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## Party Attitudes to European Integration: A Longitudinal Analysis of the Italian Case

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## **Abstract**

The problem of party attitudes to European integration has been given increasing attention in recent times. Yet, the Italian case remains under-explored and is usually associated with an image of long-established support for European integration. Nevertheless, with the political turmoil starting in 1992, and the fall of the old party system and the birth of new parties, European integration has become a more problematic issue in Italy.

In this paper I propose a framework for the analysis of party attitudes to European integration, guided by contributions available in the comparative literature. The aim of the analysis and of the proposed framework will be two-fold: on the one hand, to develop the study of attitudes at the individual party level and the longitudinal mapping of these attitudes; and on the other hand, to explore the patterns of party positioning on EU within the Italian party system.

# PARTY ATTITUDES TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION : A LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS OF THE ITALIAN CASE<sup>1</sup>

## European Integration and Domestic Party Politics

The broad attempt when studying the relationship between the integration process and domestic parties is usually to understand *how European integration works for domestic parties*. A minimum agreement seems to have been achieved in the literature on the fact that European integration does not work as a new cleavage for domestic party systems. As a matter of fact, even where it is found to produce some social conflict, few would argue it is the source of a new cleavage. Starting from Bartolini and Mair's definition of cleavage (1990), we see that the two authors emphasize the importance of holding together the social and political dimensions. They, in fact, criticize a recurrent descriptive use of the concept of cleavage aimed at the mere identification of a particular conflicting reality in a given society. In reaction to a widespread tendency to over-stretch the concept of cleavage, these authors stress the importance of a more parsimonious use of the concept by limiting it only to divisions characterised by a social and a political element. Their definition of cleavage (215) links together social structure and political order and is characterised by the occurrence of three components:

1. an *empirical element*, which identifies the empirical referent of the concept that we can define in socio-structural terms;
2. a *normative element*, that is the set of values and beliefs which provide a sense of identity and role to the empirical element and reflect the self-consciousness of the social group involved;
3. an *organisational/behavioural element*, that is the set of individual interactions, institutions and organizations, such as political parties, which develop as part of the cleavage.

When we look at the way the European issue works for domestic systems we see that not all the above elements can be found. In particular, starting from the empirical element, we see that in most cases it is not possible to clearly identify the empirical referents of a hypothetical line of conflict on

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<sup>1</sup> This paper was written at the time of my Marie Curie Fellowship at the Sussex European Institute of the University of Sussex. It represents a preliminary result of the analysis for my PHD dissertation on the attitudes of the Italian parties to the European integration from 1994 to contemporary times. I would like to thank Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak for their useful comments on earlier versions.

European integration. However, it is possible to identify some social groups that have a stronger interest or gain more benefits from European integration as opposed to some others who resist or pay more costs to EU. But problems arise when we try to define these groups in socio-structural terms. In other words, the preferences of social groups on EU are often diffused, un-structured and cut across the existing social structures. Ultimately, social response to European integration rarely gives birth to distinguished social structures. Hix (1999) argues that the location of the EU-related interests of social groups is bound to be fragmented. Intra-class or intra-sector alliances are unlikely to hold since they come to be divided respectively on the national/territorial cleavage (the extent to which power shifts towards the EU should be allowed) and on the socio-economic cleavage (basically, left-right issues). In other words, people sharing the same class status will be divided on issues such as EU economic regulation, since this will have a different impact on them according to the sector they belong to (for example, state employees might show more resistance, while employees in global production might be more supportive). While people working in the same sector might agree on the issue of EU competences they can still be divided on socio-economic issues according to their class status. This situation clearly makes it very difficult to have distinctive social groups generated by a conflict on EU issues.

In the absence of an empirical element we can hardly find the normative element as it has been defined by Bartolini and Mair. It is, of course, possible to find within domestic systems some distinctive beliefs on European integration but often they are not powerful enough to create a sense of identity and self-consciousness in a specific social group. Therefore, it is not possible to define the attitudes to EU as the normative element of socially-defined groups, since the main existing social groups seem to be defined by normative elements that are distinctive from their beliefs on European integration.

Finally, we come to the third element of Bartolini and Mair's definition of cleavage. The organizational/behavioural dimension of the European issue within party systems is probably the one that has been explored more widely. Apart from a number of case studies on party attitudes to European integration and the way parties interact on this issue, some comparative analysis has also been produced. In particular, Mair (2000) analyses the impact of European integration on the two main dimensions of party systems defined by Sartori (1976), that is format and mechanics. The author examines if European integration has affected the number of parties in contention in national electoral arenas (format), and their patterns of interaction (mechanics), for example in terms of ideological distance and dimensions of competition. He finds that the change in format that can be

ascribed to European integration is negligible<sup>2</sup>. Additionally, the mechanics of European party systems have not been affected in a relevant way since the overall structure of competition has not been modified by the debate on European integration. Finally, according to Mair, Europe has not made for significant new alliances or enmities, polarisation or dimensions of competition.

In the end, if we want to consider a cleavage as a *form of closure of social relationships* (Bartolini and Mair 1990, 216), European integration does not seem to be a good example. At best, it can be considered as a ‘non-structural’ line of conflict, lacking the empirical element, and showing some limited/diffuse normative and organizational elements (Sitter 2002).

The debate on the interpretation of the way the European issue works for party politics is further developed in an attempt to understand how this relationship comes to be at work, if not under the form of a new cleavage. Accordingly, one of the most significant arguments arises from some heterogeneous literature claiming that conflicts related to the process of European integration are largely shaped under the left-right dimension of competition. This attempt has been followed by a number of contributions that are characterised by a different focus yet ultimately sharing the same aim. In fact, some have domestic parties as their main focus, while others look at the evolution of European parties and at the relationships between these two levels (i.e., Hix 1997; and Gabel and Hix 2002; Ladrech 2000; Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002; Marks, Ray & Wilson 1999; Marks and Steenbergen 2002; Marks and Wilson 2000; Ray 1998). However, in spite of their different concerns, these studies are all guided by the same reasoning, that (left-right) ideology influences party preferences on European integration. This approach clearly builds upon the widespread argument that European integration does not produce a new cleavage, and further develops the problem, arguing that it is an issue that comes to be assimilated into the left-right line of conflict. Therefore, according to this mode of thought, the integration process does not produce new relevant normative orientations in the parties that conflict with other long-established ones, but it is, in fact, mainly subsumed by the historically rooted ideologies<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup> Mair affirms that among the large number of parties that emerged in 12 member states from 1979 only three have been established with the primarily intention to mobilize support in favour or against the EU. Moreover, in the analysed period, these parties proved very weak in terms of electoral support, polling an average of 1.5 per cent of votes at the domestic elections.

<sup>3</sup> Some of these authors add to the left-right dimension of party competition on the European issue other dimensions, but even when they do so they conclude that the single dimensional model is “a reasonable assumption for spatial modelling” of the European space and that this single dimension “would best be characterized as reflecting a traditional socio-economic left-right dimension” (Gabel and Hix 2002, 953). Eventually, in some party systems a new-politics dimension can have some influence, but this dimension is highly correlated with the left-right dimension (Hooghe et al. 2002).

