Towards a Global Society: Utopia or Dystopia? 358 359 Four controversies 'Economic globalization is nothing new' 'A materialist culture will engender uniformity and disempowermenť 'A clash of civilizations will lead to cultural conflict and violence' 363 'Globalization will lead to a dystopian future' 366 CONTENTS The making of global society Review and final remarks If you would like to know more Group work Questions to think about 361 An optimistic vision of our global future 368 In Chapter 2 we explored the concepts of globalization (the objective world« processes of integration) and globalism (the subjective awareness of living 'one world'). The extent to which these two processes have advanced contentious and besieged by uncertainties. Some anticipate that globa and globalism will be sufficiently vibrant phenomena to usher in a new i age and to promote the construction of a generally benign global societv. However, this view is strongly contested by other scholars. Those wk> sm overtly hostile to many aspects of globalization on moral grounds are inam described as 'critics'. Others, best regarded as 'sceptics', believe that manv afHiJ features described are exaggerated or oversfafedTTn this chapter, we mtU consider four areas of controversy where the critics and sceptics seerr. a» i making useful points - even if we disagree with them either in detail or ■ I of the general thrust of their arguments. Then we will turn to the element* have identified as constituting the building blocks of a global sodetv- ■ ain anticipate the conclusion to this chapter by indicating that while we d: imaf ml see a fully assembled structure of a global societv, we already see the faUffl^J work, the bricks and the mortar that are making that construction happen*. FOUR CONTROVERSIES í .5 an :ocoe dwarfed the corresponding amounts for any previous era. 6. According to Dicken (p. 51), the average number of subsidiary manufacturing plants established overseas each year between 1965-67 by the largest TNCs was over ten times greater than at any point in the period fro« 1920-29 and nearly seven times higher than in the years just after the Second World War. 7. The lion's share of the capital outflows through DFI before 1914 (about 75 pa-cent) was invested in such a way as to facilitate the export of raw materials especially from the former colonies. Very little, only 15 per cent, was directed towards manufacturing and most of this was located in Europe, America, Russia and Britain's dominions. By contrast, the shared DFI going to raw material procurement by the seven largest capital exporting countries had fallen to 25 per cent by the mid-1970s (17 per cent in 1988) while overall DH in manufacturing - much of it in technologically sophisticated activities -reached 42 per cent by 1975 (Dunning 1993a: Chapter 5). 8. The share invested in services - especially those relating to business such as banking, insurance and trade distribution networks - has also risen considerably from only 15 per cent in 1914 to 47 per cent by 1988 (Dicken 1992: 59). This huge increase has contributed to furthering the market penetration of manufactured products. 9. The arguments comparing international trade in 1914 to the present period miss the point that each country's trade (imports and exports) and the capital flows it experiences associated with outward and inward DFI are fast becoming indistinguishable (Julius 1990). This is because their integrated, global operations compel TNCs to engage in intra-firm exchanges. A good part of a couhtryVofficial declared imports and exports actually consist of the cross-border movement of components, semi-finished goods, production-related services and other 'products' between the various subsidiaries of foreign and locally based TNCs. 5"= i" M Assessment of proposition 1 Although we readily accept that there were high levels of international trade in the period just before the Fj.rst_World War we do not believe this significantly dents the argument that we are witnessing a new era of^^ economic^obalization. For one thing, prior to 19Í4 and for several decades after, states were driven by overt and strongly nationalist pressures towards protecting their home economies while seeking to dominate overseas spheres of imperialist influence. But protectionism and imperialism have been declining rather rapidly since the i 1950s in most countries. Also, in terms of scale, complexity, the number of actors / involved (both state and non-state) and the integration of finance, manufacturing, services and investment, the economic globalization of the last three] decades has gone well beyond anything that existed in 1914. It is sticking our necks out a little also to argue that the national rivalries that preceded the two world wars cannot easily happen again. With many more players, free flows of capital, images and ideas and a more complex and overlapping mesh of transnational networks it is difficult to see how the nation state can haul the weapons of protectionism and nationalism out from their armouries to the extent they once did. Of course, as we have accepted throughout the book, globalization impacts very differently in different parts of the world and there is strong evidence, discussed in our last chapter, that localisms of all sorts are on the move again. However, most of the manifesta-tions of religious and ethnic sentiment are happening at the sub-national level Where ethru>nationalism has been successful, as in the post-Soviet states, the elites of most of the emerging countries are rushing headlong for global integration, not protectionism. The political and financial crisis in Russia late in 1998 and the political crisis in Serbia will propel a partial reverse to this process. But the former Soviet satellites in the Baltic and Eastern Europe are firmly in the global market economy and it is unlikely that Russia can disengage in any meaningful way. Although Hirst and Thompson's work (1996) was a welcome reminder of the extent of earlier periods of economic integration, the title of their book, Globalization in Question, clearly overstates their case. It may be that they can convince you that economic globalization is in question - although we challenge their account on that too - but they understate the crucial point that globalization is about so much else other than economics. Social and cultural factors are ignored. So too are the transmission of shared images through the jmedLMhe risejafnew ^powercontainers' (like the global city), and the development of transnational social networks and global politics (like diasporas and social mpvementsTAs we hope we have demonstrated,,all these and much more_are_ all part of the phenomenon of globalization. 'A materialist culture will engender uniformity and disempowermenť Another anxiety for those_who fear the emergence of a global society, is that everywhere people increasinglyiexperience_an ever more bland condition of,, sameness. jSachs (1992:TÓ2) puts lit dramatically when he says 'the homogeniza-tion of the world is in full swing'. A global monoculture spreads like an oil slick over the entire planet'. Until recently, the overwhelming force for universaliza- ......Blit. _ -V-- t. - ;" - :he— rr.tiir :-'•: i-z-—i.