Cosmopolitan Virtue,
Globalization and Patriotism
Bryan S. Turner
Introduction: Global Citizenship
A
LTHOUGH THE concept of citizenship has in recent decades been
a useful way of framing progressive debates about the erosion of
welfare and mounting criticisms of neo-liberal theories of social
identity as merely market activity, theories of citizenship have been singu-
larly unimpressive as perspectives on the possibility of a global polity.
Attempts to develop theories of global citizenship look equally unpromis-
ing. And yet there is a need for some understanding of how identities,
membership and loyalties can develop and function in a global context. In
the early modern period, religion and nationalism provided the dominant
modes of individual and collective identity. Both religious and nationalist
modes of self reference are products of a common process of modernization,
of which globalization can be regarded as the contemporary dominant phase.
Just as nationalism can assume either liberal or reactionary forms (Kohn,
1944), so religion can either develop a cosmopolitan or a fundamentalist
orientation. However, from the end of the 19th century, with increasing
secularization, national citizenship became increasingly the predominant
juridical form of civil society as the conduit of national membership and
individual identity. In Europe and North America, national citizenship
emerged as a secular form of solidarity that either competed or combined
with the national church to provide a potent channel of nationalist fervour.
In England, this period witnessed the rise of a evangelical `muscular Chris-
tianity' that was tied to the public schools and the ancient universities, and
that developed the Christian mission as a form of cultural imperialism. In
the United States, citizenship was primarily an institution of `national
manhood' (Nelson, 1998) in which entitlements to citizenship benefits were
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based on work and warfare. As a form of patriarchal relationship with
the state, citizenship became an exclusionary principle of identity and
membership.
In recent political theory, there has been a growing interest in global
governance and global citizenship as alternatives to national or religious
forms of membership. While socialist internationalism once appeared as the
only viable alternative to fascism and national socialism, the failures of com-
munism as a global political movement have left a political vacuum for
alternatives to territorial politics and consciousness. For some authors,
human rights appear to be a promising ingredient for the concoction of a
post-national and postcolonial glue. Human rights discourse has emerged
as a major example of globalization and, despite its strong western vestiges,
it holds out the promise of a global language that is capable of command-
ing loyalties in a post-national political environment. The idea of humanity
and human rights as an ethical and communal outcome of the globalization
process was probably first identified as a sociological issue by Roland
Robertson in the intellectual context of theoretical engagements with civiliz-
ational theory in the 1980s (Robertson and Chirico, 1985). While human
rights institutions are clearly examples of legal and cultural globalization,
there are definite problems with the argument that human rights could
function as a global `religion' to replace either nationalism or religion.
However, the most promising human rights theories have been minimalist,
secular and pragmatic, being reluctant to make extravagant claims about
universalism (Ignatieff, 2001).
There are three arguments against human rights discourse as a global
medium for framing post-national identities. The first is that they are irre-
deemably associated with western values, and in particular with liberal indi-
vidualism. There is much discontent among Asian governments with the
substantive contents of human rights legislation, and even more anxiety
about its application and enforcement. While there have been attempts to
replace or to supplement the allegedly western tradition of rights with Asian
traditions, such as Buddhism and Confucianism, these efforts are not
entirely satisfactory. Not all forms of western rights theory are individualis-
tic, and not every instance of `Asian thought' is communal. In short, the
sharp separation of values between East and West, from a historical perspec-
tive, is bogus. It is possible to defend the view that human rights theory is
not inherently flawed by its western origins, and various forms of reformed
Buddhism do appear to be compatible with existing human rights legal
theory (De Bary, 1998; Bauer and Bell, 1999). The second criticism of the
human rights tradition is that they are not `justiciable' or enforceable (see
Woodiwiss, in this issue). While political rights such as habeas corpus or
the right to free elections appear to be enforceable, it is not clear that the
bulk of human rights, especially those that have a significant cultural com-
ponent, could be enforced. The real problem here is that it is typically states
that enforce rights and there is no global government that has the authority
or powers to enforce rights. Whereas national governments are typically
46 Theory, Culture & Society 19(1­2)
democratically elected, many international bodies are not, and hence the
legitimacy of enforcement is open to question. Finally, a right typically
implies an obligation, and, while there has been a deluge of legislation on
rights, there is at present very little discussion of the obligations that might
correspond to such rights. The primary purpose of this article is to promote
a discussion of human obligations in order to elaborate and consolidate the
idea of human rights. I shall call human rights obligations `cosmopolitan
virtue'.
Politics and Virtue Ethics
While `virtue' became unfashionable in contemporary political science, a
number of social theorists such as Alasdair MacIntyre (1984) and Martha
Nussbaum (1986) have attempted to retrieve this tradition to provide an
ethical critique of political institutions. In order to sustain the idea of
cosmopolitan virtue in relation to an extension of the province of the citizen-
ship, it is necessary briefly to rehearse the ideological and social origins of
citizenship as a theory of membership.
There are three versions of citizenship. There is a political theory of
citizenship that, from its origins in 17th-century political struggles in
England, was embraced in the 18th century by the American war of inde-
pendence. This liberal theory is minimalist. It says that the role of the state
is to protect the freedom of its citizens and that it can best achieve this aim
by removing the obstacles to free exchange between individuals in the
marketplace. This theory celebrates the sovereignty of the individual (Aber-
crombie et al., 1986). The role of the state is utilitarian, namely to maximize
the happiness of the majority, but this `happiness' is most effectively and
efficiently measured by their individual wealth. Because, for utilitarian
writers like Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, pushpin is as good as poetry
(that is, they are equal because they both produce happiness), it is not
sensible for states to take much interest in morality and culture. With the
dominance of neo-liberalism in state policy since the 1970s, the liberal view
of citizenship has been triumphant.
