

- a. Insure the ability to carry out strategic bombing promptly by all means possible with all types of weapons, without exception. This is primarily a U.S. responsibility assisted as practicable by other nations.
- b. Arrest and counter as soon as practicable the enemy offensives against North Atlantic Treaty powers by all means available, including air, naval, land and psychological operations. Initially, the hard core of ground forces will come from the European nations. Other nations will give aid with the least possible delay and in accordance with over-all plans.
- c. Neutralize as soon as practicable enemy air operations against North Atlantic Treaty powers. In this undertaking the European nations should initially provide the bulk of the tactical air support and air defense, other nations aiding with the least possible delay in accordance with over-all plans.
- d. Secure and control sea and air lines of communication, and ports and harbors, essential to the implementation of common defense plans. The defense and control of sea and air LOC's will be performed through common cooperation in accordance with each nation's capabilities and agreed responsibilities. In this regard it is recognized that the United States and United Kingdom will be primarily responsible for the organization and control of ocean lines of communication. Other nations will secure and maintain their own harbor defenses and coastal LOC's and participate in the organization and control of vital LOC's to their territories as may be indicated in over-all plans.
- e. Secure, maintain and defend such main support areas, air bases, naval bases and other facilities as are essential to the successful accomplishment of the basic undertaking. These undertakings will be a responsibility of the nations having sovereignty over these essential bases, areas and facilities, aided as necessary and to the extent set forth in collective defense plans.
- f. Mobilize and expand the over-all power of the Treaty nations in accordance with their planned contribution to later offensive operations designed to maintain security of the North Atlantic Treaty area.

COOPERATIVE MEASURES

8. The essence of our over-all concept is to develop a maximum of strength through collective defense planning. As a prerequisite to the suc-

cessful implementation of common plans, it is recognized that certain cooperative measures must be undertaken in advance. These measures are:

- a. Standardization, insofar as practicable, of military doctrines and procedures.
- b. Conduct of combined training exercises, when deemed desirable.
- c. Compilation and exchange of intelligence information and data peculiar to the conduct of contemplated Atlantic Treaty organization defense planning and operations resulting therefrom.
- d. Cooperation in the construction, maintenance, and operation of military installations of mutual concern, in conformity with the agreements between the interested countries.
- e. Standardization of maintenance, repair, and service facilities which will be of mutual concern in the event contemplated defense plans have to be implemented.
- f. Standardization, insofar as practicable, of military material and equipment for use in operations as developed by common defense plans.
- g. Collective cooperation in arranging for military operating arrangements mutually agreed between countries in peacetime, in furtherance of common defense requirements.
- h. Cooperation, within the legal limitations and administrative restrictions of each country, in research and development of new weapons and in the development of new methods of warfare.
- i. Cooperation, insofar as is practicable, in planning for the conduct of psychological and other special operations.

PART III: THE ATOMIC BOMB

44

TOP SECRET

United States Policy on Atomic Weapons

NSC 30

September 10, 1948

[Source: *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1948*, I (part 2), 624-28]

Following the Czechoslovakian crisis and the beginning of the Berlin blockade, the National Security Council in May 1948 inaugurated discussion of a policy statement on the use of atomic weapons. The result was NSC 30, prepared in consultation with the Departments of State, Army, Navy, Air Force, the National Security Resources Board, and the Central Intelligence Agency. After considering whether to establish a public policy regarding the use or nonuse of atomic weapons in any future conflict,

the Council decided, with the concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that even to discuss the possibility of not using such weapons posed unacceptable dangers, both in terms of encouraging the Russians and discouraging American allies in Western Europe.

On September 16, 1948, the National Security Council approved paragraphs 12 and 13 of NSC 30, which included language indicating that the National Military Establishment should plan for the use of atomic weapons. In the opinion of W. Walton Butterworth, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department, this recommendation in effect decided the question in favor of the use of atomic weapons, for planning on the assumption of their use would leave no alternative in crisis. The real questions, he wrote in a memorandum of September 15, 1948, were "when and how such weapons should be used. Should we, for example, in the event of war, begin by bombing major centers of population in enemy territory or start with smaller centers important for transportation or specific industries? This question should be answered not so much on the basis of humanitarian principles as from a practical weighing of the long-run advantage to this country."¹⁷

The Problem

1. To determine the advisability of formulating, at this time, policies regarding the use of atomic weapons.

Analysis

2. The decision to employ atomic weapons is a decision of highest policy. The circumstances prevailing when war is joined cannot be wholly forecast with any greater certainty than can the arrival of war. It appears imprudent either to prescribe or to prohibit beforehand the use of any particular weapons when the character of future conflict is subject only to imperfect prediction. In this circumstance, a prescription preceding diagnosis could invite disaster.