~ ■ -jí— -'■........-" ■■.....' 'hni ..r exports in 1913. According to Dkken (1992:7)«lBHBá ťhe Srší eight countries supplied 95 per era* «ŕ AeworiďsBaH 1986 the number producing this same share had risen to riBv 3. Similarly, before the First World W'ai only a handful of icant overseas investors. One country. Britain, provided the boa's 45 per cent of the world total including both portfolio investment 4. By contrast, the TNCs headquartered in manv more developed i now engaged in DFI (for example, Italy, Canada, Denmark, and Sw land). Their counterparts in the developing countries (including Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Brazil, Argentina and I have also become significant sources of capital flows. 5. Measured in terms of volume, both international trade (from the 19505ii overseas investment (from the 1960s) increased dramaticallv and dwarfed the corresponding amounts for any previous era. 6. According to Dicken (p. 51), the average number of subsidiary manufae-turing plants established overseas each year between 1965-67 bv the largest TNCs was over ten times greater than at any point in the period frca 1920-29 and nearly seven times higher than in the years just after the Second World War. 7. The lion's share of the capital outflows through DFI before 1914 (about 75 per cent) was invested in such a way as to facilitate the export of raw materials, especially from the former colonies. Very little, only 15 per cent, was directed towards manufacturing and most of this was located in Europe, America Russia and Britain's dominions. By contrast, the shared DFI going to raw material procurement by the seven largest capital exporting countries had fallen to 25 per cent by the mid-1970s (17 per cent in 1988) while overall DFI in manufacturing - much of it in technologically sophisticated activities -reached 42 per cent by 1975 (Dunning 1993a: Chapter 5). 8. The share invested in services - especially those relating to business such as banking, insurance and trade distribution networks - has also risen considerably from only 15 per cent in 1914 to 47 per cent by 1988 (Dicken 1992: 59). This huge increase has contributed to furthering the market penetration of manufactured products. 9. The arguments comparing international trade in 1914 to the present period miss the point that each country's trade (imports and exports) and the^ capital flows it experiences associated with outward and inward DFI are fast becoming indistinguishable (Julius 1990). This is because their integrated, global operations compel TNCs to engage in intra-firm exchanges. A good part of a country's official declared imports and exports actually consist of the cross-border movement of components, semi-finished goods, production-related services and other 'products' between the various subsidiaries of foreign and locally based TNCs. AL SOCIOLOGY TOWARDS A GLOBAL SOCIETY: UTOPIA OR DYSTOPIA? 361 and DFI as major concede, between Id's manufactured (this century only cturing output, bv rentv-five. ntries were signif-? lion's share, with estment and DFL jped countries are ark, and Switzer-(including India, ntina and Mexico om the 1950s) and itically and soon teidiary manufac-»-67 by the largest i the period from st after the Second 1914 (about 75 per t of raw materials cent, was directed Europe, America, DFI going to raw tin^ countries had > while overall DE ücated activities - d business such as i also risen consid-Í (Dicken 1992:591 rket penetration :i the present penoa exports) and the nward DFI are fast ie their integrated,, •xchanges. A good actually consist si ed goods, produc-irious subsidiaries Assessment of proposition 1 Although we^e£dily_J^^tJhaUhe£e^£re highjeyelsof mternational trade in the period just before the First_World War we do not believe this significantly dents theargument: that we are witnesjýnjjajriewjE^of^^ For one thing, prior to 1914 and for several decades after, states were driven by overt and strongly nationalist pressures towards protecting their home economies while seeking to dominate overseas spheres of imperialist influence. But protectionism and imperialism have been declining rather rapidly since the i 1950s in most countries. Also, in terms of scale, complexity, the number of actors involved (both state and non-state) and the integration of finance, manufac- / turing, services and investment, the economic globalization of the last three] decades has gone well beyond anything that existed in 1914. It is sticking our necks out a little also to argue that the national rivalries that preceded the two world wars cannot easily happen again. With many more players, free flows of capital, images and ideas and a more complex and overlapping mesh of transnational networks it is difficult to see how the nation state can haul the weapons of protectionism and nationalism out from their armouries to the extent they once did. Of course, as we have accepted throughout the book, globalization impacts very differently in different parts of the world and there is strong evidence, discussed in our last chapter, that localisms of all sorts are on the movejagain. However, most of the manifestations of religiousand^ethnic sentiment are happening at the sub-national levej. Where ethno-nationalism has been successful, as in the post-Soviet states, the elites of most of the emerging countries are rushing headlong for global integration, not protectionism. The political and financial crisis in Russia late in 1998 and the political crisis in Serbia will propel a partial reverse to this process. But the former Soviet satellites in the Baltic and Eastern Europe are firmly in the global market economy and it is unlikely that Russia can disengage in any meaningful way. Although Hirst and Thompson's work (1996) was a welcome reminder of the extent of earlier periods of economic integration, the title of their book, Globalization in Question, clearly overstates their case. It may be that they can convince you that economic globalization is in question - although we challenge their account on that too - but they understate the crucial point that globalization is about so much else other than economics. Social and cultural factors are ignored. So tooare tihe_transmission of shared images through the media,Jhe rise of new 'powercontainers' (like the global city), and the development of transnational social networks and global politics (like diasporas and social movements). As we horjewg. have jdgmonstrateiL all these and much more are all part of the phenomenon of globalization. _- 'A materialist culture will engender uniformity and disempowermenť Another anxiety for those who fear the emergence of a global society, is that everywhere people increa/singly experience an ever more bland condition of sameness. Sachs (1992: 102) puts it dramatically when he says 'the homogeniza-tion of the world is in full swing. A global monoculture spreads like an oil slick over the entire planet^Until recently, the overwhelming force for universaliza- 362 GLOBAL SOCIOLOGY tion in world affairs was the western-inspired view that progress meant greater 1 humanism and international peace linked to the spread of science, the creation of a unified world market and the pursuit of material improvement for all. In the days of formal imperialism and colonialism such views enabled the West to legitimize its mission to impose its culture and its political and social institutions on much of the world. The 'trade-off for the colonized was access to new markets and new commodities. Now the promise of 'one world' achievable through material progress is being replaced by the more disturbing image 'one world^or no world' (p. 107) because of impending environmental cata-strojjhg.