N O V E M B E R 2 0 2 1
SECURIT Y
OF S UPPLY
SIMUL ATION
R EP ORT
ENTSOG
UNION-WI DE
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 1 of 70
Union-wide simulation of gas
supply and infrastructure
disruption scenarios
(SoS simulation) 2021
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 2 of 70
Contents
Executive summary.................................................................................................................4
1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................6
2. Supply and infrastructure disruption scenarios................................................................7
3. Methodology and assumptions .......................................................................................9
3.1. Simulation cases and demand assumptions .........................................................................9
3.2. Exports ..............................................................................................................................11
3.3. Demand and disruption timelines.......................................................................................11
3.4. Supply................................................................................................................................13
3.5. Infrastructure ....................................................................................................................19
3.6. Modelling results interpretation.........................................................................................20
4. Results analysis..............................................................................................................21
REFERENCE SCENARIO...................................................................................................................21
SCENARIO #1 - Disruption of all imports to EU via Ukraine ............................................................24
SCENARIO #2 - Disruption of all imports to EU via Belarus.............................................................28
SCENARIO #3 - Disruption of one offshore pipeline of Nord Stream...............................................30
SCENARIO #4 - Disruption of the onshore receiving facility of Nord Stream ...................................32
SCENARIO #5 - Disruption of all imports to the Baltic states and Finland .......................................34
SCENARIO #6 - Disruption of the largest infrastructure to the Balkan region..................................38
SCENARIO #7 - Disruption of the largest offshore infrastructure to the UK ....................................40
SCENARIO #8 - Disruption of the largest offshore infrastructure to continental EU........................42
SCENARIO #9 - Disruption of the largest onshore infrastructure from Norway...............................44
SCENARIO #10 - Disruption of the largest L-gas storage.................................................................46
SCENARIO #11 - Disruption of the L-gas supply..............................................................................47
SCENARIO #12 - Disruption of the largest infrastructure to Denmark.............................................48
SCENARIO #13 - Disruption of the largest offshore production infrastructure from the UK ............50
SCENARIO #14 - Disruption of the largest offshore infrastructure to Italy ......................................52
SCENARIO #15 - Disruption of the largest offshore infrastructure to Spain ....................................54
SCENARIO #16 - Disruption of all imports from Algeria including LNG............................................56
SCENARIO #17 - Disruption of all imports from Libya.....................................................................58
SCENARIO #18 - Disruption of all imports from Turkey to Greece ..................................................60
SCENARIO #19 - the largest onshore infrastructure to Greece .......................................................62
5. Annexes: data tables .....................................................................................................64
5.1. Annex I: Demand ...............................................................................................................64
5.2. Annex II: National production ............................................................................................65
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 3 of 70
5.3. Annex III: Storages.............................................................................................................66
5.4. Annex IV: LNG....................................................................................................................69
5.5. Annex V: Capacities ...........................................................................................................69
Abbreviations: ......................................................................................................................70
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 4 of 70
Executive summary
Regulation 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning measures to safeguard
the security of gas supply and repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 ("the Regulation") entered into
force on 1 November 2017. It assigns to ENTSOG the task to carry out, every 4 years, a Union-wide
simulation of gas supply andinfrastructure disruptions scenarios in cooperation with the Gas Coordination
Group. In accordance with the provisions of the Regulation, this publication is the first full scope revision
of the above-mentioned Union wide simulation.
The revision of the methodology with the Gas Coordination Group, led to the introduction of the new
'timestamp approach'. It allows to reflect the configuration of the emergency gas corridors at the time of
application of the next national plans (by inclusion of the projects that are expected to be commissioned
before the year 2023). Consequently, the composition of the risk groups, as defined in Annex I of the
Regulation (EC) 2017/1938, has been updated.
The main findings of the Union-wide simulation of gas supply and infrastructure disruption scenarios (SoS
simulation) 2021 are:
▪ Even if the infrastructure allows for an efficient European gas market, an unexpected combination
of extreme climatic conditions and supply route disruption may nevertheless result in local
constraints and market limitations exposing some Member States to demand curtailment.
▪ The assessment confirms that the European gas infrastructure provides sufficient flexibility for
the EU Member States to efficiently apply their cooperation mechanisms and ensure security of
gas supply during extreme climatic conditions and individual supply route disruption scenarios.
▪ Nevertheless, in some scenarios infrastructure limitations and import limitations can prevent the
Member States from fully efficient cooperation.
▪ Gas storages and LNG terminals are essential to ensure seasonal and short-term flexibility. The
evolution of the storage levels results from market decisions and can significantly influence the
withdrawal capacities and therefore the short-term flexibility gas storages can provide: a too low
storage level at the end of the winter can increase the risk of exposure to demand curtailment in
some countries and for some scenarios.
▪ Since 2017 the evolution of the European gas infrastructure considered in the simulation
significantly improves the possible cooperation among Member States.
▪ Gas marketevolution, changes in the Member States energy mixes, declining domesticproduction
and coal-to-gas switch explain the evolution of the gas demand compared to the 2017 edition.
▪ In all scenarios an efficient cooperation between EU Member States can export significant
volumes to Energy Community Contracting Parties and other EU neighbouring countries.
Important: The Security of Supply results should be interpreted as an assessment of the ability of the gas
infrastructure to allow for an efficient cooperation of the EU Member States to cope with an unusual cold
winter season under different scenarios. The EU-wide simulation is not a forecast of the expected gas
supply situation.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 5 of 70
Disruption Scenarios overview
# Disruption scenario
Member State can
efficiently cooperate
and may fully mitigate
risks of demand
curtailment (Yes/No)
Sensitivity impact –
efficient cooperation
between Member
States w/o Nord
Stream 2 (Yes/No)
2017 SOS Simulation
Report
1 Ukraine Yes No; import limitation No
2 Belarus Yes Yes No
3 Nord Stream Yes Yes Yes
4 Greifswald Yes Yes Yes
5
Baltic states and
Finland
No; infrastructure
limitation
No change No
6 Trans-Balkan Yes Yes No
7 Langeled Yes Yes Yes
8 Europipe 2 Yes Yes Yes
9 Emden Yes Yes Yes
10 largest L-gas storage Yes Yes Yes
11 L-gas Yes Yes Yes
12 Baltic Pipe Yes Yes No (Ellund)
13 UK (Forties pipelines) Yes Yes Yes
14 Transmed Yes Yes Yes
15 MEG Yes Yes Yes
16
All supplies from
Algeria
Yes Yes No
17 Libya Yes Yes Yes
18 Turkey Yes Yes Yes
19 TANAP Yes Yes Yes
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 6 of 70
1. Introduction
Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning measures to
safeguard the security of gas supply and repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 ("the Regulation")
entered into force on 1 November 2017.
In its Article 7 “Risk assessment”, the Regulation stipulates:
By 1 November 2017, ENTSOG shall carry out a Union-wide simulation of gas supply and infrastructure
disruption scenarios. The simulation shall include the identification and assessment of emergency gas
supply corridors and shall also identify which Member States can address identified risks, including in
relation to LNG. The gas supply and infrastructure disruption scenarios and the methodology for the
simulation shall be defined by ENTSOG in cooperation with the Gas Coordination Group (GCG). ENTSOG
shall ensure an appropriate level of transparency and access to the modelling assumptions used in its
scenarios. The Union-wide simulation of gas supply and infrastructure disruption scenarios shall be
repeated every four years unless circumstances warrant more frequent updates.
ENTSOG’s first Union-wide simulation considered the gas infrastructure in operation along the different
gas corridors on 1 October 2017. In October 2020, upon request of the GCG, ENTSOG published an
Addendum to the Union-wide simulation 2017 to assess the impact of several major pieces of
infrastructure recently commissioned.
This publication is the first full scope revision of the above-mentioned Union wide simulation.
Union-wide simulation of gas supply and infrastructure disruption scenarios (SoS simulation) 2021
On 6 May 2021, the methodology and assumptions for ENTSOG’s Union-wide simulation 2021 have been
reviewed by ENTSOG and the GCG. Most of the assumptions from 2017 edition of the report were found
to be valid and relevant. Considering the evolution of the gas system foreseen for the next four years, the
Gas Coordination Group agreed to implement a new approach regarding the infrastructure to be assessed.
The revised Union-wide simulation considers the gas infrastructure existing at the moment of the data
collection (May 19th
-June 21st
, 2021) and also projects that are expected to be commissioned by December
31st
, 2022. This new ‘timestamp approach’ allows to reflect the configuration of the emergency gas
corridors at the time of application of the next national plans (expected to be in place in preparation for
the winter 2023/24). The choice of the relevant projects is based on the technical data submitted to
ENTSOG by promoters for TYNDP 2020, (excluding less advanced projects) and verified by national TSOs.
As a consequence of considering a specific timestamp for the simulations the composition of some risk
groups, as defined in Annex I of the Regulation, has been updated. Among those changes, the United
Kingdom has been removed from the lists of Member States and the Risk Groups have been adapted to
consider the enhanced cooperation among Member States enabled by the commissioning of new
infrastructure.
Disruption scenarios, duration, and climate conditions configuration agreed in 2017 were found accurate
for this edition of the simulation. Only necessary modifications were implemented to follow the
timestamp approach. Considering the new infrastructure to be into operation, 2 new disruption scenarios
were defined and included the Union-wide simulation 2021 (Scenario 18 and 19). As for the Union-wide
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 7 of 70
SoS simulation 2017, it was also decided to delegate the treatment of the scenarios concerning L-gas to
the Gas Platform1
.
After that meeting, Member states were provided with additional time for review and no further changes
were submitted. In parallel, the European Commission asked for feedback regarding the Draft delegated
regulation changing Annex 1 to the Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 defining risk group compositions. The
methodology and assumptions for the simulations were all approved by the Gas Coordination Group.
The input data for the simulations concerning the gas demand for the different climatic conditions,
infrastructure capacities and the estimates for the gas production were submitted by TSOs, Associated
Partners and Observers from ENTSOG as part of a specific data collection process in May-June 2021.
The supply and infrastructure disruption scenarios as well as the methodology and assumptions are
further detailed in the next chapters.
Figure 1. Timeline of 2021 Union wide simulation of supply and infrastructure disruption scenarios.
