

8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved as a basis for planning the premise that the English-speaking nations of the British Commonwealth will ally with the United States if war occurs prior to 1 January 1956. Hence, for the purpose of this paper it is assumed that strategic and critical raw materials presently obtained from Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Great Britain, will be accessible at the beginning and for the duration of war, due allowance being made for estimated losses in transit. Such losses due to enemy action should be very small in the case of Australia and New Zealand. During the same period considerably higher losses could be expected in transit between the United States and Great Britain and South Africa.

9. Though many European countries would endeavor to remain strictly neutral in the case of war in the next few years, it would be both unrealistic and dangerous to assume that any European country, with the possible exception of Spain, will be available as a source of strategic and critical materials. Losses due to enemy action during transit between Spain and the United States would be on the order of losses in transit between the United States and Great Britain.

10. The Near and Middle East will most probably be inaccessible as a source of strategic and critical materials unless the United States moves adequate forces into the areas prior to the outbreak of war and unless the present ill will on the part of the Arab states toward the United States is eliminated. Pakistan, India, Burma, Malaya, Siam, French Indo-China, China (south of the Yellow River), Japan, the Philippines and the islands lying between the Philippines and Australia will probably be available as sources of critical and strategic materials in the case of war within the next few years. However, varying conditions of internal unrest in these areas might conceivably curtail production or even in some cases, notably Pakistan, Malaya, Siam, French Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies, deny to the United States procurement from these areas. It is not believed that extensive interruption or complete stoppage of seaborne commerce between the United States and the Philippines and the islands lying between the Philippines and Australia, is a capability of any probable enemy of the United States at present, or within the next few years. However, serious losses could be expected between the United States and Japan. Serious losses would probably occur in transit between the United States and Pakistan, India and China. Minor losses should probably be expected between the United States and Burma, Malaya, Siam, French Indo-China and the Philippines. Enemy military occupation of these areas, with the possible exception of Pakistan, is not considered likely during a major war occurring during this period.

11. The accessibility of northwest Africa at the beginning of warfare will to a very large extent depend upon the status of France. If France is neutral or occupied, armed forces will be required to render this area accessible. The same is true of the Belgian Congo. Resistance in both areas would probably be weak. The remainder of Africa will most probably be accessible, although there will probably be internal unrest in Libya, Egypt, the Sudan, Eritrea, Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland. Madagascar will probably be accessible throughout the war. The same is true for Iceland and Greenland, although losses due to enemy action in transit between the United States and Iceland and Greenland can be expected to be on the order of losses in transit between the United States and Great Britain.

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TOP SECRET

Brief of Short Range Emergency War Plan (HALFMOON)

JCS 1844/13

July 21, 1948

[Source: Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on deposit in the Modern Military Records Branch, National Archives, Washington, D.C.]

By early 1948, approximately a year after the Joint Chiefs of Staff had defined the three principal categories of strategic planning (emergency, intermediate, and long range), no joint strategic plans had shown enough merit and sophistication to receive approval. But the events of February, March, and April 1948—including the war scare emanating from the reporting of General Lucius D. Clay in Berlin—stimulated renewed planning effort. One result was a Joint Outline Emergency War Plan named HALFMOON, approved for planning on May 19, 1948, and, under the name FLEETWOOD, distributed to commands on September 1, 1948, as a guide in preparing detailed operational plans (later still the plan was renamed DOUBLESTAR).

HALFMOON assumed that war with the Soviet Union was a distinct possibility; that in the first phase of war the Soviet Union would be capable of wide-ranging, concurrent, and effective offensives in virtually every major region of the globe; and that the United States would use atomic weapons in counteroffensive operations against the Soviets in Europe.

1. Estimate

1. There is a possibility that war will occur at any time as a result of miscalculation by the USSR as to the extent that the United States or other Western Powers would or could resist their present expansion policy. It is also possible that the active opposition of the Western Powers to Soviet expansion policy may induce the Soviets to believe that it would be advan-

tageous or even mandatory for them to anticipate any increase in this opposition by starting a war themselves. Such war would come with little or no warning.

2. *Operations by the Soviets.* Should war eventuate within the period covered by this plan, the Soviets can be expected to launch offensives concurrently or successively into western and northern Europe, southern Europe, the Middle East and the Far East. It is estimated that the first objectives of the Soviets would be:

- a. Seizure of Middle East and its oil resources.
- b. Destruction or neutralization of all forces of the Allies on the Eurasian land mass.
- c. Simultaneously to accomplish seizure or neutralization of those areas from which the Western Powers might swiftly and effectively strike at the USSR.
- d. Neutralization or seizure of the United Kingdom.
- e. Expansion and consolidation of positions in China, Manchuria and Korea.
- f. Disruption of the Allied war-making capacity by subversion and sabotage.
- g. Disruption of vital Allied lines of communication by aggressive submarine warfare, mining and air operations.

