406 CATHIE LLOYD NEVBU C (1994), "Is "black" an «p^bl. *«*&** *, „«inland Lumped Race aru! £ izenship in a European context in J. Rex and B. Drury (eds.), M« a Multi-Cultural Europe (Aldershot: Avebury). -^ Sabatier P A (1988), 'An advocacy coalition framework of policy ch^c and th of policy-oriented learning therein, Policy Sciences 21: 129-68. ^4 S.vanLan, A. (1995), Xa trahison des clercs', New Statin andSoaety4^ eL ani BrituH National and European Union Public Policy Ph.D. *«» Dcp™ Politics, University of Warwick. Yuval-Davis N. (1997), Gender and Nation (London: Sage). Weil, P. (1997), Pour Une Politique de l'lmmigrationjuste et Efficace (Pans: Kapportol^ miěre Ministře). 16 r m migration and European ntegration: New Opportunities for Transnational Political Mobilization? 1Í.IAN FAVELL and ANDREW GEDDES roduction t [his chapter we assess the extent to which EU responsibilities for free move-em. immigration, and asylum lead to specifically transnational political "oil Pur this to happen would be a novelty, because in the post-war period, iitro! over immigration has been stnctiy the domain of nation-states, indeed Refining hallmark of national sovereignty: thus immigration policy has been uestion struggled over predominantly at national level alone. Freer movent of persons is, however, a foundational tenet of European Union (EU) aties, and in recent years the connection berween free movement, on the une Jid, and immigration and asylum, on the other, has led to the emergence of integration and co-operation in this field. The Amsterdam Treaty has now '; created the scope tor future EU level action against racist, ethnic, and rebus based discrimination and raised questions about access to EU rights for idly resident non-EU nationals—'third country nationals' (TCNs), of whom :íľ are around 11 million in the 15 member states. We pay close attention to vi patterns of political action by pro-migrant organizations and to the inoti-tíons, calculations, and alliance-building strategies of EU level institutional ůrs. We illustrate how pro-integration alliances between lobby groups and jinsiitutiDtis can develop, (hat seek European solutions to what have become Bf-Europeanizcd issues of free movement, immigration, asylum, and whieh feblead to scope for new political opportunities. OüruistiiuQuiiaJist approach bfrn& that we pay close attention to specification of the policy context in order ascertain these associated political opportunities. ^■cholars in migration, race, and ethnic studies have had problems account- 'Jorthe developing European dimension Lu immigration politics in western ." pe. Everyone is aware that Europe matters because emerging institutions d policy engagements of the EU challenge and re-shape national approaches inimigtanun across the continent. But few studies specify the actual 408 ADRIAN FAVELL AND ANDREW GEDDES constraints and opportunities opened by the Europeanization of immigraiioq politics. Migration, race, and ethnicity researchers appear ■Jitwilling, acid perhaps unable, to explore the relation between new tonus of political aenra and the institutional dynamics of European integration. Instead, an all-toe familiar activist rhetoric has dominated and undermined academic studies of; the effects of the EU on immigration issues;lamenting the buildÍEigof 'forma Europe', the inevitable 'exclusion' of ethnic and migrant minnrities, and ů inexorable progress of 'racist' or 'fascist' Europe; while the powers that I institutions actually have, for either good or ill, are vastly exaggerated. Such. rhetoric may be an effective strategy for protest by groups who feci marginalized by the EU institutions, but it is a misleading basis for analysing whatjš going on at this level. Mainstream EU scholars who might be able to tcnipebj these claims, meanwhile, have mostly overlooked the subject. The Fact that: immigration, asylum, and citizenship moved towards the top of the Ľ U agendy as part of the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 means that it is now highly apposite to explore opportunities for EU level political action. We strip back the question to its essentials: asking what, if any, farms ejfi action or mobilization can be associated with the emergence of i m migration/asylum policy competencies and the institutionalization of a mi gratia policy context (for more comprehensive studies along these lines, -ľľ FiveJB 1998c; Geddes 2000). We specify a two-stage approach to this question: firsij specifying the institutional context, then specifying the actual, rather than knags ined or normatively desirable, dynamics that it has induced because uf j resultant opportunity structure. We pay particular attention to the construction of an emergent EU 'migrant inclusion' agenda thai is s tru ľ cured by devtlfj oping EU competencies that derive their potency from market making. This nascent agenda i »duties extended rights uf tree movement for '1'CNs, estundedt anti-discrimination provisions, and EU asylum procedures that accord -mm international standards. In other words, wc explore the possibilities for iraniiu-tional action spedfically made possible by European integration. We cxai [lints the circumstances that present opportunities and/ur i»ipose constraints tin dl forms of mobilization connected to immigration policy at the European Icvtlij We contend that European integration should be conceptualized as a predám inantly elite process which stimulates opportunities for elite forms ol acri^ that privileges certain forms of political action and actors, that are foundJBM suing technocratic and judicial avenues to influence at the EU level. I Europeanization and Transnational Politics Many studies of the EU commence with a rather hackneyed discussion uf th| respective roles of nation-states and EU institutions: is it the inember-státej controlling the scope and direction of European integration, or is the CtJH TRANSNATIONAL POLITICAL ACTION IN THE EU 409 ission the driving force of integration? The answer to this question is likely be a rather uninteresting 'both, sometimes' (Putnam 1988). A more useful pproach is to emphasize the importance of national level contexts and their level accommodation, but also to recognize that, in areas where policy rnpete»aes are established, the ability of member-states to control the ope, direction, and pace of European integration diminishes (Peterson 1995; ______Incott 1995). Once commitments have been entered into by Treaty and Eturnt:d into legislation that binds those member-states, then institutionalization Elates potential for new patterns of political activity that address EU actors in Reconfigured European polity. In such circumstances member states are key Bctors, but nor the only actors with the effect that state power becomes something to be explained rather than something viewed as causal or determining KCux 1986). »Another key observation is that European integration creates an uneven, Bsýbrid spread of powers arising from the combination of intergovernmental Ej'd supranational patterns of co-operation and integration. In turn, this is Broiptomatic of the tension in present-day European politics between state-Rntred power and authority, and new patterns of governance that do not take Kb state as their sole point of reference. In such circumstances, what we identify a? 