2. Supply and infrastructure disruption scenarios
The 20 supply and infrastructure disruption scenarios cover all the Emergency Supply Corridors as well as
the 13 different Risk Groups of Member States as defined in the amended Annex 1 of the Regulation. They
are meant to identify which Member States can address identified risks, including in relation to LNG,
against the failures of the main gas supply routes or infrastructures.
Among these scenarios, one is not simulated because no infrastructure exists yet (scenario 20). The
scenarios regarding Low Calorific gas are defined and treated within the Gas Platform.
1
The Gas Platform is the regional cooperation for gas for Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands. It is an intergovernmental initiative where ministries responsible for energy policy discuss issues
related to security of supply and market integration, in close cooperation with the National Regulatory Authorities
and Transmission System Operators. Ad hoc, the European Commission or other European authorities participate as
observer. The Benelux Secretariat provides support.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 8 of 70
Table 1. Disruption scenarios Union-wide simulation 2021.
Risk Group # Disruption scenario
Eastern gas
supply
Ukraine 1 Disruption of all imports via Ukraine
Belarus 2 Disruption of all imports via Belarus
Baltic Sea 3 Disruption of one Nord Stream offshore pipeline (50% NOS)
4 Disruption of the onshore receiving facility of Nord Stream
(Greifswald station, 100% NOS)
North-Eastern 5 Disruption of all imports to the Baltic states and Finland
Trans-Balkan 6 Disruption of the largest infrastructure to the Balkan region (TransBalkan
Pipeline)
North Sea
gas supply
Norway 7 Disruption of the largest offshore infrastructure to the UK (Langeled)
8 Disruption of the largest offshore infrastructure to continental EU
(Europipe 2)
9 Disruption of the largest onshore infrastructure from Norway (Emden
station)
Low calorific gas 10 Disruption of the largest L-gas storage (Gas Platform)
11 Disruption of the L-gas supply (Gas Platform)
Denmark 12 Disruption of the largest infrastructure to Denmark (Baltic Pipe)
United Kingdom 13 Disruption of Forties pipeline system
North-African
gas supply
Algeria 14 Disruption of the largest offshore infrastructure to Italy (Transmed)
15 Disruption of the largest offshore infrastructure to Spain (MEG)
16 Disruption of all imports from Algeria, including LNG
Libya 17 Disruption of all imports from Libya
South-East
gas supply
Southern Gas
Corridor
18 Disruption of all imports from Turkey to Greece (TANAP + Kipi import
point)
19 Disruption of the largest onshore infrastructure to Greece (TANAP)
Eastern-
Mediterranean
20 No existing infrastructure
Figure 2. Disruption scenarios allocation Union-wide simulation 2021.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 9 of 70
3. Methodology and assumptions
The methodology and assumptions cover:
▪ Simulation cases along with the corresponding demand assumptions,
▪ disruption duration,
▪ supply,
▪ infrastructure,
▪ modelling and results interpretation, and
▪ treatment of storages including the initial inventory levels.
The corresponding data are available in the Annexes.
3.1. Simulation cases and demand assumptions
For every scenario, 3 different cases are simulated to assess the impact of 3 high demand events:
I. A historical high demand winter2
– country level historical highest gas demand since winter 2009-
2010 revised by TSOs.
II. A period of 2 weeks of exceptionally high demand, occurring with a statistical probability of once
in 20 years - also called 2-week cold spell.
III. One day (peak day) of exceptionally high demand, occurring with a statistical probability of once
in 20 years.
For 2021 edition, TSOs were asked to review and update, when necessary, winter demand values used in
2017 edition, especially under the context of the market evolution and ongoing processes that are taking
place in their countries. As shown in Figure 3, an increase of 3% of the total winter demand has been
observed from 2017 to 2021 edition mainly driven by the development of the market and infrastructure
over the last 10 years. In addition to the demand within the EU member states, the demand of non-EU
countries that are only supplied via the European gas infrastructure (UK, BA, CH, MK, RS) have been
considered in the simulations.
Figure 3. Comparison of demand values for historical winters, SoS 2017 and SoS 2021 assumptions.
2
Period from 1 October to 31 March, covering the six months in between with 182 days in total.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 10 of 70
The sum of the winter demand of the EU countries in this assessment is 5.4% above the demand that has
materialised simultaneously across the EU since 2009/10. This deviation is derived from the fact that the
historical highest winter demand did not occur simultaneously in every European country.
In specific countries, the application of historical demand figures for the whole winter simulation would
not be appropriate without a revision. This applies mainly to following countries:
▪ Belgium, where there is a clearly observed yearly growth in demand driven by a gas market
evolution, decommissioning of the nuclear power plants and an ongoing L-to-H-gas conversion.
▪ Netherlands, where the gas demand has declined over the past years and is expected to decline
further in the upcoming years.
▪ Poland, where the gas demand has been gradually increasing over the recent years caused by an
ongoing coal to gas switch.
▪ Greece, where the increase of gas demand is attributed to the de-lignification plan of Greece
(decommissioning of all lignite-fired power plants by 2025) and to the increase of gas
consumption of non-power producers.
▪ Sweden, where the gas demand has increased in the industrial sector.
The high demand cases are meant to capture the capability of the gas system to cope with the most
challenging demand situation (peak day / Design Case) and a long high-demand period (2-week cold spell).
Figures 4 and 5 show the 2-week cold spell and peak day demand. The 1-in-20 years approach leads to
the sum of the 2-week cold spell demand being 18% and the one for the peak day 26% above the
simultaneous demand that could be observed since 2009/10.
Figure 4. Comparison of peak demand values for historical winters, SoS 2017 and SoS 2021 assumptions.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 11 of 70
Figure 5. Comparison of 2-week cold spell values for historical winters, SoS 2017 and SoS 2021 assumptions.
3.2. Exports
In addition to the EU member states and non-EU countries demand, the exports to Ukraine (based on the
last five winters historical flows), and the transits towards Kaliningrad (based on the last five winters
historical flows) have been considered in the simulations. The transits to Kaliningrad are not maintained
in the scenarios 2 and 5. In general, exports to Ukraine and Kaliningrad represent around 2% of the EU
winter demand. No exports to Turkey are considered.
Figure 6. Monthly, 2-week and peak day EU demand and exports from EU.
3.3. Demand and disruption timelines
The disruption periods are defined to assess the impact of the various scenarios along with a low initial
storage level during these exceptionally high demand events. They are not defined based on their
probability of occurrence but based on agreed periods instead. The 2-month disruptions are simulated
during January and February and the 2-week disruptions from 15 February to 28 February.
During the disruption periods, exceptionally high demand periods are considered with an occurrence
probability of once in 20 years: 2-week cold spell and peak day. For these exceptional cases, storage levels
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 12 of 70
and LNG import flows considered on 15 February are resulting from the whole winter simulation or the 2month
disruption depending on the scenario (see also chapter 3.6 for further information).
Table 2. Simulation cases timeframes.
Simulation case Historical high demand winter 2-week in 20 years Peak day in 20 years
Simulation period From 1 October to 31 March From 15 February to 28
February
On 15 February
Gas demand Highest winter demand since
2009/10 (at country level and
then aggregated for EU)3
Exceptionally high
demand, occurring with
a statistical probability of
once in 20 years.
Exceptionally high
demand, occurring with a
statistical probability of
once in 20 years.
Figure 7. Demand assumption and disruption timeframes.
3
TSOs were asked to review and update (when necessary) winter demand assumptions values, especially under the
context of the market evolution and ongoing processes that are taking place in their countries. In specific countries
the application of historical demand figures without any adjustments for the whole winter simulation was not
appropriate.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 13 of 70
> Specificity of scenario 16 - Algerian disruption:
▪ Disruption scenario #16 considers the disruption of the imports from Algeria via both pipelines
and LNG cargos. Regarding the LNG supply, it is assumed that a period of 3 weeks, starting from
1 January, is necessary to attract more LNG cargos to substitute the Algerian LNG (see Figure 8).
Figure 8. Demand assumption and disruption timeframes for scenario 16.
3.4. Supply
Supply limitations are set for different time scales (winter season, monthly, 2-weeks and daily) so that the
maximum flow of each source cannot exceed reasonable levels based on historical observations.
The maximum supply potentials of the different sources providing gas to EU via pipeline (Algeria, Libya,
Norway, Russia) are based on a 10 year historical data (daily and 2-week maximum supply potential are
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 14 of 70
based on the available data - 8 years range). Differing from SoS 2017, Caspian (CA) imports are considered
for the first time in this edition. Caspian supply is covering part of EU demand since December 2020;
therefore, in order to reflect the real potential of the source, summer 2021 flows have been considered
to calculate the maximum supply potential.
Figures 9 and 10 show historical supply since winter 2011/12 for pipeline and LNG imports. Figures 11 and
12 show the historical 2-week cold spell and daily peak demand since winter 2013/14.
Figure 9. Winter supply history.
Figure 10. Winter 30-days supply history.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 15 of 70
Figure 11. 2-week supply history.
Figure 12. Daily supply4 history.
4
For LNG maximum supply potential, the maximum send-out capacity from GLE map has been considered (see
further explanation below).
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 16 of 70
As an example, Figure 13 shows Norwegian maximum winter supply. Over the whole simulated winter
period, gas imports from Norway do not exceed 719 TWh and for each month, the average import flows
do not exceed 4,135 GWh/d. However, during some days, import flows go up to the daily limit (4,631
GWh/d). The supply potential limitation ensures that the monthly average flow remains below the 4,135
GWh/d limit, and the winter average flows remains below 3,953 GWh/d limit.
Figure 13. Winter supply history and modelling assumptions.
In case of LNG supply, additional assumptions are made:
▪ During the peak day, the LNG supply is allowed to go up to the total send-out capacities of the
terminals (6,803 GWh/d).
▪ LNG flows during the first week of the 2-week cold spell simulations (15 to 21 February) are limited
by the LNG flows resulting from the whole winter simulation.
▪ For scenario #16 (disruption of all Algerian imports), the model considers that the flows to the
different LNG terminals are reduced by the share of Algerian LNG in their LNG mix in 2019.
Table 3. Share of Algerian LNG in the LNG mix per country in 2019 – Cf Source GIIGNL report 20205.
Share of Algeria in LNG supply mix
Belgium 0% Netherlands 23%
Finland 0% Poland 0%
France 43% Portugal 2%
Greece 20% Spain 19%
Italy 23% Sweden 0%
Lithuania 0% UK 56%
Croatia 0%
5
The actual share of Algerian LNG on the total Italian and Greek LNG imports has been updated under request of
TSOs (Source for Italian data: IHS).