Second, there is a theory of social citizenship. In the British welfare
theory of citizenship, the state has a role to play in moderating the negative
impact of the capitalist market by providing a safety net to protect workers
against unemployment and sickness, and to support them in retirement.
This argument was the characteristic view of British welfare citizenship
as outlined by T.H. Marshall (1950) and Richard Titmuss (1958). Social
citizenship is not overtly a normative theory of membership, and in the
reformist tradition it merely describes certain social adjustments to capi-
talism and class inequality.
Finally, there is a tradition that had diverse origins in classical Greek
political theory, in Rousseau's educational theory, and in the cultural legacy
of the German Bildungsroman. This tradition says that the education of the
citizen in the virtues is essential if that individual is to achieve personal
autonomy, and if society is to remain free of corruption. While neo-liberals
Turner ­ Cosmopolitan Virtue 47
have argued that the citizen needs training in order to secure a job in the
labour market, virtue ethics argues that a person requires education in order
to become an individual. While the Marshallian tradition did not adopt a
strong theory of culture and character, the notion of virtue requires a thick
rather than thin view of the citizen of a national community, namely of the
citizen as a complex, educated and vibrant member of a society. There is,
therefore, an important connection between virtuous citizens and effective
and living institutions; this connection is through the dual operation of
virtue and obligation. An autonomous citizen will want to be an active and
involved participant in a community. The Bildungs tradition had a clear
understanding of the relationship between virtuous citizens, educational
institutions and civil society, and was critical of utilitarianism as a doctrine
that was corrosive of public institutions.
There is plenty of evidence that the liberal and social frameworks of
citizenship are in crisis. Liberal capitalist societies have created a set of
conditions that has produced an erosion of citizenship (Turner, 2001a).
Participation in the market is obviously important and the idea of the
worker-citizen has been a foundational aspect of modern society. However,
there are clearly problems with this foundation, especially where there is
profound casualization of labour, under-employment, early retirement and
flexible hours of work. As Richard Sennett (1998) has argued, the modern
market creates casualized employment that leads to a corrosion of charac-
ter. There has also been a widespread devaluation of education and the uni-
versity system by neo-liberal governments that have reduced funding and
attempted to destroy the autonomy of universities in providing an education
that is not merely training for a job. The marginalization of the worker and
the degradation of education have resulted in an erosion of citizenship that
we can see manifested in low participation rates in elections, distrust of
politicians, lack of social capital investment in society, the decline of the
public sphere and the decline of the universities.
While national forms of citizenship appear to be in crisis, there is con-
siderable interest in the possibility of global citizenship. The notion that there
could be a `citizen of the world' has long been part of the utopian imaginary
of the Western tradition. It was implicit in Augustine's idea of the City of God,
within which the legacy of Roman global society would be perfected. It was
part of Kant's vision of a `perpetual peace' in 1796 (Lutz-Bachmann and
Bohman, 1997; Kant, 1983) in which the Enlightenment dream of a world free
from irrational prejudice could be realized. It was part of Goethe's cosmo-
politan idea of world society that would transcend the narrow limitations of
emerging German militarism. Despite his criticisms of bourgeois citizenship,
it was part of Karl Marx's dream of socialism in the Communist Manifesto of
1848 (Marx and Engels, 1973/1848) to create an international society in which
workers would combine to overcome capitalism to transformation of human
nature, and to establish a world community. In recent years, this dream has
re-emerged in the idea that globalization will demand or make possible world
governance within which cosmopolitan democracy can flourish.
48 Theory, Culture & Society 19(1­2)
The revival of cosmopolitan idealism is in fact closely connected with
the classical idea of virtue. There is a republican tradition that had its
origins in the Stoic tradition of Rome that promoted the idea of cosmopolitan
virtue. This tradition, in the modern period, attempted to distinguish
between love of country (patriotism) and respect for the state (nationalism).
We have lost this tradition, failing typically to recognize any distinction
between patriotic and nationalist commitments. Writers like Giuseppe
Mazzini wanted to argue that love of one's own country was perfectly com-
patible with commitment to a commonwealth that embraced a love of
humanity. Indeed, an education in the love of patria moved inevitably
towards a commitment to the respublica. This language of virtue and the
commonwealth has been lost to us in a world that has become dominated
by calculating rationalism and the neo-liberal faith that our private vices
(greed) are public virtues (wealth).
The idea of global citizenship is probably too abstract and vague
to carry conviction and commitment. The nation state is often too distant
to provide a channel for strong emotions and serious involvement by
comparison with the effect of local and regional identities. It would there-
fore be difficult to grasp how individuals might feel some passionate loyal-
ties to a global government or indeed to any global institutions. What rituals
and collective rites might be associated with such an artificial political
entity?