'transnational' action consists of political action or mobilization enabled Buisidc of the existing opportunity structures of national level politics, as a |din>r: or indirect result of decisions to integrate in particular policy sectors. Wkch transnational action is facilitated by the specifically elite and technocratic E foe us of policy-making in the EU, which seeks to incorporate a range of non-H| and non-national actors as part of the process. Transnational action or Mobilization can, therefore, be distinguished from the formal legal and insti-Bjitiuna] term supranational'; the latter refers to the formal structures of Euro-Kan poDtits, the former to actors and organizations within them. The effect Sgthat the institutionalization of a range of policy competencies at suprana-Bpnal level means that to talk about 'transnationahsm' in the EU context is to B|Jk about understanding the spedfic sources of 'sodal power' enabled to spe-Mäfir people or orgaruzaciuns by European integration. & Given the highly intergovernmental nature of much European co-operation ^Eimnugi aiju» and asylum, it is plausible to start from the position that exist- Kg national institutions and patterns of interests alone define constraints and .opportunities over policy-making in any new sector such as immigration. This f could rule out space for new forms of transnational action to occur. That said, Rte very logic of using co-operative European fora in this way may create its Ejm institutionalizing dynamic, regardless of the strictly national-interest based Epcsirions of national politicians and public officials. Co-operation on restrictive C policy can still be a form of integration because routinization and elaboration H|cross-national ties between the most nationalist public offidals and politi- ■pisTiK in the Brussels or Luxembourg context can lead to the Commission, 410 ADRIAN FAVELL AND ANDREW GEDDES Parliament, and Court being drawn into these forms of Hurupean ľu i>pe (Koslowski 1998). Immigration and asylum art foe from being institution: at the EU level to the extent that free movement is, but new informs I res™ for other actors accrue from this inc re menial refocusing u í activity. As we see, the emergence of a pro-migrant NGO network in Brussels and Strasom is an example of this (Geddes 1998). The stimulant for these new patterns of political activity are pru c esse* which formal and informal resources associated with tiai titular paucv sectoj begin, via their elaboration and discussion in the EU environment uvei rin} to take more formalized meanings (Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996; Wiei 1997). Processes of definition, redefinition, and elaboration of common in ests become more than an intergovernmental process, and certain new tions can become routinized. A typical process of institurinnalization has bg the European Court's free movement and equal treatment logic. Tims by lo politics, such as legal rulings, jurisprudence and associated uimpaj funding, or directives, rather than the 'high' politics of iniergovernina| treaties, or parliamentary business, aclurs arc able to mobilise a round and opj tionalize the new informal opportunities and pressures for their formal | nationalization in both low and high arenas. Typically, this results in iubb activity directed towards the Commission as the privileged interlocutor; processes of elaboration of interests at EU level. It is important to vie; Commission as a 'multi-organization' with internal conflicts of interest am; even those committed to extend the remit of its powers sway from the nati " - i T state (Hooghe 1997). There is sume tun verge nee on 'Euru-iiumis' linked tq: Commission's role as the putative engine of European integration—3nd a; ciated socialisation processes—but the organization on the whole can he coi petitive across sectors: especially those that ambiguously fall across diOT DGs and institutional competencies, such as free movement, im migration, and asylum. In circumstances where the establishment of supranational legal ;*nu polJjfl ical authority generates policy outcomes that extend and develop jnteryüvertj mental deals as a result of additional legislative activity and executive imfadijg| at the EU level, then EU institutions amount to more than a neutral lepasitorj of member-state policy preferences. The EU is more than a :n;s.iiludi policy context subservient to national contexts. Initial intergovernmental deal between member-states can have a range of intended and unintended effia that could go beyond these intergovernmental deals because supranan'oi institutions, particularly the Court and the Commission, acquire esprity, shape policy outcomes (Burley and Mattli 1993; Pierson 1996; Pollack Ig^ Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998). We can then ask what forms of political action or organization r my Sit wg expect to thrive at the EU level? The technocratic corridors of power in Brussels have specifically encouraged specialized lobby groups and networks with TRANSNATIONAL POLITICAL ACTION IN THE EU 411 ^locate d Brussels offices, and have privileged the co-option of experts and i.edal interests into technical committees which can articulate interests very liferent to national ^overnmems (Mazey and Richardson 1993; Aspinwall and ^-lenwoou 1997). European integration has also placed a premium on specific ü forms u f action, capitalizing on the role of the ECJ as the most dynamic 'rill of supranational power (Slaughter, StoneSweet, and Weiler 1998). Uthougli one or two commentators have been moved to see new forms of jEuon at EU level as 'elite social movements' (Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996)— 'fid