7-/tói, suuaa:* > m&uLňRtv&   /^
?/ THE   rUkltJiOh/S    &r  ?U.BUt,   iJ^ElS^HéT
CHAPTER
1
Relief Labor, ^rid Civil Disorder: An Overview
Since the early sixteenth century, rhJin'y Western governments have come tp make provisipti fpr the Cijte of th,e destitute, often known as pO;pr relifelf, (Jjl j^e Ur(ited State», such provisions are now called p^Bjic 3sSis(ta>tpe or public welfare.) The purpose of tills chajptet1 is to sUggeSt why relief arrangements are establishedi #t)d Why they persist.
"Relief arrangements afe aficillary to economic arrangements. Their chief function is to regelate labor, and they do that in two general ways. First; Whčíl mass unemployment leads to outbreaks of fujrtnoilj relief programs are ordinarily initiated or expanded j:0 apqqrh and control enough of the unemployed lp res;ttii-e Cjt"flßt< tHerí> W turbulence subsidies, the relief systpm Cqnt^cfä, expelling those who are needed to populate the íabCjř ttiarket, Relief also performs a labor-regulating function \t\ this shrunken state, however. Some of the aged, the dlsa^IM* the insane, and others who are of no use as workers pre left on the relief rolls, and their treatment is s0 degrading and punitive as to instill in the laboring masses a fear qf the fate that awaits them should they relax into begg^y arid pauperism. To demean and punish those who 4p ftpt Work is to exalt by
Regulating the Poor                               4
contrast even the meanest labqr at the meanest wages. These regulative functions of relief, and their periodic ex-p-nsion and contraction, are made necessary by several strains toward instability inherent in capitalist economies.
Problems of Controlling Labor by Market Incentives
All human societies compel most of their members to work, to produce the goods and services that sustain the community. All societies also define the work their members must do and the conditions under which they must do it. Sometimes the authority to compel and define is fixed in tradition, sometimes in the bureaucratic agencies of a central government. Capitalism, however, relies primarily upon the mechanisms of a rnarket—the promise of financial rewards or penalties—to motivate men and women to' work and to hold them to their occupational tasks.
Basic to capitalist economic arrangements is change. The economy is kept in constant flux by entrepreneurs searching out new and bigger markets and cheaper methods of production and distribution. These changes in the organization of production and distribution create continuous shifts in manpower needs: workers must acquire new skills; they must move to new locales; a stream of uninitiated people must be made to fill new and different occupations in a changing productive system. Because of this fluidity, work roles under capitalism cannot bé assigned by tradition. Nor can responsibility for the allocation of labor conveniently be lodged in the bureaucracies of a central government, for in a market system a great variety of dispersed entrepreneurs control production and define labor requirements. In the place of tradition or governmental authority, capitalist societies control people and work tasks precisely
5                      Relief, La bor, and Chtfí Ilimfat
as they control goods and capital—(iltdugh a market system.
Under capitalism, manpower distribution, is ttrainly the result of monetary incentives or disincentives; profits or wages, of the threat pf ho profits Or hp Wages. As these incentives ebb and flovy in respqnse tö ecoiiorhic changes, most people are more or less cphtiriupUsly induced to change and adapt. Continual change in labor requirements also means that, at any given mqrrteiit( SOftie people are left unemployed. In subsistence ecoriofriies everyone works; the labor force is virtually SyhpnyrflpUs with the population. But capitalism makes labor CPnditional pn market demand, with the result that some arŕíount of unemployment becomes a permanent feature of the economy.1 In other words, change and fluctuation and unemployment are chronic features of capjtalism.
But periodically change takes on catastrophic proportions. Sometimes this is the result of the natural disasters that afflict all societies, such as crop failures or rapid population growth, which disturb the ongoing pattern of work and its rewards. To such travails capitalism adds abrupt, erratic, and extreme fluctuations in production and distribution, leading to massive and precipitous modifications in the requirements for lappr. The two main sources of the catastrophic changes that distinguish capitalism are depression and rapid modernization.
During the economic downturn^ Or depressions that have marked the advance of capitijljs|T3, the structure of
1 Many critics of capitalism have ärgtíed that thie liiälníenance of a stir-plus of unemployed workers is ndt simply ft pypfradUct pf rtiafket fluidity but a deliberately contrived cóPdítidn, děslgpét! tp' eíiše the f)OW of labor and to lessen the bargaining ppwer of \Vďr|ífirs Irj niafkei trapsáctiops. The periodic intervention of gqvehiment tk) jíicrfliiše ihe pool pf unemployed by slowing the rate of economic glrpVŕ|K ähd tne Use df government power to force men td work for ápy jfjwitf' lepcj pretlepce to these views, as we will ourselves argue later in fhis pp^fiter Wfiefi WC cjlscuss the way relief practices are designed to trtaitu^ifi 4 labor pool.
Regulating the Poor                                6
market incentives simply collapses; iyith no demand for labor, there are no monetary rewards to guide and enforce work. During periods of rapid modernization—whether the replacement of handicraft by machines, the relocation of factories in relation to new sources of power or new outlets for distribution, or the demise of family subsistence farming as large-scale commercial agriculture spreads— portions of the laboring population may be rendered obsolete or at least temporarily maladjusted. Market incentives do not collapse; they are simply not sufficient to compel people to abandon one way of working and living in favor of another.
In principle, of course, these dislocated people become part of a labor supply to be drawn upon by a changing and expanding labor market. As the history of Western market systems shows, however, people do not adapt so readily to drastically altered methods of work and to the new and alien patterns of social life dictated by that work. They may resist leaving their traditional communities and the only life they know. Bred to labor under the discipline of sun and season, however severe that discipline may be, they may resist the discipline of factory and machine, which, though it may be no more severe, may seem so because it is alien. The process of human' adjustment to these economic changes has ordinarily entailed generations of mass unemployment, distress, and disorganization.
Now, if human beings were invariably given to enduring these travails with equanimity, there would be no governmental relief systems at all. lii.it often they do not, and for reasons that are not difficult to see. The regulation of civil behavior in all societies is intimately dependent on stable occupational arrangements. So long as people are fixed in their work roles, their activities and outlooks are also fixed; they do what they must and think what they must. Each behavior and attitude is shaped by the reward of a good harvest or the penalty of a bad one, by the factory paycheck or the danger of losing it. But mass unemployment breaks
7                      Relief, Labor, and Civil pisófder
that bond, loosening people from the nvain institution by which they are regulated and cdntjrpljeid.?
Moreover, mass unemployment tijáj: persists for any length of time diminishes thé Capacity of ptlier institutions to bind and constrain people: Opcj-jpaiipriaj behaviors and outlooks underpin a Way of life $rtd tíétféjr^line färüHial, communal, and cultural patterns. Wljfell Uxgc ntjrnbeis of people are suddenly barred from jĽri<BÍ)r traditional occupations, the entire structure pf social cpntrql is weakened and may even collapse. There is rip harvest or paycheck to enforce work and the sentiments that uphold work; without work, people cannot confonji td ís(]rrii|Íal and communal roles; and if the dislocation is tvidéspreftdj the legitimacy of the social order itself may cprhe to lie questioned. The result is usually civil disqrder—crime, fnass protests, riots— a disorder that may even threaten to overturn existing social and economic arrangements. It is then that relief programs are initiated or expanded.
However, simply providing aid to quiet the unemployed will not stop disorder; it may even permit it to worsen, for although the remedy may prevent Workers' starvation, the trigger that sets off disorder \s not economic distress itself but the deterioration of social control. To restore order, the society must create the rrtearts to reassert its authority. Because the market is unable to Control men's behavior, at least for a time, a surrogate system of social control must be evolved, at least for a time, lyjtoreover, if the surrogate sys-
2 Marie Jahoda describes the total disorieritáfjph öf the porkers lit the mstrian village of Marijjnthal wherj its Orllf ťatUjj-ý stopped production uring the depression of the 1930'si "Ťhe iinerh(j|qyťt| tilth lost their sense of time. When asked at t(ie end of á day yvíját.they b*tl dpiié cliirjrtg il, they were unable to describe their áctivjtié^. 'Řř?l' lltyfc 'í • • Was vagllc and nebulous. Activities such as fetching tvp'pífí ftpiW trje sjied, }ylilcfi Could* not have consumed more than ten rnirtutés, iféte ř£á|rtíecl as If they had filled a morning. . . . The men's wiping dá^ ivi^ ' |fÍ0Írttl1ftl to tyvelvc ur thirteen hoiirs. '. . . Rational budget planning ^fpjij ipáriiÍpf1ed |i) fäVdr fif expenditure on trinkets; while essentials c^Ujrl not'bfe jpaid for" (ßÖ-fi7, 69-72). Complete citations will be föi<nd in trpí' l|ÍBJ(f}^pHy i\ flip éj|d of each chapter.                            '       '   '       ' ' ' '''' ?' '"  ''* ' ""
y
Regulating the Poor                                8
tern is to be consistent with normally dominant patterns, it must restore people to work roles. Thus, even while obsolete or unneeded laborers áre temporarily given relief, they are generally succored only on condition that they labor, whether in public workhouses and labor yards or by being contracted and indentured to private entrepreneurs. To illustrate these views we turn to some examples of the emergence and expansion of relief-giving in early European capitalist societies. Our purpose is not to give a legislative or administrative history—that has been done by other writers—but to provide a background for our subsequent discussion of the sources of contemporary relief crises in the United States.
Civil Disorder and the Initiation or Expansion of Relief-Giving
Western relief systems originated in the mass disturbances that erupted during the long transition from feudalism to capitalism beginning in the sixteenth century. As a result of the declining death rates in the previous century, the population of Europe grew rapidly; as the population grew, so did transiency and beggary. To deal with these threats to civil order, many lqcalities legislated severe penalties against vagrancy. Even before the sixteenth century, the magistrates of Basel had defined twenty-five different categories of beggars, together with appropriate punishments for each. But penalties alone did not deter begging, especially when economic distress was severe and the numbers affected were large. Consequently, some localities began to augment punishment with provisions for the relief of the vagrant poor.
As early as 1516, the Scottish theologian John Major, who taught at the University of Paris, declared: "If the Prince or Community should decree that there should be no beggar in the country, and should provide for the im-
9                      Relief, Labor, a\id Civil Qislpr4ét
potení, the action would be brais^Worthy arid lawful.'"3 In 1520, Martin Luther urged the German nobility not only to abolish beggary but tp proving foť their own poor. In 1523 Luther published a devilled tčjjpt sthßrhe foť Leis-nig, in Saxhny, which prohibited bfjjgirig »Ind provided For a common chest to aid the old, tfij? WčiíKi atlti those poor householders who had "honourably l^fklt^d, flit Hleif emit or in agriculture" but who cotilcl no rjHgei' flhtl the ttieans to support themselves. Ordinances modielfcd Qii Luther's injunctions were rapidly instituted id trje German municipalities,'! and in 1530 the German feŕriffeŕor Charles the Fifth issued an edict outlawing beggary and directing each municipality to maintain its prior.1*
A French town that initiated such atj arrangement early in the sixteenth century was Lyoŕišt6 Which was troubled both by a rapidly grooving population, ahd by the economic instability associated with the tradšjtíptt to capitalism. By 1500 Lyons' population had already begun to increase. During the decades that followed, the town became a prosperous commercial and manufacturing center—the home of the European money market arid of expanding new trades in textiles, printing, and métalworking. As it thrived it attracted people, not orily from the surrounding countryside, but even frqm Italy, Flanders, atld Germany. All told, the population of Lyons probably dotibled between 1500 and 1540.
All this was very well as lorig as the newcomers could be
n Quoted in Ashley, Vol. II, 341. Emphasis addctj.
«Webb and Webb. Part I. 31-92.
5 In 1531 the emperor elaborated; h,is earlipr et|jtt |ri '4 sehqpie thai prohibited vagrancy and begging under pain df píHřlf! íft 'l1* M*1' ar,c' commanded every city in (.he Netherlands to p-rpVJHp for its J30qr by putting the able-bodied to work while caring fot iHclij»te|ü jVtiríteij Slid orphans (ibid., 32; de Schwciniiz, 33),                     I             if            .
"Yprcs, in Flanders, initiated a scheme yety si'tjij^r tó M^*!?' "i ÍSľfe-Bruges. Paris, and Rome also inaugurated relief kyfjtóii iú about the sanle time. We use Lyons only as an illustration of dcVfcjqbjHrtíífttš t(|it Were goiflS forward in many places. For a detailed dcscriptifijl tíf tŕlfe ciťpiirnsläjices leading to Lyons' welfare program, see' pavis.
Regulating the Poor                               10
absorbed by industry. But not all were, with the result that the town came to be plagued by beggars and vagrants. Moreover, prosperity was not continuous: some trades were seasonal and others were periodically troubled by foreign competition. With each economic downturn, large numbers of workers were thrown out of work. They—and especially their children, who were preferred as beggars for the sympathy they elicited—recurrently took to the streets to plead for charity, cjuttering the very doorsteps of the better-off classes. Lyons was most vulnerable during periods of bad harvest, when famine not only drove up the cost of bread for urban artisans and journeymen but brought hordes of peasants into the city, where they sometimes paraded through the streets in great numbers to exhibit their misfortune.
Thus the economic distress resulting from population changes and agricultural and other natural disasters which had characterized life throughout the Middle Ages was exacerbated by the vagaries of an evolving market economy. Consequently, turbulence among the poor reached a new pitch. In 1529 food riots erupted, with thousands of Lyon-nais looting granaries and the homes of the wealthy; in 1530, artisans and journeymen armed themselves and marched through the streets; in 1531, mobs of starving peasants literally overran the town.
Such charity as had previously been given in Lyons was primarily the responsibility of the church or of those of the more prosperous who sought to purchase their salvation through almsgiving. If almsgiving were to serve a religious end for the prosperous, the destitute could hardly be prohibited from begging. But this method of caring for the needy obviously stimulated rather than discouraged begging and created a public nuisance to the better-off citizens (one account of the times describes famished peasants so gorging themselves as to die on the very doorsteps where they were fed). Moreover, to leave charity to church or citizen meant that few got aid, and those not necessarily
11                     Relief, Labor, and Civil Dti^wdef
according to their need. The rpsujt j|y^ tfrat rriäss disorders periodically erupted.
The increase in disorder led the rüjers; of Lyons to conclude that the giving of charity ^hojiild rip io^get" be governed by private Whim. Cphs^qli^^fj^ jjri 1,1534, churchmen, notables, and merchants jöiriec} tüg^hot to establish
d. All chnri-
aif i $\\in\ body, the
a centralized administration for diS table donations were consolidated dp
"Aumône-Générale," wfiose r;espQrikjtl|jjjty w^s {a ''rjptltisll the poor fdrpyer." A list of the neétíy ^al establiš|ip4 "V a house-to-house survey, and tickets foť t$\lftk Were issUtid to those who qualified. Standards Were fi^Ejfcj in allotting bread and money, the sick were sehj: to a hbSFfitflí for free medical care, and not least, begging Was strictly prohibited.
Indeed, most of the features of rnpapill Welfare—from criteria to discriminate the Worthy jppöf- (tdííl the UtlWorthy to strict procedures for surveillance1 of recipients and measures for their rehabilitatipn-^Were present in Lyons' new relief administration.7 Éy the logo's, aljout 10 per cent of the town's population was receiving relief, while the number of patients in the LyqnS hospital for the poor had tripled.8 The notables and merchants, who promoted this scheme did not so much take pride ih their charity as in their aspiration to make of L,ypns Ma Vision of peace."
Within two years of the eštablishríierU of relief in Lyons, King Francis I ordered each pafišh ih; France to register its poor and to provide for the ''ipipotenť' out of a fund of contributions. Elsewhere other townships began to devise
7 Foreigners were more kindly dealt with thätt jli riiqtiy other places (lliis was. after all. a center of foreign cotniHöfPrJ)! (tŕfjef^lV Mipy Were Riven a night's lodging before IhCy were sent ót) tliiäjr lýäy.
8 The hospital was in fact used id incarcerate íst^iii Nflpfct* ij* Will t»* U) care for the sick. Jüan Luis Vivos, á jiu|tiBhj^||f(rii °l W IffflPl WJPlc in his plan for relief in Bruges, dated jahiíafy pj IklQ: ^t fall ^diW^ls' ihose places where the sick are fed and faVeji fÖriUhpfe ä jcérfäjjj il(]jilt)|ír "f paupers ii supported, where boys and girls äfe Wifffffi WJI^i! 'sNfWP'lf^ infants arc nourished, where the insane ire tpjitfiritp, «W tyf)*!^ ÍM ÖÜtttl dwell. . . ." (u)l Four centuries later. tíje^lmspMIc} W'Wt*f|t|(JH9e tffts performing roughly the samé function iji' England flW1/jkrapriFtj.
Regulating the Poor                               12
similar systems to deal with the vagrants and mobs cast up by famine, rapid population growth, and the transition from feudalism to capifalism. A "new statecraft relative to destitution" was emerging:
What we see ever-increasingly realised, alike in Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, England, and) to some extent, France and Scotland, is that no policy of mere represson availed to stop either mendicancy on the one hand, or vagrancy on the other; that (as distinguished from a fortuitous distribution of voluntary gifts to necessarily selected individuals) a systematic and ubiquitous provision had to be made locally by some organ of government for all those who were actually in need of the means of existence, whatever the cause of their destitution. .. .B
England also felt these disturbances, and just as it pioneered in developing an intensively capitalist economy, so it was at the forefront in developing nation-wide, public relief arrangements to replace purely local and private charity.10 During the closing years of the fifteenth century, the emergence of the wool industry in England began to transform the economic and spcial arrangements governing agriculture. As sheep raising became more profitable, much land was converted from tillage to pasturage, and large numbers of peasants were displaced by an emerging entrepreneurial gentry which either bought their land or cheated them out of it.1' The impact on the dispossessed farmers
0 Webb and Webb, Part I, 29.
10 William Ashley commented on the similarity of these schemes: "We need not suppose that the English legislation wis a mere imitation of what was being done elsewhere; the same causes were everywhere at work, leading to the same general results" (Part II, 350).
11 "We may to-day recognise the opening of the sixteenth century as a period of special economic stress, whether we emphasise the agrarian revolution that was dislocating the manorial organisation, or the growth of manufactures in the towns, involving the production of an urban proletariat; or the rapid increase of commerce, with its unsettlemcnt of one national industry after another" (Webb and Webb, Part I, 43).