According to Marks, Ray and Wilson (1999) ‘political cleavages give rise to ideological commitments or ‘prisms’ through which political parties respond to new issues, including that of European integration’ (435). Ladrech (2000) agrees, claiming that the EU can be ‘embraced in a substantial, systematic, and coordinated manner’ only if it is ‘refitted into the ideological underpinnings’ of the party families. The point of departure of this argument is the theory of social cleavages by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), according to which, party positions are based on historical predispositions rooted in some major lines of conflict that have structured political competition in Western societies. Marks and Wilson (2000) consider parties as organizations that assimilate and make use of new issues through existing schemes, so that when they respond to new issues they can be expected to be embedded in their “historically rooted orientations” that compel them to “bounded rationality” (434). According to this reasoning, European integration does not act for party systems as a new cleavage, thus producing a new line of conflict diverging from the existing ones. Nor is it an issue beyond the reach of existing parties, in the sense that their ideology and the interests they represent do not allow them to coherently respond to it. On the contrary, parties treat European integration only as a new issue to come to terms with according to their accumulated historical experience, which is ultimately represented by the party families. This means that a line of division has been shaped around the European issue by parties grounded on pre-existing lines of conflicts; first of all around the main dimension of party competition in western societies - the left-right cleavage. Evidence of that is revealed in this literature, which shows that on attitudes to European integration, parties have significantly more in common with parties of the same party family than they do with parties of the same country but other party families, and that this relationship comes to be at work under the pattern of left-of-centre parties proving more supportive to European integration than right-of-centre parties.

The argument that the European issue has come to be subsumed by the left-right cleavage has been challenged by some other valid suggestions. In particular, by the argument that looks at the European issue as a *maverick issue*. This concept was introduced by Maor and Smith (1993) to define issues that evolve in a *bottom-up* way and that cannot be *squeezed* by the party system into one existing dimension of party competition. It is evident that this approach runs counter to the one asserting that the European issue can be fitted into the existing cleavages. As a matter of fact, in order to qualify as a maverick issue, one issue needs to have a disruptive impact on the existing structure of party competition and make a real challenge to the existing shape of the party system. The logic behind this argument is that the nature of the values and interests raised by the society and introduced by such issues does not fit the main lines of division available in the party system. In this

sense, a maverick issue cannot be forced into the main axis of party competition, typically defined by the left-right cleavage, in spite of the fact that left and right are concepts with a remarkable degree of flexibility continuous re-interpretation of their positions and encompass new issues over time, while still keeping a high degree of credibility and continuity (Bartolini and Mair 1990). In recent times some authors (Batory 2002, Sitter 2001) have started to call European integration a maverick issue, consequently widening the debate on the nature of its impact on domestic party systems and producing an alternative argument to those that claim this issue can be adjusted under existing cleavages.

Another attempt to study the way the European issue works for domestic parties is one that comes from the studies on Euroscepticism. While attempting to analyse the range of negative orientations towards the EU, contributions falling in this agenda have further developed more sophisticated knowledge about the mechanisms of party response to the European issue. Recently, the main proposition of this literature has been to assess whether party positioning along the political spectrum influences its attitudes to EU. In fact, wholly Eurosceptical parties have been found to be those at the periphery while parties at the core can be expected not to be so. In any case, signs of Euroscepticism from mainstream parties are supposed to be different from Eurosceptical stances growing elsewhere and they tend to be shaped under a form of factional conflicts rather than involving the party as a unitary whole (Taggart 1998, Szczerbiak & Taggart 2000, 2001). This argument aims to integrate the cartel-party model, according to which core parties are usually in a cartel of governmental parties with concomitant access to state funding, while parties at the periphery are largely excluded (Katz and Mair 1995). Accordingly, the core position is likely to produce more pragmatic and moderate attitudes while the peripheral position is more likely to encourage radicalism and anti-system protest. In fact, Euroscepticism has been described as one face of the anti-system protest of parties that are systematically excluded from sharing resources. In other words, Euroscepticism in its hardest shape would mean an anti-system attitude yet mainstream parties should be unlikely to share such an attitude since they have no interest to strongly attack a system they draw resources from. In sum, according to Szczerbiak and Taggart the core/periphery divide is a strong predictor of party attitudes to European integration, while there is not a linear relationship between the left-right ideology and the attitudes of parties to EU.

Some contributions from the research agenda on Euroscepticism focus on another factor in order to explain how parties shape their attitudes to EU. More specifically, Sitter (2002) says that parties translate questions of European integration into party competition, and this is why attitudes are so



dynamic, because they are largely linked to the contextual situation of challenges and opportunities open to parties at different points in time. According to this author, when parties take a position on European integration, the role of ideology is undermined, and in saying that he follows Hix's argument that "the location of class and sectorial interest limits the options for party differentiation in the Integration-Independence dimensions" (Hix 1999, 80). Again, as already mentioned before, this means that interests identifying with the left-right cleavage are cross-cut by the impact of European integration and that, therefore, the relevant groups can hardly be mobilised as unitary wholes, so that parties are unable to respond coherently according to a structured cleavage.

The central argument here is that patterns of party competition shape the translation of the European question into political contestation. Party-based orientations are believed to be a complex product of parties' strategic choices where parties come to face a dilemma. On the one hand ideology and interests shape a party's stance on European integration (based on specific policies or constitutional issues), while on the other, efforts to participate in government or to present critical opposition, may have effects in the opposite direction. According to Sitter, party attitudes depend therefore both on parties' interests and on their relative position in the party system. More specifically, while interests and ideology are longer-term variables, competition between government and opposition are expected to have a more immediate impact on a party's Euro-sceptic stance.

Finally, according to the author the most Eurosceptical parties can be expected to be those that are permanently excluded from the governmental arena, while mainstream catch-all parties can have soft Eurosceptical stances while in opposition, especially as long as the competition becomes adversarial, otherwise they converge into more supportive positions. This is another argument in favour of the idea that in order to understand party attitudes to European integration we need to look at how a party qualifies within a party system. Ultimately, the two factors of the core/peripheral position and of the governmental/opposition status seem to be correlated, at least in those systems where peripheral parties are permanently excluded from sharing governmental responsibilities. Therefore, the two arguments are not alternatives but they can be seen as playing a combined effect on party preferences.

## **A Framework for the Analysis of Party Attitudes to European Integration**

From the literature, we have seen that a number of factors could explain how the European issue is politicised by parties and these factors have been increasingly identified by scholars. As we have

seen, arguments have been raised in favour of the relevance of factors such as left-right and core-peripheral positioning to explain party response to European integration. These arguments have been raised as alternative ones or, at least, studies on party attitudes to European integration show a tendency to a non-intersecting development. What I am arguing here is that some approaches can be fruitfully synthesised into an encompassing one that is able to test the relative explanatory power of several factors. In other words, if we look at factors such as the ideological nature of a party, its location in terms of centrality along the political spectrum, its vocation to be involved in government, not as alternative explanations of the attitudes to EU the party develops, but rather as dimensions of a sole determinant that is *the party spatial positioning along the political spectrum*, we can achieve a more powerful explanation of the phenomenon under analysis. In my perspective, the various dimensions co-exist, and their combined impact helps shape party attitudes to European integration.

