Tools of Statecraft, Congress, & Mass Publics in USFP US Foreign Policy Fall 2009 Dave McCuan Masaryk University USFP Challenges Three Primary Tools of Nat'l Power Statecraft Available: Military Intervention (Ml), Foreign Aid (FA), & Sanctions (S) Challenges: Nation Building Table 1. Types of National Power Type of Power Behavior(s) Primary Currencies Gov't Policies Military Power Diplomacy Coercion Deterrence Protection Threats Force Coercive War Alliance(s) Economic Power Inducement Coercion Payments Sanctions Aid Bribes Sanctions "Soft" Power Attraction Agenda Setting Values Culture Policies Institutions Public Diplomacy Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy Source: Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics by J.S. Nye, Jr 2004. Criticisms of the Previous Slide • U.S. - led nation building exercises has had mixed success and failure (Dobbins, et al., 2003) • U.N. - led had a greater record of success, but is not long-lived & problematic, too (Dobbins, et al., 2005) • Track Two Diplomacy: Good concept, but execution in practice is quite problematic (Kaye, 2007; Diamond, Larry in Fukyama, 2005; Diamond, 2005). What Tools Exist to Exercise Nat'l Power? • Earlier this semester, we spoke of these "policies" as "tools of statecraft:" - Appeasement (Munich Conference) - Accommodation (Panama Canal) - Deterrence (Taiwan) - Coercion (Libya) - Force (Iraq) • But, these "tools" reflect Three Primary Policy Avenues Available: - Military Intervention (Ml); - Foreign Aid (FA); & - Sanctions (S) I. Military Intervention A. Predicting Intervention 1. Escalation: Joining an ongoing armed conflict a. Best predictor: Prior third-party intervention b. "Alliance Portfolios" predict side choice c. More likely when existing parity between combatants d. Great powers intervene much more frequently! B. When Does Intervention Work? 1. Who wins interstate wars? a. Who started it? Initiators win most wars quickly, but tend to lose long wars. b. Bigger economy usually wins (GDP outperforms military predictors) c. Bigger military also helps - parity makes victory less likely for both sides (stalemate) Parity Leads to Long Wars, Makes Stalemate More Likely T--! l\*>5i Lincertiftnrv ímlHwy pjKyl 35 -16 6Í 72 Du rj I i en cf War in h/arttis 10P II. Sanctions and Pressure A. Predicting Sanctions 1. US Sanctions: Best single predictor is target's relationship with US a.Domestic factors, target characteristics almost irrelevant b.Interesting: Belligerence towards US after threat reduces chance that US imposes sanctions Countries Subject to U.S. Unilateral Economic Sanctions Sources: ^^ The President's Export Council [W] As °fMarch 2D02 Sanctions The Carter Study p»2) Present II. Sanctions and Pressure A. Predicting Sanctions 1. US Sanctions: Best single predictor is target's relationship with US a.Domestic factors, target characteristics almost irrelevant b.Interesting: Belligerence towards US after threat reduces chance that US imposes sanctions 2. General: Asymmetric dependence a.If I depend on you, I am unlikely to sanction you b.If you depend on me, I am more likely to sanction you c.Problem: Measuring dependence is hard B. Do sanctions work? 1. The basic problem: The "best" sanctions are never imposed 2. Keys to success a. Sanction must be large % of target's GDP b. Sanction must not harm sender (very much) c. Problem: Trade is mutually beneficial. Cutoff will always harm sender 3. Success usually takes less than 5 years III. Foreign Aid A. Predicting Foreign Aid 1. In general (who gets the most aid?) a.Free market countries (especially during Cold War) b.Post-Colonial states (especially during decolonization) c.Poverty and Debt 2. Specific relationships a.US: Egypt, Israel, Iraq (since 2003) b.Japan: "Friends of Japan" - similar UN voting and trade c.Western Europe: Former colonies Foreign Aid B. US Gives Low % of GDP for Development Net ODA in 2008 - as a percentage of GNI A5% ofGNI 1,1 1.0 -£39 -0^ 0 7 0 5 - o se 092 i—i C .68 0.32 0 oj UN Target 0.7 DJJB 0.47 Average country effort D .47 0-4 - 0 3 - 02 - 0,1 1 00 TTT1 q .n 0 4 r ŕí3"20*1 OWD. 36 C.34 C .32 0.30 GJ7 0.30 020 0 20 D ie *ia r^——i———i———i———i———i——^———i———i———i———i———i———r^——i———i———i———i———i———i———i———i———r wyF'&uť'äŕ £> _

> _& _sS <& ^ ^ é USObiilion ...But still manages to be the largest donor Net ODA in 2003 - amounts 30 25 - 20 - 15 - 10 - -: - : i :•■■: ■ "T 119 TG 13.91 11.41 IC iž 9& t &=■ e.6& A 73 ATI 444 3.97 17 ^ n n n2Ľ-— 14 JXXL 0 69 D61 0t1 0 35 T_J-----^_^-----^_^-----^_^-----^_^-----^_^-----^_^-----^.^-----^.