g o o ECONOMY AND (SOCIOLOGY OF LAW) [ Ch
OLITICAL COMMUNITIES
United States.
1924;see infra,ch.XI:6. 1 . Nature and "Legitimacy" of Territorial Political
The term iipolitical communityJ'shall apply to a community whose
action is aimed at subordinating to orderly domination by the
ipants a "territory" and the conduct of the persons within it,
rough readiness to resort to physical force, including normally force
ams. The territory must at any time be in some way determinable,
ut it need not be constant or definitely limited. The persons are those
y either permanently or temporarily. Also, the
of the participants may be to acquire additional territory for them-
is sense has existed neither everywhere
ate community it does not exist wherever .the
gainst enemies has been assigned to the house-
association, or some association of a different
ented toward economic interests. Nor has PO-
everywhere and at all times in the sense that
GZ., "forcible maintenance of orderly dominion
abitants," be conceived necessarily as the func-
n of one and the same comniunity. The tasks implied in this function
d among several communities whose actions
rtly overlap each other. For example, "ex-
al" violence and defense have often been in the hands partly of
orhood associations, and partly of war-
ad hoc. "Internal" domination of the "ter-
tragroup relations have. likewise been dis-
s, including religious ones; and even in so
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9 0 2 POLITICAL COMMUNITIES Territorial Political Organizations 9 0 3
far as violence has been used it has not necessarily been mono or the political community, even more than other institutionally
by any one community. Under certain circumstances, "externa anized communities, is so constituted that it imposes obligations on
lence can even be rejected in principle, as it was, for a while, individual members which many of them fulfill only because they
community of the Pennsylvania Quakers; at any rate, organized aware of the probability of physical coercion backing up such obli-
ration for its use may be entirely lacking. As a rule, however, ons. The political community, furthermore, is one of those com-
to apply violence is associated with domination over a territo nities whose action includes, at least under normal circumstances,
As a separate structure, a political community can be sai ion through jeopardy and destruction of life and freedom of move-
only if, and in so far as, a community constitutes more than t applying to outsiders as well as to the members themselves. The
nomic group"; or, in other words, in so far as it possesses value s ~vidualis expected ultimately to face death in the group interest.
ordering matters other than the directly economic disposition o is to the political community its particular pathos and raises
and services. The particular content of social action, beyond the enduring emotional foundations. The community of political destiny,
domination of territory and inhabitants, is conceptually irrele above all, of common political struggle of life and death, has given
may vary greatly according to whether we deal with a "robbe to groups with joint memories which often have had. a deeper im-
a "welfare state," a "constitutional," or a "culture" state. Owi t than the ties of merely cultural, linguistic, or ethnic community.
drastic nature of its means of control, the ~oliticalassociatio s this "community of memories" which, as we shalI see [see sec. 5
titularly capable of arrogating to itself all the possible values OW],constitutes the ultimately decisive element of "national con-
which associational conduct might be oriented; there is ~robabl
in 'the world which at one time or another has not been an The political community never has been, nor is it today, the only
social action on the part of some ~oliticalassociation. mmunity in which the renunciation of life is an essential part of the
On the other hand, a political community may restrict i red obligations. The obligations of other groups may lead to the same
action exclusively to the bare maintenance of its dominion me consequences. To name but a few: blood vengeance on the
territory, and it has in fact done so frequently enough. Eve of kinship groups; martyrdom in religious communities; the "code
exercise of this function, the action of a political community is, onor" of status groups; or the demands of a good many athletic
cases, intermittent, no matter what its general level of deve ciations; of groups like the Camorra2 or, especially, of all groups
may be in other respects. Such action flares up in response to d for the purpose of violent appropriation of the economic goods
threat or to an internal sudden impulse to violence, however m
it dies down, yielding factually to .a state of "anarchy" during ' rom such groups the political community differs, .sociologically,
peaceful times, when coexistence and social action on the par ly one respect, viz., its particularly enduring and manifest existence
inhabitants of the territory take the form of merely factual mu well-established power over a considerable territory of land and
spect for the accustomed economic spheres, without the availa sibly also sea expanse. Accordingly, the differentiation between the
any kind of coercion either for external or for internal use. itical community on the one hand and, on the other, the groups
In our terminology, a separate "political" community is con erated above, becomes less clearly perceptible the further we go
where we find ( I ) a "territory1'; (2) the availability of physi in history. In the minds of the participants the notion that the
for its domination; and (3) social action which is not restricte itical community is just one among others turns into the recognition
sively'to the satisfaction of common economic needs in the fra its qualitatively different character in step with the change of its
communal economy, but regulstes more generally the interrela0 tivities from merely intermittent reaction to active threats into a
the inhabitants of the territory. manent 'and institutionalized consociation whose coercive means are
The opponents against whom the possibly violent social ac h drastic and effective but which also create the possibility of a
directed may be located outside or inside the boundaries of the tionally casuistic order for their application.
in question. Since the ~oliticalpower has become the monopoly The modern position of political associations .rests on the prestige
ized, today "institutional," action, the objects of coercion are stowed upon them by the belief, held by their members, in a specific
found primarily among the compulsory members of the organi nsecration: the "legitimacy" of that social action which is ordered
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9 0 4 2 1 Stages in the Formation of Political Association 9 0 5
and regulated by the rational consociation into an institutional order is nothing primordial,
and in so far as, soc but a product of evolution.
the power to dispose over life and death. It is on Where economic conditions are undifferentiated, it is hardly possible
consensus on the specific legitimacy of action is to discern a special political community. As we consider them today,
The belief in the specific legitimacy of political action can, the basic functions of the "state" are: the enactment of law (legislative
under modem conditions actually does, i function); the protection of personal safety and public order (police);
certain political communities, viz., the protection of vested rights (administration of justice); the cultiva-
capable of "legitimizing," by virtue of tion of hygienic, educational, social-welfare, and other cultural interests
cise of physical coercion by any other c (the various branches of administration); and, last but not least, the
threatening and exercising such coercion, the organized armed protection against outside attack (military adminis-
community has developed a system of casuistic tration). These basic functions are either totally lacking under primitive
ticular "legitimacy" is imputed. This conditions, or they lack any form of rational order. They are per-
"legal order," and the political communi formed, instead, by amorphous ad hoc groups, or they are distributed
creator, since that community has, in among a variety of groups such as the household, the kinship group,
the monopoly of the power to compel by phys the neighborhood association, the rural commune, and completely
those rules. voluntary associations formed for some specific purpose. Furthermore,
This preeminence of the "legal order" guaranteed by the poli private association enters domains of action which we are used to regard
power has arisen only in the course of a very gradual development. It exclusively as the sphere of political associations. Police functions are
due to the fact that those other groups which once had exercised their thus performed in West Africa by private secret s~cieties.~Hence one
coercive powers lost their grip on the individ cannot even include the maintenance of internal peace as a necessary
of economic and structural displacements they either disintegrate component of the general concept of political action.
subjected themselves to the political community which would If the idea of a specific legitimacy of violence is connected with any
delegate to them their coercive powers, but would simultaneously particular type of consensual action, it is with that of the kinship group
reduce them. in the fulfillment of the obligation of blood vengeance. This connection
The rise to preeminence of the politically guaranteed legal order is weak, on the other hand, with regard to organizational action of a
also due to the simultaneous develop military type, directed against an external enemy, or of a police type,
interests requiring a protection which could n directed against the disturbers of internal order. It becomes more
earlier autonomous communities. Conseque clearly perceptible where a territorial association is attacked by an
sphere of interests, especially economic ones external enemy in its traditional domain, and arms are taken up by the
tection only in those rationally regulated members in the manner of a home guard. Increasing rational precau-
the political community was able to create. tions against such eventuaIities may engender a organization
"nationalization" of all "legal norms" took p regarded as enjoying a particular legitimacy. Such an organization can
has been discussed el~ewhere.~ emerge as soon as there exists a certain stability of usages as well as at
least a rudimentary corporate apparatus, ready to take precautions
against violent attaclc from without. This, however, represents a fairly
2. Stages in the Formation of Political Association advanced stage.
The fact that "legitimacy" originally had little bearing upon vio-
Violent social action is obviously lence-in the sense that it was not bound by norms--can be observed
Every group, from the household to the even more clearly in situations where the most warlike members of
resorted to physical violence when it had a gioup on their own initiative consociate through personal fraterniza-
members and was capable of doing so. tion to organize marauding raids. This has been, at all stages of eco-
of legitimate violence by the political- nornic development up to the formation of the rational state, the typical
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Stagesin the Formation of Political Association
9 0 6 POLITICAL COMMUNITIES
9 0 7
all the girls of the territory dominated. The num&ous traces of
way in which aggressive wars were initiated in sedentary societies.
-called premarital promiscuity, which so often are taken for residues
freely selected leader is then normally legitimated by his personal
primitive, undifferentiated, endogamous sexual habits, would rather
ities (charisma), and we have discussed elsewhere the kind o
m to be connected with this political institution of the men's house.
of domination which then emerges. Violence acquires legitimacy
ach member of the warrior fraternity had his
in those cases, however-at least initially-in which it is dir
ng outside as maternal goups. In most cases, the two
against members of the fraternity who have acted treasonably or
nation with one another.
have harmed it by disobedience or cowardice. This sta their economic position, which is based on the
gradually, as this ad hoc consociation develops into a perma
of outsiders, especially women, the-consociated
ture. Through the cultivation of military prowess and war as a voc
rriors resort under certain circumstances to the use of religiously
such a structure develops into a coercive apparatus abl
ored means of intimidation. The spirit manifestations which they
and comprehensive claims to obedience. These claims will ns very often are nothing but plundering
against the inhabitants of conquered territories as well as against ire for their undisrupted execution that, on the
militarily unfit members of the territorial community from which m, the women and all outsiders flee, on pain of
warriors' fraternity has emerged. The bearer of arms a villages into the woods and thus allow the
those capable of bearing arms as political equals. All other ts" conveniently and without danger of being unmasked to take
trained in arms and those incapable of bearing arms, are the houses whatever may please them. The well-known procession
women and are explicitly designated as such in many p e Duk-Duks in Indonesia is an example in point.
pages. Within these consociations of warriors freedom is i do not believe at all in the legitimacy of
the right to bear arms. The men's house, which has been stud and simple swindle is recognized by them as
Schurtz with so much sympathetic care, and which, in various and is protected by the magical prohibition against entry into the
recurs in all parts of the world, is one of those struc s house by outsiders and by the draconic obligations of silence
eventually from such a consociation of warriors, or, in Schurtz's t ich are imposed upon the members. The prestige of the men's league
nology, a "men's league." In the sphere of political action-assu mes to an end, as far as the women are concerned, when the secret
a highly developed profession of warriors-it is the almost exact or, as has happened occasionally, when it is
terpart to the consociation of monks in the monastery i missionaries. It goes without saying that such
sphere. Only those are members who have demonstrated pro religion for black police purposes, are linked
the use of arms and have been taken into the warriors' brotherho popular cults. But despite its own disposition towards magical super-
a novitiate, while he who has not passed the test remains outsi tion, the warrior society remains specifically earthly and oriented
"woman," among the women and children, who are also join ,and thus it functions as an agent of skepti-
those no longer capable of bearing arms. The man enters a . At all stages of evolution it treats the gods
household only when he has reached a certain age, a change in ect with which the Homeric warrior society
analogous to the present-day transfer to the reserves after,s e ~ c
draftee. Until that moment the man belongs to the warriors' e warrior group, consociated freely beyond and above
with every fiber of his existence. The members of the fraternity d of life, is, so to speak, fitted into a permanent
as a communistic association, apart from wives and househo ity, and when thereby a political organization is
live on war booty and on the contributions they levy
tain a specific legitimation for the use of violence.
especially on the women by whom the agricultural wo it takes place at all, is gradual. The larger com-
only worlc, in addition to the conduct of war, regarded as
nity, among whose members are the warriors who had so far been
them is the production and upkeep of the implements of war, anized as marauders or as a permanent warriors' league, may acquire
they frequently reserve for themselves as their exclusive privilege ely~consociatedwarriors' raids to its control.
Depending on the social regulations in question, the warrio uccess through either of two processes: the warriors'
or purchase girls in common, or demand as their right the pros
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9 0 8 POLITICAL COMMUNITIES 2 1 Stages in the Formation of Political Association 9 0 9
organization may disintegrate owing to a long period of pacificatio the church, to limit feuds and to establish temporary, periodical, or
or a comprehensive political consociation may be imposed either auto permanent leagues for the maintenance of public peace (Land+edens-
omo~slyor heteronomously. The larger community will be interest biinde). And as the expansion of the market disrupted the monopolistic
in obtaining such control because all of its members may have to ruff organizations and led their members to the awareness of their interests
from the reprisals against the warriors' raids. An illustration of succ in the market, it cut out from under them the basis of that community
ful acquisition of such control is presented by the suppression by of interests on which the legitimacy of their violence had developed.