The hypothesis driving this work is that *the European issue has been managed by domestic parties through the organizational logic of the existing patterns of party competition. More specifically, the spatial positioning of a party along the political spectrum and its position towards the government explain its attitudes to European integration.* In particular, how parties qualify within the party system according to a number of dimensions such as ideology, centrality of location and government/opposition status influences their positions on European integration. Therefore, I am arguing that where a party stands within a party system and how it relates to the patterned interactions characterising the system itself, determines the attitudes the party develops to EU. This hypothesis has been clearly developed by the contributions I presented above, *and it adds to the current state of the art a pledge in favour of a new perspective: the integration of several explanatory factors into a broader causal mechanism centred on the argument of the internalisation of the European issue along the main dimensions of party competition.*

Following this reasoning, the first factor I will test in terms of its influence on the individual party attitudes is *ideology*. As we have seen, the argument supporting its relevance has been defended by a certain number of authors who think that party attitudes to European integration are inserted into the left-right ideological framework of competition. Therefore, it is of great interest to me to try and find a pattern of party positioning on EU that follows the left-right divide. In other words, *if ideology is a determinant of party attitudes to European integration we should be able to find a linear relationship between party ideology and party attitudes to EU.*

The second factor whose influence will be tested is the spatial positioning of a party along the political spectrum in terms of core/periphery. The literature claiming the relevance of this factor starts from a different perspective than the one focused on the ideological dimension of party response to EU. As we have seen, in this case the argument suggests that party attitudes to EU do not follow the ideological commitment of parties in a linear way and that instead, the pattern of party positioning is more consistent with the core/peripheral status. In this sense, the main line of division on attitudes to European integration is identified by the differentiation between mainstream and extreme parties. As has been revealed so far, since this argument comes from the studies on Euroscepticism, whose main attempt is to understand where party negative orientations to EU grow, the main expectation produced by this literature has been that hard Euroscepticism is confined to peripheral parties, while core parties share more homogenous EU-supportive attitudes. Given that the scope of this analysis goes beyond the study of negative orientations, to include all range of orientations to European integration, I am also interested to systematically analyse the attitudes growing in the area of mainstream parties. Ultimately, my aim is to understand *what kind of relationship there is between the spatial position of every party in terms of core/periphery and its attitudes to EU.*

The third factor whose impact will be tested is the government/opposition status of parties. More specifically, I want to see *if government parties develop more supportive attitudes than opposition parties.* Working on a longitudinal analysis, I should be able to find stronger evidence about the validity of this causal mechanism. In fact, in order for this factor to prove influential, the attitudes of the parties should change over time depending on whether the parties are in government or members of the the opposition. In particular, the expectation would be that the longer parties are away from any governmental activity, the more they differentiate their attitudes from those of the government parties.

I expect this three-dimensional approach to have a stronger explanatory power than the approaches that focus on one single dimension of party spatial positioning. For example, if we start by Szczerbiak and Taggart's criticism of the left-right argument, we see they argue that in reality there is not a linear relationship between ideology and attitudes to EU. The two authors produce evidence revealing that there are parties with Eurosceptical stances both from the right and from the left and

**Tab. 1 – Political parties with Eurosceptical positions in EU member states**

<i>Country</i>	PARTY	LEFT/RIGHT
Austria	Freedom Party	R
Belgium	Flemish Block	R
	National Front	R
Denmark	People's Movement against EU	L
	June Movement	L
	Socialist People's Party	L
	Progress Party	R
	Danish People's Party	R
	Unity List	L
Finland	Communist Party of Finland	L
	Christian League	R
France	Communist Party	L
	Lutte Ouvrière	L
	National Front	R
	National Movement	R
	Citizens' Movement	L
	Movement for France	R
	Rally for France and Independence of Europe	R
Germany	Republicans	R
	German People's Union	R
	German National Democratic Party	R
	Party of Democratic Socialists	L
	Social Democratic Party (faction)	L
	Free Democratic Party (faction)	C
	Christian Social Party	R
Greece	Communist Party	L
	Democratic Social Movement	L
	Political Spring	R
	Synaspimos	L
Ireland	Green Party	L
	Socialist Party	L
	Sinn Fein	L
Italy	Northern League	R
	National Alliance	R
Luxembourg	Action Committee for Democracy and Pensioners Justice	R
	The Left	L
Netherlands	Green Party	L
	Socialist Party	L
	Reformed Political Federation	R
	Political Reformed Party	R
	Reformed Political League	R
Portugal	Communist Party	L
	Greens	L
Sweden	Green Party	L
	Left Party	L
	Centre party	R
	Social Democratic Party	L
United Kingdom	UK Independence Party	R
	Conservative Party	R
	Democratic Unionist Party	R
	Greens	L

Source: adapted from Szczerbiak and Taggart 2002

that, therefore, the ideological position is not a good predictor of overall party attitudes (table 1). However, since almost all parties in the table are peripheral, if we control the core-periphery variable, and once we've isolated the peripheral parties, we might find that the left-right argument has some validity within the mainstream parties. Ultimately, the broad range of attitudes that mainstream parties adopt, going from very supportive to soft Eurosceptical are too diverse to be left ignored and unanalysed further.

I suggest that dividing parties into sub-groups will allow for the control of several dimensions of party positioning, and will generate more accurate interpretations of the phenomenon under analysis. In particular, the two groups defined by the left-right variable should be divided into sub-groups for the control of the core-periphery variable, so that we will have:

- A. Centre-left parties
- B. Centre-right parties
- C. Far-left parties
- D. Far-right parties

According to Szczerbiak and Taggart's argument we should find that sub-groups C and D have a tendency to share the same (negative) attitudes to EU. Instead, the two authors do not develop the analysis for the sub-groups A and B as much as I believe is necessary. But, as we have seen, the argument that even mainstream parties differentiate their positions on European integration, developing different degrees of support according to their (left-right) ideology, is widespread in the literature. Only the analysis of sub-groups so defined allows for the systematic testing of both arguments.

In order to analyse the impact of the patterned system of interactions on party attitudes to EU, I also suggest (in line with Sitter's argument, 2002) that it is important to measure the influence of a third dimension: the government/opposition status of a party. Adding this dimension to the other ones and considering the three dimensions as interacting, we can define new sub-groups:

- A. Centre-left parties in government
- B. Centre-left parties in opposition
- C. Centre-right parties in government
- D. Centre-right parties in opposition

- E. Far-left parties in government
- F. Far-left parties in opposition
- G. Far-right parties in government
- H. Far-right parties in opposition

Of these sub-groups, E and G are likely to be less recurrent. Still, especially in the last decade, some European democracies have experienced the formation of governments that either encompass one extreme party or rely on its own external support.

