16. Frederick W. Frye, "Cross-Cultural Survey Research in Political Science," p. 190.
17. Allen D. Grimshaw, "Comparative Sociology: In What Ways Different From Other Sociologies," in Michael Armer and Allen D. Grimshaw (eds.), *Comparative Social Research: Methodological Problems and Strategies,* New York: John Wiley, 1973, p. 5.
18. Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry,* New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1970, p. 32.
19. Ibid., p. 35.
20. Ibid., p. 34.
21. Ibid., p. 36.
22. Ibid., p. 40.
23. Ibid., p. 43.
24. Ibid., p. 45.
25. Arend Lijphart, op. cit., p. 164.
26. Ibid.
27. For a detailed discussion of this topic see the Technical Appendix.
28. Commitments for the financing of the fieldwork in the five countries had been secured by 1973. Three other countries—Finland, Switzerland, and Italy—obtained funding and executed their fieldwork in 1975 and early 1976. Later volumes will include them. Attempts to raise funds for a French study were unsuccessful, though French colleagues were involved with the research project from the beginning. A similar lack of success with generating financial support caused the withdrawal of the Canadian contingent. Time constraints caused a Japanese group to withdraw.
29. The Austrian sample includes only respondents sixteen to seventy years.

PART I: POLITICAL ACTION

Chapter 2
POLITICAL ACTION
A Theoretical Perspective

MAX KAASE and ALAN MARSH

INTRODUCTION

In chapter 1 we have described the historical and theoretical context of this study in general terms. In this chapter we will extend the previous discussion with particular emphasis upon political *action.* We prefer the term "political action" to the more commonly used "political participation" because it aligns far more closely with our theoretical concerns.

Following this introduction, we will place our study within the contemporary debate concerning participation and democracy and will state our own position in this debate. Then we will argue that empirical research has not kept pace with the growing theoretical emphasis upon noninstitutionalized, nonelectoral political action, an emphasis that reflects the prominence of protest in the mass politics of Western democracies during the 1960s. Finally—the core of this chapter—we will describe the elements of a microtheory of political action. We will argue that from a systemic perspective direct political action generally, and political protest in particular, do not necessarily assume antiregime properties; rather, it may form one element of an expanded repertory of political action. We will end this chapter with a presentation of the heuristic model that has guided much of the research reported in this volume.

DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

If democracy is rule by the people, as we and many others maintain, then the notion of political participation is at the center of the concept of the democratic state. As a normative, prescriptive system of thought, contemporary democratic theory must reconcile the right of all citizens to determine what is in their best interest and their obligation to participate rationally and responsibly. This dualism is linked to contemporary confrontations between democratic citizenship theory and democratic elitist theory,[1] between revisionist and antirevisionist democratic theory,[2] and between institutionalist and participatory democratic theory.[3] These confrontations have been of enormous consequence not only for political science as an academic discipline but also for the concrete courses of political action taken by citizens and governments.

While we cannot neglect developments in democratic theory and practice in our empirical work, we are not normative theorists; rather, we are analysts who assess empirical phenomena and seek systematic explanations for them. Our concern is with attitudes and behaviors in advanced industrial societies: how do values, ideology, and personal and political satisfaction relate to political action in these societies? We emphasize the pattern of relationships because of our cross-sectional design, though cohort and parent-child analyses as well as cross-national comparisons will add a dynamic, processual element. And the emphasis on advanced countries means that we concentrate on countries that come close to being what Bell calls postindustrial societies in which more than 50 percent of the active labor force is employed in the tertiary sector of the economy.[4]

Both considerations are highly relevant for the theoretical context of our study. Our concerns are not with modernization theory and its concomitants of urbanization, industrialization, secularization, democratization, education, and mass media development.[5] We are not interested in evolutionary sequences in which political participation as a goal (or value) can be confronted with other competing goals such as socioeconomic development in order to assess its relative costs and consequences—if realized—for a society.[6] Nor are we concerned with the processes by which political participation as a citizen right had first to be established and then realized. Rather, our study deals with the structure and meaning of citizen political involvement in five advanced industrial societies operating within the framework of liberal democratic constitutions and procedures.

It has already been mentioned that our choice of countries is purposeful but also embraces an element of chance. In this sense, we cannot claim a full variation along the dimension of democratic industrialized societies. Hence, we cannot claim that our results are representative of the total set of such

nations. We do not regard this to be a major disadvantage. In accordance with what Przeworski and Teune have—somewhat ambiguously—called a "most different systems design," our main emphasis, as was pointed out in chapter 1, is on the analysis of individual-level relationships.[7] Five countries provide an adequate test of the generality of the relationships found.

Over the last decade the concept, problems, and contingencies of political participation have gained increasing prominence in public and academic discussions. Bell even states that "the axial principle of the modern polity is *participation.*"[8] Today, the limitations on *institutionalized* citizen participation in decision-making, whether in politics or in industry, highlight the controversies of the day. This is somewhat ironic considering that the gap between preaching and practicing the principle of "one person, one vote" has, even in established liberal democracies, only quite recently been narrowed or fully closed.[9]

The constitutional right to free and equal participation for all has far-reaching effects for existing elite structures, elite circulation, interest aggregation, and interest representation. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the question of what are and are not legitimate acts of political participation has been and will continue to be a matter of conflict in day-to-day politics. At first glance it may appear as if scholarly thinking about political participation were more coherent and united than views among those actively engaged in politics, but this is not so. Rather, the academic field is flooded with segmented and frequently contradictory fragments of theories of democracy—some prescriptive and some descriptive—that look at political participation from correspondingly different angles.[10] A good case in point is the current controversy about the desirability of high voter turnout. This discussion beautifully conveys the point that little can be said about the aggregate and individual meaning of any given act of political participation unless its institutional, structural, and individual conditions are explicitly specified.[11]

It is particularly important to keep in mind that political participation derives its meaning for the individual and for the political system from the interaction between political authorities and partisans as mediated through political institutions.[12] We will return to this point in greater detail later. This processual perspective is important because it inevitably results in a less static conceptualization of the role of both political behavior and political institutions.

We have mentioned before that political participation as a general societal value is universally accepted in liberal democratic ideology but that it is embedded in many different versions of democratic theory. Modernization theory alerts us to the fact that this value can only be achieved through high costs—economic and political as well as individual—and may in fact be too expensive a goal to strive for when other important goals such as national

unity, socioeconomic development, and the like are at stake.[13] There can be no question, however, that the advanced industrial societies we are studying can afford this investment.

As a societal value, participation is linked in so many ways to democratic government—rationality, control, responsiveness, flexibility, legitimacy, conflict resolution, to name only a few—that it can justifiably be regarded as one of the central pillars of such government. The extent to which individual citizens decide to avail themselves of the opportunities opened up through the impact of this value on sociopolitical institutions is an altogether different problem. In his assessment of the state of research on public opinion and voting behavior, Converse applies cost-benefit analysis to the problem of the lingering vast differences in the ability of mass publics to take in, properly process, and retain political information even in the time of electronic mass media.[14] His elaboration on interest (or motivation) and cognitive capabilities as two core elements of information handling is also relevant for evaluating the likelihood that any given individual will participate actively in politics. Both motivation and cognitive stock have been shown by many scholars to be in part dependent on structural factors such as socialization practices in the home, formal education, organizational membership, and the like. This is often overlooked by those critics of broadened opportunities for political participation who refer to the potential threat to the rational political decision-making process originating, as they see it, from the lack of citizen competence in politics. This status quo oriented perspective overlooks the potential for change in modern democratic societies *provided this change is truly wanted.* In fact, many contemporary controversies about the proper forms of political participation remind us of the puzzle that confronted early researchers on democratic attitudes. In repeated empirical studies, researchers found that mass publics, unlike elites, were apparently unable to apply general democratic principles to concrete political situations.[15] Elitist theorists of democracy concluded from these results that elites were the true keepers of the democratic flame.[16]

The parallel between controversies about democratic attitudes and individual prerequisites for political participation can be carried even further. In both cases, it is doubtful that there exists a direct causal link between an abstract principle or value and concrete applications of it. We maintain that the meaning of abstract principles has to be defined and rendered concrete in sociopolitical processes. Moreover, the solutions emerging from such processes are timebound and therefore temporary.