Swiss of the practice of their young men to hire out as soldiers to f The spread of pacification and the expansion of the market thus consti-
eign power^.^ tute a development which is accompanied, along parallel lines, by ( I )
Such control over the booty campaigns was already exercised that monopolization of legitimate violence by the organization
eady Germanic history by the political community of the distri which finds its culmination in the modem concept of the state as the
(Landsgemeinde). If the coercive apparatus is strong enough, it ultimate source of every kind of legitimacy of the use of force;
suppress private violence in any form. The effectivenessof this sup and (2) that rationalization of the rules of its application which has
sion rises with the development of the coercive apparatus into a per come to culminate in the concept of the legitimate legal order.
nent structure, and with the growing interest in solidarity against 0 [EXCURSUS:] We cannot deal with the interesting, but hitherto
Siders. Initially it is directed only against those forms of private violen imperfectly developed, typology of the various stages in the development
which would injure directly the military interests of the political co of primitive political organization.' Even under conditions of a relatively
munity itself. Thus in the thirteenth century the French monarc advanced property system, a separate political organization and all its
suppressed the feuds of the royal vassals for the duration of a forei organs can be completely lacking. Such, for instance, was, according
war conducted by the king himself. Subsequently, it engenders, to Wellhausen,' the situation among the Arabs dudng their
generally, a form of permanent public peace, with the compul~ory age. Beyond the kinship groups with their elders (sheik), they did not
mission of all disputes to the arbitration of the judge, who transfor recognize any extra-familial permanent authority. The free community
blood vengeance into rationally ordered punishment, and feuds a of nomads, tenting, wandering, and herding together, which arose out
expiatory actions into rationally ordered legal ~rocedures. of the need for security, lacked any special organs and was essentially
Whereas in early times even actions which were openly recog unstable, and whatever authority.it accepted in the event of a conflict
as felonious were not proceeded against by the organized comm with outside enemies was only of an intermittent character.
except upon pressure on the part of religious or military interests, n Such a situation can continue for very long periods of time and
the prosecution of an ever widening sphere of injuries to persons a under any type of economic organization. The only regular, permanent
property is being placed under the guaranty of the political coerc authorities are the family heads, the elders of the kinship groups, and,
apparatus. Thus the political community monopolizes the legitim besides them, the magicians and diviners. Whatever disputes arise be-
application of violence for its coercive apparatus and is gradudy tra tween kinship groups are arbitrated by the elders with the aid of the
formed into an institution for the protection of rights. In so doin magicians. This situation corresponds to the form of economic life of the
obtains a powerful and decisive support from all those groups w Bedouins. But, like the latter, it is nothing primordial. Wherever the
have a direct or indirect economic interest in the expansion of type of settlement creates economic needs which require permanent and
market community, as well as from the religious authorities. T continuous provision beyond that which the kinship group and house-
latter are best able to control the masses under conditions 'of increas hold can provide, the institution of village chieftain arises. The village
pacification. Economically, however, the groups most interested in chieftain frequently emerges from among the magicians, especially the
fication are those guided by market interests, especially the bur rainmakers, or he is an especially successful leader of marauding raids.
of the towns, as well as all those who are interested,in rive Where the appropriation of property has reached an advanced stage,
bridge tolls and in the tax-paying capacity of their tenants and subje the position of chieftain becomes easily accessible to any man dirtin-
These interest groups expand with an expanding money economy. E guished by his wealth and the corresponding standard of living. But
before the political authority imposed public peace in its own int he cannot exercise red authority except in situations of emergency and
it was they who, in the Middle Ages, attempted, in cooperation even then exclusively upon the basis of some purely personal qualities
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9 1 0 POLITICAL COMMUNITIES
of some magical or similar kind. Otherwise, especially
of continuous peace, he is no more than a popular arbitrator and
directions are followed as statements of good advice. The total abse
of any such chieftain is by no me
periods. The consensual action of neighb
the respect for tradition, the fear of blood vengeanc
of magical powers. In any case, however, the functions of the peaceti
chieftain are in substance largely economic, such as the regulation
tillage, and, occasionally, magico-therapeutic or arbitrational. But,
general, there is no fixed type. Violence is legitimat
applied by the chieftain, and only in those manners and cases in w
it is sanctioned by fixed tradition. For :i
to rely upon the voluntary aid of the
magical charisma and economic em
in a position to obtain that aid.
3. Power Prestige and the "
AU political structures use fo
which they use or threaten to use it
These differences play a specific
destiny of political communities. No
"expansive." They do not all strive
power, or lceep their force in readiness f
over other territories and commu
them dependent. He
vary in the extent to
The political structure of
lective guarantee of the Grea
is not very strongly desired a
ousies existing among neigh
tect it from this fate. Switze
than is the Netherlands, w
is less threatened than Be
sions and is herself threat
neighbors. Sweden too is
structures towards the ou
pansive." And such atti
has a specific internal
bers may pretend to a special "prestige," and their pretensions
influence the externaI conduct of t$e power .structu
3 1 Power Prestige and the "Great Powers" 9 1 1 I/\/
I I/
I '
teaches that claims to prestige have always played into the origin of I
wars. Their part is difficult to gauge; it cannot be determined in gen- 1
eral, but it is very obvious. The realm of "honor," which is comparable I
to the "status order" within a social structure, pertains also to the
interrelations of political structures.
Feudal lords, like modem officers or bureaucrats, are the natural and
primary exponents of this desire for power-oriented prestige for one's
own political structure. Power for their political community means
power for themselves, as well as the prestige based on this power. For
the bureaucrat and the officer, an expansion of power means moreA
office positions, more sinecures, and better opportunities for promotion.
(For the officer, this last may be the case even in a lost war.) For the
feudal vassal, expansion of power means the acquisition of new objects
for infeudation and more provisions for his progeny. In his speech
promoting the crusades, Pope Urban focused attention on these op-
portunities and not, as has been said, on overpopulation. 1 %-
Besides and beyond these direct economic interests, which naturally
exist everywhere among strata living off the exercise of political power,
the striving for prestige pertains to all specificpower structures and hence
to all political structures. This striving is not identical simply with "na-
tional prideH-of this, more later-and it is not identical with the mere
pride in the excellent qualities, actual or presumed, of one's own po-
litical community or in the mere possession of such a polity. Such pride
can be highly developed, as is the case among the Swiss and the Nor-
wegians, yet it may actually be strictly isolationist and free from preten-
sion to political prestige. II
The prestige of power means in practice the glory of power over
other communities; it means the expansion of power, though not al-
i
ways by way of incorporation or subjection. The big political com-
I
munities are the natural exponents of such pretensions to prestige.
Every political structure naturally prefers to have weak rather than
II
strong neighbors. Furthermore, as every big political community is a
I
potential aspirant to prestige, it is also a potential threat to all its neigh-
bors; hence, the big political community, simply because it is big and
strong, is latently and constantly endangered. Finally, by virtue of an
unavoidable "dynamic of power," wherever claims to prestige flame
up-and this normally results from an acute political danger to peace
-they challenge and call forth the competition of all other possible
bearers of prestige. The history of the last decade [I~OO-1~101,espe-
cially the relations between Germany and France, shows the prominent
effect of this irrational element in all political foreign relations. The
sentiment of prestige is able to strengthen the ardent belief in the actual
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9 1 2 POLITICAL COMMUNITIES 4 1 The Economic Foundations of "Imperialism"
existence of one's own might, and this is important for positive self- 4. TheEconomicFoundations of '?nzperiaksm"
assurance in case of conlict. Therefore, all those having ves
in the political structure tend systematically to cultivate this prestig One might be inclined to believe that the formation as well as the
sentiment. expansion of Great Power structures is always and primarily determined
Nowadays one usually refers to those polities that appe economically. The assumption that trade, especially if it is intensive and
bearers of power prestige as the "Great Powers. if it already exists in an area, is the normal prerequisite and the reason
of co-existing polities, some, the Great Powers, u for its political unification might readily be generalized. In individual
selves and usurp an interest in political 2nd eco cases this assumption does actually hold. The example of the Zollverein8
wide orbit. Today such orbits encompass the who1 lies close at hand, and there are numerous others. Closer attention, how-
During Hellenic Antiquity, the "King," that is, ever, very often reveals.that this coincidence is not a necessary one, and
spite his defeat, was the most widely recognized that the causal nexus by no means always points in a single direction.
turned to him in order to impose, with his sanction, th Germany, for instance, has been made into a unified economic ter-
(Peace of Antalcidas) upon the Hellenic world ritory, that is one whose inhabitants seek to sell their products primarily
before the establishment of an empire, the Roman poli in their own market, only through custom frontiers at her borders,
a role. However, for general reasons of "power dyna which were determined in a purely manner. Were all custom
Powers are very often expansive powers; that is, they are associ barriers eIiminated, the economicaIly determined market for the Eastern
aiming at expanding the territories of their respecti German cereal surplus, poor in gluten, would not be Western Germany
munities by the use or the threat of force. Yet Great Powers are but rather England. The economically determined marltet of the min-
necessarily and not always oriented towards expansio ing products and the heavy iron goods of Western Germany is by no
in this respect often changes, and in these changes economic fact means Eastern Germany; and Western Germany is not, in the main, the
play a weighty part. economically determined supplier of the industrial products for East-
ern Germany. Above all, the interior lines of communications (rail-For a time British policy, for instance, quite delibe
roads) of Germany would not be-and, in part, are not now-+CO-
further political expansion. It.renounced even the re
nomically determined routes for transporting heavy goods between east
by means of force in favor of a "little England" policy, resting upon
and west. Eastern Germany, however, would be the economic location
isolationist limitation and a reliance on an economic primacy held to
for strong industries, the economically determined market and hinter-
unshakable. Influential representatives of the Roma land for which would be the whole of Western Russia. Such industries
would have liked to carry through a similar progra are now cut off by Russian custom barriers and have been moved to
after the Punic Wars, to restrict Roman political subjection to Ital Poland, directly behind the Russian custom frontier. Through this de-
and the neighboring islands. The Spartan aristocrats, so far as the velopment, as is Imown, the Anschluss of the Russian Poles to
were able, quite deliberately limited their politic the Russian imperial idea, which seemed to be ~oliticall~out of the
sake of isolation. They restricted themselves to question, has been brought into the realm of possibility. Thus, in this
other political structures that endangered their power and presti case, ~urelyeconomically determined market relations have a politicaIly
favored the particularism of city states. Usually, i unifying effect.
many similar ones, the ruling groups of notables (the Roma Germany, however, has been politically united against the economic
of office, the English and other liberal notables, the Spartan .overlord determinants as such. It is not unusual for the frontiers of a polity to
harbor more or less distinct fears lest a perpetual "imperialis conflict with the mere geographically given conditions of economic loca-
an "imperator," that is, a charismatic warlord, who might gain tion; the political frontiers may encompass areas that, in terms of eco-
ascendancy at their expense. However, like the Romans, nomic factors, strive to separate. In such situations, tensions among
after a short time, were forced out of their policy of self-restraint a economic interests nearly always arise. However, if the ~oliticalbond is
pressed into political expansion. This occurred, in part, through capit once created, it is very often, so incomparably stronger that under other-
ist interests in expansion. wise favorable conditions (e.g. the existence of a common language)
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9 1 4 POLITICAL COMMUNITIES
4 I The Economic Foundations of "Imperialism" 9 1 -5
nobody would even think of political separation because of such eco
nomic tensions. This applies, for instance, to Germany. not altogether absent; yet other motives have played their part in every
[EXCURSUS:]Empire formation does not always follow the routes o political overland expansion of the past, including the Crusades. These
export trade, although nowadays we are inclined to see things in thi
motives have included the interest in higher royal incomes, in prebends,
imperialist way. As a rule, the "continental" imperialism-,Russian, a fiefs, offices,and social honors for the vassals, knights, officers, officials,
American-just lilce the "overseas imperialism" of the British and
the younger sons of hereditary officeholders, and so on. The .interests of
those modeled after it, follow the traclcs of previously existing capital trading seaports have not, of course, been so decisive, although they were
interests, especially in foreign areas that are politically weak. And important as secondary factors: the first Crusade was mainly an overland
campaign.
course, at least for the formation of great overseas dominions of
past-in the overseas empires of Athens, Carthage, and Rome--exp By no means has trade always pointed the way for political expan-
trade played its decisivepart.
sion. The causal nexus has very often been the reverse. Among the em-
Yet, even in these ancient polities other economic interests were a
pires named above, those which had an administration technically able
least of equal and often of far greater importance than were commerci
to establish at least overland means of communication did so for ad-
profits: ground rents, farmed-out taxes, office fees, and similar gai
ministrative purposes. In ~rinciple,this has often been the exclusive pur-
were especially desired. In foreign trade, in turn, the interest in sell
pose, regardless of whether or not the means of communication were
definitely receded into the background as a motive for expansion. In
advantageousfor existing or future trading needs.
