Foreword

Pushing the Envelope – Analyzing the Impact of Values

Marita R. Inglehart

In a sense, this book began when Ronald Inglehart went to Paris in May 1968 to investigate the causes of a student uprising that had just paralyzed France. He mounted a representative national survey of the French public that probed into the motivations underlying the greatest mass uprising since World War II and why the Gaullist government that had opposed it was returned to power by a majority of French voters in subsequent national elections.

When he began to analyze the results, Inglehart was surprised: the data contradicted his expectations. Like most observers – including the strikers and demonstrators themselves – he assumed that the May 1968 uprising was a manifestation of class conflict. Paris was covered with posters attacking capitalist exploitation; French intellectuals interpreted the events in Marxist terms, and the participants used standard Marxist slogans about class struggle. Accordingly, Inglehart initially struggled to make the findings fit Marxist expectations. New elections were held a month after the strikes and demonstrations. His data showed that instead of heightened class polarization, with the proletariat supporting the parties of the Left and the bourgeoisie rallying behind General de Gaulle, a large share of the working-class voters had shifted to support the Gaullist ruling party, contributing to its victory. It was mainly middle-class voters who moved in the opposite direction.

Seeking to understand why this happened, Inglehart analyzed the responses to an open-ended question that asked about the goals of those who had taken part in the strikes and demonstrations. The motivations varied sharply by age and social class. Working-class respondents, especially the older ones, overwhelmingly mentioned higher salaries. Middle-class respondents, especially the younger ones, said they wanted a freer, less impersonal society. Inglehart hypothesized that these age and class differences reflected a process of intergenerational value change linked with the economic miracles of the postwar era.

He reasoned that, throughout history, most people have grown up experiencing economic and physical insecurity. Germany was a particularly striking example that quickly caught Inglehart's attention right after his visits to France. In Germany, the older generations had experienced deprivation and loss of life during World War I, followed by the Great Depression of the 1930s, and then defeat, occupation, and liberation during World War II. The postwar era, by contrast, brought historically unprecedented levels of economic and physical security. During the two decades before 1968, Germany experienced the highest economic growth rates in its history. This economic development, combined with the emergence of the modern welfare state, meant that for the first time in history, a large part of the population had grown up in a society where starvation was virtually unknown. A large part of the postwar generation no longer gave top priority to economic security, instead placing growing emphasis on autonomy and freedom of expression.

A society's basic values, of course, do not change overnight, and older generations continued to emphasize the materialistic goals that had shaped them during their formative years. But the more secure strata of the postwar generation gave higher priority to "postmaterialist" goals, as Inglehart called them.

The student protesters in France, Germany, and elsewhere in the Western world indicated the political emergence of the postwar generation. Although their formative conditions had been present for years, this generation did not become old enough to have an impact on politics until the 1960s, when they were university students. Eventually they would occupy the leading positions in society, but initially they saw themselves as having values that were sharply different from those of their elders. "Don't trust anyone over thirty!" was a widespread slogan. When postmaterialists first emerged as a political force, they tended to express themselves in Marxist slogans, which were then the standard rhetoric of protest in Western Europe. To a large extent, the term "Left" *meant* the Marxist parties, and it was natural for the postmaterialists to assume that they were Marxists. But in fact there were profound differences between the goals of the postmaterialists and those of the Marxist Left, as the postmaterialists gradually discovered.

In 1970, Inglehart tested his postmaterialist value change theory in a six-nation survey of European attitudes with a battery of questions he had explicitly designed to measure materialist versus postmaterialist values. In all six countries (Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands), there were massive differences between the values of young and old respondents. Among those older than sixty-five, materialists outnumbered postmaterialists by a margin of fourteen to one; but among the postwar generation, postmaterialists were more numerous than materialists. Moreover, within each birth cohort, postmaterialists were much more heavily represented among the economically secure strata than among the less-educated and lower-income groups. The article reporting these findings was published in 1971 in the

American Political Science Review, and the concept of postmaterialism entered the vocabulary of modern political science.[1]

Several critics argued that the dramatic value differences between age groups reflected life-cycle effects rather than generational change. Data from a long time series would be needed to answer this question. The four-item materialist-postmaterialist values battery was included in the Eurobarometer surveys beginning in 1973 and was continued for decades. This made it possible to carry out cohort analyses based on data covering a long time series. The results confirmed that a process of intergenerational value change was taking place: given birth cohorts did not become more materialist as they grew older, and as younger cohorts gradually replaced older ones in the adult population, the society as a whole became increasingly postmaterialist. In addition, the wealth of the data in the Eurobarometer studies enabled survey researchers to examine the range of attitudes and behaviors linked to postmaterialist value change, stimulating a growing body of research on this topic.

The research agenda on value change in contemporary societies continued to expand. In 1973, Inglehart developed a broader-based twelve-item battery. With Samuel Barnes, Max Kaase, Warren Miller, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, and Alan Marsh, he helped design the Political Action study, which demonstrated the link between value change and new forms of political action such as protests, petitions, sit-ins, and various other manifestations of contentious action.[2]

The concept of postmaterialist values has become a standard term in social science (in 2014, a Google Scholar search on "postmaterialist values" produced more than 15,000 citations). But in subsequent research, Inglehart found that the value shift he first measured in 1970 was part of a much broader process of intergenerational cultural change linked with modernization.[3] Materialist-postmaterialist values were just one component of a broader dimension of cross-cultural variation, which he called survival–self-expression values. Self-expression values give high priority to environmental protection, tolerance of out-groups, gender equality, and emphasis on participation in decision making in economic and political life. These values reflect mass polarization over gender equality and individual freedoms, which are part of a broader syndrome of tolerance of out-groups, including foreigners and gays and lesbians. The shift

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[1] R. Inglehart, "The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies," *American Political Science Review* 65 (1971): 991–1017; R. Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977).

[2] S. H. Barnes, M. Kaase, K. Allerbeck, F. Heunks, R. Inglehart, M. K. Jennings, et al., *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979).

[3] R. Inglehart, *Culture Shift* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); R. Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977); P. Abramson and R. Inglehart, *Value Change in Global Perspective* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995); R. Inglehart and W. Baker, "Modernization, Cultural Change and the Persistence of Traditional Values," *American Sociological Review* 65 (2000): 19–51.

from survival values to self-expression values also includes a shift in child-rearing values, from an emphasis on hard work and conformity to social norms toward emphasis on imagination and tolerance as important values to teach a child. Plus it goes with a rising sense of subjective well-being that is conducive to tolerance, trust, political moderation, and expressive political action – all of which are conducive to democracy.