] 3                    Relicj, Labor, and Civil Dj\brclpt
was one that was to become fami|iaf |rj successive pejripdfi of agricultural rnodernižatíqh. iSir Tjhfjtt|^ Moťů described their plight in 1516;
The husbandmen  bé thrust Out of itnBJr tíWh, Of else either by covin or fraud, or j3y yioléi|p ^n|ířř»S5J0rÍ tjiěy be put besides it, or by yvrdfifes ahčjJHjjlfjtéš |fhky bfi 5p weaned, that they be corhpelleu to sel( fljUi.pV php jí$flil|if therefore or by other, either by hobje'tjf jcj-bibljt tnéý p\U)t needs  depart   away,   ppor,  sjjly}   W^tcjjéri  sb^ls,   rripji, women,   husbands,   wivesi   fatherless  c(j||fcÍťeiir   WlddWSi woeful mothers, with their young baqop, $(1tj tř^elt* whole household small in substance and iljitjcjij jfi řlUíjibeři as husbandry required! many handl >\\f;jy they trudge, I say, out. qf their known and accufitqirieq floUses, finding no place to rest in. All their höusöboidl s^ff, Which is very little worth, though it might tyéií atjldß the s^le, yet being suddenly thrust out, they bé cdhstťitjttéd to sell it for a thing of naught. And y^hen jtr^iey have wandered abroad till that bé spent, what can they then else do but steal, and then justly pardy b<2 hahgédj of else go about a begging. And yet then alsp they be Cast in prison as vagabonds, because they go 4bout fine! Work not: whom no man will set at work, though they hever so willing profer themselves thereto.12
A statute of 1488-1489 cprhínents With; alarm 011 the resulting disorders:
[F]pr where in some toWns fwq hundred perS0ns were •occupied and lived by their lawful laibo^s, h°W be there occupied two or three herdsmen, and file re5ÍmIp fall in idleness, the husbandry which |ij orje pf t|lÖ greatest commodities Of this realm is greíitíy defc^di chMľphes destroyed, the service of God yvithdrawjjí Íh# bpdjés there buried not prayed for, the pafrpn and ftj^flfl ^Whi^fL the defense of this  íand against Qm pr|$fôíjj|j| putW^fq
12 More, 33, as quoted in rlc Schwcinitz, \p.
Regulating the Poor                               14
feebled and impaired; to the great displeasure of God, to the subversion of the policy and good rule of this land, and remedy be not hastily therefore purveyed.13
Early in the sixteenth century, the national government moved to try to forestall such disorders. In 1528 the Privy Council, anticipating a fall in foreign sales as a result of the war in Flanders, tried to induce the cloth manufacturers of Suffolk, to retain their employees.14 In 1534, a law passed under Henry VIII attempted to limit the number of sheep in any one holding in order to inhibit the displacement of farmers and agricultural laborers and thus forestall potential disorders, beginning in the 1550's, the Privy Council attempted to regelate the price of grain in poor harvests.16 But the entrepreneurs of the new market economy were not so readily curbed, so that during this period another method of dealing with labor disorders, especially vagrancy, was evolved.
Until this time, communities in England, as in other
13 Quoted in dc Schweinitz, g. Nor were the disorders merely idleness and decay. "When the sense of oppression became overwhelming, the popular feeling manifested itself in widespread organised tumults, disturbances and insurrections, from Wat Tyler's rebellion of 1381, and Jack Cade's march on London of 1460, to the Pilgrimage of Grace of 1536, and Kelt's Norfolk rising of 1549—all of them successfully put down, but sometimes not without great struggle, by the forces which the Government could command. But vagrancy was not acfually prevented; nor, as we shall presently describe, was the habit of making a living by wandering on the roads brought to ah end" (Webb and Webb, Part I, 27-28). " dc Schweinitz, 80.
15 "The activities of the Privy Council had been steadily growing during the latter decades of the sixteenth century. In the earlier part of the century these orders seem to have been concerned mainly with the prevention of vagrancy and tumult—in short, with the security of the realm and the maintenance of law and order. Gradually we sec them, with increasing frequency, endeavouring to prevent an actual shortage of food, and the high prices occasioned thereby, by compelling farmers to bring to market their hoarded stocks, putting pressure on corn-dealers, causing maximum prices to be fixed in local markets, and promoting both the purchase of corn in bulk from abroad and its distribution to the poor at less than cost price. In the special stress of I586-1587 this action of the Privy Council was elaborated into a nationwide policy . . ." (Webb and Webb. Part I, 66).
15                    Relief, Labor, and (?ivfj OMfd-ef
European countries, sanctioned álrrjSgtviiíjif ás a m^ans of personal salvation, and one jthírd pf píiřjsjl chUfch ftlilds was set aside for this purpose. Eárly íH the sixteenth Pen-tury, however, the national &c^erri|ti0irU moved to replace parish arrangements for charity ivUjl A ftrHiPMvide system of relief. In 1531, an act of fcaŕliátrijsh,'! tj^ípjrerřj that Iqcal officials search out and register tH^|s j}f tlie destitute deemed to be impotent, arid giye tj||öjri a tJpcUrrtetit a»' thorizing begging. Almsgiying to pfheii fy/f^ plitláiVed- As for those who sought alms without a^pQHz^tipiij jihe penalty was public whipping till the biöqei j-äjt
Thereafter, other arrangements foť relief were rapidly instituted. An act passed in 1536, 4mH|"I& £^e r^gti of Henry VIII, required lqcal parishes tp t^ke care of their destitute and to establish A placed Uje fqr the Collection and administration of donations foť that purpose by local officials.10 (In the same year Henry Vlll began to expropriate monasteries, helping to assufe secular control of charity.17) With these developments;, the penalties for beggary were made mdre severe, including an elaborate schedule of branding, enslavement, and execution for repeated offenders. Even so, by 15^2 beggary yvas said to have reached alarming proportions* arid ift that year local responsibility for relief was more fully spelled out by the famous Elizabethan Poor Laws, which established a local
10 In   1563,  these contributions  fqr  reliéf  tyeře  made  compulsory  (de Schweinitz, 25).                                                                                r    .     j   \
"The  Webbs  suggest   the  motive  for  tMi  restricting   the  church:
rhroughout the whole period ... [up ,0  )fi^]t the King, his Council
.,01    , Parl'ament' wc« enacting arid'casing out laws relating Jo the
^L   aA   utcr exactly "pp^'io [W Y U« ■fi'm^W °f the
ľio ľľ í, 7 t0 ,íat 0f the bcneV'°!ei1t fjKMtlMWi cVabJjsliBd by Pious founders, Craft Guilds and municipal eŕ^omtóhs, Alj fhrsp itctJvl-
n* o7'cc^vl/r?™^blisaiiľ^ ^fttoM.pftNt <«* folii»-
3 G™ s, P"»-- The ^ing and ,iä hobtó.Wflŕi IfW Upon An H to-Whcr different object, namC.y, maintaining o «# lá' (JOflltlJ 'Iway, understand  it)  the maintenance 'of* ífo iftjSM »Pb HJ.  MM
Regulating the Poor                              16
tax, known as the poor rate, as the means for financing the care of paupers and required that justices of the peace serve as the overseers of the poor.
In the closing years of the sixteenth century, the price of grain rose almost continuously, causing considerable hardship among the laborers. After 1594, bad harvests sharpened their miseries, especially in 1596-1597, when "Unemployment was frequent, poverty was everywhere . . . there was . . . constant danger of revolt." 18 When Parliament convened in October 1597, it acted to clarify and systematize the provisions for relief, especially the system of taxation, and the practice of making relatives responsible for paupers. "The coincidence between the coming of the free wage-labourer and an organised public provision for the destitute cannot, in the nature of things, be exactly proved," write the Webbs,19 but the indications are convincing, and were to become more convincing still as the system of free labqr expanded and changed.
After this period of activity, the parish relief machinery lapsed into disuse. But then a depression in cloth manufacture in 1620, followed by bad harvests and high prices in 1621-22, produced new outbreaks of disorder. The Privy Council established a special commission charged with enforcing the Poor Laws,20 and by the 1630's the relief rolls had expanded enormously.21 Relief was curtailed again with the onset of the Civil War, when high pay enticed much of the surplus agricultural population into the army. A long period of contraction then ensued, apparently accounted for by rising wages under Cromwell
18 Edward P. Cheyney, History of England, 1926, Vol. II, 36, as quoted in Webb and Webb, Part I, 62.
19 Webb and Webb, Part I, 441 n. 2.
20 Ibid., 75-100. Trevelyan writes of the Privy Council during this period that it "had a real regard for the interests of the poor, with which the interests of public order were so closely involved" (170-171).
21 According to E. M: Leonard, there was more poor relief in England from 1631 to 1640 than ever before or since (266).
17                     Relief, Labor, and Cfr/f Jtl^ótójfíf
and by the paralysis of the Central ÄeJ^jtIje^ pj jĚftJVl?)^ ment after the war.
Relief arrangements were reactiytitedl <}iid expanded again, however, during the massige äMii^Uüfai dislocations of the late eighteenth centiij-y. fyrat of the English agricultural population had, try trieh Irjst if$ lahdholdings; in place of the subsistence f^rmitig. te|iftřj elsewhere in Europe^ a three-tier system of larid|ťKm|ži$( t^ftt farmer5-and agricultural workers had evtílveti, jjtt E,tig]arjd,22 The vast majority of the pedple ^rere 3 j^jidjcM proletariat, hiring out by the year to tenant jfôrfrigfjj, TM itiargjh of their subsistence, hotyéver, v^ prdVid^ld ^ cqfijrhqji aha1 waste lands, on which they gathered ||$dji|hg( grazed afii-mals, and hunted game to suf>plemelr}j; tfli^f roeagW Wages. Moreover, the use pf the comrnoris ^s jj^ft pf the! English villager's birthright, his serfse pf p\%£é äťid pridfí. It was the disruption of these arfangjemehts1 %p,d the ensuing disorder that led to the new expansion tit rejjief.
By the middle of the eighteenffj cettttrty, ah increasing population, advancing urbanizatiqii, ftnd the growth of manufacturing had greatly expanded markets for agricultural products, iiiainjy fór ceřěajs to feed the urban population and for wool to supply the cloth manufacturers. These new markets, together with the introduction of new agricultural methods (stich äs cross-hafrowing), led to large-scale changes in agriculture, To take advantage of rising prices and new techniques, hig landowners moved to expand their holdings still further by buying up
""In 1851, when the first nationally reliable figtlres were collected, there were about «25,000 farma in Brjtain, about hajf of them fjetween 100 and joo acres in size, and all qf then! áy^)ŕ|gjrjg[ j^ist over i to acres, In other words, what passed for a smájl farm íh England would certainly have counted as a giant farm beside 'tile sriia'lj jtijjgtotft, PÍ ÍVP'í*' P***3"* economies. Just over 300,000 pepple descrirje^: (h^rj)()s|ve$ j|« 'f?rmpr| and graziers." These cultivated their farjms ei^|Ullif|iy jfeijatjltiyj'tig É? 1.5 million men !and womeri whq descntwi 'tfi&^;$# ^"igjijniHÜjral labourers, shepherds, farm-servants .' .' " \ticbs^^'0$ '%\\4Íi |4)>
Regulating the Poor                              18
small farms and, armed with parliamentary "Bills of Enclosure," by usurping the common and waste lands which had enabled many small cqttagers to survive.23 Although this process began much1 earlier, it accelerated rapidly after 1750; by 1850, well over 6 million acres of common land—or about one quarter of the total arable acreage— had been consolidated into private holdings and turned primarily to grain production.24 Half of this acreage was enclosed between 1760 and 1800, a period during which the rate of parliamentary acts pi enclosure ran ten times higher than in the previous fprty years. For great numbers of agricultural workers, enclosure meant no land on which to grow subsistence crops to feed their families, no grazing land to produce wool for hoine spinning and weaving, no fuel to heat their cottages, and new restrictions against hunting. It meant, in short, deprivation of a major source of subsistence for the poor.25
New markets also stimulated a more businesslike approach to farming. Landowners demanded the maximum rent from tenant farmers, and tenant farmers in turn began to deal with their laborers in terms of cash calculations. Specifically, this meant a shift from a master-servant relationship to an employer-employee relationship, but on the harshest terms. Where laborers had previously worked by the year and frequently lived with the farmer, they were now hired for only as long as they were needed and were then left to fend for themselves.20 Pressures toward
23 Enclosure was also encouraged by the high rentals paid by factories located in outlying areas, and especially by the prospects of coal-mining, from which the landed gentry drew great fortunes in royalties.
24 Hobsbawm and Rudé, 27. There were about four thousand parliamentary acts for enclosure during this hundred-year span, most of them in the 1760's and 1770's and during the war period of 1793-1816.
25 A comprehensive account of the life of the villagers after enclosure is provided in Hammond and Hammpi]d, 1948, Vols. I and II.
26 The loss of "gleaning rights" illustrates how the commercialization of farming affected the precarious margin of the laborers' existence. More efficient farming methods deprived them of the right to pick the fields clean after the harvest. The Hammonds estimate that such gleaning rights represented the equivalent of six or seven weeks' wages (1948, Vol. I, 103).
19                    Relief, Labor, and Ciiiil Qlsptßej
short-term hiring also resulted fföiri thjb j^jfgfi 3ca|e cultivation of grain crops for market, which ^Ufáíf for a seasonal labor  force,  as  opposed  to  rhijted  sütjsjstehce   farttiing, which required year-round laborers. THie ljse pf cash rather than .produce as the medium of payment tor Work, a rapidly spreading practice,  encouraged  partly  jby  fite   löpg-terpl inflation of grain prices, added to the jaltlqtej-'s ji^itlsliiipS,^ Finally, the rapid increase in rílHi) pqpL}iá}.icjp 2fl á t a time when the grdwth of wpplen manUf^ctUťjťjg' epfUiftUed to provide an incentive to cqnvprt jand frpíjí fiilagti fq pasturage produced a larger labor sujŕplUs. lé^VUj^ agricultural laborers with no leverage in  pai-gair|lf|g- fbf }Vages With their tenant-farmer employers.2'' Tjie ré§ujj; ^s. widespread unemployment and terrible hardship ^jftpjlg agricultural workers.
None of these changes took place Wjtllptit resistance from small farmers and iabqrers WfiPi tyltije t|iey had known hardship before, were npw1 ttéifig foťced out of a way of life and even opt of theijr yij^fcjj, Some rioted when "Bills of Enclosure" were ppisteq^ s,přfiq petitioned the Parliament for their repeal.30 taring t(le last decade of the eighteenth cenutry, when hardship was made more acute by a succession of poor harvests» there were widespread food riots.31 But their protests eppjd Pot curb the
27 Hobsbav-m and Rudé, 38-42.
28 Between 1701 and 1831, the populaiipri of f(je agricultural counties almost doubled, from 1,563,000 to 2,876,000, Moreover, itftťr 175», emigration fell off sharply, draining off only abdiit -jo per Cent Of the natural increase (ibid., 43).
29 The laborers' vulnerability was assured by latys prohibiting workers from combining for the purppse of exerting influcbej; to, reduce l\ollrS or raise wages. There were forty such laws dn tr|c books tiV I flop, New statutes in 1799 and i8op effectively prohibited1 all joint äcMö)1 by the workers (Hammond and Hammond, 1 g 17, 112-142).
3"Thc Hammonds give an account of the fiitjltí ^r^estš, oyer á pepcjtl o' some thirty years, by villagers in the yic|nity of'fcí>tfpr(| (ÍÍh|8, Ve!' it 83-92).
•1l Hobsbawm and Rude suggest increases in poaching áS ähoUléŕ iřjtleX of disorder. Poaching was motivated both by this rittirj'jEÖj fcjöt) tjjíj} ä5 ■) protest against enclosure. They offer the fpiloiyirig $|itii|jf!J!(^y); '''
Regulating the Poor                              20
market processes that were at work. As for the distress of the displaced laborers, the laissez-faire commentators of the time pontificated that [his was the necessary concomitant of economic productivity and progress.
A solution to disorder was needed, however, and that solution turned out to be relief.32 During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth tehturies, the English countryside was periodically besieged by turbulent masses of the displaced rural poor and the towns were racked by Lud-dism, radicalism, trade-unionism, and Chartism,33 even while the ruling classes worried about what the French Revolution might augur for England.
If compassion was not a strong enough force to make the ruling classes atfend to the danger that the poor might starve, fear would certainly have made them think
Commitments   to   the   County   Jails   in   Norfolk   1800-30,  and   Norwich,
Wymondham, Aylsham,  Walsingham  from   1807.
1800-04        250                 lai9        639                 1826        784
1805-09        277                 1820        811                 1827        839
1810-14        309                 1821         722                 1828        745
1815               415                 1822        943                 1829        899
1816               489                 1823        728                 1830        916
1817               579                 1824        700
1818               669                 1825        812
The landowning gentry of Britain responded to the incursions of poachers on their newly enclosed lands by legislating a series of brutal penalties (Hammond and Hammond, 1948, Vol. I, 183-204).
32 The relief system was by no means the only solution. This was an era of brutal repression; indeed, in no other domestic matters was Parliament so active as in the elaboration of the criminal codes. At the same time, troops were spread across the country and quartered in barracks (rather than in the homes of citizens) to avoid the possibility that they would identify with the rebellious population (Hammond and Hammond,
'9'7. 37-94)-
35 "At no other period in modern British history," writes Hobsbawm of
this period, especially the decades between Waterloo and the 1840's, "have
the common people been so persistently, profoundly, and often desperately
dissatisfied. At no other period since the seventeenth century can we speak
of large masses of them as revolutionary . . ." (Vol. II, 55). It should be said
that  agitation  arose  from  both   the  middle  and  working classes.  After
Parliament extended the franchise to the middle classes in 1832, however,
the workers' movement was effectively isolated and weakened.