„Such pressures towards universalization are dangeroušT^eciuselhev i destroy the world's diversity of languagesand cultures and undermine people's 1 sense of local identity. If these are lost then the confusion and conflicts this mav Vengender could disempower usj.n our attempt to solve gJtablfl~proT3Tems. Other writers see the main threat of homogenization7:oining~frorn the global marketplace led and often controlled by American business. Along withjhis-^ comes the all-pervasive and seductive imagery peddled worldwide/through media influence, also largely monopolized by America. This is theirow familiar 'McWprM^of_consumer culture and its brand-name icons - Levi J301 jeans, Coca-Cola, Reebok traineTsTfastlocds including the famous McDonald's burger itself -that are now desired even by the world's poorest inhabitants living in slums and rural backwaters. Sklair (1995: 174, 280) argues that once established, capitalism invariably engenders a powerful and understandable popular appeal among ordinary citizens that is very difficult to counter or replace with a fairer democratic socialist alternative. Other alternatives are thereby precluded. Meanwhile, even those lucky enough to afford to participate in consumerism will ultimately experience dissatisfaction. This is because consumerism cannot cater for people's additional needs for community involvement, personal development and meaningful social relationships. It also brings growing environmental damage (see Box 18.1) to the point where it is difficult to see how the biosphere can remain viable unless limits are placed on the global pursuit of economic goals. Barber (1995) also fears that the 'McWorld' market system will lead to the standardization of cultures and consumption practices and these, in turn, will bring yet other dangers. For example, the TNCs raise people's expectations through advertising by encouraging consumers to believe that their purchases open new avenues to a better life of opportunity and freedom. Yet most products are quite unable to deliver the kinds of personal self-fulfilment promised in the adverts. The purchasing power for consumer goods is no substitute for secure employment opportunities, strong community values or the ability of citizens to I influence the political process through democratic institutions. Accordingly, the vista of abundant market choice holds out promises it cannot keep. In fact, the TNCs have no interest at all in improving people's real lives or encouraging the strengthening of civil society. Neither do they intend to promote the kind of meaningful transnational solidarity that might empower global citizens to cooperate in overcoming common problems. 1 Assessment of proposition 2 J We share many of the anxieties raised by the^vriters just cited. Certainly, it would be foolish to deny or ignore the enormous influence exerted by the TOWARDS A GLOBAL SOCIETY: UTOPIA OR DYSTOPIA? 363 Major Concept HYBRIDITY Hybridity refers principally I to the creation of dynamic I mixed cultures. Sociologists and anthropologists who use the expression 'syncretism' to refer to such phenomena have long observed the evolution of commingled cultures from two or more parent cultures. Using the literature and other cultural expressions of colonial peoples, Bhabha (1986) introduceaanew twist to the idea. He saw hybridity as a transgressive act challenging the colonizers' authority, values and representations and thereby constituting an act of self-empowerment and defiance. TNCs over all aspects of our lives. However, although the dangers posed by TNCs and by the spread of capitalism are formidable, the concrete evidence for suggesting that together these produce an irresistible, disempowering and homogeneous culture dominated by American consumerist values is often more apparent than real. Indeed, as has been seen in Chapters 12 and 13 on tourism and consumerism there are powerful grounds for arguing that under capitalism consumers retain far more opportunities for personal creativity and autonomy than these arguments suggest. Moreover, as in the past, the arrival of unfamiliar goods, ideas or artistic forms generally enriches rather than narrows the local repertoire of cultural resources by extending the opportunities to express indigenous 'traditions' and lifestyles. In such situations people exercise selectivity and consciously mix the old with the new to create alternative and HYBRID forms. Increasingly, too, this process of cultural borrowing and mixing works is in reverse since western societies are increasingly absorbing a widening range of cultural experiences from the non-western world. This is readily apparent in a range of activities stretching from culinary, musical and artistic ones to practices and philosophies associated with health, sport and methods of business organization, to name but a few. Neither does the evidence so far bear out the contention that non-western peoples have no defences - and wish to have none - against the onslaught of Americanized material culture. Much depends on specific circumstances such as the degree of support governments provide for local cultures, the details of colonial history or the intrinsic strength of national economies. Sometimes, it is not westernization that poses a threat to cultural survival, but the discriminatory and centralizing polices imposed by dominant religious or ethnic groups on small minority cultures. 