These are some of the considerations that should be kept in mind as we set out to analyze political action and inclination toward political action in advanced industrial societies. Two more points need to be made. First, political protest and violence are, as has been widely noted, forms of political

expression that even the more developed countries have exhibited throughout history. "Collective violence has flowed regularly out of the central processes of Western countries," Tilly observes. And he continues, "Men seeking to seize, hold or realign the levers of power have continually engaged in collective violence as part of their struggles. The oppressed have struck in the name of justice, the privileged in the name of order, those inbetween in the name of fear."[17] Whether violence and protest are, by necessity, also "normal" characteristics of advanced industrial societies is an altogether different question that is not so easily answered.

But the second point is by far more important to deal with. In the past, direct, noninstitutionalized political action has been conceptually and empirically linked to political protest, unrest, violence, and system change. This is reflected in the citizen's perception of many legal acts of voluntary political involvement, such as demonstrations, as illegitimate. By contrast, it is our contention that Western liberal democracies are experiencing a process of change in political culture exhibited by, among other things, the increasing inclination of the citizenry to participate in such acts. We believe that this shift in political values, which may well constitute a threat to the political status quo, does not in itself threaten the persistence of the liberal democratic order. We will return to this point later in this and in other chapters of the book.

SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM MACROPOLITICAL RESEARCH

The extent to which advanced industrial societies of the West have experienced political violence and collective protest can be assessed, on the aggregate level at least, through data collected in macropolitical research. Research by Gurr and others has pointed out at least three distinctive types of uninstitutionalized conflict behavior in which individuals engage: turmoil, conspiracy, and internal war.[18] Of course, these are not evenly distributed among nations. In a methodologically sophisticated study, Hibbs analyzed the dimensionality of the conflict data gathered by the World Data Analysis Program at Yale University[19] and found two dimensions of conflict within societies—collective protest and internal war.[20] Among other indicators, "armed attacks" and "deaths from domestic violence" represent the internal war dimension; "anti-government demonstrations" and "riots" represent the collective protest dimension. These data give us a first clue about the structure of direct political action in the five countries we studied for a time period for which survey evidence is not available.[21] In the following paragraphs we present the results of a secondary analysis of the Taylor-Hudson

data on 136 countries intended to establish the rank of our five countries on the two dimensions discovered by Hibbs. More recent data provided by Gurr will complement this analysis.

For a variety of reasons the implications of this analysis are tentative at best. One important substantive reservation we have is that the data do not extend beyond 1967, when direct action techniques had just begun their rise to prominence in the advanced Western polities. While this shortcoming does not destroy the utility of these materials as background information for our countries, it does prevent us from establishing a direct link between the macro indicators and the indicators in our own study. As a second reservation, Hudson and Taylor themselves are extremely cautious with respect to the intercountry validity of their data. Third, for various reasons, between 40 percent and 60 percent of the 136 countries report zero or close-to-zero occurrences on these indicators.

Crude and tentative as these data may be, they nevertheless offer some interesting insights into the prominence of major types of direct political action in the five countries. Thus, it can be stated that none of the five countries loads on the dimension of internal war. Political activities falling under this label simply do not occur there with sufficient frequency to warrant their consideration as part of the political culture. Even if the ranks for the United States may look impressive to some, these event data follow a pattern of geometrical increase that means that intermediate ranks do not point to substantial levels of the activity in question.[22] By contrast, on the dimension of collective protest, particularly as measured by the occurrence of antigovernment protest demonstrations, the five countries on the average rank considerably higher.

While this reading of the data appears uncontroversial, we still have to face the question of how well the interpretation would hold up had the time series been extended and had the social movements of the late 1960s and the explosion of political violence in Northern Ireland been permitted to have their full impact on the analysis. There is, of course, overwhelming and unequivocal empirical evidence supporting our claim that citizens in our five nations were very active in engaging in a broad variety of antigovernment demonstrations and related activities; this is, in fact, what our study is about.

In light of the Northern Ireland conflict, the small-scale war the Baader-Meinhof terrorists declared on Germany in the 1970s, and similar occurrences of hostage dramas and destruction of life and property by explosives planted by radicalized political gangs all over Western Europe and the United States, it seems justified to ask whether an absence of internal war can still be legitimately diagnosed for the period in which our study was conducted. Fortunately, Ted Gurr has made available to us data on rebellion and protest he has collected for eighty-seven nations covering the time periods from

Table 2.1: RANK OF COUNTRIES ON VARIOUS CONFLICT DIMENSIONS[1]

	Internal War						Collective Protest					
	Deaths From Domestic Violence			*Armed Attacks*			*Riots*			*Antigovernment Protest Demonstrations*		
	1953-1957	*1958-1962*	*1963-1967*	*1953-1957*	*1958-1962*	*1963-1967*	*1953-1957*	*1958-1962*	*1963-1967*	*1953-1957*	*1958-1962*	*1963-1967*
Number of Countries With Zero Occurrences (= ranks)[2]	60	52	54	62	52	49	62	55	57	78	75	74
Remaining Ranks	69	83	82	67	83	87	67	80	79	51	60	52
The Netherlands	+[3]	+	+	+	+	69	+	+	+	+	+	51
Britain	+	82	+	+	78	79	+	55	70	48	32	40
United States	67	81	70	45	55	61	64	59	33	46	28	15
Germany	+	+	80	58	79	82	56	70	73	36	56	30
Austria	+	+	+	+	62	+	+	44	+	33	+	+

SOURCE: Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., *Mass Political Violence*, New York: John Wiley, 1973.

1. The ranks are based on the per capita occurrence of the specified events averaged over five-year periods. Because of missing population data for the 1953-1957 period seven countries and for 1958-1962 period one country could not be rank-ordered.
2. "Zero occurrence" does not necessarily mean that no such event took place. Since the reported events are divided by population (in thousands) and multiplied by 100, low-event counts will occasionally show up as zero occurrence although five digits after the decimal point were permitted.
3. + indicates that the country belongs to those with "zero occurrence" of the event during the specified time period.

1961-1965 and from 1966-1970.[23] While even these records do not extend to 1974, the date of our study, they nevertheless permit a clue as to whether or not our cautious conclusions derived from the Taylor-Hudson data can be further substantiated. To be sure, the lack of convergence between the two data bases regarding the number of nations (136 against 76) and the indicators renders any direct and systematic comparisons impossible. But, even within these limitations, the data generally corroborate our prior conclusions that the countries in our study fall on the dimension of protest and not on the dimension of internal war, especially when we look at the 1966-1970 ranks.[24]

The situation in the United States in the late 1960s, however, clearly requires a qualification of this general statement. Whereas, in commenting upon the Taylor-Hudson data, we somewhat underemphasized the rank of the United States on the internal war dimension, the Gurr data for the 1966-1970 period indicate that something close to internal war—though spatially limited—indeed took place. But even at the climax of confrontations among the National Guard, police, and protesters in America the incidents of extreme violence were not able to challenge seriously the normal operation of the democratic process in this country. Also, there can be no question that by 1974 the tides of massive conflict had subsided, bringing the United States back to a state of normalcy on the internal war dimension again.

Table 2.2: RANK OF COUNTRIES ON VARIOUS CONFLICT DIMENSIONS

	Internal War (Conflict Deaths Per 10 Million)		Collective Protest[2] (Mandays of Turmoil Per 100 000)	
	1961-1965[1]	*1966-1970*	*1961-1965*	*1966-1970*
Number of Countries With Zero Occurrences (= ranks)	33	27	21	14
Remaining Ranks	54	60	66	73
The Netherlands	+	+	+	52
Britain	+	55	43	29
United States	45	33	27	9
Germany	+	58	42	42
Austria	+	+	24	+

1. The joint data base for the two periods is n = 87.
2. Excluded were antiforeign protest and private clashes.

All of these considerations, however, do not extend to the Northern Ireland conflict, which by 1977 had cost the lives of more than 1,700 people, about sixty of them on the British mainland. In a formal sense, we need not be concerned with Northern Ireland since no interviews for our study were conducted there.[25] But there is no question that it is a unit of the United Kingdom and therefore part of a democratic nation known and praised for its stability and tolerance of diversity. We cannot, of course, offer an "easy" explanation of this phenomenon, and we are well aware of the fact that the Irish Question at various points in British history has riven the political community, brought down governments, and disrupted the conduct of politics. The violence and intensity of this conflict clearly qualify for the label "internal war."

