew the attention of the international media.<sup>8</sup>

For all of these reasons, the “demand” for new multilateral peace operations swelled at the end of the Cold War. Simultaneously, the United Nations and other international organizations were more willing and able to “supply” these new missions, and a new collegiality in the UN Security Council raised the possibility of reaching consensus (or at least avoiding vetoes) on proposals to deploy new operations to countries that were experiencing, or just recovering from, civil conflicts. The result of this combined growth in demand and supply was a sharp rise in the number of multilateral missions launched in the years immediately following the Cold War. In the decade from 1989 to 1999, the United Nations deployed thirty-three peace operations, more than double the fifteen missions that the organization conducted in the four preceding decades.

Some of the UN’s new operations undertook tasks that resembled the traditional peacekeeping missions of the Cold War. In 1988, for example, the organization deployed fifty military observers to oversee the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Although this was the first time that a UN operation had monitored Russian forces, the nature of the assignment itself – verifying a cease-fire and troop movements – was something that the world body had done several times before.

Other operations, however, required the United Nations to perform more complex and less familiar tasks. In 1989, for instance, the UN was called upon to monitor the conduct of local police and to disarm former fighters in Namibia, while preparing the country for its first democratic election and assisting in the preparation of a new national constitution. These functions went well beyond the constraints that had traditionally been imposed on peacekeepers, including the prohibition on involvement in the domestic affairs of host countries. In 1991, new missions were also launched in Angola, El Salvador, Western Sahara, and Cambodia, which involved the organization of elections, human rights training and monitoring, and even (in Cambodia) temporarily taking over the administration of an entire country. In 1992, the UN deployed personnel to Bosnia and Somalia in the midst of ongoing civil conflicts, with the formal Security Council authorization to use armed force for purposes other than simply self-defense – which contrasted with the traditional practice of deploying peacekeepers only after the cessation of hostilities. Also in 1992, a new mission was sent to Mozambique with wide-ranging responsibilities that paralleled the operations in Angola, El Salvador, and Cambodia, including the preparation and supervision of democratic elections.

<sup>8</sup> On “failed states,” see Helman and Ratner 1992/93. On the role of the international media in the creation of new peace operations, see Jakobsen 1996.

The term “peace operations” emerged as a generic label for the wide variety of missions that the UN began to conduct at this time, since many of these interventions no longer seemed to fit the traditional mold of peacekeeping. In 1992, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali issued a policy statement entitled *An Agenda for Peace* that offered a new taxonomy of peace operations for the post-Cold War era.<sup>9</sup> Among other things, Boutros-Ghali differentiated between peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and postconflict peacebuilding. Peacekeeping involved the deployment of UN military personnel to the field with mandates that largely complied with “the established principles and practices” of traditional peacekeeping.<sup>10</sup> Peace enforcement referred to something relatively new: the deployment of missions that resembled peacekeeping operations in many respects, but that were more heavily armed and authorized to use armed force for purposes other than self-defense.<sup>11</sup> The operations in Bosnia and Somalia, both of which were authorized to use armed force to accomplish their goals, represented early applications of the peace-enforcement concept. The third category of peace operation – postconflict peacebuilding – sought “to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace” in the aftermath of “civil strife.”<sup>12</sup> Boutros-Ghali offered examples of particular tasks that peacebuilding might entail: “disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.”<sup>13</sup>

As it turned out, most of the UN’s peace operations after 1988 focused on the task of postconflict peacebuilding. These missions differed from traditional peacekeeping not only in their functional complexity but also in their composition. The United Nations had virtually monopolized the practice of peacekeeping in the preceding decades, in part because the relatively straightforward tasks of traditional peacekeeping – such as cease-fire monitoring – could be performed by military personnel acting largely alone. But the more expansive and diverse functions of postconflict peacebuilding lent themselves to a new division of labor between the UN and other international agencies. In some missions, for example, military tasks were delegated to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while various specialized agencies of the United Nations, including the UN Development Program (UNDP), increasingly shared authority with regional organizations, such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the European Union (EU), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In the realm

<sup>9</sup> Boutros-Ghali 1992.      <sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29.

<sup>11</sup> I say “relatively” new because UN peacekeepers in the Congo operation during the Cold War were given extraordinary enforcement powers as well. See *Abi-Saab* 1978.

<sup>12</sup> Boutros-Ghali 1992, pp. 11 and 32.      <sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 32. See also *United Nations* 1996a.



of economic reconstruction, important responsibilities were delegated to international financial institutions – the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and regional development banks – along with the EU, national development agencies, and a host of international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

The precise constellation of international actors varied from one mission to the next. Some organizations were regular participants – in particular, the United Nations and its specialized agencies – while other actors made rarer appearances, so that a distinct alphabet soup of organizational acronyms constituted each mission. The peacebuilding operations of the 1990s, in other words, were not “run” by the United Nations – or by any other single organization. Although “lead agencies” were designated for some missions and for certain tasks, there was typically little central coordination of each agency’s activities in the field; there was always considerable room for individual peacebuilders to define their own objectives and initiatives.

Given the multiplicity of peacebuilding agencies and the absence of a centralized peacebuilding authority, perhaps the most remarkable feature of the peacebuilding operations in the 1990s was that they all pursued the same general strategy for promoting stable and lasting peace in war-shattered states: democratization and marketization. The typical formula for peacebuilding included promoting civil and political rights, such as the right to free speech and a free press, as well as freedom of association and movement; preparing and administering democratic elections; drafting national constitutions that codified civil and political rights; training or retraining police and justice officials in the appropriate behavior for state functionaries in a liberal democracy; promoting the development of independent “civil society” organizations and the transformation of formerly warring groups into democratic political parties; encouraging the development of free-market economies by eliminating barriers to the free flow of capital and goods within and across a country’s borders; and stimulating the growth of private enterprise while reducing the state’s role in the economy. Another recurrent feature of these operations was their emphasis on *rapid* democratization and marketization. Planning for elections began immediately in every mission. Although in a few cases violence reignited before elections could be held, in all the remaining cases, elections took place within three years of the beginning of the operation. The same was true of economic reform: Comprehensive marketization programs were usually initiated right away.