**Tab. 2 – Expected attitudes of parties to EU**

<b>Attitudes to EU</b>	
Centre-left parties in government	+ +
Centre-left parties in opposition	= +
Far-left parties in government	= -
Far-left parties in opposition	--
Centre-right parties in government	=+
Centre-right parties in opposition	= -
Far-right parties in government	= -
Far-right parties in opposition	--

Note: + + is maximum of positive attitude and - - is maximum of negative attitude

In analytical terms, by dividing into distinctive dimensions the cause (party spatial positioning and position to the government), that I am hypothesising shapes party attitudes to EU allows for the in-depth analysis of the explanatory power of each dimension. Looking at the attitudes that each sub-

group so defined generates will allow for a better interpretation of the causal mechanism behind the development of these attitudes. In fact, in order for my hypothesis to be proved correct *parties should come to have structured attitudes to EU for each sub-group*. Table 2 reveals the expectations generated for each sub-group in terms of attitudes, on the basis of the main arguments available in the literature.

## **Mapping Party Positions: A Typology of Party Attitudes to EU**

In order to analyse one party's attitude to European integration, a preliminary step is to define the various attitudes to EU that parties can have. This is even more important when we make a longitudinal analysis, as a change in attitudes over time can be assessed only if, firstly, a range of attitudes that potential parties can adopt has been defined, and secondly, that for the analysed parties we are able to map the relevant attitudes at different points in time. As a consequence, the following step relies on a categorization of party attitudes to EU as presented in tab. 5 (Conti and Verzichelli 2002). Here the two categories of Euroscepticism are the ones used by Szczerbiak and Taggart (2002) but just partially re-elaborated. Other three comprehensive categories have been created in order to cover a wide range of party attitudes to European integration. Finally, it has been possible to come up with five categories, ranging from the extreme negative pole of hard Euroscepticism to the extreme positive one of identity Europeanism.

Hard Euroscepticism is the most negative attitude that a party can have towards European integration, since it refers to parties that reject the whole process of European integration or, at least, the parties reject in a very substantial way the process as it is currently conceived. The solutions announced by a party so oriented do not mention reforming the process but changing it according to a completely new model. Eventually, the party's country withdrawal from EU is proposed. A typical strategy to pursue this goal would be to strongly put under question EU legitimacy without proposing any measure for the EU to gain more legitimacy. In other words, the party challenges the very nature of EU without a real commitment to overcome its estimated problems. It is a strategy that aims to create disaffection in the public, that is informed of this political discourse, where the only solutions announced are to intensively reduce the scope of EU, or to completely change its nature (for example, into a non-market economic area). According to this, if a party claims to shift power back to nation states in a very substantial way (and not just in some policy areas for the purpose of a better functioning) it aims to severely dis-empower the EU, and therefore, it qualifies as hard Eurosceptic.

On the contrary, soft Euroscepticism does not grow in an environment of principled opposition to European integration. It is a reaction to one or a number of European policies, a negative evaluation of the European institutional setting whose reform is proposed, or a negative evaluation of the impact of Europe on the domestic system that can be still corrected through reforms. The party's country withdrawal is never mentioned nor implied. Instead, a number of issue-specific criticisms are presented that can be accompanied by pro-active proposals of reform. The legitimacy of the whole process of European integration is not questioned, even if its institutions can be criticised. When Euroscepticism is so shaped it does not oppose the very basic principles of European integration (for example, its market-oriented nature) but parties giving voice to this kind of scepticism make a negative evaluation of some of its outcomes and they usually propose some pragmatic non-radical solutions. In more simple words, *a party with soft Eurosceptical stances aims to reform Europe according to its principles, while a party that is hard Eurosceptical has, as one of its principles, the aim to reverse the current trajectory of European integration.*

The central point of our categorization refers to an apparently neutral attitude. Dealing with party discourse and analysis of party documents, we define it as lack of a clear position on European integration (i.e. in support or against). The relevant documents might not mention this subject, or may present some EU issue-specific statements, while still remaining very cautious in terms of a normative evaluation of the whole process of European integration. In sum, a document falling into this category can be even over-detailed in one or more EU-related specific issues, but it does not take a broad position on European integration. This is why we can finally consider these documents as silent on the one factor we are most interested in, that is party normative orientations to European integration. And that is why in this case I define the party as un-committed to European integration (at list in the document under analysis)<sup>4</sup>.

When we deal with a period (from the beginning of the nineties to our days) where European integration increases its scope and deeper integration is widely debated (eg. the Monetary Union), we should not expect parties to have no interest in this issue. Moreover, if we do not deal with single-issue parties that eventually might be excluded from a broader vision and from showing

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<sup>4</sup> Here, we just need to remind that the documents selected for this analysis are expected to have some European salience since they include broad party platforms such as manifestos for general elections and issue-specific documents such as Euromanifestos. Accordingly, I am expecting all selected documents to be to different degrees telling in terms of party attitudes to EU. Given these expectations, the lack of normative evaluation of European integration in these documents is a data that is worth being registered and the intentions behind this apparently neutral attitude worth being interpreted.



**Tab. 3 – A categorization of party attitudes to European integration**

<b>Party attitudes to European integration</b>	
<i>Hard Euroscepticism</i>	<p>There is a principled opposition to the EU and European integration. It can be seen in parties who think that their countries should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU oppose the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived.</p> <p>There is no commitment to reform but to change radically the current trajectory of European integration.</p>
<i>Soft Euroscepticism</i>	<p>There is not a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but concern on one (or a number) of policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU.</p> <p>Or there is a sense that 'national interest' is currently at odds with the EU trajectory.</p> <p>The party has a will to reform Europe.</p>
<i>No commitment / No mention</i>	<p>No clear attitude to European integration.</p> <p>Policy-specific preferences may be expressed but it is overall impossible to define the broad party attitude.</p>
<i>Functional Europeanism</i>	<p>Support to European integration can be re-conducted to a strategy, serving domestic interests or a different party goal.</p> <p>There is no commitment to further integration, unless it is proved it would serve such interests.</p> <p>Otherwise, commitment to European integration is mainly in terms of defence of the status quo.</p>
<i>Identity Europeanism</i>	<p>There is a principled support to the EU and European integration.</p> <p>There is claim in favour of further competence shift from the national to the supranational arena, of Federal Europe and of a European citizenship.</p> <p>Further integration is a fundamental party goal.</p>

Source: Conti and Verzichelli, 2002

interest/information on the European issue, it seems reasonable to expect that parties have a normative orientation towards the EU. In this case, all Italian relevant parties have a rather encompassing ideology covering the main dimensions of political life. And since in the nineties, European integration is a factor that has a growing impact on several political dimensions we can expect these parties to have some interest in the subject. Following this speculation, I can assume that a vague attitude to European integration is just the effect of one of the following party strategies:

1. it is a temporary position of a party on the way to move from past to new positions;
2. it is a temporary position of a recently born party on the way to shape its preferences;
3. it is a long-lasting position of a party that finds problematic to shape its preferences on EU because of internal tensions (intra-party conflict) or external constraints (external legitimacy).