3. If war itself cannot be prevented, it appears futile to hope or to suggest that the imposition of limitations on the use of certain military weapons can prevent their use in war.

4. The United States has nothing presently to gain, commensurable with the risk of raising the question, in either a well-defined or an equivocal decision that atomic weapons would be used in the event of war. An advance decision that atomic weapons will be used, if necessary, would presumably be of some use to the military planners. Such a decision does not appear essential, however, since the military can and will, in its absence,

17. *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1948, I* (part 2), 630-31.

plan to exploit every capability in the form of men, materials, resources and science this country has to offer.

5. In this matter, public opinion must be recognized as a factor of considerable importance. Deliberation or decision on a subject of this significance, even if clearly affirmative, might have the effect of placing before the American people a moral question of vital security significance at a time when the full security impact of the question had not become apparent. If this decision is to be made by the American people, it should be made in the circumstances of an actual emergency when the principal factors involved are in the forefront of public consideration.

6. Foreign opinion likewise demands consideration. Official discussion respecting the use of atomic weapons would reach the Soviets, who should in fact never be given the slightest reason to believe that the U.S. would even consider not to use atomic weapons against them if necessary. It might take no more than a suggestion of such consideration, perhaps magnified into a doubt, were it planted in the minds of responsible Soviet officials, to provoke exactly that Soviet aggression which it is fundamentally U.S. policy to avert.

7. If Western Europe is to enjoy any feeling of security at the present time, without which there can be no European economic recovery and little hope for a future peaceful and stable world, it is in large degree because the atomic bomb, under American trusteeship, offers the present major counterbalance to the ever-present threat of the Soviet military power. This was recognized by the then Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, who, in an address before the United Nations General Assembly on December 13, 1946, acknowledged, with the applause of the Assembly, that: "In the recent past, the concern of peace-loving nations has not been that America maintained excessive armaments. The concern has been that America failed to maintain adequate armaments to guard the peace. . . . It was our military weakness, not our military strength, that encouraged Axis aggression."¹⁸ Were the United States to decide against, or publicly debate the issue of the use of the atomic bomb on moral grounds, this country might gain the praise of the world's radical fringe and would certainly receive the applause of the Soviet bloc, but the United States would be thoroughly condemned by every sound citizen in Western Europe, whose enfeebled security this country would obviously be threatening.

8. Furthermore, consideration must be given to whether any public uni-

18. Document AEC/31. [Not printed; note in source text]

lateral decision respecting the use of atomic weapons should be made when the international control of atomic energy is subject to debate within the United Nations. In the "General Conclusions and Recommendations" of the *Third Report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council*, dated 17 May 1948, it is stated:

The new pattern of international cooperation and the new standards of openness in the dealings of one country with another that are indispensable in the field of atomic energy might, in practice, pave the way for international cooperation in broader fields, for the control of other weapons of mass destruction, and even for the elimination of war itself as an instrument of national policy.

However, in the field of atomic energy, the majority of the Commission has been unable to secure the agreement of the Soviet Union to even those elements of effective control considered essential from the technical point of view, let alone their acceptance of the nature and extent of participation in the world community required of all nations in this field by the first and second reports of the Atomic Energy Commission. As a result, the Commission has been forced to recognize that agreement on effective measures for the control of atomic energy is itself dependent on *cooperation in broader fields of policy*.¹⁹ (The Commission concluded that no useful purpose can be served by carrying on negotiations at the Commission level.)

9. International cooperation in "broader fields of policy" has been woefully and dangerously lacking on the part of the Soviet Union and its satellites. Any attempt now or in the future under these circumstances, to prohibit or negatively to qualify the employment of atomic bombs could result catastrophically. The measure of success achieved by the United States in collaboration with other nations in the establishment of an effective system of international control of atomic energy should directly determine the measure of control the United States will impose upon itself in the employment of atomic weapons. Until international agreement can be reached on an acceptable plan to control atomic energy (only the Soviet Union, Poland and the Ukrainian S.S.R. have blocked the attainment of this goal)²⁰ it is dangerously delusive to consider the self-imposition of any unilateral qualifications of the use of atomic weapons.