21                     Relief, Labor, and. Civil Q\s$rd;cr
of the danger Lhat the poor rilight tépjjj;,. . . "thtiä fpar and pity united to sharpen the wit? w UHti ficfl, äiltj tp turn their minds to the distresses pt tjjä pöblj".3^
It was at this time that the pppj t^Hčí feystfeint>—first created in the sixteenth century to cejřítt-ti! the earlier disturbances caused by pdpulätipil gro^lÜ) fjtttí the cörturiet-cialization of agriculture—becarŕié a iilaklť ijlstitution.80 Between 1760 and 1784, taxes fjjr r^ jej>-*th]ä "pQöf rate"— rose by 60 per cent; they doubled tjý lf|pj|i ftt}4 rose j}V 60 per cent more in the next decaiie.3" By iä j$, the ppor rate was over six times as high as jt riad fc^f) fjl ľ/fiq, j-íppv bawm estimates that up tp tfiji icj§o'S) Íip>Vaffls of ip p^r cent rif tHe English pdpUlatiqil wqre' j^b^j-s^ Thfc relief system, in short, was expanded ip prejisř j;p filJHprp' arid regulate the masses of discoritented people j.ipi"ppted from agŕi' culture but not yet incorporated irjtt) jp4u$,try,^ Its importance in maintaining civil prder \ti England was suggested by John Stuart Mill ip 1863;
[T]he hatred of the poor for the fielt js an evil that is almost inevitable where the law dpěs ilpt guarantee the poor against the extremity of want» Tw poor man, in
34  Hammond and Hammond, 1948, Vol, Í, 118,
35 Hobsbawm and Rudé (76) compute the paupers relieved as a percentage of the total population in 18Í5 as fo|lotv?!
Berks.                     17                     Suffolk                                        12.25
Wilts.                     15                     Carnbs.                                       11.5
Sussex, Essex         14                     Kent                                           11.25
Dorset, Oxford      13                     Hertsi, fabtfq|k, Nqrthants.      11
Bucks.         '           12.75                 Hereford, jUžicčíteř                    10.5
Hunts.                   12.5                  Bctls., Sajopi, Matits,                  10
36 Mantoux, 437; de Schwěinifz, 1)4; Nicjiollii Vol. It, 133, 438. During this period* expenditures under the poor lály fleärly equaled the entire peacetime cost of the English naüonial gpyerj)rtte|r)ti excluding the army and navy (Webb and Webb, Part II  Vol. í, í).
37 Hobsbawm, 70. The Webjjs estimate á "pá^peť host of a million or so actually in receipt of relief in the early j^ö^ (páft U, Vol, I, 105).
38  Karl Polanyi observes of this peripd thai' 'tyjí ^|tld liifgej the nearly sixteen thousand Poor Law authorities of thé^jjtjrjtj-y rijä^tt^l )tq keijJ the social fabric of village life unbroken and iirirjji|l^p'i (fj8)(
Regulating the Poor
22
France, notwithstanding the charitable relief that he may get, has always before his eyes the possibility of death by starvation; whereas in England he knows that, in the last resort, he has a claim against private property up to the point of bare subsistence; that not even the lowest proletarian is absolutely disinherited from his place in the sun. It is to this that 1 attribute the fact that, in spite of the aristocratic constitutiqn of wealth arid social life in England, the proletarian class is seldom hostile, either to the institution of private property or to the classes who enjoy it.39                                  I
Restoring Order by Restoring Work
Relief arrangements deal with disorder, not simply by giving aid to the displaced poor, but by gfanting it on condition that they behave in certain ways and, most important, on condition that they work. Any institution that distributes the resources men and women depend upon for survival can readily exert control over them: the occasion of giving vitally needed assistance can easily become the occasion of inculcating the work ethic, for example, and of enforcing work itself, for those who resist risk the withdrawal of that assistance, pnce the destitute of sixteenth-century Lyons were identified and registered, those declared eligible for help were watched over by the rectors, who prohibited them from spending money at taverns or at cards and made surprise visits to their homes in search of evidence of immorality.  More important, an effort was
39 Mill, Vol. I, 307. Trcvelyan makes a similar judgment of poor relief in England which he says "is one reason why there was never anything like the French Revolution in our country, and why through all our political, religious and social feuds from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Centuries the quiet and orderly habits of the people, even in times of distress, continued upon the whqle as a national characteristic." Furthermore, "That we dispensed so long with a proper police force is a testimony of the average honesty of our ancestors and to the value of the old Poor Law, in spite of all its defects" (230).
23                    Relief, Labor, aiid Civil fíl'iš'áf^r
made to redirect the employable rjfcftjř df kyqns jrito the work force: schools were set j.ip to .feäfcjj pappet thijdren to read and Write, and boys wjífč á^^H^W tö iHfc fíčW industries. The town even suRsJdižeti ftfritf ŕrialiqfflCtUirers on condition that training wpj-ild tle BrrMded f o ľ pa U per children. Any employables >vho tMjrríetf fö pegging, on tl^e other hand, were chained and set tut yytirk digging sewers and ditelies.
The arrangements,  botji rjisiqricfll íí|)d cqntettlborary, through which relief recipient hčíy|í öjöen rijftdb to Work vary: some communities art relatjyejy tyénpVplpht, others harsh; some communities clevelqp # ijjtjhbl)thic systern, others have diverse arrangements; sqŕríií fjjrp efficient, others lax. IJut, broadly speaking, tfijí e^fqt^eřpettt ^f wt!ľk is accomplished in two main ways; wqrjk jg jjj-ovidíid Under public auspices, whether in the rerinleiit's hclrtle» jh 0 labor yard, c>r in a workhouse; br work já pj-qyicjed in the private market, whether by contracting or ijicjbotufíng the poor to private employers, or throiigh subsítfie? designed to induce employers to hire paupers; And ^IfhöUgli a relief system may at any time usp both of thies£ ín6thods of enforcing work,  one  or  the  other  usiially becomes  predominant, depending on the economic conditio^ that first gave rise to disorder.
Publicly subsidized work tends to be used during business depressions, when the dertiand fpr labor in the private market collapses. Conversely, «Tjŕrangťmertts jo channel paupers into the labor market are more likely to be used when rapid changes in markets or technology fender a segment of the labor supply temporarily rfialadapted. In the first case, the relief system augment» a shrunken labor market; in the other, its policies and procedures are shaped to overcome the poor fit between I^boť-market requirements and the characteristics pí the \$fí0t force,
Public work is as old as public reljöff Th,p ttltinjcipíd relief systems initiated on the Contihe^j. jfl tjip first iqUSfter of the sixteenth century often ihcldd^fl S#jt#e form of Pub-
Regulating the Poor                              24
lie works.40 In England, the same statute of 1572 that established taxation as the method for financing poor relief charged the overseers of the poor with putting vagrants to work. Shortly afterwards, in 1576, local officials were directed to acquire a supply of raw goods—wool, hemp, iron—which was to be delivered to the needy for processing in their homes, their wag-es to be fixed according to "the desert of the work." The purpose was explicit:
... to the intent youth may be accustomed and brought up in labor and work, and then not like to grow to be idle rogues, and to the intent also that such as be already grown up in idleness and so rogues at this present, may not have any just excuse in saying that they cannot get any service or work, and then without any favor or toleration worthy to be executed, and that other poor and needy persons being willing to work may be set on work.41
The favored methqd of ensuring that "youth may be accustomed and brought up in labor and work" throughout most of the history of relief was the workhouse. In 1723, an act of Parliament permitted the local parishes to establish workhouses and to refuse aid to those poor who would not enter;42 within ten years, there were said to be about fifty workhouses in the erivirons of London. Workhouses were also established elsewhere in Europe, where the rations, health conditions, and morale were usually better than in institutions under the thriving English capitalism. In 1790, when Bavaria was plagued by beggars, the city of Munich established an institution for the manufacture of army clothing where the poor were presumably to be inducted into the virtues of industry by a steady regimen of work.
The destitute have also sometimes been paid to work in the general community or in their own homes. In the late
« Sec Webb and Webb, l|art I, 29-41. "-Quoted in de Schweinitz, 26.
" In fact the parishes, responding to local exigencies, continued to provide various forms of "outdoor" relief (Webb and Webb, Part I, 121-125).
25                    Relief, Labor, arjcf Civil Ďj^f^f
1790's, the town of Hamburg initiat^cj fj piiftUc works program designed (in the wbrds of B.arpri jfi'äs'páf yp'fi VoglU, the chief author of the scheme) "to pťtetyi^t řfř$ fí?fíf! ffofti securing a shilling which' he \uas á,b\té ff? frffřít iWřň^lf • ■ . for if the manner in which relief is giV^\ (í \\pi !} f/W í0 W" duslry, it becomes \indoubtedly q.' pffififytii to ilöß and profligacy." To deter profligacy wHH$ flMlilct With Vagrancy, the respectable citizens of Hiitijbtity? decided that, "six-sevenths of our poor beirjg Wöirp} fift4 phildťieíri," they should be set to work spinfiiftg flax \x\ jjifejf |ipít}e$, Men and boys were to make rppé, cleäri Stf^tšl tí*" f&eftd i'Oads, Relief payments were deliberately W$\ b^ldty ttiftfket wages: "It was our deterrtihied prjj^jbjie,'' thč Iß^cM wrote, "to reduce this suppqirt lp^ť f|iáh wHíH <*hy industrious man or woman could earn,. 1 ,!r Mhlily tlje Břtron could report: "For the last sÉvéri yeáťá ř , . háffjly a beggar has been seen in Hamburg, i . . We Hot tíhly did tttüch toward the relief of the poor, buj: . . . iye gained söhne steps toward the more desirable, yet                retainable, end,
the preventing some of the cpiúěs Öf pq^pH^^ *3
A somewhat similar method of enforcing Work evolved in England during the bitter dtep^sjdh Of Í840-1841, As unemployment moUnifed, the poor iri some of the larger cities protested against having to (pave their families and communities to enter workhouses in Öfder to obtain relief, and in any case, in some places the workhouses were already full. As a result, various ptiblic spaces were designated as "labor yards" tq which tfle unemployed could come by the day to pick oakujm, cut wood, and break stone, for which  they were paid jh food find clothing.44 The
43 Quoted in de Schweinitz, 91-94.
44 During the same period, Irelarid, also m;it|e (fTP^t Use of Work relief in coping with the widespread political unseat ^feitetj by the "Great Potato Famine." In 1845, the first ýííar pf th<! famine, approximately 750,000 persons were employed on ptibjic WcjHtj' btfijeCtij put of a total population of slightly more than 8 million ptejrs^jlji frt thp second year of the famine, however, the situation becärfié $ rjjéjlpfij-|ij|; íftái pi'b'lč Works were abandoned and frefc spup was distributee)  jttj jjÄ^ŕ  (hati J falUf0*1
Regulating the Poor                              26
method was used periodically throughout the second half of the nineteenth century; at times of severe distress, very large numbers of the able-bodied poor Were supported in this way.'15 A similar massive use of public work under relief auspices occurred in the United States during the lego's, when millions of the unemployed were subsidized through the Works Progress Administration.
Quite different methods of enforcing work are used when the demand for labor is steady but maladaptions in the labor supply, caused by changes in methods of production, result in unemployment. In such circumstances, relief agencies ordinarily channel paupers directly into the private market. For example, the rapid expansion of English manufacturing during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 48 produced a commensurately expanded need for factory operatives. But it was no easy matter to get them. Men who had been agricultural laborers, independent craftsmen, or workers in domestic industries (i.e., piecework manufacturing in the home) did not adjust easily to the new and alien discipline of the factory. The Hammonds write of this period:
The men and women pf Lancashire and Yorkshire felt of this new power that it was inhuman, that it disregarded all their instincts and sensibilities, that it brought into their lives an inexorable force, destroying and scattering their customs, their traditions, their freedom, their ties of family and home. . . . [T]o all the evils from which the domestic worker had suffered, the Industrial Revolution added discipline. . . . The workman was summoned by the factory bell; his daily life was arranged by factory
persons. Even so, more thari a million died of starvation or fever. For a general discussion of Irish work relief programs since the eighteenth century, see MacDonagh. 27-30.
« Webb and Webb, Part II, Vol. I, 365-367.
46 "The number of power-looms in England rose from 2,400 in 1813 to 55,000 in 1829. 85,000 in 1833 and 224,000 in 1850 . . ." (Hobsbawm, 47). Over-all, the rate of growth in industrial production averaged about 40 per cent per decade from 1816 to 1850 (ibid., 51).
27                    Relief, Labor, atid Civil p^fí^éf
hours; he worked under an pvferseer t . ,j of a Idn^ series of minute regülati$jis j|jSi y^fjji fjjIBtlt ft ft t j behind all this scheme of supervision tjptf tcjhfrbl there loomed the great impersonal systpW.'jf
And they resisted the new discipline!! l}jij:\ve|e|i 1778 a fid i8;jo, there were repeated revolts by ja^o^i^ ih ývblcjl local tradesmen and farmers often J5artítir|íítocl,i'i TjljS revolts failed, of course; the new jiidu.s'try ^ipVBcl förtyrjrd inexorably, lakjng the more detaendept rdíti tractapje uťlder its command. Despite the higher yVEjges pf the factory, the operatives were mainly womehi arici fchíjtlľlElI at the beginning, and mainly pauper children.
The burgeoning English, textile iiíldLí$jíy spíyed its labor problems during the latter part bf ffijj (3}g|tlp!Järttft celftflry by using parish children, some? cítily jítjtf^ bf fj^'e yfears n|n\ its factory operatives.'1" Maiiuf;icfuťérs ii}ť;gp|i(itptl f-figlihf bargains with the parisli aiíthoridés, qrcjeijhg Ifits of fifty or more children from the poorjidj.)ses, (III af -ifrlSt ope kpowp instance, a Lancashire rpanufacturjEft- jjgrleeil to (lie stipulation of a London parish that he take* p|i0 idtat for every twenty sound children delivered.) ?•» To Siecure their acquiescence, the yourigsters were (olÜ |hat otlťe At the cotton \
47 Hammond and Hammond, 19I7, iff-19.
4" Hobsbawm, 50. Sonic independent tvorkďs, Sl|ch 95 the hand Weavers, »ere virtually starved into submission before they Would enter t he factories. Subsequent adjustment as factory methods Advanced were not much rasier: "Industrialization multiplied the ntimbet of h.mdloom weavers «nil framework-knitters. . . . Thereafter it destroyed (hem by slow strangulation: militant nfid thoughtful cpmrpuniticS like tile Dunfermline linen workers broke up in demoralization, pauperization aftd emigration In the 1830s. Skilled craftsmen were degraded iiito sweated outworkers, as in the London furniture trades . . .'' (ibid., 71).
"Somewhat earlier, various schernes had been Spotisófed by philanthropists to incarcerate paupers, especially paiibeť t|l||tjŕcn, In institutions that would train them to jyork tinder the neyt dišfcipjihc. The philanthropists had high hopes that these enterprises ^t(U|d become models for profit-making poor relief. In this regard, they fi||tk|, As for training, the new manufacturers were soon stíowjng themšťlvfc!) (d he the belter task-mastcrs in dealing with young paufjěrš—a börjtffjtient service In which tcicy took a not inconsiderable pride. 5" Hammond and Hammond, 1917, 14g.
Regulating the Poor                              28
mills or ironmongers they would live like ladies and gentlemen on roast beef and plum pudding.51
Parish children were an ideal labor source for new manufacturers. The young paupers could be shipped to remote factories,52 located to take advantage of the streams from which power was drawn. (With the.shift from water power to steam in the nineteenth century, factories began to locate in towns where they cpuld employ local children; with that the system of child labor became a system of "free" child labor.53) The children were also preferred for their docility M and for their light touch at the looms. Moreover, pauper children could be had for a bit of food and a bed, and they provided a very stable labor supply, for they were held fast at their labors by indentures, usually until they were twenty-one. Sir Robert Owen, noted as an industrial reformer, restricted the labor of the children in his workshops to thirteen hours a day and ordered that they be allowed a daily romp in the yard for their health. This was exceptionally humane; many children did not survive the terms of their indentures.
The parish children were thus in demand by manufacturers, who found it no great problem to force their helpless young serfs to work. But when the demand for labor is too slack to absorb a potential work force, or when market terms are insufficiently compelling to keep them working, the relief system may subsidize the employment of paupers—as when the magistrates of Lyons provided subsidies
51 Mantoux, 411.
52 In 1816, when parish children were no longer essential in any case, Parliament limited the distance children might be shipped to forty miles (Hammond and Hammond, 1917, 156).
53 In the early days of the factory system, workers refused to let their own children enter the mills, but their reluctance was overcome in time by the sheer force of destitution (ibid., 156).
54 When Sir Robert Peel (apparently either regretting his own methods of becoming rich or satisfied that he was rich enough) attempted to get a factory act passed that would prohibit night work for children, the mill owners protested that free laborers would not Work at night except on terms disadvantageous to the manufacturers {ibid,, 152).
29                    Relief, Labor, and, Civil f)(ipf4i'r
to manufacturers who employed patíppř fhfidfeh. ín i Uťal England during the late eighteenth teh^ťy, as more find more of the population Was being clifjpjílčjíc} p! ý the commercialization of agricultüre, this rhgtfitjd was Ušed dir ä very large scale. To be sure, a dpniahd ftjf lijljdr was dsvel-oping in the new manufacturing estäbljjjj^tjj.s that jVpuJd in time absorb many of the uprpolted Hjif}j ptjpn jfUit tjijs did not happen all at once: r^ral djsrijtee'ítieht tírjd industrial expansion did not proceed fit U)'p šfltjjt tjapé bt in the same areas, and in any esse thé dra^jc s^jft froth ftiral village to factory system took tithe. f|uř(jig tlie lqr1g interval before jieople forced off the lithe) w^rd absorbed into manufacturing, many remained ih tfje pptjjitrysjde da Virtual vagrants; others migrated to ^ tb,ty% where tjipy crowded into hovel:; «ind cellars) subjj&fcj: |# \\-\p Vicissitudes bf rapidly rising anc} falling Markets, tjielf rfjilks continually enlarged by new rural refugees. ^j-j'tj ^ ttye rrifJsspS of unemployed swelled, disordejr spťéatí.
These conditions were not the result p\ a cqllapse in the market. Indeed, grain prjees rp$e dijt-ing t|je ijecphd half of the eighteenth century, and t|iey fpfij ^ectacníaťly during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic '^í)ř$, Rather» it Was the expanding market for agricultural pťqdtlpe which, by stimulating enclosure and businpss-miiiděd farming methods, led to unemployment and destitution» Meanwhile, population growth, which p^ant ä sUťplits of laborers, left the workers little opportunity tp resist the destruction of their traditional way of life---except by crime, riots, and incendiarism. To cope with these disturbances» relief ex^ panded, but in such á way as to abspittl arid discipline the laborers by supporting the faltering lajapř market with subsidies.
The subsidy system is widely credited to the sheriff and magistrates of Berkshire,6» whp, in a meeting at Speenham-
Thcrc were ample precedents for the methpjj řecottirnehded at Speen-iand. In  the late seventeenth ceijtury, some jparishes began  to give
Regulaüng the Poor                              30
land in 1795, decided on a scheme by which the Poor Law authorities would supplement the wages of agricultural workers if these wages fell below a published scale.50 It was a time when exceptional scarcity of food led to riots all over England,57 sometimes suppressed only by calling out the troops. With this "double panic of famine and revolution," 58 the subsidy scheme spread, especially in counties where large amounts öf acreage had been enclosed.50
The local parishes implemented the subsidy system in different ways. Under the "roundsman" arrangement, the parish overseers sent any man who applied for aid from house to house to get work. If he found work, the employer was obliged to feed hirh and pay him a small sum (6d) per day, with the parish adding ahother small sum (4d). Elsewhere,   the   parish   authorities   contracted   directly   with farmers to have paupers work for a given price, with the parish paying the combined wage and relief supplement directly to the pauper. In still other places, parish authorities parceled out the unemployed to farmers, who were obliged to pay a set rate or make up the difference in higher taxes.8" Everywhere, however, the main principle was the same: an unemployed and turbulent populace was being pacified with public allowances, but these allowances were used to restore order by enforcing work, at very low wage levels. Relief, in short, served as a support for a disturbed labor market and as a discipline for a disturbed rural sosu »rilcmcnIs to workers who could not feed their families on their wages; and Gilbert's Act of 1782 provided for subsidized work outside the workhouse for the able-bodied poor in the parishes incorporated under the Act (Webb and Webb, Part I,  170-171).
