Democracy Promotion and the U.S. National Security Strategy: U.S. National Interest, U.S. Primacy, and Coercion

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by Richard Nere

Introduction

As a consequence of anarchy and the insecurity in the international system, the United States promotes, supports, and defends democracy. In an anarchic international system, the putative assurance of security for any state is indeed power. The United States retains a salient position in the international system as a formidable military power. To assure its security in the world the United States relies on a preponderance of power, and promotes its own form of governance, for it has proven competent—thus decreasing anarchy. Therefore, if democracy is promoted in this world, then it is indeed a logical consequence of ubiquitous anarchy—a cause of war in many cases, that is amongst power rivals. What is more, if in fact a state is coerced, then, to be sure, it was a logical result of proving baleful. If, however, the state is in fact competent, then, there is indeed no good reason for coercion. To be realistic, the logical contrapositive is, admittedly, not the world we live in; instead, it is, in this case, a world where coercion was indeed necessary. A negative corollary, incidentally, was engagement, and by this I mean, the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq—a costly resolution for U.S. National security.

The U.S. National Interest

The U.S. national interest is, in fact, for the United States to conduct foreign policy in the interest of its citizens, and the state relative to other states.[1] What is more, promoting its ideology, as democracy's existence in the world is vital to the future of the ideology—as well as the United States. There are three components of the national interest. First, is ensuring the security of the United States by acquiring power, specifically military power. Second, is sustaining economic prosperity, that is, of the United States and its allies, and moreover, facilitating the cooperation of those states that serve this vital interest. Third, is indeed maintaining the stability of the world. In aggregate, these three components serve as the interests of the most puissant state in the world, the United States of America.

U.S. Primacy and Security

The history of peace among democratic states, and the restraint presented by this sort of government indeed explains the decreased uncertainty amongst democratic states, whereby the uncertainty of a states action can lead to strategic miscalculation, and subsequently war.[2] The peace between democracies is unique to that type of state, for other types of like societies have

comprised the majority of the international system in the past;[3] however, this did not ensure a peace. Indeed, democracies are perceived as dovish.[4]

The democratic peace is a noble avenue of research; however, the focus of the paper is the merits of democracy promotion. A distinct domestic political structure produces a unique process, and consequently a distinctive behavior.[5] As such, a domestic political structure that can be compared to that of other states will have similar behavior as a result of this common structure, though homogeneity shouldn't be expected.[6] As discussed before the system is unipolar, in fact, the United States is the *primus interes pares*. As a direct consequence to the structure of the system being unipolar, the United States determines successful and unsuccessful behavior[7]. The United States' actions have demonstrated that it rewards democratic states, and adhering to liberal norms. States indeed have a survival motive, however, if a certain domestic political structure labeled democracy is rewarded in a unipolar system, then a reward could come in the form of security guarantees, thus, the democratic peace is the rational consequence of a powerful state rewarding that form of governance, instead of a peace among similar domestic political structures.[8]

Competent states perceiving the international system correctly conform to the structure of domestic politics that the most puissant state rewards. As the direct result of this, liberalizing occurs at the interstate level with the United States' influence. If the democratic peace is to follow logically from rewarding a particular domestic political structure, then the domestic structure must conform to the apotheosis of governance, a western-style democracy, for as Waltz posits, "Anarchy is seen as one end of a continuum whose other end is marked by the presence of a legitimate and competent government."[9] Therefore, just being a democratic state does not ensure a democratic peace, since not all democratic states are equal. Instead, non-cartelized democratic states as set forth by Snyder is the ideal.[10] For a non-cartelized democracy is indeed rational; that is, in the international arena, as the military lobby rarely influences non-cartelized democracies.

Wilhelmine Germany[11] despite having all of the qualities of a model democracy, was highly cartelized, and as the principal consequence of this the country went to war.[12] The ideal type of domestic political structure would be *non-cartelized*, and thus not susceptible to logrolling.[13] Democratic states have strategic interests all the same as other states[14]; however, upholding liberal democracy appears as if it could be explained as a realist, or survival interest, for the unipolar system rewards those states that conform to a conception of effective governance, with security incentives. As a result of states conforming to appear more similar to this archetype of domestic governance, there is indeed less anarchy, whereby the anarchy in the international system is proportional to the number of incompetent states.