hence as the mobilization of a new euro-élite campaigning against ?t order of power and privilege of elites at national levels (Favell 1998c)— ■ünsnationai mobilization would ordinarily be sought in more conventional ■cial movements terms That is, as a public demonstration or conflict strategy, h'rs the streets' so to speak; as a public protest movement against existing polit-Ěil institutions and patterns of power. Classic social movement type [gproaches to mobilization put the focus of mobilization on the action of mar--nal and excluded groups to force representation in political systems which lencc or fail to rcpiestnt their voices. Some recent work has been done along ipse lines by EU scholars, in search or transnational social movements enabled [r provoked by the Europeanization of European politics. However, the 'Euro-■^aruicatian of conflict' identified by Tarrow (1995,1998) only really shows that iurope' can now be used in the media as an effective rhetorical source of blame 1public polity failures, in the same way that national governments routinely line 'Brussels' for their own policy failures or impotence in the face of glob-izatiun processes; not that it has convincingly inspired or enabled any crossed er European mobilizations against the power of nation-states. ;To seajth tor new forma o i contentious politics, or new patterns of EU level 'Igrant orerhuic mmontv niobilútatinn within the 'contentious politics' frame likely to be a fruitless cjccrose becaust üuroueanizacioii jí wrongly construed Bf-üpening opportunities for social movement type mobilization. In its classic Kgutnent, social movements were associated with the rise of the modern state, and the steady accumulation of powers by central government and legal insti-Jutiuns. Social movements mobilized in the margins for inclusion, gaining rights and incorporation in return for acquiescence to the social regime—a logic of the kind made famous by T. H. Marshall's (1950) study of citizenship I-'Briiain. Behind this logic, inevitably, lay a vision of nation-state building and Bie social integration of all sectors of society in a common national identity -(Gftrrtrtey 1998). The projection of a similar line of development—all too .commuri in the many worried counterfactual reflections on European 'identity' or democi ney. for example, the influential work of Weiler (1998)—is a mis-||a;ding misrepresentation of the EU as an emergent 'state-like' thing on a par with national liberal democratic states. Its flawed ideological normative logic B£" the movement of European politics as one towards more democratization the emergence of a unified European public sphere, as the preliminary to S.'r 412 ADRIAN FAVELL AND ANDREW GEDDES the ultimate emergence of a (legitimate, democratic) European superstii Empirically speaking, European integration upsets this 'teleological accou of modern nation-states and social change. Much of the recent reflccrinrr the 'nature of the beast' has argued that European integration actually requires'. a new vocabulary of political analysis that is not entirely associated with che stable reference points of politics in the traditional national state, which .lode us into a misleading replication of nationally bounded debates about re prci entation, mobilization, and power (Schmitter 1996; Risse 1996). It might b more appropriate to think of the EU as a post-modern or regulatory ratSM than Westphalian state (Caporaso 1996; Majone 1996) where Eurupefllj integration opens 'fields' of action in a state of definition, which are i tot fully controlled by the intergovernmental actors that created them. Actors who successfully invest in the European level of action also try to pull up the \draw bridge behind them, by defining themselves in relation to other specifical Euro-policy networks and insider contacts. They simultaneously try :« extendi the powers of the European field, in rivalry with the national level polities, actors, bureaucrats, lawyers and so on, who previously would have mnnop lized political activity in any given sector. Looking for Transnational 'Ethnic Mobilization' in Europe Few studies of supposedly transnational 'ethnic' mobilizations in biurope ac ally recognize these constraints in their discussions. The structuring rqld institutions, and the interplay between these structures and actors at the E level that defines policies and issues, is a key determining factor delimiting* range of migration-related political action enabled by European mtegraf So, although there has been a strong 'Europeanization' of ethnic and; n studies (for example, see King 1993; Wrench and Solomos 1993; Balih Edwards and Schain 1994; Rex and Drury 1994; Miles and Thränhardtjr Cesarini and Fulbrook 1996; Modood and Werbner 1997) there has ylso 1 some distraction caused by the superficial normative rhetoric of Europea integration. One problem with these approaches has been that the emptiness of 'Hue pean citizenship' provisions is routinely pointed to as an example of a 'demo cratic deficit', and the problem of legitimacy, that could be remedied by -oi improved 'recognition' of cultural and racial diversity (Martiniello its* R 1995; Brewin 1998; Kastoryano 1998a; Kostakopoulou 1998). The sppte of this strongly normative model of multicultural change to 'Europe^ whole tends not to reflect the sources of legal, political, and social »or^ opened up by European integration that are, in fact, closely associated with I requirements for constructing a single market and EMU. The hybrid, rfiu TRANSNATIONAL POLITICAL ACTION IN THE EU levelled, and uneven institutional nature of the EU does, in fact, throw up (Opportunities and cuiisíľaiiiís in plates wheiĽ the European integration prc leads to a differentiation, and disintegration, of the political system, and spaces of autonomous action for certain political groups in relation to sp< sou ires ot legal, political, and social power. The task is to be specific about these sources are. ■ A second problem has been the misplaced location of the sources of s [power and successful collective action—and hence the motor of s ange in the mobilization of 'difference'. That is, ethnic groups which ccessfulJy pushed for improved recognition within the multicultural st; au often cited example being Islamic organizations in Europe—are said to one so by mubiliiiiig tuhu i til, b acial, or religious "idenrirv* as a collective i is utilization of ethnic identities as explaining migrant mobilizatic cd, because ethnicity may only be a successful