58 The notables of Berkshire firijt turned down, by a considerable majority, a proposal to fix a minimum wage for laborers to concspond to the high price of corn.
57  For a description of these outbreaks, see Hammond and Hammond, 1948, Vol. 1, 116-118.
58 The phrase belongs to H. R, Prelyman, Dispqupcrization, 1878, 27, as quoted in Webb and Webb, Part I, 172.
50 In 1796, Parliament again followed the rulers of Berkshire by voting down-minimum wage legislation ii« favor of wage subsidies through the relief system (de Schwciniu, 72-73).
60 Ibid., 73-74.
31                    Relief, Labpr, afid Civil Úisotdcr
ciety. "The meshes df the Poor Law \V£te spread over the entire labour system," B1
But the Poor Law was not at Variance ^\t\\ l\\'e labor System or with the interests of the groups t|iat d^iiiitiated that system. Quite the contrary. ~fM farhieťí) got cjleäp labor, and the podr rates did not encroach, bil |.|-je tpftt b|"tijlt$ pf the landed gentry. Indeed, relief alJoMptóšívérf! cjtiísely articulated with market conditions', alj:Jlqj.ifrh in principle they were supposed to be scaled tq "ifekp jífi4 child Hail," In 1795 the Berkshire magistrates hád fčWtTííí^ft^d 'It1 allowance sufficient to provide a lriij|t| jtýjjttf dlrejj gftjidh loaves per week, but the alldwanpes; ^ejríá prtjjjttssivfely cut, especially after the grain market begafi to; ffijf at the cldse of the Napoleonic wärs.BÍ! Between i ß 16 ajld i8in, several counties cut the allowance to fWo gajlqií Iqayes or a little .noie; by 1826 there were sojné equities jp >yhjch a man was deemed to need only dnp ahd ä j^jj; gfillqft jqaVes.'13 7'hese relief cuts reflected the sjiarb falj jijj) tyagfes as faririerS tried to maintain profits in the facp t)|f dtecljtiittg grajn prices—a market maneuver friede pq|jilpj$ by tlije bvet-supply of labor, but implemented t|V $£ .(NlíÉÍ ^stet'M''
1,1 Hammond and Hammorid, 1948, Vol. I, |£>2;
02 After 1815 the landed interests succeeded irj jjreakiHg th> fall in prices by securing the enactrhent of tidrn taWi ft tfctlWrfe Which Kept food prices high even wjiile allowances vyerp bciflg fedHccd, 8hd thus further worsened the laborers' condition.
03 Hobsbawm and Rude, 51.
04 The Speephamland plan is generally held ícfcfJl'htÄblé for the steadily worsening condition of the English agriculture) (iibOfej-S during the First third of the nineteenth century, the vlety bcirjg i|iaf, by assuring a minimum allowance, it sapped ihjc laborers' incentive tp tybrk productively, deterred farmers from raising wages,, and cyeJHljdlly Created a Condition of such sodden dependence as to permit a||oWar(fceš (o be cut to the starvation level. Karl Polanyi acids that Spccphamláhd hc|d back the free labor market, by which he mearis the urbari ihclustř|a| labor market. As for the first point, it seems to us that the SpěenhanilartU Scheme is being blamed for far more basic conditions: riamely, a surpju,s lattor force, rising grain prices, and the dislocations caused by the comrrjcrciailratiön of fanning. As for the latter, if Speenh.imtand retarded (he Ohset of ah industrial labor market, it did so because it was riccessiry to tflöderafc the social disturbances entailed—which wc believe lias always břeh, and still is, a major function of relief, arid not peculiar to Speerjháni||ähcl,
Regulating the Poor                              32
The English Speenhamland plan, while it enjoys a certain notoriety, is by np means unique. The most recent example of a scheme for subsidizing paupers in private employ is the reorganization of American public welfare proposed in the summer qi 1969 by President Nixon; while the mechanisms by which relief recipients would be channeled into the labor market were not precisely elaborated in his initial proposal, the general parallel with the events surrounding Speenhamland is striking. The United States relief rolls expanded in the 1960's to absorb a laboring population made superfluous by agricultural modernization in the South, a population that became turbulent in the wake of forced migration to the cities. As the relief rolls grew to deal with these disturbances, pressure for "reforms" also mounted. Key features of the reform proposals include a national minimum allowance of $1,600 per year for a family of four, coupled with an elaborate system of penalties and incentives to forqe families to work. In effect, the proposal was intended to support and strengthen a disturbed low-wage labor market by providing what was called in nineteenth-century England a "rate in aid of wages."
Enforcing Low-Wage Work During Periods of Stability
Even in the absence of cataclysmic change, market incentives may be insufficient to compel all people at all times to do the particular wprk required of them. Incentives may be too meager and erratic, oř people may not be sufficiently socialized to respond to them properly. To be sure, the productivity of a fully developed capitalist economy would allow wages and profits sufficient to entice the population to work; and in a fully developed capitalist society, most people would also be reared to want what the market holds out to them. They would expect, even sanctify, the rewards of the marketplace and acquiesce in its vagaries.
33                    Relief, Labor,, and Cii)i( Disorder
But no fully developed capitalist society actually exists. (Even today in the United States, ttie most advanced capitalist country, certain regjpns ah^ Hppljlätion groups— such as Southern tenant £arhiiáts^-jr|éjtlí}ih, pfr the perjpilery of the wage market and are qrily partjitjly socialized to the ethos of the market.) Capitalism évdjy^d šjj^vlý fftld äbrpíid slowly. During most of this evoliitip|ii| [jje ifíatkét bipyjded meager rewards for most workers,, qHjii Höhe at all for sorne. For many, this is still so. Aild 44r'Í|á Ú]fíH bf fhN evolution, large sectors of the lairing c|^S V^re; jipt fully socialized to the market ethos. TThe rejjJ3J} S^tltn'1 tye cpr|tend, has made an important cöntriputjdii tpvVílrd pýefCbtiling these persisting weaknesses in the bipapjty pf the iHafl^t to direct ahd control men.
Once an economic convulsion ájibsjdejä ahd civil order is restored, relief systems áre hot ordÍri.1i-j|y abandoned. The rolls are reduced, to be sbre'f fiiit t|ie S|-|ej| of the system usually remains, ostensibly fp prbýjcié fllc} to tjie flgěrí, the insane, the disabled, and such cjther lirjjfqijtjnate's as friay be without economic utility. Hpwevfer, ltlj£ (iiárjrMŕ jjl wftich these "impotents" have aliyáýs bejéft ti^tedi jjrt th£ United States and elsewhere, suggests, a p^jip^ quite different from remediatipn cjf their destitutiphi }fpr these residual persons have been universally de^f-äd^d, fqr lacking economic value and ordinarily rdegatlpd tp the foul quarters of the workhouse, with its Strict p^ííl rpgimetl and its starvation diet. Such institutions y/ejre repeatedly proclaimed the sole source Of aicl during tíť»ieS of Stability, and for a reason bearing directly pťi the!' rMJhtertance of work norms in a market system.
Conditions in the workhouse vyčte intended to ensure that no one with any conceivable alternatives would seek public aid. Nor can there be any doubt of that intent. This statement by the Poor Law Comniisijioners in 1834, for example, admits of no other interpretation!
Into such a house none will enter voluntarily; work, confinement, and discipline, yvijl detef the indolent and
Regulating the Poor                              34
vicious; and nothing but extreme necessity will induce any to accept the comfort which must be obtained by the surrender of their free agency, and the sacrifice of their accustomed habits and gratifications. Thus the parish oßicer, being furnished an unerring test of the necessity of applicants, is relieved from his painful and difficult responsibility; while all have the gratification of knowing that while the necessitous are abundantly relieved, the funds of charity are not wasted by idleness and fraud."5
The method worked. Periods of relief expansion were generally followed by "reform" campaigns to abolish all "outdoor" aid and restrict relief to those who entered the workhouse—as in England in 1722, 1834, and 1871 and in the
United States in the  i88,o's and  i8qo's—and these cam-
f                               J                             ...
paigns almost invariably resulted in a sharp reduction in
the number of applicants seeking aid.
The harsh treatment of those who had no alternative except to fall back upon the parish and accept "the offer of the House" terrorized the írnpoverished masses.06 That, too, was a matter of deliberate intent. The workhouse was designed to spur men to contrive ways of supporting themselves by their own industry, to offer themselves to any employer on any terms. It did this by making pariahs of those vyho could not support themselves; they served as an object lesson, a means of celebrating the virtues of work by the terrible example of their agony.07 Three years after the Poor
65 The Report from His Majesty's Commissioners for Inquiring into the Administration and Practical Operation of the Poor Laws, 1834, 271, as quolcd in de Schwcinitz, 123.
06 And terrorized is the right word, for workhouse conditions were terrifying even in an age when life for the laboring classes was always brutal. Conditions were such that a House of Commons investigation conducted in 1767 found that only 7 of 100 infants born or received into workhouses had survived for two years (dc Schwcinitz, 66).
07  Hobsbawm comments on the intent of the Poor Law: "The residuum of paupers could not, admittedly, be left actually to starve, but they ought not to be given more than the absolute minimum—provided it was less than the lowest wage offered in the market—and in the most discouraging conditions. The Poor Law was not so much intended to help the unfortunate as to stigmatize the self-confessed failures of society" (6g).
35                '    Relief, Labor, and Civil Djsůxfat
Law Commissioners of 1834 decreed the abolition of outdoor relief and the expansion of the systeW of Workhouses, Disraeli accurately said of this ŕefohtt that "it announces to the world that in England ppyßrty is \\ ct'jrjie." fl8
The deterrent doctrine of relief1"' čHmif-i-Ued ifl 1834 provided a formula for relief-giving in {fié i\f\>$\) ihjdustlial labor market, which is known as1 the ítfJtltipJč pí "less eligibility":                                                 '
The first and most essential of alt cöndjtlpHjji \\ bH|icibje which we find universally admitted, évef} (jy fh;ö$ö whpse practice is at variance with it, 'is, th'aj;, n)á; [the tŕlipf recipient's] situation on the whole shfijl (Ipt pÖ fftfjtjp really or apparently \o eligipte [i.é.j jajBfiía^Íj2] p,i the situation of the indepehdenf laborer of. the It^öst clqäs.7"
Deterrent relief practices have their ^ítte^pjaráŕy etjUiV' alents, as we will demonstrate iji later ť^ájj^, {"pr tyhile the conditions of re|ief }n the United StšUpS todjiy are less harsh, the main tendency is still far JFfohj ^pgfpSiVe liberalization. Rather, the pattern is cyčjjjbiJ! jf)b^ (jeHöcls C|f restrictivenesS are interrupted pe^iodica^y |ty short periods of liberalization. Thus the relief itysleni ^f^^d lby thě Speciál Security Act of 1955 in the United i^áj^S ^ftS a^tttínjíj-
6» Monypcnny, Vol. I, 37,1. As a practica,! rnáttetí fftj^Yeř) the fefprih was at best only1 partially implemented. TutniMtüt»ii|s heh^YJör arütihg the poor persisted, becoming especially severe dufffife íhp ptäjpťdSíWtl* if the 'a4P*s, so that, much to the disgust ot the ''refdŕrpéŕš/' pytdööf relief ccih' tinucd to be given on a large scale. "Out of the tyfy Mfilptli) into which England is divided, they [the Poor Law Co^miesiphcirsj hivp issued a prohibitory order [calling for the abolition; of outdoor |p|jef] tö tfB. JW the order is subject to so many exceptions, lhát out of i 4^0,^0 relieved [in 1845] on'y 2i5'325 were inmates oE the iVaŕkhpušfc" (ŕJet)|Di-| 326),
80 "Psychological torture," Polanyi savs pf the1 183^ foförm, "tyas Coo|ly advocated and smoothly put into practice by jüflf) philanthropists as a means of oiling the wheels of the labor mill'' (fjjj. Thlí řcforrn was the first major accomplishment of the British middle classes after their enfranchisement in 1832. and no doubt oy/es Some of It? brutal vigor to the manufacturing interests represented in the middle blasses.
70 The Report from His Majesty's Commiss\oiiirs fof Inquiring into the Administration and Practical Operation of í/i<í poof Laws, 1834, ig8, as quoted in de Schweinitz, 123.
Regulating the Poor                              36
tered for more than two decades to ensure that as few of the poor as possible obtained as little as possible from it. The principle of "less eligibility" was reflected in statute, policy, and day-to-day practice: not only were grants kept at levels "more severe than that of the lowest class of laborers who obtain their livelihood by honest industry," which meant in some states that the recipients received too little to sustain life, but the punishment and degradation that the Poor Law authorities were confident would make relief recipients "less eligible" had their modern parallel in such practices as mass searches and raids of recipients' homes. During the 1960's, however, for reasons to be discussed in the latter half of this book, many of these restrictions collapsed and the rolls rose precipitously. But even as this occurred, pressures to reorganize the system also mounted.
We should not leave this discussion of how the relief system reinforces market incentives without noting that other governmental mechanisms to achieve the same end predate the emergence of relief systems and have persisted alongside them. As early as 1349, when the British populace was depleted by the Black Plague, the feudal lords promulgated a Statute of Laborers to deal with the fact that the resulting labor shortage enabled workers to try to obtain higher wages:
Because that many valiant beggars, as long as they may live of begging, do refuse to labor,1 giving themselves to idleness and vice; and sometime to theft and other abominations; none upon the said pain of imprisonment, shall under the color of pity or alms, give anything to such, which may labor, or presume to favor them towards their desires, so that thereby they may be compelled to labor for their necessary living.11
A companion statute enacted by Parliament in 1350 forbade laborers from traveling from their regular places of
1 Quoted in de Schweinitz, 1.
37                    Relief, Labor, and Civil ptjóffat
residence so iong as any employer thefp wanted to hire them at whatever wage levels had previously been paid. Efforts to regulate the supply of Jabor fyy law persisted: in 1548, any organized efforts by laborers to fix wages and hours were prohibited; in  1563, the principles of earlier statutes were reaffirmed in a law •r£íjuirífyg the unemployed to work for any who wanted then), ánd empowering the justices of the peace to fix mpxiihiijn vyágteS and to penalize any employer who paid in excels of the standard; in i"0o), the Law of Settlement empowered lpcai authorities to remove from their respective jurisdictions tliosb neWcotfiers whose assets lyere so few that they cicc^fliöcj n, pťopeťty renting for less than ten pounds a year,7? TfJtÖ^ah $Uch coercive measures as these, governrnent enforcer] iVoľk during the transition from feudal labpr ŕel^titjrte jtp1 fri^-tTiftfket labor relations, and enforced it on testis íjjí^áted by ß'irt-ployers. Laborers could not organize, they |jt)j4lfl flht rpfusp work, they could riot exploit látypr sni}h$g£S to deitiaud higher wages, and they could not tnoye ft} hfeliř lopajitíeS tp find better working conditions.73 The function of these labor statutes v^»s fcjtfSjíjy relfftetf
72 The-Laws of Settlement were repealed Mffi thfe rftjtyitjg Htt(! fpf factory laborers in 1795, but even before that tljey ^ytjfW (Js^ti riot SO touch to prohibit the movement of labor as to cjiriiCt'it: "^ ca^flti Study Of Ljie evidence seems to lead to the conclusion tliat the Lky/t pf Settlement • • • did not stop the (low of labour, but that th'tiy regujjjttti j( jjl tlio ir)|pre5( of the employing class. . . . [\V]hen:it Suited] átj tíffi iltjypf it) Ipt ffesjl workers in, he wodíd, qua overseer, encotifqge thet|l tii fpifli ^i[h or Willi' out certificates; but when they were oiicfe in and f^tljjd'. jtf! typuld reftisc them certificates to enable them to go and try tf}ejr fdfjtltleS elsewhere, in parishes where a certificate was demanded with ^ilclj pf-cjr rjeiV'tprfjet-'1 (Hammond and Hkmmond, L948, Vol. I,11 i'i-i lá).1 ''!       '
73 Writing in 1776 in Art inquiry Into \\\e /Vflfuffr fjtjft fcttH-5?-* W M** H'enlfh of Nations, Adam Smith (citified ás fo tjie p^t'^lt ffrif) ě^ĚtiypnesS of these constraints: "There is icarce a poor mäh in Entfiel df fpH)' yeafä of ape, I will venture to say, who1 has not in some/éärt |if'fJ!í íjfp1 félf h|ŕtt-self cruelly oppressed by thiíl dl contrived lávy oťšjžhle^íéilf1' (qtipteď by de Schwcinilz, 43). Adam Smith wrote, of ctjuriie, nty'ty Üi£'pp'rfybcilVé of a philosopher of the free market, at a linie tojien' 'tfj^lt^ processes Wttp far better developed and fár more efféctiýe in aijfcí£jij:ífjg íj(tifcj disciplín"? labor,                                         '                    '     '            .....
Regulating the Poor                               38
to that of the deterrent relief practices 74 that evolved in England during periods of economic stability. The penalties of pauperism reinforced the coercive structure of labor law and to some extent came to replace it. Both arrangements had the same general purpose—to augment the regulation of labor by compensating for the vagaries and weaknesses of a pattern of control based largely on market incentives.
Relief and the Political Process
The landed gentry whp ruled Britain until 1832, and the manufacturing classes who joined them as rulers afterwards, responded to popular unrest partly because they feared revolution, partly because they recoiled from the trouble and property losses caused by disorderly mobs, and perhaps even, on some occasions, because they shared with the populace a sense qf what was right and just. But government and politics in contemporary capitalist societies are different, or so it would seem. Two features are of particular relevance to the modern relief system: the enlarged' role of national government, and the role of electoral institutions.