In international politics, there is indeed no state amongst states, thus states in the international system divested of all attributes except for power capabilities, and differentiated by domestic political structure, act in an anarchic world. However, the assertion is that the United States as a salient military power acts as a leader of all states.[15] As a consequence, the United States promotes democracy as the sole domestic political structure, for this type of domestic political structure is competent. Therefore, states that—accurately perceiving the unipolar system, and the rewards of conforming their domestic political structure to a Western model—do in fact bandwagon rather than balance the United States[16] In the end, there are states with competent governments in the international system, and as a result of this, there is indeed less anarchy.[17] The United States, ever since Wilson, has promoted this particular domestic political structure on its merits.[18] Still, another international relations scholar, Michael Doyle, who is discussed below, provides evidence to substantiate democracy promotion as an integral part of the United States' national security strategy.

The promotion of liberal ideas at the interstate level is indeed a means to achieve an end. Strictly speaking, the end is less insecurity. Indeed, political institutions naturally form to sustain, and

foster, liberal ideas at the domestic level of states within the international system.[19] Thereby, conforming those states to the archetype of competent governance, western democracy—that is, when states accurately perceive the international system. Doyle posits a liberal international theory, and in consequence to this theory, relations between states would indeed be pacified. In fact, Doyle argues for two specific principles, which in conjunction and taken as principles that states will respect, are relative to one another, thus providing a foundation for liberal international theory:

The basic postulate of liberal international theory holds that states have the right to be free from foreign intervention. Since morally autonomous citizens hold rights to liberty, the states that democratically represent them have the right to exercise political independence. Mutual respect for these rights then becomes the touchstone of international liberal theory. When states respect each other's rights, individuals are free to establish private international ties without state interference. Profitable exchanges between merchants and educational exchanges among scholars then create a web of mutual advantages and commitments that bolsters sentiments of public respect.[20]

As the net result, the merits of democracy promotion are not based on the United States' affinity for democracy; instead, democracy promotion is substantiated by Doyle's liberal international theory.

The international system becomes much simpler in a unipolar world, where a single superpower has a vision for the international system. The United States is a puissant military power; and moreover, democracy promotion has been an intrinsic component of U.S. foreign policy since it attained this salient position relative to other states.[21] The United States is fortunate, for the United States has been clearly perceived as a superpower since World War II; however, maintaining U.S. primacy through the Cold War was a daunting task, as the world became bipolar.[22] Yet, after the Soviet Union's fall the international system became unipolar once more. Throughout this distinct epoch, from Wilson to the Bush Administration, each successive presidential Administration has either promoted democracy, or supported this form of governance as a means to an end. If the means is democracy, then the end is, strictly speaking, stability and less anarchy.

Waltz argues that liberal international theory, an inside out theoroy, is a myth, and is, moreover, an *egregious* myth. Inside out theory is, in fact, where the domestic political structure of a state will determine its foreign policies, thus, if a state's domestic political structure were liberal, then as a special result the state will pursue liberal foreign policies.[23] Regrettably, inside out theories are indeed vitiated, when considering liberal states in an anarchic international structure, for there is no governing authority; that is, there is no state amongst states to compel. But this article asserts that in a unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar structure states that perceive the structure of the international system may liberalize their domestic political structure, for the United States rewards those states as this is considered successful behavior by the United States, a dominant military power in the international system since WWII. Therefore, the democratic peace is achieved through the power of a state capable enough to have others conform to an archetype that was set forth, with the powerful state rewarding the behavior with support.