10. The United States has offered, along with all other nations, to eliminate atomic weapons from national armaments if and when a fully effective, enforceable system of international control is put into effect. In the meantime United States policy should ensure that no commitment be made in the absence of an established and acceptable system of international control of

19. Underlining [italics] supplied for emphasis. [Note in source text]

20. This reference is to the votes of the Soviet Union, Poland, and the Ukraine against the Baruch Plan in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. [Ed. note]

atomic energy which would deny this country the right to employ such weapons in the event of actual hostilities. The actual decision to employ weapons should be made by the Chief Executive and in the light of prevailing circumstances.

11. The time and circumstances under which atomic weapons might be employed are incapable of accurate determination prior to the evident imminence of hostilities. The type and character of targets against which atomic weapons might be used is primarily a function of military selection in the preparation and planning of grand strategy. In this case, however, there is the additional requirement for blending a political with a military responsibility in order to assure that the conduct of war, to the maximum extent practicable, advances the fundamental and lasting aims of U.S. policy.

Conclusions

12. It is recognized that, in the event of hostilities, the National Military Establishment must be ready to utilize promptly and effectively all appropriate means available, including atomic weapons, in the interest of national security and must therefore plan accordingly.

13. The decision as to the employment of atomic weapons in the event of war is to be made by the Chief Executive when he considers such decision to be required.

14. In the light of the foregoing, no action should be taken at the present time:

- a. To obtain a decision either to use or not to use atomic weapons in any possible future conflict;
- b. To obtain a decision as to the time and circumstances under which atomic weapons might or might not be employed.

5

S E C R E T

Brief on the Pattern of War in the Atomic Warfare Age

December 16, 1948

[Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas]

Although military planners expected future wars to resemble World War II more than they would differ from it, they also anticipated many changes in underlying considerations relating to the nature and course of warfare, especially after the Soviet Union

had acquired atomic weapons. The Advanced Study Branch Plans Group of the United States Army General Staff therefore prepared an extensive study on the subject to guide war planning. This study was especially interesting for its reading of trends in civilian control of warfare, the effects of alliance relationships on freedom of action and the rational use of force, the probable war aims of the Soviet Union and a United States-led coalition, and an analysis of stages through which an atomic war might progress. It also emphasized the new importance of immediate strategic counteroffensives to reduce the offensive power of adversaries, and gave much attention to the heightened significance of psychological operations.

The document is published here as amended on March 28, 1949.

1. The study is not a war plan. It is set forth only in order to influence, in light of long range implications, the formulation of current policies and programs.

2. National policy on national security, which is now lacking, is vitally needed.

3. For purposes of this study, national policy on national security is assumed to be that set forth in "Concepts on Objectives," Appendix "A" hereto.²¹

4. War, as suggested herein, is not predicted; but because the U.S. must ride two horses, one heading towards peace and progress and the other headed toward war preparation, an idea of the pattern of atomic warfare is needed in order to provide guidance for the appropriate military posture.

5. The time period used herein is the atomic warfare age which is defined as arriving when two or more nations have available to them a significant quantity of atomic weapons, together with suitable means of delivery.

6. An enemy would probably need 100 to 200 or more atomic weapons to have a significant quantity as defined above. Intelligence indicates this might take 10 to 20 years, and, hence, 1964 has been selected as the year in which it is assumed a war would start.

Significant Major Trends Which Will Affect Materially the Character of a Future War

7. Significant major trends which would have material affect on the pattern of war should be analyzed.

8. The expansion of democracy in every aspect of control of human life will result in more emphasis on human relations in war.

9. There is a trend towards a formal supra-national community accom-

21. Not printed. [Ed. note]

panied by an extension of regional alliances; all of which is restricting more and more the freedom of nations for independent action and is making for a more rational approach to war.

10. Neutrality will be more attractive to minor nations.

11. The war objectives of antagonists will tend to become more limited than in past wars with more emphasis being given to a military posture which might allow long-range political objectives to be obtained gradually by non-military means.

12. Civilian control, at the expense of military control, will become more dominant in the conduct of war by the U.S. Government.

13. The potency of military offensive power that can be stockpiled before a war will tend to place greater emphasis than in past wars on a counter-offensive against the offensive power in being of an enemy.

14. Logistic support means will become more vulnerable and will be higher priority targets than in past wars.

Assumptions with Regard to a War in 1964

15. The USSR is assumed to be the enemy.

16. A war between the U.S. and Allies (ALLIES) and the USSR and her Allies (SOVIET BLOC) is assumed to start in 1964 after the international conflict over extension of communism has reached an impasse.