It is for this reason that it is useful to differentiate between national-
ism and patriotism. Maurizio Viroli, in For Love of Country (1995), writes
that commitments and identities require a common culture, a landscape and
shared rituals to be effective and enduring. The weakness of socialist inter-
nationalism was that it had difficulty creating a sense of solidarity without
place. The geography of emotions therefore appears to be important in
creating civic loyalties and commitments. Political attachments need
memories and collective memories need a location where these common
rituals can be enacted. A placeless cosmopolitanism would also be vacuous
and ultimately lifeless. A love of one's country as a love for the republic
does not, in Viroli's argument, rule out respect for other cultures and places.
On the contrary, love of country is merely a preparation for such respect.
John Milton, that ardent patriot of English liberties, regarded travel abroad
as a duty in order to appreciate better the culture of his neighbours. In a
similar fashion, the growth of German romantic nationalism did not rule out
the connection between patriotism and cosmopolitanism. August Schlegel
in his Vorlesungen über schone Literatur und Kunst of 1803­4 sought to
promote `European patriotism' with cosmopolitanism, which he saw as a
modern version of the Holy Roman Empire. Without such a geographical
sense of place, republicanism would commit the same mistake as 19th-
century socialist internationalism. It would be devoid of emotional speci-
ficity. This issue has been recognized by Habermas (1990) in his criticisms
of both national citizenship and socialism, and he has advocated a patriot-
ism of the Constitution (Verfassungspatriotismus) in which it is possible to
Turner ­ Cosmopolitan Virtue 49
combine universal principles of democracy and personal liberties in the
constitution of a single society.
These arguments demonstrate the limitations of the language of
national citizenship as a framework for global politics. Thus, the language
of patria and pietas need not be archaic. Indeed it makes sense that, if we
are to have global rights and global citizenship, we need to evolve a language
of obligation and virtue. What commitments might a global citizen have?
We suggest that one answer would be respect for other cultures and that this
commitment to protect the cultural diversity of the global commonwealth
would constitute a cosmopolitan virtue. We detect elements of this develop-
ment in the theory of cosmopolitan democracy.
Nationalism and Citizenship
Nation-state citizenship and nationalist ideology have been, in the modern
world, powerful agencies for creating individual identities. Modern notions
of social rights have defined citizenship as primarily a political and juridi-
cal category relating to liberal individualism. This juridical identity of
citizens has evolved according to the larger political context, because
citizenship has necessarily been constructed within a definite political com-
munity, namely the nation-state. Of course, citizenship was originally a
product of Renaissance humanism, in which the ascending order of the state
and the horizontal ordering of citizenship contrasted with the descending
theme of the Church and its hierarchical order of institutionalized grace
(Ullmann, 1977). This tradition of citizenship became linked to the norms
of civility, civilization and civil society. The rise of nation-state citizenship
somewhat replaced the tradition of humanism and urban cosmopolitanism
with a national ethic that was increasingly exclusionary. Now the problem
for the development of contemporary forms of citizenship is two-fold: global
society is not (as yet) a definite or specific political community to which
cosmopolitanism could be attached, and the continuity of robust forms of
nationalistic citizenship necessarily constrains the possibilities of global
governance.
In the traditional terminology of sociology, citizenship-building was
also, and necessarily, nation-building. The creation of the institutions of
citizenship in legal, political and social terms was also the construction of
a national framework of membership within the administrative structures
of the state ­ an historical process that dominated domestic politics in
Europe and North America through much of the late 18th and 19th cen-
turies. The production of an institutional framework of national citizenship
created new national identities and replaced regional and sub-national
cultures. Citizenship identities during the rise of the European cities had
been local and urban, but with the rise of nationalism they became increas-
ingly connected with strong nationalistic cultures that required greater
domestic coherence. Nationalism embraced negative images of outsiders,
and, as a result, modern politics became a politics of friend or foe, along
the lines suggested in political theology by Carl Schmitt (1976). National
50 Theory, Culture & Society 19(1­2)
identities and social citizenship thrived in a period of international conflict
and competition.
Historical and Sociological Roots of Cosmopolitanism
Contemporary debates about globalization are characteristically ahistorical.
There is little awareness of or appreciation for early modern accounts of
globalization and culture. More specifically, theories of modernization and
globalization have remained blind to previous debates about cosmopolitan-
ism, tolerance and the problem of difference in relation to cultural other-
ness. The moral difficulty of cultural relativism was the central issue of the
historical writing of Herodotus, and exercised the Greek imagination in its
confrontation with the outside world. The problem of strangers lay at the
roots of Greek political thought about the preservation of the polis. However,
the specifically modern problem of relativism and otherness can be located
in the philosophical inquiries of Michel Montaigne (1533­92). In attempt-
ing to develop a concept of cosmopolitan virtue, I shall draw heavily on the
sceptical humanism of Montaigne, who deployed irony to question the
values of war-like France.