Doyle contends that U.S. power is insufficient, therefore, to have a democratic peace as a corollary.[24] In the past, the United States may not have had the wherewithal to prevent challenges to its interests; however, the United States has proved its ability to maintain security, as it is has sedulously dealt with terrorism and rogue states after September 11th, and more precisely, in Iraq where the United States acted unilaterally to ameliorate its security concerns. Thus, the United States has demonstrated its ability to maintain security relying on a preponderance of military power. According to Walt, it is indeed diaphanously clear the United States is capable of maintaining security, for the United States has prevented armed conflict between European states.[25]

Bush Doctrine

The Bush Doctrine was indeed the United States' national security strategy, under which, to achieve security in an insecure world, the United States relied on three fundamental pillars: preventive war, unilateralism, and regime change. It was, in fact, a more aggressive and proactive foreign policy strategy relative to the national security strategies of previous Administrations.[26] The Bush Doctrine aimed to achieve the United States' sensitive security concerns in an insecure world, as rogue states and terrorism posed compelling security concerns. The United States coerced states that did not adhere to international norms, sponsored terrorism, and which were determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction.[27] The United States coerced rogue states that failed to comply on security issues with the threat of war to change their behavior; and, when diplomacy failed, the United States followed through on the threat.[28] And to be sure, the United States did follow through on this threat, that is, when a minatory state fails to comply, as instantiated by the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Bush Administration, unlike preceding Administrations, no longer treated terrorists as if they were committing crimes; instead, terrorists were dealt with as the irregular troops at war with the United States.[29]

The Bush Doctrine was based on three pillars. The first pillar was in fact a moral argument, where the United States was now in a Manichean struggle between good and evil. The second pillar reevaluated the United States' approach regarding terrorism; as a direct result, terrorism was no longer perceived as byproduct of economic factors. As such, the United States determined that it was because of political oppression rather than poverty and hunger that bred terrorism, thus, regime change would be apposite, as it would give Islamic states the freedoms they want and deserve, in addition to ameliorating U.S. security concerns regarding terrorism.[30] The third pillar on which the Bush Doctrine was based was preventive war in those instances where it was the United States' strategic imperative.[31] In the aggregate, the pillars of the Bush Doctrine delineated the United States' strategy to promote peace and stability, especially in the Middle East, as this part of the world is currently, and has historically been a cause of concern.

Balance of Threat

Stephen Walt's balance of threat theory would predict that states, including the United States, will ally with or balance against the most threatening power rather than the greatest power in the international system. Whether a state constitutes a threat is a determination made on the following factors: aggregate power, proximate power, offensive capability, and offensive intentions.[32] In short, rogue states, though lacking in aggregative powers and offensive capability, have offensive intentions; in fact, offensive intentions is what gives these states an aggressive perception rather than aggregate power. The United States reassessed what constitutes a threat in the international system as a result of the September 11th attacks, and formulated a national security strategy to ameliorate its security vis-à-vis these threats. Indeed, as the direct result of this, the United States determined that rogue states require balancing, for either these states have used their capabilities to harm the United States, or their offensive intentions have the potential to pose future security concerns.

When Walt talks of aggregate power it is indeed a state's capability to potentially threaten a state; in fact, aggregate power includes population, technology, and industrial and military capability.[33] Proximate power is a states geographic location relative to other states, for a state's power wanes over distance, hence a state that is in close proximity to another state, has the ability to menace a particular state more than a state that is far away.[34] Offensive power is indeed defined as a state's salient offensive capability, which provokes alliances. What is more, a state that appears aggressive may provoke other states to balance against them based on offensive intentions.[35] In the aggregate, these four components of Walt's theory indeed help predict which states pose a threat.

Coercion

The Bush Administration has used blackmail to coerce threats, and consequently, change the behavior of rogue states. Blackmail is indeed a coercive threat that uses intimidation, not the use of force, to produce a desirable outcome.[36] The threat of U.S. force is not a commitment, for the United States' action is conditional on the action or inaction of the threat. Subsequent to 9/11 the desirable outcomes relative to three different states were for Afghanistan to turn over Bin laden and shut down terrorist camps; for Iraq to halt its nuclear program; and, moreover, for North Korea to stop proliferating weapons of mass destruction (WMD). To be clear, the threat of war is favorable to the use of force, for there are indeed costs associated with conflict; however, in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq, each state proved unreasonable, as both failed to comply with U.S. demands. Therefore, Afghanistan and Iraq chose the mostly costly option by failing to comply with U.S. demands. In the end, the United States' conditional threat of war became a commitment, for the United States fought wars with both Afghanistan, and Iraq.