^-----^—----^—----^—----^—-----^—-----—|------—|—----—|—----—|—------nr------—p-------nr------—r /^y^/*0K/ WMMŘ ■* jŕ ^ ŕ-^ VVy ^vv C. Does Foreign Aid Work? 1. Aid and corruption: No overall correlation, positive or negative a. More corrupt countries tend to attract US aid b. Less corrupt countries tend to attract aid from Australia and Scandinavia 2. Aid and growth a. "Good policies:" Aid may have positive effect b. "Bad policies:" Aid has no effect c. Problem: Hard to establish effect of aid on growth. Why? Part II Congress, Public Opinion & US Foreign Policy Who Makes U.S. Foreign Policy? President How much power & influence does each have on FP? Foreign Policy Power Congress & Foreign Policy • US Constitution (Article I) assigns Congress explicit powers Result: Considerable theoretical influence in foreign policy • Before WWI & II, Congress tended to assert greater role in Foreign Policy • During the 1950s and 1960s, Congress typically deferred to the Executive Branch (Since WWII & start of Cold War) • During 1970s and 1980s Congressional activism in foreign policy grew (Post Vietnam & Watergate) • Post 9/11 Congress tended to defer to President (at first) Now appears to be re-asserting itself as war becomes unpopular Congress & Foreign Policy, cont'd • So extent of power & influence varies over time - Cold War vs. post-Watergate & post-Vietnam War vs. - Post 9/11 (.. .and back to the future) • 3 ways Congress influences Foreign Policy: - 1. Substantive legislation • $$$ appropriations shape policy => power - 2. Procedural legislation • How laws & regulations must be applied wrt Policy - 3. Efforts to shape Public Opinion • (Democrats vs. GOP on success or failure of Iraq II) Different Categories of Foreign Policy - Congress has differing levels of power depending on the Category 3 Categories:* Crisis, Strategic, & Structural *Note: Categories Overlap & Affect Each Other How Congress Influences Foreign Policy? 1) Substantive Legislation Other, more Limited ways: A) Diplomacy B) Blame Ways Congress Influences Foreign Policy 2) Informal- Anticipated Reactions Cong Pref. Prez Preference NoBMD BMD 3) Procedural Legislation - 5 Types 1) Create Agencies 2) Legislative Veto 3) New Groups 4) Conditions 5) Reporting Requirements 4) Framing Public Opinion How? - Through Committee Hearings - Through Reports Released - Speeches & Media Appearances Further Ways Congress Influences FP 5) Sue the Executive Goals of Framing Public Opinion: 1) Change Public Opinion - $600 hammers - $900 cup for chair leg - $ 76 nails for the hammers 2) Pressure Executive Branch 3) Pressure Other Countries & IGs When is Congress More Powerful 1) Crisis- not very well-suited as an Institution A) Timing B) Unity C) Electoral Concerns 2) Strategic - Using hearings to alter emphasis & directions of policy 3) Structural - greatest leverage through testimony avenue Internal Limits to Congress Influence 1) No Electoral Benefit 2) Culture of Deference Partlll Public Opinion & US Foreign Policy Public Opinion & Foreign Policy • Two options for the Public to shape Foreign Policy: - 1. Join interest groups & lobby Congress & President - 2. Vote for candidates aligned with their political views • Public seldom able to effect day to day polices (Iraq II) - Often policy makers decide with little regard to the Public -why? - Public lack detailed knowledge & expertise - Apathy (Most don't even know or care where crisis spot is) • More concerned with domestic & economic issues • Public usually rallies around President once conflict starts - Initial resistance to deployment => then active support • But with time support will wane if casualties grow and/or progress seems to take too long at too high a price - Then the Public makes its concerns known & with impact Impact of Public Opinion on Foreign Policy • Public Opinion provide decision makers with very little guidance, but... • Two indirect effects of Public Opinion: - 1. Constrains future policies which can be considered • Example: Vietnam legacy => Vietnam syndrome - 2. Determines Washington's FP priorities (with the media) - Iraq II example=> looters initially brushed off by SECDEF • Media alerted public & public became concerned re. Iraqi Museum • As result FBI went to Iraq to track down stolen antiquities • Recent Public concern for Intel failure with WMDs - Forced Administration to adjust reason for invasion (Democracy Promotion; & Nation-Building) - Then forced to defend itself against critics (Cherry Picking Intel?) Mass Publics: Views on Foreign Policy 1) Uninformed, Foolish - All politics is local thesis - Volatile & random; emotional - Mass effects, not the elites Conclusion: No Effect to Hurts FP 2) Structured and Stable - Lack of Specific Information, recall - Uses Structures to Organize FP Ideas Based on US Involvement & How to Be Involved Cooperation for Inťlsm Against Militant Inťlsm like Radical Islamic Movements Cooperative Internationalism? Yes if) P Internationalist No Hardliner Accomodationist Isolationist Mass Publics Effect(s): Can Affect FP 3) Public Mood: - Sets bounds of policy range, not day to day affectation - Affected by government & external events & coverage Mass Publics: Opinions on FP - Not informed on specifics - Lack of Coherent, Consistent, Structured Beliefs & Ideas Public Moods & Mass Publics Examples A) Cold War Mood- Consensus B) Vietnam Syndrome C) Self Interested Mood D) Pragmatic Internationalism E) Anti-Terror Mood Diversionary Theory, Wag the Dog, & Rally ťRound the Flag Effects Assumptions of Diversionary Theory - Leaders want to stay in power - Leader is dependent on some group to stay in power - Foreign policy actions can increase a leader's popularity In Group, Out Group - Rally 'Round the Flag Effects Demonstrates competency; requires high level of consistency Clinton & Lewinsky Iraq, Diversion from the Economy What's Widavsky argue here? Problems With These Theories 1) Rally effect is short 2) No systematic empirical evidence 3) Lots of conflict not preceded by domestic problems 4) Wrong for a leader to use force for personal gain