17. The war is assumed to start after the ALLIES, bonded together under the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter after failure of the Security Council to agree, issued an ultimatum that the USSR get out of Iran.

18. There would be no strategic surprise in the initiation of such a war as warning indications could be noted six to twelve months or longer in advance.

19. Tactical surprise on the initiation of war, comparable to that achieved at Pearl Harbor, will be striven for by the enemy and is apt to be successful to some extent.

20. Appendix "B"²² includes more detailed assumptions.

War Objectives of the Opposing Powers

21. Allied objectives would be to force acceptance of these armistice terms:

22. Not printed. [Ed. note]

- a. Cessation of hostilities.
 - b. Acceptance, without Soviet veto, of peace settlement to be determined by the UN.
 - c. Enemy withdrawal from territory occupied after war started.
 - d. Destruction of all atomic, biological and chemical weapons, strategic bombers and submarines, together with safe access for Allied inspectors to observe compliance with terms.
22. Soviet Bloc minimum war objectives would be to:
- a. Force Western European nations, less UK, to adopt communistic governments which would support the Soviet Bloc.
 - b. Eliminate Allied domination of the Near East.
 - c. After the above have been achieved, create militarily, at least, a war stalemate and cause UN recognition of the new communistic governments.
 - d. Create conditions, without forcing communism on the U.S. or the UK, which would allow the USSR to exploit in her interests Western Europe, Africa and the Near East and thus probably cause the U.S. and UK to conform ultimately to the Soviet concept of world order.
 - e. Cessation of hostilities.
23. Assumed objectives differ radically from World War II in that:
- a. Allies would attempt only to reduce enemy military power and prevent material gains from occupation which would be materially less than unconditional surrender.
 - b. The Soviet Bloc would have less extensive territorial demands than did Hitler and they would be playing up to social unrest.

Conditions Which Would Probably Cause Acceptance of Terms

24. It is difficult but necessary to forecast the military, political and economic conditions which would probably cause acceptance of armistice terms.
25. *Conditions for Allied victory.* It would be necessary to:
- a. Reduce enemy's offensive capabilities so that only insignificant destructive attacks could be launched against Allied home territory.
 - b. Reduce enemy's defensive capabilities so that Allied strategic air forces could penetrate successfully, without undue losses to all critical areas of enemy territory.

- c. Prevent enemy from obtaining popular support for governments in captured territory or support from neutral nations.
 - d. Reduce enemy's war economy to a point where he could not regain initiative or air supremacy.
 - e. Prevent enemy from obtaining war support from captured territory.
26. *Conditions for Soviet Bloc victory.* The Soviet Bloc might expect Allied surrender on their terms when:
- a. No Allied forces would remain in the European continent, in the Near East or in Asia.
 - b. The UK had been neutralized as an effective Allied military base and reduced to a starvation economy.
 - c. Relatively strong governments with at least moderate popular support had been established in captured territory and these nations were contributing substantial war support to the Soviet Bloc.
 - d. Neutral nations were imploring Allies to accept.
 - e. U.S. war potential had been so reduced that it would take Allies at least two years free of destructive air attack to regain the military initiative and Soviet aerial supremacy was on the increase.
27. Conditions somewhere between those forecast for Allied or Soviet Bloc victory might induce a war stalemate lasting for years.

The General Pattern of War

28. The Soviet Bloc would attempt to extend throughout Europe and the Near East, to neutralize the ABC air potential of the Allies, and to undermine the support of the Allies.

29. The Allies would probably decide on the following basic undertakings in the war:

- a. *First undertaking*—Neutralize the enemy's offensive capabilities against the Allies.
- b. *Second undertaking*—A political, social and economic warfare campaign, coordinated with military strategy in order to convince the enemy to accept the Allied terms.
- c. *Third undertaking*—Prevent any successful exploitation of enemy territorial gains.
- d. *Fourth undertaking*—An aerial offensive to gain the military posture and the degree of aerial supremacy which would probably cause the enemy to accept the Allied terms.

e. *Fifth undertaking*—If the enemy should not accept the armistice terms after the above four undertakings have been achieved, maintain ever-increasing military, political, social and economic pressure on the enemy until he accepts the terms.

30. The purpose of military force in war is *not* to destroy the will of the enemy to resist. Rather, *the purpose is to create in the mind of the enemy the idea that he will accept the terms that the Allies propose.*

31. Military intelligence would probably not give adequate warning of the character of the initial enemy attack although political intelligence as to intentions would be available.