U.S. National Security

If the United States is indeed a puissant military power, and moreover, the structure of the international system indicates that the world is unipolar, then the Bush Doctrine is appropriate for the United States' power position, and in fact, the U.S. national security strategy is apposite for this the current era. The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq were indeed applications of the Bush Doctrine. What is more, these two wars were examples of U.S. power, thus demonstrating the credibility of any threat the United States makes to another state. Preventive war, unilateralism, and regime change are indeed principles to exercise the United States' military power.

Afghanistan supported the bin Laden-led terrorism efforts to attack the World Trade Center, and as a rational consequence the terrorist attack threatened U.S. interests.[37] The United States is indeed powerful; however, it is vulnerable to terrorist attacks. In short, Afghanistan's Taliban government aided Al Qaeda, a terrorist organization that attacked the United States The Taliban government when approached on the issue of terrorism, failed to comply with U.S. requests. The United States asked for Osama bin Laden, and for the Taliban government to close terrorist camps.[38] However, the Taliban government was irrational, and thus war was indeed politics achieved by another means (see Figure 1).[39]

Figure 1

		Afghanistan		
		Comply		Resist
U.S	Accept	Stop Sanctions/ Gives up Bin Laden & closes terrorist camps 3/ 3		Poses a security concern/ Supports Terrorism 1/5
	Punish	War / Give up Bin Laden & close terrorist camps -1/ -1		Cost of regime change/Regime Change -1, -1
				Fig. 1

Stephen Walt's balance of threat theory would predict balancing against an irrational Afghanistan. Afghanistan had limited offensive capabilities; however, the state had supported Al Qaeda terrorists. Consequently, Afghanistan's offensive intentions, that is, aiding terrorists whose aim is

to attack the United States, was perceived as aggressive and threatening. After September 11th, Afghanistan would prove the most threatening state for its support of Al Qaeda. Thus, Walt's theory when applied to these circumstances predicts balancing behavior by the United States to ameliorate its security concerns; that is, in addition to states allying or expressing support for the United States, for the state was attacked by the most threatening power in the international system.[40]

International support for the United States, in consequence to U.S. military action in Afghanistan, is indeed easily demonstrated, for there were numerous offerings of solidarity from allies in Europe, and moreover, on September 12, 2001, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1368 condemning the actions of "those responsible for aiding, supporting, or harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts." To be clear, the UN authorized action to this threat; however, the authorized action was ambiguous. In any case, the United States responded with U.S.-led coalition forces. Thus, the offensive intentions of Afghanistan were threatening, for the Taliban government openly supported Al Qaeda.[41] As such, the international community expressed support for action against the Taliban government.

If, then, Afghanistan were rational, Afghanistan would appease the United States by turning over bin Laden and shutting down all terrorist camps. Alas, Afghanistan resisted, and moreover, the U.S. threat of war became a commitment, for Afghanistan would continue to pose a security risk, as the September 11th terrorists were linked to Al Qaeda. The Bush Doctrine's application in this case appropriately dealt with the security risk using political influence, preventive war, and regime change. Afghanistan was a rogue state that was not deterred by the threat of war; however, regime change served U.S. security interests.

To be frank, Iraq also posed a security concern to the United States post-9/11, and to be sure, the U.S. national security strategy was sufficient to deal with this threat.[42] The argument is made by discussing the Saddam-led regime's history of aggressiveness in the context of a post-9/11 world, where U.S. security concerns were sensitive. Iraq has had a history of aggressive behavior, as it waged war against Iran throughout the 1980s in addition to invading Kuwait in 1990. What is more, the regime pursued WMD in the 1990s and early in the twentieth century to gain power relative to other Middle Eastern states and eventually assert itself as a regional power in the process. However, the process of Iraq asserting itself as a regional power would involve war; thus, Saddam's ambitions threatened peace and security in the Middle East.