'A clash of civilizations will lead to cultural conflict and violence' We have already discussed Barber's views (1995) on the likelihood of 'McWorldism'. In fact, his arguments on this topic are also relevant to proposition 3 because he observes that many ethnic, religious and national groups around the world are diametrically opposed to the individualistic, materialist hedonism embodied in American consumerism. Indeed, he believes that we are witnessing a growing worldwide resurgence of organizations enflamed with a mission to pursue various kinds of Jihad (the Islamic version of a holy war), sometimes involving the use of terrorist and genocidal violence. In many instances these can be interpreted as direct responses to what such groups perceive as the threat of Americanization and its trivialization of ancient, unique cultures, or the revealed truths originating in divine inspiration. Thus, we appear to be confronted with two Scenarios: (a) an unequal but relatively peaceful world where the poor majority are kept in a state of passivity by a promise of the future acquisition of consumer goods^ and (b) a dangerqusjone of contending, fundamentalist warrior causes. The conservative American writer, Sa^jmenrluntingtori (1993), appears to go much further than Barber in forecasting a future consisting of cultural and even actual bloody wars between rival civilizations. His argument can be summarized as follows: \ 364 GLOBAL SOCIOLOG» 1. A 'civilization' consists of the broadest level of cultural identity shared fey clusters of ethnic groups, nations or peoples based on common experiencss», especially history, religion, language and customs. On this definition these are perhaps seven or eight such civilizations in the world today although each contains important sub-divisions. 2. In the post-Cold War era, neither ideological conflicts, as for example1 between communism and capitalist democracy, nor the struggles between nation states will continue to shape global politics to the same extent as in the past although the latter remain as very powerful actors. Rather, rutine conflicts will increasingly develop along the 'fault lines' (p. 29) between civilizations - sometimes exploited by political leaders and groups as a means of enhancing their own interests. 3. Chief among such confrontations may be that between the West, now at the zenith of its global leadership and power, and a coalition of non-western civilizations probably focused around an Islamic-Confucianist axis. The countries drawn together within the Muslim and East Asian civilizations are rapidly increasing their military capability either through imports or by developing their own arms industries linked to industrialization. 4. What binds these and other non-western civilizations together - although much also divides them - is a shared resentment concerning the West's past. They see the West as continuing to impose its version of modernity on the world and to use its current control of international institutions such as the World Bank and the UN to further its own interests. Western concern to prevent the spread of military capability and arms, especially nuclear weapons, to the rest of the world can be readily understood against this background. 5. Several worldwide changes are working to accelerate and intensify this growing sense of 'ciy^^tíůrj^lj^pisjácu^ness' (p. 25). However, the most powerful of these are probably linked to globalization and modernization, especially the increased interactions between different countries and cultures arising from time-space compression and the yearning gap created in people's lives by the resulting lossono^aj^ki^ntities. This gap is increas-ingly being rilled by the revival of various forms of religious and cultural fundamentalism. Assessment of proposition 3 One of the difficulties with Barber's theory is that not all fundamentalist groups are opposed to consumerism and material prosperity - such values are, for example, embraced by most American revivalist churches. Moreover, many Islamic fundamentalist groups, whether active terrorists or Iran's ruling ayatollahs, are highly ambivalent in their attitudes to modern materialism. They revere the past, but are dependent on advanced technology in order to fight their cause - from faxes, the Internet and television to jet travel and sophisticated armaments along with the market systems that provide them (Hadar 1993). Moreover, the desire to reject American cultural domination constitutes only part of the explanation for the/rise of non-western violent movements operating around the world today. Many recent nationalist and secessionist movements GLOBAL SOC ; . feral identity shared % : - : ?mmon expenenna,,. On this definition ä« e world todav aithanfl r me struggles be; .^r. o Ae same extern » in ■J actors. Rather, ŕ*» **''P-29) between;»: ■nd groups as a me WARDS A GLOBAL SOCIETY: UTOPIA OR DYSTOPIA? 365 m the West, now- ar Sat ■lirion of non-u-essem, Confucianist axis. Hr í Asian civilizations am bough imports or idealization. s together - althoüsjb ■ning the West's past. 'or modernih' on ihe> Wütutions such as thp j \ Western concern I» L especially nuclear prstood against th» F and intensify- this ' However, the moss •■nd modernization, i »»it countries and P""1^ SaP createi "Qys_garj_is_increa5-f&Qus and adtunJ J "lamentalist groups •ch values are, for t- Moreover, many i or Iran's rulirti: "materialism. Thev order to fight their and sophisticated hadar 1993). ■> constitutes only »ements operating bnist movements have ongmated either in the post-Cold War disintegration of the Soviet empire or in situations where minorities have made what some might regard as quite reasonable demands for international recognition as separate nations following long periods of persecution by hostile majority governments. Obvious examples, here, are the Kashmiris, Kosovars, Tamils or Kurds. By the same token the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Algeria, Egypt, Iran and elsewhere is linked among other things, to the inequalities, repression and policy failures that have characterized previous regimes and which western governments sometimes supported or condoned. In August 1998, President Clinton ordered a missile attack on alleged Islamic terrorist sites located in the Sudan and Afghanistan. This followed the bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania earlier that month by these same funda^ mentalis! groups. Surely, these - and earlier events of a similar kind - look ominously like a clear foretaste of Huntington's predicted civilizational wars' Certainly, Huntington publicly declared his thesis had been demonstrated However, there are solid reasons for doubting whether Huntington's analysis is entirely valid. Here, Holiday's trenchant criticisms (1996) are especially telling: 1. The very validity of the notion of civilization can be questioned. Like the idea of nationhood it is based on the assumption that it is possible to identify and represent a set of timeless traditions. In reality, however, it makes much more sense to regard traditions as based on different and conflicting interpretations arising out of cultural creations concocted largely to suit the political interests and purposes of different elites. Thus, the case for an actual or potential confrontation between civilizations is largely a myth because no such clearly demarcated and distinctive entities can be identified. 2. The idea of clearly differentiated civilizations with distinctive cultural boundaries is further thrown into disarray when we remember the extent to which cultures and peoples have always borrowed and mixed each other's technologies, art forms, religious symbolism, and much else besides. Indeed it seems more likely that with globalization these processes will intensify, not dimmish as Huntington's argument implies. If so, then the conflicts he envisages will surely become more not less difficulty to sustain or justify. 