32. The major undertakings were listed in order of importance and also in chronological order, except for the second, the political, etc. campaigns, which would be the primary undertaking of the war and would precede the war as well as be carried on after the war.

First Undertaking—Neutralization of the Enemy Offensive

33. The enemy would attempt, and probably achieve, tactical surprise in an all-out effort to neutralize the Allied ABC air power in being.

34. The enemy would attempt an initial knockout blow against Allied air power in being, employing such tactics as A-bombs against concentration of bombers or missiles on above ground bases, ABC anti-personnel weapons to destroy bomber crews and assembly personnel, vertical envelopment, sabotage and destruction of critical underground facilities, missile or torpedo attack against aircraft carriers, etc. without regard as to conventional ideas of military costs.

35. The enemy potential would probably not support an initial attack against the industry as a whole or the population of the Allies in addition to the blows against Allied ABC air power in being, although psychological and political means combined with sabotage and subversion would be employed to undermine support of the Allies.

36. The initial Allied strategy must provide a counter to the forecast initial enemy attack.

37. The Allies would launch a counter-offensive against the enemy ABC air offensive forces in being, utilizing Allied ABC air power against aircraft and missile bases, storage areas, logistic bottlenecks, etc.

38. Allied airborne raids of a suicide character would be required against enemy targets relatively invulnerable to bombardment.

39. The Allied counter-offensive *must* succeed, regardless of cost. It would be an air battle, greater than any battle of history.

40. Defensive measures should include as near to 100 percent protection as may be possible for a portion of the economy and counter-offensive forces in being, combined with a degree of active defense to the remainder with effective utilization of passive defense.

41. A "Military Offensive Complex" (MOC), completely separate from the normal economy and having military forces set aside for the sole purposes of its defense, may be needed in order to provide as near to 100 percent protection as possible to the Allied counter-offensive means.

42. Active defense should be sufficient to limit materially an enemy attack against industry as a whole or the population. Passive defense should include civil defense and dispersion of critical industries.

43. The first Allied undertaking, if successful, would take from three months to a year or longer.

Second Undertaking—The Political, Social and Economic Campaigns of the War

44. This would be the major undertaking of the war, and would be a continuation of a peacetime campaign modified and intensified for war purposes.

45. The campaigns themselves will be the accommodation of words to acts and vice versa with the objective of convincing the enemy to accept the armistice terms; these terms would have been previously set forth to the world.

46. The Allied political, social and economic campaigns designed to achieve acceptance of the Allied terms would emphasize the spirit rather than the form of democracy and would promote universal adherence to democratic principles in government.

47. Efforts would be made to keep the UN active during the war with all enemy and neutral nations participating in order to provide a forum in which armistice terms and peace settlements may be approached rationally by the antagonists.

48. The campaigns would not oppose communism per se but would foster the idea that the Allied democracies can co-exist progressively with governments or any type of ideology including communism provided that international conflicts would be solved peacefully and that nations would not exploit other nations.

49. The Allies should develop and demonstrate the themes that the Soviet Bloc cannot win militarily and that Allied weapons will be used humanely against vital targets of a military character.

50. Neutrals should be encouraged to exert their influence on the enemy to convince him to trust the Allies and to accept the Allied terms.

51. The peoples in areas occupied by the enemy should be encouraged and prepared to make the necessary sacrifices and to support the military and subversive operations that would be designed to make the enemy expend more of his own resources in occupation than he gains from indigenous sources and to cause the enemy strategic position in occupied areas to deteriorate continuously.

52. Allied agreement should be sought to a policy of equality in the sharing of war costs to the end that the Allies less affected by the war will grant aid during and after the war to the more affected Allies until a condition is reached after the war when the *relative* standards of living and economic conditions amongst the Allies are comparable to the relative pre-war status of the Allies in these respects. Allied campaigns would emphasize this policy in sustaining resistance to occupation and in gaining support of neutrals.

53. The Allies should endeavor to cause the enemy masses to bring pressure to bear on their leaders in order to cause acceptance of the Allied terms.

54. Covert and overt operations would be directed so as to convince the enemy elites to accept the terms, or to weaken their leadership and their opposition to the Allies, or to bring into power covertly from indigenous sources leaders amenable to acceptance of Allied terms. The Allies should design subversive "hardware" for these purposes.