3. The following brief of emergency plan of action is based on maximum utilization of U.S. forces and estimated Allied forces initially available and estimated build-up during the first year of war. It is aimed at the early initiation and sustaining of an air offensive against vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity and the regaining of Middle East oil to assure availability of these resources to the Allies during later phases. The shortcomings of this plan are recognized in that it does not provide adequate assistance to the countries of Western Europe, nor does it provide for the initial retention by the Allies of the Middle East oil resources.

II. United States Plan of Action First Period

4. Under the concept of the present plan, in the event of hostilities in the immediate future, United States armed forces would immediately mobilize and accomplish the undertakings listed below.

5. Defend the Western Hemisphere. This would be accomplished by:

a. Provision for the security of Canada, Newfoundland, and the United States to the extent permitted by available forces and facilities which would include:

- (1) Activation of limited air warning net.
 - (2) Provision by Canada of forces (estimated at approximately one infantry brigade group, six transport squadrons and two light bomb squadrons at reduced strength) for the defense of northeast Canada, Newfoundland and Labrador.
 - (3) Provision by the United States of six fighter groups (day) and one squadron all-weather fighters for defense of critical industrial areas in the United States and southern Canada. In addition it is anticipated that Canada will augment this defense with the equivalent of two and one-half day fighter squadrons.
 - (4) Maintenance of a reserve in the United States of two-thirds airborne division and two troop carrier groups.
 - (5) Sending one-third infantry division to Alaska for the defense of the Fairbanks-Anchorage area, and employing air forces presently deployed less MB group.
 - (6) Defense of atomic installations and stockpiles of atomic weapons—special ground units equivalent of two-thirds division with antiaircraft support, and two fighter groups, one squadron all-weather fighters, all of which are included in the forces specified in paragraph 5a (3) above. Antiaircraft units will consist primarily of federalized National Guard.
 - (7) Defense of Saulte Ste. Marie Canal—special units equivalent of one-third division.
 - (8) Defense against sabotage and subversion in U.S.—initially by special units equivalent to three divisions.
 - (9) Local defense of ports and harbors.
 - (10) Defense of coastal lines of communication.
 - (11) Requisition of U.S. merchant shipping essential to military purposes and induction of merchant marine personnel into the naval service as necessary.
- b. Defense of Panama Canal and Caribbean bases—equivalent of two infantry regiments now deployed, Air Force elements reduced to one fighter squadron (day), one fighter squadron (AW), one reconnaissance squadron, one cargo squadron, rescue and liaison units.
- c. Invoking the provisions of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and implementing the Inter-American Military Coopera-

tion Act,⁶ thereby insuring the cooperation and assistance of a maximum of the Latin American countries in the conduct of war. This cooperation and assistance should include: Contribution of manpower, resources, or bases; maintenance of internal security and local defense against clandestine action; maintenance of bases; and assistance in providing security for air, sea and land lines of communication by the conduct of antisubmarine and escort of convoy operations and by other means, thereby minimizing requirements for United States forces for hemisphere defense. (Note: Forces allocated to defense of the Western Hemisphere will be continuously reviewed and progressively adjusted in consonance with the evaluation of the threat.)

6. *Evacuation.*

a. *Europe.* It is contemplated that the initial withdrawal of Allied forces will be to the Rhine. Further withdrawal in the face of Soviet pressure must take maximum advantage of all opportunities to delay Soviet advances and to stimulate resistance to the Soviets in friendly countries. Withdrawal of U.S. forces from Germany will take place in accordance with Commander in Chief, European Command (CINCEUR) plan. The timing, direction and extent of withdrawal must depend on the tactical situation but it is probable that U.S. forces will withdraw through France either to French coastal ports or to the Pyrenees. U.S. forces in Austria will join forces in Germany to the extent possible. Those unable to join forces in Germany may withdraw through Italy, the Belfort Gap or may enter Switzerland. British forces in Austria, if unable to withdraw to Germany, will withdraw through Italy to Genoa. Coordination between the local commanders concerned is required to implement the above concepts.

b. *Mediterranean.* U.S. forces in Trieste will be withdrawn in accordance with TRUST force plan.⁷ U.S. military missions in Turkey

6. The Inter-American Treaty was the Rio Pact of September 2, 1947. See the note to JCS 626/3, Document 38. The Inter-American Military Cooperation Act, proposed by the Truman Administration in 1946, was intended to standardize the military equipment of the Latin American republics by transferring quantities of surplus American military equipment. In two successive sessions Congress failed to pass the bill. By mid-1948, the United States exhausted its surplus of World War II equipment. Thereafter the problem of military equipment for Latin America became one more facet of the developing military assistance program legislated in 1949. [Ed. note]

7. TRUST was the code name of the headquarters of the United States Army in Trieste established September 16, 1947. The reference is to that headquarters' local plan for operations in case war should occur. [Ed. note]

and Greece will initially assist indigenous forces. Plans for evacuation by sea of these military missions and U.S. nationals from areas in the Mediterranean will be prepared for implementation by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM). Naval support will be furnished CINCNELM in accordance with Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT) plan. British forces in Trieste and Greece will similarly be withdrawn in accordance with plans made by Commanders in Chief, Middle East. Coordination between CINCNELM and the Commanders in Chief, Middle East, is required.

c. Occupation forces being withdrawn can expect no reinforcements.