Under present-day conditions, Russia may well be considered a coun-
age of modem capitalism the interest in exporting to foreign territor
is dominant, but in the ancient states the interest was rather in the p
try whose means of communication (railroads today) have been pri-
session of territories from which goods (raw materials) could be i
marily determined politically. The Austrian southern railroad is another
example. (Its shares are still called "lombards," a term loaded with
ported.
Among the great states that have formed on the inland plains, t
political reminiscences.) And there is hardly a polity without "strategic
exchange of goods played no regular or decisive part. The trading
railroads;" Nevertheless, many projects of this kind have been under-
taken with the concomitant expectation of a traffic guaranteeing long-
goods are most relevant for the river-border states of the Orient, es
run profitableness. It was no different in the past: On the one hand, it
cially for Egypt; that is, for states that in this respect were similar
cannot be proved that the ancient Roman military highroads served a
overseas states. The "empire" of the Mongols, however, certainly d commercial purpose; and it certainly was not the case for the Persian
not rest on any intensive trade in goods. There, the mobility of the ruli and Roman mail posts, which served exclusively political purposes; on
stratum of horsemen made up for the lack of material means of c
munication and made centralized administration possible. Neither
the other, the development of trade in the past has of course been the
normal result of political unification. Political' unification first placed
empires of China, Persia, or Imperial Rome after its transformati trade upon an assured and guaranteed legal basis. Even this rule, how-
from a coastal to a continental empire, were originated or maintai
ever, is not without exceptions. For, besides depending on pacification
on the basis of a pre-existing and a particularly intensive inland tra
and formal guarantees of law enforcement, the development of' trade has
in goods or highly developed means of communication. The continen been bound to certain economic conditions (especially the development
expansion of Rome was undoubtedly very strongly determined of capitalism). Moreover, the evolution of capitalism may be strangled
capitalist interests; and these interests were above all the interests
by the manner in which a unified political structure is administered.
tax-farmers, office hunters, and land speculators. They were not, in
This was the case, for instance, in the late Roman Empire. Here a uni-
first place, the interests of groups pursuing a particularly intensive tra
fied structure took the place of a league of city states; it was based
in goods.
upon a strong subsistence agrarian economy. This increasingly made for
The expansion of Persia was not in any way served by capital liturgies as the way of raising the means for the army and the administra-
interest groups. Such groups did not exist there as motivating forces tion; and these directly suffocated capitalism.' [ENDOF EXCURSUS.]
as pace-makers, and just as little did they serve the founders of the C If trade in itself is by no means the decisive factor in political ex-
nese empire or the founders of the Carolingian monarchy. pansion, the economic structure in general does co-determine the extent
Of course, even in these cases, the economic importance of trade and manner of political expansion. Besides women, cattle, and .slaves,
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9 1 6 POLITICAL COMMUNITIES 4 1 The Economic Foundations of "Imperialism" 9 1 7
scarce land is one of the original and foremost objects of forceful a conflict with the land interest of the peasantry. Such a conflict has
quisition. For conquering peasant communities, the natural way is played its part in the status struggles in the long epoch ending with the
take the land directly and to wipe out its settled population. T Gracchi. The big holders of money, cattle, and men naturally wished
Teutonic Migration has, on the whole, taken this course only t the newly gained land. to be dealt with as public land for lease (ager
moderate degree. As a compact mass, this movement probably publicus). AS long as the regions were not too remote, the peasants
somewhat beyond the present linguistic frontiers, but only in scat demanded that the land be partitioned in order to provide for their
zones. How far a land scarcity, caused by overpopulation, contribu progeny. The compromises between these two interests are distinctly re-
how far the political pressure of other tribes, or simply good oppo flected in tradition, although the details are certainly not very reliable.
ties, must be left open. In any case, for a long time some of the in Rome's overseas expansion, as far as it was economically determined,
ual groups who went out for conquest reserved their claims to the ar shows features that have since recurred in basic outline again and again
land back home, in case they should return. and which still recur today. These features occurred in Rome in pro-
In other than peasant communities, too, the more or less viole nounced fashion and in gigantic dimensions, for the first time in history.
taken lands are important for the way in which the victor will However fluid the transitions to other types may be, these "Roman"
his rights. As Franz Oppenheimer has rightly emphasized, groun features are peculiar to what we wish to call imperialist capitalism, or
is frequently the product of violent political subjection.1° Given a rather, they provide the conditions for the existence of this specific type.
sistence economy and a feudal structure this subjection means, of co These features are rooted in the capitalist interests of tax-farmers, of
that the peasantry of the incorporated area will not be wiped out state creditors, of suppliers to the state, of overseas traders privileged
rather will be spared and made tributary to the conqueror, who beco by the state, and of colonial capitalists. The profit opportunities of all
the landlord. This has happened wherever the army was no longe these groups rest upon the direct exploitation of political power directed
levy composed of self-equipped freemen, or yet a mercenary or bur towards expansion.
cratic mass army, but rather an army of self-equipped knights, as By forcibly enslaving the inhabitants, or at least tying them to the
the case with the Persians, the Arabs, the Turks, the Normans, a soil (glebae adscriptio) and exploiting them as plantation labor, the
the Occidental feudal vassals in general. acquisition of overseas colonies brings tremendous opportunities for
The interest in ground rent has also meant a great deal for pl profit for capitalist interest-groups. The Carthaginians seem to have
cratic trading communities engaged in conquest. As commercial pr been the first to have arranged such an organization on a large scale;
were preferably invested in land and indebted bondsmen, the no the Spaniards in South America, the English in the Southern States of
aim of warfare, even in Antiquity, was to gain fertile land fit to the Union, and the Dutch in Indonesia were the last to do it in the grand
ground rent. The Lelantine War [c. 590 B.c.], which marked a s manner. The acquisition of overseas colonies also facilitates the compul-
epoch in early Hellenic history, was almost wholly carried on at sory monopolization of trade with these colonies and possibly with other
and among trading cities. But the original object of dispute be areas. Wherever the administrative apparatus of the polity is not suited
the leading patricians o! Chalcis and Eretria was the fertile Lelan for the collection of taxes from the newly occupied territories--of this,
plain. Besides tributes of various sorts, one of the most important p later-the taxes opportunities for profit to capitalist tax-farmers.
leges that the Attic Maritime League evidently offered to the demo The material implements of war may be part of the equipment pro-
the ruling city was to break up the land monopoly of the subject c vided by the army itself, as is the case in pure feudalism. But if these
The Athenians were to recei t to acquire and mortgage implements are furnished by the polity, rather than by the army, then
anywhere. expansion through war and the procurement of armaments to prepare
The establishment of com ong cities allied to Rom for war represent by far the most profitable occasion for loan operations
in practice the same thing. rseas interests of the on the largest scale. The profit opportunities of capitalist state creditors
Italics settled throughout the of influence certainly re then increase. Even during the Second Punic War capitalist state credi-
sented, at least in part, land essentially capitalist na tors prescribed their own _conditionsto the Roman polity.
as we know them from [Cice gainst Gaius Verres.ll Where the ultimate state creditors are a mass stratum of state rentiers
During its expansion, erest in land may come (bondholders) such credits provide profit opportunities for bond-issuing
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4 I The Economic Foundations of "Imperialism" 9 1 9
banks, as is characteris is, brought into the specifically modern forms of public and private
the materials of war p enterprise. These opportunities spring from public arms contracts; from
forces interested in th railroad and other construction tasks carried out by the polity or by
builders endowed with monopoly rights; from monopolist organizations
life. for the collection of levies for trade and industry; from monopolist con-
cessions; and from government loans.
The preponderance of such profit opportunities increases, at the
expense of profits from the usual private trade, the more that public
enterprises gain in economic importance as a general form of supply-
ing needs. This tendency is directly paralleled by politically backed
economic expansion and competition among individual polities, whose
members can afford to invest capital. These members aim at securing
for themselves such monopolies and shares in public commissions. And
the importance of the mere "open door" for the private importation of
goods recedes into the background.
The safest way of monopolizing for the members of one's own polity
profit opportunities which are linked to the public economy of the
foreign territory is to occupy it or at least to subject the foreign political
power in the form of a "protectorate" or some such arrangement. There-
fore, this "imperialistJ' tendency increasingly displaces the "pacifist'!
tendency of expansion, which aims merely at freedom of trade. The
latter gained the upper hand only so long as the organization of supply
by private capitalism shifted the optimum of capitalist profit opportuni-
ties towards pacifist trade and not towaids monopolist trade, or at least
trade not monopolized by political power.
The universal revival of "imperialist" capitalism, which has always
been the normal form in which capitalist interests have influenced
politics, and the revival of political drives for expansion are thus not ac-
important for the nature of expansive eonomic tendencies backed u cidental. For the predictable future, the prognosis will have to be made
political communities. in its favor.
This situation would hardly change fundamentally if for a moment
we were to make the mental experiment of assuming the individual
polities to be somehow "state-socialist" communities, that is, organizations
supplying a maximum amount of their needs through a collective econ-
omy. They would seek to buy as cheaply as possible indispensable goods
not produced on their own territory (cotton in Germany, for instance)
from others that have natural monopolies and would seek to exploit
them. It is probable that force would be used where it would lead easily
to favorable conditions of exchange; the weaker party would thereby be
obliged to pay tribute, if not formally then at least actually. For the rest,
Increasing opportunities for profit abroad emerge again today, e one cannot see why the strong state-socialist communities should disdain
cially in territories that are opened up politically and economically, to squeeze tribute out of the weaker communities for their own partners
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9 2 0 POLITICAL COMMUNITIES The Economic Foundations of "Imperialism" 9 2 1
where they could do so, just as happened everywhere during ear more difficult to satisfy demands in other fields. Above all, the means of
history. Even in a polity without state-socialism the mass of citizens ne war are raised by way of levies, which the ruling strata, by virtue of
be as little interested in pacifism as is any single their social and political power, usually know how to transfer to the
demos-and not it alone-lived economically off war. War brough masses, quite apart from the limits set to the regimentation of property
soldiers' pay and, in case of a victory, tribute fro for "mercantilist" considerations.
tribute was actually distributed among the Countries little burdened by military expenses (the United States)
veiled form of attendance-fees at popular ass and especially the small countries (Switzerland, for example) often
public festivities. Here, every full citiz experience a stronger economic expansion than do some of the Great
terest in imperialist policy and power. Nowad Powers and sometimes are more readily admitted to the economic ex-
from abroad to the members of a polity, includ ploitation of foreign countries because they do not arouse the fear that
origin and those actually representing f' political intervention might followeconomicintrusion.
constellation of interests so comprehensible to the masses. For und Experience shows that the pacifist interests of petty bourgeois and
the present 'economicorder, the tribute to "creditor nations" assumes t proletarian strata very often and very easily fail. This is partly because
forms of interest payments on debts or of capital profits transferred fro of the easier accessibility of all unorganized "masses" to emotional in-
abroad to the propertied strata of the "creditor nation." Were one fluences and partly because of the definite notion (which they enter-
imagine these tributes abolished,it would mean for countries like Englan tain) of some unexpected opportunity somehow arising through war.
France, and Germany a very palpable decline of purchasing pow Specificinterests, like the hope entertained in overpopulated countries of
for home products. This would influence the labor market in an acquiring territories for emigration, are, of course, also important in this
favorablemanner. connection. Another contributing cause is the fact that the "masses," in
In spite of this, labor in creditor nations is of strongly ~acifistmi contrast to other interest-groups, subjectively risk a smaller stake in the
and on the whole shows no interest whatsoever in the continuation a game. In case of a lost war, the monarch has' to fear for his throne; re-
compulsory collection of such tributes from foreign de publican power-holders and groups having vested interests in a republi-
that are in arrears. Nor does labor show an interest in forcibly particip can constitution have to fear their own.victorious general. The majority
ing in the exploitation of foreign colonial territories and ~ublicco of the propertied bourgeoisie have to fear economic loss from the brakes
missions. This is a natural outcome of the imm being placed upon business as usual. Under certain circumstances,
the one hand, and, on the other, of the internal so should disorganization follow defeat, the ruling stratum of notables has
situation of communities in a capitalist era. Those to fear a violent shift in power in favor of the propertyless. The "masses"
belong to the opponent class, who do as such, at least in their subjective conception and in the extreme case,
successful imperialist policy of coercing the g concrete to lose but their lives. The valuation and effect
least at first-also strengthens the domestic prestige fluctuates in their own minds. On the whole, it
power and influence of those classes, status groups, and parties, zero through emotional influence.
whose leadership the success has been attained.