A first conclusion derived from consideration of these data is that there is nothing at all about advanced industrial societies that *guarantees* immunity from acts of warfare generated from internal political events, though the probability is very low. A second is that three of the five countries—Britain, the United States, and Germany—do indeed show substantial, antigovernment protest demonstrations, thus pointing to the fact that this type of political participation was apparently not at all alien to advanced Western industrial societies even before the sociopolitical movements of the late 1960s erupted at full strength. A third is—as we had hypothesized on theoretical grounds—that antigovernment demonstrations obviously cannot be readily interpreted as an unambiguous indicator of *system* instability.

While we do not want to overinterpret these results, we find that they confirm our expectations about the structure of political participation in Western political systems. In the 1960s, demonstrations occurred with sufficient and increasing frequency in the countries of our study (and certainly in other democracies such as France, Sweden, and Italy not covered here) to warrant consideration and inclusion in empirical studies of political participation. Still, as was mentioned before, cross-sectional or longitudinal survey data dealing systematically with attitudes toward direct political action in these countries are practically nonexistent in the literature for all of the 1960s and even the early 1970s.[26] Obviously, this lack of information not only reflects the initially more isolated, less general occurrence of these techniques, but also the *theoretical* preoccupation of the discipline with electoral types of political involvement. Unfortunately, there is no way to reconstruct attitudinal data on direct political action for this epoch. Moreover, the existing aggregate data on conflict do not, of course, lend themselves to reliable trend extrapolation or to the assessment of the meaning of protest activities for a given political system and its citizens at a particular point in time. Thus many of today's controversies about political participation are beyond the analytical potential of this cross-sectional survey study.

For example, we will not be able to determine whether or not participation enhances self-esteem and self-realization.[27] Neither will we be able to follow the long-term consequences of political participation on either the individual level—in terms of positive and negative reinforcement, satisfaction or dissatisfaction, lower or higher sense of efficacy and trust, and the like—or on the system level—in terms of following participatory inputs through concrete decision-making processes. What we will be able to analyze—from advanced industrial societies—are aspects of the structure and dimensionality of political actions that go beyond electoral and election-related forms.

REFLECTIONS ON A MICRO THEORY OF POLITICAL ACTION

Systemic Conditions and the Meaning of Political Action

A theoretical preoccupation with segmented sociopolitical phenomena and a corresponding research methodology focusing on single points in time can be held responsible jointly, though not exclusively, for tendencies in empirical research to overinterpret findings and extrapolate them beyond their narrow contextual limits. A good example is the stimulation and support elitist democratic theory received in the late 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s from the results of empirical research that indicated a considerable lack of political interest and involvement on the part of the average citizen. In addition, heavy reliance on nonhistorical research methodologies by those who study contemporary societies increases the chance that major systemic changes will go unnoticed. This will be so as long as their impact is not personally experienced or widely publicized through channels of communication such as the mass media. Scheuch, in a book on the governability or nongovernability of the Federal Republic of Germany, correctly observes that the percentage of individuals deriving their income from the primary sector of the economy has been reduced by 50 percent or more in Western countries during the last two decades without resulting in major sociopolitical conflicts.[28]

Changes in the occupational structure of the industrialized Western nations certainly are not the only ones worth noting. One change that can be unambiguously demonstrated with survey data and is of major importance with respect to the structure of political action is the increasing political involvement of the citizenry.[29] This politicization reflects secular trends such as the "educational revolution,"[30] the growth of an interventionist welfare state supported by a progressive income tax system, the decrease in the number of working hours, the technological time-saving upgrading in household appliances, and, as a major factor, the development of a widespread electronic mass communication network including, in particular, the diffusion of television.[31] A major factor in all these developments of course was an unprecedented rate of economic growth that not only made it possible to pay for these changes but also, and more importantly, reduced the potential large-scale income and wealth distribution conflicts to highly ritualized peaceful confrontations among pluralist corporate actors such as political parties, trade unions, and employer unions.[32]

The emphasis on political stability that characterizes this phase of economic growth is well embedded in notions of elitist democratic theory and can be easily understood in light of the apocalyptic experiences suffered by citizens in almost all industrialized Western countries during World War II. The high hopes of the 1950s for limited, peaceful conflicts are well summed up by Lipset, who wrote in 1961, "the democratic class struggle will continue, but it will be a fight without ideologies, without red flags, without May Day parades."[33] This conclusion sounded plausible enough against the background of economic well-being and undisturbed development in the postwar industrialized societies. The return of the ideologies, flags, and parades in the movements for civil rights, for peace in Vietnam, and for more participation constituted a definite challenge to the explanatory capabilities of social scientists. One challenge in particular was to discover why support for these movements was found overwhelmingly among the well-to-do classes.

One answer to this question lies in the structural changes we have described but cannot *systematically* integrate into our study and analysis design. An additional answer can be provided by Inglehart's theory of value change, which will be more thoroughly discussed in this and particularly in later chapters of the book.[34] Finally, an answer can be sought in the important relationship between democratic values that are so closely bound to concepts of participation, on the one hand, and concrete forms of political action, on the other. These latter are defined as legal or legitimate, or both, in a given society at a given point in time. Here it will be argued that the emphasis on *existing* political structures underestimates the actual impact of the substantive political philosophy of democracy, of political ideology as a constrained belief system, and of well-developed political cognitions upon processes of political change. These factors, as well as the structural changes we have mentioned above, add to the amount and intensity of systemic strain on the social and political order in advanced industrial societies.

A Systems Perspective of Political Action

As the standard definition based on Eastonian thinking goes, politics is a process that produces decisions about the production and distribution of

scarce material and nonmaterial resources. Such a frame of reference points to the high conflict potential of this process. Its successful management has a direct bearing on the survival chances of any given political regime. In this sense, then, the institutionalization of adequate patterns of conflict management enables a polity to achieve its goals without facing the constant threat of self-destruction. Likewise, it remains strong against external threats.

Positions of influence in a political and social system at a given point in time testify to the economic, technological, organizational, and ideological resources that the actors in the system command. As a result, participation in conflicts that are regarded as legitimate—such as between employers and labor unions or between government and opposition—generally reflects the societal status quo. The extent to which competing groups have access to resources will change over time, so there will always be groups that have not yet gained access to channels of influence. Consequently, noninstitutionalized conflicts reflect a system state in which newly emerging interest cleavages have not been sufficiently recognized and therefore are not coopted into the regular bargaining processes. The result is inadequate representation of minorities. The failure to recognize this phenomenon is at the core of much criticism directed at pluralist democratic theory.

According to fundamental democratic principles, democratic societies, at the very least, guarantee individual citizens or social groups the chance to influence decisions by political authorities. To the extent that this principle is realized or believed to be realized, any recourse to collective political violence or the threat thereof is unnecessary. On the other hand, lack of system responsiveness might legitimately, though not necessarily legally, permit resort to various direct action techniques including the use of violence as the final point on a continuum of unconventional political behavior.

If we relate political actors and political authorities in such a dynamic model, we can then conceptualize political participation in any of its concrete forms as an interaction between political authorities and nonauthorities (or potential partisans, as Gamson prefers to call them) in which mutual expectations and eventual outcomes determine the dynamics of this interaction.[35] The core variables relevant to the process are the trust of the nonauthorities in the political authorities, the formers' trust in the nonpartisan nature of the institutions of the political system, the perceived success of attempts by nonauthorities to influence outcomes, the ability of authorities to change outcome decisions, and the authorities' definition of the situation in terms of its potential for social control. But, most important, the concrete nature of the exchange is determined by the responsiveness of the political actors, their chosen means of influence, and the repertory of political resources and activities that partisans command.[36]

The concept of political repertory defined as the sum of all political skills an individual has acquired through vicarious reinforcement and imitative learning will play an important role in the empirical analysis we shall present in the following chapters. It will permit us to consider jointly conventional and unconventional forms of political participation without an a priori limitation of our theoretical perspective. We regard the command of a political repertory as a prerequisite for citizens to express political demands.