Moving along in our categorization we come to positive orientations towards European integration. The first category that has been defined for this pole is the one of functional Europeanism. Here, we refer to parties that ascribe their support to European integration to a prior goal: *servicing domestic interests or a specific party interest distinct from integration*. In this case pro-Europeanism is functional to a goal other than European integration *per se*. In a party, which has this attitude, there is no commitment to further integration unless it is proved that it would serve those specific interests. Otherwise, party support is given to the favourable outcomes already attained (economic stability, modernization, etc.) and there is no pledge in favour of an advance in the integration process. In other words, this attitude can take the shape of a *status quo* pro-Europeanism or of a more pro-active attitude bounded into the logic of giving support as long as the specific interest of the party is enhanced by European integration. Consequently, it is understandable that such attitudes are exposed to contextual factors and that parties developing this attitude express a conditional support to European integration that can experience shifts according to contextual interest change. European integration is not considered as good in itself but it is good in so far as if it meets other goals.

Finally, we come to the last category at the extreme end of the positive pole, the one of identity Europeanism. Here, we come across a principled support to European integration. The process is not presented in terms of costs and benefits upon the domestic arena or upon the party itself. Instead, the only positive function of European integration is highlighted, be it in terms of attained or potential outcomes. Further integration is proposed, deeper integration is mentioned and these are considered party-specific goals. In fact, eventual party dissatisfaction with European integration is primarily linked to unattained outcomes due to a yet inadequately deep integration. The language is EU-celebratory and aims at creating affection in those who are exposed to this political discourse. European integration is considered good in itself and therefore can be supported even if it produces some kind of costs.

Table 4 shows a synoptic version of the categorization focusing on the most distinctive components that characterise each category. Some clarifications for the use of this categorization are now necessary. First of all, the categories I am using in order to measure party attitudes to EU are ordinal. Therefore, we can rank them and make some speculations about the difference between one category and another, such as whether a specific attitude is more or less supportive than another. But what it is not possible to do by means of this categorisation, is to measure the exact distance between attitudes. This means that we can tell, for instance, that functional Europeanism is a less supportive attitude than identity Europeanism, but we cannot assess whether there is the same distance between soft Euroscepticism and functional Europeanism on the one side and identity Europeanism on the other side. This is an important clarification when dealing with a longitudinal analysis, because I am interested in the dynamic working of the European issue for parties. Therefore, I am particularly interested in shifts in attitudes over time at the individual party level. As a consequence of this, a number of questions can be raised: Can we assess the magnitude of each shift? Can we compare shifts occurring in different parties? We need to assess more in-depth the nature of each category and then interpret shifts accordingly.

**Tab. 4 – Main components of party attitudes to European integration**

	KIND OF APPROACH	FINAL GOAL	MODES OF INTEGRATION	LANGUAGE
<i>Hard Euroscepticism</i>	Principled opposition	Radical change of the EU trajectory or country withdrawal	Shift power back to member states	Protest-based
<i>Soft Euroscepticism</i>	Qualified opposition	Reform of the EU trajectory	Intergovernmentalism	Goal-oriented
<i>Functional Europeanism</i>	Qualified support	Status quo or further integration serving domestic/party interests	Intergovernmentalism	Goal-oriented
<i>Identity Europeanism</i>	Principled support	Unconditional further integration	Supranationalism	Celebratory

The categorization has two extreme categories, respectively representing the most enthusiastic and the most Eurosceptical attitudes to EU that we can define as largely ideological. Here European integration is encapsulated in the party ideology, it is a party value or it challenges a party value,

therefore support or rejection of European integration becomes a component of the party world vision. Parties falling in these two categories lock their commitment in favour of or against European integration within their ideology and use it in their discourse as a hard feature. For this reason, we could expect parties to have rather stable attitudes when placed in one of these two categories.

On the contrary, parties falling into soft Euroscepticism or functional Europeanism seem to have a more pragmatic attitude: support or rejection of European integration is not permanent but conditional in order to serve other interests. Conditional support/rejection is a strategy played in a game where the party is primarily oriented to defend interests other than European integration, and where any attitude that is adopted to EU is functional so as to meet this goal. As such, we can expect these two categories will be much less stable than the other two categories and that this will depend on a number of contextual factors first of all on the impact of supranational integration on the interest parties promoted before European integration. As a consequence, it should be easier for parties to move from one of these two categories to the other, since this is just the outcome of a strategic approach to the issue, and not from hard Euroscepticism or from identity Europeanism to any other, since such shifts would imply an ideological change. At the same time, shifts from a pragmatic to a more ideological approach to the European issue would entail a serious party change, characterized by ideological evolution. Ultimately, I consider soft Euroscepticism and functional Europeanism as mutually flexible categories in the sense that shifts from one category to the other are likely to occur. Better still, they represent two faces of the same phenomenon - that is parties having a pragmatic and context-driven approach to the integration process. In fact, I consider hard Euroscepticism and identity Europeanism as principled and, therefore, more stable categories.

We have now come to a problem that has largely been debated in the literature and on which, as we have seen, no agreement has been found yet: are attitudes to European integration an ideological or a strategic problem? Here, I try to give a possible answer. I suggest that both options can occur within a party system: party attitudes to EU can be shaped as part of the party ideology, or they can be rather independent from ideology and occur as a result of strategic action when Europe does not have such a dominant position as the party believes. In the first option, the pro-Europeanism or the Euroscepticism of a party *is* a component of the ideology of one party, while in the second option the attitude to EU *is not* a component of the ideology and European integration turns out to be a *tool* or an *obstacle* to implement other party goals. Ultimately, I distinguish between two broad attitudes

parties can possibly have: ideological and pragmatic ones. Accordingly, they proceed and develop some more specific attitudes that I define through the above-mentioned categories.

Finally, the categorisation proposed here for the study of party attitudes to EU, as expressed in the political discourse, highlights two different dimensions:

1. the kind of *approach* parties have to the European issue, more specifically whether it is locked in the ideological background of a party and therefore it is principled; or whether it is pragmatic/dependent on the context and therefore contingent.
2. the *orientations* parties develop, whether supportive or sceptical towards the EU.

It is now possible to sum-up all categories into a typology (tab. 5). Of course, the neutral category does not fit this typology since the cases falling in this category are rather silent in terms of the kind of approach and do not clearly reveal any orientation. The occurrence of this category will be registered but it cannot be inserted into this typology.

Ultimately, this category creates serious problems in terms of interpretation. In particular, how to interpret intentionality? The most cautious way of dealing with this problem is probably to see which cases this category applies to, and how continuously and, as a result try to advance some interpretations on its occurrence.

**Tab. 5 – A typology of party attitudes to European integration**

		<b>approach</b>	
		<u>Principled</u>	<u>Contingent</u>
o r i e n t a t i o n	<u>Positive</u>	<i>Identity Europeanism</i>	<i>Functional Europeanism</i>
	<u>Negative</u>	<i>Hard Euroscepticism</i>	<i>Soft Euroscepticism</i>

Here, I am supporting the idea that attitudes to European integration are best characterised by their ideological or their pragmatic nature. Kopecky and Mudde (2002) have already differentiated between ideological and pragmatic attitudes to Europe. But the two authors actually suggested that parties may develop both sides when responding to Europe, so that we can have parties with an ideological commitment (in favour or against) European integration, but who at the same time have a pragmatic approach to (in favour or against) the current trajectory of European integration as represented by the EU. In other words, according to the two authors, for each party we need to differentiate between a diffuse approach to European integration, and a specific attitude toward the EU. This also means that we might find some parties with a diffuse support to European integration who oppose the EU, or parties with a pragmatic support to the EU, who criticize the broad process of European integration.