The fact that these agencies tended to promote liberalization as a remedy for civil conflict reflected another major change that occurred in world politics at the end of the Cold War: the perceived triumph of liberal market democracy as the prevailing standard of enlightened governance across much of the world, including places where it had been anathema only a few years earlier. Few commentators had predicted the sudden collapse of

liberalism's principal ideological competitor, Soviet-style communism. As recently as the mid-1970s, one prominent American political observer, the late Daniel Patrick Moynihan, had expressed pessimistic thoughts about the long-term prospects of liberal democracy. "Liberal democracy on the American model," he wrote despondently, "increasingly tends to the condition of monarchy in the nineteenth century: a holdover form of government, one which persists in isolated or peculiar places here and there, and may even serve well enough for special circumstances, but which has simply no relevance to the future. It is where the world was, not where it is going."<sup>14</sup> Moynihan listed the symptoms of liberal democracy's alleged decline, including the seeming strength of communist ideology in many parts of the world, and the failure of liberal democratic experiments in several developing countries, such as India, the "largest and most important experiment of all," which temporarily abandoned democracy for dictatorship in 1975. These developments, he argued, gave liberal democracy "a fateful air of a transitional arrangement."<sup>15</sup>

As it turned out, however, Moynihan's pessimism about the future of market democracy soon gave way to heady optimism as the Soviet bloc began to disintegrate in the late 1980s and formerly communist countries instituted elections. From 1990 to 1996, more than three dozen countries adopted liberal democratic constitutions for the first time, raising the total number of liberal democracies in the world from 76 to 118.<sup>16</sup> By the mid-1990s, 61 percent of the world's countries were holding competitive, multiparty elections for major public office, as compared with only 41 percent a decade earlier.<sup>17</sup> These developments prompted several commentators to declare that a "democratic revolution in global politics" had taken place,<sup>18</sup> or, in the even loftier words of one pundit, "Democracy's won!"<sup>19</sup> In a much-discussed article, U.S. State Department official Francis Fukuyama proclaimed the "end point in mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human governance."<sup>20</sup> Although Fukuyama seemed to overstate both the finality and the extent of liberalism's new ascendancy,<sup>21</sup> the Western liberal conception of democracy did seem to have emerged as the "the only model of government with any broad legitimacy and ideological appeal in the world."<sup>22</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Moynihan 1975, p. 6.      <sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> Diamond and Plattner 1996, p. ix; and Diamond 1997, p. xvi.

<sup>17</sup> Diamond and Plattner 1996, p. ix.

<sup>18</sup> Roberts 1990, p. ix; Gershman 1990; and Ledeen 1996.

<sup>19</sup> Krauthammer 1989.      <sup>20</sup> Fukuyama 1989, p. 4.

<sup>21</sup> If history is any guide, new political and economic ideologies periodically sweep across human societies, displacing contemporary orthodoxies. On this historical tendency, see Lasswell 1935.

<sup>22</sup> Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1990, p. x. In the words of Manuel Pastor (1998, p. 154): "With the Cold War's end, the norm of free elections as the legitimate basis of governing has become almost universal."

To be sure, the principles of political liberalism were not observed universally – there continued to be significant pockets of resistance, both within the Western liberal democracies (among certain groups of commentators, who believed that “democracy” connoted not only elections and civil liberties but also social and economic rights)<sup>23</sup> and from the governments of a few resolutely antidemocratic countries (such as in China, Iran, and Cuba). Furthermore, some states that formally adopted democratic constitutions and conducted elections continued to behave “illiberally” by refusing to grant their citizens basic civil and political rights.<sup>24</sup> But what was striking about the post–Cold War period was the relative absence of disagreement in world politics over the definition and desirability of “democracy” itself. Whereas during the Cold War the meaning of democracy had itself been a lightning rod for ideological conflict, there now seemed to be widespread agreement – even in the former Soviet bloc and in much of the developing world – that the liberal definition of democracy (emphasizing elections and political liberties) was the “correct” definition.<sup>25</sup>

The global shift to liberal democracy took place along with an equally impressive movement toward market-oriented economics. “By the mid-1990s,” observed the Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs, “almost the entire world had adopted the fundamental elements of a market economy, including private ownership at the core of the economy, a currency convertible for international trade, shared standards of commercial transactions . . . , and market-based transactions for the bulk of the productive sectors of the economy.”<sup>26</sup> Even such putatively socialist countries as China and Vietnam moved away from central planning and toward marketization in the aftermath of the Cold War.

One indication of this economic revolution emerges from the *Economic Freedom of the World* report for the year 2000.<sup>27</sup> The report, sponsored by fifty-five economic research institutions, annually rates the economic openness of most countries in the world on a scale from 1 to 10, with 10 being the most open. Every country (for which data was available) is assigned a score, based on the composite index of economic openness, for each year from 1970 to 1997. According to these figures, economic openness declined by an average of 9.9 percent in 1970–1975, increased at just over 2 percent in 1975–1980 and 1980–1985, and rose by 4 percent in 1985–1990, reflecting the trend toward market-oriented economic reform in many parts of the world during this period. But in 1990–1995, the increase in economic openness was striking, with average scores climbing by over 16 percent. In the words of Claude Ake, market-oriented economics quickly became “something

<sup>23</sup> For example, Hyland 1995; Robinson 1996; and Peeler 1998. See also Gould 1988.

<sup>24</sup> On the phenomenon of “illiberal democracies,” see Zakaria 1997 and 2003.

<sup>25</sup> Schmitter and Karl 1991, p. 75; Armijo, Biersteker, and Lowenthal 1994, p. 161; and Held 1998, p. 11.

<sup>26</sup> Sachs 1999, p. 98. See also Gilpin 2000, p. 15.      <sup>27</sup> Gwartney and Lawson 2000.

close to a global theology” in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War.<sup>28</sup> This was the political and ideological milieu in which the first flurry of peacebuilding operations were launched at the very end of the Cold War – and it was the context that shaped the design and conduct of these operations in fundamental ways, as we shall see.

### The Agents of Peacebuilding

When faced with the task of postconflict peacebuilding, the world’s leading international organizations seemed almost predisposed to adopt strategies promoting liberal market democracy as a remedy for conflict. Many of these organizations had, in fact, become active and vocal proponents of liberal democracy, market-oriented economics, or both, at the end of the Cold War. This ideological reorientation took place not only in the United Nations but also in other major organizations – including the UN’s specialized agencies, the OSCE, the EU, NATO, the OAS, the IMF and World Bank, national development agencies, and many international NGOs engaged in relief and development tasks – in short, the principal practitioners of peacebuilding.