From the devastation of the French religious wars, Montaigne wanted
to achieve an ethical reform of the French nobility whose warlike charac-
ter prohibited the development of political compromise and compassion. In
the Essais (Tilley and Boase, 1948), Montaigne, who in this respect could
be seen an early theorist of civilization in the mode of Norbert Elias (1978),
argued that the violent ethic of noble life had resulted in the destruction of
French society. His question was simply: what is appropriate behaviour for
a noble class if we are ever to restore peace and civilization? Through a
close examination of revenge and clemency, Montaigne presents an
argument which gives priority to `humanité' as the basis for mercy and
sympathy. Only the cultivation of humanity can contain the propensity
towards a cycle of vengeance and resentment (Quint, 1998). Montaigne was
shocked by the cruelty and violence of his own times. Men had become like
beasts of the field; they delighted in the torture of others. How could this
behaviour be regarded as truly noble? Hunting as the principal pastime of
the nobility prepared them for a warrior calling in which they were trained
to inflict terrible violence on human beings. He complained about parents
who encouraged aggressive behaviour in their children. What he called the
seeds of cruelty and tyranny were to be found in a child who is amused by
hurting a dog or cat, or in a young nobleman who unjustly strikes a peasant
or lackey who cannot defend themselves. Montaigne saw a parallel between
refractory French noblemen, intransigent religious zealots, Roman gladia-
tors and Brazilian cannibals. In many respects they all exhibit the virtues
of Roman Stoicism which, Montaigne argued, had profoundly negative con-
sequences. The unyielding and rigid behaviour of the Stoic warrior ruled
out compromise and social cooperation. Montaigne's values embraced the
softer (feminine) values of mercy, compassion and tenderness.
Montaigne's interest in the Brazilian cannibals was a literary device
Turner ­ Cosmopolitan Virtue 51
for analysing the violence of his own society (O'Neill, 1982). His ironic
version of Orientalism was employed as a literary technique to study his
own society. This attitude was in fact an important part of the humanistic
goal of understanding one's own society through the study of other societies.
Montaigne's notion of virtuous behaviour ­ yielding, flexible, forgiving,
clement, in favour of talking it through rather than fighting it out, adopting
feminine virtues rather than Stoic masculinity ­ could make men behave
more humanely towards each other, perhaps lead his fellow country men out
of their civil war and restore conditions of justice.
There is a useful theoretical connection between Montaigne and Elias.
The civilizing process involves a pacification of warriors that Elias traced
from the foundation of feudalism through the creation of a court society to
the world of the bourgeois gentleman. We can interpret cosmopolitan virtue
as a further evolution of the process of civilization in which cosmopolitan
virtue embraces pacific values and further precludes violence as a worthy
model of action. Care for others and protection of their rights that lie at the
heart of human rights legislation are a civilizing transformation of inter-
national relations.
In ancient civilizations, trade centres were often protected by religion
and custom as places where strangers could meet for exchange without
danger or harassment. The flow of trade across the ancient Middle East
required trading depots where traders could meet without the dangers of
tribal and ethnic conflict. Hospitality towards strangers evolved out of these
norms of protected trade. In early Islam for example, Medina and Mecca
had always been traditional places for trade where foreigners could
assemble without fear of tribal or religious violence (Watt, 1953, 1956).
They were sites of enforced hospitality and cosmopolitanism.
With the growth of early capitalism in Europe, there were similar
developments where the need to exchange had the unanticipated conse-
quence of promoting cosmopolitanism. In Amsterdam in the Golden Age,
Calvinist leaders of the reformed church sought desperately to exclude or
control the growing cultural and religious diversity of the public arena, but
the urban culture of the United Provinces was deeply fragmented by a
kaleidoscope of religious opinion and theological debate from Quakers,
Remonstrants, Counter-Remonstrants, Arminians, Mennonites and mil-
lenarians. In addition, after the expulsion of the Jews from Spain in 1492,
Jewish traders began to settle in Amsterdam via Portugal and France. Many
Jews who had converted to Catholicism to escape persecution returned to
orthodox practice in the more secure environment of northern Europe. While
the Calvinist authorities attempted to restrict the entry of Jews into main-
stream society, they often came to prominence through their commercial
success in long-distance trade. Attempts to secure religious uniformity were
constantly undermined by the economic needs of a trading society, where
liberal and secular views flourished alongside religious fragmentation. The
quest for religious orthodoxy was further corroded by the fact that the Dutch
authorities could not find enough Calvinist recruits to run their overseas
52 Theory, Culture & Society 19(1­2)
operations. The problems of the New Netherlands forced the Calvinist elite
to employ people of divergent religious backgrounds (Boxer, 1965; Smith,
1973).
Trade tended to impose tolerance, which had the unwanted and un-
anticipated consequence of promoting cosmopolitanism. We should not
exaggerate the extent of such tolerance. Civic calm was periodically frac-
tured, for example, by a number of messianic movements in 1656 and 1666,
including the European-wide Jewish messianism associated with Sabbatai
Zevi. Throughout the 17th century, there were various attempts to purge the
northern cities of Jews, heretics and heretical sects. Despite these attempts,
the Netherlands was regarded as the home of liberal tolerance. In a famous
poem on the `Character of Holland', Andrew Marvell observed:
Hence Amsterdam, Turk, Christian, Pagan, Jew,
Staple of sects and mint of schisms grew:
That bank of conscience, where not one so strange
Opinion but finds credit and exchange. (Marvell, 1681)
Market exchange required the background assumptions that every indi-
vidual was the autonomous origin of their own beliefs and actions. These
abstract elements of the structure of rationalism ­ individualism, tolerance,
universality, contract and equality ­ were identified by Lucien Goldmann
(1973) as products of bourgeois capitalism that came to maturity with the
Enlightenment.