The modernization of any society generally entails expansion of the power and authority of its national government. However, when disruptions in the economy lead to occupational dislocation, causing widespread distress and discontent, it is usually local government that first experiences the tremors and moderates them by extending relief. The necessary incremental adjustments are made by local
74 "Labor organization, according to the Statute of Artificers, rested on three pillars: enforcement of labor, seven years' apprenticeship, and yearly wage assessments by public cjfficiajs. . . . The Statute of Artificers and the Poor Law together provided wtiat might be called a Code of Labor" (Polanyi, 86-87).                    '           '
39                    Relief, Labor, ä.nc^ Cipif Ďt'\SQi[det
legislative bodies or by iócál officials^ iMb fjq^iass discretion over relief arrangements.
But institUtions dp nót qfcilnariíy adjust Řasily, Jiot only because of internal bureaucratic rijrjriitjj2| tit|t alst» bfccávjstí change requires that the fiscal ahijl 'pcj|íj.lci|l ^fjptořtš, fbr the institution inusf be rel/is.ed:. for fe$4Jfl$i&l if !°£$Í fölief rolls rise, the parish pbqr rate Qr tne s|;a(;g iäáíoS táX ftiüst be increased, and that may anger Joc^l jlaibjřiyfifs,, Ácctírtlíhglyi the ability of local government tö ré^pjS^a1 td štich crises is inhibited even while the ljmited éxpŕá^iori Of relief that is taking place strains arid overloads the: rfäcäiíj ^dřriiíiistrative, arid political underpinnings of tlie relief systerrj. When local relief practices and capacities, teplit (.q break down, the national government is likely to intervene,
Correlatively, if eXpandjng lpfcal rejjef begins to intrude on the operations qf tlie lapor rjiarketi the national government will intervene to force the contraction of relief, especially if disorder is ript widespread The national government of England intervenefl tq assure the provision of local relief in the logo's arid again lit the i§30% but it enforced the contraction of relief iri 1732 and }$34« the Federal Government in the United States jntéryérijžd to assure a massive expansion of relief during the Qreat Degression (and again in the ig6o's), but moved iq pontract relief arrangements in the late 1930's.
The electoral system is anpther rnqd^fO, ahd especially a capitalist, phenomenon. In a feijdal qf rjli^rchical polity, the poor could demonstrate their p^OjTJjéhí billy by begging, stealing, marching, burjijng, bi j^Cftlng, TbeäČ Ma$s disturbances were a form pf political ^t|()|f|, $ rnéfijis by which the poor occasionally fOTccc} spiJT}k $$$'§# $ ^f>\kJ modatioh from their rulers. But ciyil fl|btf}er íš faf riipfe costly and threatening iri a hij^y cJŕ^íjíäífd ^H{1 coftiplex society, especially as Urbanization arid']f|,(|l|i|irigli^titirl In-
crease. To minimize disturbances, an ^ 4tpp řjiíjc^,,,,.
has evolved in capitalist so^ietl^síp^jf jft jfljjrfotyii' tttofe rapidly in the United States, uŕ^ttei-iéť)' jty řésítlii^l políti-
T
f
7    Towards a European welfare state?
On integrating poverty regimes into the European Community
Stephan Leibfried
9-' é-
-a
Who overcomes 1;" bKu "      By force. hath overcome but half his foe. '1L- Ills                          (John Milton, Paradise Lost)
19
W european Integration and social policy:
II   historical and analytical approaches
Europe is more than just a geographical entity. And it is more than a
'common market'. Europe has a common tradition in war, peace, culture
and, above all, welfare statism - making it a distinct peninsula on the Asian
continent (Schulze, 1990). The legally still separate West European nations
may be about td merge into a United States of Europe ('USE') or at least into
a steadily increasing 'pool' of 'shared sovereignties' - an economic, political
as well as-cultural entity of its pwn - analogous to but also quite different
from the USA. This process and prospect has been gaining momentum
during the past two decades, After several unsuccessful attempts, the Single
European Act of 28 February, 1986 and the Maastricht summit of December
1991 have moved the European Community (EC) closer to an economic, a
j   -j       political, and to some extent also a social union.1 By now, the EC has
*       definitely developed beyond just a 'tariff union' - but where is it moving?
';        WjlLÜlßJS^bej^Eurogeah welfare state, a 'rransnatiqnal^ synthesis' (Offe
'•t    [        1990: 8) of national welfareštates, with 'European social citizenship' being
j             one backbone of the USE? Or will the welfare state, which is 'characteristic
i    ,       only foi; this part^ofJhe..worÍď (van Cangendonck, 1991), bejrreleyant for
1    '•        'building the new European state'? Will fragmented 'social citizenships' remain
í            an^.naíion^eyeí.wíierefh.eyjmight slowly erode? (c.f. Majone, 1992)
If European unification were not to be based on 'social citizenship',
,        European welfare regimes would remain at the USE's state or 'regional'
'    ,[       level and stay below the supranational level of visibility. The regimes of
poverty policy, the mošt exposed parts of social citizenship, would then be
134   Neyf perspectives fVí tlie welfare suite in E... ■■v/;.-
most likely1 to cprťpde sjpvyjý and idcpnspicuously. This may cause phantom pain for social Welfare fttidt jft particular, poverty experts. In tfieir respective national contexts they' Wptijd tie struggling wiih the consequences of something that never cftjtie to be: á European welfare state built on a European poverty policy»
The options and constraints involved in puildihg á Eurppean welfare state constitute the topic of this pap|r. I will fpcus mostly phEuropean poverty regimes and will discuss thprh historically and typologically.    ~~'"......"
From negative tö posltjvjp íííitegr^(ipri
If 'European SPöial pítiz^iá^Hip1 P,r 'Sqcial Europe' is to come about, a . ■ 'positive' fnode of ijlteg|-^tian is j-equíŕec}. Such an integratiph is much mpre ambitious árid^pBlTipJoJt tTfaH a pure and simple 'common market' gqal. It aitns «t Jöitjt 'cöh^tiilijitiVl' kctipn> at a positive state'. However, the evÖlUtiöti Of 'preretjN'äj' É|ij'dpea|l institijtioris, of Europe's 'incpmplete federalistu', has bé&ri stttphgly moulded by 'negative integration'.. (A SUtnitiaiy d£ the: tWd $í$fe| pf integration is given in Table 7.'l.) Negative Ittlfcíjřfittótifpcits^sdh,!fl^ph|tru9Upp', onjüstremoving obj^ejesjoafree hiafket, ihti^ 'fôlhj! tl4ít]|[idft|Í öf ífthej-érjt sociál consequences. (Kaufmann,
i986i"69)r................7"".";.....' _ ,
IvlüViftS frphl 'ftřřtóW' tP 'sopjal rights' implies a shift in the nature of the pölltlcSöl ŕčglhii Ifi p |Jn%ihg Europe2 - a shift from negative to positive integraildh. The ülscijssidrifaji 'SocialEurope', ph the 'socialdimension', on the 'Social Charter', fyrjd. d|i Šojne derails of the EC social pplicy mandate is already testing the limits of the unification regime of the European ComrriUnity. In this context, the poverty issue is of special relevance, since it U morally clear crif and marks the 'North-South' divide in the Community itself, To address European poverty the EC would háve to design ptoglftmitiös which äiŕh at all European fajniltés. However, the EC mandate
' is focUsed mostly Ort European employees and their families - and not yet on the European citizen /Je/- se, Even the EC Social Charter refers mostly to
J employees^älthqü^H'c'drnparable basic statements of rights at the national
|eVel a4tlress all citjzejis
Infeiestingly ehot(gh, the negative integrätipn modus of the EC was
transcended (mostly) in agricultural policy in the Rome Treaty at the very ;.   .      sTart of European  Intepiation  (Pinder,   19(§8i 1 ÖÖf.). Tri""tííé European
.....f         CommUhlty, as Weil as i|i the USA, agriculture was the first 'internal' policy
: '., ' domain to be 'nationalised'. This has fundamentally affected the ',"' -•.' development of a süpra-nat}oha( bureaucracy in the USA (Skowronek, 1982; '"LS Dupree, 1957; Rossiter, 1979) and at the EC level this development also „.' '",'"''    incorporated different social policy developments, at first only vis-ä-vis
Table 7.1 Types of integration
Towards a European welfare state?    135
Modus of	Nature of tasks Political		Examples in	Classical and
integration		system	present EC legislation	typical models
Negative	Rremove	Weaker,	Free	'Tariff Union'
	obstacles	strong reliance	movement of	('Zoll Verein")
		on"Juridical *	persons.	(Germany
		; procedures	"goods, capital,	before 1871 or.
	.-y	; and "decisions	and services {the four freedoms)	USA; Italy?)
Positive	Create	(Stronger;	Set minimum	'German
	common	■, reliance on a	of essential	Reich' (after
	social space	developed executive and parliament	health and safety requirements	1871), Canada.
Note: See Dehousse (1988:313) on (he first three columns.
agriculture. Mbre attention should be paid to how universal social welfare components might be systematically intertwined with the agricultural domain at the EC level, and not only tp how a 'basic income' for certain agricultural producers is or might be achieved EC-wide. The US Fppd Stamps programme might pffer a mpdest example of such a prpcess. Since the EC has been granted legal arid administrative competence in this area, it TQignt at first be easier to widen these established policy channels,4 rather than struggling, for a comprehensive EC social policy based on positive integration.
Historical models for European integration in the social policy domain
Two major examples highlight the different relevance of 'positive integration' or 'social unification' for processes of national integration:5 the German unification of 1871 - and again of 1990 - and the consolidation of a United States of America as a 'state' at the turn of the twentieth century.
The German Reich
The first German integration of 1871 did not conform to the 'normal' (AngÍo_-"Säxôň) pattern of evolution ofrights, i.e. one expanding from civil to political to social rights (cf. Marshall, 1964). The extension of social
136   New perspectives on the welfare state in Europe
/citizenship to the working class - not to the poor p_er_sg„- which was the opre |of~Bisma£cť£-ŠOTÍ^"TigSIaUpA.,preceded politicaLcitizenship (that is, firitroďuction of universal suffrage after defeat in World War I) by four i decades.
f Integration^ the German Reich - as in England - was mainly achieved I through social reform. 'One nation' grew out of a class-divided 'two nations' in a sphere of common social rights. An overdose of social citizenship, mostly granted to men, as well as a homogeneous national bureaucracy,6 was administered to a nation about to unify - hence identifying the (mostly male) 'Second Nation', or the organised working class, with the new, benevolent national state, the 'social security state'. The riew welfare state of the 1880s became the foremost intermediary (not directly state) bureaucracy,7 which legitimated an otherwise fragile central government.
Today's German unification repeats, compressed in time, the pattern of 1871: civlTancľ social unification preceded the political union, though -contrary to 187 T- the "chances of an improved 'integration through social reform' have been mostly bypassed by (West) German politicians.8
At first, the German Democratic Republic (GDŔ) seemed to aim at a synthesis of the 'social advantages' of West and East Germany and proposed a 'Social Charter'. But in the meantime, the West German social policy model has simply been extended (sometimes in a watered-down version)jto the territory of the former GDR, in some cases allowing for transition periods, and now making it 'the' German model. There may be some lasting consequences of German social unification in the area of minimum income legislation, since transitional minimum pensions and minimum unemployment benefits have been provided for in the Unificatipn Treaty. Many issues which had pointed towards the need for a new era of social reform during the unification period, and which had been 'displaced', resurface now that unification is implemented. West German .policy solutions often do not fit reality in the five new states. So 'social cohesion' is an important inner-Gerrjianissue, which is triggering compensatory action but not Comprehensive social reform.
In any case, German unification today wiljMDe W£W£dJby_ others -, e^eciaJ]yJ&Ejjrc^^                                                        in Ireland ^asa
i leading case for 'integration^ noücy_.9 Perhaps unification can contribute to changing Germany's role in the EC in a positive way, too, with Germany how more inclined to promote European social unification instead of blocking it as it did in the past. Other EC countries, especially at the Latin rímj will closely monitor the German 'integration experiment'; it may become a 'regional observatory' for a possible development of the social dimension of the EC.
Towards a Éuropěaji fyfilfyfH ,$?/£?    \$1
\ USA
J                                                                                                ,                           .     .
In the USA, the historical sequencing of 'citizenship1' is 'riohyial1  Ťfols ,
Anglo-Saxon pattern conforms to the one we can also qbsfctVß. tfttbp EG fti s, t ' .
come civil, ffiäň^Útícaúi^diťhen^ocial rights The ýs A Ihus offers tjie best
counter-example to the German Reich of 1871.  It bpeiates with fifl
'underdose' of social rights - instead political and civil rlgrjls are strdng|y
emphasised. Vis-ä-vis the EC, me USA offers a good comparative case,
since it shares central features: both 'continents' are unified through
'federations', and the ^nificatipnplboth is coqrt-leriiu^.cjp^rHeü^10 wifh;    '
j^ďilicatiqnplayjrig a central role. At the turn bf the century, the USA Wfos
still just 'a state of courts and parties' (Skowronek, 1982) - mus á non-state
at least in the European sense. On the other hand, the EC might be
characterised as aJst^le-ofjUieEurppeán Court and of Brüssels technocrats'
""Social policy iq the USA was at~?irst only Indirectly halibhalis,pd, Lbrig
before the Great Depression of the 1930s, two classical pfepartnierits - War11
and Agriculture12 - incorporated social policy functloiľi Until the Dicat
Depression  the national  level  was  otherwise  void  of sqpial  policy
competencies, a situation which was first altered by Roosevelt's introdüctiptl
of social security. The historical legacy of this gaping ho(e in (tational social
responsibility is a permanently lajbile state of nationalisatiqh pf social policy
itseifj which today is seen best in 'functionally decentralised/ US poverty
policies.
Viewed from the perspective df a USE-to-b]e, thfe ßö Js fttíW1 Ct>|ifrpt)ted
by a similar 'void'. Will the nations of Westen) Eurppe; q§ flble1 to cope with
this challenge of 'social cohesion' faster arid rho,ťei SMccpsfqlly it] the
twenty-first century than the USA was able tp \t\ thk i^ét^iétb, century?
The EC versus; the USA and the German Reich
TheUSA - ljkethe EC, but in contrast to the Gentiärj Reich - has stayed ; • čldsegttothe 'tariff union' pattern, the typical rriofdÉší t>jf tie gatiye integration. At the same time, theUSAJij^ j^mpre highly integrated poetical structure than jhe EC migjit ever achieve. In"Tapíě 7.2, d[ffei'eriCe'sTin federal developments of the USA and the EC are contrasted, fipř the USE aftd the . USA, there are different fault lines. In the ÜS^ theJflUJt line fütis.between ; political and social.rightst since a 'common liiarket' $r)fl a political qtlion ■ have developed there in one process. In the sequence Of citizenships, social ;; citizenship comes, last. The UŠE, though, has two suf?li fault lines: the same I one as in the USA, but also a preceding one that runs between civil aqd  j ~ political rights. Á European synthesis will thus be &§r^p]ífliy dehíähäTng.   ! The situation of the EC therefore resembles the deVelpptrjollt ifi tlie USA loss
,.18   New perspectives on the welfare state in Europe Table 7.2 Types of federalism and lines of breakage: [he USE versus the USA
USE
USA
Type
Market
('civil citizenship')
Incomplete federalism Common markel
Parliamentary
Governance etc.
('political citizenship')
Political union
Complete federation
Interstate commerce
'■ i    '
Congress, federal government
Welfare state
('social citizenship')
Social union, 'Social Europe'
Brqad federal powers for social regulation
Remarks
Rome Treaty left competency vacuum in social policy and provided for meagre forms of political representation; no EC social citizenship (needle's eye: employment relationship: atrophy of national social citizenship regimes, e.g. welfare, child allowances, youth welfare, housing allowances, etc.)
With the Great Depression, the competency vacuum at the federal level was filled by redefinition of constitutional powers.
Note: Fault Iincs=
and
than it looks like the building of the German Reich of 1871 - at that time, Germany also had to deal with two such fault lilies af orice. But Germany dealjrwjtfijo^Ixitizenship[earlier than it did with political citizenship. This reversal of the sequence is also of interest for an analysis of European integration marked by a distinctly lagging 'political union'.
When we look at the EC compared with the USA of the German Reich this question arises: should and will EC development conform more to the Anglo-Saxon^tte^^fjeg^uencing citizenshipor to the C3enpan one?Jnjhe
' former case, European unification would take place without a social, foundation but would rest, on the contrary, on a market-oriented foundation of 'possessive individualism'. In the latter case, European unificatipn would,,
; instead attempt a synthesis of civil, political and social rights thus confronting both fault lines at once and breaking with the Anglo-Saxon
' pattern of development. 'Social Europe', 'social dimensions' of European development, a 'Social Charter' (Kommission, 1989; Silvia, 1991; Acldison
Towards a Ěyropéáii Wčlfaľe stale?    139
and Siebert, 1991; Bercusson, 1989; Lange, J9^2)( 'SJrjcia! Fund''3 - at the moment these are catch-phrases in symbolic politics pöltttiitlg at a social foundation without really building any of the stŕuctuí/ít| prerequisites, Only a confluence of several favourable cpnditions \yijj Contribute to a breakthrough for a truly Social Europe,
THE FOUR SOCIAL POLICY REGIMES IN Tft% $C
We have seen that positive integration, 'social cir^qsjoŕj^|J^jgiLl5MÍiLlrlto.t^ťí  ,\ I  ■' present structure of the EC, Therelš"~np""ÉC wélfajj (fta^p (qtjtsjde of "\\ agriculture). If we look at the different existing welfä^ö py^t^tfis (ň ßlii-öpe    j • may we then realistically expect that a 'Social JBúŕppí' $|)j öf}tt}e flbp^t by an 'organic' merging of such systems frpr(i trie Q0ßl \\p1 H$i\\yb integration at the EC level would then be a by-prbdtjpt of j^ipljijt; |^^j^f economic and political integration, Or are thésqcíäl kM bpv||ty p^(jöy regimes of the EC so contradictory that an organic h^Mjig'fi'tírtl pelflW la noTpossible and 'harmonisatiori' will necessarily ji^|y| \p ppjtje 'fťjjftl ajxwe',, i.e. it will have to be synthesised anil impleni^||ij 1$ ifii aythpiŕjsép! EC^.,bureaucracy? Such a European welfares státe Wf}t|íd; hjiost ||]b|ýf ' presuppose a historical North-South fcomprorriisé Wiüiio f $$ $|Ö fttlii StlťšlV) a reformulation of the Rqme Treaties* partly already acHi py^fj Íri jVíäas|flGht> Without an EC welfare state, in the long run, rejajtojridlf iij§tfpt1$l we(fit|t ' - í    ' ■' regimes will be in atrophy: their economic and legiiirfi<i|:pi-y b^ses, typuld"' ' •' slowly erode with the completion and further deyelcjrjirj^t of tlle Cprnnion       ' Market -just as they erpded in the USA with the réaliSřitlah gf its 'cpttitrlfth      ,   , market' interstate cprnmerce (Peterson and Rpfh, l?9t|)i
Whether Social Europe might come about via merging fŕtŕltl thé íbptípľh up' can be examined by reviewing typical EC pdyejrtyjegjjiieij, fyj[y ;|tt6f)t!p|1 will centre ön the interfaces between1 poverty, sofciäl ih^iirfjijßö ártd pbyefty policy. The different consequences which the irttŕódúrJtibh rjf"^ j)q)(c iltcfihje scheme under each regime might havb will be1 outlined.H ^fjls js phe WW to iííustrate the practical importance of the differences: bet^effl these regirrles,
Though the discussion of welfare st^te regiriies UŠ^liy fpö^ös öji tbbsö policy areas that quantitatively dömjnate the welfáŕ^ staif r í,J3. (he" söcjal insurance systems (cf. Schmidt, 1988) -1 concentrate pfj |(ip rpfU-gifjs bf the welfare state; it is here that the limits - and fne contents - öf social citizenship are tested, and it is here that any differences ifl EyiPReaft spciaj policy will be most obstructive.