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 17 of 70
In addition to the pipeline supply and LNG supply, the assessment takes into consideration indigenous gas
production, the gas coming from the underground storages and the LNG tanks flexibility:
> EU Production:
The EU production levels are based on the best TSOs estimates for the monthly average production
expected to flow from the production facilities in January 2023.
Figure 14. EU production history and SoS assumption.
The EU Production level considered in the simulations is 60% lower than the EU Production observed
during the high demand winter of 2009/10. National production value submitted by TSOs for the 2021
edition of this report is 30% lower than production considered in 2017 simulations. Differing from SoS
2017 edition, the renovation of the Danish production gas field (Tyra) is considered as completed and the
associated production increased. In the simulations, the Danish national production represents 103.3
GWh/d plus 306.8 GWh/d of Norwegian supply thanks to the commissioning of the Norwegian tie-in to
Danish upstream system. Additionally, a minimum flow of 1.5 bcm is expected to continue from the
Groningen field from October 2022 to March 2023.
> Underground Gas Storages:
In winter, the supply flexibility in the European gas system is largely ensured by the gas storages. Storages
are essential assets to cope with the high demand variation during the winter season. The capability of
the gas system to cope with the winter demand variation depends on the storage filling levels at the
beginning of the winter and is reported every year by ENTSOG in its Winter Supply Outlook.
For this edition of the Security of Supply simulation, the lowest historical storage filling level was
considered (in percentages): 75%6
on 1st
October 2021. Therefore, for all EU storage, 75% of their WGV is
assumed on 1 October. As shown in Figure 15, when comparing absolute values, winter 2012/13 and
2013/14 started the injection season with lower gas in the storages but the total WGV was lower than in
2021 and the EU indigenous production was significantly higher. For further information, see Annex III.
For 2-week cold spell and peak day simulations, the model considers the storage levels resulting from the
simulations of the entire winter. The storage level of 15 February is then considered as an input.
6
Under request of TSO, a lower storage level was kept for Latvia in line with AGSI historical data of 50.05%.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 18 of 70
Figure 15. EU injection history and SoS assumption (Source: AGSI+).
ENTSOG model considers injection and withdraw capacities provided by SSOs and TSOs. In addition to the
withdrawal and injection capacities, withdrawal and injection curves for storages are considered. These
curves define the abilities of storages to withdraw or inject gas depending on the filling level. The lower
the storage level, the lower the withdraw capacity. The curves are provided by Storage System Operators
via GSE (available in Annex III).
> LNG terminals tank flexibility:
LNG infrastructure is characterised by the regasification capacity available along the winter season and
the peak send out capacity available during high demand situations. The LNG tank volumes have
operational characteristics specific for each terminal. LNG stored in the tanks fluctuates within a normal
operating range and a minimum amount of LNG that must be kept in the tanks for a safe operation. In
case of high demand events such as cold spells or peak days, this minimum amount can be lowered and
part of the tanks can be used as a buffer volume, waiting for more LNG carriers to unload. This flexibility
is modelled based on information provided by the LNG System Operators via GLE (available in Annex IV).
Figure 16. LNG tank flexibility.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 19 of 70
3.5. Infrastructure
ENTSOG uses Plexos modelling tool since spring 2021. ENTSOG model builds
on TSO expertise and hydraulic modelling of national infrastructure to model
the European gas infrastructure with the most relevant accuracy. This enables
the national assessments to benefit from the Union wide simulation of supply
and infrastructure disruption scenarios.
Figure 17. ENTSOG model overview.
The simulations consider the existing Europeangas infrastructure and projects to be commissioned before
January 2023. This assumption is made to reflect the configuration of the emergency gas corridors at the
time of application of the next national plans (expected to be in place in preparation for the winter
2023/24). The choice of the relevant projects is based on the technical data submitted to ENTSOG by
promoters for TYNDP 2020, (excluding less advanced projects) and verified by national TSOs (see Table 4).
Capacities used in the simulation can be found in Annex I.
Table 4. TYNDP2020 projects included for the SoS assessment.
Project Name Code
NTS developments in North-East Romania TRA-F-357
Upgrading GMS Isaccea 1 and GMS Negru Voda 1 TRA-F-1277
Upgrade of LNG terminal in Świnoujście (first stage) LNG-F-272
Poland - Slovakia interconnection TRA-F-190
Poland - Slovakia Gas Interconnection (PL section) TRA-F-275
Gas Interconnection Poland-Lithuania (GIPL) - PL section TRA-F-212
Gas Interconnection Poland-Lithuania (GIPL) (Lithuania's section) TRA-F-341
Poland - Denmark interconnection (Baltic Pipe) – onshore section in Poland TRA-A-1173
Poland - Denmark interconnection (Baltic Pipe) - offshore section TRA-A-271
Baltic Pipe project – onshore section in Denmark TRA-A-780
Norwegian tie-in to Danish upstream system TRA-A-394
GUD: Complete conversion to H-gas TRA-N-955
Capacity4Gas – DE/CZ TRA-F-752
EUGAL - Europaeische Gasanbindungsleitung (European Gaslink) TRA-F-763
Necessary expansion of the Bulgarian gas transmission system TRA-F-592
Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (IGB Project) TRA-F-378
Modernization and rehabilitation of the Bulgarian GTS TRA-F-298
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 20 of 70
3.6. Modelling results interpretation
The Security of Supply results should be interpreted as an assessment of the ability of the gas
infrastructure to allow for an efficient cooperation of the EU Member States to cope with an unusual cold
winter season under different scenarios. The EU-wide simulation is not a forecast of the expected gas
supply situation. The actual utilisation of the gas infrastructure, supply directions and the development of
the gas storage levels, will be also determined by the decisions of the market participants.
The simulations identify situations where a country can receive some help from its neighbouring countries
in order to avoid or mitigate the exposure to demand curtailment. An infrastructure limitation can be
observed when the capacities between countries are completely used, and no additional gas can flow to
the country with the highest exposure to demand curtailment.
> Comparison with reference case
For the purpose of giving more insight to the flows during the disruption scenarios, a reference case
without disruption has been defined (reference scenario). The comparison of the scenarios’ results with
the reference case is described in the results analysis and gives more information on the reaction to the
disruption scenarios. Demand-side response and demand-side measures are not simulated so that the
results can be interpreted and compared to the reference scenario without pre-empting any reaction or
possible solution to the identified situations.
> Demand curtailment allocation
Whenever a simulation result indicates possible exposure to demand curtailment, the actual allocation of
this curtailed demand between the countries depends on several factors amongst which the cooperation
of member states and contractual arrangements are most relevant. In some instances, infrastructure
limitations can limit the cooperation possibility. It is assumed in the simulation that all member States
within a risk group cooperate to avoid demand curtailment to the extent possible and by sharing the
curtailment equally.
The allocation of the demand curtailment within the member states can be further investigated as part of
the national and regional risk assessments.
> Storage use
Simulations of the whole winter season assess the capability and the flexibility of the gas infrastructure
and supply to cope with a high winter demand. The model prepares for this high demand level by injecting
in the UGS as long as the import flows allow for it. High demand cases (2-week cold spell and peak day)
consider the storage levels at the start of the events resulting from the whole winter simulation.
> Nord Stream 2 sensitivity
Nord Stream 2 is included in all scenarios as an existing infrastructure. Due to some uncertainty on the
commissioning of the project, the Gas Coordination Group decided to include a sensitivity assessment for
all disruption scenarios. All disruption scenarios and specific demand events are additionally simulated
without Nord Stream 2. Results of this sensitivity are presented in this report when changes in terms of
exposure to demand curtailment are observed.
> Units
All the data used in the simulation are expressed in energy (TWh or GWh). For better readability of the
results analysis, ENTSOG presents the results in both energy and volumes. ENTSOG derives volumes from
energy by applying a single conversion factor of 11 kWh/m3
.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 21 of 70
4. Results analysis
REFERENCE SCENARIO Reference case
Risk group: Not applicable
Disruption duration: No disruption
Simulation results
Whole winter
Supply
Storages: The EU storage level ends around 30%7
on 31st
of March, which means that all EU countries reach the
target of their working gas volume (WGV). Gas is still injected in the storages in October up to 83% of WGV and
withdrawal is observed in all countries from November to March. Higher withdrawal is observed during the months
of highest demand: December, January, and February.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: Supplies are not used at their maximum supply potential during the whole winter, only
RU and LY supply reach the maximum.
CA LY DZ LNG NO RU EU production
269 GWh/d 247 GWh/d 1,389 GWh/d 4,746 GWh/d 4,135 GWh/d 6,084 GWh/d 2,333 GWh/d
24 mcm/d 22 mcm/d 126 mcm/d 431 mcm/d 376 mcm/d 553 mcm/d 212 mcm/d
7
Spain has strategic storages usage, UGS should not be used below 55% for the reference case simulations. The level
of the storages could go below 55% in particularly stressful situations as in the case of Algerian Disruption.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 22 of 70
REFERENCE SCENARIO Reference case
Demand
No country is exposed to demand curtailment.
Exports to Ukraine (UA) and transit to Kaliningrad can be maintained.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
2-week / 20 years: Simulated from 15 to 28 February
Supply
Storages: Storages are mostly used up to their maximum withdraw potential set by the SSOs.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: Supplies are used at the maximum level defined at supply potential for whole winter.
CA LY DZ LNG NO RU EU production
282 GWh/d 250 GWh/d 1,348 GWh/d 4,898 GWh/d 4,164 GWh/d 6,140 GWh/d 3,111 GWh/d
26 mcm/d 23 mcm/d 123 mcm/d 445 mcm/d 379 mcm/d 558 mcm/d 283 mcm/d
LNG tanks: In total LNG tanks can provide up to 39 TWh of flexibility that can be used within the limits of the
capacities from the individual LNG terminals (at EU level around 6 TWh/d in total).
Demand
No country is exposed to risk of demand curtailment. Compared to 2017 SoS edition, Denmark and Sweden improve
their situation being no longer exposed to risk of demand curtailment. The renovation of the offshore production of
Tyra is considered completed in 2023 - increasing the Danish national production - as well as the Norwegian tie-in
to Danish upstream system project and the Baltic pipe project.