This cultural diversity that was described by Marvell provided the
background to Baruch Spinoza's democratic and republican theory of urban
space. Spinoza's rationalism desacralized and naturalized religion whereby
the personal God of Judeo-Christianity became Nature. Spinoza (1632­77)
challenged the basic authority of Jewish orthodoxy by claiming that Moses
was not the sole author of the Torah. He treated the sacred texts as
historical documents that were fallible and open to diverse interpretation,
and distinguished between the ceremonial and moral functions of religious
rituals. Spinoza's radical argument for tolerance found support among
Protestant radicals such as the Quakers, who had questioned the authority
of the Bible by raising issues about the historical nature of sacred scrip-
tures. For Spinoza, there was little to choose between Islam and Roman
Catholicism. Because the role of religion was to mystify the masses in the
interests of a dominant elite, the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus clearly set
out the necessary connections between the `internal' rights to freedom of
belief for an individual and the external requirements of a democratic state.
Spinoza's rationalist critique of religion thus paved the way for an open and
tolerant society, of which Amsterdam as the spearhead of free trade was
the principal example (Nadler, 1999: 147). In the Tractatus, Spinoza com-
mented on the civil liberties and tolerance that were possible in Amster-
dam. He observed that, when commercial exchanges were undertaken, the
trader's:
Turner ­ Cosmopolitan Virtue 53
religion or sect does not matter, for it has no influence on the decision of law-
suits; and no sect whatsoever is so detested that its members (provided that
they harm no one, give everyman his own, and live decent lives) are refused
the protection of the civil authorities. (Wernham, 1958: 241)
Civil liberties in a tolerant society were not damaging to the sovereignty of
a democratic state and, in these circumstances, `outsiders' were not a threat
to the state.
Let us now consider a contemporary example, namely the debate
around the universality of human rights. Cosmopolitanism has been closely
associated with the human rights revolution, but this cosmopolitanism has
often been dismissed because it is allegedly western, elitist and inter-
ventionist. The cosmopolitan thrust of human rights legislation, it is argued,
will bring about the standardization of other cultures. Everything is accept-
able, provided it falls within the basic assumptions of western modernity.
In his recent study of Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, Michael Ignati-
eff (2001) attempts to get round this problem by recommending human
rights as a minimalist defence of rights that promotes human agency and
dignity. His thesis is overtly liberal, in the tradition of Berlin's negative
freedoms, but he argues that, in practice, there is widespread support for a
minimalist version of human rights, that fundamentalism is not the only view
of Islam and that relativism is not defensible as a moral position. Ignatieff's
argument is that:
[I]t should be possible to maintain regimes of human rights protection in a
wide variety of civilisations, culture and religions each of which happens to
disagree with others as to what a good human life should be. (Ignatieff, 2001:
56)
His minimalist theory to achieve this possibility has the following features.
Democratically elected foreign powers should not be the target of inter-
national intervention if and only if they abide by human rights convention.
However, intervention should be a last resort, and only undertaken when
human rights abuse is systematic, constitutes a threat to international peace
and military intervention has a real chance of stopping abuses. East Timor
illustrates the dangers of intervention without regard for internal security.
Generally speaking, states that offer `their citizens security without democ-
racy are preferable to no government at all' (Ignatieff, 2001: 36). The human
rights revolution, as an aspect of the globalization of juridical relations, does
not spell the end of state sovereignty; on the contrary, the efficacy of human
rights, in most cases, will require state support. Ignatieff is very critical of
cultural relativism as an argument against human rights universalism, and
complains that the West has conceded too much to arguments about local
custom (such as female circumcision). The mistake has been to regard
fundamentalism as the only voice of Islam and to have ignored the diver-
sity of internal voices of opposition in Islamic societies. While `people from
54 Theory, Culture & Society 19(1­2)
different cultures may continue to disagree about what is good . . . [they]
nevertheless agree about what is insufferably, unarguably wrong' (Ignatieff,
2001: 56). There is in my view an even stronger argument about the com-
munity of suffering and vulnerability that lies behind the notion that there
is a consensus about the insufferably wrong. In his Reflections on the Causes
of Human Misery (1970), Barrington Moore argued that, while some weak
version of cultural relativism was inevitable for social science, there is
strong human consensus against tolerance of suffering. While there is a
diversity of happiness, there is a unity of human misery. Thus `a general
opposition to human suffering constitutes a standpoint that both transcends
and unites different cultures and historical epochs' (Moore, 1970: 11). If
human rights exist to protect us from suffering, why not argue that there are
universal human obligations to oppose misery, to respect the cultures of
other peoples and to oppose governments that fail to protect human rights?
Respect for other cultures and revulsion against oppression emerged in the
modern period in reaction to religious wars and civil wars, and were
enhanced by the growth of liberalism as an unanticipated consequence of
global trade. Contemporary cosmopolitanism can be regarded as a response
to ethnic cleansing and racial violence in a context of a global economy that
produces, through a global labour market, the unintended consequence of
hybridity.
Irony and Cosmopolitanism
In a number of recent essays, I have attempted to outline the contents of
cosmopolitan virtue in terms of irony. The ability to respect others requires
a certain distance from one's own culture (Turner, 2000a, 2000b, 2001b),
namely an ironic distance. While that formulation of the problem is valid,
there is an important addition to that perspective. Irony may only be
possible once one already has an emotional commitment to a place. Patriot-
ism, in this sense, may be not only compatible with irony, but its precondi-
tion. Irony may not be comfortable with hot nationalistic commitments, but
patriotic love of country is compatible with both the capacity for ironic
distance and regard for others. Perhaps irony without patriotism may be too
cool and thin to provide for identification and involvement with place and
with politics.