In the following, I will distinguish four different SP'cläJ pdljcy regimes - ■ < ■ four 'worlds of welfare capitalism':15 the Sc|ih(}inavii|ti Welfare Slates, the 'Bismarck' countries   the Anglo-Saxon cqúntrieí;, ajid \\ip 'Latin rifti' countries.
140   New perspectives on the welfare state in Europe
The Scandinavian welfare states
Since World War I, the welfare states of Scandinavia16 have stressed the right to work for everyone and have centred their welfare state policy on mis issue and not on compulsory income transfer strategie?. Scandinavia fits the type 'modern welfare state'. Universalism reigns, though not primarily through income redistribution outside the sphere of work. Here, the welfare / stafeTs[employer of firstjgsqrt (mainly for women). Subsidising 'entry' into - or non-exit from - the labour market is the welfare state strategy which conveys the institutionalised notion of social^citizenship.
In Scandinavian countries, the basic income debate is likely to be used only as an additional argument for the support of a universalist 'work-centred society'. The debate might be of some use for improving 'income packaging' in the Scandinavian welfare state (see Rainwater et al., 1986). Broad-scale issue-specific redistribution, like child allowances, might be improved. Or the rather residual, truly marginal welfare systems there might be improved in such a way that they match the standards of 'Bismarck' countries. But basic income is unlikely to develop into a strong option; to opt out of 'work society' as a general strategy will not be condoned.
The 'Bismarck' countries
For a century, Germany and Austria have relied on a strategy of 'paying off social problems, of subsidising 'exit' from the labour market or even 'non-entry' while pursuing a strong policy of economic development only. These countries might be characterised as' institutional welfare states'. Here, f 'comrjens£tory_stxateg|es^ which_substitute a right to sociäľsecurityJor_a j right to work are prominent, and a basic income debate would be most likely to radicalise the present focus on compensation and exit (or non-entry). The welfare state is not the employer but the compensator of first resort, and the institutionalised notion of social citizenship is biased accordingly. Though there is no explicit tradition of universalism in these countries, the 'institutionalised full employment promises' and private labour market 'practices' (of the 1950s to the early 1970s) have created a fragile tradition of virtual universalism (for an overview cf. Leibfried and Voges, 1992).
TJie basic income debate here amplifies the pre-existing focus on nonjientryj3r_easmg-exit from the labour rriarketľ Perhaps in the Bismarck countries this debate cöulH lead to something like a universalised noii-residual needs approach which might become less and less restrictive in terms of means-testing and might also develop towards an individual instead of a household orientation.
Towards a European tyelfafe state ?    141
The Anglo-Saxon countries
The English-speaking countries have always ernphakised the 'residual \ welfare model' (see Titŕnuss, 1987; 262)( especially ijri income transfers,'1 ' They did not accent, as the Scandinavian cpjuritries cud,) (he, Wölfare state as the major employer in a 'work society'; rather j they <;ótit?piVed of the welfare state as a work-enforcing mechanism (séé L0deme}, 1989), The USA, Australia, New Zealand, and aiso the UK. best exemplify the typo Of 'residual welfare state' (Titmusis, 1987: 367). 'Entry*'into the t^Pf-lr market Was facilitated more by pure .force than by sjjbsidisátíbfy pf by trilihiflg and qualification policy. Here, seiectivisrh reigns aš |h<i tifijliicipal approach of social policy, making the welfare state rather á cp^ipei^afof of (flst tesô,t\< I The distance of the Anglo-Saxqn model from a 'epihp^jWdi)' i^irHB' pr ! from a Scandinavian 'work society regime' |s equ|li^ gť^tt ^titls, 'f(pcla( citizenship' has remained more of an academic issijé jh tHesei c^títije^^
The basic income debate in the Ánglo-Sáxoh crjhji(fj|| |f jfilW ffÜ f}Wf$ from institutionalising an 'option out of work sqfciety'j \\ n(|y ^P^öft t|if* development.of a ínormal welfare system* in fjiě fydrtjilJ-fi |üfep^fift S^ŠO, However, the development .is not likely to go any ftyrtríjiSí' jjjj![jj ín}fíf A, Hftfjt^l welfare system in the Anglo-Saxon context'woujd jihifjj) j^s|$j3Jajjy jj) (jíl* case of the USA) introducing a'universal instead'b'f ^l^^ij^l' V/eiffjife system (treating each category differehtly), cdmb^jrtg f jlis11 'W^lfaf& s^ffi with a more prominent role for a public jpbs rJrpgj^fr||f$ fija| jalfjlS, ftf integration into the primary labour market (sorriewhorf p^|^fá|Sh (|w G&Hflari and the Scandinavian model), and having ädkqjMíí Cfaif shitr?') find nationally standardised (again especially ift the ca£é öf (ho P$A) 'welfare1 rates.         '"""
The 'Latin Rim' countries
The southern countries of Westerh Europe, Some pf üjerij jjitegtfítjäd illtfi \\k EC only in the 1980s, seem to constitute a welfare sMé Říjili Pf (he}f flWH» This league comprises Spain, Portugal, Greece, kejŕ, s^rr||í"Í}ttfejlt {§g(itji^jrH) Italy and; least of all, Francci9 This type cqtilij m ijhäfapíer|šéd rtS, 'rudhnentary welfare state'. In Portugal, Spjiihj Itaí^ ^ $f0h (i^ <?VÖh íl ngEt.to Welfare is given. In some respect?, these m,\p$ 0 similar1 to tjl<S Aiiglo-Saxori countries, cfe/acro stressing r^                          'ehtry' ItitP •
the labour market. But in these couritrjes( older tt|ditÍotiS; pf Welfare (connected to the Catholic Churph) seem tb exist on tyJUoh; the Ahglo^axpfi model and most northern countries caniiqt biiildj JyíflffoVett itt these countries certain social security prograrnmes gérV# äj? bftSJt) income measures, although they were not designep as such ($$ disability pensions

/yewperspectives on the welfare state in Europe
íj/ípiithem Italy seem to have worked out this way; see Ascoli, 1986: 113f., 122). In addition, labour market structures are radically different and often reveal a strong agricultural bias, combined with a 'subsistence' economy which provides a different - non-Northérn European - 'welfare' state background. Finally, these countries do not have a full employment tradition - in particular, one trTaTalso fully applies to women -r as do some of the Scandinavian countries. But many of these countries have made strong promises pointing towards a 'modern welfare state' in their constitutions; it is the legal, institutional and social implementation which seems to be lacking in the 'Latin Rim', the welfare state of institutionalised promise. It is hard to gauge the effect of a basic income debate in these countries. The development of 'normal welfare systems' seems most likely - normal in the sense of the Northern European or German welfare mqdel.
These four types of welfare state are summarised ih Table 7.3, Modern, institutional, residual and rudimentary welfare states start from rather different, in some cases contradictory, goals and are built on quite disparate intervention structures; and they do not share a common policy (and politics)
Table 7.3 Types of European welfare states
	Scandinavian	Bismarck	Anglo-Saxon	Latin rim
Type of welfare	Modem	Institutional	Residual	Rudimentary
regime				
Characteristics	Full	Full growth;	Full growth;	Catching up;
	employment;	welfare state	welfare state	welfare state as
	welfare state	as	as	a semi-
	as employer	compensator	compensator	institutionalised
	of first resort	of first resort	of last resort	promise
	and	and employer	and tight	
	compensator	of last resort	enforcer of	
	of last resort		work in the market place	
Right to:	Work    >',	Social	Income	Work and
- ...........--.....".......~		security	transfers	welfare proclairhed
	Backed up by	an institutio-	No stich	Implemented
	nalised concept of social		back-up	only partially
	citizenship			
Basic income	Marginal,	May	May support	May support
debate	but may	somewhat	development	development of
	improve	radicalise	of 'hormaľ	normal welfare
	income	decoupling	welfare	system
	packaging	of work and income	system	
towards q Euŕppeqh ^élfyttí Wflté?    143
tradition that could serve as a centripetal force. In aný c^séi tljls dtVefgöhce of regimes does not lend support to the notion that a ^uropéaM ^p1 Ifare State might grow via automatic harmonisatioh, building from the nalibfta! towards the EC level. A 'bottom up' strategy for EC 'sociál integration' policy seerns stillborn.
\fwHITHER EUROPEAN WELFARE POLICY: \/'Europeanisatipn' from the 'top down' ot 'Arrterjcänifcqtiöti' from the 'bottomTup'?•"""""""               "                       ■
What may be the influence of a continuous Euröpeanlsätiph of ecqnomic and representational policy on social, especially povprfy, pojipy? Since automatic harmonisatiori of European social policy^ ßlillcling from l"e national towards the EC level, is not likely, twq alternatives rétttain!
,'ľ 1 Policy disharmony in welfare policy ma,y either p'rjfey^U as a pemiajient '
.2     underside of European integratiqn or, \yprse, be trátiSfprrried Into a
'■'■' (.^process of automatic disharmonisation at thfe bottcjitl» r4át-íp(lřll politics
14 may be 'Balkaniseď as the European Common; M^ťk^t solidifies,
, v  especially when a common purrehcy is áphjeyed. THiS {# tit$SB rpsenibles
what happened tq American poverty policy as tlie ÍS|é\V Aňljíricun,
national state was built, starting at the turn of the t\yet)fjetjl pentyty.
2 Policy disharmony may also provoke - in particular iyhi^ fc^hftp|1t^d
with more potent pressures for European 'social cótl^šíýilI •*- fli CäPSäj-jÜ|i
reaction of European institutions.^ This jmigl^t prort^pt i| cbrilbj-ehpnsjVe
5        European policy frame for poverty policy - pr for a'íj ppfttyj ^én^fitS -
primarily tied to social citizenship. In the context of ctijfpttcy tlnlpH SCjiiie.
such non-incremental development is likéíy, If a (s; hoj jjj^YfSrjtiaj}
through advance incremental sqcial state btiildirtg at \^ ftp level |jt the
short time remaining in the 1990s,
Towards 'Americanisation' of European poverty bö^i^y?
In this part, I will concentrate on ' Américanisatjph' ás orie" tytéfT>íltive' SiHce this path is closest to the given EC situation, I will shq\V 'yWJIcbffeSpqhtlii with present EC welfare legislation, which is mámily J}j$e|ifj|}t/4! 4hd rtól substantive (see Table 7.4 belo\y). f he development of Ép jé|jj|S|{tt|oh' again fits in with the historic model of evolution c)jf poveirjiy tójlpý ill ßurrJpetth nation-states (see Table 7.5 below).
In my view, European development will mpst likely jeftVö öl j pöVpfty tittfj welfare policy at the locaLor state - that is at a sub^Ěu^tóp ÍOěj/ělílf Is hard to stä7t~frorriTä^ornmorTKuŕopean denörnlnatöri *|Pfi§ jä$jty ccjjlttjtqh ground is missing on which a European welfäfp regiiríe Říjiti lie bl|||t,
.44   Ne\y perspectives on the welfare state in Europe Table 7.4 Status, EC residence permit and poverty support in Germany
Residence permit
Right to welfare
Self-Employed
Employed Pte-employed;
Employed: Unemployed:
Not employed c Students:
Pensioners:
Others:
For Economic activity within EEC treaty framework (freedom of services and capital movement); otherwise, see 'Others'
For job search in due time (according to EC law, 3 months)
Even in the case of sub-poverty-level of remuneration
cf. pre-employed; for the involuntarily unemployed, permit expires as 'availability for work' is deniedb
If registered for study and insured in event of sickness
If insured in event of sickness and in receipt of sufficient (old age, accident, disability) pension to avoid take-up of welfare
If insured in event of sickness and in receipt of sufficient resources to avoid take-up of welfare
Yes; only take-up of welfare parallel to economic activity is legitimate; otherwise, take-up results in loss of right to residence and in possible deportation
Yes; beyond due time, take-up of welfare results in loss of right to residence and possibly in deportation"
Yes; parallel take-up of welfare is legitimate
Yes; when permit expires, take-up of welfare results in loss of right to residence and possibly in deportation
Only temporarily; costs may be recovered from 'home state' of recipient11
Yes; but take-up of welfare results in loss of right to residence and possibly in deportation
Yes; but take-up of welfare results in loss of right to residence and possibly in deportation
Notes:
a    Section 10, para. 1, no. 10, Ausla'ndergesetz (Alien Bill) stipulates that foreigners may be
deported if they cannot support themselves without the take-up of welfare.
b   Section 103, AFG (Employment Bill).
c    In the following, I refer to legislation proposed by the Commission (see Amtsblatt der
Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 28 July, 1989, Nr. C 191/2-6; KOM(89) 275 endg.-SYN 199,
200; 89/C 191/02-04). The Council of Ministers agreed to these somewhat modified
proposals on 22 December, 1989 (cf. FAZ 23 Dec. 1989). As yet, the 'Not employed' have
no mobility rights which are Community protected.
d    Such recovery, though, would contradict section 4 of the European Convention on Social
and Medical Assistance, ratified by all 12 EC member countries.
P
Ô
Tpwá\rdš ä ßutöpecfi} \^\fdH štqie ?    145
In contrast to poverty policy, somé work-ŕéhľ.ré(l social,(jollcjes.^ 'health' \ and 'work safety' issues - wiMl&bs.mucfľéakiei,^                        or to \
'harmonise', since these policies are structured in a, fajrty pofriparable Way to begin with and since the European insUtutjtos,.jiaV^ £ Jtrdttger mandate there. Needs-centred social policies are rather difficult 1° standardise and will have no strong thematic lobby in the European content n Unless some poor 'Latin rim' states make it a 'state iss,ue' - and stich policies Will have a hard time finding a mandate, Thus, the iriost likely pqtcoirie is that needs-centred social policies are least likely tq Be protected by European development.
One might therefore predictJhaJ; the 'Europe to rid', lh terms of social I golicy and especially in terms of poverty pqlicVj wilt look mtlch more like I the USA "did before the"l930s, qr like it dofes todaýj tjlftrt like any of the ' Northern European welfare regimes. Europe after 1992t 8s far as poverty policy is concerned, might lead to a shift tbwaids the Anglo-Saxon welfare model; at least, it is likely to lead tb a welfaie state 'Balkanisatioh1 quite similar to that in the USA. If 'integration' ir) poverty policy comes about within these limits it will be of a negative sort, allowing each nieiTiber stajd f tg have its own regime and creating only procedural rules) perhaps also abptlt ■ how to proceed with^fpreign' recipients_and with the re-exportation of t^elr i burden to their 'home' countries.?0
What is the current state of EC welfare policy'/ Tff$ f|W )EC (tiles ofj welfare that do exist are meaningful only iii 'rlatipifal ^elfiire ctiflffejtyš'i where they are meant to become operational, Therefqi|i ty\\\ qiscflsS trjerfi in a national - in this case, the 'welfare state generpus;' Q^a(i - ijdtljrig,
At present the situation, as it is captured in Table1 f 4i is. Stlj( at u )eve| where receiving welfare .leads to the_classicipocir law* l^tijetililj prpcüdüfes! ship the poóFTĎackľtoTtheir pľace Of origin (in the EG)rfh¥'gCfffiefeftjfe, ^ÓmplxěTwllththé evolution of poverty pdlipy in Eufdp||iijií(tícir)^ti|teS -still bound tflJhe.first-of four historical and logical l^djfi oj Itjt^třttíbn of poverty policy, as shown in Table 7-5.
A second, more refined stage of Sociál policy, deyf lachten! is realised when a person is permitted to stay in the country granting jMfti4ť-frftř Welfare but the costs of support are charged* back to his Or her plijc^ of bf l^jt) (Table 7^)".TÖ'channel transfers from mariy riational sjauŕcjííi tpfn^Nné i14f!°Hal agency is a regular feature of social security nétívorkíj díjjta|í\\Ú}éd iii hJla^íílL agreements; for example, when pensions are1 rjaid tq art žjgdji Ijiigriittt Worker, Community law allows for this pqssibility in Welfare j^jpy' exclusively for 'students', a most temporary status (see table 1Á\ Nof ál^j^ý1^, ''s^cieMs' h An internal administrative shifting of costs is su|lJ_á^__^|p^)iJ^|Rp«t poverty bureaucracies. At the "moment, such á solutlpjí s'éffiú fipt tq bfi envTšlonedforthe aged (see Table 7.4: Not ernblpydd, IfieltfiiiiiVlf) *• though they are closest to pensioners, where this.solution already éxjíjts \vllhjn Social
(
^mpprvew perspectives on the welfare state in Europe ■Pfahle 7.5 Steps in integration of poverty policy Step        Characteristics
1             'Shipping the poor back home'   '•   C      '   ';
2             Shifting only the cost? of poôrsupport to the locality of origin
3             Treatment of EC citizens as national (or local) citizens in each country
(or community)
4             Creation of European substantive and procedural welfare standards
insurance. An aged person moving from Germany to Spain, therefore, has to prove to the Spanish authorities that he/she has sufficient resources pot to be in need of welfare. Nevertheless, a solution similarto that for 'students' may have to come about for pensioners who did move to another EC country, stayed there for a long time, and then needed long-term care arrangements that they could not afford without welfare co-payments. Rather than destroy the new, last social roots at the place of retirement by Insisting that these pensioners return to their country of origin in the EC, it would seem more desirable to recover outlays from that country.
A third step in the evolutionary ladder (see Table 7.5) is taken when take-up of welfare in Germany - or for that matter in any other EC country which grants a right to welfare - becomes as legitimate for EC citizens as it is for German citizens, or for the citizens of any respective EC country. This is the base only in connection with employment (see Zuleeg, 1987); most extremely in the case of low-wage employment (see Table 7.4: Employed, 'employed'), less in the case of joblessness {'unemployed') and least in the case of non-employment (job search, 'pre-employeď).