Building on this revised view of modernization, Inglehart, in collaboration with various colleagues, particularly Christian Welzel and Pippa Norris, developed the *evolutionary modernization theory*. Departing from earlier versions of modernization theory, it abandons simplistic assumptions of linearity.[4] Instead, it emphasizes that modernization is reversible and can change direction. Thus, the transition from agrarian to industrial society was linked with a cultural shift from "traditional" to "secular-rational values," which made the emergence of "electoral democracy" possible, although by no means inevitable. Then, the transition from industrial to postindustrial society brought a shift in a very different direction: from "survival" to "self-expression values," which makes "liberal democracy" increasingly likely. This theory also moves from a narrow focus on changes in objective socioeconomic conditions to examine changes in people's subjective beliefs and the impact of these beliefs on regime institutions and public policies. Finally, this theory recognizes the enduring impact of a society's historic heritage, as is manifest in the robust global cultural zones based on religious and colonial experiences: economic development tends to change a society's culture in roughly predictable ways. But the process is path dependent: the fact that a society was historically Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox, Muslim, or Confucian continues to shape its people's values today.

Nevertheless, it seems clear that rising economic and physical security tends to erode the rigid cultural norms that characterized agrarian societies, leading to norms that allow greater individual autonomy and free choice. Strikingly similar findings have been reported by researchers in other disciplines from anthropology to biology. Thus, Gelfand and colleagues find that nations that encountered severe ecological and historical threats have stronger norms and lower tolerance of deviant behavior than do other nations, arguing that existential pressures determine whether a culture is tolerant of deviance.[5] Similarly, Thornhill and colleagues find that historic vulnerability to infectious disease is linked with collectivist attitudes, xenophobia, and low support for gender equality – all of which hinder the emergence of democracy.[6]

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[4] R. Inglehart and P. Norris, *Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change around the World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); P. Norris and R. Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*, expanded 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); R. Inglehart and C. Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

[5] M. J. Gelfand, J. L. Raver, L. Nishii, L. M. Leslie, J. Lun, B. C. Lim, et al., "Differences between Tight and Loose Cultures: A 33-Nation Study," *Science* 27 (2011): 1100–4.

[6] R. Thornhill, C. Fincher, and D. R. Murray, "Zoonotic and Non-zoonotic Diseases in Relation to Human Personality and Societal Values," *Evolutionary Psychology* 8 (2010): 151–55.

Inglehart's theory of postmaterialism and the revised theory of modernization that developed from it continue to be the basis of evolving theories. Recent extensions include Welzel's *general theory of emancipation*[7] as well as Dalton and Welzel's *allegiance-assertion theory*, pursued in this volume, which postulates a shift from allegiant to assertive types of citizens. The underlying logic connecting this lineage of theories is that increasing existential security, cognitive mobilization, and other opportunity-widening aspects of modernization tend to make people more self-directed and to shift their emphasis on freedom of choice and equality of opportunities. These values fuel various social movement activities that advocate gender equality, tolerance of gays and lesbians, and participatory democracy throughout societal life.

In 1973, Jacques-René Rabier launched the Eurobarometer surveys and had the foresight to include the materialist-postmaterialist values in a long-term program of monitoring the attitudinal component of social change. This made it possible to test these ideas empirically and to modify and build on them to improve our understanding of how people's beliefs and goals are changing. Rabier is one of the unsung heroes of cross-national survey research. He not only launched the Eurobarometer surveys but also inspired and supported other cross-national survey research programs such as the Latino Barometer, the Afro Barometer, and the East Asia Barometer. He also helped design the European Values Study, launched in 1981 by Jan Kerkhofs and Ruud de Moore, which was carried out by the same survey institutes that did the Eurobarometer and included many of its key indicators, such as materialist-postmaterialist values and unconventional political action measures from the Political Action Surveys. Later, de Moor and Kerkhofs invited Inglehart to help expand the European Values Study (EVS) into a global survey project that in 1990 became the World Values Survey (WVS). In 1995, Inglehart launched a new wave of the WVS on his own, and in 1999, the EVS and WVS were established as two separate groups, which continue to cooperate, sharing key batteries of items to build up an unprecedented time series for the analysis of value change. Kerkhof's and de Moor's work has been carried on with great success by Paul de Graaf, Loek Halman, Jaak Billiet, Jacques Hagenaars, and their colleagues, covering virtually every country in Europe.

The WVS is the most important research project of Inglehart's career. In discussing the WVS, he is clearly expressing his appreciation and gratitude for having been able to work with such colleagues as Miguel Basanez, Russell Dalton, Jaime Díez-Nicolás, Juan Díez-Nicolás, Yilmaz Esmer, Christian Haerpfer, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Marta Lagos, Shen Mingming, Alejandro Moreno Alvarez, Neil Nevitte, Pippa Norris, Thorleif Pettersson, Bi Puranen, Catalina Romero, Sandeep Shastri, Christian Welzel, Seiko Yamazaki, and many other colleagues in the WVS network. These people, from countries

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[7] C. Welzel, *Freedom Rising: Human Empowerment and the Quest for Emancipation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

around the world, have played key roles in carrying out the WVS, analyzing the data, and presenting the findings in publications and conferences around the world. A project of this scope requires people with diverse talents to design, organize, fund, analyze, archive, interpret, and publish findings from this study of social change in more than 100 countries, extending over 30 years. The WVS is diverse not only in talented people but also geographically. The WVS secretariat is based in Stockholm, the archiving is carried out in Madrid, and analysis and interpretation of the data are pursued by thousands of researchers in scores of countries around the world.

In codesigning the WVS, Inglehart emphasized a strategy of diversity, trying to cover the widest possible range of societies. This was a deliberate strategic choice. He was aware that a more cautious approach would have been to limit the data collection to countries with well-developed survey infrastructures, ensuring that fieldwork was carried out by experienced survey institutions. But this would have meant limiting the survey's coverage mainly to prosperous democracies. He was convinced that it was a better overall strategy to push the envelope, maximizing the economic, political, and cultural diversity of the countries covered. This approach greatly increases the analytic leverage that is available for analyzing the role of culture, economic development, and democratic versus authoritarian institutions. But it also tends to increase the possible error in measurement. This is a difficult balancing act, and it is an empirical question whether the gains offset the potential costs.