3. The fragmentation and conflicts that have occurred within civilizations based on inter-ethnic or state divisions, have been just as marked as those between them and often much more so. This has certainly been the case in Europe, wracked for centuries by religious, civil and inter-state wars despite the apparent over-arching Christian legacy. Moreover, if we count the recent and continuing bloody conflicts in the Basque region of Spain, Northern Ireland and especially the former Yugoslavia this era did not end in 1945 The Islamic world, too, continues to be deeply divided along national and sectarian lines, among others, notwithstanding the brazen attempts by some westerners to present the alternative image of a 'green peril' - a united Islam bent on destroying its ancient enemy (Hadar 1993). We will add that if US interventions in Sudan and Afghanistan 'proved' Huntingdon's thesis - which Halliday has, himself, in any case rejected -NATO's attack on Serbia in defence of the Muslim Kosovars completely contradicts the Huntington thesis. Indeed this was noted in March 1999 by a number í 366 GLOBAL SOCIOLOG of editorials in the Pakistan daily newspaper Dawn that called on the Musi world to acknowledge that the leading western powers were defending Musli against Christians. Dystopia - an imaginary place where things are as bad as they could possibly be. 'Globalization will lead to a dystopian future' Just as Huntington (and others) present a disturbing vision of the future from the right, so are there prophets of doom from the left. In an original and challenging book Roger Burbach (an American), Oscar Núňez (a Nicaraguan) and I Boris Kagarlitsky (a Russian) (Burbach et al. 1997) suggest that globalization has triggered a number of counter reactions or anti-systemic movements due to the] traumatic shocks and horrors it has engendered in many areas of the world Their perspective is undoubtedly valuable in that the three authors are representatives of what used to be called 'the First', 'Second' and Third Worlds. Thev deny that they are opposed to globalization per se. However, they argue that 'the economic forces that currently determine the direction of globalization aJZEggl}LgJle£L^^ is, humankind's] ability to create a better world' (p. ix). Given the dominance of the forces they are opposed to, they can see nothing but a dystopian future for all of us. They argue that the form taken by globalization will have the following features: , • Trade wars - whereby intense competition between trading blocs leads to instability and speculation between the national currencies. In this respect they see a tension between different sectors of capitalism - with computer firms, biotech companies and TNCs in food-processing favouring free international markets, while steel, farmers and clothing manufacturers will try to defend national markets. Angry French farmers, rebellious peasants in Chiapas (Mexico) and trade union opponents of regional agreements such as NAFTA are all seen as forces resisting the integration of global markets (Burbach et al. 1997: 61-3). • Global unemployment - with some 30 per cent of the world's 2.5 billion workers being unemployed. The argument here is that automation and information processing will permanently displace workers from the manufacturing and services sector leaving nowhere for those displaced from the land to go. Beyond the global village, the destitute and outcast will gather (pp. 64-6). • Destructive financial speculation - which will allow unbridled 'robber barons' to indulge in greed and uncontrolled speculation in stocks, bonds, currencies and precious metals. While some fortunes are made in the new computer industries, the bulk of fortunes are made by junk bond scams, insider trading or those playing the markets of casincKcapitalism. The stability of global accumulation is, Burbach et al. suggest, only an illusion: a 'major catastrophe' will arise 'before we get too far into the next century' (p. 73). • Collapse of the poor countries - where the neo-liberal panaceas of the World Bank have resulted in further malnutrition and destitution. Even the proclaimed success of the neo-liberal solutions in places such as Costa Rica and Chile have shown gains only for the wealthy and at the expense of those living in poverty (pp. 85-6). soc ;. TOWARDS A GLOBAL SOCIETY: UTOPIA OR DYSTOPIA? 367 Bed on the Ml-j»| i of the future rrr» 1 original and -fai A Nicaraguas ami it globalization faJ ■ements due to Ap ■eas of the wodfl [authors are repie»-rhird Worlds. Thew er. they argils rt^i t is. humankind'"«! Ev can see nothing ft taken by global- ■g blocs leads In» es. Ln this respect - \viih computer "wiring free inrer-fcturers will trv to ions peasants in freements such as t global markets orld's 2.5 billion matron and infor-■n the manufac-»d from the land least will gather 1 'robber barons' »nds, currencies e new computer %, insider trading W of global accu-catastrophe' will as of the World ition. Even the ch as Costa Rica expense of those • The 'gutting' of the cities in rich countries - marked by the massive increase of those living on welfare, those permanently unemployed and those scraping by through criminal activities. 'The violence, fear, crime, alcoholism and drug abuse that grip the underclasses of these cities is directly linked to this despondency and hopelessness' (p. 103). • The rise of a 'barbaric' bourgeoisie in the post-communist world - with ineffective and parasitic states, entrepreneurs who lack ethical, intellectual, cultural or professional values, and a 'mafia' comprising old party hacks, state bureaucrats and new 'yuppies'. These groups 'are united by the lack of roots and total disrespect towards any rules and laws as well as by the lack of even minimal moral constraints' (pp. 117-21,122). ) Assessment of proposition 4 One cannot help but admire the concern and passion behind these denunciations of the present form of globalization. Indeed we concur in many of Burbach and his colleagues' observations. The emergence of a new global age is a, painful, uncomfortable and often distressing process. Not to recognize this pain, discomfort and distress would be to promote a blinkered perspective, as well as showing a total insensitivity to the many marginalized and excluded people round the world. The angry and desperate Russians in queues outside banks bitterly denouncing their country's flirtation with global capitalism further demonstrate the point. It is perhaps no coincidence that critics like Burbach and his co-authors draw their indignation from a self-confessed Marxist or socialist background. The Jeremiah-like sense of apocalyptic doom, the inevitable march of historical forces and the fear of fateful technological determinism all draw from that deep well. But it has to be recalled that Marx himself saw the dual nature of capitalism. It was both destructive and potentially liberating. Just as capitalism consigned feudalism and slavery to the dustbin of history (just