Exports to Ukraine (UA) and transit to Kaliningrad can be maintained.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 23 of 70
REFERENCE SCENARIO Reference case
Peak day/ 20 years: 15 February
Supply
Storages: Storages are mostly used up to their maximum withdraw potential set by the SSOs.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: Supplies are used at the maximum level defined at supply potential for whole winter
except for NO that used up to the maximum import capacity and LNG.
CA LY DZ LNG NO RU EU production
297 GWh/d 303 GWh/d 1,388 GWh/d 6,803 GWh/d 4,631 GWh/d 6,277 GWh/d 3,111 GWh/d
27 mcm/d 28 mcm/d 126 mcm/d 618 mcm/d 421 mcm/d 571 mcm/d 283 mcm/d
Demand
No country is exposed to risk of demand curtailment compared to 2017 SoS edition, Denmark and Sweden improve
their situation being no longer exposed to risk of demand curtailment. The renovation of the offshore production of
Tyra is considered completed in 2023 - increasing the Danish national production - as well as the Norwegian tie-in
to Danish upstream system project and the Baltic pipe project.
Exports to Ukraine (UA) and transit to Kaliningrad can be maintained.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 24 of 70
SCENARIO #1 - Disruption of all imports to EU via Ukraine
Risk group: Eastern gas supply – Ukraine Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Croatia,
Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg, Hungary, Austria, Poland,
Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Sweden
Disruption duration: 2 months (1 January – 28 February)
Simulation results
January-March
Supply
Storages: Storage usage increases during January and February by 33 TWh to compensate the decrease of Russian
supply through Ukraine.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: Imports from Russia though Ukraine can be partly re-routed thanks to other available
routes (Belarus, Nord Stream 1 and 2 and Turk Stream). Supplies shows some potential flexibility. The decrease in
Russian imports could be replaced by Norwegian and LNG supplies, as well as storage utilisation.
Demand
No country is exposed to demand curtailment. The situation in this Risk Group has improved with the commissioning
of Turk Stream and other investments in the region.
Exports to Ukraine (UA) and transit to Kaliningrad can be maintained.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 25 of 70
SCENARIO #1 - Disruption of all imports to EU via Ukraine
2-week / 20 years: Simulated from 15 to 28 February
Supply
Storages: Storage usage increases during both weeks by 19 TWh to compensate the decrease of Russian supply
through Ukraine.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: Supplies are used at the maximum potential for the 2-week cold spell. The overall flows
of Russian gas are limited by capacities via Belarus to Poland (reduced capacities as of 2023), Nord Stream 1 and 2
(used up to the technical maximum), Turk Stream (all routes are used up to the technical maximum). Nevertheless,
the decrease in Russian imports could be replace by LNG supply as well as storage utilisation.
LNG tanks: Necessary to provide extra LNG capacity during both weeks.
Demand
No country is exposed to demand curtailment. The situation in this Risk Group has improved with the commissioning
of Turk Stream and other investments in the region. Additionally, following the re-location of capacities for IP Isaccea
1/Orlovka and IP Negru Vodă 1 / Kardam (from Romania transit balancing zone to Romanian National balancing
zone), Romania is not exposed to demand curtailment since the capacity from Bulgaria to Romania national
increased.
Exports to Ukraine (UA) and transit to Kaliningrad can be maintained.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 26 of 70
SCENARIO #1 - Disruption of all imports to EU via Ukraine
Peak day / 20 years: 15 February
Supply
Storages: Storage usage increases during both weeks by 1.3 TWh to compensate the decrease of Russian supply
through Ukraine.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: Supplies are used at their maximum potential apart from LNG and RU supply. The overall
flows of Russian gas are reduced to around 1,000 GWh/d which is limited by the capacities of the transit via Belarus
(reduced as of 2023), Nord Stream 1 and 2, Turk Stream (all routes are used to the technical maximum).
Nevertheless, the decrease in Russian imports could be also replaced by storage utilisation (storages are used up to
their maximum withdrawal potential set by SSOs in BE, CZ, HR, IT and RO in other countries, additional usage still
possible).
Demand
No country is exposed to demand curtailment. Situation in this risk group has improved by the implementation of
Turk Stream and other investments in the region. Additionally, following the re-location of capacities for IP Isaccea
1/Orlovka and IP Negru Vodă 1 / Kardam (from Romania transit balancing zone to Romanian National balancing
zone). Romania is not exposed to demand curtailment since the capacity from Bulgaria to Romania national
increased.
Exports to Ukraine (UA) and transit to Kaliningrad can be maintained.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 27 of 70
SCENARIO #1 - Disruption of all imports to EU via Ukraine
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2):
With exports to Ukraine (UA) and transit to Kaliningrad.
All countries within the risk group, but GR and BG, can
efficiently cooperate to mitigate the situation by sharing
around 10% of demand curtailment. Infrastructure
limitations prevent BG and GR to further cooperate with
RO and IT.
Risk group demand: 16,507 GWh/d.
Without exports to Ukraine (UA) and with transit to
Kaliningrad.
All countries within the risk group, but GR and BG, can
help mitigating the situation by sharing around 7% of
demand curtailment. Infrastructure limitations prevent
BG and GR to further cooperate with RO and IT.
Conclusions:
> Lower storage level at the beginning of the 2-month disruption and a critically low level in the high demand
situation mid-February (peak day).
> At the start of the peak day, storage levels are around 30% of WGV. In this situation the withdraw capacity
is limited (on average 70% of the withdraw capacity can be used) (see Annex III).
> Storages are used up to their maximum withdrawal potential set by SSOs in most of the countries within the
Risk Group (AT, CZ, DK, HR, PL, IT, RO, SE) with a utilization of239 GWh/d higher than peak day simulations
with NOS2.
> Capacities from BG towards RO are fully used.
> Demand curtailment caused by import limitations to the region. Import flows from DZ, LY and CA are used
up to their maximum supply potential. While NO supply is used up to the maximum import capacity.
> BE, FR, HR, IT, NL, PL & UK LNG regasification capacities are fully used.
> The overall flow of Russian gas is limited by the transit capacities via Belarus, Nord Stream 1, Turk Stream.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 28 of 70
SCENARIO #2 - Disruption of all imports to EU via Belarus
Risk group: Eastern gas supply – Belarus Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia,
Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Poland, Slovakia, Sweden
Disruption duration: 2 months (1 January – 28 February)
Simulation results
January-March
Supply
Storages: Storage usage is the same as in the reference situation.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: Russian gas stays on a similar level reaching the maximum supply potential. Transits
through BY are re-directed through other Russian supply routes.
Demand
No country is exposed to demand curtailment.
Exports to Ukraine are maintained while transit to Kaliningrad is interrupted in line with the considered assumptions.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 29 of 70
SCENARIO #2 - Disruption of all imports to EU via Belarus
2-week / 20 years: Simulated from 15 to 28 February
Supply
Storages: Storage usage slightly increases during both weeks by 0.40 TWh to compensate for the decrease of Russian
supply through Belarus.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: The overall flows of Russian gas stay on a similar level, reaching the maximum supply
potential. Transits through BY are re-directed through other Russian supply routes.
LNG tanks: Necessary to provide extra LNG capacity during both weeks.
Demand
No country is exposed to risk of demand curtailment.
Exports to Ukraine are maintained while transit to Kaliningrad is interrupted in line with the considered assumptions.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
Peak day/ 20 years: 15 February
Supply
Storages: The storages are used up to the same level as in the reference case.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: The overall flows of Russian gas stays on a similar level, reaching the maximum supply
potential. Transits through BY are re-directed through other Russian supply routes.
LNG tanks: LNG supply does not reach its maximum supply potential; therefore, LNG tanks are not used.
Demand
No country is exposed to demand curtailment. DK and SE are no longer exposed to demand curtailment as explained
in the reference case.
Exports to Ukraine are maintained while transit to Kaliningrad is interrupted in line with the considered assumptions.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 30 of 70
SCENARIO #3 - Disruption of one offshore pipeline of Nord Stream
(50% of Nord Stream capacity)
Risk group: Eastern gas supply – Baltic Sea Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany,
France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria,
Slovakia, Sweden
Disruption duration: 2 months (1 January – 28 February)
Simulation results
January-March
Supply
Storages: Storage usage is the same as in the reference situation.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: The overall flows of Russian gas stay on a similar level, reaching the maximum supply
potential. Nord Stream import flows are re-routed through UA, BY, TR/STR and NOS2.
Demand
No country is exposed to demand curtailment.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 31 of 70
SCENARIO #3 - Disruption of one offshore pipeline of Nord Stream
(50% of Nord Stream capacity)
2-week / 20 years: Simulated from 15 to 28 February
Supply
Storages: Storage usage is the same as in the reference situation.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: The overall flows of Russian gas stays on a similar level, reaching the maximum supply
potential. Nord Stream import flows are re-routed through UA, BY, TR/STR and NOS2.
LNG tanks: Necessary to provide extra LNG capacity during both weeks.
Demand
No country is exposed to risk of demand curtailment. DK and SE are no longer exposed to demand curtailment as
explained in the reference case.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
Peak day/ 20 years: 15 February
Supply
Storages: Storage usage is the same as in the reference situation.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: The overall flows of Russian gas stays on a similar level, reaching the maximum supply
potential. Nord Stream import flows are re-routed through UA, BY, TR/STR and NOS2.
Demand
No country is exposed to demand curtailment. DK and SE are no longer exposed to risk of demand curtailment as
explained in the reference case.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 32 of 70
SCENARIO #4 - Disruption of the onshore receiving facility of Nord Stream
(Greifswald station)
Risk group: Eastern gas supply – Baltic
Sea
Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, France,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Slovakia, Sweden
Disruption duration: 2 weeks (15 February – 28 February)
Simulation results
January-March
Supply
Storages: Storage usage slightly increases during February by 1 TWh to compensate for no import flows from NOS.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: The overall flows of Russian gas stays on a similar level, reaching the maximum supply
potential. Nord Stream import flows are re-routed through UA, BY, TR/STR and NOS2.
Demand
No country is exposed to risk demand curtailment.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 33 of 70
SCENARIO #4 - Disruption of the onshore receiving facility of Nord Stream
(Greifswald station)
2-week / 20 years: Simulated from 15 to 28 February
Supply
Storages: Storage usage slightly increases during February by 0.5 TWh to compensate for no import flows from Nord
Stream.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: The overall flows of Russian gas stays on a similar level, reaching the maximum supply
potential. Nord Stream import flows are re-routed through UA, BY, TR/STR and NOS2.