Extending survey research into developing countries means doing it in places where the infrastructure is less developed and the margin of error is likely to be higher. This raises the question: Is it possible to obtain accurate measures of mass beliefs and values in low-income countries and authoritarian states where survey research is rare? Or is the error margin so large as to render the data useless for comparative analysis? There is no a priori answer to this question; it requires empirical testing. Inglehart and Welzel conducted some relevant tests.[8] They theorized that self-expression values should be strongly correlated with indicators of economic development. Thus, they compared the strength of the correlations obtained from high-income societies with the strength of those obtained from all available societies. Here two effects work against each other: (1) the presumed loss of data quality that comes from including lower-income societies, which would tend to weaken the correlations; and (2) the increased analytical leverage that comes from including the full range of societies, which should strengthen the correlations. Which effect is stronger? They found that among high-income societies, the average correlation between self-expression values and ten widely used economic development indicators was 0.57, whereas across all available societies, the average correlation is 0.77. The data from all

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[8] R. Inglehart and C. Welzel, "Changing Mass Priorities: The Link between Modernization and Democracy," *Perspectives on Politics* 8 (2010): 551–67.

available societies explain almost twice as much variance as the data from high-income societies alone.

Their theory also implies that one should find strong linkages between self-expression values, the emergence of civil society, and the flourishing of democratic institutions. As data from scores of countries demonstrate, societal-level self-expression values are indeed closely correlated with a wide range of such indicators, including the "global civil society index" and World Bank indices of "government effectiveness," "rule of law," and "corruption control." They are also strongly correlated with the United Nations Development Programme's "gender empowerment measure" and an "index of effective democracy." Again, the gains obtained by increasing the range of variation more than compensate for any loss of data quality.

Another important reason for covering the whole spectrum of economic and democratic development is that bringing survey research into these societies helps them develop their research capabilities. Survey research can provide valuable feedback for policy makers, and the WVS network is based on the belief that it is the responsibility of social scientists in developed societies to help disseminate survey research techniques. Accordingly, the WVS has produced many publications based on collaboration between social scientists in developing countries and colleagues from countries with a long experience in using survey research. Inglehart was convinced that, over time, the quality of fieldwork in developing countries would be improved, and he considered the effort to do so worth a substantial investment.

For academics, life regenerates itself through students and colleagues. Inglehart takes tremendous pride in the students and colleagues with whom he has worked – some of whom have contributed to this volume. This volume is a tribute to Inglehart's achievements as a modernization theorist and an analyst of sociocultural change and also as a visionary who persistently worked to develop a key data resource, the WVS. I express my deep gratitude to all the authors for producing this volume. It is a testament both to Ronald Inglehart's scholarship and to the continuing importance of studying how changing values are reshaping the societies and political systems in which we live.

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Political Culture and Value Change

Russell J. Dalton and Christian Welzel

Approximately fifty years ago, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963) published *The Civic Culture*, followed soon after by Sidney Verba and Lucian Pye's (1965) *Political Culture and Political Development*. The importance of these two classic studies cannot be overemphasized. They widened the political culture approach into a global framework for the comparative analysis of political change and regime legitimacy in developed as well as developing countries. The guiding question of the Almond-Verba-Pye approach concerned what citizen beliefs make democratic regimes survive and flourish. With the expansion of democracy into new regions of the globe, this civicness question is even more relevant today.

Political Culture and Political Development laid out the analytical tool kit and categories to examine the civicness question empirically. The volume was particularly important on conceptual grounds, yet it lacked systematic cross-national data to support its conclusions because such research was not feasible. Today, this situation has changed dramatically. The World Values Survey (WVS) and other cross-national projects have opened large parts of the developing world to public opinion research. Now there is an abundance of evidence on a wide range of social and political attitudes. This situation creates an excellent opportunity to evaluate contemporary political cultures in terms of the civicness question.

Verba and his colleagues stressed a cluster of orientations that supposedly support a democratic polity: allegiance to the regime, pride in the political system, and modest levels of political participation. This *allegiant model* was most apparent in the United States and Britain, the two mature and stable democracies in their study – and lacking in other democratizing nations. However, the modern wave of comparative research in political culture offers a different answer to the question of what citizen beliefs are congruent with democracy.

Ronald Inglehart and his associates have stressed that the public's values in established democracies have been changing in fundamental ways that conflict with the normative model of *The Civic Culture* (Inglehart 1977, 1990; Abramson and Inglehart 1995; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). This research argued that contemporary publics are developing more *assertive, self-expressive values* that contrast with the allegiant values of the *Civic Culture* model, thus changing the nature of democratic citizenship. Instead of an allegiant and loyal public, established democracies now have a public of critical citizens (Klingemann 1999; Norris 1999; Dalton 2004).[1]

In addition, the expansion of democracy during its third and fourth waves speaks to a democratic potential that was often overlooked in the scholarly community (Huntington 1984). People power movements from the Philippines to communist Eastern Europe to sub-Saharan Africa demonstrate a popular desire for political change that appears inconsistent with the *Civic Culture* model. The *Economist* recognized this development when it described why Egyptians protested for political reform against the various authoritarian regimes they confronted, from the Mubarak regime to the generals controlling the government in late 2013:

[The] worst mistake, however, is to ignore the chief lesson of the Arab Spring. This is that ordinary people yearn for dignity. They hate being bossed around by petty officials and ruled by corrupt autocrats. They reject the apparatus of a police state. Instead they want better lives, decent jobs and some basic freedoms.[2]

These insights produce a far different image of the average person in a developing nation than what was proposed in *Political Culture and Political Development*. Individuals in these societies do not embrace or accept the authoritarian states in which they live, but rather hold unfulfilled aspirations for a better way of life.