about), soToo it can be argued that globalization is undermining nationalism and other impediments to the full realization of capitalism on a worldwide scale. The argument is not the heartless one that 'you can't make an omelette without breaking eggs', but rather that social actors and organizations can do something about the ingredients of that omelette, how it is cooked and served and who gets to eat it. It was very much part of the Marxist tradition to look to social agency to supersede the limitations of the capitalist revolution by instigating another kind of revolution on behalf of humanity at large. The chosen social vehicle for this change, the proletariat, was - according to one's view -either mistakenly identified, or not up to its historical mission. However, there is no need to collapse into an impotent sense of predestination. As another socialist writer argues (Bienefeld 1994: 97), the destructive effects of globalization will arise only if we allow it to be so; if we remain deaf to the cries of help from societies ^ presently being destroyed; or to the voices of those who still believe in the possi- i bility of building stable, prosperous societies in which people can live in harmony with nature and with each other, while spending time in less stressful, more inter-\ esting jobs and devoting an increasing part of their lives to social and cultural/ pursuits. Technology has made this dream a possibility; politics must realize it. GLOBAL SOCIOLOGY AN OPTIMISTIC VISION OF OUR GLOBAL FUTURE That final observation provides the opening for our more optimistic vision of global future, although we would not consider our position to be Utopian. Teda nological and economic changes can allow a positive outcome, but people must try to make that happen. Let us mention some of these more positive changes: 1. A number of observers (for example Reich 1992; Bradley et al. 1993; Carnov et al. 1993) argue that a new phase has arrived in the moves towards integration among TNCs. Between 1975 and 1986 there was a 50 per centrise in the number ot scientists and engineers engaged in research and the development of technology. In responding to these changes, some TNCs have downsized and concentrated their technological expertise in core areas of competency. Many others have formed strategic cross-border alliances with overseas companies. Such joint ventures increasingly involve small and_ medium-sized TNCs and not simply the largest. Both theTncreasing number of alliances between TNCs and the increase in shared R&D activity strongly suggest that the process of economic integration is deepening quite rapidly and does not always involve greater concentration of capital. 2' The development of niche markets and access to technologies thaj^hrink dištance has allowed small specialist companies to survive, sometimes at the level of a family business or a community co-operative. This has revived small-scale, craft and art-based production, often conducted in a humanitarian environment with the minimum of worker exploitation. Artists, potters, cabinet makers, small publishers, alternative health therapists, organic farmers, those making green health products, craft jewellers, small specialist shops, psychoanalysts and poets can all thrive in our global economy and many do. Fair-trading organizations and ethical firms like the Body Shop have linked small peasant producers to a global market on a nojv exploitative basis. 3. Even in more conventional settings, work experience is said to be undergoing rapid change. Information technology and electronic communications provide several advantages to employers: firms can co-ordinate their operations more cheaply and easily across considerable distances; customers and producers are linked directly and instantly; many functions such as product design, accountancy and engineering can be easily subcontracted to specialist outside firms, more in touch with rapidly changing markets and production methods; and the design, experimentation and testing of manufactured and other products all benefit from a growing number of computer applications (Bradley et al. 1993:16). 4. At the same time, innovations in manufacturing technologies mean that machines are becoming programmable, multi-functional, smaller and less energy intensive than they once were. The advanced economies are undergoing a steady process of reducing the bulk of the raw material used in production, a process accelerated by using microelectronics so as to miniaturize many products. Apparently, although the GDP in the USA has risen twenty times in real value over the last 100 years its weight, measured in tonnes, has increased little (The Economist, 28 September 1996: 43). Contrary BAL SOCIOLOGY optimistic vision of Id be Utopian. Tech-le, but people must I positive changes: etal. 1993;Carnoy; oves towards inte-150 per cent rise in ich and the devel- some TNCs have se in core areas of tder alliances with ■ivolve small and increasing number D activity stronglv ning quite rapidlv ial. fogiesthat_shrink •r sometimes at the "This has revived led in a humani-rfoitation. Artists, I health therapists. ft jewellers, small we in our global real firms like the [market on a non-aid to be xuiderz : communications mate their opera-5; customers and s such as product «bcontracted to pig markets and testing of manu-iber of computer . 'OWARDS A GLOBAL SOCIETY: UTOPIA OR DYSTOPIA? 369 bgies mean that smaller and less ■nies are under-material used in s so as to minia-e USA has risen pit, measured in *6: 43). Contrarv to the prediction of the doom and gloom merchants (and the old Yorkshire saying that 'Where there's muck there's money') economic prpsperityáoes not have to produce J^ountamsof waste. 5. There has been a marked rise in the number of vjablejsmall firms across the western world since the 1980s or so as^e^ecojiomic^nďjexhnojogjcal barriers to_entry have been lowered. Meanwhile, the old hierarchical, pyramid-shaped structure once so noticeable in many large companies is becoming flatter as the emphasis on problem-solving, the need to respond quickly to specific customer requirements and so on combine to place much more emphasis on team work, self-reliance, multi-skilling and close collaboration between employees. Reich (1992) describes these changes in terms of what he calls the increased importance of 'enterprise webs'. Enterprise webs undermine managerial authority, they render business bureaucracy redundant, they disperse control widely within organizations and they therefore empower many employees. If we think about all these changes while situating them within the context of growing globalization we end up with a much more enticing vision of contemporary business organization. Even very large, global corporations are apparently breaking down internally into overlapping networks of partly self-reliant enterprise webs operating on a more human scale. Meanwhile their external boundaries with domestic suppliers and foreign TNCs at home and abroad are effectively dissolving as these same webs coalesce across