Never Too Early to
Prepare for Next Winter:
Europe’s Gas Balance for
2023-2024
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INTERNATIONAL ENERGY
AGENCY
Never Too Early to Prepare for Next Winter:
Europe’s Gas Balance for 2023-2024
Page | 3
IEA.CCBY4.0.
Summary
 Russia’s natural gas deliveries to the European Union by pipeline halved in the first
ten months of 2022 compared with the same period in 2021, a drop of 60 billion cubic
metres (bcm). For the full year, Russia’s pipeline supplies are expected to decline by over
55%, a drop of 80 bcm, putting unprecedented pressure on both European and global gas
markets.
 EU gas storage sites are now 95% full – putting them 5%, or 5 bcm, above their 5-year
average.
 The process of filling EU storages over the summer of 2022 benefitted from two
factors that might not be repeated in 2023: 30 bcm of Russian gas supplied to the EU
via pipeline, and lower LNG imports by China due to its economic slowdown and Covidinduced
lockdowns.
 The cushion provided by the current mild temperatures, lower gas prices and high
storage levels should not lead to overly optimistic predictions about the future. The
combination of lower-than-normal gas demand in October and persistently strong LNG
inflows has put strong downward pressure on day-ahead prices, which fell below USD
10/MMBtu by the end of October –against an all-time high of USD 100/MMBtu at the end
of August. However, Europe is not out of the woods yet, and our analysis identifies some
significant risks ahead in 2023 and 2024.
 Global LNG supply is expected to increase by only 20 bcm in 2023, much less than
the likely additional reduction in Russian pipeline deliveries. Russian pipeline gas
deliveries to the EU in 2022 are set to reach around 60 bcm. But in 2023, they will in all
probability drop to less than half that amount – and could cease completely.
 China’s LNG imports could rebound next year to close to their 2021 levels as
economic growth recovers after Covid-related lockdowns. This would capture over 85%
of the expected increase in global LNG supply, much of which has in any case already
been contracted to China, thereby limiting the amount of LNG cargoes available to the
European market in 2023.
 If Russian pipeline gas supplies to the EU cease completely and Chinese LNG
imports recover to 2021 levels, Europe could face a supply-demand gap of 30 bcm
during the key summer period for refilling gas storage in 2023. This gap could
represent almost half the gas required to fill storage sites to 95% capacity by the start
of the 2023-24 heating season.
 More rapid deployment of energy efficiency measures, renewables and heat pumps
is needed to reduce the risk of a worsening energy and gas crisis. This will require
immediate action from governments. A further push to accelerate structural changes and
reduce gas consumption is essential not only for Europe’s clean energy transitions but also
for its energy security and the wellbeing of its citizens and industries.
 The IEA will present a roadmap for securing Europe's gas balance for next winter
showing what is needed to ensure storage sites are filled to 95% capacity by the beginning
of the 2023-24 heating season and to structurally reduce gas consumption during the
winter.
Never Too Early to Prepare for Next Winter:
Europe’s Gas Balance for 2023-2024
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IEA.CCBY4.0.
As winter approaches, a combination of favourable LNG market
dynamics, robust pipeline deliveries from non-Russian suppliers, lower
demand, and policy actions has given Europe a chance to sidestep some
of the worst immediate impacts of Russia’s steep cuts to natural gas
deliveries
 Russia’s pipeline gas deliveries to the European Union halved in the first ten
months of 2022 compared with last year’s levels. The decline in absolute terms
was 60 bcm, the equivalent of over 10% of the global LNG trade. The steep decline
in Russian gas supplies coincided with multi-year lows in European hydro and
nuclear power output (down by 20% and 16% year-on-year, respectively), putting
huge pressure on European gas markets.
 Gas prices on the Dutch Title Transfer Facility (TTF) – a leading European gas
hub – averaged over EUR 130/MWh (USD 40/MMBtu) year-to-date, almost eight
times the 5-year average between 2016 and 2020. The all-time high prices
attracted record LNG inflows to the European Union and the United Kingdom,
rising by 65% or over 50 bcm year-on-year in the first ten months of 2022.
