The Case of State Terrorism,
Part II, Terror Threats & Trends Policy
Responses to Changes in
Terror Tactics
US National Security Policy
Fall 2009
Masaryk University
Dave McCuan
Recall: Terrorism is a Political Act
* A weapon of psychological warfare
for political purposes
* Recall the USG definition (helpful, but not
definitive for our purposes)
* "...premeditated, politically motivated violence
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by
subnational or clandestine agents, usually
intended to influence an audience."
 Title 22 of USC, Sec. 2656f(d)
Terrorism as Politics
* Designed to create extreme fear & anxiety
in a target group larger than the immediate
victims
-- With the purpose of coercing the large target
group into meeting some political demand
-- Use "extra-normal" violence in a symbolic act
--Specifc victims has no particular significance
to terrorist
Research in the Field:
Terrorism is Not Irrational
* Research in the field argues, in general, that
terrorism is not irrational.
* Terrorism has its own logic that links:
--Goals
--Objectives
--Strategy
--Can be state-centered or focused; and
--Can be sub-national; and
--"Quasi-national (-istic)
Political Goals of Terrorism
* Political Goals:
­ To create a sense of vulnerability in larger target
population
­ To publicize terrorists' plight; gain recognition
­ To embolden their allies and supporters; gain support
Provoke adversary into an inappropriate violent reaction
Demonstrate the vulnerability & weakness of their adversary
­ To push adversary into self-constraining acts
Martial law
Intentional, & unintentional attacks
­ To force policy change by adversary via public
pressure
Turn public wrath against authorities (why are we vulnerable?)
"Traditional" Terrorism
* Terrorists' concern for legitimacy
­ moderated strategy of violence
* Violence calibrated in relation to political objectives
­ Leaves future possibility for negotiation & political
settlement
PLO & Israel (until 2001)
­ Excessive violence reduces legitimacy & claims for
support
* Terrorists always claim credit for their acts
"Traditional" Terrorism
* General findings from terrorism "data" and
"databases:"
* <10% Terrorists Caught or killed
­ <50% Caught went to jail
 low personal risk
* Origins & Actions are usually nation-based
* Let's look at "Terrorism By The Numbers"
International Terrorism; USG DoS Data of
Incidents & Casualties
Terrorist Incidents, cont'd
Type of Facilities Attacked in
International Terrorist Incidents
Casualties in Anti-U.S. Attacks
U.S. Citizen Casualties in
International Terrorist Attacks
Major Anti-U.S. Terrorist Incidents
U.S. Casualties
Anti-U.S. Terrorism, Types of Attacks, USG
DoS Data
Anti-U.S. Terrorism
Regional Patterns
States Sponsoring Terrorism <2001
* Iran
* Iraq
* Syria
* Sudan
* Libya
* North Korea
* Cuba
A Question Re-Appears Based on This Data:
Are We in a "New" Era of Terrorism?
* Religion-based
­ Self legitimacy no need for restraint
­ Sense of superiority no need for restraint
­ Personal risk unimportant; sacred mission
* Greater Violence Greater "Good"
­ death of victims reduces number of non-believers
­ 1995: 25% of terrorist attacks religion-based
Accounting for 60% of all fatalities [Simon & Benjamin
(2000)]
* Claiming credit for specific acts less important
­ political message is vulnerability & destruction of
adversary
"New" Terrorism: Sub-State  & Impacts?
* Transnational
* Better technology &
means for terror effects
­ communications
­ financial
­ weaponry &
explosives
WMDs?
* Greater vulnerability of
Modern Urban
Technological
societies
­ Fragile, yet complex
systems
­ Communications 
­ Energy (electricity)
­ Transport (food,
commodities,
people)
­ Financial flows
Modern Terrorism, State & Sub-State
Impacts: "The Four Waves" Thesis
* Put forward by Rapoport (Attacking Terrorism:
Elements of a Grand Strategy, 2004) who
argues that:
­ Key catalyzing events signal a shift, uptick in terror
behavior & orientations;
­ Terror activity, thus, has had historic ebbs and flows,
as part of a broader "ocean" of movements signaling
a struggle among independence movements, calls for
colonial ties to end, etc.;
­ The level of activity for insurgent & guerrilla efforts
mark this rise and fall of activity;
­ International in scope in terms of trend activities.
Modern Terrorism: "The Fifth
Wave, New Tribalism" Thesis
* Argument here is that:
­ Many movements do not fit Rapoport's "wave" thesis;
­ There is, recently, a "new tribalism" movement where
common calls and bonds, across insurgent actors,
delineates how groups have allied & partner against a
common enemy.
­ Recognizes a disillusionment with prevailing int'l orgs.
& support networks, including NGOs.
­ Radicalization is the norm, & this norm is local,
intense, and seeks in one generation, broad change in
the nature of relations among nation-states & NSAs.
­ See Jeffrey Kaplan (2007), "The Fifth Wave: The New
Tribalism" in Terrorism and Political Violence 19:545-
570, 2007.