Obviously, our approach to the understanding of political participation is an instrumental and rationalistic one. It assumes that a specific participatory act is selected as the precise means for the political actor to achieve certain goals at a minimal cost, goals that do not seem to be otherwise achievable because of the lack of responsiveness of the political authorities and institutions. It does not assume, however, that this calculation, which is *zweckrational* in Weber's sense, is carried out independently of all external social stimuli and structures of influence. Therefore, our approach is neither identical with nor similar to the concept of the rational individual "political man" who collects all available and necessary information and then makes up his mind accordingly—an ideal type that has been demolished by modern empirical research. Nor is our approach identical with that of the traditional "ruling elite" model, since we do not assume that the organizational structures necessary to pose a realistic threat to the governing elites must be based on traditional, well-established influence positions.

The establishment of complex and efficient mass communication systems has somewhat eased the organizational requirements for successful political inputs. The impact on political decision-making of the student movement in the middle and late 1960s is a good case in point. Even so, the importance of demand organization across time and space, for example, cannot be emphasized enough. With the exception of political terrorism, which must be regarded as a pathological concomitant of advanced industrial society, it is still the *collective* character of political action or the threat of such action that determines the sequence and character of interactions between partisans and political authorities.[37]

The overall view of political participation and political action we have presented thus far is basically of a functionalist nature. This is in line with conflict theorists such as Coser who, following a systems perspective, stresses the impact of extreme forms of societal involvement on the ability of sociopolitical systems to adapt successfully to structural challenges.[38] The importance of Gamson's similarly functionalist theoretical conceptualization is that it explicitly considers the actions and reactions of the state as a possible reason for the recourse by partisans to direct action techniques. These are actions that in the past have frequently been analyzed within the

framework of political extremism or deviance.[39] One important factor in this one-sidedness was, in our opinion, the pluralist bias that confined people's actions to the *existing* political institutions, implicitly assuming that the process of interest aggregation and interest input into the decision-making structure was functioning properly.

This assumption has become less and less credible as the once homogeneous and well-structured hierarchy of political preferences diversified. This hierarchy was well embedded in the class cleavage and, to a lesser extent, in the religious cleavage, which, as Lipset and Rokkan once stated, have been the base for many of the existing Western party systems.[40] As the diversification process continues, the central role of political parties as a link between the populus and the political decision-making elites depends ever more heavily on diffuse, generalized support by citizens.

At this point, the distinction between *government trust,* or trust in the political authorities, and *system trust,* or trust in the political institutions and acceptance of the political philosophy of the political system, becomes very important. As Gamson has pointed out, trust as a general concept can be understood as a blank check issued by citizens on the assumption of system responsiveness. With citizen demands becoming more specific, the ability of political authorities—and this includes the political parties—to maintain government trust will increasingly depend not only on their general reactions but also on their reactions to specific, less institutionalized demands.

If this analysis is correct, it implies consequences for the dimensionality of the political space and the corresponding structure of political party systems in Western advanced industrial societies. While the Downsian model of a unidimensional party space has hardly ever been validated empirically,[41] it may, at least in the days of constrained demand organization, have served nevertheless as a useful analytical tool. But now slow changes can be observed in the hierarchical structure of the political space, and politics also becomes increasingly important for the average citizen, not only because educational levels and resulting cognitive capabilities are increasing, but also because the state, as we have mentioned before, has been rapidly enlarging its spheres of influence and responsibility. Both the hierarchical structure of the political space and the low level of citizen involvement in politics once permitted and even required that "normal" citizens develop general orientations toward the parties in order to reduce the complexity of the political process to a level congruent with their own capabilities and motivations to participate. On the other side, political authorities were happy, and even relieved, to reciprocate this demand for simplicity and provide straightforward pathways for participation. By contrast, it is now reasonable to predict that there will be an increasing tendency for citizens with particular demands to organize themselves outside the established political institutions in general and outside the existing parties in particular.[42]

The lack of empirical analyses of the development of political trust in four of the five countries in our study renders impossible generalizations based only on the observed decline in *government trust* in the United States.[43] Such a decline in government trust does not necessarily pose an immediate threat to the stability of the Western democratic polities as long as *system trust* remains at a high level. Variations in trust in government are a normal phenomenon in representative democracies; they reflect incumbency roles on the system level. But if trust in government substantially deteriorates because even those citizens who identify with the governing party or parties lose trust in "their" political authorities, then changes in system trust are also likely to occur unless the institutional make-up of the political system changes to meet the new demands.[44]

Much of this is speculation. Still the systemic perspective we have applied to political action is essential in order not to fall prey to a static conceptualization of the problem. In public perceptions, acts of unconventional political behavior are usually associated with social movements that at least try to transcend the sociopolitical structure of a given system. Many observers view the rise in noninstitutionalized political participation as an effort at transcendence of this nature; some view it with feelings of fear, others with feelings of hope. In spite of speculations about the imminent breakdown of the present social and political order, we have a less apocalyptic view of the future.

Elements of a Micro Theory of Political Action

This study was begun in 1971 with a strong interest in measuring and explaining dimensions of political action. We were especially concerned with unconventional political behavior, which can be defined as behavior that does not correspond to the norms of law and custom that regulate political participation under a particular regime. This interest is reflected in the following schematic representation of the core variables in the study. This figure is not meant to be a systematic specification of causal relationships among variables or blocks of variables. Rather, we see it as an heuristic device permitting a broad overview of the set of constructs that have been found to be theoretically or empirically useful for the explanation of political participation. In accordance with the "grand design" of our study, we have operationalized and measured all constructs referring to *individual actors.* In this chapter we will not try to link these constructs systematically in order to arrive at some kind of a causal model. This will be left to later chapters in the

book. Our interest at this point lies in offering a concise description of the range of the project's research interests in the realm of political action.

The Main Dependent Variables: Conventional and Unconventional Political Participation. In most contemporary empirical research, political participation appears as a straightforward concept that is theoretically well grounded and amenable to empirical research without major obstacles. We do not intend to challenge this notion directly; it is, in fact, supported by a substantial body of good empirical research, especially on electoral behavior. Nevertheless, substantial criticism has been leveled at much of the empirical work on political participation on theoretical as well as ideological grounds. Voting behavior, which has been the focal point of some of the best empirical political science research done to date, has been branded irrelevant and misleading.[45] Quantitative participation research in general has been accused of being status quo oriented, too narrowly focused on only the *political* arena, and lacking a wider perspective with respect to the goal of democratization.[46]

Given our theoretical interest, the cross-national and cross-sectional character of our research design, and the limitations of empirical research in general, we have found these criticisms to be of little relevance for our research on political participation despite the validity of some of the charges. As it turns out, we can live quite comfortably with the broad standard definition offered in the literature, which refers to political participation as all voluntary activities by individual citizens intended to influence either directly or indirectly political choices at various levels of the political system.[47] However, this working definition entails one key element that requires qualification with regard to our own empirical research.

We have mentioned before that our interest in uninstitutionalized direct political action had to be reconciled with the cross-sectional, national representative survey design. This design is well suited for the measurement of institutionalized, "traditional" political acts such as voting and so on. However, it is much less adequate for measuring behaviors that occur irregularly, infrequently, and in specific, often local, contexts of mobilization. As the detailed discussion in the following chapter will show, the cross-national study design required and warranted a conceptual approach concentrating on protest *potential* in the five countries. In comparison, the measurement of the behavioral component of conventional political involvement did not incur major problems.