In addition to the pacifist sympathies determined
political constellation, there are economic sources o
among the masses, especially among the poletariat. Every inv
capital in the production of war engines and war material he fervor of this emotional influence does not, in the main, have
and income opportunities; every defense contract origin. It is based upon sentiments of prestige, which often
directly contributing to prosperity by incre down to the petty-bourgeois masses of states rich in the
the intensity of business enterprise. Even of power-positions. The attachment to all this
become a source of enhanced confidence in the econo se with a specific belief in responsibility towards
of the participating industries and lead to a spec generations. The great power structures per se are then
vestment, however, withdraws capital from alternate us e a responsibility of their own for the way in which power
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9 2 2 POLITICAL COMMUNITIES 5 1 The Nation 9 2 3
and prestige are distributed between their own and varying intensity; for instance, it is very low in the United States as well
It goes without saying that all those groups who hol as in Canada.
steer common conduct within a polity will most strongly instill them "National" solidarityamong men speaking the same language may be
selves with this idealist krvor of power prestige. T just as well rejected as accepted. Solidarity, instead, may be linked with
specific and most reliable bearers of the idea of the state differences in the other great culture value of the masses, namely, a
power structure demandingunqualified devotion. religious creed, as is the case with the Serbs and Croats. National soli-
In addition to the direct and material imperialist in darity may be connected with differing social structure and mores and
above, there are the indirectly material hence with "ethnic" elements, as is the case with the German Swiss
terests of strata that are in 'various ways ~rivilegedwi and the Alsatians in the face of the Germans of the Reich, or with the
indeed, privileged by its very existence. They com Irish facing the British. Yet above all, national solidarity may be linked .
those who think: of themselves as being the specific "partners" o to memories of a common political destiny with other nations, among
specific"culture" diffused among the members of the ~olity.Under the Alsatians with the French since the Revolutionary War which
influence of these circles, the naked prestige of "power" is un represents their common heroic age, just as among the Baltic Barons
transformed into other special forms of prestige and especially into with the Russians whose political destiny they helped to steer.
idea of the "nation." It goes without saying that "national" affiliation need not be based
If the concept of "nation" can in any way be defined unambiguousl upon common blood. Indeed, especially radical "nationalists" are often i
of foreign descent. Furthermore, although a specific common anthro-it certainly cannot be stated in terms of empirical qualities
those who count as members of the nation. In the sense of those us pological type is not irrelevant to nationality, it is neither sufficient nor . ,
prerequisite to nation founding. Nevertheless, the idea of the "nationJ'the term at a given time, the.concept undoubtedly means, above all, t
it is proper to expect from certain groups a specific senti is apt to include the notions of common descent and of an essential,
darity in the face of other groups. Thus, the concept b though frequently indefinite, homogeneity. The "nation" has these no-
sphere of values. Yet, there is no agreement on how tions in common with the sentiment of solidarity of ethnic communities,
be delimited or about what concerted a which is also nourished from various sources, as we have seen before
solidarity. [ch. V:4]. But the sentiment of ethnic solidarity does not by itself
In ordinary language, "nation" is, fi make a "nation." Undoubtedly, even the White Russians in the face of
"people of a state," that is, with the the Great Russians have always had a sentiment of ethnic solidarity, yet
Numerous polities comprisegroups who e even at the present time they would hardly claim to qualify as a separate
ence of their "nation" in the face of other "nation." The Poles of Upper Silesia, until recently, had hardly any
parts of a group whose members declar feeling of solidarity with the "Polish Nahon." They felt themselves to
nous "nation" (Austria is an examp be a separate ethnic group in the face of h e Germans, but for the rest
"nation" is not identical with a community spea they were Prussian subjects and nothing else.
that this by no means always suffices is indi Whether the Jews may be called a "nation" is an old problem. Most
Croats, the North Americans, the Irish, and of the time, the answer will be negative. At any rate, the answers of
trary, a common language does not seem to h the Russian Jews, of the assimilatingWest-European and American Jews,
"nation." In official documents, besides "Sw and of the Zionists would vary in nature and extent. In particular, the
the phrase "Swiss Nation." And some lan question would be answered very differently by the peoples of their en-
of themselves as a separate "nation," for exa vironment, for example, by the Russians on the one side and the Amer-
the White Russians. As a rule, however, th icans on the other--or at least by those Americans who at the present time
a special "nation" is associated with a common languag still maintain American and.Jewish nature to be essentially similar, as an
value of the masses; this is predominantly American President [T.R.] has asserted in an official document.
of language conflicts, Austria, and equally so in Russia Those German-speaking Alsatians who refuse to belong to the Ger-
Prussia. But this linkage of the common language and "nation" is o man "nation" and who cultivate the memory of political union with
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9 2 4 POLITICAL COMMUNITIES The Nation 9 2 5
France do not thereby consider themselves simply as members of the man State would fight readily against a Russian Polish army but hardly
French "nation." The Negroes of the United States, at least at presen against an autonomous Polish army. The Austrian Serbs would fight
consider themselves members of the American "nation," but they wi against Serbia with very mixed feelings and only in the hope of attaining , ,
hardy ever be so considered by the Southern Whites. common autonomy. The Russian Poles would fight more reliably
Only fifteen years ago, men 1nowing:~theFar East still denied against a German'than against an Austrian army.
the Chinese qualified as a "nationJJ;they held them to be only a "rac It is a well-known historical fact that within the same nation the
Yet today, not only the Chinese political leaders but also the very sa intensity' of solidarity felt toward the outside is changeable and varies
observers would judge differently. Thus it seems that a group of peo greatly in strength. On the whole, this sentiment has grown even where
under certain conditions may attain the quality of a nation through internal conflicts of interest have not diminished. Only sixty years ago
cific behavior, or they may claim this quality as an "attainment"-- the [Prussian conservative] Kreuzzeitung still appealed for the interven-
within short spans of time at that. tion of the emperor of Russia in internal German affairs; today, in spite
There are, on the other hand, social groups that profess indiffere of increased class antagonism, this would be difficult to imagine.
to, and even directly relinquish, any evaluational adherence to a sin In any case, the differences in national sentiment are both significant
nation. At the present time, certain leading strata of the class move and f l ~ dand, as is the case in all other fields, fundamentally different
of the modern proletariat consider such indifference and relinquish answers are given to the question: What conclusions are a group of
to be an accomplishment. Their argument meets with varying suc ~eoplewilling to draw from the "national sentimentJ1found among i
depending upon political and linguistic affiliations and also upon them? No matter how emphatic and subjectively sincere a pathos may
ferent strata of the proletariat; on the whole, their success is ra be formed among them, what sort of specific joint action are they ready
diminishing at thepresent time. o develop? The extent to which in the diaspora a custom, more cor- 1
An unbroken scaleof quite varied and highly changeable attitu rectly, a convention.is adhered to as a "national" trait varies just as much
toward the idea of the "nationJJis to be found among social strata does the importance of common conventions for the belief in the
single groups to whom language usage ascribes the quality of "n stence of a separate "nation." In the face of this value concept of
The scale extends from.emphatic affirmation to emphatic negation e "idea of the nation," which empirically is entirely ambiguous, a
finally complete indifference, as may be characteristic of the citizen ociological typology would -have to analyze all the individual kinds of
Luembourg and of nationally 'hnawaltened" peoples. Feudal str sentiments of group membership and solidarity in their genetic condi-
strata of officials,bourgeois strata of various occupational categories, s and in their consequences for the social action of the participants.
of "intellectuals" do 'not have homogeneous or historically constant cannot be attempted here.
tudes towards the idea. nstead, we shall have to look a little closer into the fact that the
The reasons for the belief that one represents a nation vaq grea ea of the nation for its advocates stands in very intimate relation to
just as does the empirical conduct that actually results from amation restige" interests. The earliest and most energetic manifestations of the
lack of it with a nation. The "national sentiments" of the German, a, in some form,. even though it may have beeri veiled, have con-
Englishman, the North American, the Spaniard, the Frenchman, or a~nedthe legend of a providential "mission." Those to whom the repre-
Russian do not function in an identical manner-to take o tives of the idea zealously turned were expected to shoulder this
simplest illustration-in relation to the polity, with the geog sion. Another element of the early idea was the notion that this
boundaries of which the "idea" of the nation may come into con lssion was facilitated solely through the very cultivation of the pe-
This antagonism may lead to quite different results. Certainly uliarity of the group set off as a nation. Therewith, in so far as its self-
Italians in the Austrian state would fight Italian troops only if coer stification is sought in the value of its content, this mission can con-
into doing so. Large portions of the German Austrians would today stently be thought of only as a specific "culture" mission. The sig-
against Germany only with the greatest reluctance; they could n ificance of the "nation" is usually anchored in the superiority, or at
relied upon. The German-Americans, however, even those valuing east the irreplaceability, of the culture values that are to be preserved
[former] '!nationality" most highly, would fight against Germany, and developed only through the cultivation of the peculiarity of the
gladly, yet, given the occasion, unconditionally. The Poles in the group. It therefore goes without saying that, just as those who wield
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9 2 6 POLITICAL COMMUNITIES Distribution of Power: Class, Status, Party 9 2 7
in the polity involce the idea of the state, th legal order, but, at least normally, it is not' their primary source.
shall tentatively call those who usurp .leadership in a Ku er is rather an additional factor that .enhances the chance
schaft (that is, within a group of people who by virtue er or honor; but it can not alwayssecure them.
culiarity have access to certain ~roductsthat are considered "cul y in which social honor is distributed in a community be-
goods"), are specifically predestined to propagate the "nu een typical groups participating in this distribution we call the
Thishappens when thoseculture agents. ... status order." The social order and the economic order are related in a
[The presentation breaks off here. Notes on the margin of the ner to the legal order. However, the economic order merely
script indicate that Weber intended to deal with the idea and d way in which economic goods and services are distributed
ment of the nation state throughout history. The following d used. Of course, the status order is strongly influenced by it, and
were found on the margin of the sheet: ~ulturalprestige an n turn reacts upon it.
prestige are closely associated. Every victorious war enhances the NOW:"classes," "status groups," and "parties" are phenomena of the
prestige (Germany [I8711, Japan [~gogl,etc.). Whether war stribution of power within a community.
1 the "development of culture" is another question, one whi B. DETERMINATION OF CLASS SITUATION BY MARKET SITUATION. In
solved in a "value neutral" way. It certainly does not do logy, "classes" are not communities; they merely represent
ambiguous way (see Germany after
empirical criteria it would not see
ble, and frequent, bases for social action. We may speak of a
a specifically German character di s" when ( I ) a number of people have in common a specific causal
Germany.] ponent of their life chances, insofar as (2) this component is repre-
sively by economic interests in the possession of goods and
ortunities for income, and (3) is represented under the conditions of
6. TheDistributionof P commodity or labor markets. This is "class situation."
Community:Class,
It is the most elemental economic fact that the way in which the
sposition over material property is distributed among a plurality of
A. ECONOMICALLY DETERMINED R AND THE STATUS ORDER. eople, meeting competitively in the market for the purpose of exchange,
structure of every legal order di itself creates specific life chances. The inode of distribution, in accord
economic or otherwise, within its respective communi th the law of marginal utility, excludes the non-wealthy from com-
of all legal orders and not only that of the state. I ting for highly valued goods; it favors the owners and, in fact, gives
stand by "power" the chance of a man or a number them a monopoly to acquim such goods. Other things being equal,
their own will in a social action even against the resistance of distribution monopolizes the opportunities for profitable
who are participating in the action. those who, provided with goods, do not necessarily have
"Economically conditioned" power is not, of nge them. It increases, at least generally, their power in the price
"power" as such. On the contrary, the emergence o with those who, being propertyless, have nothing to offer but
may be the consequence of power existing on other or or the resulting products, and who are compelled to get rid of
not strive for power only in order to enrich himself e ese products in order to subsist at all. The mode of distribution gives to
including economic power, may be valued for its propertied a monopoly on the possibility of transferring property
quently the striving for power is also conditioned by the social m the sphere of use as "wealth" to the sphere of "capital," that is,
it entails. Not all power, however, entails social honor: The gives them the entrepreneurial function and all chances to share
American Boss, as well as the typical big specul rectly or indirectly in returns on capital. All this holds true within the
linquishes social honor. Quite generally, "mere economic" ea in which pure market conditions prevail. "Property1' and "lack of
especially "naked" money power, is by no means roperty" are, therefore, the basic categories of all class situations. It
social honor. Nor is power the only basis of social honor. Indeed, s oes not matter whether these two categories become effective in the
honor, or prestige, may even be the basis of economic power, and ve struggles of the consumers or of the producers.
frequently has been. power, as weu as honor, may be guarantee n these categories, however, class situations are further dif-
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Distribution of Paver: Class, Status, Party 9 2 9
ferentiated: on the on dn by it something other than the factual direction of interests follow-
usable for returns; and, on the with a certain probability from the class situation for a certain aver-
services that can be of those people subjected to the class situation. The class situation
other circumstances remaining the same, the direction in which
e individual worker, for instance, is likely to pursue his interests may
ry widely, according to whether he is constitutionally qualified for the
hand to a high, to an average, or to a low degree. In the same
money or objects tha n of interests may vary according to whether or not
over products of one' ction of a larger or smaller portion of those commonly affected
to their various dis the class situation, or even an association among them, e.g., a trade
ion, has grown out of the class situation, from which the individual
ect promising results for himself. The emergence of an associa-
on or even of mere social action from a common class situation is by
o means a universal phenomenon.