Expanding empirical research on developing nations – both democratic and nondemocratic – often finds that citizen values are a poor match to the patterns presented in the early political culture and political development literature (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Dalton and Shin 2006; Bratton et al. 2004; Moaddel 2007). Many of these publics are politically interested with strong democratic aspirations. In short, some of the stark contrasts the civic culture model posited between developing nations and established democracies seem no longer valid. *The Civic Culture* maintained that allegiant orientations characterize stable democracies and that these orientations need to mature in the developing nations, too, if they ought to become stable democracies as well. Today, however, assertive orientations characterize established democracies, with some evidence that they are also emerging in the developing world.

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[1] There are, of course, debates on the processes producing value change and the nature of these values. See, for example, Flanagan and Lee (2003), Schwarz (2006), and Abramson (2011).

[2] "The Battle for Egypt," *The Economist*, August 17, 2013, p. 11.

This book is dedicated to a twofold task: analyzing cross-national survey data in light of the initial Almond-Verba-Pye framework and reevaluating the original civic culture model against more recent empirical evidence. To accomplish this task, the contributors to this book use evidence from the WVS. This is an unparalleled resource that allows us to analyze public opinions toward government and democracy, citizen values, and the potential impact of changing values on contemporary societies.

In the parlance of Hollywood filmmaking, we are not sure if this book represents a remake of the early *Civic Culture* study or a sequel to it. However, our intent is to use the basic concepts and ideas of Almond-Verba-Pye as our starting point. Then we reevaluate this theory – and more recent developments in political culture theory – based on the new evidence of the WVS. The results, we believe, shed new light on how global values have been changing and the implications for contemporary political systems.

THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL CULTURE RESEARCH

A stable and effective democratic government . . . depends upon the orientations that people have to the political process – upon the political culture. (Almond and Verba 1963, 498)

Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba's (1963) classic *The Civic Culture* began the systematic effort to identify the citizen beliefs that underlie viable and flourishing democratic institutions. Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba's (1965) *Political Culture and Political Development* put this theme in an even broader cross-national perspective, conceptualizing the role of citizen beliefs in the processes of nation building and democratization.

Although the *Civic Culture* framework is well known, it is worthwhile to summarize the key elements on which we build. Almond and Verba (1963, 15–17) characterized a nation's political culture in terms of two dimensions. First, they used a Parsonian approach to distinguish between *different types of attitudes*: (1) cognitive orientations involve knowledge and beliefs about politics; (2) affective orientations are positive or negative feelings toward political objects; and (3) evaluative orientations involve judgments about political options and processes. Second, they identified four *different classes of political objects* toward which citizen attitudes are directed: (1) the political system in general; (2) input objects, such as political parties, interest groups, or political actors engaged in conveying demands from the citizenry to institutions; (3) output objects, such as government bureaucracies or agents of state authority that implement public policies; and (4) orientations toward the self and others in terms of role models of what the ideal citizen should do.

Combining these two dimensions, Almond and Verba identified three ideal types of political culture. The *parochial culture* exists when individuals are essentially apolitical. People are unaware of the government and its policies

and do not see themselves as involved in the political process. The *subject culture* is one in which individuals are aware of the state and its policy outputs but lack significant orientations toward input objects and toward the individual as an active participant. The subject is aware of politics but only involved as a recipient of orders and an object of mobilization.

In the *participant culture*, people hold orientations toward all four classes of political objects. They are aware of government, the processes of political input, and the outputs of government, and they adopt an activist view of their role as citizens. People know and appreciate that they can express their preferences through interest organizations and political parties, by casting votes for their preferred candidates, or through other political activities.

Almond and Verba portrayed the *civic culture* that is most conducive to democracy as a mixture of the subject and the participant orientations. In a civic culture, citizens strictly abide the law and respect legitimate political authority. Even as participant citizens, they are aware of their limited role in representative democracies, which focuses on electing representatives within organizations or public office holders. Direct involvement in policy formulations and policy implementations is not part of the ordinary citizen's standard repertoire, not even the participant citizen.

Almond and Verba stressed that the parochial, subject, and participant cultures are ideal-typical models, which do not exist in pure form in any society. But they maintained that elements of the three models exist in significantly different proportions in the world of their time. They postulated that elements of the parochial culture were most widespread in the developing world; elements of the subject culture in the communist world; and elements of the participant culture in the "free world" of the West.

Other scholarship from this period reinforced this basic theoretical framework. For example, Pye and Verba (1965) described the cultural impediments to democracy in Egypt, Ethiopia, and Turkey in terms that evoked the concepts of parochial and subject cultures – and a lack of a participant culture. Daniel Lerner's (1958) *The Passing of Traditional Society* described how socioeconomic development and cognitive mobilization could change the political culture of a nation, bringing a transition from parochial and subject orientations to more participatory orientations. Banfield's (1963) research on a rural Italian village highlighted the conditions producing parochial and subject orientations. Seymour Martin Lipset's (1959, 1994) *social prerequisite* framework considered less-developed nations as lacking the social conditions and public sentiments that favor democracy. Accordingly, democracy required socioeconomic modernization to transform a society and its culture in a democracy-compatible fashion (also see Almond and Coleman 1960; Inkeles 1969, 1983; Inkeles and Smith 1974). This research posited a strong relationship between socioeconomic development and the development of a democratic civic culture.

The political culture literature repeatedly emphasized a central assumption – that a stable political system was more likely when the political culture was

congruent with the structures of the political system (Almond and Verba 1963, 23–26; Eckstein 1966; Almond and Powell 1978, Chapter 2). For instance, a parochial political culture should be predominant in traditional peasant societies that have little contact with a national or regional government. A society that is partly traditional and partly modern, typical of many developing nations, presumably has a mixed parochial-subject culture. Most people in such systems are presumably passive subjects, aware of government, complying with the law, but not otherwise involved in public affairs. The parochials – poor and illiterate urban dwellers, peasants, or farm laborers – have limited contact with or awareness of the political system. Only a very small stratum of the public participates in the political process, and even then in highly restricted ways.

At a further stage of social and political modernization, the congruent culture and institutions reflect a different pattern. For instance, in industrialized authoritarian societies, such as fascist states in Western Europe or the former communist nations of Eastern Europe, most citizens are subjects. They are encouraged and even forced to cast a symbolic vote of support in elections and to pay taxes, obey regulations, demonstrate system identification in state-managed public events, and follow the dictates of government. Because of the effectiveness of modern social organization, propaganda, and indoctrination, few people are unaware of the government and its influence on their lives; there are few parochials. At the same time, few people are involved as participants who autonomously express their authentic preferences. It is even questionable if authentic political preferences exist: Participants in the true sense are absent not only because the system would repress them but also because the citizens have not learned the role model of a participant citizen. There is a strong assumption that modern authoritarian-totalitarian systems are successful in using propaganda, indoctrination, and mass organization to infuse public norms that support the system's power structures.