This notion of ironic cosmopolitanism is intended to steer a course
between two contrasted positions in the work of Maurizio Viroli (1995) and
Martha Nussbaum (Cohen, 1996) on For Love of Country. Against patriot-
ism, Nussbaum has rejected the distinction between patriotism and
nationalism, and condemns those on the Left who have argued that national-
ism can be combined with universalism. She asserts, in the interests of
`international quality of life issues' (such as hunger, poverty and ecological
crises), that we must commit ourselves to a higher level of values
(Nussbaum, 2000). Her plea for cosmopolitanism is to establish `a more
international basis for political emotions and concern' (Cohen, 1996: 4). We
must undertake a dramatic shift in allegiance from national citizens to
Turner ­ Cosmopolitan Virtue 55
`citizens of the world' and establish an educational strategy to promote
understanding other cultures and acceptance of a moral obligation to `the
rest of the world' (1996: 389). We can take Nussbaum's argument to be
directly opposed to the arguments of Richard Rorty who has celebrated
value diversity (Rorty, 1998a), and who in Achieving Our Country (1998b)
has also criticized the `cultural left' for its lack of patriotism.
Nussbaum's argument is problematic partly because the creation of
`citizens of the world' would require a global government to enforce the
rights and obligations of citizens. While I can in principle vote in a demo-
cratic government as a citizen of a state, I cannot currently enjoy many or
any rights as a `global citizen'. Here is one reason why the language of
human rights and citizenship do not easily combine. Nussbaum's sharp
contrast between patriotism and cosmopolitanism is too severe; it depends
what we mean by patriotism. The danger with global cosmopolitanism is that
it is too abstract and flat to carry conviction, whereas patriotism has the
advantage of a living culture. But two aspects of her argument are very
relevant to my account of cosmopolitan virtue. First, it appears to be self
evident that American patriotism, especially after 11 September, is not a
promising basis for understanding other cultures, even less respecting them.
Indeed `American foreign policy, particularly with regard to foreign aid,
ecology, and international trade, does near to nothing to address the moral
scandals of our times' (Bader, 1999). Second, most accounts of cultural
relativism would imply that the contemporary cultural world is made up of
a collection of tribes that have almost nothing in common. We need argu-
ments that flesh out the commonalities of the human, especially social,
experience. I use `flesh out' deliberately. We can make the cosmopolitan
argument more convincing through the argument that the vulnerability of
the human body provides the starting point for an account of human com-
monality as the basis for a cosmopolitan ethic.
One response to the growth of globalization and cultural hybridity was
to embrace the so-called politics of identity in order to develop an ethical
view (respect for difference) that is relevant to multiculturalism. Accept-
ance of cultural differences in multiculturalism, however, does not provide
an effective basis for common purpose or communal integrity. The problem
of cultural fragmentation and loss of solidarity has, in recent years, resulted
in a volume of critical responses that attempt to create some revised grounds
for universalism. Critics of the politics of difference include Todd Gitlin
(1995) who has accused left-wing politics of betraying the positive values
of the Enlightenment. A politics of identity ends up as just another par-
ticularism, and leaves modern society exposed to `culture wars'. A similar
view has been developed by David Hollinger, who examines the need for a
post-ethnic moral viewpoint for cosmopolitan America (1995). Perhaps the
most elegant exposition of cosmopolitanism has come from Martha
Nussbaum (1986), who attempts to develop a universalism that depends on
a critical reading of Kant, but also argues there is a need to recognize the
new issues raised by multiculturalism. Nussbaum clearly has a preference
56 Theory, Culture & Society 19(1­2)
for universality, but she recognizes the need to study other cultures with
tolerance and care. A `cosmopolitan' is a `citizen of the world' (kosmou
polites) and this type of membership raises an old problem: can a cosmo-
politan be a patriot? In modern terms, it raises the issue of whether citizen-
ship can be de-territorialized. There is here an important relationship
between the desire for adventure and nostalgia for a homeland ­ a tension
that was expressed in the Odyssey. Sceptics of cosmopolitanism argue that
a genuine democracy cannot be without territory, because love of country is
a necessary prerequisite for pride in the democratic community. One learns
political virtues within a definite spatial context, because respect for democ-
racy cannot be easily divorced from commitment to a place (Deneen, 2000).
There is a parallel here between adherence to the faith of our forefathers
and a global ecumenical regard for other religions: can a committed believer
have an ecumenical love of world religions? Can cosmopolitanism survive
without otherness? In short, the problem of religious studies in a global
society is the problem of borders.
Cosmopolitanism does not mean that one does not have a country or
a homeland, but one has to have a certain reflexive distance from that
homeland. Cosmopolitan virtue requires Socratic irony, by which one can
achieve some distance from the polity. The principal component of cosmo-
politan virtue is irony, because the understanding of other cultures is
assisted by an intellectual distance from one's own national or local culture.
If Nussbaum's plea for global civic education can work, then understand-
ing other cultures presupposes that we could treat our own culture disin-
terestedly as an object of inquiry. As such, cosmopolitan virtue also requires
self-reflexivity with respect to both our own cultural context and other
cultural values. Such an orientation of irony and reflexivity produces a
humanistic scepticism towards the grand narratives of modern ideologies.