The class situation may be restricted in its efforts to the generation of
reactions, that is to say, within our terminology, of
However, it may not even have this result. Further-
often merely amorphous social action emerges. For example, the
tinuous relation bling" of worlters known in ancient Oriental ethics: The moral
tion of the conc 1 of the work-master's conduct, which in its practical sig-
the decisive mo as probably equivalent to an increasingly typical phenomenon
recisely the latest industrial development, namely, the slowdown of
tion. The effect of naked possession per se, which among cattle rers by virtue of tacit agreement. The degree in which "social action"
gives the non-owning slave or serf into the power of the cattle possibly associations emerge from the mass behavior of the members
neral cultural conditions, especially to those of
also linked to the extent of the contrasts that
d, and is especially linked to the transparency of the
etween the causes and the consequences of the class situa-
. For however different life chances may be, this fact in itself,
of "class situations" first in the cities, where a "credit marlcet," ence, by no means gives birth to "class action"
e members of a class). For that, the real conditions
e class situation must be distinctly recognizable. For
st of life chances can be felt not as an absolutely
e accepted, but as a resultant from either ( I ) the given
or (2) the structure of the concrete economic
at people may react against the class structure
status group. f intermittent and irrational protest, but in the
C. SOCIAL ACTION FLOTNING PROM CLASS INTEREST. According iation. There have been "class~situations" of the
I), of a specifically naked and transparent sort, in the
Antiquity and during the Middle Ages; especially then
ere accumulated by factually monopolized trading
1products or in foodstuffs; furthermore, under certain
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9 3 0 POLITICAL COMMUNITLES Distribution of Power: Class, Status, Party 9 3 1
conditions, in the rural economy of the most diverse ~eriods, rom consumption credit toward, first, competitive stiggles in the com-
agriculture was increasingly exploited in a profit-making manner. odity market and then toward wage disputes on the'labor market. The
most important historical example of the second category (2) i ass struggles of Antiquity-to the extent that they were genuine class
class situation of the modern proletariat. gles and not struggles between status groups-were initially carried
D. TYPES OF CLASS STRUGGLE. T ~ U Severy class may be the c y peasants and perhaps also artisans threatened by debt bondage
of any one of the innumerable possible forms of class action, but struggling against urban creditors. For debt bondage is the normal
not necessarily so. In any case, a dass does not in itself consti It of the differentiation of wealth in commercial cities, especially
group (Gemeinschaft). To treat "class" conceptually as bein seaport cities. A similar situation has existed among cattle breeders.
to "group" leads to distortion. That &en in the same class s ebt relationships as such produced class action up to the days of
ularly react in mass actions to such tangible situations as economic atilina. Along with this, and with an increase in provision of grain for
in the direction of those interests that' are most adequate to their av e city by transporting it from the outside, the struggle over the means
number is an important and after 4 simple fact for the underst sustenance emerged. It centered in the first place around the pro-
of historical events. However, this fact must not lead to that sion of bread and determination of the price of bread. It lasted through-
pseudo-scientific operation with the concepts of class and class m t Antiquity and the entire Middle Ages. The propertyless flocked
which is so frequent these days and which has found its most ther against those who actually and supposedly were interested in
expression in the statement of a talented author, that the individu dearth of bread. This fight spread until it involved all those com-
be in error concerning his interests but that the class is infallible dities essential to the way of life and to handicraft production. There
its interests. ere only incipient discussions of wage disputes in Antiquity and in
If classes as such are not groups, nevertheless class situations e e Middle Ages. But they have been slowly increasing up into modern
only on the basis of social action. However, social action that es. In the earlier periods they were completely secondary to slave
forth class situations is not basically action among members ellions as well as to conflicts in the commodity market.
identical class; it is an action among members of different classes. The ~ropertylessof Antiquity and of the Middle Ages protested
actions that directly determine the class situation of the worker a ainst monopolies, pre-emption, forestalling, and the withholding of
entrepreneur are: the labor market,: the commodities market, an ods from the market in order to raise'prices. Today the central issue
capitalistic enterprise. But, in its turn, the existence of a ca~itali s the determination of the price of labor. The transition is represented
terprise presupposes that a very specific kind of social action e y the fight for access to the market and for the determination of the
protect the possession of goods per se, and especially the power o rice of products. Such fights went on between merchants and workers
dividuals to dispose, in principle freely, over the means of producti the putting-out system of domestic handicraft during the transition
certain kind of legal order. Each kind of class situation, and abo modern times. Since it is quite a general phenomenon we must men-
when it rests upon the power of property per se, will become n here that the class antagonisms that are conditioned through the
clearly efficacious when all other determinants of reciprocal re1 rket situations are usually most bitter between those who actually and
are, as far as possible, eIiminated in itheir significance. It is in this ctly participate as opponents in price wars. It is not the rentier, the
that the use of the power of propebty in the market obtains its re-holder, and the banker who suffer the ill will of the worker, but
sovereign importance.
I
most exclusively the manufacturer and the business executives who
Now status groups hinder the skict carrying through of the e the direct opponents of workers in wage conflicts. This is so in spite
market principle. In the present context they are of interest only the fact that it is precisely the cash boxes of the rentier, the share-
this one point of view. Before we briefly consider them, note older, and the banker into which the more or less unearned gains flow,
much of a general nature can be said about the more specifi er than into the pockets of the manufacturers or of the business
antagonism between classes (in oui meaning of the tenn cutives. This simple state of affairs has very frequently been decisive
shift, which has been going on continuously in the past, and up:t the role the class situation has played in the formation of political
times, may be summarized, although at a cost of some precision ties. For example, it has made possible the varieties of patriarchal
struggle in which class situations are effective has progressively shi cialism and the frequent attempts-formerly, at least--of threatened
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9 3 2 Distribution of Paver: Class, Status, Party 9 3 3
status groups to form In its characteristic form, stratification by status groups on the basis
geoisie. of conventional styles of life evolves at the present time in the United
E. STATUS HONOR. I States out of the traditional democracy. For example, only the resident
normally groups. They are, however, often of an of a certain street ("the Street") is considered as belonging to "society,"
contrast to the purely economicallydetermined "clas qualified for social intercourse, and is visited and invited. Above all,
to designate as status situation every typical component of the lif is differentiation evolves in such a way as to make for strict submission
men that is determined by a specific, posifive or n the fashion that is dominant at a given time in society. This sub-
tion of Izonor. This honor may be connected with ssion to fashion also exists among men in America to a degree un-
a plurality, and, of course, it can be fpit to a cla wn in Germany; it appears as an indication of the fact that a given
tinctions are linlced in the most varib n puts forward a claim to qualify as a gentleman. This submission
Property as such is not always recoglize cides, at least prima facie, that he will be treated as such. And this
in the long run it is, and with extrbordinary r gnition becomes just as important for-his employment chances in
sistence economy of neighborhood associations, wank establishments, and above all, for social intercourse and marriage
richest who is the "chieftain." However, this of "esteemed" families, as the qualification for dueling among Ger-
preference. For example, in the so-calledpure modem democracy, ns. As for the rest, status honor is usurped by certain families resident
one devoid of any expressly ordered Status ~rivilegesfor individ a long time, and, of course, correspondingly wealthy (e.g. F.F.V.,
may be that only the families coming under app e First Families of Virginia), or by the actual or alleged descendants
class dance with one another. This example is the "Indian Princess" Pocahontas, of the Pilgrim fathers, or of the
Swiss cities. But status honor need not necess members of almost inaccessible sects and all sorts of
situation. On the contrary, it normally stands in sharp opposition to emselves apart by means of any other characteristics
pretensions of sheer property. is case stratification is purely conventional and rests
Both propertied and propertyless1 peopl on (as does almost all status honor in its beginning).
status group, and frequently they d o with very tangible consequen a1 privilege, positive or negative, is easily traveled
This equality of social esteem may, however, in the long run beco stratification of the social order has in fact been
quite precarious. The equality of itatis among American gentlemen, inJ1and has achieved stability by virtue of a stable distribution of
instance, is expressed by the fact that outside the subordination
termined by the different functions of business, it would be conside I;.. ETHNIC SEGREGATION AND CASTE. Where the consequences have
strictly repugnant-wherever the old ;tradition still prevails-if even een realized to their full extent, the status group evolves into a closed
richest boss, while playing billiards or cards in his club would not aste. Status distinctions are then guaranteed not merely by conventions'
his clerk as in every sense Fully his equal in birthright, but would bes and laws, but also by religious sanctions. This occurs in such a way that
upon him the condescending status-donscious "benevolence" which every physical contact with a member of any caste that is considered to
German boss can never dissever fro+ his be lower by the members of a higher caste is considered as making for a
most important reasons why in America the German clubs have ritualistic impurity and a stigma which must be expiated by a religious
been able to attain the attraction &a( the American clubs have. act. In addition, individual castes develop quite distinct cults and gods.
In content, status honor is normally expressed\by the fact that a In general, however, the status structure reaches such extreme con-
all else a specific style of life is edected from all those who wis equences only where there are underlying differences which are held
belong to the circle. Linlced with this expectation are restriction o be "ethnic." The caste is, indeed, the normal form in which ethnic
social intercourse (that is, intercourde omrnunities that believe in blood relationship and exclude exogamous
nomic or any other purposes). ~he!e res arriage and social intercourse usually associate with one another. As
marriages to within the status cir e an
1 entioned before [ch. VI:vi:6], such a caste situation is part of the phe-
dogarnous closure. Whenever this is not ah peoples and is found all over the world. These peo-
irrelevant imitation of another style of life, but consensual action of es, acquire specific occupational traditions of handi-
dmino character. the status develop&ent is under way. afts or of other arts, and cultivate a belief in their ethnic community.
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9 3 4 POLITICAL COMMUNITIES
They live in a diaspora strictly s d from all personal intercours
except that of an unavoidable their situation is legally
carious. Yet, by virtue of their indispensability, they are
erated, indeed frequently privil they live interspersed in
political communities. The J e most impressive historic
example.
A status segregation grown differs in its structure fro
mere ethnic segregation: the cast transforms the horizo
and unconnected coexistences segregated groups into a
tical social system of super- a on. Correctly formulate
comprehensive association integrates the ethnically divided communi
into one political unit. They differ :precisely in this way: ethnic
existence, based on mutual repulsion and disdain, allows each e
community to consider its own honor as the highest one; the caste s
ture brings about a social subordination and an acknowledgement
"more honor" in favor of the privileged caste and status groups. Thi
due to the fact that in the caste structure ethnic distinctions as s
have. become "functional" distinctions within the political associa
(warriors, priests, artisans that are politically important for war
for building, and so on). But even pariah peoples who are most despi
(for example, the Jews) are usually apt to continue cultivating the
lief in their own specific "honor," a belief that is equally peculia
ethnic and to status groups.