mobilizing force t ertain institutional conditions. Ireland (1994) identifies the importan stitutionai channeling' of ostensibly ethnic mobilization. Similarly, S ■199-í) stresses the importance of 'institutional repertoires' in countri Smigrauun. These institutionalist perspectives can usefully be applied t level to explain how, why, and under what conditions new patterns c el political activity emerge. This political activity may or may not ha uc component The task is to be specific about the institutional contex y or may no: give meaning to ostensibly ethnic forms of political acti good example of this is the EU's Migrant's Forum, which, as shown this chapter, could be construed as an example of ethnic mobilizatic P however, it serves as an example of a standard form of EU level co-option, and accords with fairly standard EU level attempts to inci tiripaiion and consultation as a device for imparting an air of legitim« ruiional processes. In the out or f wo exam p I ľ y of studies that have explicitly looked for tra nal ethnic mobilization in the new European context, both of the two < ntjjied above have been made. Kastoryano (1998b) reads an erne o sna t i onu I multicultural state into the European integration procesí ľcts it with a range of successful transnational 'ethnic' mobilization fact have little grounding in actual European institutional developn ere, a highly idealized, normative idea of an emergent 'European citjzei otng ail the explanatory work; an idea of European citizenship that ha: "oubtfiii in Llit miller empty It^a) Mams oi European citizenship which jEurupean ueades. Mlíiíi while, in earlier, EU-focused studies by Soysal ( 3 Ireland (1991), the emerging European institutions and patterns < eration are misleadingly read as nffhringa fertile, preferential ground fo lie' based mobilizations, seeking to address claims to European level oris rather than traditional national ones. This overestimates what th ..... 414 ADRIAN FAVELL AND ANDREW GEDDES as an institutionalized 'state' power, can actually do, as well as witj inferring that it is naturally progressive in its leanings on immigrant or c(S politics. Successful transnational mobilization, such as Islamic protest movemi across Europe (Blom 1999), Turkish political organizations lAimravx ľ Ögelman 1998), or new cultural identities based on transnational m (Hargreaves and Mahjoub 1997), in fact only have a coincidental conneci| with the European integration process. Wimi none of rhese approaches!^ is anything specifically European about the emergent transnational oppori ity structures they use, whether material or symbolic in kind. The cmerg of the EU is indeed an example of a 'shift' m rhe pusc- Wudd War 11 státe sy; that has enabled new forms of post-national claims-making (Soysal 1994) there are, after all, several other emergent 'supranational' institutions and tutional contexts that can be more plausibly pointed to as the ultimate so of transnational empowerment beyond snaring nation-state opportunity-si tures; none of these are specifically EU-related in nature. First, are shifts ii global political economy, opening new opportunities tor tranjitiitiona! busiij and forms of organization (Sassen 1991; Portes 1997). Second, j re shifts in" geo-political balance of world politics and international relations, ^uch ai: rise in prominence of Islam, and its increasing attraction as a pole uf opj? tion to the hegemonic powers of the West (Ahmed 1992). Third, are shift; international legal norms which, backed by universalistic international-tri tures such as the UN, have provided new sources of justification for < making (Soysal 1997). These, indeed, may have some grounding m more diffuse 'universalistic' norms about personhood or equal rights of cultural ii fie senegas claimed by some sociological institutionalists (Meyer et al. 1997; Boli and Thomas 1997). J The claim, then, that there was something specifically in the European iuieg». ration process—either the formal institutions created or the new symbolic euro-ideas they give rise to—which has enabled some ethnic gruups tu niobéS ize transnationally, remains a theoretical assertion, not yet backed by ýny spe-Ji cific findings. Indeed, more recent work offers empirical refutation of such. readings. A 1998 study shows that different ethnic groups in Italy and SpiL have vastly different successes in organization in relation to i u p puse d tieWjJ European opportunities, which in fact depend on the help al go-between advob cacy groups such as trades unions and the church (Danese 1998). Moreover, they organizational behaviour of different ethnic groups is still strongly ätnctuiedí by national political structures and /or the nature of local opportunities; andi,-s despite a great deal of talk about new European opportunities, f he re is a c|a underinvestment in the European level, or worse, the EU rem am? remote jgB uninteresting, indeed irrelevant, to these ethnic Roup's sľíÍ-perceived iniercstaj Other scholars show that, in empirical terms, Europe has not and does nni^OT really provide formal 'European transnational sources of power for Ľtlmírl 1 TRANSNATIONAL POLITICAL ACTION IN THE EU groups themselves (Guiraudon 1997, 1998; Koopmans and Statham, [jfclumc; They find that the explanation of mobilization is invariably natic location, and most likely to do with party cleavages, the depoliticizatio emigration politics by elites, and the structure of national level conflicts i le con ten f and meaning of national citizenship. in other words, to go out looking for ethnic transnational mobiliza enabled by Europe is to put the cart a long way before the horse. There is 1 [empirical evidence of it; and where opportunities exist for European-level p ŕica! action, they are not necessarily salient for migrant and minority gn [themselves. Transnationalism associated with the immigration issue at [European level still needs to be specified in terms of the actual structui ftn rope an institutions; and when it claims to be of an 'ethnic' nature, it sh nut always be taken at face value. |the Institutional Structure of EU Immigration Politics LA core component of our argument in this chapter is the requirement to cli Ispedry the institutional context in order to understand new patterns of ] tical activity that may emerge in relation to EU free movement, immigra |and asylum competencies. The risk is that such an approach lapses into I ■jargon that is difficult for the non-EU specialist to untangle. We aim, there [to extract broader