As a result, cosmopolitan irony would share much in common with the prag-
matism of Dewy and Rorty in that tolerance of others must start from a
position of some uncertainty as to the ultimate authority of one's own culture
(Rorty, 1982). Cosmopolitanism assumes that there is doubt about the
validity of any `final vocabulary', but cosmopolitan doubt about cultural
authority is not equivalent to cultural relativism, especially what I have
termed complacent relativism. Because cosmopolitanism engenders ironic
self-reflection, it does not need a strong or hot version of otherness, because
its own identity is not profoundly shaped in conflict with others.
Scepticism and distance from one's own tradition are the basis of an
obligation of care and stewardship for other cultures. If cosmopolitans are
urbanites, they have a special responsibility towards aboriginal cultures
arising from an awareness of their precarious condition and hence accept-
ance of cultural hybridization. This description of cosmopolitan virtue as a
set of obligations flows from a recognition of the vulnerability of persons and
the precariousness of institutions with the globalization of culture (Turner
and Rojek, 2001). It is intended to take a stand against relativism and
awaken a recognition of the similarities between the prospects for and
Turner ­ Cosmopolitan Virtue 57
problems of cosmopolitan understanding and an ecumenical commitment to
dialogue with other cultures, especially religious cultures.
The argument, however, is not that contemporary cosmopolitanism is
simply a return to classical cosmopolitanism or religious universalism.
Cosmopolitan irony is generally incompatible with nostalgia, because it
recognizes that our modern dilemmas cannot be solved simply by a naive
return to origins. The cosmopolitanism of the Stoics (Hill, 2000) attempted
to come to terms with the cultural diversity of classical times, but contem-
porary cosmopolitanism is specifically a product of globalization and mod-
ernity. Classical cosmopolitanism was an inevitable product of Roman
imperialism, but contemporary globalization cannot be easily or effectively
dominated or orchestrated by a single political power. While American
culture, especially popular and commercial culture, provides much of the
content of contemporary globalization, it is also the case that cultural
exchange has promoted the prominence of Japanese civilization globally.
Similar arguments could be made for Chinese cuisine, alternative medicine
and commerce (Ong, 1999). This view of global cultural exchange thus leads
to a more complex and rewarding interpretation of the traditional under-
standing of Orientalism. Modern cosmopolitanism is a consequence of
specific social changes that are associated with globalization. These changes
include: the partial erosion of national sovereignty and the growth of dual
and multiple citizenship; the growth of global markets, especially a global
labour market and an expansion of migrant labour seeking forms of quasi-
citizenship; the growth of multiculturalism and cultural hybridity as an
aspect of mainstream contemporary political life; and the globalization of
the politics of migrant communities, giving rise to diasporic cultures. These
global political communities require ironic membership if the modern world
is to escape from the vicious cycle of ethnic conflict and retribution. Modern
political communities need to be thin and contemporary identities have to
be cool (Turner, 2000a).
In a period of globalization, traditional systems of inclusion and
exclusion have to face the challenge of hybridization, diversity and hetero-
geneity. As a result, in a system of global cultures, cosmopolitan citizen-
ship will be characterized by cool loyalties and thin patterns of solidarity
(Walzer, 1983; White, 1991). Indeed the characteristic mode or orientation
of the cosmopolitan citizen would in fact be one of Socratic or ironic involve-
ment in politics through a critical dialogue. Given the complexity and the
hybridization of modern society, there is no convenient place for real or hot
emotions. Intercultural sensitivities and the need to interact constantly with
strangers promote irony as the most prized norm of social interaction. Irony
is sensitive to the simulation which is necessary for interaction in multi-
cultural societies. In such a world, ironic distance is functionally compatible
with globalized hybridity, because we have all become urban strangers.
Urbane ironists, in Rorty's terms, always hold their final views about the
social world in doubt, because they are always subject to revision and
reformulation. Their picture of social relations is necessarily provisional or
58 Theory, Culture & Society 19(1­2)
temporary and they are sceptical about `grand narratives', because their own
`final vocabulary' is always open to further criticism, inspection and cor-
rection. Their ironic views of the world are always contingent and `for the
time being'. If the cosmopolitan mentality is cool, the social relationships
of the ironist will of necessity be thin; indeed, email friendships and elec-
tronic networks will constitute the new patterns of companionship in a post-
modern globe. Ironists are often homeless people who are in some sense
dislodged from their traditional worlds and find themselves in new situations
where old answers no longer work. Cosmopolitan virtue may well turn out
to be the ethic of exile (Turner, 2000c). While nationalism does not easily
cohabit in the world of cosmopolitan diversity, patriotic cosmopolitanism is
not a contradiction in terms, because the republican tradition regards patri-
otism as a training ground for cosmopolitanism. Ironists are inclined towards
reflexivity, because they intuitively get the point of hermeneutics. In this
anthropologically reflexive context, the world is a site of contested loyalties
and interpretations (Rorty, 1989).
By describing the intellectual as ironic, it may be taken to mean that
the intellectual is indifferent to ethical issues. Cosmopolitan virtue does not
simply mean moral indifference or vague liberal universalism. The image
of the modern intellectual as the revolutionary hero, who is passionately
committed to social and political causes, may not be relevant to a frag-
mented and diverse global culture. Intellectual concern for other cultures
might draw upon a different set of metaphors, either relating to the
hermeneutic understanding of illness or to the psychoanalytic relationship,
in which the neutral analyst has to listen carefully to what the other is
saying. Moral responses to pain may not require passion but care as a con-
trolled emotional engagement. One could imagine that cosmopolitan virtue
would involve a careful engagement with cultural issues such as the pro-
tection of so-called primitive cultures and aboriginal communities which
are clearly threatened by the globalization of tourism, and responsibility for
advocacy in a world of collapsing environments and endangered languages.