However, with the negatively privileged status groups the sens
dignity takes a specific deviation. A sense of dignity is the precipit
in individuals of social honor and of conventional demands
positively privileged status group raises for the deportment of its
bers. The sense of dignity that characterizes positively privileged :
groups is naturally related to their "being" which does not transc
itself, that is, it is related to their "beauty and excellence" (KahoKdya@
Their kingdom is "of this world." They live for the present and by
ploiting their great past. The sense of dignity of the negatively privil
strata naturally refers to a future lying beyond the present, whether
of this life or of another. In other words, it must be nurtured by
belief in a providential mission and by a belief in a specific honor be
God. The chosen people's dignity is nurtured by a belief either that
the beyond "the last will be the first," or that in this life a Messia
appear to bring forth into the light of the world which has cast
out the hidden honor of the pariah people. This simple state of a
and not the resentment which is so~stronglyemphasized in Nietzsc
much-admired construction in the Genealogy of Morals, is the sourc
the religiosity cultivated by pariah status groups (see above, ch. V1:vi:
Disaibution of Paver: Class, Status, Party 9 3 5
moreover, resentment applies only to a limited extent; for one of
Nietzsche's main examples, Buddhism, it is not at all applicable.
For the rest, the development.of status groups from ethnic segrega-
tions is by no means the normal phenomenon. On the contrary. Since
objective "racial differences" are by no means behind every subjective
sentiment of an ethnic community, the question of an ultimately racial
foundation of status structure is rightly a question of the concrete in-
dividual case. Very frequently a status group is instrumental in the
production of a thoroughbred anthropological type. Certainly status
groups are to a high degree effective in producing extreme types, for they
select personally qualified individuals (e.g. the knighthood selects those
who are fit for warfare, physically and psychically). But individual selec-
tion is far from being the only, or the predominant, way in which status
groups are formed: political membership or class situation has at all
times been at least as frequently decisive. And today the class situation
is by far the predominant factor. After all, the possibility of a style of
life expected for members of a status group is usually conditioned
economically.
G. STATUS PRIVILEGES. For all practical purposes, stratification by
status goes hand in hand with a monopolization of ideal and material
goods or opportunities, in a manner we have come to know as typical.
Besides the specific status honor, which always rests upon distance and
exclusiveness, honorific preferences may consist of the privilege of wear-
ing special costumes, of eating special dishes taboo to others, of carrying
arms-which is most obvious in its consequences-, the right to be a
dilettante, for example, to play certain musical instruments. However,
material monopolies provide the most effective motives for the exclusive-
ness of a status group; although, in themselves, they are rarely sufficient,
almost always they come into play to some extent. Within a status circle
there is the question of intermarriage: the interest of the families in the
monopolization of potential bridegrooms is at least of equal importance
and is parallel to the interest in the monopolization of daughters. The
daughters of the members must be provided for. With an increased
closure of the status group, the conventional preferential opportunities
for special employment grow into a legal monopoly of special offices for
the members. Certain goods become objects for monopolization by status
groups, typically, entailed estates, and frequently also the possession of
serfs or bondsmen and, finally, special trades. This monopolization oc-
curs positively when the status group is exclusively entitled to own and
to manage them; and negatively when, in order to maintain its specific
way of life, the status group must not own and manage them. For the
decisive role of a style of life in status honor means that status groups
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9 3 6 6 1 Distribution of Power: Class, Status, Party 9 3 7
are the specific bearers hatever way it may be his style of life has been adjusted to theirs. They will only accept his
manifest, all stylization descendants who have been educated in the conventions of their status
least conserved by the of status conventio group and who have never besmirched its honor by their own economic
differ greatly, they reveal certain labor.
most privileged strata. As to the general effect of the status order, only one consequence
there is a status disqua can be stated, but it is a very important one: the hindrance of the free
common physical lab development of the market. This occurs first for those goods that status
America against the old tradition of esteem for 1 groups directly withhold from free exchange by monopolization, which
every rational economic pursuit, and especially e may be effected either legally or conventionally. For example, in many
is looked upon as a disqualification of status. Arti Hellenic cities during the "status era" and also originally in Rome, the
is also considered degrading work as soon as it is exploited for inherited estate (as shown by the old formula for placing spendthrifts
at least when it is connected with hard under a guardian)14 was monopolized, as were the estates of knights,
is the sculptor working like a mason in his dus peasants, priests, and especially the clientele of the craft and merchant
the painter in his salon-like studio and those f guilds. The market is restricted, and the power of naked property per se,
that are acceptable to the status group. which gives its stamp to class formation, is pushed into the background.
H. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND EFFECTS OF STATUS STRATIFICATIO The results of this process can be most varied. Of course, they do not
The frequent disqualification of the gainfully employed as such is necessarily weaken the contrasts in the economic situation. Frequently
direct result of the principle of status stratification, and of course, they strengthen these contrasts, and in any case, where stratification by
this principle's opposition to a distributio status permeates a community as strongly as was the case in all political
exclusively through the market. These two fa communities of Antiquity and of the Middle Ages, one can never speak
variousindividual ones,ivhich will be touched upon below. of a genuinely free market competition as we understand it today. There
We have seen above that the market an are wider effects than this direct exclusion of special goods from the
personal distinctions: Yunctional" interests d market. From the conflict between the status order and the purely
ing of honor. The status order means pr economic order mentioned above, it follows that in most instances the
in terms of honor and styles of life peculia notion of honor peculiar to status absolutely abhors that which is essen-
The status order would be threatened a tial to the market: hard bargaining. Honor abhors hard bargaining
acquisition and naked economic power stil among peers and occasionally it tabo,os it for the members of a status
extra-status origin could bestow upo group in general. Therefore, everywhere some status groups, and usually
same or even greater honor as the ves the most influential, consider almost any kind of overt participation in
After all, given equality of status hono economic acquisition as absolutelystigmatizing.
addition even if it is not overtly acknow With some over-simplification, one might thus say that classes are
groups having interest in the status order stratified according to their relations to the production and acquisition of
precisely against the pretensions of pure goods; whereas status groups are stratified according to the principles of
cases they react the more vigorously their consumption of goods as represented by special styles of life.
threatened. Calderon's respectful treatment An "occupational status group," too, is a status group proper. For
as opposed to Shakespeare's simultaneou normally, it successfullyclaims social honor only by virtue of the special
canaille illustrates the different way in wh style of life which may be determined by it. The differences between
order reacts as compared with a status ord classes and status groups frequently overlap. It is precisely those status
cally precarious. This is an example of a st communities most strictly segregated in terms of honor (viz. the Indian
where. Precisely because of the rigorous reactions against the claims castes) who today show, although within very rigid limits, a relatively
property per se, the "parvenu" is never accepted, personally and witho high degree of indifference to pecuniary income. However, the Brah-
reservation, by the privileged status groups, no matter how complete mins seek such income in many different ways.
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9 3 8 POLITICAL COMMUNITIES Distribution of Power: Class, Status, Party 9 3 9
As to the general economic conditions making for the predominance to the kind of social action which they struggle to influence; that means,
of stratification by status, only the following can be said. When the they differ according to whether or not the community is stratified by
bases of the acquisition and distribution of goods are relatively stab1 status or by classes. Above all else, they vary according to the structure
stratification by status is favored. Every technological repercussion an of domination. For their leaders normally deal with its conquest. In our
economic transformation threatens stratification by status and pushes general terminology, parties are not only products of modem forms of
class situation into the foreground. Epochs and countries in which domination. W e shall also designate as parties the ancient and medieval
naked class situation is of predominant significance are regularly t ones, despite the fact that they differ basically from modem parties.
periods of technical and economic transformations. And every slowi Since a party always struggles for political control (Herrschaft), its
down of the change in economic stratification leads, in due course, organization too is frequently strict and "authoritarian." Because of these
the growth of status structures and makes for a resuscitation of variations between the fonns of domination, it is impossible to say any-
important role of social honor. thing about the structure of parties without discussing them first. There-
I. PARTIES. Whereas the genuine place of classes is within the ec fore, we shall now turn to this central phenomenon of all social organi-
nomic order, the place of status groups is within the social order, th
is, within the sphere of the distribution of honor. From within the Before we do this, we should add one more general observation
spheres, classes and status groups influence one another and the 1 about classes, status groups and parties: The fact that they presuppose a
order and are in turn influenced by it. "Parties" reside in the spher larger association, especially the framework of a polity, does not mean
power. Their action is oriented toward the acquisition of social pow that they are confined to it. On the contrary, at all times it has been the
that is to say, toward influencing social action no matter what its cont order of the day that such association (even when it aims at the use of
may be. In principle, parties may exist in a social club as well as i military force in common) reaches beyond the state boundaries. This
state. As over against the actions of classes and status groups, for w can be seen in the [interlocal] solidarity of interests of oligarchs and
this is not necessarily the case, ~arty-orientedsocial action always I democrats in Hellas, of Guelphs and Ghibellines in the Middle Ages,
volves association. For it is always directed toward a goal which and within the Calvinist party during the age of religious struggles;
striven for in a planned manner. This goal may be a cause (the pa and all the way up to the solidarity of landlords (International Con-
may aim at realizing a program for ideal or material purposes), or gresses of Agriculture), princes (Holy Alliance, Karlsbad Decrees
goal may be personal (sinecures, power, and from these, honor for [of I 8I g]), socialist workers, conservatives (the longing of Prussian con-
leader and the followers of the party). Usually the party' aims at a servatives for Russian intervention in 1850). But their aim is not neces-
these simultaneously. Parties are, therefore, only possible within gro sarily the establishment of a new territorial dominion. In the main they
that have an associational character, that is, some rational order an aim to influence.the existingpolity.
staff of persons available who are ready to enforce it. For parties
precisely at influencing this staff, and if possible, to recruit from it pa
members. N O T E S
In any individual case, parties may represent interests I. This is the early formulation of territorial political organization and of the
through class situation or status situation, and they may r state, which Weber later summarized in sec. 17 of Part One, ch. I. (R)
following respectively from one or the other. But they need be nei 2. Camorra-well-organized large-scale criminal gang operating in Southern
purely class nor purely status parties; in fact, they are more likely to especially Naples; first appearance c. 1820; achieved effective power over
mixed types, and ,sometimes they are neither. They may represe es municipal government in the I 8go's, was defeated in the elections of goI
rough the effort of the Honest Government League, but flared up repeatedly in
ephemeral or enduring structures. Their means of attaining power ater times, especially about I9I I. (Rh)
be quite varied, ranging from naked violence of any sort to canvas 3. Cf. Soc. of Law, above, ch. VII1:ii: I and 5, and vi:I. (W)
for votes with coarse or subtle means: money, social influence, the f 4. Cf. in this respect the role of the "military societies" as police organs
of speech, suggestion, clumsy hoax, and so on to the rougher or ng the Plains Indians, as described by K. N. Llewellyn and E. A. Hoebel,
Cheyenne Way (1g41), esp. c. 5. (Rh)
artful tactics of obstruction in parliamentary bodies. 5. Cf. E. Fischer, Schweizergeschichte(3rd ed. 1947) 150. (Rh)
The sociological structure of parties differs in 'a basic way accordi 6. For a recent survey and synthesis of such studies, see R. ~hurnwald,
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9 4 O POLITICAL COMMUNITIES
Werden, Wandel und Gestaltung von Staat und Kultur (1934); for illustrations
of the type of society mentioned in the following sentences, see R. F. Barton,
Ifugao Law (1919) and The Kalingas (1948). (Rh)
C H A P T E R
under Prussian leadership in the 1820's
comprised all German states with the
i.e., practically that part of Ge
emerged in I 87I as the new Germ
DOMINATION AND
unity under Prussian hegemony, but
became final through the Prussian-A
tuted an important step. (Rh)
LEGITIMACY
9. Cf. Weber, Agrarverhaltnisse, in
10. On Franz Oppenheimer, see supra
Sicily ruthlessly exploited the loc
prosecuted in the Repetundae (ext
tions contain much valuable informatio
the decline of peasant farming in favor
in the Roman provinces. CE.also Weber, I . Domination byEconomic Power and by Authority1
12. Cf. now Victor Ehrenbe
Schocken paperback, I 962), chs Domination in the most general sense is one of the most important
I 3. All subheadings by Gerth elements of social action. Of course, not every form of social action re-
this section is the elimination of the dic
action and the substitution of "group" for " f the varieties of social
14. On the bona paterna avitaque of n where it is not obvious
also infra, ch. XVI:v, at n. 33. (Wi) omrnunities the elevation
f an official language of a
influence on the develop-
literary language, as, for
nd, political separation has de-
ponding linguistic differentiation, as,
lland as against germ an^.^ Furthermore,
hools stereotypes the form and the
01 language most enduringly and
every sphere.- -of social action is profoundly.,,." ...