companies and countries. Finally, according to Reich (1992: Chapter 4) wealth creation in more and more sectors increasingly depends on the contribution played by the^s^mbolic ^analysts'. He claims that such people now constitute about 20 per cent of the workforce in the advanced countries. They enjoy specialist, problem-identifying and problem-solving skills. These are critically linked to their grasp of different kinds of symbolic knowledge in creative design including the arts and media, scientific research, oral and visual communications, the ability to engage in strategic thinking and so on. Their centrality to all kinds of economic and creative activity means they command high rewards, are frequently wooed by rival companies and so are increasingly mobile, taking their knowledge, connections and skills with them as they move between organizations and countries. Although Reich's symbolic analysts may be the new 'movers and shakers' of the contemporary world economy, others outside this charmed circle can also benefit. Between 40 per cent and 50 per cent of all jobs in the rich countries are linked to knowledge-creation and information-processing in both manufacturing and services (Carnoy et aL 1993: Chapter 2) and it is in this area where four-fifths of all new jobs are being created. Knowledge-based industries now generate more than half of total GDP in the advanced economies. A nation's wealthy creation and its ability to compete increasingly thus dejjen.d^much moreon the skills and creative resources possessed by its citizens, and their capacity to understand, transfer and improve technology, than on the actual ownership of different kinds of tangible assets (Reich 1992: Chapter 12). The most important role any government can now play is to concentrate on raising the knowledge-acquiring capacities of its inhabitants at all levels. We can anticipate, in turn, that this shift will help to generate a more 370 GLOBAL SOCIOLOGY educated, adaptable and reflexive citizenry, more willing and able to question authority, demand autonomy and act as key agents in shaping policy agendas. Of course, this rosy picture has to be balanced by our knowledge of the many 'global victims' (see Chapters 4, 8 and 9) who have so far been left far behind in the race to knowledge. Again, reflexive citizens using their skills for benign purposes are not the only beneficiaries ofglobalization"^ drug-dealers, arms merchants and mediamoguls_are also 'global winners'. Nonetheless it is important to emphasize that the economic and technical changes we have identified and the rise of the symbolic economy can potentially generate a more democratic and participatory future globaljäociejy^ Work can be more empowering and even enjoyable, governments can become more accountable, while through the interdependence of the world economy wars can be avoided. THE MAKING OF GLOBAL SOCIETY We have considered the possible gains to be made from changes in economic management and technology. There are^ several other major gainsjľt_a_social_ level to be realized from globalization and globalism: 1. An extension of democratic, civil and human rights. 2. The spread of education and literacy. 3. Information and access to communications for all the world's inhabitants. 4. The grown of multicultural understanding and awareness. 5. The empowering of women and other historically disadvantaged groups. 6. The promotion of environment-friendly production systems. 7. The growth of leisure, creativity and freedom from want. Can any of these dreams be realized? There are those who still pin their hopes on a 'positive nationalism'. Bienefeld (1994:122), for example, while recognizing the malign as well as the benign aspects of nationalism, nonetheless says that we have little alternative but to rely on a reformed nation state. In what other form, he asks can we realistically hope, at the end of the twentieth century to redefine and reconstruct political entities that would allow us to manage the increasingly destructive forces of global competition while providing individuals with the capacity to define themselves as social beings and while containing the risk of political conflict between such political entities? jn^jjuestion J.S a good one, but we feel thaf\ those who wish to reform the nation state do not adequately recognize how far disillusionment has already set in. In sômTTíollowed-ouP or 'broken-backed' states, for example in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Myanmar or Somalia, the state has imploded - leaving its former citizens to the mercies of gangs and warlords. But even in the industrialized states, the belief in nationhood and formal democracy has eroded. The former appears increasingly as parochial and irrelevant while democracy seems to offer little more than a hollow administrative system for reaching decisions that do not begin to reach the needs or tap the energies of citizens living in the rapidly changing world. Besides, as we argued in Chapter 5, the cultural pluralism char- lAL SOCIOLOG» -QWARDS A GLOBAL SOCIETY: UTOPIA OR DYSTOPIA? 371 d able to questka ig policy agendas ZS- ■ lett far behind an F skills for benign Ircig-dealers, arms ttieiess it is impair- i ■e have identified ■ more democratir empowering ami while through tis»1 í nges in economic r sains at a social Id's inhabitants. ... mtaged groups. ns. ill pin their hopes-while recognizing etheless says that Ite, In what other redefine and recoa-asingly destructive e capacity to define i political conflict ish to reform the ment has already ample in Liberia, leaving its former he industrialized »ded. The former »cy seems to offer decisions that do ing in the rapidlr al pluralism char- acteristic of the global age undermines the idea of texútGňaiÍŠX-äad£ax£X£ÍgntV, the historicalbuildingblocks of the nation state. There clearly is still a need for developing more active national democracies with flourishing civil societies. However,_in_addiüj3n_to^^ superseding the nation state are other sites of political encounter and engage-ment. Let us just mention again some of these sites, which were discussed at greater length elsewhere in this book: 1. At the international level courts, particularly those dealing with human rights and genocide have begun to make effective judgements that transcend domestic legislation. 2. The International Governmental Organizations, such as the UN and its agencies, have made some advances in acting on behalf of a global community -although the UN is still crucially dependent on the members of the Security Council and especially the USA. 3. A proliferation of regional bodies has developed, admittedly with highly variable levels of power and authority. 4. TNCs have generated immense resources and power and are effectively out of the control of the nation state. In Chapter 7 we show how some accept their social responsibilities on a global scale. 5. Transnational communities have developed through enhanced travel and communications. 6. Global cities have evolved to service the needs of the world economy and its cosmopolitan citizens, a development discussed in Chapter 15. 