The cosmopolitan intellectual does not argue that fundamentalism is, in
some simple sense, wrong or dangerous. The cosmopolite joins, rather, with
local voices to probe and if necessary to problematize debate.
Cosmopolitan virtue may be regarded as a weak alternative to a strong
theory of cultural relativism. A more important auxiliary argument concerns
human frailty and vulnerability. The underlying moral component of this
argument is that human frailty provides a foundation for recognizing a
common human bond, typically described as `the human condition'. Human
beings are embodied, and therefore they are frail and vulnerable. In order
to respond to that frailty, human beings create institutions to protect them
against risk, but these very institutions are also sociologically precarious,
Human beings need both social and ontological security, and therefore they
need a `sacred canopy' (Berger, 1967), but this sacred canopy can only have
force if it is based on an existing foundation of social reciprocity.
The dangers of the modern world are that globalization increases our
Turner ­ Cosmopolitan Virtue 59
vulnerability (through damage to the natural environment), makes our insti-
tutions even more precarious (through an erosion of their sovereignty in the
face of global exchanges) and reduces the interconnectedness of social life
(by the erosion of the social capital invested in everyday life). Precisely
because body, society and culture are threatened by global risks, we need
methods of rebuilding community, solidarity and inter-communal under-
standing. The concepts of vulnerability and cosmopolitanism are a modest
proposal towards such a project. It is intended to be an alternative to the
bleak and tragic view of Weber's analysis of the differentiation of the life-
spheres and at the same time a statement about how religious studies could
function in a global era.
Cosmopolitan virtue is not designed to make us feel psychologically
comfortable with cultural difference and diversity. Cosmopolitanism has a
relationship to the traditional themes of homelessness in the theology of the
Abrahamic faiths. Adam and Eve were driven from their Garden as a con-
sequence of their transgression, and forced to sweat and labour in an alien
place. It was also central to Jewish themes of exile and exclusion, and is
generally shared by the world religions as an image of the vulnerability of
human beings. If the body has been a metaphor of the human home, then
homelessness expresses the fundamental spiritual alienation of human
beings. The adventures of Odysseus provide an equally potent image of the
tensions between the security of a dwelling place and the moral challenge
of the journey. Odysseus's confrontation with diversity and his voyage home
have been taken as a collective metaphor of human alienation.
Conclusion: Against Relativism
Cosmopolitan virtue is a defensible moral position in a globally fragmented
culture, and complacent relativism is not the only possible outcome of the
recognition of global diversity. In addition, a focus on human vulnerability
provides a moral baseline for standards of conduct and intellectual inquiry
that can, as it were, make relativism relative. Cosmopolitanism can both
express a set of virtues (care for other cultures, ironic distance from one's
own traditions, concern for the integrity of cultures in a hybrid world,
openness to cross-cultural criticism and so forth), and embrace a love of
country as a republican commonwealth that ought to be shared by all. If
there is now widespread acceptance of the relevance of human rights legis-
lation, then in principle perhaps we can accept a set of obligations that
logically underpin those rights. The notion of `cosmopolitan virtue' is a
general description of such cultural and moral obligations.
This account of cosmopolitan virtue could be easily criticized as hope-
lessly nave and, even as a normative position, could be challenged for being
completely out of touch with contemporary social and political realities.
Cosmopolitans are criticized as rootless sceptics who are not committed to
place and local culture (Barber, 1985; Mansfield, 1994). In Achieving Our
Country, Rorty (1998b) condemns the liberal complacency of the super-rich
cosmopolitans who have turned their backs on the democratic American
60 Theory, Culture & Society 19(1­2)
traditions of Dewey and Whitman. Cosmopolitanism could also be held to
be elitist in the sense that the elite, in the comfort of their Beverly Hills
mansions, can afford to be generous to other cultures at a safe distance,
whereas the slum dwellers of Bradford and Glasgow cannot. It is because
these criticisms have considerable force that I have selected Montaigne as,
so to speak, the fountain of contemporary cosmopolitanism. It was precisely
in the horror of civil war and religious violence that Montaigne called upon
his fellow countrymen to exercise restraint and to adopt a set of `feminine'
virtues lest they destroy themselves in a sea of blood. His disquisition on
virtue and his reflections on cannibalism must also have appeared nave
and elitist. My proposal for cosmopolitan virtue is addressed to precisely
those powers responsible for genocide in Chechnya, Bosnia, Kosovo and
Rwanda, and equally for global warming, the global narcotics industry and
the global sales of small arms. These virtues are elitist in the sense that
they are initially addressed to those in power to exercise a set of obligations.
Finally, there is a sociological argument behind this normative account of
virtues. It is the sociological hope that, as the global elites become more
culturally diverse and flexible, they will have to embrace global diversity
more seriously and with greater determination. In this sense, they may
become, in Aihwa Ong's terms, `flexible citizens' (Ong, 1999), because
cosmopolitanism is part of the cultural logic of transnationality.
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Bryan Turner is Professor of Sociology at the University of Cambridge.
He is the editor of Citizenship Studies and with John O'Neill Journal of
Classical Sociology. With Anthony Elliott, he edited Profiles in Contem-
porary Social Theory (Sage) in 2001.
Turner ­ Cosmopolitan Virtue 63