The European Court decided in the cases of Leyin and Kempf that it is only relevant under European law that a person be gainfully 'employed' and 'active in wage or salaried employment', independent of whether he/she is earning less than the state-defined subsistence minimum (Zuleeg, 1987: 344 f.). For the residence permit of an EC citizen 'it is irrelevant whether such income ... is increased by other income up to this minimum or whether the person is satisfied with his [or her] below-poverty income, as long as he [or she] is truly active in wage or salaried employment' (European Court Reports 19#6, 1749ff.). This interpretation does not hinge on what the country concerned defines as 'employment'; it thus holds universally in the EC.
Thus German social security law - Section 8 of the fourth book of the SGB, the Welfare Law Code - levies no pension contributions on 'insignificant employment', defined as being below 15 hpurs per week or earnings less than 470 DM (parameters as of 1 January 1990).21 Looking at the hours only, Kempf- the plaintiff in the European Court case - would not have been considered 'employed' according to German law.But according
TovJards^ a Eufdpeafi ú.élfd^ $iqtéf>    147
toguperior EC law he is considered 'employed' in GérrhafjV, ftjid! ttitfS tips a right of residence, and access to all social benefits; |jl Gérrŕ^ny, which includes a right to welfare.
Independent of what a national 'standard emplpymeŕít rftl^iöpsHip' is, the EC and its courts set their own Europe;wirje p>ltjcitíie$. Ä broad interpretation of 'employment' thrpiigh the Cp^rt has tti^fl one of the avenues of moving towards 'social citizenship' uridejr tlie) poiistraipts of aft employment-oriented concept of freedom and European integration (see, most extensively, Steinméyer, 1990). The sárrté solution obtains in the case of self-employment that does pot provide sufflcieht réSOtirces for self-support (see Table 7.4: Self-employed). Again, Welfare; ftiay be legitimately used as a supplementary benefit for EC citizens; Ih this cä§é( however, (here is no 'pre' and 'post' protective status as it relate^ to the iiinpltiyment situation (job search, unemployment). Self-employment is thus leas, shielded in ün EC social policy context against the risk of poverty. But tiiej^ jfi ul^o |ess of a necessity to shield it: empirically, these cases are nof Very sjgííificapt; und legally, a Gestaltswitch of the 'sělf-émpldyed' into the sitUüs of 'employed, searching for work' can easily be orchestrated by the person öörjcerfied,
\ The four steps in integration of European poverty pb)(cy jiaVe been summarised in Table l.Š. Át present. Step 1 is still the ntítíjl, ftfld Steps 2 4bd ä^retíigexception. Step4, which aims more at aEurppjaab; flpvg^y r£girr|e, isMitirely out of reach,,If the European Court of Justice \Vf|'fe tt? lake lib the 'chSDenge' of the Maastricht revisions of the EC Treaty, üiiS itüöHt CiitaWült the_E_C's social and poverty policy immediately td Step $ (Tšjblé 7.5) and would do away with all present residential and fiŕiáŕjčjaj fijs:irictipfi$ : discussed above. Why? Because until now European tíít|z&ls!|íírJ hi$ tjeeti ■ ' limited to the migrant worker and'- through him, jrf her í- }bj (($ ftüffl)y. J3yt at the Maastricht summit, to demonstrate af least some h^aj^sly !Ü H^lltjťíjl
í and social unipn.it was agreed 'to strengthen the prbtöctJQii) Öf||i| fi^flf*? 'íhtí jjjjergstsof the nationals of its Members States thipugh $é ijfj:i;p$üptjp|i p'f (fj
í citizenship of the Union'. The agreement reads;
Citizenship of the Union is hereby established, Every JÄöH |]bjcl(ng the nationality of a member state shall be a citizen of the yhÍPjtí> fevery UpiPh citizen shall have the right to move and reside.jjrfcely MÚ\\fa tjiö territory Qf the Member States [and tj2jecfeiye consular.sUggdrti Pfb explicit fiSPfll preconditions seem to be set.] Union citizéjrs resident jfj ij$ iyíeplbe(" States of which they are not nationals will háve the rigpt jtjj y'Otg.arjjtj ^hp ascandidates in municipal and Eiirppeah elections^
""".....                  (Financial finles, 1 2 U^phet 19&) i ŕj)
Thjsagreement may just seem symbolically gratifying. Öii{ f| ijpliijtf <|clUíj|);y imgly for Europe what two basic Supröfne típufj cléci5ji0|i^ ErJWäftjs- V.
^New perspectives on the welfare state in Europe
^^California^jiid^Jiapiio,,^^^^, 21 achipved for the USA: a right to travel, even when the aim is just to attain better special social benefits.23 Edwards was arrested for bringing his brother-in-law, an indigent, from Texas to California. To grasp the European analogy let me quote some of the Supreme Court's reasoning in 1941. While California píeaded that other states, like Texas, should not be able 'to get rid of their poor... by low relief and insignificant welfare allowances and drive them into California to become our public charges' (168), the Supreme Court focused on the limits which a federal union places on state power:
And none is more certain than the prohibition against attempts on the part of any single state to isolate itself from difficulties cpmmon to all of them by restraining the transportation of persons and property across its horders.... [T]he peoples of the several States must sink or swim together, and ... in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not in division. (174)
Central to that Supreme Court decision was an underlying assumption, an ' assumed national responsibility to address the problem of poverty' (Garth, 198,6:100). The Supreme Court notes a 'growing recognition that in an industrial society the task of providing assistance to the needy has ceased to be local in character. The duty to share the burden, if not wholly to assume it, has been recognised not only by State governments, but by the Federal government as well' (175). From a federal point of view it does not matter whether poverty is in Texas or in California. Does it matter from an EC point of yiew„wheÜiet.Doverty is in Portugal or in Germany, in Ireland or in England? The EC With its new "competency vis-ä-vis 'social exclusion' (Financial Times, 12 December 1991), with its new unconditional citizenship and its old general responsibility to deal with 'regional inequality' (Structural Funds), could grašp f his opportunity for member ^states to js.wJun-inslead_.QfJo sink together, if ^socialcitizenshipj„were to \ become a focus for_a continuous rights-building exercise at the EC level from f the 1990s onwards.
'Europeanisation' of poverty policy
European institutions could also define European standards of poverty .. policy, 'social rights' for European citizens 'from the top down' - in a Sismarckian, Napoleonic fashion. These standards could be designed to bring the top - the more generous welfare systems - down or to bring the boTforh- the more miserly welfare systems - up. These standards could rely on~a'European formula (for example, 40 per cent pf the average national wage income to be used as the basic welfare rale of each nation) which could
Towards q EufOpfcin frglfaft íípft? 't-    14?
sriiLaHowior.Yariancé between thedifferent n4tioriš. #$ ýfji \ cjo |ipt $£& hpW the political and juridical base for a beneficial E^fótíôatt Stfif(cjardisiit|öri might be forthcoming. However, if the EC may not $t}f sjlfldards, that itlfofrn a European right to welfare, it might still subsidise flatJQhai poverty policy systematically; for example, in underdeveloped or peritii$fftl regions (cf, on thecfiřferent strategies, Haiiser, 1983,1987). ''
With spcial security 'harmonised' -r of rii?t (spé SfehWHhli 1989: 4?) - at the national level and not institutionalised at the Euro1 fieftii level, it would be a rather peculiar situation tp háve poverty pplldy partly centralised supranational^ at the EC level. The 'showcase' effect Vis-a-Vis the ppor produced at the Community level might even surpass the national 'parading of the poor' so well known from the US social policy Spene ih AFDC (Aid for Families with Dependent Children).
The Europeanisation of poverty pqlicy might älsdi |ake qUUe 3 different angle: it may be that certain risks (the 'deserving pop^) tyijl be EUrppean-ised; for example, the 'poverty of the aged' and; much l$$ likely* the poverty of the unemployed.24 Here, there might be ah agreerjiehf arrigflg all nations for a rather positive means-tested sPlutioh. Thus, t}íé 'deserving' categories of the poor, which are already 'privileged' |rt many úf the EC hierüber countries (see Schulte, 1991), cpuld be Eufop;pahjs}iétli All the Other popr might be left to be dealt with at the state or local ley^l a^cqj-fllfíg, t° diverging national traditions. This filtering of ^he poor jjrjjjäjfji j^fytij} g Cli|tlifa1 construction of an 'underclass' at tfye national jeyel, ajf$ifEl|titji S^lh^i Whfcj} prejudicejriight then be better directed.
If "such a development were to come about, it itojjj($ l|!{jtí |fcf &|fttfh# Anglo-Saxonisation (in the sense of theUS; model} b^thl Etjröp^an VÍ$\f\#% context: the 'čaTegoricaľ approach to welfare \yill bé ij^Jjbj-tep and the universal approaches which are d0rhiriant in fýprťheríj Btjrtjpjsljfl šfa1 tes Vf\\\ be slowly subverted. The USA, with its fixatipri oh s|ri||| ňwtllížís' ty$\$t\tú (AFDC), is the most prominent example of the cátegdrlCfj) l^brp^Ch1 - ty\}\č\) Germany had already discarded in the 1920s, Alsö,! ij%e lip decide1*» j^tiV to subsidise minimum income developrrierits, tjién cpíjtřdl deijdcés pf Spéci(i| revenue sharing, as they have evolved in the US i-esidtjäj Wöifkrb policy regime (especially in AFDC), are likely candidates jpr E\lrdfiöat]isqt|Ph' Once the benefits of means-tested income transfers CftrJIjat be titrgéted at nationals only, such transfers may eitHer slo\Vly withef aiVaj/ pt haye (0 be delivered directly at the European leyét dr riatiqhajly ijl 4 ,stro|1gly harmonised way.
Since European Comniunity law at preserit (|prne chjiHg^jj fife ühcSöl* way)
. makes national solutions pf the cátegoricäj sort dtf^Ü üjpfe $$$ tlfttißhfl
allow 'transfer exports' to other European cpuniriěs, -^ "$t l^ljÄ %0& M
such transfers may not be sheltered nationally (Zülfeeg, jfjjíjjj * (jjeýb \n ji ppiitj*
ragra^1"1-"-/'t/jyci-ii ľtj ľ« '«e weijure iiaie m citrope
*cal and economic incentive for a straightforward European categorical solution.
That a more radicalised version of a basic income might become the European Community approach seems, at this time, rather unlikely25 - though the discussion of these issues in a European context rriay be beneficial fora push towards more generous traditional 'welfare' solutions at the European level.
CONCLUSION
A unified European poverty regime is no 'all-purpose weapon'. Surely, Europe should develop its own perspectives on a 'War on Poverty' and its standards for a fair distribution of income. Poverty, though, is not limited to the income dimension alone but concerns all Sorts of resources - be it education, qualifications, or other means of social integration (see Friedrich et ai, 1979:11-47). But to focus first on absent income may be the easiest way to make deprivation and marginalisation visible ('social reporting'; see Leibfried and Voges, 1990) at the European level and to politicise them, using it as an eye-opener for wider poverty issues.
Access to the road from a common market to a Social Europe, a European welfare state, has barely been gained. It will be a long road - but with monetary union on the books it may have to be travelled speedily (Eichengreen, 1990). Germany's first unification at the end of the last century led to the creation of the national welfare state. This state was built on a then timely concept of social citizenship - for workers. The founding of a United Europe depended mainly, if not totally, on the 'four freedoms': the free movement of persons, goods, capital and services. Thus 'economic citizenship', which does contain some civil aspects of 'social citizenship',26 is at the fore. Political as well as social citizenship have, until now, been marginal in the process of European unification. For this reason, European unification reminds one more of the unification of the USA - a process in which political citizenship was pertinent from the beginning and has been complemented by social citizenship only since the 1930s, if at all.
The citizenship on which a unifying Europe might come to rest seems primarily an economic or civil notion, secondarily a political one, and only lastly a social one (see Marshall, 1964:78ff.). This pattern repeats British and American precedents and is not anchored well either in Germany or in Scandinavian history. Unity in such a restrictive frame would turn into a unity of 'possesive individualism', a unity of markets qnly. It will not be the unity of an enlightened 'Social Europe' syntheslsing its traditions of derhbcracy and solidarity, of civil and social rights, and building on its traditions ofmerging the citizen and the social state. But, maybe, steps taken towards European citizenship at Maastricht in  1991  will  allow  the
/ QWárds a Eiiťopfiáú H'oŕ/j^fž sl^ ?    15)
metamorphosis of the 'market citizen' (1957-91^ into tjfé '||tlj-|[jed|éď ßC CľHzerí- a new synthesis which includes a Eurdpeari Welfaji fctatp träjectpry, builduig on universal rights?
The coming of such an enlightened 'Social Europe^ ^p1 {ie|jjí|lriíj pri t|1e challenges, provided and the escapes offered by its 'envirolitfj^hľ' J^pftfl ffnd the USA do not offer the EC a betfer model for social l^e|rflflöri, 'Social E^urope' might lose much of its impetus if Eastefh Etirp'te « $| least being perceived as 'social' pressure in the days offsystems competition'27 - wore to^Jium into 'less Central Europe than Zwisclíénéuŕojjh ,,, 4 d^pendefit intermediate zone of weak states, national prejutiicb, ihedj^lltý jpoyerty, arid Šchiamasseľ (Ash, 1990; 22).
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This paper is reproduced iri edited arid revised form, bý perrrilsšlori of Cantpus Verlag of Frankfurt a.M. and Westview Press of Bqujder< Colorado, from the volume Social Policy in a Changing Europe, edited by Szuxza Pfirge i|lid Jon Ei Vind Kolberg, published May 1992 in the series 'Public Policy ä(jd'Sbf3in| Welfare'.
I am grateful to Lutz Leisering, Chiará Saracpno, Bernd Sqh'ültöiföter Townsend and several participants at the 1990 annual conjerence of (he Social Policy Association in Bath fof comments 'and critical remarks rjatuinh Brückner, Marlene Eilerkamp, Peter Klein, Jutta Mésíeť and pitta fíléfltiéť were helpful in completing this paper.
NOTES
1 The 'social' component was already an issue between Friiricé ä|jt( Cjofrřjfitiy $t (he time of the Rome Treaty, though not as a 'Social fynipji'.'.fjtófl, tll0 jítóMřWW should social policy expenditures be counted as japbur cost^'m jžsl(ib|jšj)ing 'free markets'? Decades later, in the 1960s, (he 'Social UHion' fp^mtirjSBdjji i}|téfr|f>|,í> by the Commission to move towards Hárrj1únišii(iórj lij |j)c |ľpolicy, VýjticH failed. Finally, in the early 1970s, another attempt Was hl|ujá "I'tif ,1t' 'phJbjjMifl Social Union', supported by the German goyernrhent he^iJJq by Wjl|y íäďftnql. Herbert Wehner, head of thji parliamentary SPbUnvisibtp 'life p|lflN Šj^s of Europe constituted as a democratic welfare sjilte' (VerMjole mill&W ýofi
daleri RéÉKtítámí Cř. fOf 111)
Europa in der Form eines demokratischen und sozialen RéĚj]||l!|áf^]. Cf. fOf 4|l overview Henningsen, 1992.
The two regime types arej not exclusive. The s^ift frorii h^tly^ if$ pbsjtlVĚ integration implies a synthesis: positive integration lnClUdr!^ ür\cl trjtrišfpflrj5 negative integration by relating to concepts of 'justice' arid '(V^lflfr ' Positive integration confronts the 'social infrastructure' tipcessiry }p acfjieVf 'nfcgíjtWe integration', thus not simply displacing the cbsts of integration tjfjWilWIirds. 'Social' policy at the EC level js structurally narrow - If iij (Jqt|ft|lý líndefstoDd ^ 'employment' policy only, i.eľprograinmes for ihpsb e'rnb|fiyétj hit eijiplpyftble. When Jacques Delors speaks about á1 'social fldpť foý f^ble' fjji W^S fiot ft floor for citizens but one for the employed only.Tllé 'ilatöul-^'1 ||c| jbji ' fitlzälf (in the nineteenth century, the 'poor') are treatefj ^ dištfrjpf fMf| titj^ß0!"'^.
pr new perspectives on tne welfare state in EUrope
4   A not too successful Version of this was tested in the extremely cold winter of 1987 when the European ministers for agriculture decided to have agricultural surplus products distributed to the needy at no cost. This programme has been continued since then (see Henningsen, 1989: 74) and costs more per year than the entire ('other') four-year poverty programme of the EEC. This programme was later discontinued.
5   At the time these developments took place they looked much more like 'supranational' integration. Only in retrospect and in the light of their success do they look like processes of mere 'national' integration.
6   German unification after 1871 was, compared with the US, not particularly influenced by agricultural interests. 'Poverty' and 'agriculture' were issues within one Interior Department. After World War 1, the Reich's Labour Ministry (Reichsarbeitsministerium) evolved as 'the' social policy unit out of the Department of the Interior. Agricultural policy in Germany, in contrast to the US, had no pioneering role in the nationalisation of social policy competence.
7   The social security bureaucracies are not direct parts of the national German government or of the state governments. They are independent national or state agencies, usually of a corporatist nature, with their governing bodies staffed by representatives of labour, employers and the different levels of government.
8   If (West) Germany had accepted the challenge, a synthesis might have looked quite interesting. The German Democratic Republic's road to a welfare slate differed substantially from the West German one: it guaranteed a right to work (and thus did not institutionalise unemployment insurance), with the labour force participation rate of women being far higher than in the FRG. Redistributive policies focused less on the aged - as they do in West Germany - than on the young. Social policy operated mainly through the provision of public goods. With respect to monetary transfers, uniform minimum approaches dominated. Thus had the GDR moved from the Bismarck model, which it had inherited, towards the Beveridge model.
9   In Germany, two countries were unified which were much further apart than the extremes within the EC. The differences between the FRG and the GDR in poverty, for example, are rather similar to the North-South incline obtaining in the EC; but in addition the whole economic system was at variance, which is not the case in the North-South incline of the EC.
10   The Supreme Court in the USA and the European Court in Strasbourg are the respective core of these integration processes.
11   In the Department of War, a strongly expanding pension system was. built up after the Civil War. This system partly stepped in for a then not existing federal welfare state (Skocpol and Ikenberry, 1983).
12   At first, this was just social policy for the farmworkers, but with Food Stamps in the second half of the twentieth century the scope of social policy has been extended to the urban population. Food Stamps is still the only programme available to any poor person in the US and it is nationally uniform. The programme is administered by the Department of Agriculture, even though it is quasi-money (coupons) and not food which is distributed today (cf. Leibfried, 1992b).