The Civic Culture implied that a modern industrial democracy has a majority of participants (in the limited, allegiant sense), a substantial number of subjects, and a small group of parochials. This distribution presumably provided enough political activists to ensure competition between political parties and sizable voter turnout as well as attentive audiences for debate on public issues by parties, candidates, and pressure groups.

There is an interesting tension in the Almond-Verba framework. On the one hand, their framework is influenced by modernization theory and open to the idea that socioeconomic modernization changes citizen preferences and expectations. For example, they routinely examined educational differences in political attitudes with the implicit argument that social modernization would expand education and thus transform orientations in a pro-democratic direction. The postulated direction of change was to strengthen many aspects of the allegiant model of citizenship, such as various measures of political support. On the other hand, comparative politics scholars largely overlooked the parallel message that social modernization would also increase feelings of efficacy,

autonomy, and political tolerance that might lead to new patterns of assertive democratic participants.

In addition, the framework emphasized the indoctrination powers of modern authoritarian systems and their ability to reproduce a culture that is congruent with their authoritarian structures. This was likely a reflection of the Cold War communist experience in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as well as the tragic history of Europe in the mid-twentieth century (Almond 1998). The *Civic Culture* framework thus gave less attention to how socioeconomic modernization can give rise to democratic, participatory desires even in nondemocratic systems, accumulating an underground delegitimizing force of authoritarian rule. Rightly or wrongly, many analysts concluded that participant orientations and other democratic orientations can really take root only under existing democratic systems (Rustow 1970; Muller and Seligson 1994; Jackman and Miller 1998; Hadenius and Teorell 2005). This implies a primarily elite-driven model of democratization, if it occurs.

In summary, two broad implications for the democratization process follow from this framework. First, the congruence thesis assumes that regime stability and effective government are more likely if the political culture is congruent with the regime form. Thus, one reason why autocratic governments exist is presumably because they occur in societies where the citizenry tolerates or even expects an autocratic state. Brutally rephrasing Adlai Stevenson, people get the type of government that they deserve. Moreover, if we assume that the political culture is embedded in a network of social relations, traditional norms, and socioeconomic conditions, then cultural change will occur very slowly (Eckstein 1966; Pye 2006). Thus, the congruence thesis implies that autocratic governments endure when there is a parochial and subject culture. Progress toward political modernization is likely to occur slowly and requires profound changes in a nation's political culture that may lag behind institutional change.[3] Cultural-institutional congruence is an important condition for stable regimes.

Second, *The Civic Culture* had a constrained view of the values of the ideal democratic citizen. The specter of hyperparticipation by antidemocratic groups in interwar (and postwar) Europe led them to stress *allegiance* as a core virtue of a stable democracy. Participant orientations are a good thing. However, a civic culture requires that participant orientations be tempered by a strong dose of subject orientations. In their words, "the civic culture is an *allegiant* participant culture. Individuals are not only oriented to political inputs, they are oriented positively to the input structures and the input process" (Almond and Verba 1963, 31; emphasis added).[4] The ideal citizen thus respects political authority

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[3] Almond and Verba do not say that cultures cannot change or be changed. In fact, the focus on Germany in their study was implicitly to identify how the culture should be changed to produce public values more supportive of postwar German democracy.

[4] Almond and Verba (1963, 31) continue to state that "in the civic culture participant political orientations combine with and do not replace subject and political orientations. Individuals

and accepts the decisions of government; this citizen is a follower rather than a challenger. She supports democracy, is satisfied with the democratic process, has confidence in institutions, and becomes engaged only where institutional mechanisms channel her activities toward orderly outcomes. There is limited room for political dissatisfaction, questioning authority, civil disobedience, or elite-challenging activity in *The Civic Culture*.

A COUNTERVIEW

An initial challenge to the importance of an allegiant citizenry for a flourishing of democracy came from the *Political Action* study (Barnes and Kaase et al. 1979). In reaction to the student protests of the late 1960s, this study examined the expanding use of elite-challenging political action, such as protests, boycotts, wildcat strikes, blockades, occupying buildings, and other contentious actions. The project asked whether the extension of the citizens' repertoire to elite-challenging actions undermined representative democracy, as some critics suspected (Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki 1975). The Political Action study did not support this suspicion; protesters did not abstain from conventional forms of political participation, and they showed a strong attachment to democratic norms. For sure, protesters were disillusioned about some aspects of the democratic process. However, they did not reject democracy; they were committed to the democratic ideas of citizen participation, freedom of expression, and the elites' obligation to be responsive to public demands. The 1960–70s protesters seemed to anticipate a new model of an assertive democratic citizen that contrasts with the allegiant model of *The Civic Culture*. Ever since, political culture research has seen a latent tension between an allegiant and an assertive model of democratic citizenship.

Recognizing these developments, Almond and Verba (1980) began to explore the dynamics of cultural change in *The Civic Culture Revisited*. They found that the best examples of the civic culture, the United States and Great Britain, had experienced a decline in allegiant, trustful orientations and a rise in challenging political values that was unexpected in the earlier *Civic Culture* volume. Almond (1998, 5–6) wrote retrospectively, "What we learned from the *Civic Culture Revisited* was that political culture is a plastic many dimensioned variable, and that it responds quickly to structural change. It was not that Verba and I failed to appreciate structural variables... But we surely did not appreciate how quickly, and how steep the curves of change were going to be." Thus the research agenda changed from explaining the persistence of

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become participants in the political process, but they do not give up their orientation as subjects or parochials... The maintenance of these more traditional attitudes *and their fusion* with the participation orientation lead to a balanced political culture in which political activity, involvement and rationality exist but are balanced by passivity, traditionality, and commitment to parochial values."

political cultures to predicting how they could change, and the consequences of change.