Kopecky and Mudde applied their conceptualization to the study of party attitudes in East Central Europe. But when we turn to the parties of Western Europe, it is quite difficult to find parties that do not have a vision of Europe of some kind and therefore, a broad (or diffuse) acceptance of the idea of greater cooperation among European countries. In fact, even the parties that are most strongly opposed to the EU, such as the French *Front National*, have their own conception of European integration, yet they do not reject on principle the idea of cooperation among European states (in the case of the *Front National*, in order to establish a European fortress, which would be closed to goods coming from third countries and would thus defend the national heritage of each country from external pressures such as those coming from globalization). We need to go back several decades in order to find (in Western Europe) parties that reject the idea of cooperation among European countries, opposing European integration completely while defending, instead, alternative projects, such as exclusive cooperation with the United States (Atlanticists), the Eastern block (communists) or the national autarky (fascists). This would make the two categories of parties with diffuse opposition to the broad process of European integration (and respectively, support or rejection for the EU) inappropriate in the cases of West European parties. Given this weakness in the differentiation suggested by Kopecky and Mudde, I suggest rather to measure attitudes towards EU in relation to its current trajectory, represented today by the current EU, whilst keeping the differentiation between an ideological and a pragmatic approach to the European issue, as voiced in the party attitudes to EU, in order to see if parties tend to relate to the European issue in a principled (ideological) or, alternatively, in a contingent (pragmatic) way.

## **Empirical Evidence from the Italian Case**

The case this study will focus on is Italy, from 1994 to contemporary times. The rationality behind this choice is that the Italian case shows very peculiar features in this period. In fact, during the nineties the Italian party system experienced a political turmoil that led to a radical change. The parties that lasted fifty years after WWII disappeared in some cases transformed into new parties. Other parties shortly grew and rapidly came to share governmental responsibilities. As a consequence of this process of dramatic party change we can expect traditional party attitudes to EU to be at odds with the birth of new parties and windows of opportunity to be open to new orientations. In fact, Italy is a country that has for a long time been seen as one of the most Euro-enthusiastic among the member states. Surveys on the attitudes of the Italians have systematically confirmed such an image (see Eurobarometers, various issues).

For this reason, the idea of an established support to European integration associated with this country has ended up producing an image where widespread party support to EU is often seen as guaranteed. Systematic studies on the attitudes of Italian parties to European integration are actually extremely rare and they are mostly focused on the pre-1994 period. Yet, in recent times, the European issue has gained increased attention in the Italian political discourse. Contrary to the idea that the European issue would be a target for de-politicisation (Katz 1999), in Italy today it seems that the European issue is becoming more and more problematic, and the relevant debate increasingly politicised. Yet, the image of long-established support for European integration seems to have been somehow mechanically shifted to the new Italian party system, whilst continuity with the past is often assumed. As a matter of fact, according to most scholars involved in the debate, a shift in the attitudes of the Italian Communists in the seventies determined a sort of “unanimity” of support for European integration. Alberta Sbragia provides a clarification of this view: “... once the PCI changed its position and supported Italian participation in the European Community, it became difficult to find anyone who questioned the appropriateness of the Italian participation in the process...” (Sbragia 2001, 93).

The methodology I will use for this study is content analysis of party political discourse. Spatial theorists such as Budge and Robertson, and in more recent times Gabel and Hix who applied their method to the study of European parties (2002), have studied how parties differ from each other in the real world through the systematic analysis of their electoral programmes. In particular, what they have been interested in is the identification of the main dimensions of contestation of political



Note: in the horizontal axis NE = national general elections and EE = European elections.  
 In the vertical axis 0 = no commitment, other values raise from hard Euroscepticism to identity Europeanism

space. Through an analysis of the emphasis given to the different items included in the party programmes, they have mapped not only party positions along the political spectrum but also the relevant patterns they produce. In a similar (yet distinctive) way, through analysis of the party discourse articulated in the official party documents, my aim is to map the positions of parties when they contest the political space involved in the European issue and decipher what dimensions such positions reflect.

I attempted to apply the categorization proposed in this work to a wide range of official documents of the Italian parties. Documents include manifestos for general and European elections, as well as other party platforms and party leaders' speeches<sup>5</sup>. After this first attempt, the categorization proved exhaustive, in the sense that all parties could be qualified with an attitude at each relevant point in time. This preliminary mapping allows us to start to depict patterns of party positioning on EU for the Italian parties. Data are shown in fig. 1-3, which in particular reveal attitudes for the points in time where electoral manifestos are available for all analysed parties, be it under the form of a party or of a coalitional manifesto. From this data we can draw some significant observations:

<sup>5</sup> Extending the range of documents can create some problems of comparability with proper electoral manifestos when conducting a quantitative analysis. Electoral manifestos are broad platforms covering a wide range of items, while other party platforms might not. Since I am conducting a qualitative analysis, all the differences among the documents that would create to quantitative analysis problems in terms of standardization do not really affect my analysis. In fact, what I am interested to find is just the broad normative orientation of the parties towards European integration while, at this stage of the analysis, I am not trying to articulate this broad orientation into more specific items.




- Both *continuity* and *discontinuity* have been produced in the attitudes at the individual party level, suggesting that for some parties the attitude to EU is locked in the ideology and therefore it is more stable, while for some others it is contextual and more volatile.
- A *constellation of preferences* occurs within the Italian party system where attitudes can be ordered between two poles ranging from hard Euroscepticism to identity Europeanism.
- *Euroscepticism significance*: at some points in time the number of parties with Eurosceptical stances and their vote rate is higher than usually acknowledged by the literature.
- During the last decade, support to European integration in Italy has not been a unitary issue and it has been even less so in recent times.
- *Right-of-centre parties are more Eurosceptical* than left-of-centre parties, with the far left (RC) being the only Eurosceptical party of the left wing while, overall, in right-of-centre parties Euroscepticism currently prevails;
- The *case of the Northern League* is very interesting because in a decade this party moves from the positive to the extreme negative pole, so producing the largest shift in the Italian party system.

Evidence at this initial stage of data analysis is encouraging for the workability of the hypothesised three-dimensional mechanism explaining party attitudes to EU. Table 6 shows the relative impact of each hypothesised factor on the attitudes of the Italian parties. In particular, it seems clear that the left-right as well as the core-periphery variables are influential factors when the parties take positions on Europe. Centre-left parties are the most supportive to EU within the Italian party system, while the extreme left has a distinctive position of hard Euroscepticism throughout the period. The documents of DS and PPI lack a critical dimension in the discourse on Europe. European integration is presented just as a source of positive outcomes (in particular in terms of its impact on the country) and when dissatisfaction is mentioned this is related to the lack of deep integration. These two parties support a supranational vision of Europe, in particular a federal Europe with empowered EU institutions and effective political integration. There is a specific reference to the question of identity with an appeal to go forward with a common European identity. On the contrary, the position of RC reflects an opposite direction. The communists oppose the role of the nation, (which is considered as the natural environment for the conquest of social rights), over the EU, considered as a by-product of American predominance and an instrument for the globalization of capitalism and market-economies against the interests of the masses. The party is very critical of shifts of power from the nation state to the European arena and supports, instead, a scenario with limited and fixed competences for the EU and shifts of power back to nation states.