#### *United Nations*

The UN had been nominally committed to upholding the principles of representative democracy since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the General Assembly in 1948, stating that “everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives” and that the “will of the people . . . expressed in periodic and genuine elections . . . shall be the basis of the authority of government.”<sup>29</sup> In practice, however, Cold War disagreements effectively turned the organization into a “battleground between two opposing ideologies and power blocs,”<sup>30</sup> which prevented the UN from emphasizing its commitment to the principles of representative democracy and civil rights.<sup>31</sup> But a remarkable change took place within the organization at the end of the Cold War. “Suddenly,” writes Carl Gershman, the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights relating to democracy were “dusted off and presented to the international community as the foundation for a new world order.”<sup>32</sup>

The turning point came in 1989, with the launching of a UN mission to Namibia that set a number of precedents for the world body: For the first time, a UN field operation not only observed a cease-fire but also actively assisted in the creation of democratic political institutions within a sovereign

<sup>28</sup> Ake 1997, p. 287.

<sup>29</sup> Article 21. A similar passage also appears in Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

<sup>30</sup> Jakobson 1993, p. 23.    <sup>31</sup> Forsythe 1996, p. III.    <sup>32</sup> Gershman 1993, p. 9.

state. Shortly thereafter, the organization created a permanent Electoral Assistance Division to provide countries making the transition to democracy with technical advice and outside observers for the holding of elections.<sup>33</sup> The General Assembly underscored the organization's more active support for representative democracy by passing a resolution in December 1991 declaring that "periodic and genuine elections" are a "crucial factor in the effective enjoyment . . . of a wide range of other human rights."<sup>34</sup> The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights also began to provide states with advice on electoral laws and other election-related legislation, and helped to train public officials filling key roles in the administration of national elections.<sup>35</sup> Further, in April 1999, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, which had been one of the principal ideological battlegrounds of the Cold War, adopted a resolution affirming that "democracy fosters the full realization of all human rights" and defining democracy in clearly Western-liberal terms, emphasizing elections and civil liberties in particular.<sup>36</sup> The resolution passed by a vote of 51-0 with two abstentions: China and Cuba.

The UN Development Program, the world's largest multilateral grant-making agency, also embraced the goal of democratization after the Cold War. Although the UNDP's mandate was to promote "sustainable human development," primarily through measures aimed at eradicating poverty,<sup>37</sup> in the early 1990s the agency began to argue that the promotion of "good governance" in developing countries could help to achieve this goal. According

<sup>33</sup> As of July 2002, the Unit had received formal requests from a total of 103 member states for electoral support. ("Member States' Requests for Electoral Assistance to the United Nations System," [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/ead/assistance\\_by\\_country/ea\\_assistance.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/ead/assistance_by_country/ea_assistance.htm), accessed in May 2003.)

<sup>34</sup> UN General Assembly Resolution 46/137 of December 17, 1991, "Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections," reprinted in *United Nations* 1992, pp. 588-589.

<sup>35</sup> "Support by the United Nations System of the Efforts of Governments to Promote and Consolidate New or Restored Democracies," UN document A/53/554, October 29, 1998, para. 37.

<sup>36</sup> UN Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1999/57 (April 27, 1999). According to the resolution, democratic rights include: "(a) The rights to freedom of opinion and expression, of thought, conscience and religion, and of peaceful association and assembly; (b) The right to freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media; (c) The rule of law, including legal protection of citizens' rights, interests and personal security, and fairness in the administration of justice and independence of the judiciary; (d) The right of universal and equal suffrage, as well as free voting procedures and periodic and free elections; (e) The right of political participation, including equal opportunity for all citizens to become candidates; (f) Transparent and accountable government institutions; (g) The right of citizens to choose their governmental system through constitutional or other democratic means; [and] (h) The right to equal access to public service in one's own country."

<sup>37</sup> United Nations Development Program, "Mission Statement," <http://www.undp.org/info/discover/mission.html>, accessed in March 2002.

to the UNDP, good governance meant “the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority” in ways that are “participatory, transparent and accountable.”<sup>38</sup> In practice, this definition included support for democratic elections, which the agency views as “a major mechanism to promote accountability.”<sup>39</sup> The promotion of good governance could also include efforts to help “establish and operate” national executive, legislative and judicial institutions in developing countries, on the grounds that

[s]ound national and local legislatures and judiciaries are critical for creating and maintaining enabling environments for eradicating poverty. Legislatures mediate differing interests and debate and establish policies, laws and resources priorities that directly affect people-centered development. Electoral bodies and processes ensure independent and transparent elections for legislatures. Judiciaries uphold the rule of law, bringing security and predictability to social, political and economic relations.<sup>40</sup>

For these reasons – and because the UNDP believes that “democracy, human rights, and good governance are indivisible” – the agency came to view the promotion of good governance as one of its central goals.<sup>41</sup> In the period 1997–2000, for example, the UNDP devoted 46 percent of its regular budgetary resources to good-governance programs, such as training election personnel in the Philippines and helping elected officials in Gambia to implement the administrative and legislative provisions of their country’s new democratic constitution.<sup>42</sup>

If there were any doubts that the UN had, in fact, embraced a distinctly Western-liberal conception of democracy, the organization’s post–Cold War secretaries-general – Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan – dispelled these doubts in their public statements. In 1996, Boutros-Ghali defined a democracy as a state that observed the following principles:

that the will of the people is the basis of governmental authority; that all individuals have a right to take part in government; that there shall be periodic and genuine elections; that power changes hands through popular suffrage rather than intimidation or force; that political opponents and minorities have the right to express their views; and that there can be loyal and legal opposition to the Government in power.<sup>43</sup>

In 2000, Kofi Annan similarly described the “principle of democracy” as “the right of all people to take part in the government of their country through free and regular elections.”<sup>44</sup> Such endorsements of liberal democracy by the UN secretary-general would have been virtually unthinkable during the

<sup>38</sup> UNDP 1997, pp. 2–3.    <sup>39</sup> UNDP 2000c, chap. 5.    <sup>40</sup> UNDP 1997, p. 14.

<sup>41</sup> Cheema 1999.

<sup>42</sup> UNDP 2000a. For an overview of the UNDP’s role in promoting democracy in peacebuilding operations, see Santiso 2002.

<sup>43</sup> Boutros-Ghali 1996, para. 21. See also Boutros-Ghali 1994.    <sup>44</sup> Annan 2000.