LNG tanks: Necessary to provide extra LNG capacity during both weeks.
Demand
No country is exposed to demand curtailment. DK and SE are no longer exposed to demand curtailment as explained
in the reference case.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
Peak day/ 20 years: 15 February
Supply
Storages: Storage usage is in line with the reference case.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: All supplies are used at the maximum level defined at the supply potential for whole
winter. The Russian flows are redirected via Belarus (capacities planned to be reduced by 2023), Nord Stream 2,
Turk Stream and the imports to the Baltic States and Finland.
Demand
No country is exposed to demand curtailment. DK and SE are no longer exposed to demand curtailment as explained
in the reference case.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 34 of 70
SCENARIO #5 - Disruption of all imports to the Baltic states and Finland
Risk group: Eastern gas supply – North-
Eastern
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden
Disruption duration: 2 months (1 January – 28 February)
Simulation results
January-March
Supply
Storages: Storage usage slightly increases during January, February and March by 1.6 TWh
Pipeline and LNG supplies: Commissioning of Balticconnector pipeline allows Finland and the Baltic States to
cooperate efficiently up to the maximum technical possibility. Supply usage is in line with the reference case and
shows some potential flexibility.
Demand
Results of the simulation show that Finland is exposed up to 61% of demand curtailment in case of disruption of all
imports to the Baltic states and to Finland. Risk of demand curtailment in Finland is presented excluding the countryspecific
possibility of using back-up fuels for gas. The exposure to demand curtailment is observed for the duration
of the disruption, in January and February. Estonia cooperates with Finland up to the maximum technical capacity
of Balticconnector, being exposed to 3% demand curtailment in February. The commissioning of Balticconnector
allows gas to flow from the Baltic States to support Finland, which was not effective in 2017. Additionally, the
commissioning of the GIPL project (PL-LT interconnection) integrates the gas systems of the Eastern Baltic Sea region
and Continental Europe. GIPL is used up to the maximum capacity between Lithuania and Latvia.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 35 of 70
SCENARIO #5 - Disruption of all imports to the Baltic states and Finland
Country Demand curtailment JAN Demand curtailment FEB
Finland 97 GWh/d ≈ 9 mcm/d 85 GWh/d ≈ 8 mcm/d
Estonia 8 GWh/d ≈ 0.5 mcm/d 1.6 GWh/d ≈ 0.15 mcm/d
Latvia - Lithuania
- Within
the risk group:
Risk group demand Demand curtailment
JAN 6,589 GWh/d
105 GWh/d ≈ 10
mcm/d
FEB 6,082 GWh/d 87 GWh/d ≈ 8 mcm/d
MAR 5,121 GWh/d Exports
to Ukraine (UA) can be maintained while transit to Kaliningrad is interrupted in line with the considered
assumptions.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
2-week / 20 years: Simulated from 15 to 28 February
Supply
Storages: Storage usage slightly increases during both weeks by 1.7 TWh.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: Commissioning of Balticconnector pipeline allows Finland and the Baltic States to
cooperate efficiently up to maximum technical possibility. Supply usage is in line with the reference case. LNG flows
to Lithuania up to the maximum technical send-out capacity.
LNG tanks: Necessary to provide extra LNG capacity during both weeks.
Demand
Results of the simulation show a risk of demand curtailment in Finland up to 69% in case of disruption of all imports
to the Baltic states and Finland. Risk of demand curtailment in Finland is presented excluding the country-specific
possibility of using back-up fuels for gas. Risk of demand curtailment is observed in both weeks. Latvia and Estonia
cooperate with Finland up to the maximum technical capacity available of Balticonnector, sharing the risk of demand
curtailment within the range of 23-48%. The commissioning of the Balticconnector allows gas to flow from the Baltic
States to support Finland which was not possible in 2017. The capacity from Lithuania to Latvia is fully used.
Additionally, the commissioning of the GIPL project in 2021 (PL-LT interconnection) integrates the gas systems of
the Eastern Baltic Sea region and Continental Europe. The GIPL project is used up to the capacity limitation between
Lithuania and Latvia.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 36 of 70
SCENARIO #5 - Disruption of all imports to the Baltic states and Finland
Country Demand curtailment W1 Demand curtailment W2
Finland 125 GWh/d ≈ 11 mcm/d 125 GWh/d ≈ 11 mcm/d
Estonia 27 GWh/d ≈ 3 mcm/d 27 GWh/d ≈ 3 mcm/d
Latvia 7 GWh/d ≈ 0.7 mcm/d 21 GWh/d ≈ 2 mcm/d
Lithuania - Within
the risk group:
Risk group demand Demand curtailment
W1 7,927 GWh/d 159 GWh/d ≈ 14 mcm/d
W2 7,927 GWh/d 173 GWh/d ≈ 16 mcm/d
Exports to Ukraine (UA) can be maintained while transit to Kaliningrad is interrupted in line with the considered
assumptions.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
Peak day/ 20 years: 15 February
Supply
Storages: Storage usage slightly increases during peak day by 0.2 TWh
Pipeline and LNG supplies: the commissioning of the Balticconnector pipeline allows Finland and the Baltic States to
cooperate efficiently up to its maximum technical possibility. Supply usage is in line with the reference case. LNG
flows to Lithuania up to the maximum technical send-out capacity.
Demand
Finland is exposed up to 73% of demand curtailment in case of disruption of all imports to the Baltic states and
Finland. the exposure to demand curtailment in Finland is presented excluding the country-specific possibility of
using back-up fuels for gas. Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania cooperate with Finland up to the maximum technical
capacity of Balticonnector, sharing the exposure to demand curtailment within the range of 15-58%. The
implementation of Balticconnector allows gas to flow from the Baltic States to support Finland which was not
possible in 2017. Additionally, the commissioning of the GIPL project in 2021 (PL-LT interconnection) integrates the
gas systems of the Eastern Baltic Sea region and Continental Europe. The GIPL project is used up to its maximum
capacity to cooperate with Lithuania.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 37 of 70
SCENARIO #5 - Disruption of all imports to the Baltic states and Finland
Country Demand curtailment
Finland 145 GWh/d ≈13 mcm/d
Estonia 41 GWh/d ≈ 4 mcm/d
Latvia 32 GWh/d ≈ 3 mcm/d
Lithuania 22 GWh/d ≈ 2 mcm/d
Within the risk group:
Risk group demand Demand curtailment
peak day 9,186 GWh/d 240 GWh/d ≈ 22 mcm/d
Exports to Ukraine (UA) can be maintained while transit to Kaliningrad is interrupted in line with the considered
assumptions.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 38 of 70
SCENARIO #6 - Disruption of the largest infrastructure to the Balkan region
Risk group: Eastern gas supply – Trans-
Balkan
Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Romania
Disruption duration: 2 weeks (15 February – 28 February)
Simulation results
January-March
Supply
Storages: Storage usage is the same as in the reference situation.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: The overall supply stays at similar levels as in the reference case. Gas originally flowing
through Trans Balkan Pipeline can be delivered to Bulgaria via Turk Stream and the Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria.
Demand
No country is exposed to demand curtailment. Following the commissioning of Turk Stream in 2020 and IGB in 2022
(gas Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria), Bulgaria is no longer exposed to risk of demand curtailment compared with
previous edition.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 39 of 70
SCENARIO #6 - Disruption of the largest infrastructure to the Balkan region
2-week / 20 years: Simulated from 15 to 28 February
Supply
Storages: Storage usage is the same as in the reference situation.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: Same supply structure as in case of reference situation – gas originally flowing through
Trans Balkan Pipeline can be delivered to Bulgaria via Turk Stream and Gas Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria.
LNG tanks: Necessary to provide extra LNG capacity during both weeks.
Demand
No country is exposed to risk of demand curtailment. Thanks to the commissioning of IGB in 2022 (Gas
Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria) and Turk Stream in 2020, Bulgaria is no longer exposed to demand curtailment
compared to the previous edition.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
Peak day / 20 years: 15 February
Supply
Storages: Storage usage is the same as in the reference situation.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: Same supply behaviour as in the reference situation – gas originally flowing through Trans
Balkan Pipeline can be delivered to Bulgaria via Turk Stream and the Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria.
Demand
No country is exposed to demand curtailment. Thanks to the commissioning of Turk Stream in 2020 and IGB in 2022
(Gas Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria), Bulgaria is no longer exposed to demand curtailment compared to the
previous edition.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 40 of 70
SCENARIO #7 - Disruption of the largest offshore infrastructure to the UK
(Technical disruption of Langeled pipeline)
Risk group: North Sea gas supply –
Norway
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Spain, France,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
Sweden
Disruption duration: 2 months (1 January – 28 February)
Simulation results
January-March
Supply
Storages: Storage usage increases during January and February by 12 TWh.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: Supplies and are not used at their maximum supply potential. There are less imports from
NO to UK. The overall flows of Norwegian gas decrease and it is replaced mainly by LNG supply and storage usage.
Demand
No country is exposed to demand curtailment.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 41 of 70
SCENARIO #7 - Disruption of the largest offshore infrastructure to the UK
(Technical disruption of Langeled pipeline)
2-week / 20 years: Simulated from 15 to 28 February
Supply
Storages: Storage usage slightly increases during both weeks by 4.7 TWh
Pipeline and LNG supplies: Less imports from NO to UK. The overall flows of Norwegian gas decrease and are
replaced mainly by LNG and storage usage. The LNG supply in the UK is used up to the maximum send-out capacity.
LNG tanks: Necessary to provide extra LNG capacity during both weeks.
Demand
No country is exposed to demand curtailment. DK and SE are no longer exposed to demand curtailment as explained
in the reference case.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
Peak day/ 20 years: 15 February
Supply
Storages: Storage usage slightly increases by 0.8 TWh.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: Less imports from NO to UK. The overall flows of Norwegian gas decrease and are
replaced mainly by LNG supply and storage usage. The LNG supply in the UK is used up to the maximum send-out
capacity.
Demand
No country is exposed to demand curtailment. DK and SE are no longer exposed to risk of demand curtailment as
explained in the reference case.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 42 of 70
SCENARIO #8 - Disruption of the largest offshore infrastructure to
continental EU (EUROPIPE II)
Risk group: North Sea gas supply –
Norway
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Spain, France,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
Sweden
Disruption duration: 2 months (1 January – 28 February)
Simulation results
January-March
Technical disruption of Europipe II pipeline (72.1 MSCM/d), Europipe I with 45.7 MSCM/d remains operational.