Ronald Inglehart's *The Silent Revolution* (1977) provided a theoretical groundwork for this assertive model of democratic citizenship. Inglehart linked the spread of elite-challenging action to the rise of postmaterialist values, which emphasize self-expression and direct participation in politics. Inspired by modernization theory, he explained the emergence of postmaterialist values as the consequence of the rising existential security and cognitive mobilization that characterized the postwar generations in Western democracies. He held that social modernization would also give rise to postmaterialist values in nondemocratic regimes – which is potentially a powerful delegitimizing force against authoritarianism (Inglehart 1990).

The new type of self-expressive, postmaterialist political protester raised the suspicion of scholars who believed that the functioning of representative democracy requires the dominance of an allegiant citizen model (Crozier et al. 1975). Robert Putnam's (1993) influential study of political culture in Italy also accepted the allegiant model of citizenship – at least implicitly. This is apparent in the way he defined social capital, namely, as "trust, norms, and networks that facilitate cooperation and civic action" (167). Social capital was not only operationalized as trust in fellow citizens but also as trust in institutions, including the institutions of government – which is a key allegiant orientation.

Indeed, further research showed that the processes linked to rising elite-challenging politics and postmaterialist values strained the principle of representative democracy. For one, political and partisan competition added a cultural cleavage focused on lifestyle issues to the long-standing economic cleavage centered on material redistribution. This gave rise to New Left parties that mobilize on environmental and other "New Politics" issues and New Right parties that mobilize on immigration and traditional values (Kitschelt 1989; Norris 2005). Furthermore, electoral participation, party identification, confidence in political institutions, and satisfaction with the democratic process were declining in most postindustrial democracies, while support for democracy as a political system and attachment to basic democratic norms remained stable or increased (Dalton 2004; Norris 2011).

The Civic Culture study and much of the early public opinion research typically focused on established Western democracies. The practical reason was that representative mass surveys could not be conducted in the communist world and large parts of the developing world. This situation changed dramatically when consecutive waves of democratization opened the former communist bloc and large parts of the developing world to survey research. This initiated an unprecedented expansion of cross-national survey programs in addition to the WVS: the International Social Survey Program; the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems; and the democracy barometers in Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Much of the work in these programs was

inspired by the initial question of the *Civic Culture* study: What types of citizen beliefs are most beneficial to help new democracies survive and flourish and what makes and keeps citizens supportive of the idea of democracy?

These surveys fielded questions on people's regime preferences and their levels of support for democracy, both in its concrete form and as an abstract ideal. The first reports calculated the percentages of democracy supporters in a country or compared the balance of support for democracy against support for alternative regimes (Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998; Klingemann 1999; Mishler and Rose 2001; Klingemann, Fuchs, and Zielonka 2006). This research yielded the surprising – and consistent – finding that support for democracy as a principle was widespread across established democracies, new democracies, and nondemocracies. In sharp contrast to Almond and Verba, the public in contemporary authoritarian states does not seem to embrace rule by autocrats – at least not when one takes people's overt regime preferences at face value.

Scholars also started to differentiate different types of democratic support, such as *intrinsic* and *instrumental* support (Bratton and Mattes 2001; Inglehart and Welzel 2005), *idealist* and *realist* support (Shin and Wells 2005), or support that is coupled with dissatisfaction with the way democracy works: *dissatisfied democrats* or *critical citizens* (Klingemann 1999; Norris 1999). These classifications qualify democratic regime support for the motives and beliefs that lie behind it (Schedler and Sarsfield 2006). Accordingly, they focus attention on the emergence of a new type of nonallegiant democrat and the implications for the development of democracy.

More recently, researchers have tried to disentangle what people in different parts of the world understand about the term *democracy* (Dalton, Shin, and Jou 2007; Mattes and Bratton 2007; Diamond 2008; Chapter 4). Surprisingly as it may seem from the viewpoint of cultural relativism, there is a core liberal understanding of democracy among ordinary people around the world. What first comes to most people's minds when they think about democracy is the freedom to govern their lives that liberal democracy grants them. Pronounced cultural differences exist, however, in the extent to which the liberal notion of democracy trumps alternative notions of democracy (Welzel 2013, 307–32). Yet, despite these differences in relative importance, freedom seems to have appeal across cultures. Resonating with this broad appeal, freedom is the central theme in Amartya Sen's (1999) interpretation of modernization as "human development." He defines development normatively as the growth of freedom. Clearly this definition of development includes liberal democracy.

Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel (2005) further elaborate the idea of human development and integrate it into the political culture field (also Welzel, Inglehart, and Klingemann 2003). In *Freedom Rising*, Welzel (2013) expands this approach to describe the growth of emancipative values among contemporary publics. He equates development with the empowerment of people to exert their freedoms. His theory describes liberal democracy as the "legal component" of empowerment. Its significance from an empowerment perspective

is that it grants people the rights that enable them to practice freedoms (both personal and political). However, in the sequence of empowerment, democracy is the third component. For democracy only becomes effective *after* ordinary people have acquired the resources that make them capable to practice freedoms and after they have internalized the values that make them willing to practice freedoms. In this view, participatory resources and values proliferate the material and motivational components of people power. They must be in place before democracy can be effectively practiced. Welzel identifies a set of orientations that are emancipative in their impetus because they merge libertarian and egalitarian orientations. The prevalence of these emancipative values in a society is more closely linked with levels of democracy than any other citizen belief. The most important component of emancipative values in this respect has been found to be liberty aspirations – quite in line with the emphasis that liberal democracy places on freedom (Welzel 2007). In short, the human development model by Inglehart and Welzel and Welzel's emancipatory theory argue for recognition of an assertive model of democratic citizenship.[5]

The revisionist strand of research champions an assertive model of political culture that also can be congruent with democracy, albeit with different political implications. Some of the key contrasts between allegiant and assertive cultures are summarized in Table 1.1. Changing orientations produce a general increase in postmaterialist and emancipative values as well as a shift in basic authority beliefs. These cultural changes manifest themselves in shifting attitudes toward political institutions, the practice of democracy, and even the definition of a good democracy and a good citizen. These political norms carry over to specific policy views that we also examine in this volume. For example, the traditional model of citizen included a strong priority for economic prosperity and little concern for environmental protection. The new pattern of assertive citizenship heightens environmental concerns. Traditional norms gave limited attention on issues of racial and ethnic equality and sexual liberation; these issues receive strong support under the assertive model of citizenship.