Another problem of great concern to us has been the dimensionality of the political action space. When Milbrath in 1965 postulated a unidimensional hierarchy of political involvement in the United States, he observed that



Figure 2.1

"demonstrations do not fit into the hierarchy of political involvement in the United States."[48] This hierarchy of conventional activities oriented exclusively toward the electoral process was not *empirically* established by Milbrath. It has been challenged by Verba and Nie, though their work can also be interpreted—as they themselves observe—as a confirmation of the Milbrath hypothesis about the unidimensionality of conventional political participation.[49] We have started out with a similar assumption about the unidimensionality of unconventional political participation. We understand this dimension as reflecting the lengths to which a given individual is prepared to go in the use of unconventional political means.

Two aspects of this dimension of unconventional political behavior require elaboration: these are its relationship to political violence and to conventional political participation. Political violence can be defined as the use of physical force against objects or persons for political reasons. Almost all forms of direct political action, including many conventional ones, are, at least potentially, prone to violence. One could, in fact, conceptualize these acts as the representation of an underlying continuum of violence proneness. As we have mentioned before, even if protest and violence are, historically speaking, "natural" concomitants of any sociopolitical development, their consequences are sufficiently unpleasant to explain why people are usually opposed to political violence. This is particularly true for the advanced industrial societies of the West, where many find it difficult to imagine situations in which violence could be a meaningful political resort. This evaluation is apparently shared with little disagreement by the mass publics in these countries.[50]

A study by Blumenthal and others of attitudes toward violence alerts us to the fact that we are dealing with a very complex attitude structure. According to their analyses, there exists a consistent perceptual bias in the way that violence-prone social groups think of specific actions as violent or nonviolent. Since they share with others rejection of "violence" as an abstract societal norm, such groups face the difficult task of justifying the fact that the direct action techniques they adopt are frequently violent or at least violence-prone. The cognitive dissonance that is bound to arise from this discrepancy in belief elements is resolved, as Blumenthal and others show, by a simple psychological trick: the respective social groups define "their" action repertory as "non-violent" and the actions of other (usually opposed) groups as "violent." Thus they are able to maintain their view that violence is fundamentally evil.

Another aspect of the work of Blumenthal and her colleagues is also relevant for the assessment of violence by mass publics. They were able to demonstrate the existence of two separate dimensions of attitudes toward violence: violence for social control, that is, repressive violence by the state or vigilantism to maintain the status quo, and violence for social change, that is,

a set of beliefs that the sociopolitical changes deemed necessary can be brought about only by violent means.[51] We will deal later with both aspects of attitudes toward violence when we develop our measurement instruments.

The second question we raised concerned the relationship of unconventional to conventional political behavior. The former is rather closely related to what in colloquial as well as scholarly discourse is frequently referred to as protest behavior.[52] Our preference for the term "unconventional political behavior" reflects two considerations, one theoretical and one political.

As we have tried to demonstrate in our discussion of the systemic conditions of political involvement, there is every reason to assume that, in a middle- or long-range analysis of political action, concrete forms of participation may experience changes in the degree to which they are considered unconventional. These forms may be evaluated both according to their *legality,* that is, their conformity to positive legal norms relevant for a given type of behavior, and their *legitimacy,* that is, the extent to which a given population at a given point in time approves or disapproves them.[53] Although legality and legitimacy are not completely unrelated, for analytical purposes they must be kept separate to permit the analysis of lags or discrepancies between the two and of processes of change in political culture.[54]

The Main Independent Variables. The content of the two boxes labeled "independent variables" in Figure 2.1 surely has already alerted the reader to the fact that in this general overview of relevant theoretical constructs the concept of "independent variables" is used very loosely indeed. Clearly, what in a given analysis is regarded as an independent variable has to be determined theoretically. Consequently, our interest at this point is simply to point to blocks of variables that we regard as being the most important antecedents of political action.

The first such block includes variables locating individuals in the social structure of society. Three core elements of this structure have been proven time and again to be relevant for political participation. The first is social status, the position in which individuals find themselves *relative to others* with respect to education, income, and the like. The second element indicates the degree of integration into networks of secondary associations such as interest groups and comparable organizations.[55] The third is age, which is differentiated into the two components of generation and position in the life cycle.

The second block of variables is designed to measure sociopolitical values and is based on the conceptualization of value change proposed by Inglehart in 1971. Inglehart sets out to provide an explanation for the puzzling observation that members of the middle classes were heavily overrepresented

in the protest movements of the late 1960s, and he begins with the psychological theory of a value—or need hierarchy proposed by Maslow.[56] Briefly summarized, this theory postulates that individual needs are hierarchically organized, and that satisfaction of each respective lower stage of the hierarchy leads to the activation of needs located one step higher in the hierarchy.

Without discussing this theory in any greater detail,[57] at least one general hypothesis related to the appearance of unconventional political behavior on the political scene can be formulated as follows: contrary to many expectations, satisfaction of the physical and safety needs, a goal that is now at least in sight in many advanced industrial societies, will not eliminate political conflict. Rather, the conflict in these societies will now shift to values related to the needs ranking higher on the need hierarchy, such as the feeling of belonging and self-actualization.

A third block of variables deals with the motivational and cognitive conditions that make it possible for citizens to orient themselves in the world of politics, and with their ideological commitments. We have already pointed out the extent to which a rational, means-end political calculus requires, in addition to the motivation to engage and act, the cognitive capabilities to assess adequately the contingencies of a given situation and then to make the relevant choices from the repertory of political means available. This perspective is particularly relevant for analyses on the macro level of the political system. The reason is that increases in levels of mass political competence can, at least in the long run, lead to a reduction in the "pluralist bias" and ensure a more adequate consideration of noninstitutionalized interests. Unfortunately, after the pioneering work by Converse published in 1964, very little cross-national research has been done to provide firmer empirical grounds for estimating the cognitive capabilities of mass publics.[58] In our study, Klingemann made a substantial effort to overcome this lack of empirical data by adapting Converse's measurement approach in order to arrive at a cross-national indicator of level of conceptualization based on open-ended questions.[59]

This measure is complemented by indicators derived from two questions—one closed and one open—about self-placement on the ideological left-right dimension and the respondent's cognitive understanding of that dimension. On the one hand, these indicators will permit us to answer the questions of the extent to which mass publics are guided by ideological preferences and how these preferences are integrated by the existing party systems. On the other hand, these indicators will make possible an assessment of the left-right ideological balance in advanced industrial societies and its consequences for political action.

The fourth and final block of variables to be discussed is centered around the concept of relative deprivation. This concept is anything but new and was derived from work on reference group theory.[60] Relative deprivation has played a major role in macro conflict research where it was defined either as the "perceived discrepancy between men's value expectations and their value capabilities"[61] or the "discrepancy between present social aspirations and expectations, on the one hand, and social achievements, on the other."[62] Whatever the theoretical importance of relative deprivation, it certainly did not fare well in macropolitical empirical research. Thus Hibbs sums up his analyses—utilizing his operational definition of the relative deprivation concept—by stating that "the social mobilization-government performance and social mobilization-social welfare hypotheses do not provide powerful explanations of differences across nations in levels of mass political violence."[63]

Relative deprivation as a micro concept in survey research has only sparsely been used *systematically* in empirical studies in the past.[64] Therefore, it is not at all surprising that an examination of empirical research into unconventional political behavior in 1971 concludes, "there is considerable reason for rejecting the sociological and popular cliché that absolute or relative deprivation and the ensuing frustration or discontent or despair is the root cause of rebellion."[65] Still, a careful analysis of the operationalizations of such a complex concept as relative deprivation in the studies reanalyzed reveals that such a far-reaching conclusion is not at all warranted. Rather, it should be regarded as bad research policy that the unavailability of adequate data results in ex post operationalizations that are not grounded in the theory they are designed to assess and therefore do not provide a proper test of the construct.