The United States since the Clinton Administration had determined that regime change in Iraq was the panacea for the problems that Saddam's Administration posed. In 1998, the Iraq Liberation Act documented Saddam's use of chemical weapons, and discussed Iraq's WMD programs. Clinton had branded Iraq as a rogue regime that had ambitions that could not be deterred. As a logical consequence, the Clinton Administration launched Operation Desert Fox, which was a strategic military mission to destroy the Saddam-led regime's WMD capacity. However, the extent to which Saddam had a WMD capacity was indeterminable as U.N. inspectors were ejected in response to the attack, and were not allowed back until November 2002. What is more, U.S. intelligence and reports by UN inspectors from 1997-1999 had concluded that information concerning Saddam's weapons program was inconclusive; therefore, there was uncertainty as to Iraq's capabilities.

What made the Saddam-led regime a baleful rogue state was indeed its history of war with Iran, and Kuwait, as well as its WMD program. Therefore, the history of Iraq's aggressive behavior, and moreover, with Iraq having WMD capabilities, made Saddam what Clinton had declared: "The greatest threat to our security in the 21st century." An adducer to Clinton's assertion is Saddam's history of non-compliance, misleading UN inspectors, and Iraq's industrial capacity through which biological weapons could be produced; all these factors in the aggregate contributed to the state's aggressive perception.

The United States' and the UN Security Council's objective was to disarm Iraq, and in doing so they provided many opportunities to avert war as a means to achieve this end. Security Council Resolution 1441 was in fact a final attempt for the regime to cooperate, and disarm. Alas, detractors would state that UN inspectors had inspected Iraq on numerous occasions with the objective of finding evidence of WMD; however, these inspections were to no avail, as no WMD was found. Yet, Richard Butler, UN arms inspector, stated in his reports to the UN that inspections were premised on Saddam's cooperation. Regrettably, Saddam, a rational policy maker, was a power maximizer, for he was positing foreign policy, therein, an anarchic system. Indeed Iraq's national interest was to ensure their WMD capacity remained surreptitious, thus, if WMD were not found, then it is perhaps a result of Saddam preserving the Iraqi national interest, instead of Iraq not having WMD

The Saddam-led regime having access to WMD would lead to instability in the Middle East, as WMD would increase Iraq's power relative to other Middle Eastern states. As such, the balance power would shift in favor of Iraq, which would allow Iraq to coerce its neighbors. The United States is influenced by its power position in the world and has an interest in maintaining stability throughout the world. President George H.W. Bush, Sr., went to war with Iraq, more precisely, when Iraq invaded Kuwait. To be clear, as a result of Iraq's actions the balance of power would shift in Iraq's favor.[43] The Bush Administration has done the same with Operation Iraqi Freedom, since Iraqi WMD would shift the balance of power, and the net result would be instability.

Figure 2

		Iraq	
		Comply	Resist
U.S.	accept	Remove the threat of War (Sanctions)/ Disarm 3/3	Security concern/ Gain power 1/5
	Punish	War or Sanctions / Disarm -1/-1	Cost of regime change/Regime Change -1/-1
			Fig. 2

To be honest, Iraq proved irrational, for Iraq had opportunities to comply with U.S. demands (see Figure 2 above). Unfortunately, Saddam chose not to cooperate, and as a regrettable consequence would upset the balance of power in the region. As such, Iraq posed a security threat. Therefore, the United States sought regime change to restore security. Saddam should have complied, especially after the United States had threatened Afghanistan with a commitment of war in the event the state did not comply. As Figure 2 demonstrates when Iraq resists, and the United States punishes, it is the most costly scenario. Iraq was a security concern, for it failed to comply. What is more, the potential harm the regime posed to the United States was less than the harm the United States posed to Saddam, in consequence, the scenario was indeed asymmetrical. Figure 2 gives an accurate portrayal of the bargaining the two states were engaged in regarding WMD.

Balance of Threat theory pontificated by Stephen Walt would predict balancing against Iraq, for after Afghanistan the state was perceived as a threat to peace and stability in the Middle East. Iraq's WMD ambition would lead to instability in the Middle East. Thus, the state's offensive intentions, and its aggregate power, proved menacing, for a stronger Iraq would upset the balance of power. Alas, the threat posed by Iraq was not perceived as an imminent one by the international community, for the state's offensive intentions did not lead to action.[44] However, the United States' national security strategy was formulated in a world where security is not assured, therefore, preventive war, unilateral intervention, and regime change were called for to ameliorate U.S. security.