points about the relation between institutionalizatic policy compel ende s and the development of new forms of transnational ] Seal action, and illustrate our points with examples of pro-migrant pol activity at the EU level. KTht: ujuiprments of a pro-migrant agenda at the EU level are closely re to EU market-making. The EU is an economic organization from which í and pubtieal competencies may arise, not vice versa. Free movement is a component of market-making. Pro-migrant groups have sought to extei legally resident third country nationals similar rights of free movement to i Enjoyed by EU citizens. The EU's free movement framework has establisl jriangulai i d an unship between EU citizens, the member-states, and EU tiitiuns wherein individuals are empowered by being given access to EU Ťitions that constrain the competence and discretion of member statas (« 1998}. It is this relationship thai distinguishes the EU from international o Kations such as the Council of Europe that are not capable of creating Egal effects Can this triangular relationship also be extended to third co Satin na Is so that they too enjoy rights of free movement? Another key a I the agendu is the extension of anti-discrimination provisions to extend ,liig provisions from their coverage of nationality and gender based discrii ip'on to also include racial-, ethnic-, and religious-based discrimin; ^respective of whether those discriminated against are EU citizens. Th 416 ADRIAN FAVELL AND ANDREW GEDDES issue here is equal treatment, enshrined in EC law by a 1976 directive. KcYjri migrant organizations in relation to these issues are the Starting Line Grand the EU Migrant's Forum. A further aspect of che agenda is iht: efforts~ by groups such as Amnesty, the European Council on Refugees and and Caritas to secure EU asylum provisions that accord with interns standards. The commitment to market-making and free movement has always countered by a marked reluctance on the part of some member-states to tenance transfers to the European level of immigration and asylum resp ibilities. Despite this, single market integration has drawn immigration asylum closer to the evolving web of supranational mieiüependcnce becaj the creation of a single market defined by Article 8a of the Single Eurogr Act (1986) as 'an area without internal frontiers' means that immigration í asyium policy became matters of common concern- Attainment of freer rar ment for people has required 'compensating' immigration and asylum tin ures, but this requirement does not dictate the form that these measures take—whether they will be supranational or intergovernmental or whcjJÍ they are inside the formal treaty structure or, as was originally the case — the Schengen Agreement, outside it. Nevertheless, patterns of co-operai have led immigration and asylum to become Europeanized issues, k ven if1 less intentional backdoor route. Moreover, this development imparts fluidii the nascent co-operative structures, which may offer opportunities for en preneurial actors interested in opening up new European level üpportunijJM It would be wrong to characterize immigration and asylum ca- operatiaiföH inclusively by-products of single market liberalization. Co-operation onaspeeffl of immigration policy has also built upon the security co-operation between' inferior ministries and their officials, that developed in relation Eo cusEornsfmH the late 1960s and developed into anti-terrorism/crime co-operation from ihtf mid-1970s through the Trevi Group. Patterns of security co-operation are longj established, and the structures for immigration and asylum co-operation havŕ therefore drawn heavily from the model for co-operation established tor mttr| nal security. The recent history of evolving immigration and asylum policy -an, then, bo read in terms of these general structuring principles and t ľ n si on s that are clearly evident in the Treaty of Amsterdam, which came into force on .Msy 1 1999. The Amsterdam Treaty imports the Schengen arrangements into die Union and make provisions for the establishment of a new Treaty cbaptej! dealing with free movement, immigration, and asylum. Free moverrt^H immigration and asylum have been 'communitarizeď in the sense that Qot have been brought into the main institutional framework of the Union iinj within the remit of the Commission and Court. Member-states have.thnugffl maintained the machinery of intergovernmental co-operation that rypinett.effl operation on these issues in the 1980s and 1990s. TRANSNATIONAL POLITICAL ACTION IN THE EU 417 Some observers have stressed that migration is mainly subsumed within e security paradigm, within which emphasis is placed on the development of the egislativc apparatus technologies of cross-national population control (Bigc }99&; Huysmans 1095). But the Amsterdam Treaty's chapter on free movement immigration, and asylum has established potential connections between free ovement, market liberalization and immigration/asylum with implication; t migrant inclusion. Mobilizing for EU Level Migrant Inclusion Following this brief overview of recent developments we can now examine who is able to successfully engage with these new opportunities for action rwlv.H forms of organization this action takes, what strategies are deployed, an> these groups seek to build alliances with EU institutions. As is no\ mmon in much POS based theory, we define the opportunity structure as poliiical and legal combination of 'material' resources—formalized resource power ur funding and 'symbolic' ones—sources of normative and discur: Empower (see M c Adam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). jtMost of the new forms of action associated with European integration i ffüs sector are elite and technocratic in nature: this is an inescapable feature c jüe EU institutional context. Bottom-up mobilization and participation of a Mads are limited by the EU's lack of channels for democratic representatior JtiwnuJd. however, be wrong to conclude that this situation will automaticall id n In re e 'fortress Europe' tendencies that lead to migrant exclusion, becaus Ewe are also tendencies of inclusion well established in the EU's institutiom ped activities In fact, the oft-cited argument that European integration h? Sjpengthened the fortress Europe tendency is weakened by the observation th; pro mutant groups at EU level tend to call for more not less integratioi Em ľ n de c supranational competencies are viewed as a potential progressiv gniritcrbalance to lowest