 Gas demand in the European Union and the United Kingdom in the first 10 months
of 2022 was down by an estimated 10%, or over 40 bcm, compared with the same
period a year earlier. This was mainly the result of lower consumption across the
residential, commercial and industrial sectors, but it also includes some efficiency
gains and behavioural responses to higher prices. It also reflects demand
destruction, particularly in gas-intensive industries.
 Non-Russian pipeline supplies to Europe increased substantially. Pipeline
deliveries from Norway rose by 5% (5 bcm) and flows from Azerbaijan via the
Trans Adriatic Pipeline surged by close to 50% (3 bcm) year-on-year in the first
ten months of 2022. In both cases, export infrastructure is running close to
nameplate capacity. Algeria increased its pipeline supplies to Europe by over 10%
(or 3 bcm) on available export routes in the first ten months of the year, and has
some limited upside
Never Too Early to Prepare for Next Winter:
Europe’s Gas Balance for 2023-2024
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IEA.CCBY4.0.
Year-on-year changes in global LNG exports and imports by key regions, January –
October 2022
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
 Strong European demand for LNG led to a reconfiguration of global LNG flows as
increases in LNG supply (23 bcm) were not sufficient to meet Europe’s rapidly
rising LNG imports. Higher LNG flows towards Europe were enabled in part by
China’s LNG imports falling by 20% (or 19 bcm) year-to-date as it drastically
reduced spot procurements. Europe’s thirst for LNG also disrupted gas and
electricity supply in more price-sensitive markets, including in South Asia.
Mild weather, healthy storage levels and strong LNG supply have led to a
significant fall in some natural gas price markers
 The combination of higher non-Russian gas imports and lower demand was
instrumental for Europe to offset Russia’s gas supply cuts and enable a nearrecord
build-up of storage levels. Storage injections were 22%, or 13 bcm, above
their 5-year average in 2022. At the beginning of November, EU storage sites were
close to 95% full – well above the European Union’s 80% target and well-aligned
with the IEA’s 10-Point Plan to Reduce the European Union’s Reliance on Russian
Natural Gas.
 Unseasonably mild weather in October reduced gas demand from distribution
networks (concentrated in the commercial and residential sectors) by over 30%
year-on-year and effectively delayed the start of the heating season in most
European markets. This steep decline in demand coincided with a persistently
strong influx of LNG cargoes, which have limited immediate flexibility to change
destination, as deliveries are typically scheduled several weeks in advance.
 Lower-than-expected demand, together with high LNG inflow and healthy storage
levels, pushed down European gas prices. Month-ahead prices on TTF fell to just
0
10
20
30
40
50
Yoychange(bcm)
EU
Other
Europe
Lower demand
in Asia
Lower demand in
South America
Demand in other
regions
LNG export growth
from the US
Supply growth from
other regions
China
Never Too Early to Prepare for Next Winter:
Europe’s Gas Balance for 2023-2024
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below EUR 100/MWh (USD 30/MMBtu) by the end of October. This was less than
one-third of the all-time high at the end of August but still more than five times the
5-year average during the 2016-20 period. Day-ahead prices – which are more
reflective of short-term supply-demand factors – fell below USD 10/MMBtu at the
end of October, while next-hour prices dropped into negative territory for a short
period on 24 October amid infrastructure constraints in the TTF market zone.
Day-ahead and month-ahead TTF prices
(August – October 2022)
EU gas storage levels
(1 November 2022)
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
The temporary comfort provided by today’s market conditions should not
lead to overly optimistic conclusions about the future: a cold spell could
quickly change sentiment and Europe’s gas balance faces even tougher
tests in 2023
 While EU gas inventories are standing 5%, or 5 bcm, above their 5-year average,
this additional storage cushion could be quickly erased: 5 bcm is just two days of
EU gas demand during a cold spell.
 There is a wide range of possible outcomes for EU gas storage at the end of this
winter heating season. Assuming no or very low Russian gas deliveries to the
European Union this winter, and average levels of LNG imports (around 13 bcm
per month), then gas storage levels could be anywhere between 5% and 35% by
the end of the heating season, depending on demand trajectories over the coming
months.
 Variable demand trajectories, which can be influenced by policies as well as prices
and weather, translate into a variety of future scenarios for gas injection needs
during the summer of 2023. These vary between 60 bcm and 90 bcm in order to
reach 95% storage levels by the beginning of the 2023-24 heating season.