55. A major share of these campaigns would be in direct support of Allied military operations with the objective ultimately of convincing the enemy leaders, military as well as civil, and the enemy masses of the ultimate overwhelming superiority of Allied air power and the futility of land or other military operations in face of the increasing Allied air superiority.

56. Campaigns in the Allied homefronts would be necessary in order to develop and secure popular support to counter enemy campaigns and to condition the peoples for the expected enemy attacks.

57. Success of the Allies in establishing popularly supported indigenous governments in territories that the Allies occupied for military operations would be a material factor in gaining the trust and confidence of the rest of the world, including the enemy, in the Allied intentions.

58. The character and tempo of the political, social and economic campaigns would change with Allied military progress and the demonstrated military prowess backing up threats of inevitable greater military hurt would be utilized to convince the enemy to surrender.

59. *The major problem*, after Allied air superiority had been achieved,

would be to convince the enemy leaders to trust the Allies to carry out only the terms that the Allies had proposed.

60. When enemy acceptance of Allied terms appears likely, emphasis would have to be given to convincing the enemy leaders and masses to acceptance of Allied inspectors and their safe conduct in enemy territory under penalty of immediate, retaliatory, and destructive air blows if the terms are violated or the inspectors are attacked.

61. Concepts with regard to political, psychological, economic, subversive and other similar methods of warfare should be studied in order to devise techniques that might accomplish the purposes outlined above for this undertaking.

Third Undertaking—Prevent Exploitation of Enemy Territorial Gains

62. It is vital to the Allied cause to prevent the enemy from maintaining control of Western Europe and the Near East and from increasing his war potential by occupation and to cause the enemy strategic position in occupied areas to deteriorate continuously, because otherwise the enemy would be in position to achieve his limited objectives and thus victory in the war.

63. The Allies could prevent exploitation of enemy territorial gains by the obvious method of preventing the enemy from occupying such areas and, when that method fails, by conducting internal and external operations against the enemy in occupied areas which would deny gain to the enemy and cause his strategic position to deteriorate.

64. In defending Western Europe, the Allies would probably have to face an initial military superiority of the Soviet Bloc.

65. It is to be hoped that the expected enemy campaign to overthrow internally the French, German and Italian governments would fail; and, thus, the enemy would be forced to launch a land and air campaign across Germany with the objective of eliminating Allied military forces on the continent.

66. The Allies initial move would probably be to defend the Rhine-Alps-French and Italian border line—which would have to be done in face of initial enemy superiority on land and in the air based in part on ABC weapons.

67. While the initial primary role of Allied long-range strategic bombardment forces would be to launch the counter-offensive described in the first

undertaking, the second mission of these forces would be to check enemy progress of the land battle of Western Europe.

68. The Allies would initiate immediately an air battle with the objective of eliminating the initial enemy air superiority over the land battle area of Western Europe. Short-range trans-sonic or super-sonic Allied aircraft would attack all air bases utilized by the enemy to support the land battle. A-weapons capable of destroying all aircraft on the ground and denying enemy use of the base for protracted periods would be used in lightning attacks. The Allies should be able to eliminate enemy air superiority in this area.

69. The above air battle would be a major contribution to the battle for overall air superiority (fourth Allied undertaking), because the battle for Western Europe would provide the Allies with a great opportunity to defeat, under conditions favorable to the Allies, a great portion of the enemy air power in being which would have to be accomplished before Allied victory could be achieved.

70. In spite of the prospect of early elimination of initial enemy air superiority, Allied land forces may be forced to withdraw from the Rhine, but they should be able to stabilize a position before being driven back to the Atlantic.

71. If Allied withdrawal from the Rhine is forced, an extensive base on the Atlantic and Channel Coasts, with previously prepared positions, should be held by the Allies in order to provide a base for Allied operations into occupied areas, to contribute to the air defense of the UK, and to reduce the enemy Atlantic submarine threat, and to provide Allied air bases for the continuing reduction of enemy air power.

72. The U.S. should provide an expeditionary force, immediately upon the initiation of war if not prior to the war, to participate in the ground defense of Western Europe in order to sustain Allied resistance and morale.

73. Resistance movements should be well organized by the Allies before any withdrawal.

74. If withdrawal is necessary, instead of a "scorched earth" policy, the Allies should use ABC weapons which can deny areas and interfere with communications, with a very minimum of destruction, in order to prevent the enemy from benefiting from the resources of captured areas. Internal attacks by resistance forces should be supported by selective air attack and airborne raids.