One important factor that has to be considered explicitly is that relative deprivation can become politically relevant only as a collective property of one or more groups. In essence, a built-in feature of relative deprivation theory is that, in order to cross the threshold of awareness, deprivations have to be pinpointed and put into a common frame of reference through the activities of political elites in order to overcome the isolation of the individual. Here we see a direct link to the role that ideologies and political sophistication play in processes of political mobilization.[66]

Second, it must not be forgotten that even collective deprivations[67] have to be politicized, that is, fed into the political process. As Dahl writes, "to the dismay and astonishment of the activists who struggle to rouse a disadvantaged group to oppose its lot, the human psyche does not invariably impel those who are deprived of equality to seek it, or sometimes even to want it."[68] Dahl maintains that five conditions must be fulfilled for a successful process of politicization:

A) perception of deprivation;
B) high relevance for the individual and for the group;
C) evaluation of deprivation as illegitimate;
D) feelings of anger, frustration, resentment over it;
E) actual demand for removal of deprivation.[69]

There are two additional conditions that are missing in Dahl's formulation and that are crucial for the process of politicization. The first is that political authorities be held responsible for the condition of felt deprivation; the second is that the performance of the authorities in the respective areas of deprivation be negatively evaluated.

Both the requirements of a *collective* deprivation and of the politicization of the deprivation reveal once more the limits of a cross-sectional representative survey study design as long as its focal point is the explanation of *concrete acts of unconventional political behavior.* If relative deprivation theory is to be given a fair chance to explain political unrest, then a time lapse in which dissatisfaction precedes unrest must be assumed. In addition, there must be social actors who anticipate and define deprivation and push it over the threshold of individual awareness. Or it may happen that certain actors take up existing individual deprivations and organize as well as articulate them. There has to be an interaction over time between actors on different system levels to initiate the process of unrest. The process itself is strongly influenced by factors based on the societal value system as well as on organizational and structural properties of the participants in the conflict, and this is true notwithstanding the dynamics of the confrontation itself.[70]

Some Intervening Variables. Macropolitical conflict research has identified variables that determine whether a readiness for conflict behavior is indeed transformed into action: these variables include the coercive potential of the state,[71] subjective justifications for the respective behavior,[72] and the responsiveness of political authorities to citizen demands.[73] We will be dealing only with subjective individual perceptions of government and system responsiveness. Gamson's model for the exchange between political authorities and partisans assumes a central intervening role for political trust or, to use a more general term, legitimacy beliefs.[74] This interest in *processes* of influence exchange emphasizes the properties of the trust concept *as a variable.* According to Gamson, levels of public trust depend on the outcomes of influence efforts by potential partisans. We will not be able to deal with this dynamic perspective with our data; Gamson himself is also unable to support his theoretical approach empirically. Nevertheless, he provides some important conceptual differentiations that require separate and explicit operationalizations.

The first distinction refers to the Eastonian categories of input and output dimensions.[75] The theoretical equivalent of the input dimension is the

perception by individuals of their ability to influence; its operationalization is the political efficacy scale.[76] The theoretical equivalent of the output dimension is trust, defined as the individual's perception of influence, or the probability that the political system will produce preferred outcomes even if left untended; its operationalization is the system responsiveness scale.[77]

The second distinction deals with four different aspects of political trust that, Gamson argues, are hierarchically organized along a specificity-generality dimension: (1) political authorities, (2) political institutions, (3) public philosophy, and (4) political community.[78] In this study only the first of these four steps in the hierarchy—*government* trust—has been adequately operationalized while measures of *system* trust—steps two, three, and four in the hierarchy—can at best be regarded as very rough approximations of the concept.[79]

SUMMARY

In this chapter we have developed the theoretical contours that have guided our research into conventional and unconventional forms of political participation in advanced industrial societies. It was necessary to discuss, at least in general terms, the relationship to democratic theories of participation as a political value or goal, and to speculate about the meaning that acts of unconventional political participation might have in a systemic analysis. In order to come to grips with the phenomenon of political protest, we had to pay particular attention to two serious problems.

First, popular and scholarly views of political protest have specified a conceptual frame of reference for the explanation of this phenomenon—theories of collective violence—that regard unconventional political behaviors as part of a scenario in which political stability is disrupted by aggressive social or political groups. While we do not deny the usefulness and validity of this approach *in general,* we argued that it is too one-sided for the analysis of the newly emerging participatory political culture of advanced industrial societies. This implies a culture characterized by the waning of broad sociopolitical movements for system change and an increase in limited, issue-based, and frequently regional ad hoc group actions that may well dissolve after the issue has receded. It is particularly important to note that in this theoretical perspective the emergence of direct action techniques does *not* in itself signal the end of stable liberal democracy (or the end of "Spaetkapitalismus" as certain German political philosophers have preferred to call it).[80]

Second, and not unrelated to this difference in theoretical emphasis just mentioned, we found that very little empirical cross-sectional evidence and even less longitudinal survey evidence is as yet available for mass publics

nationally as well as cross-nationally on styles of political participation that go beyond institutionalized, electorally oriented activities. Thus, whereas the macrodata we have looked at do not contradict our basic contention of an increasing predisposition of mass publics toward direct political action techniques and thereby indicate a secular trend toward a different quality of political life, the critical evaluation of this research-guiding hypothesis grown out of the theory of value change will have to come from the data of our own study. Since we are following a new path in looking at political action in very broad terms, the cross-national design of the study is particularly useful in helping us, on the one hand, to avoid overinterpretations of our data and, on the other, to arrive at conclusions of more general validity. To describe a new set of relationships between social structure, social dispositions, and political action in one country is exciting but uncomfortable. The arm of chance is a long one. To find such a phenomenon replicated in four other nations simultaneously is exciting and reassuring.

NOTES

1. Dennis F. Thompson, *The Democratic Citizen,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970, pp. 10ff.

2. Henry S. Kariel, (ed.), *Frontiers of Democratic Theory,* New York: Random House, 1970.

3. Juergen Habermas et al., *Student und Politik.* Neuwied: Luchterhand-Verlag, 1961.

4. Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society,* London: Heinemann, 1974, pp. 14ff. Germany and Austria are slightly less developed in this respect. In the following table we have included both Bell's figures which are based on a 1969 OECD publication, and the data contained in Eike Ballerstedt and Wolfgang Glatzer, *Soziopolitischer Almanach.* Frankfurt-New York: Herder and Herder, 1975, p. 93, on the percentage of labor force employed in the tertiary sector.

Country	Percentage of Labor Force in Tertiary Sector			
	OECD		*Almanach*	
	Year	#	*Year*	#
The Netherlands	1969	49.8	1968	51.3
Britain	1969	49.7	1966	51.4
United States	1969	61.1	1971	60.8
Germany*	1969	41.4	1971	43.4
Austria	–	–	1971	42.1

*According to 1977 micro census data 50.1 percent of the active labor force were employed in the tertiary sector in Germany.

5. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies,* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968, p. 32.

6. Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, *No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976.

7. Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry,* New York: John Wiley, 1970, pp. 31ff.

8. Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society,* p. 12.

9. According to the handbook by Dolf Sternberger and Bernhard Vogel (eds.), *Die Wahl der Parlamente, Band 1, Europa,* Berlin: Verlag Walter de Gruyter, 1959, the active right to a free, direct, equal and secret vote was awarded to:

- The Dutch in 1917 (age limit: 25 years), the age limit was reduced to 21 years in 1956 (p. 867);
- The British in 1948 (age limit: 21 years); after the reform of 1928 a double vote for university graduates was still in effect (p. 634);
- the Germans in 1920 (age limit: 20 years) (p. 252);
- the Austrians in 1923 (age limit: 20 years) (p. 940).

The situation in America is considerably more complicated. May it suffice to note that the present Carter Administration is considering measures to ease voter registration to boost turnout that still substantially lags behind other Western democracies.

Another case in point is Switzerland where women obtained full national voting privileges only in 1971.

10. The discussion in Thompson, *The Democratic Citizen,* pp. 53ff., represents a more balanced, complex view on participation although it too suffers from the lack of formalization of the arguments.

11. See the discussion in Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man,* Anchor Book Edition, New York: Doubleday, 1963, pp. 226ff.; furthermore Bernard Berelson, "Survival Through Apathy," in Henry S. Kariel (ed.), *Frontiers of Democratic Theory,* pp. 68ff. (reprinted from "Voting"), and Bernard Berelson, "Democratic Theory and Public Opinion," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 16 (Fall 1952), pp. 313ff. A more recent statement is Manfred Kuechler, "Was leistet die empirische Wahlsoziologie", in Max Kaase (ed.), *Wahlsoziologie heute. Analysen aus Anlass der Bundestagswahl 1976,* Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1977, p. 153.