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
01-Aug-22
09-Aug-22
17-Aug-22
25-Aug-22
02-Sep-22
10-Sep-22
18-Sep-22
26-Sep-22
04-Oct-22
12-Oct-22
20-Oct-22
28-Oct-22
EUR/MWh
TTF month-ahead
TTF day-ahead
0
20
40
60
80
100
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
bcm
EU storage levels 5-year average
Never Too Early to Prepare for Next Winter:
Europe’s Gas Balance for 2023-2024
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 Considering current market trends, our assessment today is that the storage
injection needs of the European Union and the United Kingdom will be 68 bcm
(including 1.68 bcm of injections to the Rough storage in the United Kingdom).
This is based on the assumption that European gas demand during this
November-March period is 11% below its 5-year average. A colder-than-average
winter could deplete European storage levels faster, resulting in injection needs in
the range of 80-90 bcm.
Potential EU and UK storage levels by
end March 2023
Resulting injection needs in summer
2023 to reach 95% fill level
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: assuming no Russian piped gas to the European Union from 1st
of January and average (13 bcm/month) LNG
imports into the European Union and the United Kingdom.
 Measures to limit short-term demand and storage depletion, alongside more
structural measures to bring down gas demand, are absolutely essential to
position Europe for next year. The drive to refill Europe’s gas storages for the
2023-24 winter heating season has to begin now.
Some of the factors that helped Europe in 2022 are unlikely to be as
favourable in 2023: in particular, Russian deliveries are likely to be
considerably lower and competition from China for available LNG
cargoes considerably higher
 Although Russian gas deliveries to Europe were cut sharply during 2022, they
were close to ‘normal’ levels for much of the first half of the year. Total pipeline
supply from Russia in 2022 is likely to amount to around 60 bcm. It is highly
unlikely that Russia will deliver another 60 bcm of piped gas in 2023. If supply
remains at current levels, then Russian pipeline supply would be around 25 bcm
in 2023. It is also entirely possible that Russian deliveries could fall further – or
cease entirely.
 Non-Russian pipeline suppliers have limited upside potential, with both Azerbaijan
and Norway supplying close to their nameplate capacity in 2022. In the case of
Algeria, some limited upside is expected with the development of gas fields in the
Berkine South basin.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
13% demand
reduction
5y average 9% demand
reduction
no demand
reduction
Fill levels
0
20
40
60
80
100
13% demand
reduction
2022 injections 9% demand
reduction
no demand
reduction
bcm
Injection needs to 95%
Never Too Early to Prepare for Next Winter:
Europe’s Gas Balance for 2023-2024
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IEA.CCBY4.0.
Change in non-Russian pipeline gas deliveries to Europe
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
 Global LNG supply is expected to increase by 20 bcm in 2023, supported mainly
by the ramp-up of the Calcasieu Pass LNG facility in the United States and the
Coral South LNG facility in Mozambique, as well as the return of the Freeport LNG
facility in the United States. However, this increased LNG supply will not be not
sufficient to offset the likely decline in Russia’s pipeline deliveries to the European
Union.
 Domestic gas production in the European Union is set to decline in 2023. In the
Netherlands, production at the Groningen field was capped at 2.8 bcm for the
2022-23 Gas Year1
, down from 4.5 bcm in the 2021-22 Gas Year. Production from
small fields in the Netherlands also continues to decline. In Denmark, the restart
of the Tyra field was postponed to the 2023-24 winter –meaning that it will not
contribute to the refilling of gas storages during summer 2023. In the United
Kingdom, gas production recovered strongly in 2022 and the potential for further
short-term growth is limited.
 Even more significantly, China’s LNG imports could rebound next year. China’s
lower LNG imports in the first ten months of 2022 were a key enabler of higher
LNG availability to Europe. A return to stronger Chinese economic growth and
some easing of lockdowns could bring 2023 LNG imports back to their 2021 levels
(108 bcm), which would capture over 85% of next year’s expected increase in
global LNG supply and limit the amount of LNG available to the European market.
 China has pursued a strong LNG contracting strategy in recent years. As a result,
China’s reliance on destination-fixed LNG contracts is set to increase from 88 bcm
per year in 2022 to 100 bcm per year in 2023. This effectively means that China
1
A Gas Year starts on 1 October and ends on 30 September.