Cold War. Yet, as Annan characterized the UN's new values and priorities: "Support for democratization has become one of our major concerns."<sup>45</sup>

### *Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe*

A similar evolution took place in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Prior to 1990, members of the OSCE (which was then known as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, or CSCE) operated on the principle of "respecting each other's right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems as well as its right to determine its laws and regulations."<sup>46</sup> This meant that all forms of government – both democratic and nondemocratic – enjoyed equal legitimacy within the organization. But after popular revolutions swept across Eastern Europe in 1989, the organization passed a resolution in June 1990 declaring that "the development of societies based on pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are prerequisites for progress in setting up the lasting order of peace, security, justice, and cooperation that they seek to establish in Europe."<sup>47</sup> To minimize ambiguity, the resolution included a list of specific governmental structures and processes that the organization would promote, including representative government in which the executive is accountable to the voters, either directly or through the elected legislature; the duty of government to act in compliance with the constitution and laws; a clear separation between the state and political parties; a commitment to consider and adopt legislation through regular public procedures; publication of regulations as a condition of their validity; effective means of redress against administrative decisions and the provision to the person affected of information about the remedies available; an independent judiciary; and various requirements in the area of criminal procedure.<sup>48</sup>

The OSCE's democracy-promoting functions were concentrated in a new Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), based in Warsaw, with a mandate to help OSCE-participating states "to ensure full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, to abide by the rule of law, to promote principles of democracy and . . . to build, strengthen and protect democratic institutions as well as promote democracy throughout society."<sup>49</sup> In its field missions, ODIHR drafted rules and regulations for democratic elections (primarily in the countries of the former Soviet bloc), trained election observers and administrators, conducted voter education programs, and encouraged grassroots political organization in states undergoing

<sup>45</sup> Annan 1997.

<sup>46</sup> This is one of the ten "guiding principles" set out in the Helsinki Final Act, which was signed by members of the CSCE in August 1975. Cited in Kritz 1993, p. 19.

<sup>47</sup> CSCE 1990, p. 1307. <sup>48</sup> This summary is drawn from Kritz 1993, pp. 19–20.

<sup>49</sup> ODIHR website, <http://www.osce.org/odihr/about.htm>, accessed in August 2000.

the transition to democracy.<sup>50</sup> In 1999 alone, ODIHR conducted more than fifty projects in twenty countries, and sent more than nineteen hundred observers to monitor elections in eleven states.<sup>51</sup>

### *European Union*

During the Cold War, the European Union's efforts to promote democracy beyond its borders were limited and haphazard,<sup>52</sup> but since the early 1990s, the organization has been actively engaged in fostering democracy in other parts of Europe and overseas. First, in Europe, negotiations aimed at inducting new states into the EU have included express requirements for candidate countries in Eastern Europe to consolidate their transitions to democracy and institutionalize civil liberties and the rule of law, among other things.<sup>53</sup> Economic liberalism is also a condition of joining the EU, with candidate states being required to have a "functioning market economy."<sup>54</sup> It appears, in fact, that these conditions have strongly reinforced the consolidation of transitional democracies in Eastern Europe that are seeking to demonstrate their suitability for membership in the Union.<sup>55</sup>

Second, in the Balkans, the EU has been deeply engaged in the peacebuilding operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. In Bosnia, one of the organization's primary goals has been "to establish functioning institutions and a viable democracy, based on the rule of law and respect for human rights."<sup>56</sup> It has pursued this goal by funding independent local media, helping to draft new laws for Bosnia that are compatible with European Union standards, and supporting a commission whose tasks include enforcing the human rights provisions of the Bosnian constitution.<sup>57</sup> In Kosovo, where the EU is by far the largest external donor agency, the organization has focused on developing a "modern market economy" in the territory, a task that it shares with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.<sup>58</sup>

Third, in its relations with countries beyond Europe, the EU has not only funded democracy-promotion programs but also imposed increasingly

<sup>50</sup> Diamond 1995, p. 35; Franck 2000, p. 38; and the following ODIHR websites: <http://www.osce.org/odihr/democratization.htm>, and <http://www.osce.org/odihr/unit-eassistance.htm>, accessed in August 2000.

<sup>51</sup> ODIHR website, <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections.htm>, accessed in August 2000.

<sup>52</sup> Youngs 2001b, p. 2.

<sup>53</sup> These criteria were determined at the EU's Copenhagen European Council in June 1993, reproduced in the website of the European Parliament, [http://www.europarl.eu.int/enlargement/ec/cop\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.eu.int/enlargement/ec/cop_en.htm), accessed in May 2003.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.* <sup>55</sup> Kopstein and Reilly 2000. <sup>56</sup> European Union 2001.

<sup>57</sup> European Union 2000a.

<sup>58</sup> European Union 2000b. For more on the division of institutional responsibilities in the Kosovo operation, see Chapter 10. Since 1999, the EU's activities in the Balkans have been guided in part by the provisions of the Stability Pact for South East Europe, which include the goals of democratization and marketization in Bosnia and Kosovo (see Bartlett and Samardžija 2000).



stringent conditions on states with which it negotiates commercial agreements. Revisions in 1989 were made in the Lomé Convention – an agreement between the EU and developing countries in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean – requiring these states to respect human rights as a condition of the agreement. A further revision in 1995 provided for the suspension of agreements with states that failed to “respect . . . democratic principles and fundamental human rights.”<sup>59</sup> Under these arrangements, the EU suspended trade and aid relations with several countries in the 1990s, including Lesotho in 1994, Niger and Sierra Leone in 1996, and Cameroon in 1997.<sup>60</sup> Although some commentators have accused the EU of failing to implement these provisions fully and consistently across all states with which it has trade and aid relationships,<sup>61</sup> the European Union nevertheless emerged as one of the world’s most vigorous promoters of democracy in the 1990s.

### *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*

The North Atlantic Treaty, signed in 1949, formally committed NATO to upholding “the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.”<sup>62</sup> During the Cold War, the organization’s pursuit of this goal was limited to the defense of liberal democracies of Western Europe against the threat of hostilities with the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. NATO did not, in other words, actively promote democracy in states outside the area of the alliance itself. The demise of the Soviet Union, however, profoundly altered the strategic landscape of Europe. The likelihood of a military attack upon NATO suddenly seemed very remote, but at the same time a new problem emerged: Long-suppressed tensions threatened to erupt into violence in parts of the former communist bloc, including in nearby Yugoslavia, which collapsed into civil war in 1991. In response to these shifting circumstances, NATO began to reorient its activities. In June 1992, NATO foreign ministers decided that the alliance could make available its resources and expertise in support of the OSCE’s conflict-resolution efforts in the former communist bloc.<sup>63</sup>

Since then, NATO has accepted primary responsibility for implementing the military aspects of the Bosnian and Kosovo peace accords, missions that aim, among other things, to establish functioning democratic institutions in these war-shattered Balkan territories. Furthermore, when NATO established the Partnership for Peace program in 1994 – a framework for cooperation between NATO and the members of the former Warsaw Pact organization, along with other states – the alliance imposed the condition that any state joining the program had to commit itself “to the preservation

<sup>59</sup> Quoted in Youngs 2001b, p. 35.      <sup>60</sup> Youngs 2001a, p. 19.