Conclusion

In sum, the United States promotes democracy as a distinct domestic political structure, for it is competent, and decreases anarchy in the international system. To be clear, peace and stability are assured—that is, if the United States exerts its military power. What is more, as a result of the U.S. presence abroad, there is indeed a peace among democratic states. The evaluation of the Bush Doctrine substantiates the assertion that the United States acts in a manner to assure international peace and stability. Above all, coercion was apposite, that is, as an expedient to security. Thus in the end, it is indeed veritable that as a consequence of anarchy and insecurity, the United States promotes, supports, and defends democracy.

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1. Karl Von Vorys defines the U.S. national interest in *American National Interest: Virtue and Power in Foreign Policy*. (New York: Praeger, 1990), 19-32.

2. Wars are based on uncertainty which is a problem with states; each individual state has security concerns, and makes strategic considerations based upon their status in the international hierarchy. Based on the aforementioned considerations states make decisions rooted in chaos, or uncertainty: "First outside the pacific union, liberal regimes, like all other states, are caught in the international state of war Hobbes and realists describe. Conflict and wars are a natural outcome of struggles for resources, prestige, and security among independent states; confusion is an unsurprising accompaniment in a state of war without reliable law or organization." Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12, No. 4 (Autumn 1983), 324.

3. That like societies won't fight is not true, since feudal and totalitarian states fight each other; meaning that the peace amongst liberal states is unique to those states due to their distinct traits: "Second, at the level of social determinants, some might argue that relations among any group of state with social structures or with compatible values would be peaceful. But again, the evidence for feudal societies, communist societies, fascist societies, or socialist societies does not support this conclusion. Feudal warfare was frequent and very much a sport of the monarchs and nobility. There have not been enough truly totalitarian, fascist powers to test fairly their pacific compatibility; but fascist powers in the wider sense of nationalist, capitalist, military dictatorships fought each other in the 1930s." Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12, No. 3 (Summer 1983), 222.

4. Democratic states have a unique peace between themselves because they are perceived as dovish, which decreases the uncertainty of actions; therefore increasing how secure democracies feel when dealing with other democracies, "We should begin the common assertion that democracies are *inherently* more peaceful or 'dovish' internationally because of the political culture favoring the peaceful resolution of disputes, or because the democratic processes produce restraint by the general populace which will have to pay the price of war in blood and money. Individual examples of the operation of these factors can be easily found. Over the

course of a long war democratic governments may experience seriously eroding domestic support for the war effort, and may feel constrained, if they do go to war, to pursue strategies designed to minimize their own costs, especially in casualties." Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 30.

5. "Political structures shape political processes, as can best be seen by comparing different governmental systems." Kenneth N. Waltz. *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 82. Also: "Political structure produces a similarity in process and performance so long as a structure endures," 87.

6. Ibid, 87.

7. Ibid., 92-93.

8. Stephen M. Walt, "American Primacy: Its Prospects and Pitfalls," *Naval War College Review* LV, No. 2 (Spring 2002), 9.

9. Waltz, Op. Cit., 114.

10. Some American scholars thought that Wilhelmine Germany was the very model of a modern democratic state with a wide suffrage, honest elections, a legislature that controlled the purse, competitive parties, a free press, and a highly competent bureaucracy. But in the French, British, and American view after August 1914, it turned out that Germany wasn't a democracy of the right kind. Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War." *International Security* 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), 7.

11. Ibid., 7. Also see: Ido Oren, "The Subjectivity of the 'Democratic' Peace: Changing U.S. Perceptions of Imperial Germany," *International Security* 20, no. 2 (Fall 1995), 156-157.

12. Jack Snyder. *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 45.

13. Snyder discusses how cartelized powers can be propelled into conflict:"Cartelized politics can produce somewhat different forms and degrees of overexpansion, depending on precisely which groups are represented and on the strength of the coalition leaders who act as brokers." Ibid., 44.

14. Bruce Russett, "The Democratic Peace—And Yet it Moves," *in Debating the Democratic Peace*, ed. Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 350: "There is not need to jettison the insight of realism which tell us that power and strategic considerations affect states' decisions to fight each other. But neither should one deny the limitations of those insights, and their inability to explain many of those insights, and their inability to explain many of these instances when liberal states have chosen not to fight or threaten one another. The danger resides in 'vulgar realism's" vision of war."