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Y-o-ychange(%)
Y-o-ychange(bcm)
Norway North Africa Azerbaijan Y-o-y change
Never Too Early to Prepare for Next Winter:
Europe’s Gas Balance for 2023-2024
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IEA.CCBY4.0.
will have the right-of-first-refusal on an additional 12 bcm of LNG – well over half
of the expected increase in global LNG supply in 2023.
 In mid-October, it was widely reported that China’s National Development and
Reform Commission had asked state-owned gas importers to stop reselling LNG
to buyers in Europe and Asia to ensure stable gas supply ahead of winter.
Structure of China’s LNG import contracts
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
 EU gas exports to Ukraine are set to rise. Ukraine started the 2022-23 heating
season with storage levels at just 14 bcm – well below their historic average. Even
assuming a 25% reduction in the country’s winter gas consumption, storage sites
are expected to be severely depleted by the end of March 2023. Our analysis
indicates that Ukraine would require at least 5 bcm of gas imports from the
European Union during the summer of 2023 to replenish its storage levels to 14
bcm by the start of the 2023-24 heating season.
Europe could face a 30 bcm shortfall in the gas it needs to fuel its
economy and sufficiently refill storage sites during the summer of
2023, jeopardising its preparations for the winter of 2023-24
 A full cessation of Russian pipeline gas supplies to the European Union combined
with a return of Chinese LNG imports to their 2021 levels would lead to a shortfall
of 30 bcm of gas in Europe during the summer of 2023, the period when gas
storage sites need to be refilled.
 This equates to almost half of the injections required to fill storage sites to 95% of
capacity by the start of the 2023-24 heating season. This is based on the
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
bcm/y
Destination-fixed Destination-flexible
Never Too Early to Prepare for Next Winter:
Europe’s Gas Balance for 2023-2024
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IEA.CCBY4.0.
assumption that natural gas demand in the European Union and the United
Kingdom will decline by 11% compared to its 5-year average during the November
2022 – March 2023 period and that Europe’s gas storage sites will be around 30%
full at the end of this winter.
Breakdown of the summer 2023 natural gas balance of the European Union and the
United Kingdom in case of full cessation of Russian flows and limited LNG availability,
April – September 2023
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
 A recovery in European hydropower generation to its 5-year average and higher
nuclear power output in France (aligned with the mid-range of EDF’s latest
guidance) could reduce the shortfall to 22 bcm, but it would not eliminate it.
 This puts the spotlight back on natural gas demand. Shortfalls in available supply
would put immense pressure on prices again, but this could be relieved by
accelerated structural changes in European gas demand.
An even faster deployment of renewables, heat pumps and energy
efficiency measures can mitigate the risks of a worsening energy and
gas crisis
 While healthy storage levels and unseasonably mild weather at the beginning of
the 2022-23 winter season provide some temporary relief to gas and related
energy markets in Europe, our analysis indicates that supply-demand
fundamentals are set to tighten in 2023.
 A more rapid deployment of renewables, heat pumps and energy efficiency
measures can mitigate the risk of a worsening energy and gas crisis. However,
this would require immediate action from governments.
 The IEA will present a roadmap for securing Europe's gas balance for next
winter showing what is needed to ensure storage sites are filled to 95% capacity
0
25
50
75
100
125
150
175
200
225
Demand Supply-demand
gap
Incremental
LNG
LNG Azerbaijan North Africa Domestic
production
Norway
bcm
2022 summer
demand
needs
Injection
Exports to Ukraine
Never Too Early to Prepare for Next Winter:
Europe’s Gas Balance for 2023-2024
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IEA.CCBY4.0.
by the beginning of the 2023-24 heating season and to structurally reduce gas
consumption during the winter. Key measures include:
 Speeding up investments in energy efficiency improvements.
 Faster deployment of renewables.
 Accelerated installation of heat pumps.
 Identifying remaining fuel-switching options in industry and the power sector.
 Behavioural changes.
 A further push to accelerate structural changes and reduce gas consumption is
essential not only for Europe’s clean energy transitions but also for its energy
security and the wellbeing of its citizens and industries.
 The current market context requires greater attention to instruments and
measures that could facilitate investment in methane abatement options.
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