Communists voted against the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and declare to be against the monetary union, the Stability and Growth Pact and all the main criteria currently driving the trajectory of European integration.

The centre-right parties are less supportive towards the EU than the centre-left ones and change throughout the period their positions according to the context. Shifts are always between functional Europeanism and soft Euroscepticism, showing the validity of the expectation that these two attitudes are ultimately the reflection of the same approach to European integration - that is, a pragmatic and interest-driven one. In fact, European integration is not at the centre of the ideology of FI, where the market is, instead, the focus. Ideally, European integration is seen by this party as a process inserted into a broader one of liberalisation of exchanges at the global level. The nature of EU is usually seen according to this function and, in fact, deeper integration is not presented as a priority, while instead the over-stretching of the EU through the means of enlargement to the East to include Russia, and to the South to include Israel, is supported in order to create a larger market and more economic benefits. A distinctive political identity for an integrated Europe is not wanted by FI and instead its identification with Atlanticism and its alignment with the United States are explicitly mentioned. AN is, on the other hand, the Italian party most centred on the idea of nation. Therefore, the party rejects the idea of a federal Europe and supports one of a looser union where the power of nation states are preserved and the outcomes of European integration are systematically checked through analysis of the costs and benefits produced upon national interests. In fact, the cost-benefit analysis characterizes the approach of these two parties towards the EU and in this perspective European integration or, better still, deeper integration is not considered as a goal in itself but as long as it guarantees benefits to national interests or the liberalisation of the markets. Otherwise, these two parties do not avoid adding a critical dimension to their discourse on Europe, as has been the case with criticisms against the constraints imposed by the EMU and the Stability and Growth Pact, or with the lack of accountability of the European bureaucracy to the nation states.


Fig. 2 - The attitudes to EU of the Italian left-of-centre parties



Note: in the horizontal axis NE = national general elections and EE = European elections.  
 In the vertical axis 0 = no commitment, other values raise from hard Euroscepticism to identity Europeanism

The case of LN is extremely interesting because this party has moved in a decade from a supportive stance to hard Eurosceptical stances. This can be explained by the following factors: the sense of dissatisfaction of the outcomes of EU in relation to the main party goal; the shift of the party to increasingly more extreme positions along the political spectrum. The sense of dissatisfaction with the process of European integration that the party earlier supported, is due to the fact that EMU changed the pre-conditions to attain the main party goal - that is the self-determination of the Northern regions of Italy. At an earlier stage, support for European integration was seen by LN as a tool for the North to exit the nation-state. The party expected the country would not be able to meet the criteria in order to join the monetary union and that this would have an explosive impact, creating the conditions for secession of the wealthier regions. Or, at least for the transformation of the system into a loose federal entity, with the economically strong and highly competitive North eventually being allowed to join the EMU alone. The federal vocation of the European Union was seen as a factor that would play in favour of this scenario. But, actually, the joining of this country to the monetary union changed the process whereby the exit-orientation of the North might grow, and turned it somehow against the party. The problem of the preservation of the competitiveness of the Northern regions of Italy became less effective and the announced scenario actually highly improbable. From that point on, the party started to oppose the EU with increasingly radical tones.

Fig. 3 - The attitudes to EU of the Italian right-of-centre parties



Note: in the horizontal axis NE = national general elections and EE = European elections.  
 In the vertical axis 0 = no commitment, other values raise from hard Euroscepticism to identity Europeanism

Radicalism in the positions on the EU is also linked to the fact that after the shift of the post-fascist party, AN, into more moderate positions, LN found the area of mainstream parties successfully occupied by two major competitors and it moved therefore into even more peripheral positions, with a further shift to the right. From the year 2000 on, the attitude of this party is better represented by the category of hard Euroscepticism, as we can see from tab. 8. The manifesto for the general elections of 2001 held by the centre-right coalition, *House of freedom*, represents a compromise among different forces, including LN, with some Eurosceptical stances voiced, but under the form of soft Euroscepticism. This document does not represent at best the position of the party at that time since, in all the other analysed documents from 2000, LN shows a high degree of continuity in its hard Eurosceptical attitudes<sup>6</sup>.

To sum up, it seems that the left-right and the core-periphery factors played a crucial role in the case of the Italian parties, where the left is by far more pro-European than the right and the extremes are both strongly Eurosceptical. In fact, it is not evident that the government/opposition status of a party plays an equally important role, even if the right-of-centre parties seem overall to be negatively impacted in the post-1995 period by their opposition status. But, overall, centre-right parties experience shifts in their positions both while in government and while in the opposition,

<sup>6</sup> This is why the record shown in figg. 1 and 3 for LN is the one of hard Euroscepticism.

centre-left parties have their commitment to European integration locked no matter what their government/opposition status, and extremes do not come to be less Eurosceptical when they come closer to government. Certainly, RC did not change its attitude while giving external support to the government in the 1996-1998 period and the Northern League enters the government in 2001 with hard Eurosceptical stances. Therefore, in this case it seems that the government/opposition status of a party is not a good predictor of its attitudes to EU. There is a possible explanation for this that should be considered for further analysis.

Lees (2002) suggests that in order to analyse how attitudes to EU are voiced within a party system, it is important to look at the institutional setting. More specifically, he suggests that the level of centralisation of a party system determines the way the European issue is politicised within the system itself, where the most centralised systems are considered to be the ones where polity-wide parties are more likely to be successful than territory-based ones. Lees argues that since these systems facilitate the success of polity-wide parties, their stances on Europe prevail over the alternative ones. The author gives an empirical example of his proposition, showing that Germany is a federal country characterised by a high level of centralisation in the party system where the mainstream polity-wide parties have adopted EU-supportive positions, and Euroscepticism coming from territory-based parties or from party factions<sup>7</sup> has been reduced to invisibility. Finally, what the author claims is that the way party attitudes to EU are patterned in Germany, with party advocates of Euroscepticism seriously limited in their ability to voice their stances, is due to systemic variables, in particular to the level of centralisation of the system itself.

Attention to the nature of the institutional setting seems to have some relevance also for the Italian case. Here, the main factor does not seem to be the level of centralisation of the system but rather the level of inclusiveness of the electoral institutions. More precisely, Italy is a country where an extremely large number of parties are represented in the electoral institutions and governments rely on the seats of small parties in order to have a majority. This, together with a high level of alternation in government experienced in the last decade, creates a situation where virtually no party is permanently excluded from the government arena. In Italy, even extreme parties have been involved in sharing governmental responsibilities in the recent past, either through direct access or external support to government. This factor can play as an incentive for parties to differentiate their positions, specifically on European integration, without the need to fear the costs of exclusion from the competition to govern. In particular, this can explain why extremist parties have no strong

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<sup>7</sup> Such as PDS and CSU or some party factions of CDU and SPD.

incentive to change their attitudes into more moderate ones, since their radical positions are not an obstacle to their becoming part of a parliamentary majority.