7. *Secure the United Kingdom.* This task must be performed initially by British forces. It is considered that over the first six months, British forces will have the capability of defending the United Kingdom to the extent that it can be used initially as an operating base area. Thereafter, if the U.K. base is to continue to be available to the Allies, there will be an additional requirement for fighter aircraft and AA defenses, unless in the meantime our air offensive has reduced the scale of Soviet attack.

8. *Secure the Cairo-Suez Base Area.*

- a. This area will be secured and supported through the Mediterranean, at least initially. . . .
- b. The LOC throughout the Mediterranean will be operated as long as possible. The following weaknesses will be accepted:
 - (1) Defense of Spain will be left to Spanish forces.
 - (2) Defense of Sicily will be left to Italian forces.
 - (3) Air Defense and security forces of naval bases in French North African will be provided by French Colonial forces.
 - (4) Malta will not be reinforced.

It is recognized that closure of the Mediterranean may occur about D+6⁸ in which event a LOC via the Cape of Good Hope-Red Sea route will be established.

c. British and U.S. light carrier forces will be used on defensive missions in protection of shipping through the Mediterranean. Heavy U.S. carrier task forces in the Mediterranean will be used primarily for offensive missions in securing and maintaining air superiority over the LOC's and in interdiction of enemy LOC's. CVE trans-

8. D + 6, that is, the sixth month of military operations in the projected war. [Ed. note]

port⁹ will be provided for movement of Air Force fighters, carrier replacement aircraft and crews from the U.S. . . .

d. Antiaircraft defense of Egyptian ports will be provided mainly by Egyptian forces.

9. *Secure the Bering Sea-Japan Sea-Yellow Sea Line*

a. Operations required for this task are provided for in existing plans of Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE), Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), and Commander in Chief, Alaska (CINCAL). These include:

- (1) Withdrawal of United States forces from Korea.
- (2) Maintenance of United States forces in China in their present location, their redeployment to tenable locations in China, or their withdrawal from China if necessary.
- (3) Defense of Japan and the Ryukyus Islands.
- (4) Destruction by air and naval forces of enemy ports, air bases, industrial installations, stockpiles and naval forces; blockading of that portion of East Asia under Soviet control.
- (5) Provision of some aid to China if feasible.

b. Forces available are those presently assigned, less certain of CINCPAC forces which are redeployed elsewhere. Filler replacements will be shipped to CINCFE to arrive between D plus sixty and D plus ninety days.

c. It is anticipated that British forces will provide for the internal security of Malay.

10. *Air Offensive.* Initiate as early as practicable an air offensive against vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity. (Note: Assumption is made that authority to employ atomic bombs has been obtained.)

a. Deploy available units of the Strategic Air Command to bases in England (alternatively to Iceland), and to the Khartoum-Cairo-Suez area and conduct operations from these bases and Okinawa utilizing available atomic bombs against selected targets. Initial deployments will be accomplished by air movements of some elements of the Strategic Air Command in unit aircraft and by air transport.

b. Operations would begin and be sustained from:
 England —D + 15 days

9. CVEs were small, straight-decked carriers of World War II vintage originally used in antisubmarine hunter-killer groups, and converted to aircraft transport ships after the war. These later were designated CVTs. [Ed. note]

Okinawa —D-day (D + 15 days with atomic bombs)

Khartoum-Cairo-Suez area—D + 15 days. . . .

d. In conjunction with the atomic campaign, units of the Strategic Air Command, as available, would operate against remaining elements of the Soviet petroleum industry and submarine operating facilities and conduct extensive mining operations in Soviet ports and waterways.

e. Carrier task groups will supplement and support the air offensive to the extent practical consistent with their primary task.

11. Air and Naval bases will be established in Iceland and the Azores. Advanced combat elements of the Marine security force for Iceland base will be air lifted on D-day or as soon thereafter as possible. The balance of the Iceland force and the Azores forces, making the total of one Marine Brigade with Marine tactical air units for each base, will be moved amphibiously to each base immediately after D-day. A U.S. escort fighter group, to be eventually deployed to the U.K., will proceed so as to arrive in Iceland in time to cover landing of advance elements of Marine force. Elements of this group will remain there until Marine air tactical units arrive.