13   Compared with the Social Charter, however, the Social Fund is a real institution, though its scope is modest. The Social Fund of the EC demands as niuch in terms of fiscal resources as do Child Allowances in former West Germany alone.
14   On the structure of 'Basic Income Security' in former West Germany see Leibfried, (1990a).
Towgrds ú EúYoptan fájfafP $W'é?    Í53
15   I add another category ('Latin Rim' countries) tp Esping-Afid^rsjí(ťi) (1900) tliriít; worlds of welfare capitalism. I have studied potential trftjjsctjj^Spf {\óp dotyfl' development of a European welfare sjate elsewhere (Léibfŕjedi fí^Žfll L^ibfríéd and Pierson, 1992).       '                   ,            '   "   ' ', " /''"   ,"! ' '   ' "
16   In fact, the Scandinavian model is essentially a, Syyetjlsh tncjcjelj ty|j)c|i h;a|ds for Norway, Denmark and Finland only with important moclífipíti|d|iŠ, '
17   If one took in-kind transfers into account, the prominent yK^mHRl^OftM NHS would highlight the taxonomy in a different wayi             !."■''
18   This is, historically speaking, more so ifi the USA tjii|ri jn, ([já (J$| tbdllgh England has moved visibly towards the US in the last ďptflďĚi
19   In France (see Haupt, 1989: 27 Iff.) the strorig fam'ily'ipcusp^iill jipahil pqljcy (flfifj concomitantly of wage policy) probably leads to a special sort pf Mslfífíi?' sfiitě regime,
20   Outside of building social insurance institutions against Ŕó.Y|s|ŕty jfi filtl #ge til1 yy'|0] regard to invalids and (he sick, this was' the tŕádiílotial pattej+j tit ptiyjsfiy pqljcy integration in the building of the German Reich from 'l 871 tö Wqŕ)tj y/ář1, The 'Unterstützungswohnsitzgesetz' basically left all sijbstanllvis topvefty IflW (o the states or local governments and was concerned only with issijfesj t)f 'ffé§ fhpbijity \
21   The same holds true for health insurance. Blue-collar'work^ Wb|kii1g [ess, (hah 10 hours a week have no right tb continued wage p^yrnetyl jri tjie event pf sickness. Then again, unemployment insurance does riof reflpb put to Pertain 'part-time employed'. For instance, it cpvers only pédpté ýVpyjtihg 18 (ipurs and more per week.
22   394 US (1969). The Supreme Court dealt here with sfatutfís w(lich llthited welfare benefits to persons who had resided for at least pne ye«- jh (he respective state, Justice Brennan: 'State rnay no more try to fence put those ifidjgént!? who Seek higher welfare benefits than it may try tb fence otit indigent ^(iefa||y' (631).
23   'Social tourism' is the not so benign label in the negative j>pli(iea) discourse thot is characteristic of Northern Europe looking south (áhd látaly east),
24   In the 1970s an EC initiative to partly 'Europearfise' linprnplpyiiipni jnsur«hce was blocked by the Council (Taylor, 1983:223), Tlié'SiudJ Círplip oři EcQhörnic and Monetary Union' (Marjolin Report) had proposed á Eurbpčah pprjlporient to national unemployment insurance in 1975. The Mj|cDpu|áí| Report (1977) (lad given this proposal further momentum. The Council blpplierj this Initiative in 1978. Both reports stressed the fact that a coihtnpn currency would be an inescapable 'forcing mechanism' for the EC. Sines nations) gqYerfUflentS would lose most of their traditional adjustment instrument? (d^Yft|U4tloni deficit spending), only the EC at the supranational leyel pqUld thé^'qék) (sffeetivCly with regional inequality and social cohesion - unemplpýmeni ins|jj|^pe ^d regional (infrastructure) policy being amongst the most suitable jtjäjttijtjerjtsjief^, \ similar case might be made for unemployment insurance htiti tjti.pM #jt$f$tát\t:i! in tandem. The EC currency union of the 1990s w'll) möst ijkeíy farjá (iff bf ofjcjsíjls such as these resurface soon.
25   At the European level, basic income is Unlikely tp become a mzjftjiji tb pßf qljt pf politics and socio-political issues since, for example, there j s t\ti |sUrf)bei||i
consensus whatever on building an institutional welfare's(|i| i\ ((■(Is jéýcj which could legitimate simply 'paying off social broblems, ' ' ' ' 26 Only those aspects of Marshall's civil citizenship arfc c|j|l|řjitj t(lffi MS/i ill1? needle's eye of 'free rhobility'. Freedom of speecht thpijghi j$tj fí|itj)i fpp instance, would play a minor role; the right to own1 proper« arjp (pj cy(1c|LJc|é y (j j (d contracts, and the pertinent right to justice, wpuld pjay a rri^jpť fplfe.
i ic rv isci jy/ct-ci Kcj wit ific rvctju/c jiujc ifi uur u]sc
The necessity to 'outcompete' East Germany in social policy was behind much of West German social reform in the 1950s. On this 'struggle of principles' see Hockerts (1980). This necessity has now withered away. In its stead 'functional equivalents', internal mechanisms, will have to be developed which serve as forcing mechanisms for social innovation in the future.
REFERENCES
Addison, J.T. and Siebert, W.S.(1991) 'The Social Charter of the European
Community: Evolution and Controversies', Industrial and Labor Relations
Review 44 (4), 597-625. Ascoli,  U.  (1986)   'The  Italian  Welfare  State  between  Incrementalism  and
Rationalization' in Laura Balbo and Helga Nowotny (eds) Time to Care in
Tomorrow's Welfare Systems: The Nordic Experience and the Italian Case,
Vienna: Eurosocial, 107-141. Ash, T.G. (1990) 'Eastern Europe: The Year orTruth', New York Review of Books,
15 February, xxxvii (2), 17-22. Bercusson, B. (1989) Fundamental Social and Economic Rights in the European
Community, Florence: EUI. Dehousse, R. (1988) 'Completing the Internal Market: Institutional Constraints and
Challenges'; in Roland Bieber, Renaud Dehousse, John Pinder and Joseph H.H.
Weiler teds)  1992.  One  European  Market?  A   Critical Analysis  of the
Commission's Internal Market Strategy, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 311-336. Dupree, A.H. (1957) Science in the Federal Government: A History of Policies and
Activities to 1940, Cambridge, Mass: The Belknapp Press of Harvard University
Press (reprinted 1986). Eichengreen, B. (1990) 'One Money for Europe? Lessons from the US Currency
Union', Economic Policy 10, 117-187. Esping-Andersen, G. (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Cambridge:
Polity Press. Friedrich, H. et al. (1979) Soziale Deprivation Uni Familiendynamik, Göttingen:
Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht. Garth, B.G. (1986) 'Migrant Workers and Rights of Mobility in the European
Community and the United States: A Study of Law, Community and Citizenship
in the Welfare State', in Mauro Cappelletti, Monjca Secombe, Joseph Weiler
(eds) Europe and the American Federal Experience, Vol. I: Methods, Tools and
Institutions, Book 3: Forces and Potentials for a European Identity, Berlin: de
Gruyter, 85-163. Haupt, H.G. (1989) Sozialgeschichte Frankreichs seit 17^9, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. Hauser, R. (1983) Problems of Harmonization of Minimum Income Regulations
Among EC Member Countries, Frankfurt a.M., sfb 3, Working Paper no. 118.
------ (1987) Möglichkeiten und Probleme der Sicherung eines Mindesteinkommens in den Mitgliedsländern der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Frankfurt a.M., sfb 3, Working Paper np. 246.
Henningsen, B. (1989) 'Europäisierung Europas durch eine europäische Sozialpolitik?' in Peter Haungs (ed.) Europäisierung Europas, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 55-60.
------   (1992)   'Die   schönste   Nebensache   Europas   -   Zur   Geschichte   der
EG-Sozialpolitik', Sozialer Fortschritt 41(9), 204-12.
Hockerts, H.G. (1980) Sozialpolitische Entscheidungen i(h Ndt^kr\egsdpt(scbhHHÍ Alliierte und deutsche Soziulversicherungspolit^ 1945 i?/',y 195% StUtlgBH; Klett-Cotta.                                                     ,.,     .,,■>., ■■
Kaufmann, F.X. (1986) 'Nationale Traditionen der S,ßzjalpol|tlk U|1tj BUropäischti Integration' in Lothar Albertin (ed.) Probleme und Pérsfyéftjvtyl ^•b/^l'.ft/je/' Einigung, Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft unfl Politik, 69-j-lii
Kommission 1989: Kommission der Euřqpaisťtiéň\ tyě^jifáftafiii^ Generaldirektion Beschäftigung) soziale Arigelegeßeifeft ^/Iŕíjf'r^lf^i'i$0,,> Soziales Europa, Der Kampf gegen die Armul (Social EujopJ, W Vy^ (igfÜjl^j Poverty), Brussels, Luxembourg: Publications Djvíisiori i\ť'\M EEÜ| lÜÖ tie. (CE-NC-89-002-DE-C).                 .....,ľ."      '"'   ,n/ '"'"        ''^
Lange, Peter (1992) 'The Politics of the Social Dimension' in 0»fä íyí. ^WHgM (ed.) Europolitics, Institutions and Policy Mqk(i\g in] Vßä' l$f?>íi' Elf\-qpeúli Community, Washington DC: Brookmgs Institution 225'-S6,
Langendonck, J,. van (1991) 'The Rple of tlie Spolal Security öSteffis \\\ fhe Completion of the European Market', Acta Hospitülja nti.' 1, ÍIt-Š:?.'
Leibfried, S. (1990a) 'Soziale Grundsicherung - bas BédarfspŕWÍíb ti diSf ^djslu! und Gesellschaftspolitik der Bundesrepublik',1 ifil tít^ YflBfp£|i (£Ü,j Strukturwandel der Sozialpolitik. Lohnarbe^sze^triertl ^#ů\pp\\\\k t!tiij soziale Grundsicherung, Frahkfurta. M: Suhrkarrip, í 82-42$ i
------   (1990b)   'Sozialstaat   Europa7   Integíäjionsppspeíclifííjii   MapajspJlef
Armutsregimes', Nachrichtendienst des Deutschen Ver;e\t\;t für 6ffět\\licj\e Intel private Fürsorge 70 (9) September, 296-395.    !
------ (1992a)   'Social  Europe, Welfare State Trtijt-cjdŕi?!! ö| fjj|  gi|röp&|irj
Community', in HansrUwe Otto and Gapl Flöget (eidilj «(tyi'ife tty^fóŕ Prevention, Berlin: de Gruyter, CeS.Wdrkmg Papej-'Nd. if)$t| tf-#,
(1992b) 'Nutritional Minima and the State >- The IjístltlUlp^iilízStÍpn pf
Professional Knowledge in National Sociaj Policy jn the :0S ji(|i| Öerirltihy1 Bremen: CeS-Working Paper Nö. J 0/92.           !        "'  "'? '        "   '   ''
Leibfried, S. and Pierson, P. (1991) 'The Prospects far Social Burpöe', hjiUpŠ & Society 20(3), 333-66.                                            i   «     (      f!
Leibfried, S. and Voges, W. (1990) 'Kfctpe Sonne für die MM, Vah) Sa^j-hilfebezug als Verlauf ('Karriere') t- ohne umfassend^ ImpIfJTítiíjpti (ceihe wirksame Armutsbekämpfung', Nachrichtendienst |íles Dfij^č||é|i'ýeruiliii '% öffentliche und priváte Fürsorge 70 (5), ivfay, 135-41.'       ,                       '
------(eds) (1992) Armut im modernen Wohlfahrtsstaat, Opläderil Wßfitdeutsch;er
Verlag.                                                     !   •   'n'      ' "'"''
Ltfdemel, I. (1989) The Quest for Institutional Welfcjr? apa1 //)<) PrfihU'hl <>f \h( Residuum. The Case of Income Maintenance and persona^ Sppltíl Cfít'e Policies in Norway and Britain 1946 to 1966, London: LsEt f^öjifjfterlt of Social Science and Administration, June.
MacDougall Report (1977) Report pf the Study Gr'ofip d,n[ ifa fiüJe of Public-Finance in European Integration. Vol 1: General Report, Vol. 2; Individuell Contributions and Working Papers, Brussels: Commission pf th,e European Communities, Economic and Financial Serieš A 13.
Majone, G. (1992) 'The European Communify between Sepjal Pb)|cy and Social Regulation', Florence: European University Institute, unpublished, {rittnuscript.
Marjolin Report (1975) Report of the Study Group 'Economic pud {tfphetary Uhion 7950', Brussels: EC, Mafch.                                ,,....,
Marshall, T.H, (1964) 'Citizenship and Social Class;* in TtH, Mwshal), Clm,
^^^^ 156   New perspectives on the welfare state in Europe
Citizenship and Social Development, Essays  by T.H.  Marshall,  with an
introduction by Seymour Martin Lipset, Chicago IL: University of Chicago
Press: 71-134. Offe, C. (1990) 'Europäische Dimensionen der Sozialpolitik', Bremen: Centre for
Social Policy Research, July, unpublished manuscript. Peterson, P.E.  and Rom, M.C.  (1990)  Welfare Magnets, Washington  DC:
Brookings Institution. Pinder, J. (1968) 'Positive Integration and Negative Integration - Some Problems
of Economic Union in the EEC, World Today 24, 88-110. Rainwater, L., Rein, M. and Schwartz, J. (1986) Income Packaging in the Welfare
State: A Comparative Study of Family Income, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Rossiter, M.W. (1979) 'The Organisation of the Agricultural Sciences',.in Alexandra
Oleson and John Von (eds) The Organisation of Knowledge in Modern America
1860-1920, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2Í 1^8. Schmähl, W. (1989) 'Europäischer Binnenmarkt und soziale Sicherung - einige
Aufgaben und Fragen aus ökonomischer Sicht', Zeitschrift für die gesamte
Versicherungswirtschaft, 29-50. Schmidt, M.G. (1988) Sozialpolitik. Historische Entwicklung und internationaler
Vergleich, Opladen: Leske and Budrich. Schulte, B. (1991) 'Das Recht auf Mindesteinkommen in der europäischen Gemeinschaft. Nationaler status quo und supranationale Initiativen', Sozialer
Fortschritt 40(1) 7-21. Schulze, H. (1990) Die Wiederkehr Europas ('The Reform of EurorJe'), Berlin:
Siedler. Silvia, S.J. (1991) 'The Social Charter of the European Community. A Defeat for
European Labor', Industrial and Labor Relations Review 44 (4), 626—43. Skocpol, T. and Ikenberry, J. (1983) 'The Political Information of the American
Welfare State in Historical and Comparative Perspective'  in Richard F.
Thomásson (ed.) The welfare state 1883-1983, Greenwich, and London: JAI
Press, (Comparative Social Research, vol. 6) 87-148. Skowronek, S. (1982) Building a New American State. The Expansion of National
Administrative Capacities, 1977-1920, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Slcinmcycr, H.D. (1990) 'Freizügigkeit und soziale Rechte in einem Europa der
Bürger'   in   Siegfried   Magiera  (ed.)  Das  Europa  der  Bürger   in   einer
Gemeinschaft   ohne   Binnengrenzen,   Baden-Baden:   Nomos, '63-80   (this
approach is discussed on pp. 81-7). Taylor, Paul (1983) The Limits of European Integration, New York: Columbia
University Press. Titmuss, R.M. (1987) 'Developing Social Policy in Conditions of Rapid Change:
the Role of Social Welfare', in Brian Abel-Smith and Kay Titmuss (eds) The
Philosophy of Welfare. Selected Writings of Richard M. Titmuss, London: Allen
and Unwin, 254-68 (First published 1972). Zuleeg, M. (1989) 'Die Zahlung von Ausgleichszulagen über die Binnengrenzen
der Europäischen Gemeinschaft', in Deutsche Rentenversicherung, no. 10, 621-29. Zuleeg, S. (1987) 'Zur Einwirkung des Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrechts auf die
Sozialhilfe   nach   dem    Bundessozialhilfegesetz',   Nachrichtendienst   des
Deutschen Vereins für öffentliche und private Fürsorge 67 (10), 342-7. Zuleeg-Feuerhahn, S.  (1992)  'Berücksichtigung  von  Kindererziehung  in  der
Rentenversicherung,    das    Territorialitatsprinzip    und    das    Europäische
Gemeinschaftsrecht', Zeitschrift fur Sozialreform 38(10), 568-88.
8    The end óf the middle W#y?
The Swedish welfaip state iri crisis Arthur Gould
1       i
INTRODUCTION
Until recently it looked äs if the power of Swedish sqcJ41 d^ffttjtjj'ftöy Wqu|t} escape the more extreme reaction Which has, been ékjíje^ftéčíj By Pfhejr welfare states. After six years of bourgeois patty ri||p hpS^etl |Ö76 ftf|tj 1982, the Social Democratic Workers' Party (SAP),ß'i$ ty^ty $ p,ŕf|ä and went on to win the general electidns of í $85 |ijfj '198$ '^|((1 (fjj proportions of the popular vote hardly changed. W|jjk iri |hjf tĺK 4 Conservative government rejected KeýnesianignHi extéftsjjj/o řp$ Welfaj^, # strong public sector and the commitment tP full érppliaýjr)|j|if.; $^t|en! ftty only clung to them, but seemed to maintain a štrqng í^epjra pf ÉJtJJifltrHo growth. Representatives of the Labour Party ij} the t!}j|' §$if lf|t$il ttí visit Sweden well into the 1980s to find out hpw tjjie $w^é| tjitj ||, jfi 199if however, it wasjbegihning to look as though tlip middle tyay jj$d ct)tt|B th fl dead end. Economic growth was r-0.5 per cjéht, ||yíti| ^jptjtij-ds; V/erti declining, and.unemployment was on the incre^se* iS|ajp| ejliflä wet® böhig made to welfare services and benefits ,ant( s(ir}pprt fbif' the §kp In ptiblic opinion polls had sunk to a consistent all-time lcj>v. fife jiijUlrY^iVpS VVere1 within a few percentage points of becoming the largest p'ip ^VVfqétt'ä |iqlit!tjti| parties and would be fighting the general eleptipn in SW^pef j$9l ot) '$ clear neo-liberal platform.'
THE WELFARE STATE
The foundations for the Swedish yelfare state \yer<5 ist^tjljshec) Mlöfl the SAP took office in 1932. Major social prpgrfii|iirrt|S (P ajleVlatfli unemployment and provide financial support to farnilies; jö$ fyfäfcjtiiä C\\[\(\& to describe SWeden as 'The Middle Way', by wh{bh he ttifeaftí [hat tile country had successfully combined the better f£á,tureS tjf ppth #pitíili§ŕi1 aftd socialism (Childs, 1936). Two years after ChilcJ'is hPpk &pp6areti, the