**Tab. 6 – Expected and effective attitudes to EU of the Italian parties**

	Cases	Year	Expected Attitudes to EU	Effective Attitudes	Expectation
Centre-left parties in government	PPI DS	95-01 95-01	+ +	Identity Europeanism	v
Centre-left parties in opposition	PPI DS	94 / 01- 94 and 01-	= +	Identity Europeanism	v
Extreme left in government	RC	96-98 (ext.support)	= -	Hard Euro scepticism	v
Extreme left in opposition	RC	94-96 from 98 on	--	Hard Euro scepticism	v
Centre-right parties in government	FI AN	94 and 01- 94 and 01-	= +	Functional Europeanism Soft Euro scepticism	v
Centre-right parties in opposition	FI AN	95-01 95-01	= -	Functional Europeanism Soft Euro scepticism	v
Extreme right in government	LN	94 and 01-	= -	Functional Europeanism Hard Euro scepticism	?
Extreme right in opposition	LN	95-01	--	Functional Europeanism Soft Euro scepticism Hard Euro scepticism	?

**Note:** + + is maximum of positive attitude and - - is maximum of negative attitude  
v = expectation confirme

## **Conclusions**

In this work I proposed a framework for the analysis of party attitudes to European integration based on the synthesis of some existing arguments as well as on some original analytical tools. Then, I applied this framework to the study of the Italian case. Yet, the empirical evidence is not strong enough to draw conclusions. Nevertheless, at this stage of the research a positive evaluation can be made about the workability of the framework used for this analysis. The case of the attitudes of the Italian parties to EU can be largely explained through the impact of two of the three dimensions of the party spatial positioning that have been analysed: the left-right ideology and the core-periphery nature. Patterns of party positioning on European integration clearly emerge for the Italian case with the positions at the individual party level coming to be structured under the influence of these two factors. The third factor that I analysed, the government-opposition status of a party, does not play an equally relevant role, very likely because it is overcome by the impact of another institutional factor, the level of inclusiveness of the Italian political system.

## **Appendix A – List of Italian parties**

AN – Alleanza Nazionale (post-fascists/conservatives)

DS – Democratici di Sinistra (socialdemocrats)

FI – Forza Italia (Berlusconi's movement)

LN – Lega Nord (regionalists)

PPI – Partito Popolare Italiano (christiandemocrats)

RC – Rifondazione Comunista (communists)



## Appendix B – Analysed party documents

PARTY	TITLE	YEAR	TYPE OF DOCUMENT	ESTIMATED PARTY ATTITUDE
1	<i>Un programma per gli Italiani</i>	1994	1	++
1	<i>Il partito popolare è il cuore dell'Europa</i>	1994	2	++
1	<i>Tesi per la definizione della piattaforma programmatica dell'Ulivo*</i>	1996	1	++
1	<i>Europa, un impegno popolare</i>	1999	2	++
1	<i>Rinnoviamo l'Italia, insieme*</i>	2001	1	++
2	<i>Relazione introduttiva al Congresso di Rimini</i>	1991	3	++
2	<i>Pds. L'opposizione che costruisce</i>	1992	1	++
2	<i>Per ricostruire un'Italia più giusta, più unita, più moderna</i>	1994	1	++
2	<i>Il programma del Pds per le elezioni europee</i>	1994	2	++
2	<i>Tesi per la definizione della piattaforma programmatica dell'Ulivo*</i>	1996	1	++
2	<i>Piattaforma dei Democratici di Sinistra per le elezioni europee</i>	1999	2	++
2	<i>Rinnoviamo l'Italia, insieme*</i>	2001	1	++
2	<i>Per una Unione Europea protagonista del governo del mondo</i>	2001	4	++
3	<i>Dall'opposizione per l'alternativa</i>	1992	1	--
3	<i>Europee '94. A sinistra c'è un'altra Europa</i>	1994	2	--
3	<i>Un'alternativa per l'Europa. Pace, lavoro e democrazia</i>	1999	2	--
3	<i>Programma politico</i>	2001	1	--
4	<i>No title</i>	1994	1	0
4	<i>Programma per l'Europa</i>	1994	2	+
4	<i>100 Impegni per cambiare l'Italia*</i>	1996	1	+
4	<i>Relazione di Berlusconi congresso di Assago</i>	1998	3	+
4	<i>Il Manifesto per l'Europa di Forza Italia</i>	1999	2	0
4	<i>Piano di governo per una intera legislatura*</i>	2001	1	-
4	<i>Nessuno può mettere l'Italia sotto tutela</i>	2002	5	0
5	<i>Discorso di Bossi al II Congresso Federale della Lega Nord</i>	1994	3	+
5	<i>Programma elettorale esteri della Lega Nord per le elezioni politiche</i>	1994	1	+
5	<i>L'Europa della Lega Nord</i>	1994	2	+
5	<i>Discorso di Umberto Bossi all'Assemblea Federale della Lega Nord di Torino</i>	1995	4	+
5	<i>Programma elettorale per la Padania</i>	1996	1	+
5	<i>Discorso di Umberto Bossi alla Camera dei Deputati</i>	1996	5	+
5	<i>Intervento di Bossi al Congresso Federale Straordinario della Lega Nord</i>	1998	3	-
5	<i>Intervento di Bossi alla Camera su fiducia al Governo Prodi</i>	1998	5	-
5	<i>Elezioni Europee 1999. Per una Padania libera in un'Europa libera</i>	1999	2	-
5	<i>Intervento di Bossi a Pontida</i>	2000	4	-
5	<i>Discorso di Bossi a Venezia</i>	2000	3	--
5	<i>Piano di governo per una intera legislatura*</i>	2001	1	-
5	<i>Discorso di Bossi a Pontida</i>	2001	4	--
5	<i>Intervento di Bossi al Congresso Ordinario della Lega Nord</i>	2002	3	--
6	<i>Il programma della destra di governo</i>	1994	1	-
6	<i>12 giugno. La nuova Europa</i>	1994	2	-
6	<i>Le tesi del congresso di Fiuggi</i>	1995	3	+
6	<i>100 Impegni per cambiare l'Italia*</i>	1996	1	+
6	<i>Conferenza programmatica</i>	1998	4	-
6	<i>Programma di AN per le elezioni europee</i>	1999	2	+
6	<i>Libero, forte e giusto. Il governo che vogliamo</i>	2001	1	0
6	<i>Piano di governo per una intera legislatura*</i>	2001	1	-
6	<i>Piattaforma politico-programmatica del II congresso nazionale</i>	2002	3	-

**Notes:**

**Party:** 1. PPI, 2. DS, 3. RC, 4. FI, 5. LN, 6. AN.

*(\*) In 1996 and 2001 general elections parties subscribing a unitary coalitional manifesto got individual codes for that manifesto.*

**Type of document:** 1. General election platform, 2. European election platform, 3. Party congress platform, 4. Other party programmatic document, 5. Party leader's parliamentary speech.

**Party attitude:** (--) Hard Euroscepticism, (-) Soft Euroscepticism, (0) No commitment/ No EU salience, (+) Functional Europeanism, (++) Identity Europeanism.

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