15. After World War II, the United States led Europe in the post-war reconstruction efforts. See John Ikenberry, "Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony," *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays*, ed. John Ikenberry (New York: Pearson Education, 2005,) 111-135.

16. Schweller discusses bandwagoning for profit, and forsecurity. Earlier in this article, several papers were mentioned that dealt with bandwagoning and forms of appeasement. Randall Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," *International Security* 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), 82.

17. "Anarchy is seen as one end of a continuum whose other end is marked by the presence of a legitimate and competent government." Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Op. Cit., 114.

18. Oren, Op. Cit., 170-171.

19. Doyle, Op. Cit., 206-7.

20. Doyle, Op. Cit., 213

21. Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 31.

22. Ikenberry, Op. Cit. Also see Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A critical appraisal of postwar American national* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 94, 190, 205-6, 319-26. In Gaddis' book Kennan asserts that the Russian's had superior conventional military forces, and had developed their atomic weapons program to the point where the Russians had neutralized the U.S. advantages. Thus, it was tough to retain military primacy through the Cold War.

23. Waltz, Op. Cit., 60-64.

24. Doyle, Op. Cit., 223.

25. In Walt's "American Primacy," Op. Cit., 11-13, he states that American troops are there to assure their security. Also see Ikenberry, Op. Cit., 115-131.

26. Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay. *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 65-77.

27. See the White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,* Washington, DC, 2002, 14.

28. Ibid., 15. Thomas Schelling discusses deterrence in *Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 6 -20. With deterrence, when properly applied, a state is deterred from carrying out an action because of the threat of harm/war; the state is coerced, and thus blackmailed.

29. See Norman Podhoretz, "World War IV: How it Started, What it Means, and Why We Have to Win," in *The Right War? The Conservative Debate on Iraq*, ed. Gary Rosen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 112: "Irregular troops of a military alliance at war with the United States."

30. See *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, iv.

31. *Ibid.*, 6, 15-16. Also see Podhoretz, Op. Cit., 126- 132.

32. Walt, Op. Cit., 9-12.

33. Ibid., 9.

34. Ibid.,10-11.

35. Ibid., 12.

36. Mearsheimer discusses blackmail "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics," Op. Cit., 152-3.

37. Robert Jervis, *American Foreign Policy in a New Era* (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2005), 41. Ahmed discusses how Afghanistan supported bin Laden, as a consequence of aiding bin Laden, the U.S. was attacked. "Throughout the 1980s religious extremists gained ground against their moderate and secular counterparts within the Afghan Diaspora and resistance, and after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, within Afghanistan itself. Following the Soviet withdrawal, as the holy warriors fought among themselves for power, forging and breaking alliances, another contender for power-the Taliban emerged in 1994. By 1996 this diverse group of Pashtun military commanders and religious leaders and their students (Taliban) had gained control over most of the state. It is these Pashtun commanders, clerics, and their cadre who became bin Laden's hosts and protectors in Afghanistan." Samina Ahmed, "The United States and Terrorism in Southwest Asia: September 11 and Beyond," *International Security* 26, No. 3. (Winter, 2001-2002), 80.

38. Podhoretz, Op. Cit., 124.

39. Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2004), 98: "War is about changing peoples minds or at least their behavior."

40. Walt, Op. Cit., 8-9.

41. Ibid., 8-9.

42. Podhoretz, Op. Cit., 18-35.

43. According to Podhoretz, "A strong adherent of the 'realist' perspective on world affairs, he believed that the maintenance of stability was the purpose of American foreign policy, and the only wise and prudential course to follow. Therefore, when Saddam Hussein upset the balance of power in the Middle East by invading Kuwait in 1991, the elder Bush went to war not to create a new configuration in the region but to restore the status quo ante." Ibid., 118.

44. The U.S. failed to garner international support for a Second U.N. Security Council resolution after Security Council Resolution 1441. Iraq still posed a threat. As such, the U.S. intervened unilaterally. Daalder and Lindsay, Op. Cit., 129-144.