common denominator Council decision-making, po: irayed as focused on restrictive immigration policies and ever tougher asylur procedures kin addition to the legaJ, political, and institutional context, 'Europe' also pre Edes certain symbolic resources. On the 'security' side, the fortress Europ metaphor offers significant discursive resources to those seeking to accru powers or mobilize opinion through immigration-related fears. That is, in th HTcouragemenr of a 'crisis' atmosphere over immigration and asylum—and th tep i es e n lati on of such flows as a security threat—security focused officials an Siti-immigration politicians can draw on a good deal of capital through pre mod n g the. idea that a fortress needs to be built to protect European welfai systems, or national models of democracy etc. »iIn other, more 'progressive' Europeanized circles, however, the idea c 418 ADRIAN FAVELL AND ANDREW GEDDES immigration is no less of a resource-stimulating area or policy activity. In snrat i areas of European integration the 'regulatory' character of policy has always; created scope for 'entrepreneurialism' by supranational level nctors when legalg and political competencies are established and a significant margin oJ autonomy for action has developed {Majone i996). In such ri neu msta n tes, Lhc Commission";'. can become a 'purposeful opportunist' (Cram 1996) emboldened by the mar; tenal and symbolic resources associated wi'.h Eyropean integration to push new policy lines in different sectors. Particularly relevant in this respect s te rhe resources associated with the quest for 'social inclusion'. The EU's social dJmeiij sion has become mure evident since the mid- 1980s and has provided significant. legal, political, and symbolic resources for EU institutions keen to promote i 'people's Europe'. So far, however, third country nationals have been lar^m deluded froi n this dimension because access to EU level entitlements his at'isetrt from prior possession of the nationality of a member-state, irom this perspct» tive, a 'cure' for fortress Europe, the democratic deficit and social exclusion is more Europe—albeit often conceived as an unrealistic, co un t erf actual ide^^H democratic, multicultural, citizenship-grounded transnational polity. The; underlying argument here, then, is not that the process of European integration^ per se is the problem; rather the problem is the actual form taken >,r immigration and asylum co-operation. The basic confusion in the a mi-EU, pro-Runr argument may be intentional—it works in the same away as a national govt, ment's ability to generate symbolic resources by blaming the EU for its:rr impotence or failures or it may indicate a basic ignorance of how the EU üis tu tions in latí work, arid how successful campaign groups do m ľa et get invoľ. in the poiicy process. As long as people conceive of the EU in counterŕactualn. mative terms that have little to do with the way the institutions actually wor they will keep making this mistake. Whatever is developed at the supranational. level on immigration and asylum is more likely to arise because of m associs^ tion with market-making and the commitment to free movement rathf.r than from id caustic conceptions of liuropean citizenship or multicultural democracy. The EU cannot be characterised as a social and political actor separate iiom its.: fundamental economic purposes. To characterize it as a social and political aes which can or should have an interest in promoting a transnational 'ritizenshj utopia', leads commentators and campaigners to project on to it problems;' issues that it is simply not equipped to resolve. That said, a growing awareness of the ways in which notions of sudami inclusion impinge on 'migrant inclusion' has informed the actions of ELJi institutions. Numerous DGs have now also opened activities relating to immigration and/or the position of minorities in Europe. PC '■> ; I ímpli 'viij-nt ap Social Affairs), DG10 (Information, Communication, and Culture) and DGH (Science, Research, and Development), in particular, have been very active. La terly, the Third Pillar Task Force and the Forward Studies Unit of the Seal tariat have published reports on immigration policy, or tendered substanr" W TRANSNATIONAL POLITICAL ACTION IN THE EU 4 sjims of money for new research in this area. These entrepreneurial efforts ha ■followed a familiar pattern of co-opting experts into the policy community Ejcluding academics, existing NGOs, public officials and so on—and son attempt at public awareness campaigning and localized activities such as mi lacultural activities associated with the European Cultural Capitals programu Moreover, because Brussels is a small world there are only a handful jjeoule with direct responsibility within the Commission, and so stro: ersonal contacts in Brussels can quickly lead to a prominent role in poli ěVdopnient circles. A small new 'field' is emerging of specialist poli mpaigners—usually self-styled etiro-NGOs—who have been able to monc lize European-level policy thinking, such as the production of reports or t 'ŕganizing of conferences, through their well-located awareness of key cc " :ts and specialized know-how needed to be effective in the Brussels envirc pnt (see Favell 1998c). Among those with a strong interest in immigrati id migrants' rights are ECAS (European Citizenship Action Service) and t ľigrarion Policy Group. Although organized as small-scale offices these org; Kations do provide an important port of access for wider nationally-based n Tgrks 0/ activists and campaigners. Their achievements, though, are very m substantiating the claimed existence of transnational ethnic mobilizati this policy sector. Rather they provide further evidence of the deploym« Bf expert knowledge in an institutional environment that privileges techi itic avenues to influence, 1 central focus of efforts to establish these measures was dunng :he 1996/ Amsterdam Treaty intergovernmental conference, in which a whi ethoM of campaign groups, with well-established insider positions, were al push for new migrant and minority rights, alongside other well-he; itizenship' issues such as gender equality and the environment (Mazey a chauison 1998). Pro-migrant organizations expressed some dissatisfacti th the outcome. The European Council on Refugees and Exiles charact ietl the establishment of a new chapter 4 of the EU Treaty that dealt with fi ement, immigration, and asylum as a 'technical transfer without the kir checks, in terms of Commission, European Court, and European Parliame ers, that they had called for. The new anti-discrimination provision wa use of dissatisfaction too. It did not^örlnd discrimination on grounds of ra icity, religion, age, disability, or sexual orientation. Rather, it empowei Commission to bring forward proposals in these areas that needed then agreed to by unanimity among the member-states in the Council. 