12. A Marine reenforced battalion will be deployed from Mediterranean to the Bahrein area to assist in evacuation of United States nationals and for possible neutralization of oil installations. This movement is to be made as soon as possible after D-day by Naval air lift and by utilization of service and commercial aircraft available in the Mediterrean area. It is considered that a similar responsibility for the neutralization of oil installations in Iraq and at the head of the Persian Gulf and destruction of rail LOC's to Persian Gulf will be assumed by the British.

13. In order to establish control of sea areas necessary for the execution of the concept, naval forces will be deployed to contain or destroy Soviet naval forces and shipping.

14. To secure essential sea and air LOC's control and routing of shipping will be instituted as necessary. Essential air and naval bases will be established as rapidly as possible. Only limited fighter defense and air early warning for LOC's within range of enemy air attack can be provided. Surface escort, local sea defense forces, advanced base units, and naval and air force squadrons will be deployed to assigned areas.

Second Period

15. *Tasks.* Tasks to which forces have been committed in the first period will be a continuing charge against available forces. Forces required for these tasks are assumed to be the same as for the first period with the following exceptions:

- a. *The Air Offensive.* The air offensive against vital elements of Soviet war-making capacity must be intensified and sustained, base areas and operating facilities improved and expanded, and defense of bases and base areas strengthened.
 - b. *Security of the Cairo-Suez Base Area.* (See paragraph 16 below.)
 - c. *Defense of the United Kingdom.* In the event that the Soviets achieve a large build-up of air forces in Western Europe, it is anticipated that a Soviet air offensive would by D+6 materially reduce the RAF. Under such circumstances the United Kingdom might be rendered unusable as an air base and would be subject to airborne and seaborne invasion by the Soviets. In order to forestall the conquest of the United Kingdom, reenforcement in the form of fighter aircraft and AA defenses would be required. Redeployment of the heavy carrier task groups from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom would render brief reenforcement but would not meet the requirement of air reenforcements. The scale and timing of reenforcement to be provided for the defense of the United Kingdom is dependent on the effects of the Allied air offensive on the maintenance of Soviet air forces deployed in Western Europe and the decisions relative to the use of the U.K. bases.
 - d. *Security of Lines of Communication.* Dependent upon the effectiveness of the air offensive, mining campaign, and ASW operations, additional forces may be required in the second period for defense of essential LOC's and possibly including the longer sea-route around the Cape of Good Hope.
 - e. *Defense of Western Hemisphere.* It may be possible by the beginning of or during the second period to redeploy some forces allocated to the defense of the Western Hemisphere to other tasks, depending upon a continuous evaluation of the threat.
 - f. *Security of Far East.* It may be possible to withdraw some air force units from the Far East for redeployment to other tasks during the later part of the second period.
16. During this period a build-up of forces will be required to insure the retention of the Khartoum-Cairo-Suez area as an operating base area. As

soon as practicable this base area will be expanded to the north and east in order to increase the security of the Cairo-Suez area. . . .

17. *Further Operations*

- a. By D+12 the Allies can provide, in addition to those already enumerated, approximately twenty-three divisions together with air groups totalling approximately 1,400 aircraft which would be available for the execution of those tasks considered most essential at that time. Such tasks might include:
 - (1) Reopening of the Mediterranean.
 - (2) Regaining of Middle East oil.
- b. *Reopening of the Mediterranean.* By D+6 the Soviets have the capability of occupying and consolidating the entire northern littoral of the Mediterranean from the Pyrenees to Syria, and of bringing the Mediterranean LOC under heavy air attack. In addition they have the capability of occupying Spain by approximately D+6 and bringing the line of communication under artillery fire. These might have the result of closing the Mediterranean LOC. If the air offensive is effective, however, the operational capabilities of the Soviet forces, deployed to cover the Mediterranean, should be seriously impaired. In this event it may be feasible to force the opening of the Mediterranean, particularly if Spain is unoccupied. These operations may initially involve the regaining of Sicily, the establishment of strong air forces along the North African littoral, and the reopening of French ports in Algeria and Tunisia. Reopening of the Mediterranean would be a most important factor in support of offensive action in and from the Middle East.
- c. *Regaining of Middle East Oil.* Present estimates indicate that it will be necessary for the Allies to regain a substantial portion of Middle East oil resources by the end of the second year. The Allied offensive to regain these resources might be directed toward Kirkuk or the Persian Gulf, or both. The Kirkuk operation would involve an overland offensive in unfavorable terrain; the Persian Gulf offensive would impose difficult amphibious or triphibious operations.

[The plan concludes with a brief list of Army, Navy, Air Force, and British Commonwealth forces available for carrying out the tasks listed in paragraph 17.]