75. A threat of a "breakout" from the Allied continental base should be maintained continuously in order to strain the enemy and to attract enemy air forces into close range of Allied air power.

76. The peoples of occupied countries should be made fully aware of Allied operations on their behalf, of the general Allied strategy, and of the Allied intentions to liberate them ultimately.

77. Allied areas occupied by the enemy would be liberated ultimately by over-running types of land campaigns, more similar to the liberation of Brittany than to the assault of the Siegfried line in World War II, shortly prior to surrender of the enemy.

78. In the Near East, the enemy would probably occupy readily the oil areas near the Arabian Gulf, perhaps by-passing Turkey if the latter remains neutral, and then would attempt to occupy or neutralize bases for Allied air power in Egypt.

79. The Allies would probably not be able to defend any Near East areas, except Egypt in the event that moderate ground and substantial air and naval forces were in that area prior to enemy attack.

80. The Allies could neutralize enemy oil production in the Near East by air attack, airborne raids, and sabotage utilizing selective ABC type weapons.

81. Until overwhelming Allied air superiority could be achieved late in the war, the Allies probably could not exploit Near East oil resources even if they succeeded in capturing the areas.

82. In the Far East, air attacks on transportation, key heavy industries, and enemy air and sub bases should neutralize enemy exploitation of this area. The enemy would probably not attempt to occupy Japan.

Fourth Undertaking—Aerial Supremacy Over the Enemy

83. Because Allied success in their first three undertakings would have stopped the enemy and wrested the initiative from him, the Allies should next attain aerial superiority over the Soviet Bloc territory to such an extent that the enemy's air defense would deteriorate continuously, and the enemy could not produce the air power necessary to regain the initiative on any substantial front.

84. The objective would be Soviet air power; the forces in being, the defense, the bases and storage areas, and the vital communications in direct support of Soviet air power and the weapons used.

85. Allied success would depend on having bases within 2,500 miles of critical targets and success in the first three undertakings should provide such bases in the UK, on the continent and possibly in the Near East.

86. Water or ice bases, used for launching and landing aircraft, would be relatively invulnerable to atomic attack.

87. Advanced bases would be less vulnerable to ABC attack if they were

used only as a stage base for aircraft which were permanently based in rear, well protected areas.

88. When a base must be seized in enemy defended territory, local Allied air superiority over the selected area should be achieved by atomic attack against all enemy air bases outside of the target area which the enemy would use for air support, and the target area should be softened up by a lethal ABC attack which would cripple the defense but would not destroy the essential facilities.

90. A lightning vertical envelopment followed up immediately by air transported forces or amphibious attack would be employed in order to seize the area. Fighter, AA, ground and tactical air-defense units would be prepared for counter attack with defense against surface attack relying heavily on the denial effects of ABC weapons.

91. Because of enemy capability for ABC air attack against extended air and ground LOC in support of major combat forces, advanced bases should not be located more than 150 to 200 miles from a sea LOC base, except for limited periods of two to three weeks.

92. If seaplane bombers, fighters and tactical aircraft become available, a mobile base could be established in protected waters with air, naval and land units combined to seize, defend and operate a staging base.

93. Allied air attacks would fan out from advanced bases in ever-deepening penetration attacks against the enemy air force, defensive bases, logistic support means, and the industrial complex in support of the enemy air force. When the climax is reached, the enemy air defense should deteriorate rapidly as did that of Germany following the climax of the air battle in the spring of 1944.

94. Allied air bases should be located so as to maintain an attack from all quarters of the compass.

95. Small Army airborne raid forces would be utilized to destroy or neutralize vital enemy targets which would be relatively invulnerable to air attack.

96. It might take the Allies four to five years or longer to achieve the desired air supremacy over enemy territory.

Fifth Undertaking—Pressure After Air Supremacy is Won

97. Although successful prosecution of the above four undertakings by the Allies should cause the enemy to surrender, the Allies would have to be prepared to carry on if the enemy does not accept.

98. In selection of a course of action to be followed in this undertaking, the Allies should give great weight to convincing the enemy leaders to trust the Allies to enforce *only* the proposed terms. Other factors which should be considered are: conditions in the affected nations which would foster post-war supra-national security; military capabilities; and costs in men and resources.

99. The first course of action available to the Allies, that of maintaining the military status quo while increasing the political, social and economic pressures, would: be most apt to convince the enemy leaders to trust the Allies; leave the affected nations in a condition best suited for post-war supra-national security; be relatively easy to accomplish militarily without prohibitive cost.