'Pro-migrant groups have been keen to exploit new opportunities. They h; ;iighE Extension of the provisions of the legal framework governing the sin. " rket to offer more extensive protection to migrants and their descendar & 1998, the Starting Line Group (SLG) brought forward a draft directive on t Bits of third country nationals that would have had the effect of creatinj ŕtsidenr's charter': after three years legal residence third country nation 420 ADRIAN FAVELL AND ANDREW GEDDES would acquire the same rights of free movement as EU citizens (SLG iyyb)f: The SLG's proposals actually drew from a very specific resource, the 19M assoj] ciation agreement between Turkey and the EU, which extends established! rights to Turks resident in an EU member-state. The SLG posed the question^ that if such rights were extended to Turks then why couldn't they be open to". all third country nationals? The SLG was not ploughing a lone furrow. The Commission's draft convention on the rights of third country nationals also indicated a willingness at Commission level to promote developments in this.'j area as the post-Amsterdam allocation of responsibilities for free movemeufe immigration, and asylum plays itself out (CEC 1997). The Starting Line Group also brought forward new proposals ior antidiscrimination legislation. The original rationale had been the 13V'fr ĽuuaU treatment directive, which sought to guarantee gender equality. In the wskeoS Amsterdam's new anti-discrimination provisions, the SLG brought forwaidj proposals that would protect people—whether citizens of a member stares otj not—from discrimination when exercising rights associated with Europeans integration. The major impediment to developments in the sircas ol extended] residence rights and anti-discrimination is the requirement for unanimity in thfijj Council and the diverse and patchy frameworks of ann-cdaciiminaüoii legiďíS tion in EU member states that render problematic intergovernmental agree-* ment on supranational action (European Parliament 1998). In the area of asylum too, there has been rapid development of íobbyingl activity during the 1990s. The intention is not so much to include asylum^ seekers—who by definition are not migrants with an intention to setae pcE manently—but to include the EU's asylum provisions within the scape uí Ela law with jurisdiction for the European Court. The hope is that the Court wüjl be a progressive guarantor of asylum rights in an era when the internationals sianiiaids laid down in the post-war period appeal threatened by move [uwanisj systems of 'temporary protection' (ECRE 1997a, 1997b, 1997c). Clearly, it is dilUcult tu categorize any of this worthy activity as ethnic nn$M ization. The one direct attempt by the Commission to create an ethnic Tqn9 for direct representation within the European institutions the HuroBOT - i i-_- 1--------:1_. a I,.-.,.. .„-.r„,n( OK Union Migrants' Forum—has fared much less happily. A large amouaj money was invested by DG5 in creating this consultative hudy drawn {■■■■ national-level associations in order to give migrants and minorities ;i v nice* the European level. The EUMF's early years were, however, dogged b> ethnic conflict over the goals and strategy of the Forum, a financiaj^ amongst the executive, and an overwhelming sense t>f the operation us * ***** meaning but ineffective sounding box, in which a few migrant elites gjptiff their anger at well-funded conferences, but without it leading to ajH impact in the policy process. Similar things might be said about the Ed Year Against Racism of 1997, in which a large range of funding Was unevenly on local projects often monopolized by go-between groiijSj TRANSNATIONAL POLITICAL ACTION IN THE EU 421 [ immigrant entrepreneurs, with a weak claim to be representative of migrant jknd minority interests on the whole. As with many other areas of EU inter-tventian, good intentions arc hampered by corrupt and uneven implementation Eat the national and local levels. Very little grassroots activity has been direcdy inspired by the EU's material or symbolic resources, and it remains an area of Ipalicy linuly iiiuriupulizcd by the elite gatekeepers working in the shadow of t the Commission; much to the anger, for example, of other local Brussels-based [Belgian campaign groups and migrants associations, who are most conscious [of being excluded from the benefits flowing to other parts of the city. ' Given, as we have argued, that market-making is a key force underpinning [arguments for more inclusionary tendencies in migration policy, it is surprising to note the absence in the past, of any significant business-led pressures for Expansion in this policy sector. The fact that transnational corporations have ■always been active in Hrussels makes this bill the mure surprising. Further down Efre line, then, there is still the possibility that the dynamics of the European labour market and business interests—as they did in the post-war boom years fand the age of the guestworker—will start to have the clout within the EU s agend a to push for more open immigration policies. This is a major point of Ufere n r e between Europe and the US/NAFTA, where a sizeable right wing f pro-immigration lobby has always pushed for open borders and the import of Eheap la bom hoi n Mexico and elsewhere (Freeman 1995). Perhaps on smaller, Local level there is evidence for this: such as the Berlin labour market influen-Eng new pragmatic bilateral agreements between Germany and Poland; or Beasonai labour needs in Spain or Italy pushing regularization efforts by their H&pectiYc govern n tents. The involvement of transnational business interests in [this way could indeed provide a derisive shift in the balance «f powers in immig-Eation policy; moving away from the intergovernmental to supranational level. Lib incorporate an awareness of the underlying sti utturai labour marker factors Kdctemnrung population movements, would also be a significant step towards yfcmuri: rational European immigration policy; a policy which at present is so Knistrung be twee 11 uppasi te but eomplemeii ta ry ideological arguments