minanc)~.In a great number of cases the
n from amorphous social action has been
y in which it has been exercised. Even
here this is not the case, the structure of dominancy and its unfolding
rm of social action and its orientation
yed .the,,.decisiverole..par-
!-tan.! social- ...--..,....,.,.strucfxres.. .. ., __ - of the past
e one hand, and the large-scale capi-
ial case of power, as we shall see
r i
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9 4 2 DOMINATION AND LEGITIMACY Domination by Economic Power and by Authority g 4 3
presently. As in the case of other forms of power, those who exercise can emerge from the social relations in a drawing room as well as in the
domination do not apply it exclusively, or even usually, to the pursuit market, from the rostrum of a lecture-hall as well as from the command
of purely economic ends, such as, for example, a ~lentiful'supply of of a regiment, from an erotic or charitable relationship as well as
economic goods. It is true, however, that the control over economic scholarly discussion or athletics. Such a broad definition would,
goods, i.e., economic power, is a frequent, often purposively willed, con- owever, render the term "domination" scientifically useless. A compre-
sequence of domination as well as one of its most important instruments. nsive classification of all forms, conditions, and concrete contents of
Not every position of economic power, however, represents domination.. ., . .. .. . . . . -. -. -.-... . . . --
omination" in that widest sense is impossible here. We will only call
, ....-..... ...
in our sense of the word. Nor .does domination utilize in every case to mind that, in addition to numerous other possible types, there are
economic power.for its foundation and maintenance. But in the vast two diametrically contrasting types of domination, viz., domination by
majority of cases, and indeed in the most important ones, this is jus virtue of a constellation of interests (in particular: by virtue of a posi-
what happens in one way or another and often to such an extent tha tion of monopoly), and domination by virtue of authority, i.e., power
the mode of applying economic means for the purpose of maintaini to command and duty to obey.
domination, in turn, exercises a determining influence on the structu The purest type of the former is monopolistic domination in the
of domination. Furthermore, the great majority of all economic organiz market; of the latter, patriarchal, magisterial, or princely power. In its
tions, among them the most important and the most modern ones, rev purest form, the first is based upon influence derived exclusively from
a structure of dominanc~.The crucial characteristics of any form the possession of goods or marketable skills guaranteed in some way
domination may, it is true, not be correlated in any clearcut fashion wi and acting upon the conduct of those dominated, who remain, however,
any particular form of economic organization. Yet,-- the..stru.--.
formally free and are motivated simply by the pursuit of their own
dominancy is in many cases both a factor of great economic import interests. The latter lcind of domination rests upon alleged absolute duty
... . . . . , , . ~ - -
Bnd,-.. at least-to some extent,,a result of,economic. ..conaitions. to obey, regardless of personal motives or interests. The borderline be-
Our first aim here is that of stating merely general propositions r tween these two types of domination is fluid. Any large central bank or
garding the ._relationship. ... ..~bet~een.- .-. -.- .-...- forms-.. -of economic organization. . _ . _ _---. a credit institution, for instance, exercises a "dominating" influence on
of,.domihation. Because of this very general character, these proposi the capital marlcet by virtue of its monopolistic position. It can impose
will inevitably be abstract and sometimes also somewhat indefinite. upon its potential debtors conditions for the granting of credit, thus
our purpose we need, first of all, a more exact definition of what influencing to a marked degree their economic behavior for the salce of
mean by "domination" and its relationship to the general term "power the liquidity of its own resources. The potential debtors, if they really
Domination in the quite general sense of power, i.e., of the possib need the credit, must in their own interest submit to these conditions
of imposing one's own will upon the behavior of other persons, and must even guarantee this submission by supplying collateral security.
emerge in the most diverse forms. If, as has occasionally been done, o The credit banks do not, however, pretend that they exercise "authority,"
looks 'upon the claims which the law accords to one person against o i.e., that they claim "submission" on the part of the dominated without
or more others as a power to issue commands to debtors or to those regard to the latters' own interests; they simply pursue their own in-
whom no such claim is accorded, one may thereby conceive of the wh terests and realize them best when the dominated persons, acting with
system of modem private law as the decentralization of domination formal freedom, rationally pursue their own interests as they are forced
the hands of those to whom the legal rights are accorded. F upon them by objectivecircumstances.
angle, the worlcer would have the power to command, i.e., "domination," Even the owner of an incomplete monopoly finds himself in that
over the entrepreneur to the extent of his wage claim, and the civi same position if, despite existing competition, he is able 'by and large
servant over the king to the extent of his salary claim. Such a termi to "prescribe" prices to both exchange partners and competitors; in other
nology would be rather forced and, in any case, it would not be of mor words, if by his own conduct he can impose upon them a way of conduct
than provisional value since a distinction in kind must be made betwe according to his own interest, without, however, imposing on them the
"commands" directed :by the judicial authority to an adjudged debt slightest "obligation" to submit to this domination. Any type of domina-
and "commands" directed by the claimant himself to a debtor prior tion by virtue .of constellation of interests may, however, be transformed
judgment. However, a position ordinarily designated as "dominatin gradually into domination by authority. This applies particularly to
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9 4 4 DOMINATION AND LEGITIMACY Domination by Economic Power and by Authority g 4 5
domination originally founded on a position of monopoly. A bank, f contract concluded in the labor market by formally "equal" parties
instance, in order to control more effectively a debtor corporation, m ry" acceptance of the terms offered by the em-
demand as a condition for credit that some member of its board be ma t than the difference between private and public
a member of the board of the debtor corporation. That boa y that between the military service and the other
can give decisive orders to the management by virtue of the latter's ons. The latter are concluded and terminated voluntarily, while
ligation to obey. by compulsion, at least in those countries where,
Or a central bank of issue causes the credit institutions to ours, the ancient system of mercenary service has been replaced by
uniform terms of credit and in this way tries, by virtue of its p relationship of political allegiance can be en-
power, to secure to itself a continuous control and supervision o extent, be dissolved voluntarily; the same holds
relationships between the credit institutions and their customers. It under certain circumstances, even of the patri-
then utilize its control for ends of currency management or for tionships of the past. Thus even in these cases
purpose of influencing the business cycle or for political ends suc gradual to those relationships of authority, for
for instance, the preparation of financial readiness for war. The are completely involuntary and, for the subject,
kind of use will be made in particular where the central b nterminable. Obviously, a certain minimum interest of the
exposed to influence from the political power. Theoretically, in his own obeying will normally constitute one of the. in-
ceivable that such controls can actually be established, that the en motives of obedience even in the completely authoritarian
and the ways of its exercise become articulated in reglementations, relationship. Throughout, transitions' are thus vague and changing.
special agencies are created for its exercise and special appellate a e wish at all to obtain fruitful distinctions within the con-
for the resolution of questions of doubt, and that, finally, the s.stream of actual phenomena, we must not overlook the clear-cut
are constantly made more strict. In such a case this kind of do een factual power which arises completely out of posses-
might become quite like the authoritative domination of a bureauc of interest compromises in the market, and, on the other
state agency over its subordinates, and the subordination wou ritarian power of a patriarch or monarch with its appeal
the character of a relationship of obedience to authority. bedience simply as such. The varieties of power are in
The same observation can be made with respect to the domin ed by the examples just given. Even mere possession
by the breweries over the tavern owners whom they supply with power in forms other than that of the market. As we
equipment, or the domination to which book dealers would have to d out before, even in socially undifferentiated situations wealth,
mit if there should some day be a German publishers' cartel with p panied by a corresponding way of life, creates prestige, correspond-
to issue and withhold retailers' licenses, or the domination of the in present society of one who "keeps an open house"
line dealers by the Standard Oil Company, or the domination exer r ifsalon." Under certain circumstances, every
through their common sales office by the German coal ~roducers onships may assume authoritarian traits. Domination
the coal dealers. All these retailers may well be reduced broader sense can be produced not only by the exchange rela-
sales agents, little different from linemen working outside the ut also by those of "society"; such phenomena
plant or other private employees but subject to the authority of rom the "drawing room lion" to the patented
partment chief. The transitions are gradual from the ancient d imperial Rome or the courts of love of the
factual dependency on his creditor to formal servitude for debt; Indeed, such situations of domination can be found
the Middle Ages and in modern times, from the craftsman's d side the sphere of private markets and relationships. Even with-
on the market-wise exporter over thk various forms of dep formal power of command an "empire state" or, more correctly,
the home industry to the completeljr authoritarian labor regulatio ho are the decisive ones within it either through au-
the sweatshop worker. And from re other gradations lead to the market, can exercise a far-reaching and occa-
position of the secretary, the engi , or the worker in the 0% otic hegemony. A typical illustration is afforded by
plant, who is subject to a discipline anger different in its nature thin the German Customs Union or, later, in the
that of the civil service or the ar though it has been created me, although much lesser extent, New York's posi-
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9 4 6 DOMINATION AND LEGITIMACY Domination by Economic Power and by Authority g 4 7
tion within 'the United States affords another illustration. I his sense of duty, or by fear, or by "dull" custom, or by a desire to
Customs Union the Prussian officials were dominant,. because th iologically,-thosedifferences are not
state's territory constituted the largest and thus the d hand, the sociological character of
the German Reich they are paramount because the ng to the basic differences in the major
largest net of railroads, the greatest number of univers
and can thus cripple the corresponding administrati s exist, as we have seen, between that narrower con-
the other, formally equal, states. New_-____._____York can.-....exer we have defined it now and those situations of
becau~~i~.js.the,seat_.-__..._.of the.... great.__._financial_ . _ powers.. ._ the tone in the market, the drawing room, .in a discussion, etc.,
power are based upon constellations of interests, They thus we have discussed earlier. W e shall briefly revert to some of these
those which occur in the market, and in the course of develop cases so as to elucidate more clearly the former.
can easily be transformed into formally regulated relationsh ips of domination may exist reciprocally.
thority or, more correctly, into associations with heterocephal ,among officials of.differentdepartments, each is
'-ofcommand and coercive apparatus. Indeed, because of the ve wers of command insofar as the latter have.juris-
of rules, domination which originates in the market or 0th conceptual' difficulties involved, but where a
constellationsmay be felt to be much more oppressive than an mer places with a shoemaker an order for a pair of shoes, can it
in which the duties of obedience are set cut clearly and exp be said that either one has control over the other? .The answer
aspect must not affect, however, the terminology of the soci pend upon the circumstances of each individual case, but almost
In the following discussion we shall use the term dominatio will it be found that in some limited respect the will of the one
clusively in that narrower sense which excludes from its e other even against that other's reluctance and
situations in which power has its source in a formally fr t, consequently, to that extent one has dominated over the other. No
interested parties such as occurs especially in the market. In nation could be built up, however, upon the
in our terminology domination shall be identical with s statement holds true for all rela-
power of command. se of intangibles. Or what shall we
To be more specific, domination will thus mean the is often the case in Asia, is employed
which the manifested will (command) of the ruler or rulers is he, within his vocational jurisdiction, a
to influence the conduct of one or more others (the ruled) , and, if so, by whom? One will be inclined
does influence it in such a way that their conduct to a soc f domination to such relationships,
degree occurs as if the ruled had made the content of th rs which he, the craftsman, exercises
maxim of their conduct for its very own sake. Looked u are exercised over him by those persons who
other end, this situation will be called obedience. o control him by virtue of their officialposition. As soon as we do
FURTHER NOTES:I. The definition sounds awkward, ,we narrow the concept of domination to that technical one which
to the use of the "as if" formula. This cannot be avoided, however. position of a village chief, that is, a
merely external fact of the order being obeyed is not sufficient to si may be exactly like that of the village crafts-
domination in'our sense; we cannot overlook the meaning of the fact een private business and public office, as we
the command is accepted as a "valid" norm. On the other hand, h ent and it is not at all so firmly rooted
ever, the causal chain extending from the command to the actual fac any. In the popular American view,
compliance can be quite varied. Psychologically, the command may dge's job is a business just as a banker's. He, the judge, simply is a
achieved its effect upon the ruled either through empathy or thr who has been granted the monopoly to give a person a decision
inspiration or through persuasion by rational argument or elp of which the latter may enforce some performance against
combination of these three principal types of influenc ,as the case may be, may shield himself against the claims of
over a n ~ t h e r . ~In a concrete case the performance of th opoly the judge enjoys directly or indirectly
have been motivated by the ruled's own conviction of its propriety ate or illegitimate, and for their enjoyment
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9 4 8 DOMINATION AND LEGITIMACY Direct Democracy and Rule by Notables 9 4 9
he pays a portion of his fees to the party boss to whom he owes his job. the hands of the rector and the dean^),^ as well as in numerous other
To all of these, the village chief, the judge, the banker, the crafts- tions of a similar kind. However modest the administrative func-
man, we shall ascribe domination, wherever they claim, and to a socially some power of command, and
relevant degree find obedience to, commands given and received as etween that of a mere servant
such. No usable concept of domination can be defined in any way other development of the latter that
than by reference to power of command; but we must never forget that directed. However, "equalityJ1
here, as everywhere else in life, everything is "in transition." It should ers of functionaries are also
be self-evident that the sociologist is pided exclusively by the factual t the members of their own
existence of such a power of command, in contrast to the lawyer's in- the aristocracy of Venice,
terest in the theoretical content of a legal norm. As far as sociology is or that of the full professors of a German university. They all
concerned, power of command does not exist unless the authority which using those same "democratic" forms of rotation of office,
is claimed by somebody is actually heeded to a socially relevant degree. r short-term election.