100. The second alternative, to intensify the air battle in order to reduce the enemy's economy below the minimum needed to sustain his civil economy, and at the same time, to increase the political and social pressures would be less apt to cause great destruction which would run counter to post-war Allied aims; although, the Allies should be able to accomplish this military campaign without prohibitive cost.

101. The third alternative, great land campaigns to occupy strategic enemy areas accompanied by increased political, social and economic pressures, would be least apt to cause the enemy leaders to trust the Allies, would result in extensive destruction and dislocation of economies both in enemy and Allied nations, and would be the most expensive and difficult military campaign to undertake; and such campaigns might not be successful.

102. The first alternative, maintenance of a military status quo while increasing the political, social and economic pressures on the enemy, would be the best available Allied course of action.

103. If some Allied territory should remain to be liberated, air and resistance attacks against the enemy occupation forces and their support means would be intensified until "over-running" types of liberation campaigns could be undertaken by relatively small mobile Army forces, as contrasted to the great Allied armies of World War II that were engaged in the "Overlord"²³ campaign against determined and sustained enemy resistance.

104. Adoption of these strategies should lead to enemy acceptance of the proposed Allied terms.

23. The code name for the Allied cross-channel invasion of Europe in June 1944. [Ed. note]

Post Surrender Operations

105. Small military forces, for inspection of enemy compliance with the terms, would be all that the Allies would need, as there would be no military government of enemy territory or other such provision which would require great occupation forces capable of dominating the enemy areas.

106. Allied inspection forces would be located on enemy air bases which would be provided with defensive forces adequate to permit immediate air evacuation in emergencies, and with small, highly mobile forces which could furnish individual protection to inspectors or missions away from the air base.

107. Allied air bases in enemy territory should be located in the vicinity of: centers of government, industries capable of producing aircraft, submarines and ABC agents; principal air and naval headquarters; and land commanders controlling major forces.

108. Success of post-surrender operations would depend on the immediate availability of overwhelming Allied air forces, located on external and protected bases, who would maintain frequent surveillance flights over the enemy areas, and would be capable of launching devastating retaliatory attacks in the event of resistance to terms or of attack on Allied inspectors.

109. Rehabilitation of Allied areas in Europe would involve considerable post-war commitments by the Western Hemisphere Allies.

General Considerations

110. When considered fully and tested adequately, the political, social and economic concepts upon which this study was based, may be rejected in part or in full by the responsible authorities.

111. If, contrary to the concepts of this study, national policy should require Allied imposition of an armistice involving a non-indigenous change of the enemy government, separation of large areas from enemy territory or military government of the enemy territory, then great and very difficult land campaigns would probably be required in order to occupy large areas of enemy territory before the enemy could be defeated.

112. If the political, social and economic forces of the world were mobilized, in line with the philosophy of this study, to repudiate the use of military force as an instrument of national policy, such a war as depicted herein could probably be avoided.

113. Studies on war should be made in a reverse chronological order,

first taking up objectives, then postwar conditions, then armistice terms, then the military campaigns in reverse order, and finally preparations for possible war.

114. The nature of a future war should be made a continuing study, which, it is predicted, will tend to confirm the concepts set forth herein.

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TOP SECRET

Evaluation of Current Strategic Air Offensive Plans

JCS 1952/1

December 21, 1948

[Source: Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on deposit in the Modern Military Records Branch, National Archives, Washington, D.C.]

The importance of strategic air operations in early postwar American war plans made the Berlin crisis of 1948-49, with the famous airlift, a particularly worrisome proposition. The question arose whether the United States could meet Berlin's needs and still carry out strategic air offensives concurrently, should the requirement arise. In answering this question, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force explicated the assumptions and principal features of Strategic Air Command Emergency War Plan 1-49, the culmination of a series of attempts to devise an emergency, or quick-reaction, war plan that could receive approval all the way to the top of the policy pyramid. Despite objections of the Chief of Naval Operations, SAC EWP 1-49 became the first atomic annex to an emergency war plan to receive approval at the Joint Chiefs of Staff level.

The Problem

1. To evaluate the chances of success in delivering a powerful strategic air offensive against vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity as contemplated in current war plans; to consider the risks involved in the planned strategic air operations; and to appraise any adverse effect on this offensive of the continuation of the Berlin air lift at its contemplated level until war occurs.

Assumptions

2. War will occur prior to 1 April 1949.
3. Atomic bombs will be used to the extent determined to be practicable and desirable.