Supply
Storages: Storage usage increases during January and February by 5 TWh.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: Supplies shows some potential flexibility. The overall flows of Norwegian gas to the EU
decrease and are replaced mainly by LNG supply and storage usage.
Demand
No country is exposed to demand curtailment.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 43 of 70
SCENARIO #8 - Disruption of the largest offshore infrastructure to
continental EU (EUROPIPE II)
2-week / 20 years: Simulated from 15 to 28 February
Supply
Storages: Storage usage increases during both weeks by 4 TWh.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: The overall flows of Norwegian gas decrease and are replaced mainly by storage usage.
Norwegian gas supply is used up to the reduced import capacity. The LNG supply in BE, NL, FR, UK, SE and PL is used
up to the maximum send-out capacity.
LNG tanks: Necessary to provide extra LNG capacity during both weeks.
Demand
No country is exposed to demand curtailment. DK and SE are no longer exposed to demand curtailment as explained
in the reference case.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
Peak day/ 20 years: 15 February
Supply
Storages: Storage usage slightly increases by 0.7 TWh.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: The overall flows of Norwegian gas decrease and are replaced mainly by storage usage.
Norwegian gas supply is used up to the reduced import capacity. The LNG supply in BE, NL, FR, UK, SE and PL is used
up to the maximum send-out capacity.
Demand
No country is exposed to demand curtailment. DK and SE are no longer exposed to demand curtailment as explained
in the reference case.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 44 of 70
SCENARIO #9 - Disruption of the largest onshore infrastructure from
Norway (Technical disruption of Emden station)
Risk group: North Sea gas supply –
Norway
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Spain, France,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
Sweden
Disruption duration: 2 weeks (15 February – 28 February)
Simulation results
January-March
Supply
Storages: Storage usage increases during February by 13 TWh.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: Supplies shows some potential flexibility. The overall flows of Norwegian gas to the EU
decrease and are replaced mainly by storage usage.
Demand
No country is exposed to demand curtailment.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 45 of 70
SCENARIO #9 - Disruption of the largest onshore infrastructure from
Norway (Technical disruption of Emden station)
2-week / 20 years: Simulated from 15 to 28 February
Supply
Storages: Storage usage increases during both weeks by 8 TWh.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: The overall flows of Norwegian gas decrease and are replaced mainly by storages usage.
Norwegian gas supply is used up to the reduced import capacity. The LNG supply in BE, NL, FR, UK, SE and PL is used
up to the maximum send-out capacity.
LNG tanks: Necessary to provide extra LNG capacity during both weeks.
Demand
No country is exposed to demand curtailment. DK and SE are no longer exposed to demand curtailment as explained
in the reference case.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
Peak day/ 20 years: 15 February
Supply
Storages: Storage usage slightly increases by 1 TWh.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: The overall flows of Norwegian gas decrease and are replaced mainly by storage usage.
Norwegian gas supply is used up to the reduced import capacity. The LNG supply in BE, NL, FR, UK, SE and PL is used
up to the maximum send-out capacity.
Demand
No country is exposed to demand curtailment. DK and SE are no longer expose to demand curtailment as explained
in the reference case.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
SCENARIO #10 &1 1 - Disruption of the largest L-gas storage and L-gas supply
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 46 of 70
As for Union-wide SoS simulation 2017, it was also decided to delegate the treatment of the scenarios concerning
L-gas to the Gas Platform8
. The involved TSOs of the Gas Platform have prepared the L-gas scenarios. The
coordinators of the involved members states (Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands) of the Gas Platform
have agreed upon the L-gas scenarios.
SCENARIO #10 - Disruption of the largest L-gas storage (UGS Norg – NL) Gas Platform
Risk group: Low Calorific Gas Germany, Belgium, France, The Netherlands
Simulation results
2-week: Cold spell period for 2 weeks (coldest period of two weeks of the last 30 years, reference period used in simulations:
December 27, 1996 – January 9, 1997).
Supply
Increased production of (mainly) the Groningen field
within the boundaries set by the Dutch government and
pseudo L-gas production (quality conversion from H-gas
to L-gas).
Demand
No demand curtailment.
Dutch domestic demand can be supplied and exports to
Germany, Belgium and France can be maintained.
Peak day: The peak is considered at minus 17°C (effective temperature at weather station De Bilt, The Netherlands), because
this temperature is used as the design temperature of the transmission system in The Netherlands (reference day used in
simulation: January 14, 1987).
Supply
The amount of supply in the L-gas system is sufficient to
meet demand in case of Norg disruption.
Demand
No demand curtailment.
Dutch domestic demand can be supplied and exports to
Germany, Belgium and France can be maintained.
Results analysis
Sufficient compensation available within The Netherlands.
8
The Gas Platform is the regional cooperation for gas for Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands. It is an intergovernmental initiative where ministries responsible for energy policy discuss issues
related to security of supply and market integration, in close cooperation with the National Regulatory Authorities
and Transmission System Operators. Ad hoc, the European Commission or other European authorities participate as
observer. The Benelux Secretariat provides support.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 47 of 70
SCENARIO #11 - Disruption of the L-gas supply (pseudo L-gas facility
Wieringermeer – NL)
Gas Platform
Risk group: Low Calorific Gas Germany, Belgium, France, The Netherlands
Simulation results
2-week: Cold spell period during 2 weeks (coldest period of two weeks of the last 30 years, reference period used in simulations:
December 27, 1996 – January 9, 1997).
Supply
Increased production of (mainly) the Groningen field within
the boundaries set by the Dutch government and pseudo Lgas
production (enrichment and quality conversion from Hgas
to L-gas).
Demand
No demand curtailment.
Dutch domestic demand can be supplied and exports to
Germany, Belgium and France can be maintained.
Peak day: The peak is considered at minus 17°C (effective temperature at weather station De Bilt, The Netherlands), because this
temperature is used as the design temperature of the transmission system in The Netherlands (reference day used in simulation:
January 14, 1987).
Supply
The amount of supply in the L-gas system is sufficient to
meet demand in case of Wieringermeer disruption.
Demand
No demand curtailment.
Dutch domestic demand can be supplied and exports to
Germany, Belgium and France can be maintained.
Results analysis
Sufficient compensation available within The Netherlands.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 48 of 70
SCENARIO #12 - Disruption of the largest infrastructure to Denmark (Baltic
Pipe)
Risk group: North Sea gas supply –
Denmark
Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland,
Sweden
Disruption duration: 2 weeks (15 February – 28 February)
Simulation results
January-March
Supply
Storages: Storage usage is the same as in the reference situation.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: The overall import flows to the EU stay on a similar level as in the reference case.
Demand
No country is exposed to demand curtailment.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 49 of 70
SCENARIO #12 - Disruption of the largest infrastructure to Denmark (Baltic
Pipe)
2-week / 20 years: Simulated from 15 to 28 February
Supply
Storages: Storage usage is the same as in the reference situation.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: The overall import flows to the EU stay on a similarlevel as in the reference case, reaching
the maximum supply potential.
LNG tanks: Necessary to provide extra LNG capacity during both weeks.
Demand
No country is exposed to demand curtailment. DK and SE are no longer exposed to demand curtailment as explained
in the reference case.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
Peak day/ 20 years: 15 February
Supply
Storages: Storage usage is the same as in the reference situation.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: The overall import flows to the EU stay on a similarlevel as in the reference case, reaching
the maximum supply potential.
Demand
No country is exposed to demand curtailment. DK and SE are no longer exposed to demand curtailment as explained
in the reference case.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 50 of 70
SCENARIO #13 - Disruption of the largest offshore production
infrastructure from the UK (Technical disruption of Forties Pipeline system)
Risk group: North Sea gas supply –
United Kingdom
Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands
Disruption duration: 2 months (1 January – 28 February)
Simulation results
January-March
Supply
Storages: Storage usage increases during January and February by 9 TWh.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: Supplies shows some potential flexibility. The overall flows of national production
decrease by the corresponding capacity of the Forties Pipeline system and are replaced mainly by Norwegian supply,
LNG supply and storage usage. National production is used up to the reduced capacity.
Demand
No country is exposed to risk of demand curtailment.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 51 of 70
SCENARIO #13 - Disruption of the largest offshore production
infrastructure from the UK (Technical disruption of Forties Pipeline system)
2-week / 20 years: Simulated from 15 to 28 February
Supply
Storages: Storage usage increases during both weeks by 5 TWh.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: The overall flows of national production decrease and are replaced mainly by storage
usage. National production is used up to the reduced capacity. The overall import flows reach the maximum supply
potential. The LNG supply in BE, NL, FR, and UK is used up to the maximum send-out capacity. Storages can provide
the flexibility of the reduced NP.
LNG tanks: Necessary to provide extra LNG capacity during both weeks.
Demand
No country is exposed to risk of demand curtailment.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
Peak day/ 20 years: 15 February
Supply
Storages: Storage usage slightly increases by 1 TWh.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: The overall flows of national production decrease and are replaced mainly by storage
usage. National production is used up to the reduced capacity. The overall import flows reach the maximum supply
potential. The LNG supply in BE, NL, FR, and UK is used up to the maximum send-out capacity. Storages can provide
the flexibility of the reduced NP.
Demand
No country is exposed to risk of demand curtailment.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 52 of 70
SCENARIO #14 - Disruption of the largest offshore infrastructure to Italy
(Technical disruption of the Transmed system)
Risk group: North-African gas supply –
Algeria
Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Malta, Austria,
Portugal, Slovenia
Disruption duration: 2 months (1 January – 28 February)
Simulation results
January-March
Supply
Storages: Storage usage increases during January and February by 13 TWh.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: Supplies shows some potential flexibility. The overall flow of Algerian gas into EU is
reduced by the imports from North Africa to Italy and it is replaced mainly by LNG supply, storage usage and Caspian
gas.
Demand
No country is exposed to risk of demand curtailment.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 53 of 70
SCENARIO #14 - Disruption of the largest offshore infrastructure to Italy
(Technical disruption of the Transmed system)
2-week / 20 years: Simulated from 15 to 28 February
Supply
Storages: Storage usage increases during both weeks by 15 TWh.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: The overall flow of Algerian gas into EU is reduced by the imports from North Africa to
Italy and it is replaced mainly by LNG supply and storage usage. The overall Algerian import flows reach the
maximum supply potential. LNG imports to Italy are up to the maximum send-out capacity while Algerian imports
to Spain increase up to the maximum technical capacity.