<sup>61</sup> For example, Olsen 2002; and Kubicek 2002.      <sup>62</sup> North Atlantic Treaty, preamble.

<sup>63</sup> Barrett 1996, p. 145. For an overview of changes in NATO’s mission since the end of the Cold War, see Rader 1996; and Kaufman 2002.

of democratic societies.”<sup>64</sup> Democracy is also a condition for gaining full membership in the organization.<sup>65</sup> In these various ways, NATO became directly involved in the promotion of democracy in countries outside its membership.

### *Organization of American States*

Like the UN, the Organization of American States has always been constitutionally committed to upholding representative democracy,<sup>66</sup> but until the 1990s, the organization’s efforts to enforce this commitment were, in the words of one commentator, “modest and episodic at best.”<sup>67</sup> In June 1991, however, the OAS membership passed a resolution calling for “the immediate convocation of a meeting . . . in the event of any occurrences giving rise to the sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government of any of the Organization’s member states.”<sup>68</sup> The adoption of this resolution signaled the start of a new period of activism in the promotion and defense of democratic governance by the OAS.<sup>69</sup> The organization has since monitored elections in Haiti, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Paraguay, and Surinam, and imposed sanctions following antidemocratic coups in Haiti and Peru.<sup>70</sup>

At the same time, the OAS also established a new Unit for the Promotion of Democracy to “provide guidance and support to the member states to strengthen their democratic institutions and procedures.”<sup>71</sup> The unit’s many projects have included educational courses for national politicians and officials on the workings of democracy, the coordination of OAS electoral assistance, and local-level projects to promote dialogues between ordinary citizens and their elected leaders in OAS member states.<sup>72</sup> In September 2001, members of the organization signed the Inter-American Democratic Charter, reaffirming their commitment to promote democracy in the Americas and to suspend the membership of any state in which an “unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order” has occurred.<sup>73</sup>

<sup>64</sup> NATO 1994.      <sup>65</sup> NATO 1999.

<sup>66</sup> In the preamble to the OAS Charter, member states express their conviction that “representative democracy is an indispensable condition for the stability, peace and development of the region.” See also Articles 3(d) and 2(b).

<sup>67</sup> Diamond 1995, p. 36. See also Acevedo and Grossman 1996, p. 137; and Boniface 2002, p. 365.

<sup>68</sup> Resolution AG/Res. 1080 (XXI-0/91), cited in Franck 1992, pp. 65–66.

<sup>69</sup> For an overview, see Parish and Peceny 2002.

<sup>70</sup> See Schnably 2000; and Boniface 2002, pp. 365–367.

<sup>71</sup> Unit for the Promotion of Democracy website, <http://www.upd.oas.org/Introduction/aboutus.htm>, accessed in March 2002.

<sup>72</sup> OAS 2000.

<sup>73</sup> Article 21 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, signed at Lima on September 11, 2001.

***Bretton Woods Institutions***

The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are known collectively as the Bretton Woods institutions, with the World Bank itself comprised of two main constituent units: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Development Association.<sup>74</sup> Before the 1980s, the Bretton Woods institutions had clearly different roles: The IMF provided short-term “stabilization” loans aimed at helping countries overcome temporary balance-of-payments problems, while the World Bank concentrated on lending for large-scale development projects. During this period, the International Monetary Fund frequently attached strings to its loans; the World Bank generally did not. In particular, the IMF typically required recipient states to implement fiscal and monetary austerity measures – such as reductions in public spending, limits on the provision of credit, and devaluation of the local currency – in order to lower the rate of inflation and restore macroeconomic balance.<sup>75</sup>

In the 1980s, however, the distinction between the respective roles of the IMF and World Bank gradually eroded as IMF lending packages became longer term, and as the World Bank began to impose policy conditionalities on its loans that were similar to those advocated by the IMF.<sup>76</sup> There was also a partial convergence in their conception of what was required in order to promote economic growth in the developing world – sometimes described as the “Washington consensus” – which held that international donors should encourage recipient states to implement economic liberalization policies, on the grounds that deregulation and privatization of these states’ economies would create the most propitious conditions for sustained growth.<sup>77</sup> Specifically, both organizations began promoting “structural adjustment” programs in developing states, which included provisions for fiscal austerity and deflationary policies, privatization of state-owned enterprises, trade liberalization, currency devaluation, and deregulation of financial and labor markets.<sup>78</sup> John Walton and David Seddon explain the reasoning behind these policies:

Currency devaluations make Third World exports more competitive in international trade; reduced public spending curbs inflation and saves money for debt repayment; privatization of state-owned corporations generates more productive investment and reduces public payrolls; elimination of protectionism and other restraints on foreign investment lures more efficient export firms; cuts in public subsidies for food and basic necessities help to “get the prices right,” benefiting domestic producers; wage

<sup>74</sup> The other major units of the World Bank are the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).

<sup>75</sup> Taylor 1993, pp. 41–42. <sup>76</sup> Feinberg 1988; Polak 1997, pp. 473–493; and Krueger 1998.

<sup>77</sup> Williamson 1989. See also Taylor 1997.

<sup>78</sup> Rapley 1996. See Weaver 1995 for a general description of structural adjustment, including an overview of the main elements of the “typical” structural adjustment program.

restraints and higher interest rates reduce inflation and enhance competitiveness; and import restrictions conserve foreign exchange for debt servicing.<sup>79</sup>

Since the end of the Cold War, structural adjustment programs sponsored by the Bretton Woods institutions have routinely demanded that developing states undertake not only economic liberalization but political liberalization as well – a policy shift that has been more evident in the World Bank than in the IMF.<sup>80</sup> In theory, the Bank is prohibited by its own Articles of Agreement from interfering in “the political affairs of any member” state, and Bank officials are required to make lending decisions only on the basis of “economic considerations.”<sup>81</sup> From 1990 onward, however, the World Bank has effectively linked its lending to a requirement for “good governance” in recipient states, which includes “holding those in positions of authority responsible for their actions through the rule of law and due process rather than by administrative fiat” and “giving citizens a voice in governmental decisions and activities – not only through voting and representation but also through direct involvement in shaping and implementing programs that affect their lives and well-being.”<sup>82</sup>

Although the Bank claims that it does not seek to impose any particular form of government on developing states, its conception of “good governance” (like that of the UN Development Program) nevertheless implies support for the principles of limited government and popular accountability through elections, which are central elements in the Western notion of liberal democracy.<sup>83</sup> In the words of Wolfgang Reinicke: “It is difficult to imagine how an independent judiciary, freedom of organization, speech, the media, and even elections, all of which are preconditions for good governance but also elements of democracy, could be operated only with reference to economic efficiency and effectiveness criteria.”<sup>84</sup> Nevertheless, they are. For better or worse, the good-governance agenda pursued by the Bank (and to a lesser extent by the IMF)<sup>85</sup> has sought to remedy “two undesirable characteristics that had been prevalent earlier, the unrepresentative character of governments and the inefficiency of non-market systems.”<sup>86</sup> Thus, the

<sup>79</sup> Walton and Seddon 1994, p. 41.