In summary, the debates over the role of political culture owe their inspiration to the initial groundwork laid by Almond and Verba in *The Civic Culture* and by Verba and Pye in *Political Culture and Political Development*. Their research focused on an allegiant model of citizenship as essential to stable democracy, whereas the contours of an assertive model of citizenship became clear only recently. The content of a democratic political culture can be more complex than Almond and Verba and Pye initially envisioned, and the spread of democratic orientations differs markedly from earlier expectations of average citizens. The results, we believe, lead to both a reevaluation of the political

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[5] This same theoretical logic is represented in research on dissatisfied democrats by Klingemann (1999), critical citizens by Norris (1999), and even more clearly the model of engaged citizenship by Dalton (2009).

TABLE 1.1. *Aspects of Allegiant and Assertive Citizenship*

Domain	Allegiant Citizens	Assertive Citizens
Value priorities	Output priorities with an emphasis on order and security limit input priorities that might emphasize voice and participation; materialist/protective values predominate	Input priorities with an emphasis on voice and participation grow stronger at the expense of output priorities with an emphasis on order and security: postmaterialist/emancipative values prevail over materialist/protective values
Authority orientations	Deference to authority in the family, at the workplace, and in politics	Distance to authority in the family, at the workplace, and in politics
Institutional trust	High trust in institutions	Low trust in institutions
Democratic support	Support for both the principles of democracy and its practice (satisfied democrats)	Strong support for the principles of democracy but weak support for its practice (dissatisfied democrats)
Democracy notion	Input-oriented notions of democracy as a means of voice and participation mix with output-oriented notions of democracy as a tool of delivering social goods	Input-oriented notions of democracy as a means of voice and participation become clearly dominant
Political activism	Voting and other conventional forms of legitimacy-granting activity	Strong affinity to nonviolent, elite-challenging activity
Expected systemic consequences	More effective and accountable governance?	

Note: For an operationalization of allegiant and assertive citizens, see Table 12.1 (p. 293).

culture approach and a new sense of the potential for democracy to advance in the world today.

STUDYING VALUES AROUND THE GLOBE

The WVS emerged from the European Values Study (EVS), which in turn has its roots in the Eurobarometer surveys. In contrast to the Eurobarometer and other regional barometers, the WVS/EVS surveys are interested in deep-seated preferences, expectations, and beliefs of the people, not in short-term public opinion topics. The guiding perspective of the value surveys is threefold. One objective is to identify patterns of values that are useful for cross-cultural comparison

TABLE 1.2. *The Five Waves of the World Values Survey*

Regions	Wave 1, 1981–84	Wave 2, 1989–93	Wave 3, 1994–99	Wave 4, 1999–2004	Wave 5, 2005–8
Western democracies	16	18	10	20	15
East Europe/ Post-USSR	1	11	23	21	17
East/South Asia	2	3	6	8	10
Middle East/North Africa	–	1	1	9	6
Sub-Saharan Africa	–	2	2	5	7
Latin America	2	4	10	4	9
Total number of nations	21	39	52	67	62
Total number of respondents	26,511	62,771	77,114	100,052	81,474

and that group societies into distinctive culture zones. Another objective is to determine whether these cultural patterns relate to the institutional forms and the socioeconomic conditions of a society: Is there systematic evidence for a psychological dimension of development and democracy? Another objective focuses on cultural change: Is there evidence for a transformation in human values, and are these changes operating in the same direction under the imprint of similar socioeconomic transformations?

Inspired by these objectives, the WVS/EVS surveys followed three priorities: (1) only ask questions about things that are fundamental to the lives of people in *every* society, whether rich or poor, democratic or autocratic, Western or non-Western; (2) repeat the surveys every five to ten years to build a time series that allows one to trace change in values; and (3) expand the scope of comparison so that it spans all culture zones of the globe to test general theories of mass behavior. The latter point reflects a unique feature of the WVS.

The EVS started with a first round in 1981–83 and included more than a dozen European countries. Additional efforts that then established the WVS added Japan, South Korea, Argentina, Mexico, Australia, the US and Canada. Interestingly, the first round also included two communist samples: a national Hungarian sample and a sample from the Russian oblast "Tambov."

The second round of the WVS was conducted from 1989 to 1991 in some forty societies (see Table 1.2). This round expanded especially into the transforming ex-communist world. In many countries, like the former German Democratic Republic, the survey was done before the political transition was finalized, providing a valuable snapshot of public mood during the transition period. This round of the WVS also expanded to China, India, Chile, Brazil, Nigeria, South Africa, and Turkey.

The third round of the WVS spanned from 1995 to 1997. It included some fifty societies. Thanks to efforts by Hans-Dieter Klingemann, the project

had extensive coverage of postcommunist countries in this round. In addition, Columbia, El Salvador, Venezuela, Uruguay, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Taiwan were surveyed for the first time.

The fourth round, from 1999 to 2001, covered almost sixty societies. The project placed particular emphasis on covering Islamic societies: Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia were surveyed for the first time. The WVS also extended the list of surveyed countries in sub-Saharan Africa: Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In Asia, the WVS included Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam for the first time.

The fifth and most recent round of the WVS was conducted between 2005 and 2008 in some fifty societies. The survey was extended into francophone sub-Saharan Africa, covering Burkina Faso, Cameroon, and Mali, as well as into Ethiopia and Rwanda. In Asia, the WVS included Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Thailand for the first time. The fifth round also revised a considerable portion of the questionnaire: new questions developed by Christian Welzel to measure in-group and out-group trust, meanings of democracy, social identity, citizenship ideals, and media usage were added.[6]

In terms of spatial and temporal scope, the WVS is a unique data source. The survey has included more than ninety societies that represent more than 90 percent of the world population. Counting repeated surveys in the same nations, about 250 country-by-year units are available. About sixty societies have been surveyed at least twice; for about forty-five societies, the WVS provides longitudinal evidence of at least ten years. For another dozen societies, the time series covers the entire period from 1981 to 2006, spanning fully twenty-five years.

The WVS covers topics that are of inherent interest from the civic culture perspective: regime preferences, support for democracy, trust in institutions, social trust, law abidingness, political interest, media usage, voluntary activity, protest participation, authority orientations, liberty aspirations, social tolerance and so on. It is the only international survey that has such basic measures of human values across countries spanning all the regions of the globe.