7. Global diasporas and religions have resurfaced to bridge the gap between universalism and the need for linking to one's past (Chapter 19). 8. Global social movements have arisen to help build the global society of the future (Chapters 16,17 and 18). We need to say just a little more about global social movements. In sociology there has always been a creative tension between 'structure' and 'agency' - what happens to one and what one makes happen. Social move-ments are the key agents _far_ progressive and humanitarian social change. Even if they only achieve a small part of the tasks "they have set for themselves, their struggles will have been worthwhile. The environment and women's movements have merited our special attention as they both seem to have some transformátory potential but other social movements are also potentially significant in the slow construction of a relatively benign and functioning global society. REVIEW AND FINAL REMARKS In this concluding chapter we have partly concurred with those who argue that not everything connected with the making of a global society brings advantages and gains to the human condition. A more integratedjsvorjdjs nptnecessarily a 372 GLOBAL SOCIOLOGY more harrrwrm3u>ůr^ajriore_equal one\_WgLare faced with greater risks as well as opportunities. As we nave seen throughout the book much transnational activity is atavistic and potentially damaging to others - as in the case of neo-Nazi cells, crime gangs or drug syndicates who operate on an international basis. Some transnational movements and groups may evoke a common universal purpose, yet are divided and made ineffective by internal squabbles. There are also plausible concerns about the ways in which global homoge-nization could eventually dilute the local and national particularities, about environmental problems, demographic expansion, joblessness and poverty, the emergence of terrorism, drug-trafficking, and the spread of epidemics throughout the world. Globalization has so far done little to diminish the blight of poverty and wretchedness in which about half of the world's inhabitants is forced to live. Social movements have still not proved effective in mobilizing efforts to reduce global inequalities. Thus, we are not dealing_j!»t{i a unilinear pro^e*s^,aLJ¥ÜHnevitably-iake us.to a^gíťer world. Despite these concessions to the sceptics and critics, we nonetheless argue that globalization has become irreversible and is taking on new forms not previously encountered. Moreover, although the direction in which it may evolve is unclear and certainly not fixed, some global changes are very positive. They provide a greater potential than ever before for the world's inhabitants to forge new understandings, alliances and structures - both from below and inalliance with elite institutions - in the pursuit of more harmonious, environmentall}" sustainable and humanitarian solutions to local and global problems^The world of workhäs been transformed and for many lucky citizens the possibilities for a creative engagement with global changes are much enhanced. In itself globalization will lead to neither a dystopia nor a utopia. The future directions of global society depend on us as ordinary world citizens, on what moral positions we choose and what battles we are prepared to fight. A 'global ecumene', 'a universal humanism', a 'shared planet', a ^cosmopolitan democracy^tííelielďTafe tions. The world remains lop-sided. Many powerful and wealthy actors profit disproportionately from global changes. Throughout this book we have shown how 'global winners' use their privileged access to power, wealth and opportunity to feather their own nests. The TNCs, crime syndicates, rich tourists, skilled migrants and others are all major beneficiaries of the opportunities for transnational activity. But it behoves us to remind you, in a final word, of the many 'global losers' - the refugees, poor peasants, the underclasses of the collapsing cities - who still peer through the bars at the gilded cages of the rich and powerful. The key social challenge of the twenty-first century is to prise open the bars for these disadvantaged people so that they can discover the transformátory possibilities globalization has generated. A vibrant civil society and active global social movements provide far-off glimpses of that benign future. However distant, we hope we have encouraged you to see some of the many possibilities for social engagement, co-operation and positive change. TOWARDS A GLOBAL SOCIETY: UTOPIA OR DYSTOPIA? 373 to know more ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• An articulate and coherent critique of globalization from a Marxist point of view is provided in Roger Burbach era/. (1997) Globalization and its Discontents. Robert Reich's book, The Work of Nations (1992) should be read together with the contrasting account by Jeremy Rifkin (1995) titled The End of Work. Benjamin Barber's Jihad vs. McWorld (1995) speaks of the gloomy visions of a clash of civilizations or a homogenized global consumer culture. Finally, Richard Falk's Explorations at the Edge of Time (1992) is the work of a plausible futurologist. Group work #•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••■••••••••••••••• 1. Divide the class into several smaller groups. Each will examine one of the four propositions from both sides for about thirty minutes and prepare a brief report to be presented to the class. On balance do the various groups agree or disagree with their propositions and why? 2. Working in groups of three or four, students will agree in advance to collect material on particular world political/military/economic crises (perhaps assigned on a regional basis). Before their class presentations each team will summarize (a) the nature of the events/problems and so on within their area and (b) discuss what light their data throws on any one or more of the propositions. How far do the team assessments agree or differ? 3. Some critics of globalization express anxiety concerning the disquieting sense of lost local or national identity that many individuals may feel as a result. Drawing on their own personal experiences, what are the perceptions of the class members themselves on this question and how can they account for them? Are there any apparent overall social indicators that explain whatever individual differences or similarities may emerge? Questions to think about •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1. The degree to which the world economy has become integrated is no greater than it was before the First World War. Discuss. 2. Examine and assess the fears expressed in the theories of Barber and Huntington. 3. Discuss the view that a global monoculture will destroy diversity and difference. 4. Using the material in this chapter and any other sources you like, construct: (a) an optimistic scenario for an emergent global society; followed by (b) a critique that traces the possible parallel dangers and difficulties. If you would like \