<sup>80</sup> Williams and Young 1994, pp. 85–86; and Shaw 1996, p. 41.

<sup>81</sup> Article IV, Section 10 of the World Bank’s Articles of Agreement, cited in Skogly 1993, p. 760.

<sup>82</sup> World Bank 1995, pp. 5–6. See also World Bank 1992 and 1994.

<sup>83</sup> Jeffries 1993, p. 26; Islam and Morrison 1996, p. 11; and Gillies 1996. For an overview of the various ways in which “good governance” has been defined, see Moore and Robinson 1995.

<sup>84</sup> Reinicke 1996, p. 293.

<sup>85</sup> The IMF’s global governance efforts focus primarily on “the rule of law, improving the efficiency and accountability of the public sector, and tackling corruption.” See IMF 1997. For analysis of IMF “good governance” activities, see James 1998; and Phillips 1999.

<sup>86</sup> Weiss 2000. See also Abrahamsen 1997, pp. 145–146.

lending practices of the Bretton Woods institutions in the 1990s seemed to presuppose that Western models of economic and political organization were optimal, and that market-oriented economies and political democracies were mutually reinforcing.<sup>87</sup>

### *National Development Agencies*

The national development agencies of the wealthy industrialized democracies, which are among the most prominent players in the world of international aid, have also shifted toward democracy promotion since the end of the Cold War, reflecting the broader trend toward “political conditionality” in development lending.<sup>88</sup> The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), for example, the world’s largest aid donor, historically focused on social and economic development in poor countries, especially in the areas of health, population, and the environment, and until recently placed relatively little emphasis on democracy and human rights.<sup>89</sup> This focus began to change under the Reagan administration in the 1980s, when USAID initiated several programs to assist in the administration of justice and the conduct of democratic elections, particularly in Latin America.<sup>90</sup> In 1990, the agency identified the promotion of democracy as one of its central goals, announcing that “allocations of USAID funds to individual countries will take into account their progress toward democratization,” with the objective of placing “democracy on a comparable footing with progress in economic reforms and the establishment of a market-oriented economy, key factors which are already used as criteria for allocating funds.”<sup>91</sup> USAID subsequently launched a series of new programs aimed at assisting developing states in the areas of free and fair elections, constitution drafting, legislatures, judicial systems, local government, anticorruption efforts, regulatory reform, civic education, and independent organizations and media in civil society (including human rights, legal aid, and women’s, professional, and church groups).<sup>92</sup>

Comparable changes have also taken place in the national aid agencies of other industrialized states, as virtually all major donor governments have placed more emphasis on democracy and human rights in their allocations of development aid since the end of the Cold War, including Canada, the Nordic countries, Holland, Britain, Belgium, France, Germany, Switzerland, and the European Union.<sup>93</sup> Further, the Development Assistance Committee of the

<sup>87</sup> Harbeson 1994, p. 7. See also Hibou 2002. <sup>88</sup> Stokke 1995.

<sup>89</sup> Diamond 1995, p. 13. <sup>90</sup> Ibid. See, in particular, n. 13 on p. 71.

<sup>91</sup> Cited in Nelson and Eglinton 1992, p. 16. See also Nelson and Eglinton 1996, pp. 170–172.

<sup>92</sup> Diamond 1995, p. 13.

<sup>93</sup> See Uvin 1993; Robinson 1993; Leftwich 1993; Baylies 1995; Islam and Morrison 1996; Forsythe 1996; Selbervik 1997; Commins 1997; and Blair 1997.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which coordinates policy among the world's preeminent aid donors, has endorsed the objective of using development assistance to promote "democratic and accountable governance."<sup>94</sup> Even Japan, which has traditionally been reluctant to link aid to the policies of recipient governments, announced in 1992 that it would include progress toward democracy among the principles that would guide the future apportionment of aid.<sup>95</sup>

### *International Nongovernmental Organizations*

The number and variety of international nongovernmental organizations has increased rapidly in recent decades, making it difficult to generalize about the activities or ideological orientation of the international NGO sector as a whole.<sup>96</sup> In the final years of the twentieth century, however, a new class of international nongovernmental actors gained prominence – the so-called democracy NGOs – based primarily in the United States and in other Western democracies. Ronald Reagan's decision to emphasize democracy promotion in the early 1980s led to the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), modeled on Germany's *Stiftungen*, which had subsidized democratic groups in the developing world since the 1950s.<sup>97</sup> The NED, a publicly funded but privately run grant-making agency, has transferred funds directly to foreign organizations and democracy movements and has also channeled grants through four other U.S.-based international NGOs: the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, the International Republican Institute, the Free Trade Union Institute, and the Center for International Private Enterprise.<sup>98</sup>

The British government founded the independent Westminster Foundation for Democracy, fashioned after the NED, in 1992; and the Canadian government established the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development in 1989, with a mandate to "encourage and support the universal values of human rights and the promotion of democratic institutions and practices around the world."<sup>99</sup> Several private NGOs, such as the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, the Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe, and George Soros's Open Society Institute, were also created around this time in order to support democratic transitions and elections in developing countries and the states of the former Soviet bloc.<sup>100</sup>

<sup>94</sup> OECD 1996; and Kondo 1999.    <sup>95</sup> Nelson and Eglinton 1996, p. 175.

<sup>96</sup> Rosenau 1995.    <sup>97</sup> Carothers 1999, pp. 30–31.    <sup>98</sup> Diamond 1995, p. 16.

<sup>99</sup> International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development 2000, p. 1.

<sup>100</sup> The proliferation of these international democracy-promoting organizations was, in part, the result of the shifting priorities of the industrialized democracies, which began to "contract out" the delivery of development assistance in the 1980s to NGOs. See de Wall 1997; and Barkan 1997.