With this thematic breadth and its spatial and temporal scope, the WVS is clearly the ideal data source to examine the various facets of the civicness question outlined earlier. Hence, the chapters in this book are unified by both their interest in the civicness question and their usage of WVS data as a common source.[7] In that sense, this book is a tribute to the WVS and its founding father, Ronald Inglehart.

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[6] At the time of this writing, the World Values Survey was about to finish its sixth wave of surveys in more than sixty societies around the globe. The initial release of the sixth wave data was in April 2014: www.worldvaluessurvey.org.

[7] Unless indicated otherwise, the analyses throughout the chapters of this book use WVS data in unweighted form. The experience shows that weighted results usually do not differ significantly. Because the calibration weights provided with past official data releases are not documented equally well for all countries, it seems preferable not to use these weights in the type of large-scale cross-national analyses that the chapters of this volume perform.

PLAN OF THE BOOK

As the WVS has expanded over time, a large number of international scholars have become part of this research project. We have assembled a distinguished subset of these scholars to examine the topics of political culture, global value change, and democratic politics.

The book is organized into three thematic sections. The first section concentrates on the broad process of value change that fuels the transition from allegiant to assertive citizenship. Postmaterialist value change in Western democracies was the foundation for challenging the allegiant model of *The Civic Culture* and led to the broad theory of emancipatory cultural change. Thus, Paul R. Abramson first examines the postmaterialist trend in Western democracies. He tracks the evolution of postmaterialist values across generations spanning forty years of surveys. He also shows how the generational patterns persist across the life cycle of consecutive birth cohorts. The results demonstrate that generational turnover has been a driving force in postmaterialist value change.

Neil Nevitte uses the multiple waves of the WVS to track the decline of deferential orientations in various social domains. The traditional political culture model implies that deference to legitimate authority is a key element of an allegiant culture (Almond and Verba 1963, Chapters 9–12; Eckstein 1966). Thus, the erosion of deference is part of the transition toward a more assertive and elite-challenging citizenry.

Christian Welzel and Alejandro Moreno Alvarez analyze a new set of questions on people's views of democracy. They find that rising emancipative values change the nature of people's desire for democracy in a twofold way: Emancipative values increase (1) the liberalness of people's notion of democracy and (2) the criticalness of their assessment of democracy. Emancipative values make people's democratic desires more liberal and critical in all culture zones and across different social traits and political regimes, which the authors characterize as an "enlightenment" effect.

The second section of this volume identifies some key features that describe the rise of an assertive citizenship. Russell J. Dalton and Doh Chull Shin document the limited applicability of the allegiant model to citizens in established democracies and in developing nations. Support for a democratic regime is widespread across the globe, yet public skepticism of political institutions is also widespread. It is especially striking in many established democracies that were once the bastion of allegiant citizens but now have politically skeptical publics. The authors offer evidence that contemporary democratization stimulates a more critical citizenry.

Hans-Dieter Klingemann then focuses on the new category of dissatisfied democrats in European societies, describing their increase as a consequence of the changing values of contemporary publics. He reflects on the implications of these new assertive citizens for our traditional models of a democratic political culture.

Finally, Christian W. Haerpfer and Kseniya Kizilova describe patterns and change in political support in postcommunist Europe and post-Soviet Eurasia. They find a stronger presence of allegiant orientations in the countries with the largest deficiencies in democracy. By contrast, the countries with the least democratic deficits show a stronger presence of assertive orientations – in line with the theme of this book.

The third section of this book asks how changing values of contemporary publics are affecting more specific political attitudes and behaviors. Robert Rohrschneider, Matt Miles, and Mark Peffley study the relationship between social modernization, values, and environmental attitudes. They find that post-materialist values in developed societies connect current environmental attitudes in these nations to a broader criticism of modes of economic production. The result is a more politicized environmental movement, even when environmental conditions are improving.

Tor Georg Jakobsen and Ola Listhaug analyze the evolution of protest activity from 1981 to 2007. They find that citizens' use of elite-challenging behavior increases with economic development and is especially common among younger generations and postmaterialist citizens.

Pippa Norris studies differences in gender attitudes between Muslim and non-Muslim states. In contrast to those who argue that oil resources entrench the patriarchy of traditional societies, she argues that cultural values leave a deep imprint on the way people see the most appropriate roles for men and women in society – including the contemporary role of women in elected office.

Finally, Bi Puranen examines people's willingness to fight for their country in the case of war, which is a key element of allegiant orientations.[8] She finds that confidence in the armed forces and authoritarian regime preferences – which are in decline in many places – explain people's willingness to fight. This finding suggests that willingness to fight is in decline as well, indicating the erosion of allegiance in one of its core domains.

The conclusion by Welzel and Dalton evaluates the *Civic Culture*'s theoretical framework in light of the findings presented in this book. The previous chapters document the transition from an allegiant to an assertive type of democratic citizen. The conclusion then extends these micro-level analyses to examine the impact of political culture at the aggregate cross-national level. This analysis puts the central assumption of a culture-governance congruence to a direct test. Specifically, the chapter examines the relationship between allegiant and assertive values with governmental capacity and democratic accountability. It finds that allegiant values do not associate with either capacity or accountability, whereas assertive values display strong positive relationships with both. These results suggest that a new style of democratic

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[8] We, together with Bi Puranen, wish to acknowledge Juan Díez-Nicolás and to thank him for his very valuable contribution to earlier versions of this chapter.

politics is expanding, which should produce a more participatory and more citizen-centered democratic process.

THE CIVIC CULTURE'S LEGACY

Almond and Verba's *The Civic Culture* is a major landmark in the study of citizens' relationship with their government. In trying to look back at the failures of democracy in the past, it proscribed a model of citizen values that fit that history. Our book's basic argument is that history has changed and, with it, the values of citizens in contemporary democracies – shaping a new relationship between citizens and their government. The reader will see the evidence in the pages that follow.

At the same time, the legacy of *The Civic Culture* is enduring. As Sidney Verba (2011) has recently written, the lasting impact of the Almond and Verba study is to create a fruitful field of political culture research in which others contribute and continue to expand the research crop. As Verba states, "*The Civic Culture* was fruitful. Its substantive and technical approach was such that it could be improved on, and it has been" (Verba 2011, iv). Thus, we see this book as contributing to the bounty that *The Civic Culture* first sowed more than five decades ago.