Yet, the sociologistwill normally start from the observation that "factual" is End of administration occurs in organizations which
powers of command usually claim to exist "by virtue of law." It is exactly
for this reason that the sociologist cannot help operating with the con- e local or otherwise limited in the num-
ceptual apparatus of the law. ositions of the members must not greatly
ministrative functions must be relatively
stable; 4) however, there must be a certain minimum devel-
2. Direct Democracy and Rule by Notables7 nt of training in objectively determining ways and means. This
rement exists, for instance, in the direct democratic adminis-
W e are primarily interested in "domination" insofar as it is com- Switzerland and the United States just as it existed in the
bined with "administration." Every domination both expresses itself and ssian mir within the confines of its traditional scope of business. W e
functions through administration. Every administration, on the other not look, however, upon this kind of administration as the historical
hand, needs domination, because it is always necessary that some powers velopment but rather as a
of command be in the hands of somebody. Possibly the power of com- as the starting point of in-
mand may appear in a rather innocent garb; the ruler may be regarded s nor drawing lots nor election are
as their "servant" by the ruled, and he may look upon himself in that nctionaries of an organization.
way. This occurs in its purest form in the so-called, zm- Wherever it exists, direct democratic administration is unstable.
mediately democraticJ'administration ["direct democracy"]. ic differentiation arises the proba-
This lcind of administration is called democratic for two reasons ministration will fall into the hands of the wealthy. The
which need not necessarily coincide. The first reason is that it is based personal qualities or more
upon the assumption that everybody is equally qualified to conduct the they can afford to take the
public affairs. The second: that in this lund of administration the scope ns cheaply or without any
of power of command is lcept at a minimum. Administrative functions who are forced to work for
are rotated, or determined by drawing lots, or assigned for short ~eriods ich means income, and the .more
by election. All important decisions are reserved to the' common resolu- labor grows, the more intolerable does this sacrifice become. The
tion of all; the administrative functionaries have only to prepare and of that superiority are thus not simply those who enjoy high in-
carry out the resolutions and to conduct "current businerr" in accordance ut rather those who have an income without personal labor or
with the directives of the general assembly. This type of administration intermittent labor. Under otherwise equal conditions a
can be found in many private associations, in certain political c manufacturer can thus get away from his work less easily and .is
ties such as the Swiss Landesgemeinden or certain townships in th orrespondingly less available for administrative functions than a land-
United States, or in universities (insofar as the administration lies i r a medieval merchant patrician, both of whom have not had
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9 5 0 DOMINATION AND LEGITIMACY Direct Democracy and Rule by Notables 9 5 1
to work uninterruptedly. For the same reason the directors of the great rriors and there often develops a democratic bias of the ,younger
university clinics and institutes are the least suited to be rectors; al- inst the prestige of old age (sexagenarios de ponte).ll The
though they have plenty of administrative experience, their time is too ds of economic or political revolution,
much occupied with their regular work. Hence in the measure in which where the power of reli-
those who have to work are becoming unable to get away from it, direct of a sacred tradition is little de-
democratic administration will tend to turn into rule by notables e. The prestige of old age is preserved, on the
(honoratiores) . ective usefulness of experience or the
We have already met the type as that of the bearer of a special soci tion are estimated highly.
honor connected with the mode of living.g Here we now deposed, power normally accrues not to youth
another indispensable requirement, viz., that capacity to take care of some other kind of social prestige. In the case of
social administration and rule as an honorific duty which derives fro mic or status digerentiation the councils of elders (yepovala, sen-
economic position. Hence we shall tentatively define hon retain its name, but de facto it will be composed of honora-
follows: e . sense discussed above, i.e., "economic" honoratiores, or
Persons who, first, are enjoying an income earned without, or with tatus honor whose power ultimately is also based upon
comparatively little, labor, or at least of such a kind that they can afford
to assume administrative functions in addition to whatever business ac- hand, the battle.cry that a "democratic" administra-
tivities they may be carrying on; and who, second, by virtue of such preserved may become a powerful tool of.the
income, have a mode of life which attributes to them the social "pres- t against the honoratiores, but also of economically
tigeJ1of a status honor and thus renders them fit for being called to rule. hich are not admitted to status honor. In that case
Frequently such rule by honoratiores has developed in the form of ministration becomes a matter of struggle between political
deliberating bodies in which the affairs to be brought before es, especially since the honoratiores, by virtue-of their status pres-
munity are discussed in advance; such bodies easily come to anticipate and the dependency on them of certain groups, can create for
the resolutions of the community or to eliminate them and thus to selves "security tr~ops"~"rom among the poor. .As soon as it is
establish, by virtue of their prestige, a monopoly of the honoratiores. object of a struggle for power, direct democratic adminis-
The development of the rule by honoratiores in this way has existed a tion loses its specific feature, the undeveloped state of domination.
long time in local communities and thus particularly in th ty, after all, exists for the very purpose of fighting for
hood association.Those honoratiores of olden times had a chara the specific sense, and.it thus necessarily tends toward
different, however, from those who emerge in the rationalized dire structure, however carefully it may be trying to
democracy of the present. The original qualification was old a
communities which orient their social conduct toward tradition, i. Something similar to this social alienation of the members, who
toward convention, customary law or sacred law, the elders are, so ed in substantially the same manner in the marginal case of "pure"
speak, the natural honoratiores not only because of their urs where the group grows beyond a certain size or
wider experience, but also because they know the traditions. re the administrative function becomes too difficult to be satisfac-
sent, advance approval (?rpopov'~evpa),or ratification (a~ctoritas)~~ of by anyone whom rotation, the lot, or election may
antees the properness of a resolution as against the supernatural p f administration of mass structures
just as it is the most effective decision in a case of dispute. Where a taining in small associations resting
members of a community are in about the same economic position, the ionships. As soon as mass administra-
"elders" are simply those oldest in the household, the clan, or the democracy changes so radically that it
neighborhood. sociologist to ascribe to the term the
However, the relative prestige of age within a community is subject the case discussed so far.
to much change. Wherever the food resources are scarce, he who can complexity of the administrative tasks and the sheer
no longer work is just a burden. Also where war is a chronic state of ope increasingly result in the technical superiority
affairs. the ~ r e s t i ~ eof the older men is liable to sink below that of the ose who have had training and experience, and will thus inevitably
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9 5 2 DOMINATION AND LEGITIMACY Structure and Bases of Legitimate Authority 9 5 3
favor the continuity of at least some of the functionaries. Hence, there e sociological character of the structure of any particular case
always exists the probability -of the rise of a special, perennial structure n is determined by the kind of relationship between the
for administrative purposes, which of necessity means for the exercise r or masters and the apparatus, the kind of relationship of both
of rule. As mentioned before, this structure may be one of honoratiores, e ruled, and by its specific organizational structure, i.e., its specific
acting as equal "colleagues," or it may turn out to be "monocratic," so of distributing the powers of command. There can also be con-
that all functionaries are integrated into a hierarchy cul urse, a good many other elements, which may then be
one singlehead. establish a great number of varying.sociological classifications.
limited purposes, we shall emphasize those basic types of domi-
which result when we search for the ultimate grounds of the
3. Organizational Structure and the Bases of of a domination, in other words, when we inquire into those
Authority s upon which there are based the claims of obedience made by
ster against the "officials" and of both against the ruled.
The predominance of the members of such a structure o have encountered the problem of legitimacy already in our dis-
rests upon the so-called "law of the small number." The of the legal order. Now we shall have to indicate its broader
can reach understanding among its members; it is or a domination, this kind of justification of its legitimacy
any time quickly to initiate that rationally organized action which more than a matter of theoretical or philosophical speculation;
necessary to preserve its position of power. Consequently it can easi tutes the basis of very real differences in the empirical
squelch any action of the masses (Massen- oder Gemeinsch e of domination. The reason for this fact lies in the generally
threatening its power as long as the opponents have not created the sa ble need of any power, or even of any advantage of life, to
kind of organization for the pl
for domination. Another benefi fates of human beings are not equal. Men differ in their
secrecy as to the intentions and heal.& or wealth or social status or what not. Simple observa-
of their information; the larger the circle grows, the more difficult ows that in every such situation he who is more favored feels
improbable it becomes to guard such secrets. Wherever i ever ceasing need to look upon his position as in some way
is placed upon "officialsecrecy," we take it as a symptom on his advantage as "deserved," and the other's disadvan-
intention of the rulers to tighten the reins of their d e or of a fee ught about by the latter's "fault." That the purely
on their part that their rule is being threatened. But every domina s of the difference may be ever so obvious makes no
established as a continuing one must in some decisive p
rule. eed makes itself felt in the relation between positively
Generally speaking, however, the specific arrangemen rivileged groups of human beings. Every highly privi-
tion, as they are established by association, show the following c elops the myth of its natural, especially its blood,
acteristics: conditions of stable distribution of power and, con-
A circle of people who are accustomed to obedience to the ord of status order, that myth is accepted by the negatively privi-.
of leaders and who also have a personal interest in the continuance Such a situation.exists as long as the masses continue in
the domination by virtue of their own participation and th state of theirs in which thought about the order of domi-
benefits, have divided among themselves the exercise of remains but little developed, which means, as long as no urgent
which will serve the continuation of the domination an render the state of affairs "problematical." But in times in which
themselves continuously ready for their exercise. (This is wh lass situation has become unambiguously and openly visible to
by "~r~anization.")'~Those leaders who d o not derive from grant one as the factor determining every man's individual fate, that
others the powers of command claimed and exercised by them, we sh myth of the highly privileged about everyone having deserved
call masters; while the term apparatus shall mean the circle of tho ticular lot has often become one of the most passionately hated
persons who are holding themselves at the disposal of the master of attack; one ought only to think of certain struggles of late
masters in the manner just defined. quity and of the Middle Ages, and quite particularly of the class
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9 5 4 DOMINATION AND LEGITIMACY [ Ch. X
struggle of our own time in which such myths and the claim of legiti-
mate domination based upon it have been the target of the most power-
ful and most effective attacks.
Indeed, the continued exercise of every domination (in our techni-
cal sense of the word) always has the strongest need of self-justifica-
tion through appealing to the principles of its legitimation. Of such
ultimate principles, there are only three:
The "validity" of a power of command may be expressed, first, in a
system of consciously made rational rules (which may be either agreed
upon or imposed from above), which meet with obedience as generally
binding norms whenever such obedience is claimed by him whom the
rule designates. In that case every single bearer of powers of command
is legitimated by that system of rational norms, and his power is legiti-
mate insofar as it corresponds with the norm. Obedience is thus given
to the norms rather than to the person.
The validity of a power of command can also rest, however, upon
personal authority.
Such personal authority can, in turn, be founded upon the sacred-
ness of tradition, i.e., of that which is customary and has always been
so and prescribes obedience to some particular person.
Or, personal authority can have its source in the very opposite,
viz., the surrender to the extraordinary, the belief in charisma, i.e.,
actual revelation or grace resting in such a person as a savior, a
prophet, or a hero.
The "pure'1 types of domination correspond to these three possible
types of legitimation. The forms of domination occurring in historical
reality constitute combinations, mixtures, adaptations, or modifications
of these "pure" types.
Rationally regulated association within a structure of domination
finds its typical expression in bureaucracy. Traditionally prescribed
social action is typically represented by patriarchalism. The charismatic
structure of domination rests upon individual authority which is based
neither upon rational rules nor upon tradition. Here too we shall proceed
from the type that is the most rational and the one most familiar to
us: modern bureaucratic administration.
N O T E S
I. Unless otherwiseindicated, all notes areby Rheinstein.
2. Among numerous German dialects and ways in which the language was
used in poetry, literature, and polite padance, acceptance as the standard was
achieved by that form which was used in the late fourteenth and fifteenth cen-
Notes 9 5 5
ularized through Henry Sienkiewicz'
ident (Rektor) and the deans
Roman Senate as
semblies (comitia);
ent, see JOLOWICZ,
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