about ^raoiabJc national interests and sovereignty on the one hand, and a transna-^jal, mu/ficuiruraJ Euro-idealism, on the other. inclusion; Europeanization Versus Globalization :i;j íuropeanization of immigration politics in Europe brings with it a fun-pd challenge to one of the defining characteristics of the European i-state- its powers of self-definition and authority over a territorially ded population (Joppke 1998). The powers of the state—and the institu-^law. democracy, welfare it sustains—were centralized through this avc process of identity formation. Immigration and the integration of 422 ADRIAN FAVELL AND ANDREW GEDDES newcomers in the post-war period has previously followed this pattern in in ostí European nations (Brubaker 1992; Favell lJ»P8a); All of the above is itirtiwu inj question by the establishment of supranational powers and junsdiction t tree immigration questions at the EU level. We have argued that, empirically, it makes sense to look for a distinct £ij™ pean 'transnational opportunity structure' in the immigration policy scctoflB only where specific channels and sources of empowerment have begun : ■ be institutionalized. These are limited, and as yet Csdtosivii to organized Ĺlit groups putting the accent on technocratic and judicial channels or campaigns ing. These efforts may indeed contribute tu challenging European nation-staä control over immigration, and to national models of migrant inclusion,^ ihey cannot be said to contribute to better democracy ur citizenship-style incJU sion for migrants and minorities in Europe. In fact, they can be said lpi« positively damaging to the value of national citizenship as if is unriersLůuiS the national level, because new 'postnational' rights, such čS those based ondj idence, will render national citizenship less meaningful, less identity forriflffl more instrumental, and more incidental for migrants, If, however, (he respore to this is to move back towards an idea of European cHhíL-nsI i it1 pn miseu uii naturalization and incorporation, control over new pupu la nous wnuLiB returned back to the nation-state, and thus the European integration praceš that had opened up new opportunities' would be reversed in favour of thc.qSH Marshallian option which can see nothing beyond national identity foitnatiO'i as the background to social change (see Hansen 1998; Weil 1996). 'indeedjH the point at which it stands, the current, empty, nation-state-derived ide« : EU citizenship only reinforces this older idea of national membership,'! belonging. Within the strictly delimited picrure of EU integration we have orľeru i ■ kind of transnational opportunities remain aar a true migrant- or mitiorijM mobilization? The symbolic resources provided by the emergent idea oľ ĽutojgM should perhaps prove the most fertile source. However, 'transnational elaijä making' is as yet more backed up by other more obvious transnational stri tures' than the limited European context. Indeed, were the EuropeanrzatijOT immigration and asylum to be fully institutionalized at the supranational levcH it would probably prove directly damaging to the kinds or universalistic, global values powering visions of post-national membership: European-bouncy rights and membership is not same thing as human rights or a toj community. The question, of course, remains as to how far the supranauunali/ing tc ency wffTbe insinuitonaTTzecTai the European íevcřwíTh consequent eifccfipB" migrant inclusion. If they are to develop then, rights for důro* countrylíať als are likely to be associated with the logic of free movement and its rnmicc- "" tion with market-making. If this space were to be opened, it wouíčľ prôv..... strong impetus to transnational communities interested in rights derived frr| TRANSNATIONAL POLITICAL ACTION IN THE EU 423 (residency in two or more luh n tries, particularly if these rights are linked to the growing acceptance of dual citizenship (Freeman and Ögelman 1998). There is S very anti-Marsha Hi an kind of idea at work here: the idea that certain rights Ĺŕnight be given to resident workers of the European free marker, unconditional ton nationality, be Jon ging, moral investment in the nation, or even nation-state »welfare contributions (Boiumes and Geddes zflOQ). These are interestingpossi-5 Mílie* ior those ethnic groups most able to organize themselves transnation-rally, and whose support networks and business networks in any case stretch mcross ihcir nations of residence and back and forth to their homeland. Were [these opportunities to develop, they may well open up a form of symbolic icgic-BmatiQii oi action nut „it ail grounded in the oid equality and justice-based logic M inclusion and incorporation, thar has been at ihe heart of most classic social En elements style campaigning. P What this underlines ultimately, is that European integration is a particular Rpe oi internationalizing piucess: the in stí e mi on-bu tiding process of a specihe- EÜly regional cross-nationaj co-operative entity European integration is thepoiiE- Eal supra n at i una j izati on of sovereignty, over certain political powers and a Ispecitically European geographical' space, and over an uneven range of policy Sectors and law, that is both responding to globalizing transnational processes End associated powers—particularly those led by international capital—while. : the same rime, creating new political and legal institutions which formalize t the possibility uf transnational action of a specifically delimited European kind. Tnu essentially ambiguous dynamic of the European integration process lies Kre; in that it is caused by globalization, an attempt to harness globalization, ä m some sense a campaign against globalization. This also leaves the U in a paradoxical relation with other forms of transnationalism, such as the global environment or human rights movements. As a regional entity— Hftwee-n nation-state and united nations—European institutions and Euro- meanizarion often cut across and/or contradict these umversniising movements Rid the uiitvcrsafisnc norms they are b nut on: for example, those often said to Ktbehind progressive changes by IR scholars in the idealist tradition (e.g. Klotz ■ This last point may pose severe difficulties for NGOs and other idealist-based icial movements who ground their raison d'etre in universal ethical norms of lis kind. Europeanization in the end leads to a rather different form of transna- pnal action and legitimation. 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