12. William A. Gamson, *Power and Discontent,* Homewood: Dorsey Press, 1968.

13. Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, *No Easy Choice,* pp. 159ff.

14. Philip E. Converse, "Public Opinion and Voting Behavior," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), *Handbook of Political Science,* Vol. 4, Reading: Addison Wesley, 1975, pp. 93ff.

15. James W. Prothro and C. M. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement," *Journal of Politics,* 22 (Spring 1960), pp. 276ff.; Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," *American Political Science Review,* 58 (June 1964), pp. 361ff.

16. The facets of the problem are well described in Thomas R. Dye and I. Harmon Zeigler, *The Irony of Democracy,* Belmont: Duxbury Press, 1970.

17. Charles Tilly, "Collective Violence in European Perspective," in Hugh David Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (eds.), *Violence in America,* New York: Signet Books, 1969, pp. 4f.

18. Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971, p. 11.

19. Charles Lewis Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators,* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972. The data were made available

for secondary analysis through the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), Ann Arbor.

20. Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., *Mass Political Violence,* New York: John Wiley, 1973, pp. 7ff.

21. Hibbs also includes political strikes in his collective protest measure and assassinations in his internal war measure. For an operational definition of the six indicators see Hudson and Taylor, pp. 59ff.

22. This assessment is also shared by Hibbs (p. 10) who used logarithmic transformations for all variables before beginning the substantive analysis.

23. A fuller analysis of these data can be found in Ted Robert Gurr, "Political Protest and Violence in the 1960's: The United States in World Perspective"; in Hugh David Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (eds.), *Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives,* Revised College Edition, Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1979. We appreciate the permission of Gurr to use these data for our analyses.

24. In the Gurr data Northern Ireland is treated as a separate nation and not as part of the United Kingdom.

25. The British investigators felt they could not accept the responsibility of sending their interviewers down the Falls Road to ask people penetrating questions about their political beliefs.

26. Verba, Nie, and others in their seven-nation study conducted in the United States; Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie and Jae-On Kim, "The Modes of Democratic Participation," *Comparative Politics Series,* Sage Professional Paper No. 01-013, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971; Sidney Verba et al., "The Modes of Participation," *Comparative Political Studies,* 6 (July 1973), pp. 235ff.; Jae-On Kim, Norman Nie, Sidney Verba, "The Amount and Concentration of Political Participation," *Political Methodology,* 1 (Spring 1974), pp. 105ff. The American part of the study is thoroughly analyzed in Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, *Participation in America,* New York: Harper & Row, 1972. In this book Verba and Nie state on page 3 that "our concern is with activities 'within the system'—ways of influencing politics that are generally recognized as legal and legitimate." This perspective is, of course, perfectly in order as long as the Verba-Nie data are not mistakenly interpreted as a complete representation of the structure of political action. This limitation is critically noted by Jerrold G. Rusk, "Political Participation in America: A Review Essay," *American Political Science Review,* 70 (June 1976), pp. 583ff. This criticism is even more strongly voiced by William R. Schonfeld, "The Meaning of Democratic Participation," *World Politics,* 28 (October 1975), pp. 141ff. For a similar point see Robert H. Salisbury, "Research on Political Participation," *American Journal of Political Science,* 19 (May 1975), p. 325.

27. The "participatory" side of the controversy has been taken by Carole Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970. The assumption of a positive causal relationship between participation and self-esteem has been challenged on empirical as well as theoretical grounds in Paul M. Sniderman, *Personality and Democratic Politics,* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975, pp. 315ff. An interesting, unusual perspective on the problem has been unfolded by William Lafferty, "Participation and Democratic Theory: Reworking the Premises for a Participatory Society," *Scandinavian Political Studies* (Oslo), 10, 1975, pp. 53ff.

28. Erwin K. Scheuch, *Wird die Bundesrepublik unregierbar?,* Koeln: Arbeitgeberverband der Metallindustrie, 1976, pp. 28ff. That these enormous changes could be peacefully accommodated testifies to the adaptive capabilities of modern sociopolitical systems.

29. See Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "Wahlentscheidung in der Fernsehdemokratie," in Dieter Just and Lothar Romain (eds.), *Auf der Suche nach dem muendigen Waehler,* Bonn: Bundeszentrale fuer Politische Bildung, 1974, p. 186, for a table of survey marginals representative for the Federal Republic over a period of 21 years which show a 22 percentage point increase in the number of those indicating their interest in politics. For the United States see Warren E. Miller and Teresa E. Levitin, *Leadership and Change,* Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers, 1976, p. 229.

30. Philip E. Converse, "Change in the American Electorate," in Angus Campbell and Philip E. Converse (eds.), *The Human Meaning of Social Change,* New York: Russell Sage, 1972, pp. 322ff.

31. John P. Robinson and Philip F. Converse, "Social Change Reflected in the Use of Time," in Angus Campbell and Philip E. Converse (eds.), *The Human Meaning of Social Change,* pp. 17ff.

32. The relevance of such corporate agreements is stressed by Philippe C. Schmitter, "Associability and Governability," Paper presented at the Colloquium on "Overloaded Government" held at Florence from December 13 through December 16, 1976.

33. Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man,* p. 445.

34. The first presentation was Ronald Inglehart, "The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies," *American Political Science Review,* 65 (December 1971), pp. 991ff. See also his book, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics,* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977.

35. This conceptualization closely follows William A. Gamson, *Ideology and Discontent,* op. cit.

36. It is important to note that our particular perspective is not meant to reflect the "classical" mass-elite model since partisans in conflict with political authorities may, of course, also be or recruit societal elites.

37. Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel,* pp. 7ff; Klaus v. Beyme, "Politischer Extremismus im Lichte sozialwissenschaftlicher Radikalismusforschung," in Rudolf Wassermann (ed.), *Terrorismus contra Rechtsstaat,* Neuwied: Luchterhand Verlag, 1976, pp. 48ff.

38. Lewis Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict,* New York: Free Press, 1956.

39. The set of studies on the authoritarian and dogmatic personality is a good case in point.

40. Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," in Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds.), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments,* New York: Free Press, 1967, pp. 1ff.

41. Donald E. Stokes, "Spatial Models of Party Competition," in Angus Campbell et al., *Elections and the Political Order,* New York: John Wiley, 1966, pp. 161ff. (First published in 1963 in the *American Political Science Review.*)

42. A good example of this development is the conflict about the erection of numerous nuclear energy production plants in West Germany. This conflict has a clear government/antigovernment dimension on *both* the federal and state level thereby cutting across party lines. It threatens to erode government as well as system trust because only after violent actions all over West Germany had successfully stopped construction work on some of the sites did it become evident that major problems involved in the production of nuclear energy had not been sufficiently considered and adequately solved by the political authorities.

43. Arthur H. Miller, "Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964-1970,"

American Political Science Review, 68 (September 1974), pp. 951ff. See also Jack Citrin's "Comment" and Miller's "Rejoinder" in the same issue of this Review.

44. This interpretation is corroborated by Miller's empirical analyses. See his "Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964-1970," pp. 963ff., 1970ff.

45. This criticism has been frequently voiced by Murray Edelman. See his *The Symbolic Uses of Politics,* Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964; "Research Orientations: Some Pitfalls and Some Strategic Suggestions," in Henry S. Kariel (ed.), *Frontiers of Democratic Theory,* pp. 352ff.; *Politics as Symbolic Action,* Chicago: Markham, 1971.

46. Gisela Zimpel, *Selbstbestimmung oder Akklamation? Politische Teilnahme in der buergerlichen Demokratietheorie,* Stuttgart: Enke Verlag, 1972; Ulrich v. Alemann (ed.), *Partizipation–Demokratisierung–Mitbestimmung,* Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1975.

47. Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, *Political Participation in America,* New York, 1972, p. 2: "Political participation refers to those activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take."