To be sure, a number of NGOs were critical of the new prominence of political and economic liberalization as development goals. Some organizations in the human rights field – such as Amnesty International, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, and the International League for Human Rights – contended that too much emphasis was being placed on elections and too little on civil liberties. As the former director of Human Rights Watch, Aryeh Neier, wrote in 1993: “By and large the human rights movement would prefer not to be associated with the global crusade to promote democracy.”<sup>101</sup> Others claimed that aid donors should do more to foster popular “grass-roots” forms of political participation, instead of focusing so narrowly on elections.<sup>102</sup> Still others criticized the allegedly disruptive and damaging effects of market-oriented adjustment policies on developing countries.<sup>103</sup>

Yet these criticisms were less fundamental than they appear at first glance. Few international NGOs ever went so far as to endorse antiliberal political or economic policies – say, dictatorships or command economies. When international human rights organizations argued, for instance, that more attention should be paid to civil and political rights, they were still advocating principles that derived from liberal democratic ideology.<sup>104</sup> As David Williams and Tom Young note, most development NGOs share a “common vision of what development means which is rooted in Western notions of the state, ‘civil society’ and the self. The most radical part of the NGO discourse . . . is their emphasis on ‘grass roots’ participation. . . . But this terminology is always to be understood entirely within Western preconceptions.”<sup>105</sup> This is not to say that these organizations’ criticisms were insignificant but, rather, that they tend to remain committed to promoting liberal political or economic goals, albeit by different means. Put differently, most international NGOs (in the fields of human rights, development, and emergency relief) seemed to accept the view that free and fair elections, respect for civil liberties, and market-oriented economics are desirable objectives for developing states.<sup>106</sup>

For many of these governmental and nongovernmental organizations, liberalization was an uncontroversial solution for reconstituting war-torn societies. No great ideological debates were required to reach this consensus; it emerged almost automatically and without much questioning or comment, reflecting the newfound enthusiasm for liberal democracy and market-oriented economics in the world’s leading international organizations, which in turn mirrored the ascendancy of liberal political and economic ideas in world politics at the end of the Cold War. “It is clear,” wrote David Chandler in 1999, “that we have witnessed a major transformation in the language

<sup>101</sup> Neier 1993, p. 47.      <sup>102</sup> For example, VeneKlasen 1996.

<sup>103</sup> For example, Oxfam 1995.      <sup>104</sup> Carothers 1994, p. 112.

<sup>105</sup> Williams and Young 1994, p. 98.      <sup>106</sup> Fernando and Heston 1997, p. 14.

and themes of international relations. The international policy agenda today is dominated by issues such as the consolidation of democracy and the protection of rights.”<sup>107</sup> This observation applies directly to the international organizations described here, which exhibited a newfound and “unprecedented commitment . . . to the promotion of liberal pluralist arrangements” after the Cold War.<sup>108</sup> As three commentators put it in 1994, “the primary debate now taking place within governments and many international organizations centers not around whether democracy and market-oriented reforms are desirable, but rather around how they can be supported most effectively by external actors, and how best to secure and target the necessary resources.”<sup>109</sup> Given all of the changes that occurred at the end of the Cold War – the increased demand for postconflict peacebuilding, the ability of the United Nations and other international agencies to respond to this demand, and the turn toward liberalism both in world politics and in the commitments of the world’s leading international organizations – it comes as little surprise that peacebuilding operations would emerge as a growth industry in the post–Cold War era, and that these operations would tend to promote political and economic liberalization.

Indeed, it appears that it was a combination of changes in the power structure of international affairs at the end of the Cold War and a concurrent and related shift in the “cultural” environment of world politics that led the agents of peacebuilding to adopt the strategy of promoting liberalization as a means of consolidating peace in war-shattered states. One could argue that both the Soviet Union and the United States had been conducting their own versions of peacebuilding during the Cold War, within their respective spheres of influence. For the United States, that meant managing internal conflicts by propping up friendly regimes that were often touted as democratic (even if the real character of the regimes was different). For the Soviet Union, dealing with civil conflict within its client states meant building up socialist regimes on the Soviet model. When the Cold War ended, the power structure of world politics changed, and the American version of peacebuilding “won” and was largely adopted by international agencies for the peacebuilding operations of the 1990s. This model was, in a manner of speaking, internationalized.

But changes in the power conditions of world politics tell only part of the story, because there was a related shift in what might be called the international norms of legitimate statehood. The “world polity” school of sociology offers one set of analytical tools for examining this normative change.<sup>110</sup> Like other sociologists, members of this school study the norms,

<sup>107</sup> Chandler 1999a, p. 18.      <sup>108</sup> Taylor 1999, p. 555.

<sup>109</sup> Armijo, Biersteker, and Lowenthal 1994, p. 161.

<sup>110</sup> Examples of this school’s work include Meyer and Hannan 1979; Meyer 1980 and 1999; Thomas, Meyer, Ramirez, and Boli 1987; Boli and Thomas 1997 and 1999; and Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez 1997.



customs, and widely held beliefs – or the “culture” – of human societies, but rather than focusing on the culture of a particular national or religious group, they examine the formal and informal rules of the *international* system, or what they call the “global culture.” Among other things, global culture defines who the principal actors in world politics should be, how these actors should organize themselves internally, and how they should behave. From this perspective, the modern state is itself a cultural form that is continuously reproduced because it is widely viewed as the most appropriate model for organizing human societies. At a given moment in history, some states may be considered as more legitimate than others; and it appears that the end of the Cold War gave rise to a historic shift in global culture in which liberal democracy came to be generally perceived as the most legitimate form of the state. This cultural revolution cannot be separated from the power changes that occurred at the end of the Cold War, as noted, but the global culture perspective does help to explain why international organizations seem to have willingly embraced liberalization as the “natural” solution to civil conflict and strategy for peacebuilding.<sup>111</sup>

### Liberalization as an All-Purpose Elixir

Decades from now, historians may look back on the immediate post-Cold War years as a period of remarkable faith in the powers of liberalization to remedy a broad range of social ills, from internal and international violence to poverty, famine, corruption, and even environmental destruction. In the statements of government policymakers and the writings of academics, especially in the first half of the 1990s, market democracy took on the qualities of a universal antidote to misery and conflict, “almost mystically endowed with an array of characteristics that are supposed to assure both domestic and international peace and prosperity.”<sup>112</sup> Writing in 1995, for example, Stanford University’s Larry Diamond, coeditor of the *Journal of Democracy*, offered this paean to liberal democracy as a panacea for so many of the world’s problems:

The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically “cleanse” their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations

<sup>111</sup> For an elaboration of this argument, see Paris 2003c.