LNG tanks: Necessary to provide extra LNG capacity during both weeks.
Demand
No country is exposed to risk of demand curtailment.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
Peak day/ 20 years: 15 February
Supply
Storages: Storage usage increases by 1 TWh.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: The overall flow of Algerian gas into EU is reduced by the imports from North Africa to
Italy and it is replaced mainly by storage usage. The overall Algerian import flows reach the maximum supply
potential, apart for LNG that will be used up to the maximum needed to satisfy demand. LNG imports to Italy are up
to the maximum send-out capacity while Algerian imports to Spain increase up to the maximum technical capacity.
Demand
No country is exposed to risk of demand curtailment.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 54 of 70
SCENARIO #15 - Disruption of the largest offshore
infrastructure to Spain (Technical disruption of the MEG system)
Risk group: North-African gas supply –
Algeria
Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Malta, Austria,
Portugal, Slovenia
Disruption duration: 2 months (1 January – 28 February)
Simulation results
January-March
Supply
Storages: Storage usage is the same as in the reference situation.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: Supplies shows some potential flexibility. The Algerian gas flowing through MEG is redirected
to MEDGAZ and Transmed not reaching neither of them the full technical capacity.
Demand
No country is exposed to risk of demand curtailment.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 55 of 70
SCENARIO #15 - Disruption of the largest offshore
infrastructure to Spain (Technical disruption of the MEG system)
2-week / 20 years: Simulated from 15 to 28 February
Supply
Storages: Storage usage is the same as in the reference situation.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: The overall import flows to the EU stay on a similar level as in the reference case. Algerian
supply is used up to the maximum supply potential. The Algerian gas flowing through MEG is re-directed to MEDGAZ
and Transmed not reaching neither of them the full technical capacity.
LNG tanks: Necessary to provide extra LNG capacity during both weeks.
Demand
No country is exposed to risk of demand curtailment.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
Peak day/ 20 years: 15 February
Supply
Storages: Storage usage is the same as in the reference situation.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: The overall flow of Algerian gas imports is reduced, and it is mainly replaced by LNG
supply.
Demand
No country is exposed to risk of demand curtailment.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 56 of 70
SCENARIO #16 - Disruption of all imports from Algeria including LNG
Risk group: North-African gas supply –
Algeria
Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Malta, Austria,
Portugal, Slovenia
Disruption duration: 2 months (1 January – 28 February)
Simulation results
January-March
Specificity of scenario #16 - Algerian disruption:
Disruption scenario #16 considers the disruptions of the imports from Algeria via both pipelines and LNG cargos. It
is assumed that DZ LNG cannot be substituted for additional cargos coming from different suppliers for a period of
3 weeks. A period of 3 weeks is assumed necessary to attract more LNG cargos to substitute the Algerian LNG (see
Table 4 for more details).
Supply
Storages: Storage usage increases during January and February by 39 TWh.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: Norwegian and Caspian gas supply are used up to their maximum supply potential in
January to compensate the decrease of LNG cargos during the first 3 weeks and the disruption of Algerian supply.
Storage gas is also used to compensate the lack of Algerian supply.
LNG tanks: Gas from LNG tanks is used to compensate the missing LNG cargos during the first 3 weeks (total 35
TWh).
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 57 of 70
SCENARIO #16 - Disruption of all imports from Algeria including LNG
Demand
No country is exposed to risk of demand curtailment. Compared to the previous edition, Greece no longer faces risk
of demand curtailment during the 2-month disruption. following the commissioning of TANAP, Greece can
additionally access the Caspian gas supply.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
2-week / 20 years: Simulated from 15 to 28 February
Supply
Storages: Storage usage increases s during both weeks by 15 TWh.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: Russian, Norwegian, Libyan and Caspian gas supplies are used up to their maximum
supply potential. Gas from the storages is used to compensate no Algerian supply.
LNG tanks: Necessary to provide extra LNG capacity during both weeks.
Demand
No country is exposed to risk of demand curtailment.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
Peak day/ 20 years: 15 February
Supply
Storages: Storage usage increases by 13 TWh.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: All supplies are used up to their maximum supply potential (apart from NO that is used
up to its maximum import capacity). Gas from the storages is used to compensate the absence of Algerian supply.
Demand
No country is exposed to demand curtailment. Compared to the previous edition, Italy, Croatia and Slovenia no
longer face demand curtailment during peak day.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 58 of 70
SCENARIO #17 - Disruption of all imports from Libya
Risk group: North-African gas supply –
Libya
Croatia, Italy, Malta, Austria, Slovenia
Disruption duration: 2 months (1 January – 28 February)
Simulation results
January-March
Supply
Storages: Storage usage increases during January and February by 4 TWh.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: Supplies shows some potential flexibility. The overall flow of Libyan gas to Italy is replaced
mainly by LNG supply, Caspian gas and gas from the storages.
Demand
No country is exposed to risk of demand curtailment.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 59 of 70
SCENARIO #17 - Disruption of all imports from Libya
2-week / 20 years: Simulated from 15 to 28 February
Supply
Storages: Storage usage increases during both weeks by 4 TWh.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: The overall flow of Libyan gas to Italy is replaced mainly by gas from the storages.
LNG tanks: Necessary to provide extra LNG capacity during both weeks.
Demand
No country is exposed to risk of demand curtailment.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
Peak day/ 20 years: 15 February
Supply
Storages: Storage usage increases by 0.3 TWh.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: The overall flow of Libyan gas to Italy is replaced mainly by gas from the storages.
LNG tanks: Necessary to provide extra LNG capacity.
Demand
No country is exposed to risk of demand curtailment.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 60 of 70
SCENARIO #18 - Disruption of all imports from Turkey to Greece
Risk group: Southern Gas Corridor —
Caspian
Bulgaria, Greece, Croatia, Italy, Hungary, Malta,
Austria, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia
Disruption duration: 2 months (1 January – 28 February)
Simulation results
January-March
Supply
Storages: Storage usage increases during the months of January and February increase by 4 TWh.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: Supplies shows some potential flexibility. No Caspian gas reaches the EU due to the
disruption of the TANAP pipeline and the entry point at Kipi. The overall flow of Caspian gas to Europe is replaced
mainly by LNG supply, Algerian pipe gas and gas from the storages.
Demand
No country is exposed to risk of demand curtailment.
Exports to Ukraine (UA) are maintained.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 61 of 70
SCENARIO #18 - Disruption of all imports from Turkey to Greece
2-week / 20 years: Simulated from 15 to 28 February
Supply
Storages: Storage usage increases during both weeks by 3 TWh.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: The overall flow of Caspian gas to Europe is replaced mainly by LNG and gas from the
storages. All supplies are used up to their maximum supply potential.
LNG tanks: Necessary to provide extra LNG capacity during both weeks.
Demand
No country is exposed to risk of demand curtailment.
Exports to Ukraine (UA) are maintained.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
Peak day/ 20 years: 15 February
Supply
Storages: Storage usage increases by 0.1 TWh.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: The overall flow of Caspian gas to Europe is replaced mainly by LNG supply and gas from
the storages. All supplies are used up to their maximum supply potential.
Demand
No country is exposed to risk of demand curtailment.
Exports to Ukraine (UA) are maintained.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 62 of 70
SCENARIO #19 - the largest onshore infrastructure to Greece (TANAP)
Risk group: Southern Gas Corridor —
Caspian
Bulgaria, Greece, Croatia, Italy, Hungary, Malta,
Austria, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia
Disruption duration: 2 weeks (15 February – 28 February)
Simulation results
January-March
Supply
Storages: Storage usage increases during February by 0.6 TWh.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: Supplies shows some potential flexibility. Caspian gas supply is used up to the reduced
import capacity. Caspian gas is flowing into the EU only through Kipi. Caspian gas is mainly replaced by Algerian
supply and storage use during February.
Demand
No country is exposed to risk of demand curtailment.
Exports to Ukraine (UA) are maintained.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 63 of 70
SCENARIO #19 - the largest onshore infrastructure to Greece (TANAP)
2-week / 20 years: Simulated from 15 to 28 February
Supply
Storages: Storage usage increases during both weeks by 3 TWh.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: Caspian gas supply is used up to the reduced import capacity. Caspian gas is replaced
mainly by gas from the storages. Supply sources are used up to their maximum supply potential.
LNG tanks: Necessary to provide extra LNG capacity during both weeks.
Demand
No country is exposed to risk of demand curtailment.
Exports to Ukraine (UA) are maintained.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
Peak day/ 20 years: 15 February
Supply
Storages: Storage usage increases by 0.2 TWh.
Pipeline and LNG supplies: Caspian gas supply is used up to the reduced import capacity. Caspian gas is replaced by
gas from the storages.
Demand
No country is exposed to risk of demand curtailment.
Exports to Ukraine (UA) are maintained.
Nord Stream 2 sensitivity (without Nord Stream 2): no changes.
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 64 of 70
5. Annexes: data tables
5.1. Annex I: Demand
Table 5.Average daily demand [GWh/d].
Country OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR 2-Week Peak day
AT 302 335 440 414 412 339 414 588
BA 5 7 10 13 8 6 14 18
BEh 681 781 982 985 974 782 1,136 1,202
BEl 162 178 217 217 217 182 227 239
BGn 88 120 126 141 140 137 156 183
CH 91 154 185 159 203 160 220 230
CZ 259 303 479 421 432 315 592 727
DE 2,042 2,575 3,099 3,531 3,136 2,645 4,045 4,813
DEI 490 635 778 896 788 654 1,178 1,198
DK 73 106 116 131 128 110 140 215
EE 16 22 39 37 31 36 57 70
ES 1,031 1,257 1,281 1,292 1,269 1,135 1,502 1,863
FI 95 114 148 152 140 125 180 200
FR 1,197 1,845 2,495 2,243 2,088 1,711 3,154 3,828
FRnL 143 206 265 223 187 150 323 394
GR 153 185 212 221 175 190 265 312
HR 81 104 129 130 159 90 205 223
HU 362 468 600 646 659 451 700 760
IE 144 164 190 199 198 186 242 298
IT 2,155 2,735 3,636 3,607 3,389 2,899 3,801 4,893
LT 76 83 95 100 106 85 128 151
LU 47 46 57 54 53 47 49 60
LV 59 79 79 92 117 102 92 117
MK 10 16 17 17 16 16 17 19
NL 921 1,460 1,902 1,896 1,857 1,485 3,165 3,832
PL 612 742 830 889 902 782 1,009 1,121
PT 206 209 206 221 211 211 245 277
RO 351 536 526 559 635 483 716 773
RS 62 62 62 62 62 62 95 104
RUk 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85
SE 24 41 42 59 49 38 65 77
SI 34 41 43 50 47 40 61 68
SK 156 205 269 281 253 229 441 496
UAe 335 335 335 335 335 335 416 416
UK 2,450 3,165 3,969 4,325 4,107 3,551 4,403 5,144
UKn 61 66 68 74 72 68 74 96
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 65 of 70
5.2. Annex II: National production
Table 6. Average daily production [GWh/d].