Herbert McClosky, *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,* Vol. 12, New York: Macmillan and the Free Press, 1972 (first 1968), p. 252: "Political participation will refer to those voluntary activities by which members of a society share in the selection of rulers and, directly or indirectly, in the formation of public policy." Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, *No Easy Choice,* p. 4: "We define political participation simply as activity by private citizens designed to influence governmental decision making."

Interestingly enough, Lester W. Milbrath in his book *Political Participation,* Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965, nowhere explicitly offers an operational definition of the term. Extrapolating from the text, political participation refers to "individual behavior as it relates to the political system" (p. 3).

48. Lester W. Milbrath, *Political Participation,* p. 18. However, in the new edition of "Political Participation" by Milbrath and Goel, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1977, p. 20, a different perspective now largely coherent with our own regarding the conventionality of certain political acts has been adopted in that the authors argue "that standards about "normality" and "legitimacy" differ from culture to culture and over time."

49. Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, *Participation in America,* pp. 60ff.

50. Monica Blumenthal et al., *Justifying Violence,* Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1972. See also Monica Blumenthal et al., *More About Justifying Violence,* Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1975, and the detailed discussion of our data in the following chapter.

51. Monica Blumenthal et al., *Justifying Violence,* pp. 26ff.

52. See as an example Jerrold G. Rusk, "Political Participation in America: A Review Essay," pp. 585, 588.

53. These two aspects of unconventionality are also differentiated in Muller's definition of political dissent behavior. See his "A Test of a Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence," *American Political Science Review,* 66 (September 1972), p. 934. See also Max Kaase, "Bedingungen unkonventionellen politischen Verhaltens in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in Peter Graf Kielmansegg (ed.), *Legitimationsprobleme politischer Systeme, Sonderheft 7 der Politischen Vierteljahresschrift (PVS),* Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1976, pp. 184ff.

54. Legality and legitimacy were included as two separate dimensions in the British pretest. As one would expect, the two were positively correlated (r = .30), but the

weakness of the correlation indicates that the two, as we have argued on theoretical grounds, are by no means identical. For a detailed description of the British pretest analyses see Alan Marsh, "Explorations in Unorthodox Political Behavior: A Scale to Measure 'Protest Potential'," *European Journal of Political Research,* 2 (June 1974), pp. 107ff. It was decided to exclude the legality dimension from data collected in the main study because of our emphasis on legitimacy and—a very practical reason—because of the problem of very limited questionnaire space.

55. There is little point and also need to base these statements on literature references which are abundant. See the already mentioned books by Milbrath, *Political Participation,* Verba and Nie, *Political Participation in America,* and, as an example of a cross-national survey study, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.

56. Abraham Maslow, *Motivation and Personality,* New York: Harper & Row, 1954.

57. For a thorough presentation see Ronald Inglehart's chapters in this book.

58. Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David E. Apter (ed.), *Ideology and Discontent,* New York: Free Press, 1964, pp. 206ff.

59. These analyses are presented in the chapters by Hans D. Klingemann in this book.

60. One example is Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure,* New York: Free Press, 1949.

61. Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel,* p. 13.

62. Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind I. Feierabend, and Betty A. Nesvold, "Social Change and Political Violence: Cross-National Patterns," in Hugh David Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (eds.), *Violence in America,* pp. 606ff. It is not at all necessary to rely exclusively on the term "relative deprivation." John P. Spiegel, "Theories of Violence: An Integrated Approach," *International Journal of Group Tensions,* 1 (1971), p. 83, speaks of the "clash between the ideal value pattern and the actual or operative patterns," addressing the problem of the inconsistency between political ideals and practice as a motivating force to political violence. However, the decisive factor here is the discrepancy between expectations and reality.

63. Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., *Mass Political Violence,* pp. 61ff. Erich Weede, "Unzufriedenheit, Protest und Gewalt: Kritik an einem makropolitischen Forschungsprogramm," *Politische Vierteljahresschrift,* 16 (September 1975), pp. 409ff., also has little good to say about the validity of the relative deprivation concept in macropolitical research.

64. One of the first empirical studies using relative deprivation as a central variable was W. G. Runciman, *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice,* London: Penguin Books, 1966. See also Edward N. Muller, "A Test of a Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence," and Bernard Grofman and Edward N. Muller, "The Strange Case of Relative Gratification and Potential for Political Violence: The V-Curve Hypothesis," *American Political Science Review,* 67 (June 1973), pp. 514ff.

65. Clark McPhail, "Civil Disorder Participation: A Critical Examination of Recent Research," *American Sociological Review,* 36 (December 1971), p. 1064.

66. The parallel between this argument and the classic Marxist notions of "Klasse an sich" and "Klasse fuer sich" are obvious.

67. In complex industrial societies a differentiation between collective violence and collective political violence, which is made by Gurr for good analytic reasons, seems superfluous since it is difficult to imagine a social conflict of some magnitude that will not also involve the political system.

68. Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy,* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971, p. 95.

69. Ibid.

70. Well-known theoretical approaches to this problem are William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society,* New York: Free Press, 1959; Neil J. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior,* New York: Free Press, 1963, and Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel,* op. cit. These approaches have triggered widespread criticism. Examples of this criticism are Joseph Firestone, "Three Frameworks for the Study of Violence: A Critique and Some Suggestions for a New Synthesis." Research Paper No. 11, Center for Comparative Political Research, Binghamton, 1971; Anthony Oberschall, *Social Conflict and Social Movements,* Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1973; Terry Nardin, *Violence and the State: A Critique of Empirical Political Theory,* Comparative Politics Series, Sage Professional Paper No. 01-020, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1971.

71. Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel;* Neil F. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior.*

72. Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel.*

73. William A. Gamson, *Power and Discontent.*

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid., p. 42.

76. The scale is documented in John P. Robinson, Jerrold G. Rusk, and Kendra B. Head, *Measures of Political Attitudes,* Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1968, p. 460.

77. William A. Gamson, *Power and Discontent,* pp. 42, 54. The scale is derived from the various attitude items used in studies of the Center for Political Studies, Institute for Social Research, Ann Arbor. For a critical review of the extended work on subjective political efficacy see George I. Balch, "Multiple Indicators in Survey Research: The Concept 'Sense of Political Efficacy'," *Political Methodology,* 1 (Spring 1974), pp. 1ff.

78. William A. Gamson, *Power and Discontent,* pp. 50ff.

79. This is particularly unfortunate since a recent analysis by Edward N. Muller and Thomas O. Jukam, "On the Meaning of Political Support," *American Political Scien Review,* 71 (December 1977), 1561-1595, has demonstrated the analytical usefulness of a differentiated approach to the measurement of political support as the most general label for a whole family of related concepts.

80. Juergen Habermas, *Legitimationsprobleme im Spaetkapitalismus,* Frankfurt: Suhrkamp-Verlag, 1973; Claus Offe, *Strukturprobleme des kapitalistischen Staates,* Frankfurt: Suhrkamp-Verlag, 1972.

Chapter 3
MEASURING POLITICAL ACTION

ALAN MARSH and MAX KAASE

INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter outlined our theoretical focus upon extending the analysis of political behavior beyond conventional forms such as voting, party support, and participation in campaigns to embrace new political dimensions arising from an increased use of direct action and protest tactics. Such an intent arouses a hornet's nest of methodological difficulties of both a conceptual and a technical nature. In particular, to develop a measure of the extent to which ordinary people feel disposed to engage in political protest activities may seem, at first acquaintance, a rather unpromising idea. What could such a measure mean? After all, proportionately few people regularly take any active role in conventional forms of political engagement such as attending meetings or helping in elections even though such activities are

AUTHORS' NOTE: Parts of the first two sections of this chapter were published in Alan Marsh, *Protest and Political Consciousness,* Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977. It should be noted throughout this text that whenever comparisons are made between the results obtained in the cross-national study and those described in the British study published by Marsh, certain key variables, e.g., "protest potential," "political trust," and so on, though having the same name, were calculated with different algorithms. The reader interested in following up such comparisons should check these differences carefully. We gratefully acknowledge permission to reprint these sections.