<sup>112</sup> Slaughter 1998, p. 129.

and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.<sup>113</sup>

At the same time that Diamond was writing these words, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was drafting a major policy statement that later became known as the *Agenda for Democratization*.<sup>114</sup> In the report, Boutros-Ghali expressed a similar missionary-like faith in the many benefits of liberal democracy. Given the importance of the UN as a peacebuilding agency and symbol of the international community, and the fact that the organization had been so riven by ideological disputes during the Cold War, the *Agenda for Democratization* is worth quoting at length. According to the secretary-general, “the practice of democracy is increasingly regarded as essential to progress on a wide range of human concerns and to the protection of human rights.” These “human concerns,” he went on to explain, include interstate and intrastate peace, economic development, cultural enrichment, control of crime and corruption, and protection of the environment:

Because democratic Governments are freely chosen by their citizens and held accountable through periodic and genuine elections and other mechanisms, they are more likely to promote and respect the rule of law, respect individual and minority rights, cope effectively with social conflict, absorb migrant populations and respond to the needs of marginalized groups. . . . Democracy within States thus fosters the evolution of the social contract upon which lasting peace can be built. . . . Democratic institutions and processes within States may likewise be conducive to peace among States. . . . The legitimacy conferred on democratically elected Governments commands the respect of the peoples of other democratic States and fosters expectations of negotiation, compromise and the rule of law in international relations. When States sharing a culture of democracy are involved in a dispute, the transparency of their regimes may help to prevent accidents, avoid reactions based on emotion or fear and reduce the likelihood of surprise attack. . . .

In today’s world, freedom of thought, the impetus to creativity and the will to involvement are all critical to economic, social and cultural progress, and they are best fostered and protected within democratic systems. In this sense, the economic act of privatization can be as well a political act, enabling greater human creativity and participation. The best way to cultivate a citizen’s readiness to participate in the development of his or her country, to arouse that person’s energy, imagination and commitment, is by recognizing and respecting human dignity and human rights. The material means of progress can be acquired, but human resources – skilled, spirited and inventive workers – are indispensable, as is the enrichment found through mutual dialogue and the free interchange of ideas. In this way, a culture of democracy, marked by communication, dialogue and openness to the ideas and activities of the world, helps to foster a culture of development. . . .

<sup>113</sup> Diamond 1995, pp. 6–7.

<sup>114</sup> Boutros-Ghali 1996.

By providing legitimacy for government and encouraging people's participation in decision-making on the issues that affect their lives, democratic processes contribute to the effectiveness of state policies and development strategies. Democratic institutions and practices foster the governmental accountability and transparency necessary to deter national and transnational crime and corruption and encourage increased responsiveness to popular concerns. In development, they increase the likelihood that state goals reflect broad societal concerns and that government is sensitive to the societal and environmental costs of its development policies.<sup>115</sup>

Boutros-Ghali concluded that the promotion of democracy was essential because "peace, development and democracy are inextricably linked."<sup>116</sup>

Given all these claims, it would have been surprising if the UN had *not* embraced liberalization as the grand strategy for postconflict peacebuilding, particularly since one of the core arguments in favor of liberalization is that it promotes peace. In fact, as we shall see in the next chapter, the proposition that liberalization fosters peace – sometimes called the "liberal peace thesis" – is a very old idea, dating back to the writings of eighteenth-century Enlightenment philosophers. Scholars "rediscovered" this idea in the 1980s. It became a major area of social scientific research in the early 1990s, providing timely ammunition to policymakers in national governments and international organizations who were already inclined to believe that democratization and marketization represents the surest route to lasting peace in countries that are just emerging from civil wars.

But to what extent was the peace-through-liberalization proposition based on demonstrated fact? Did democratization and marketization actually create conditions for stable and lasting peace in the countries that hosted peacebuilding operations after the Cold War? These are questions that the remainder of this book will address, after we take a closer look at the liberal peace thesis itself.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 17, 18, 22, 24.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 118.

## Appendix to Chapter 1

### *The Terminology of Peace Operations*

The terminology of peace operations is notoriously slippery. Some commentators use “peacekeeping” as a label for all types of military operations that do not involve outright war fighting, whereas others assign specific labels to different kinds of missions. Following is a short glossary of terms used in this book, including a definition of peacebuilding itself:

- *Preventive diplomacy* is action to prevent conflicts from starting in the first place or spreading to neighboring territories.
- *Peacekeeping* is the deployment of a lightly armed, multinational contingent of military personnel for nonenforcement purposes, such as the observation of a cease-fire.
- *Peacemaking* is the attempt to resolve an ongoing conflict, either by peaceful means such as mediation and negotiation, or, if necessary, by the authorization of an international military force to impose a settlement to the conflict.
- *Peace enforcement* is the threat or use of nondefensive military force to impose, maintain, or restore a cease-fire.
- *Peacebuilding* is action undertaken at the end of a civil conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of fighting. A *peacebuilding mission* involves the deployment of military and civilian personnel from several international agencies, with a mandate to conduct peacebuilding in a country that is just emerging from a civil war.
- Finally, the generic phrases *peace operations* and *peace missions* refer to any international peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, peacebuilding, or preventive diplomacy operations that include a multinational military force aimed at restoring or preserving peace.

These terms are not mutually exclusive. Peacebuilding, for instance, can involve the deployment of lightly armed, multinational contingents for nonenforcement purposes, and can therefore incorporate elements of peacekeeping. Alternatively, peacebuilding missions may include troops with enforcement rather than peacekeeping duties and powers. Confusion sometimes arises from the fact that peacebuilding operations seek to prevent a recurrence of violence, which is, in effect, a type of preventive diplomacy. Furthermore, peacebuilders can become involved in peacemaking if fighting reignites during a mission.

While it is easy to become entangled in these definitions, two distinguishing features of peacebuilding are worth highlighting. First, peacekeeping and peacebuilding are not synonymous. Peacekeeping is a primarily military activity that typically concentrates on cease-fire monitoring, whereas peacebuilding involves a wide variety of both military and nonmilitary functions,

including the administration of elections; the retraining of judges, lawyers, and police officers; the nurturing of indigenous political parties and non-governmental organizations; the design and implementation of economic reforms; the reorganization of governmental institutions; the promotion of free media; and the delivery of emergency humanitarian and financial assistance. The military component of a peacebuilding operation therefore represents only one element in a larger effort to establish the conditions for stable and lasting peace. Second, peacebuilding begins when the fighting has stopped. It is, by definition, a postconflict enterprise. Some commentators use the term more broadly to encompass other types of interventions, including those aimed at preventing violence from erupting in the first place, or what I have labeled preventive diplomacy. However, I have adopted the more common usage: Peacebuilding operations are deployed to consolidate peace in countries that have recently experienced civil conflict, and where hostilities have already ended.<sup>117</sup>

<sup>117</sup> For example, the U.S. Army field manual on peace operations (United States Army 1994) has defined peacebuilding as “postconflict actions . . . that strengthen and rebuild civil infrastructures and institutions in order to avoid a return to conflict.”