Country OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR 2-week Peak day
AT 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
BGn 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
CZ 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
DE 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
DEI 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128
ES 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
DK 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103
FI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HR 15 15 15 15 15 15 16 16
HU 45 45 45 45 45 45 50 50
IE 45 45 45 45 45 45 46 46
IT 110 110 110 110 110 110 122 122
NL 452 452 452 452 452 452 994 994
PL 61 61 61 61 61 61 71 71
RO 251 251 251 251 251 251 255 255
SE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.15 0.15
SK 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
UK 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,248 1,248
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 66 of 70
5.3. Annex III: Storages
Table 7. Storage working gas volumes and initial levels (WGV: source AGSI+).
Name
Working Gas Volume
[GWh]
Initial filling level
[% of WGV]
AT 45,325 75%
ATm 17,510 75%
ATn 32,353 75%
BEh 9,001 75%
BGn 6,270 75%
CZ 29,000 75%
CZd 6,944 75%
DE 4,862 75%
DEd 1,832 75%
DEdL 4,374 75%
DEg 101,085 75%
DEgL 16,346 75%
DEm 34,178 75%
DEmL 3,012 75%
DEn 71,674 75%
DEnL 6,076 75%
DK 10,460 75%
ES 34,248 75%
FRa 47,000 75%
FRn 28,500 75%
FRnL 13,400 75%
FRs 10,300 75%
FRt 33,100 75%
HR 5,216 75%
HU 69,643 75%
IT 206,204 75%
LV 24,200 50%
NL 143,707 75%
PL 37,460 75%
PT 3,570 75%
RO 32,991 75%
RS 4,532 75%
SE 86 75%
SKm 43,448 75%
UK 20,890 75%
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 67 of 70
Table 8. Injection curves.
UGS inventory
Name 100% 99% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%
AT 0% 65% 78% 85% 90% 93% 96% 97% 99% 99% 100% 100%
Injectionavailability
ATm 0% 48% 62% 75% 80% 85% 92% 94% 98% 99% 99% 100%
ATn 0% 48% 62% 75% 80% 85% 92% 94% 98% 99% 99% 100%
BEh 0% 18% 18% 35% 35% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
BGn 0% 56% 63% 63% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
CZ 0% 30% 40% 60% 75% 85% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
CZd 0% 48% 62% 75% 80% 85% 92% 94% 98% 99% 99% 100%
DE 0% 50% 62% 73% 81% 89% 96% 98% 99% 99% 100% 100%
DEd 0% 48% 62% 75% 80% 85% 92% 94% 98% 99% 99% 100%
DEdL 0% 48% 62% 75% 80% 85% 92% 94% 98% 99% 99% 100%
DEg 0% 48% 62% 75% 80% 85% 92% 94% 98% 99% 99% 100%
DEgL 0% 48% 62% 75% 80% 85% 92% 94% 98% 99% 99% 100%
DEm 0% 48% 62% 75% 80% 85% 92% 94% 98% 99% 99% 100%
DEmL 0% 48% 62% 75% 80% 85% 92% 94% 98% 99% 99% 100%
DEn 0% 48% 62% 75% 80% 85% 92% 94% 98% 99% 99% 100%
DEnL 0% 48% 62% 75% 80% 85% 92% 94% 98% 99% 99% 100%
DK 0% 75% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
ES 0% 85% 85% 90% 90% 90% 95% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
FRa 0% 76% 76% 80% 84% 88% 92% 96% 100% 100% 100% 100%
FRn 0% 62% 68% 77% 85% 93% 95% 98% 100% 100% 100% 100%
FRnL 0% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
FRs 0% 42% 57% 60% 65% 70% 76% 82% 88% 92% 96% 100%
FRt 0% 98% 99% 99% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
HR 0% 33% 83% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
HU 0% 88% 89% 91% 92% 94% 95% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
IT 0% 15% 31% 62% 62% 62% 79% 79% 100% 100% 100% 100%
LV 0% 50% 60% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
NL 0% 58% 68% 78% 82% 86% 91% 93% 97% 98% 99% 100%
PL 0% 54% 70% 83% 83% 89% 87% 88% 89% 90% 97% 100%
PT 0% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
RO 0% 48% 62% 75% 80% 85% 92% 94% 98% 99% 99% 100%
RS 0% 48% 62% 75% 80% 85% 92% 94% 98% 99% 99% 100%
SE 0% 48% 62% 75% 80% 85% 92% 94% 98% 99% 99% 100%
SKm 0% 48% 62% 75% 80% 85% 92% 94% 98% 99% 99% 100%
UK 0% 48% 62% 75% 80% 85% 92% 94% 98% 99% 99% 100%
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 68 of 70
Table 9. Withdraw curves.
UGS inventory
Name 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 1% 0%
Withdrawdeliverability
AT 100% 99% 98% 97% 96% 95% 88% 80% 71% 63% 57% 0%
ATm 100% 100% 99% 98% 98% 98% 84% 70% 56% 41% 27% 0%
ATn 100% 100% 99% 98% 98% 98% 84% 70% 56% 41% 27% 0%
BEh 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 20% 20% 10% 10% 0%
BGn 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 95% 85% 75% 66% 57% 0%
CZ 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 97% 80% 70% 50% 40% 20% 0%
CZd 100% 100% 99% 98% 98% 98% 84% 70% 56% 41% 27% 0%
DE 100% 100% 100% 99% 99% 99% 86% 74% 60% 46% 31% 0%
DEd 100% 100% 99% 98% 98% 98% 84% 70% 56% 41% 27% 0%
DEdL 100% 100% 99% 98% 98% 98% 84% 70% 56% 41% 27% 0%
DEg 100% 100% 99% 98% 98% 98% 84% 70% 56% 41% 27% 0%
DEgL 100% 100% 99% 98% 98% 98% 84% 70% 56% 41% 27% 0%
DEm 100% 100% 99% 98% 98% 98% 84% 70% 56% 41% 27% 0%
DEmL 100% 100% 99% 98% 98% 98% 84% 70% 56% 41% 27% 0%
DEn 100% 100% 99% 98% 98% 98% 84% 70% 56% 41% 27% 0%
DEnL 100% 100% 99% 98% 98% 98% 84% 70% 56% 41% 27% 0%
DK 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 85% 33% 25% 0%
ES 100% 80% 72% 67% 63% 60% 55% 50% 45% 40% 40% 0%
FRa 100% 95% 90% 85% 80% 75% 66% 57% 48% 39% 30% 0%
FRn 100% 96% 91% 87% 83% 78% 72% 65% 58% 49% 38% 0%
FRnL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 93% 85% 0%
FRs 100% 97% 94% 91% 88% 85% 79% 73% 66% 56% 27% 0%
FRt 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 91% 74% 57% 39% 22% 0%
HR 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 96% 80% 65% 48% 32% 14% 0%
HU 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 97% 95% 84% 72% 52% 40% 0%
IT 100% 100% 99% 98% 98% 98% 84% 70% 56% 41% 27% 0%
LV 100% 100% 100% 90% 80% 70% 50% 40% 25% 20% 20% 0%
NL 100% 98% 96% 95% 93% 91% 81% 70% 59% 48% 37% 0%
PL 100% 100% 99% 98% 97% 90% 84% 72% 65% 51% 29% 0%
PT 100% 100% 100% 100% 85% 85% 85% 85% 85% 85% 85% 0%
RO 100% 100% 99% 98% 98% 98% 84% 70% 56% 41% 27% 0%
RS 100% 100% 99% 98% 98% 98% 84% 70% 56% 41% 27% 0%
SE 100% 100% 99% 98% 98% 98% 84% 70% 56% 41% 27% 0%
SKm 100% 100% 99% 98% 98% 98% 84% 70% 56% 41% 27% 0%
UK 100% 100% 99% 98% 98% 98% 84% 70% 56% 41% 27% 0%
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 69 of 70
5.4. Annex IV: LNG
Table 10. LNG tank capacity and flexibility
Name
LNG Tank Capacity
[GWh]
LNG Tank Flexibility
[% of LNG Tank Capacity]
BEh 2,644 35%
ES 13,337 68%
ESa 9,381 68%
FI 538 54%
FRn 6,371 76%
FRs 2,809 60%
GR 1,541 57%
HR 959 54%
IT 1,627 63%
ITa 1,713 33%
LT 1,165 3%
NL 3,699 35%
PL 2,192 74%
PT 2,672 43%
SE 343 54%
UK 14,385 64%
5.5. Annex V: Capacities
Separate file
ENTSOG Union-wide SoS simulation report
Page 70 of 70
Abbreviations:
Country codes are defined according to the ISO standard 3166-1
DC: Design Case, identical with Peak Day
EC: European Commission
ENTSOG: European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas
EU: European Union
GCG: Gas Coordination Group
GIE: Gas Infrastructure Europe
GLE: Gas LNG terminals operators Europe
GSE: Gas Storages operators Europe
H-gas: High calorific gas
L-gas: Low calorific gas
LNG: Liquified Natural Gas
SoS: Security of Supply
TSO: Transmission System Operators
UGS: Underground Gas Storage
WGV: Working Gas Volumes
WSO: Winter Supply Outlook
Co-Authors Kacper Zeromski, Paula Di Mattia, Louis Watine
Cover ZN
Publisher ENTSOG
Avenue de Cortenbergh 100
1000 Brussels, Belgium
AISBL
Avenue de Cortenbergh 100 1000 Brussels, Belgium
Tel. +32 2 894 51 00
ENTSOG AISBL
info@entsog.eu | www.entsog.eu